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MEMOIRS
OF
PRINCE METTERNICH

MEMOIRS
OF
PRINCE METTERNICH
1815—1829

EDITED BY
PRINCE RICHARD METTERNICH

THE PAPERS CLASSIFIED AND ARRANGED BY M. A. DE KLINKOWSTRÖM

TRANSLATED BY
MRS. ALEXANDER NAPIER

VOL. II.

NEW YORK
HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE
1881

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MEMOIRS

OF

PRINCE METTIRICH

1812-1880

EDITED BY

PRINCE DE METTIRICH

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PREFATORY NOTE.

THE reader having now advanced well into the Memoirs of Prince Metternich, a few remarks as to their arrangement may not be without interest.

The volume already published contains a history of the Prince's career from 1773 to the peace of 1815, given in the three Memoirs he left behind him. These Memoirs do not extend, however, in their completed form beyond the period of the Congress of Vienna, with a brief exception during the closing years of the Prince's life.

The history of the important events contained in the present volume is drawn, therefore, from the private correspondence of Prince Metternich, which is at this period very copious and interesting, and, being addressed to members of his family or to intimate friends, is less formal than the autobiography. We here meet with the first impressions of the Prince on the events of the day, imparted freely in confidence, with no idea of their future publication, to some of the chief personages of the state.

The present volume deals principally with the internal affairs of the Austrian Empire in the years 1816 and 1817; the period of the Congress, 1818 to 1822; and the complications arising from the Russian advance upon Turkey, ending in 1829.

The succeeding volumes will embrace the period from the July Revolution of 1830 to the retirement of Prince Metternich in 1848, also the last eleven years of the Prince's life.

The reception which the earlier volume of this work has met with from the public gives evidence of the universal and lively interest taken in the life of the great Chancellor.

In the criticisms which have appeared, notwithstanding the diversities of national feeling and sentiment, the master-spirit of the great statesman, and the important rôle he played during the most brilliant period of Austria's power, are unanimously acknowledged.

A fresh generation has sprung up. These Memoirs will place before it a life-like portrait of Prince Metternich.

•

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BOOK IV.

*THE REGULATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF THE EMPIRE.*

1816-1817.

MEMOIRS OF PRINCE METTERNICH.

THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE IN THE YEARS 1816-1817.

1816.

IDEAS ON A CONCORDAT OF ALL THE STATES OF THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION WITH THE ROMAN COURT.

208. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Verona, April 5, 1816.

208. During the negotiation of German affairs at the Vienna Congress, I made it my duty to direct the attention of the ambassadors there assembled to the advantages which must ensue to the whole German body-politic, as well as to the Princes themselves, from a uniform treatment of the general affairs of the Church (now in a deplorable state) at the future Diet. I at that time maintained the closest intercourse with the vicars of Constance and Münster, who were at Vienna, and I believe that I prevented the acceptance of the views of a so-called deputation from the German Church then in Vienna, which consisted of some wild enthusiasts who, probably without intending it themselves, acted in the most exaggerated interests of the Roman Church. The principle that ecclesiastical affairs should be considered in council at Frankfurt met with general approval from the German Princes of the second and third class. The King of Wurtemberg alone, intent upon his so-called rights of sovereignty, who had, in consequence of those very principles, taken no direct part in the last negotiations, endeavored to isolate himself from this ecclesiastical question also, and, without further ceremony, to enter into negotiations with the Roman Court about a concordat of his own.

Cardinal Consalvi, whose general political conduct cannot be sufficiently praised, remained faithful to the promise I had obtained from him, that he would enter into no separate negotiation with German Princes without my consent. He referred the matter to Rome. The conclusion of the Congress, and the great military and political events which followed it, brought these intrigues to an end.

Since the meeting of the German Ambassadors at Frankfurt I have given your Majesty's ministers instructions concerning this matter; and the efforts of the King of Wurtemberg for a speedy and separate concordat with Rome smoothed the way quite naturally. Up to this time I have succeeded in preventing this concordat.

I agree with Councillor Lorenz* on the subject of a common basis for the negotiation of the affairs of the German Church, based on our ecclesiastical principles; and I have only to point out the further course of an affair which I consider one of the most important that has to be decided at the future Diet.

In this, as in every great negotiation, very much depends on the point of view from which it is taken into consideration. In my opinion, Germany must be induced to adopt an ecclesiastical constitution, and to accept our principles without our appearing too eager to obtrude those principles on Germany.

By a judicious course we shall, moreover, set a good example to the German Princes; our principles will become popular in the very same measure as they seem to have sprung up in Germany; our position with regard to the Roman Court itself remains correct and vigorous, and will even serve as a protection if we by our example bar the way to the exaggerated claims here and there put forth, as always happens in the course of human affairs. Urged by these various considerations, I should much prefer to make sure of the views of some excellent superintendent of a German church, and leave him undisturbed to take the initiative in the arrangement to be made. It seems to me certain that Baron von Wessenberg—who has meantime been appointed coadjutor at Constance, and has been confirmed in this office by the Pope—is most fit for our purpose: he enjoys the general confidence in Germany, and, I believe, also that of Councillor von Lorenz.

* He had given an official report concerning the future ecclesiastical constitution, which was submitted to Metternich's attention.—ED.

If your Majesty vouchsafes your approval, I propose to inform this minister of our ideas fully and without delay, and this can probably best be achieved by sending to him the vice-director of theological studies, Augustin Braig. Such an arrangement would ensure the most comprehensive application of our principles being made known to Baron von Wessenberg, who is already devoted to the political system of our Court, and to whom may be disclosed without reserve even the political and religious sentiments of the Imperial Court; and the *Imperial Directorial-Embassy* in Frankfurt would be placed in a position entirely in accordance with my views—to support the wishes of the German Church, instead of taking the initiative in this matter.

For greater satisfaction I should not only approve but should think it desirable to send the above-mentioned Augustin Braig afterwards to consult with the Austrian embassy.

The nature of the negotiations about to commence at Frankfurt ensures there being sufficient time to carry out these measures. But not till the Diet is constituted, which will certainly be three or four weeks after its opening, will it be possible for our embassy to broach the subject of ecclesiastical affairs, and urge the formation of a concordat of all the German States with the Roman Court.

Probably some of the greater German Courts, and certainly Wurtemberg, will attempt some protest. But such important principles are involved that their triumph would be certain if it were not for the petty spirit of the greater German Governments, which often conflicts even with their own State interests. If, however, the idea of a general concordat should not be adopted, an opening is left for separate concordats based on the same principles, and the success of this opening can the less be doubted as these principles are equally suited to the authority and the financial interests of the Princes. It will not, therefore, be difficult to show, that the dissentient Governments will lose, rather than gain by their contumacy; for whereas, separately, they will be weak against the Roman Curia, by union among themselves, and by union with the Austrian Church, they would gain in strength. The principles of that body are a guarantee that the cogency of such arguments must be evident, and I do not know any example as yet of even the most absolute of German Princes, out of mere self-conceit, putting himself *deterioris conditionis* in a different position from the other German sovereigns—a case which would inevitably occur if the King of Wurtemberg should conclude a concordat with the Roman See

more advantageous to it than the concordats with the other German Courts.*

* The negotiations were begun in this sense, but were unsuccessful. In the course of the years 1817 to 1830 special concordats were concluded with separate States of the Bund: thus, in 1817 with Bavaria; in 1821 and 1827 with the States forming the Upper Rhenish Church Province; in 1824 with Hanover; in 1827 with Saxony; in 1830 with Gnesen and Posen, &c.; at last, in 1855, after Metternich's retirement, the well-known Concordat of the Apostolic See with Austria was concluded. The aged Chancellor welcomed the appearance of this document with the greatest satisfaction, and took pen in hand to narrate the history of the delay (of half a century) between his first idea of it in 1816 and its realization in 1855. This paper, written with his own hand in August 1855, is given here to make the matter more plain. It is as follows:

"The twenty-fifth anniversary of the birthday of the Emperor Francis Joseph (Aug. 18, 1855) has been celebrated in a manner as excellent as significant, by the signature of the Concordat with the Roman Chair.

"No one can be better informed than I of the circumstances which hindered the good work of withdrawing from the encroachments on the Church (called reforms) of which the Emperor Joseph II. had been guilty.

"Put together concisely and faithfully represented, the historical facts are as follows:

"After the general peace was concluded in 1814-1815, I directed my attention to the painful consequences of Joseph's legislation in ecclesiastical affairs. While these weighed on the whole empire, their evil influence was particularly felt in Lombardy and Venetia, in the German States of the Bund, and in Hungary.

"The personal feelings of the Emperor Francis were, for political and religious reasons, inclined to the removal of certain conditions existing since the reign of Joseph II. It was otherwise with the officials; indeed, even among the clergy the Febronian doctrines had, with exceptions, taken deep root. In the upper departments of the Government I was alone on the side of truth in this important question. I did not allow myself to be discouraged by this position, and continued the solution of the problem on the principles I had laid down in my conferences with Cardinal Consalvi. To assist me in the great undertaking I had selected Propst von Justel, at that time Ecclesiastical Adviser to the State Council. In the year 1817 the marriage of the Archduchess Leopoldine with the heir to the Portuguese throne gave me an opportunity to continue the secret negotiations which I had begun with the Roman Chair. I caused Propst von Justel to be sent to Rome, and intended, if the prospect had been favorable of an agreement between the two Governments, to have gone thither myself, after the making over the Archduchess at Leghorn. This plan was not carried out, because I saw that the affair was not yet ripe for conclusion.

"In the year 1819 the Emperor went to Italy, and in the personal intercourse of his Majesty with Pope Pius VII., they came to an agreement, which was, however, frustrated by the difficulties which the Emperor found placed in the way by the authorities on his return to Vienna.

"Delays of every kind took place. One arose from the strong feeling of *Law* (the inviolability of the written law) which in the Emperor's mind

amounted to scrupulosity. Another cause was the resistance of the lay and clerical canonists devoted to Febronianism, against every agreement with the Roman Chair. The revolutionary outbreaks which, at the beginning of the third decade of the nineteenth century, disturbed the peace of Europe, and particularly of Italy, forced the questions between the Empire and Rome into the background: mutual concessions took place between the highest powers, when, I am convinced, an end ought to have been put to the foundation of the evil. But I stood alone at the centre of affairs, and therefore, in spite of my efforts, there remained nothing but empty negotiations.

"When, in the year 1835, the Emperor Francis, who morally quite agreed with me, was near his death, he ordered, in a testamentary document, that the controversy between Church and State should be terminated as quickly as possible, and appointed me and the Bishop of St. Polten (Wagner) executors of his will. The pressure which always follows a change of rulers prevented the immediate termination of the important task so dear to my heart; soon afterwards the Bishop whom the Emperor had appointed died. I chose Abbot Rauscher to succeed him, and we took up our position against the officials, but did not succeed in bringing the affair to that issue for which at last a path was made by the Revolutions of 1848.

"The goal is reached! In this faithful narrative of events the key is given to the delay caused by erroneous ideas, false doctrines, and bureaucratic influences—hindrances to the victory of truth, and even of common-sense—to the best intentions of two Emperors and to my efforts."

THE TREATY OF MUNICH, CONCERNING THE CESSION OF DETACHED PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY OF BAVARIA TO AUSTRIA.

Metternich to Von Wacquant, Austrian Plenipotentiary at Munich, Milan, February 9, 1816.

209. The time of the Prince Royal (at Milan) was passed as much in direct *pourparlers* between him and the Emperor as in my negotiations with the Prince Royal and the Count de Rechberg. If it is difficult to describe to you the persistence with which the former pursued his favorite idea—that of the acquisition of the greater part of the Palatinate—and the tedious conduct of the latter, it is not so with regard to the result of the negotiation. . . . The negotiation turned on three points:

1st. On the claim of Bavaria to an augmentation of her share, to make up for the loss which she asserts that she has sustained through our exchanges.

2nd. On her claim to contiguity of territory.

3rd. On her desire to see the negotiations of Munich joined with those which we are reserving for Frankfurt.

The Prince Royal, and especially M. de Rechberg, used every effort to sustain the first of these points. It had been explained most positively to him that nothing could alter his Majesty's conviction of the more than sufficient importance of the indemnity offered to Bavaria, and accepted by her, and that consequently we could never admit or sustain a claim founded on a contrary principle.

In the first interview of the Emperor with the Prince Royal, the latter maintained with much heat a project for the acquisition of a line of communication which had been fully explained to us. The Emperor left no doubt on the Prince Royal's mind of his determination in the present negotiation not to maintain this project, which would certainly have met with insurmountable obstacles on the part of the Court of Baden. His Imperial Majesty merely promised his good offices for the cession of the circle of Main-and-Tauber. This proposal has been definitely accepted by the Prince Royal and by M. de Rechberg.

We met with very strong opposition on the part of the Bavarian

negotiators, with the object of uniting the negotiation of Munich to that of Frankfurt, or, what was equivalent, of subordinating our direct negotiation to the one reserved for the latter city, and thus exposing it to new complications. The very decided declaration of the Emperor's determination not to lend himself to an arrangement which, if carried out, would prolong all the annoyances we have experienced in our negotiations with Bavaria for more than two years, has caused the bringing forward of a new Bavarian proposition. The Prince Royal asked, while consenting to the complete separation of the two negotiations, that the term of the surrender of Innviertel should be delayed until the end of the negotiation of Frankfurt, and his Imperial Majesty having declined this demand, the Count de Rechberg reduced it the next day to some districts of Innviertel, which should remain under the same clause, and as a pledge, in the hands of Bavaria.

The Emperor, seeing in the adoption of such a measure the very compromises he has decided to avoid, all the more that the minds of our people, now united to the Kingdom of Bavaria, and properly belonging to it, are already too much excited; and desiring, on the other hand, to prove to the King of Bavaria that he does not wish to prevent the conclusion of an important affair for considerations connected with mere financial details, will endeavor to find a means of attaining both these ends. The simplest of all has presented itself to the mind of his Imperial Majesty. M. de Rechberg has sent to me a statistical and financial valuation of the circle of Main-and-Tauber. His Majesty has decided to offer to the Prince Royal himself to bear the loss sustained by Bavaria from the revenue of this circle, counting from the day of the surrender of the provinces which are to be restored to us, to the day when Bavaria enters into possession of the indemnity claimed by her as compensation for her renunciation of the contiguity of her territories ancient and modern. . . .

The Count de Rechberg having spoken to me of the King's desire to possess the territory which crosses a part of the road from Reichenhall to Berchtesgaden, which has always been a part of Salzburg, the Emperor sees no difficulty in granting this request. He claims, on his side, a free passage for his troops on the road from Salzburg to Lofer by Reichenhall. . . .

. . . It only remains for me to tell you, Sir, of the King's idea of the acquisition of the Palatinate. The Prince Royal, seeing the impossibility of engaging us to support his wishes for the acqui-

tion of the Palatinate, and still less of imposing them on the Grand Duke of Baden, has ended by requesting to be at least assured of the intentions of our august master the Emperor in favor of an arrangement which Bavaria could be induced in time to propose to the Court of Baden—an arrangement which should be made amicably and according to the principles of a just compensation. His Majesty did not hesitate to assure the Prince Royal that such an arrangement would meet with no difficulty on his part; and that, on the contrary, he will be delighted to contribute, by an amicable intervention, to the reconciliation of the King's wishes with the interests of the Court of Baden.

. You will find enclosed full powers for concluding and signing the treaty which you are to negotiate.

Metternich to Wacquant, Verona, April 8, 1816.

210. The present courier will give you the means of concluding and signing the final arrangement with Bavaria, and it will not be difficult for you to prove to the King and his minister that our august master the Emperor to the unexampled proofs of patience which he has given in the course of the negotiation has added the greatest condescension to the often unreasonable claims of the opposite party. . . .

The date of May 1 is fixed so rigorously that our generals have orders not to allow themselves to be stopped in the occupation of the places ceded to us by Bavaria by any protestation or opposition: therefore it will be necessary for your Excellency to insist in the strongest manner on this surrender, and, if need be, that you should throw on Count de Montgelas himself all the responsibility of any complications which may arise from defective instructions or from a want of good faith on the part of Bavaria. It will be easy for you to prove that the Emperor, determined as he is to admit of no delay or evasions in the recovery of his provinces, feels it impossible to modify any orders whatever given to his civil and military authorities, considering how distant the places to be exchanged are, both from each other and from the present abode of his Imperial Majesty.

I agree with you as to the possibility of the signature taking place on the 13th or 14th at latest.*

* The above-mentioned treaty, dated April 14, was published in the usual way. In consequence of this, the places which had been abstracted in 1809 again came into the possession of Austria.—Ed.

COUNT METTERNICH'S LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

211. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), April 8, 1816; with the Royal Note attached, Padua, April 9, 1816.

211. I need not tell your Majesty how grieved I am that in a moment like the present I am unable to be of use to your Majesty. My feelings are so well known to your Majesty that they need no asseveration to confirm them. I send your Majesty through Count Mercy my first plan of the journey. I would have gone to Vicenza instead of Padua, but Scarpa warned me that the dampness of that town made it a very injurious residence in cases of rheumatic affections. This applies also to Stra and Venice. In any case, however, your Majesty may depend upon my earnest attention to the state of affairs in Treviso . . . *

METTERNICH.

I am convinced of your attachment to my person, and very sorry that you cannot be with me, but I wish you to stay as long as you can, and take care of yourself; and I shall only be glad to see you return when you can do so without injury to your health.

FRANCIS.

* A letter from Metternich to his mother gives the real reason of this short absence. It is written from Verona, dated April 13, 1816, and says: "My eye is better; it has never been alarming, but inconvenient and tedious, like all affections of the eye. The cure which I have begun, and still continue, is doing me much good, in every respect. I have had three years of very great labor, and I prefer to take measures now, rather than wait for what might prove a very serious malady. The Emperor is exceedingly kind, and daily gives me proofs of confidence and attachment of which he perhaps hardly knew himself capable. I am more devoted than any one else to him, and certainly in a more disinterested way than most of his servants."—Ed.

REGULATION OF MONEY.

212. A Memorandum by Metternich,* Vienna, October 12, 1816.

213. A summary view of the result of the gradual withdrawal of Paper Money. Autograph note by Metternich.

212. If the present conference is to have any useful end, it seems to me quite necessary to come to some decision as to general principles, or let it be clearly and distinctly explained why there can be no such agreement. In a matter like this, questions and answers, objections and counter-objections, may be repeated in endless multiplication, unless it is decided beforehand what we want to ask for, and in what order the questions shall be put.

The problem is, to introduce a fixed and regular monetary system to take the place of the present one, which is admitted to be in every respect defective, and to come to a decision upon the now discredited paper money in circulation, which (at least in its present quantity and quality) is the occasion of all these faults and incongruities.

Every possible measure concerning this paper money runs on the lines of one of the following three systems:

1. The retention of paper in a reduced nominal value. System of devaluation.

2. The abolition of paper money by law—with or without equivalent. System of legal or forcible withdrawal.

3. The abolition of paper money by a voluntary and therefore a gradual operation. System of gradual withdrawal.

The system of devaluation has the advantage of being simple in execution and rapid in its effects, and the Government remains in possession of its cash. There are, however, many objections to the adoption of this system, one of the greatest of which is that it is the second attempt of the kind, and would be as strongly opposed by public opinion as the finance operation of 1811, at a time of the greatest pressure, although the present attempt does not fall in a time of such pressure.

* Metternich was appointed, in 1816, President of the conference summoned to remove the financial pressure and restore the public credit.—ED.

The system of enforced withdrawal from circulation is not capable of any great modification. A difference between a sudden and a periodical withdrawal of the paper money cannot, according to my conviction, exist; for any calling in of money by law, however it may be announced or declared, concerns the whole amount. Therefore, the only question here is, whether the possessors of the paper are or are not indemnified. No voice has been heard at present, among us at least, in favor of the abolition of paper money without an equivalent. Those who desire its abolition by a legal arrangement are ready to grant an indemnification to the holders of it, and since such compensation cannot be given in ready money, they are willing to give them interest-bearing national bonds. This second system may therefore be more briefly and more pertinently called the system of consolidation by law—that is, enforced consolidation.

The system of gradual withdrawal admits, indeed, of a far greater variety of combinations and operations. But all are agreed that even with this system, as things are at present, the sum total, or at any rate the greater part, of the paper money must be withdrawn by national bonds that pay interest. Only these bonds should not be introduced compulsorily, like a system of consolidation by law, but by free operations as a compensation for the paper money. The system of gradual withdrawal, with the reservation of all the remedial measures applicable to it may therefore be called, in contradistinction to the others, the system of free consolidation.

Opinions are at present divided amongst us as to these two systems.

Both parties agree in the main point that the State must annually devote a considerable sum to pay the interest of the bonds replacing the paper money. If we estimate the paper money in circulation only at six hundred millions, this sum would amount with $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to fifteen millions, with 2 per cent. to twelve millions.

The question therefore which must take precedence of all others is this: Can the State, besides the yearly interest due on the present interest-bearing debt, afford annually twelve to fifteen millions for interest on the new bonds?

This question is common to both systems. If it has to be answered in the negative, neither of the two systems can exist (least of all that of forced consolidation, which at once affects the whole mass of paper money in circulation equally). If it be affirmed, this leads to the further inquiry whether it be better to expend those twelve or

fifteen millions of yearly interest once and for all on the consolidation of the paper money, or to leave that sum to be disposed of by the Finance Minister as a maximum for the introduction and performance of free operations of consolidation.

Second chief question: Which of the two systems of consolidation is the better and the more feasible?

1. Those who maintain the system of consolidation by law must, I am convinced, show—

(a) That the compensation assigned by law to the possessors of paper money will be real and not delusive: in other words, that the value (namely, the market-price) of the bonds in exchange for the paper money, if not equal should be as nearly as possible equal to the present real worth of this paper money, and should not fall to $\frac{1}{5}$, $\frac{1}{6}$, or even perhaps $\frac{1}{10}$, $\frac{1}{20}$ of the nominal value of the paper money.

(b) That, after an entire and sudden withdrawal of paper money, other circulating media will be at once or in a short time introduced, and that, in the absence of this, the most ruinous stagnation in the circulation would not be introduced into all trades great and small, a result which would end in the general ruin of the country.

(c) That after so rapid and extensive a revolution the Government will be strong enough to raise (if even by violent means) the money it requires for urgent necessities, or rich enough to advance the money for an indefinite time.

2. Can the system of free consolidation with the same means as the system of enforced consolidation (twelve to fifteen millions of annual interest) be applied to compass the same ends?

It is incumbent on the Finance Minister to prove—

(a) That the gradual withdrawal of paper money can be effected by the measures proposed or to be proposed by him.

(b) That the operation will be uninterrupted and will not be prolonged beyond the shortest term possible.

(c) That, in case one of his proposed measures should fail by unforeseen hindrances, it would not be impossible to him to replace it quickly by some other and more effective one.

When these points are established, the two following, requiring the greatest attention, must be mentioned.

A. Without at the present moment deciding on either of the two systems of consolidation, I cannot conceal my conviction that, in setting forth the reasons for the forced system of consolidation, far more care and even severity must be used than in judging of the single measures which might be proposed for the execution of a

free system of consolidation, for the danger is no doubt greater with the former than with the latter. Here (2), at the worst, it is but the further continuance of the present burdensome condition: there (1), the possible ruin of the country is at stake; here (2), a principle already laid down is pursued: there (1), a system actually in force is abolished and replaced by one perfectly new. With a free consolidation, the Government remains from beginning to end master of its measures: in the consolidation by law, from the moment the law is proclaimed, every retrogression and even every essential modification is barred.

B. I should consider it an evil, the consequences of which would be incalculable, if the investigation of definite questions should check the Government in its progress along its regular path; or if it should take measures not quite consistent with an impartial and prudent deliberation, or with the future application of the principles which must be established by it.*

Summary of the Results of the gradual Abolition of the Paper Money.

I. MAIN PROPOSITION.

213. 1. The paper in circulation shall be abolished.
2. This abolition shall not take place without a fair indemnification of its holders.
3. The rate of interest for the conversion of paper money into national interest-bearing bonds is $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
4. The maximum of the charge on the State, arising from this conversion, is fifteen millions annual interest.
5. The national debt, hitherto paying an interest of about 15,000,000 W. W., must, at every change from the circulation of paper to that of a metallic currency, sooner or later be charged with 15,000,000 in C. M.

II. PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS.

1. The paper money in circulation amounts, the reserves of cash being deducted, to 600,000,000.
2. Of this about 40,000,000 is already abolished in virtue of the

* The patent of October 29, 1816, by which a free loan was opened for the withdrawal of paper money was the result of the conference to which the above memoir served as guide.—ED.

patents of June 1, and by the sale of 2,500 bank stock; the interest on the 40,000,000 amounts to about 400,000 florins C. M.

3. In the treasury are the war contributions and all other revenues, with the deduction of 10,000,000 C. M., employed in the operation in consequence of the patent of June 1.

III. PROPOSED OPERATION.

A loan reckoned for the conversion of 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 withdraws in the first case from circulation the sum of 120,000,000 W. W., and costs the State for fresh interest 3,000,000 C. M.

IV. FURTHER COURSE OF THE OPERATION.

	W. W.
I purposely separate from the sum total of.....	600,000,000
A sum of.....	200,000,000
Which I consider the minimum of paper that (in an altered form) must be kept in circulation, and for the abolition of which, if it ever takes place, quite different means must be employed. My examination, therefore, reaches only the sum of.....	400,000,000
Of these—	
1. Already abolished	40,000,000
2. Will be abolished by the minimum of the revenue from the next loan.....	120,000,000
3. I think it quite certain that in one way or other, beside the 2,500 already abolished in bank stock, 20,000 more (not altogether half the number prescribed in the patents) will have to be abolished, by which will be called in the further sum of.....	40,000,000
	<hr/> 200,000,000 <hr/>

Therefore, from the above 400,000,000 W. W., must still be withdrawn, by gradual free operations, 200,000,000 W. W.

As a beginning of these operations the State may apply—

1. Interest at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. = 5,000,000.
2. Bonuses (by which the payment of higher interests than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. would be avoided) from the store of ready cash, a sum of about 10,000,000.

V. RESULT OF THE WHOLE OPERATION.

	w. w.
1. Abolished already.....	40,000,000
2. Will be abolished:	
(a) By the loan now proposed.....	120,000,000
(b) By bank stock.....	40,000,000
(c) By further operations by credit.....	200,000,000
	<hr/>
	400,000,000
3. One particular withdrawal without the increase of State's load of interest.....	200,000,000
	<hr/>
	600,000,000
	<hr/>

In this way the interest to be paid by the State would be—

	w. w.
1. For the sum already withdrawn.....	400,000
2. For the proposed loan.....	3,000,000
3. For the 20,000 in bank stock.....	1,000,000
4. For further operations.....	5,000,000
	<hr/>
	9,400,000
	<hr/>

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING RESULT.

(1) By this course the State remains in possession of all its stores of ready cash with the exception of—

(a) The 10,000,000 already made use of under the patents of June 1, by which, however, the amount of paper money in circulation has been reduced to 40,000,000.

(b) The 10,000,000 to be used in case of necessity, to assist in the further credit operations.

2. By the present conversion of paper money the State has to bear, not only all the interest for the national debt (the paper money) at present paying no interest, but also the interest of the national debt hitherto paying interest in W. W., together with 15,000,000 C. M.; an annual interest, therefore, of 30,000,000, immediate and without deduction. On the other hand, the interest of the new debt, when the operation is concluded, will not be more than 9,400,000 W. W., so that from the maximum, 15,000,000 W. W., will be saved 5,600,000 W. W., and, with regard to the present debt, the interest has not to be paid in C. M. till the whole operation is finished, so that the State gains for one or two years more the considerable difference between the amount of interest in W. W. and the same in C. M.

1817.

JOURNEY TO LEGHORN IN THE SUITE OF THE ARCHDUCHESS LEOPOLDINE, THE NEWLY-MAR- RIED CROWN PRINCESS OF PORTUGAL.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from June 10 to July 26, 1817.

214. Padua and Venice. 215. From Covigliajo—wretched accommodation—Cattajo—concert at the house of the Cardinal Legate—Abbé Mezzofanti. 216. Impression made by Florence—the Pitti Palace—the gallery. 217. Pisa—Campo Santo—the episode of Pernambuco. 218. The Catalani. 219. The Pope's illness—Fiesole—the Florentine dialect—the churches of Sta. Annunziata and Sta. Croce—Alfieri's monument by Canova—picture of the Last Judgment, by Bronzino. 220. The order of Elizabeth sent for Princess Metternich—Dr. Jaeger makes a sensation in Florence. 221. The portrait medallion presented for signing the marriage treaty—the expected arrival of the fleet. 222. The ladies in attendance on the Archduchess. 223. Plan of the journey. 224. To Leghorn—the island of Elba—the American Admiral's ship—arrival at Lucca—return to Florence. 225. Preparations for giving over the Archduchess—anecdote of Zichy. 227. Arrival of the fleet—Metternich's journey to Lucca.

Metternich to his Wife, Padua, June 10, 1817.

214. I arrived here, as I intended, in the evening of the day before yesterday.

I have always fancied, and I am quite sure now, that summer is the proper season for Upper Italy. There is as little resemblance between the country, the towns, everything, in fact, in winter and summer, as between a garden in November, during the fogs and mud of that season, and that same garden in the month of June. No one can form any idea of the beauty of the country; all the plantations, all the trees, which with us suffer from cold, wind, and dust, are in full vegetation; all the fields covered with flowers, all those melancholy little gardens of the Brenta full of roses, and jasmines and orange trees in flower; all those houses, which then looked so dilapidated, open and forming charming dwellings: in one word, everything is now beautiful. Venice in June and Venice in December are two different cities; the heat there is

moderated by the neighborhood of the sea; every evening a breeze springs up which is refreshing but not cold; in the daytime it is as warm as with us in those beautiful summer days when there is no appearance of a storm. The Piazza in front of St. Mark's is filled with large tents; the people are in the streets till daybreak; the cafés close at five in the morning; the Giudecca and the Grand Canal are covered with gondolas. I walked about Venice yesterday as if it were a city of the "thousand and one nights." The women have no longer red hands; blue noses have disappeared, and the only ugly things I have seen are those horrible old witches one meets everywhere, their gray hair streaming in the wind, and all having bouquets of roses, or perhaps one great rose fastened to their horrid old wigs. I cannot help sending you a sketch which is very much like one of these nymphs of the lagunes, who was literally *coiffée* as you see.

215. *Covigliajo*, June 12.—I write to you, my dear, from our last resting-place before Florence. This place reminds me of the charms of our head-quarters in the Vosges: there is here only one house, and that a very bad one; the Archduchess has one room; I share one with Floret; Madame de Khuenburg has a closet near her mistress, without doors or windows; the rest of the suite sleep in the carriages. I do not know who chose the place, but certainly they could not have chosen a worse. We are in the midst of the Apennines, and no one would suspect we were in *la belle Italie* if it were not for the number of chestnut woods.

Yesterday morning we left Padua and slept at Ferrara, where we were received by three cardinals. The road from Padua as far as Rovigo is superb; we stopped on the way to see a beautiful castle (Cattajo) belonging to the Duke of Modena. A wealthy gentleman named Obizzo took it into his head to bequeath it to the Duke, to show his claim to belong to the House of Este. The place is curious in itself, and for the beautiful and numerous collections of every kind gathered together by its last possessor. The road from Rovigo to Lagoscuro, where the Po is crossed, is detestable; the only choice is between being drowned in the Po or smothered by the dust of a narrow causeway. Ferrara is superb, and if it had four times as many inhabitants it would be tolerably filled. We found there the Duke of Modena. The Cardinal Legate had arranged a concert for us in one of the great theatres, not being able to give us a play, which, for want of spectators, can only be managed once or twice a year. This theatre is finer than those in Vi-

enna; it holds 3,000 persons, and would do honor to a great capital. We left Ferrara this morning at five o'clock. The Cardinal Legate of Bologna gave us an elegant and very good breakfast at the University, a celebrated and magnificent place. The Librarian, Abbé Mezzofanti, is worthy of his position; he speaks thirty languages, and as well as if he were a native of each of the thirty countries. I attacked him in German, and I defy any one not to take him for a Saxon. He has never been away from Bologna, and never had a master. I asked how he got the right inflections of the language. "The inflections," replied he, "all spring from the genius of language. I learnt in the grammar that each letter is pronounced in a certain manner; I read and understood it in three months, I could speak it in six, and since then I have held conversations with Germans of different countries. I have done the same with all languages. Indian and Chinese are the only ones that have embarrassed me a little, for I have never had an opportunity of talking either with a mandarin or a brahmin, so that I am not sure if I have surmounted the vulgar pronunciation." I made an inward sign of humility, and thought myself a perfect simpleton beside the Librarian of Bologna.

216. *Florence, June 14.*—We have been here since eleven yesterday morning. It would be difficult to explain to you the kind of impression which Florence must necessarily produce on every one who loves what is beautiful and grand. All that I have seen up to this time far surpasses my expectations. Great God! what men they were in past times.

Yesterday I went through the gallery of the Pitti Palace and Academy of Fine Arts, as well as the manufactory of *pietra dura*. To-day I have seen the great gallery. I shall return here every day that I am in Florence. I declare that I prefer it as it now is to the Museum as it was. It is difficult to form an idea of this immense treasury of all kinds of things; the building is magnificent, and above all perfectly adapted to its object. The gallery of the Pitti Palace is a perfect quintessence of beauty, and the great gallery is as beautiful as that of the palace. The Venus de Medicis is infinitely better placed than she was at Paris. She is, with four other magnificent statues, in the Tribune of the Uffizi, which is lighted from above. There are in the same gallery seven or eight Raphaels, each more beautiful than the other. Among others there is one which represents the painter's mistress, and it is beyond conception. I protest that the Grand Duke is the richest man in the world. All

the monuments left here by Leopold are worthy of the Medici: many even surpass them.

The country is fine, more so, however, in my opinion, from culture than from its natural features. The town is on the Apennines, in a valley formed by the Arno. The soil is not very good; nevertheless cultivation has made Tuscany one of the most productive countries in the world. It would be quite useless to attempt to count the number of dwellings to be seen from every eminence. Besides hundreds of towns and villages, from one window there may be seen, between Florence and Pistoia, more than four thousand country houses and detached dwellings spread and scattered on all sides. The climate is divine; there is great heat from eleven till five, but the morning, the evening, and the night are like what a day in Paradise will probably be.

217. *June 18.*—The day before yesterday I went to Pisa, and returned yesterday. Three or four very violent storms during the day spoilt the illuminations a little, but still they were magnificent. Pisa in itself is very curious. There are three edifices close together, which are as beautiful as possible—the Cathedral, the Tower (*campanile*), and the Baptistry of St. John. A fourth far surpasses them. The Crusaders, on their return, brought vessels full of earth from Palestine. They placed it in a field, which they surrounded with a building, forming a vast, simple corridor, in which are their tombs. Not being able to die in the Holy Land, they wished to be buried in its soil. This is called the *Campo Santo*. No one can be buried there without special permission from the Grand Duke, and there are many modern tombs. The corridors are used now as a museum. They collect there all that is dug up in the environs of Pisa, and the excavations are considerable.

The last news from Lisbon informs us that the Government has sent two vessels, intended to form part of the convoy of the Archduchess, to blockade Pernambuco, and they have done well. This will, however, cause a delay of two or three weeks. I shall therefore change my plans. In two or three days I expect the first news from Rome. I shall start (if I take this journey) as soon as they arrive, for that city, where I shall remain ten or twelve days, and then return to Florence. I accompany the Archduchess to Leghorn. If the fleet should be delayed beyond July 15, I shall make over the affair of the surrender of the Archduchess to M. d'Eltz, and shall be, as I told you when I left, at Vienna on the 22nd or 24th. I suppose this affair at Pernambuco will make a great noise

at Vienna, and that our gossips are talking as if that town were between Purkersdorf and Sieghartskirchen. It appears that the rising has made no progress, and that the measures for repressing it were very well managed. It will have no effect on the departure of the Archduchess, except the necessity of hastily equipping two new ships to convey her, or rather to complete her escort. I beg you to mention these facts to the trumpeters of the good town of Vienna.

For the rest, my journey here is a great and inestimable benefit. I do not know how the great crisis brought about by this new complication would have passed over if I had not been on the spot. If my good friends at Vienna cry out for or against my good fortune, I certainly have the conviction that I am doing what is just and right, and at the right moment; the only one in which great things can be done. My presence in Italy has an incalculable influence on the progress of affairs. If I could be vain of anything that Heaven has helped me to do in the last few years, it would be of the part I am playing at this interesting juncture in Europe. The sovereign of all Italy could not be received as I am; all those who are on the right side—and they are very numerous—crowd round me; they give me their entire confidence, and look for safety from me alone. The Jacobins hide themselves, and they look upon me as a rod held over them. If I have ever been inspired in any step I have taken, it was in deciding to come here; and you are witness that I made up my mind in a quarter of an hour.

218. *June 20.*—Yesterday we passed a charming evening, a small party having been made at Madame Appony's to hear Catalani sing. The two Archduchesses came and all our suite. She sang in such a way as to make all the company wild with delight. She was in good voice, and you would have been as much enchanted as we all were. Assuredly, if the Holy Virgin mingles her voice with the songs of the blessed, she must sing like this woman.

I shall not decide on my journey to Rome for two or three days. The Holy Father is always so ill that he cannot attend to business; and as it is to do business with him that I go there, I depend, thank God, on his faculties much more than on my own.

219. *June 28.*—Not only does my journey to Rome become every day more problematical, but it is very probable that I shall not go at all. The Pope, although he is so far better that he has been taken from Castel Gandolfo to the Quirinal, seems unable to do anything; and as I was going to Rome entirely on business, I should give up my visit if I could not attain my object.

Yesterday I had a charming drive. About three miles from the town there is a mountain on which was built the ancient Etruscan town of Fesulæ, now Fiesole. There are some remains of antiquity: there are the walls of the old town, which date back to the time of Porsenna; and in the midst of a field of olives are the ruins of an amphitheatre, now almost entirely covered over by landslips. On a mound are the remains of a temple of Bacchus now transformed into a chapel. It would be difficult to find a more magnificent site; Florence with its innumerable villas is under your feet; you can trace the whole valley of the Arno, and the valleys which lead to Pistoia and to Volterra. It was here in this town that Catiline was defeated, and that this precursor of the "*Nain jaune*"* of our time ceased to threaten the existence even of the Republic. Many recollections, both ancient and modern, are connected with this place, and with every spot of earth on which one treads.

A remarkable thing in this country is the kind of culture which exists among the people. There is not a peasant who does not speak his own language with all the refinement and elegance of an academician of the Crusca. It is interesting to hold a conversation with these good people: their language is that of the drawing-room—no jargon, no shouting or raising of the voice, such as one hears in the rest of Italy. A vine-dresser, who looked like a half negro, acted as cicerone. This man related and explained everything to me like an antiquary. Among the things which have most struck me are the details of the Church of the Annunziata, the first which was used by the Order of Servites. This church is not very large, but beautiful, and exceedingly rich in marbles. It contains pictures of the first rank, and there is, among other things, as in all the convents of Italy, an interior court surrounded by an open corridor, and here all the arches between the columns are painted in fresco by Andrea del Sarto. There are about forty paintings representing the foundation of the order, all of inconceivable beauty of design and composition. Here also is the superb painting of the Virgin with the Infant Jesus and St. Mark, which is engraved in so many ways. One of the arches represents the triumph of the Virgin; she is seated on a car drawn by a lion and a sheep—charming in idea, so rich and withal so simple. The car is surrounded by angels with ideal figures. These paintings were paid for at the rate of twenty crowns each. The persons who had them painted

* *Nain jaune* was an illustrated comic journal of the republican color.—ED.

took care to have their coats-of-arms painted on them. Their descendants assuredly cannot regret the expense. The frescos are in perfect preservation. In this climate nothing is injured, however it may be exposed to the air. Given a good painter and a roof, and the pictures will be handed down to posterity.

In the Church of Sta. Croce are the monuments of celebrated men. Galileo has a fine tomb, and the Countess of Albany has erected a superb monument to Alfieri, executed by Canova. A colossal female, personating Italy, is represented as weeping over his tomb. The whole thing is more grandiose than beautiful. I know many things of Canova's much better conceived, and which speak more to the soul. There are magnificent paintings in this church, among others a "Last Judgment" by Bronzino, inconceivably fine as to execution. Christ, seated on an eminence, holds His hand out to the elect, who are issuing from a tomb at His feet. The painter has taken care to place himself with his wife and his daughter among them. He seems to have made sure of his own future state. If all who enter Paradise resemble the figures in this picture, it would be a pity if there should be neither pencil nor palette there. I have seen, I do not remember where—at Padua, I think—a small picture, the beautiful conception of which made a great impression upon me. Christ, with an air simple though triumphant, holds up the cross in the middle of a vast grotto. It is the entrance of Limbo. On the right of the picture are the patriarchs weeping with joy and love. St. John the Baptist calls to him a number of beings, who are coming from all parts of the interior of the cave, and shows them the cross. There is an inspiration in this picture which is quite magical. It is no longer Christ suffering on the cross, but Christ having triumphed over death, and sharing His triumph with the just, who are entering into His kingdom. Expectation and happiness are equally depicted on the faces; Christ alone is calm, and St. John more inspired than ever. We hear him cry from the abyss, "The hour is come!"

I have told you of the paintings; I will pass now to the sculpture, and to something which, without producing *chefs-d'œuvre*, is not without merit. It is curious to see the manufactories of alabaster. You order an enormous vase to-day, and they bring it you to-morrow. You wish for your bust: a man takes a model of you in clay in ten minutes, and in three or four days you have a bust in alabaster, a perfect likeness. Eltz was modelled to-day. a man took a lump of clay, and I declare to you that one could not think more

quickly than he made the head, the nose, the mouth, &c. This sculptor, who is not a disciple of Gall, has proved to me—what we knew before, however—that the theory of the said doctor is true in every respect. Eltz was almost finished, but something was wanting; my man took a step forward, and with a firm hand he raised with his thumbs four or five bumps on the head and the sides of the jaws. From that moment the likeness was striking.

220. *June 29.*—I take advantage of the departure of the military courier to inform you, my dear, that M. de Maccalon has received news which leaves no doubt about the departure of the fleet. If the winds are favorable it will be at Leghorn about July 15. This same courier has brought with him three decorations of the Order of St. Elizabeth: one for the Archduchess, one for our Empress, and the third for you. The ribbon is rose-color; but the sea-air has faded it so much that it is now a sort of straw-color. It will be necessary to get new ribbon, and I will send you your decoration as soon as it has become rose-colored again. As you love the pomps of this world, this news will make you very happy. I am sure that Leontine* will be more delighted than her mamma with the ribbon, and that she will have great pleasure in repeating to her nurse, *dass Mama hat schönes Band*. The order itself is superb; it is generally given only to queens or princesses of the blood.

I do not think I have ever told you about my eye. It makes more progress in one day here than it did in eight at Vienna. I am well satisfied, and so is my physician, who is becoming very famous at Florence. He saves every day four or five eyes; people are more backward here in that art than any one can imagine. Almost all diseases of the eye, even when not serious at first, lead to blindness, not for want of good eyes, but for want of good doctors. Jaeger† has told me astonishing facts on this subject. Just imagine, here they do not know one of the instruments or curative methods which have been adopted by all the world for the last thirty or forty years. Another singular fact is that the poor people do all they can to make themselves blind, for here, as at Rome, it is the blind alone who can exercise the profession of mendicants. Jaeger offered to restore a man's sight to him; the man asked if he would also undertake his maintenance.

* Metternich's daughter, afterwards Countess Sándor.—Ed.

† Dr. Friedrich Jaeger, a celebrated physician in Vienna, who for many years was Metternich's private physician, and survived him.—Ed.

I have bought two pretty things: a charming copy of Canova's Venus and an enormous alabaster vase, at a ridiculous price. I shall not buy anything else unless I go to Rome, and, as I shall not go, I shall buy nothing.

221. *Poggio Imperiale, July 1.*—Here is your decoration from the other world, my dear Laura. You alone will have a new ribbon, for that which you will receive to-day has become hortensia instead of rose, which it should be, and certainly the rose need not be made more tender than nature has already made it. I send you your decree, with a translation into French, with which Mercy and I amused ourselves yesterday. The turn of the sentences is so original that we have tried to preserve it as much as possible. You must reply to the Queen. The decoration, from its form, seems to go back to the year 801—that is to say, till the time of Charlemagne.

The Marquis de Maccalon sent me yesterday, for the signature of the contract of marriage, a medallion with the portrait of the King surrounded by precious stones, but so shamefully painted that he would not let me keep it. The painter, who does not seem to be one at all, has aimed at making his Most Faithful Majesty smile. He has opened his mouth so wide that he was forced to show either his teeth or his tongue. The upper teeth show like a ball of ivory lying on a tongue, to say the least, as thick.

Everything convinces me that the fleet must arrive at Leghorn in eight or ten days. We go, therefore, without further delay to settle ourselves there till the moment of embarkation, and I will take my route by Modena and Parma to return to you, and prepare to be made a grandpapa.

Metternich to his daughter Marie, Florence, July 3.

222. Time goes on, my dear Marie, and I am expecting the arrival of this devil of a fleet as if it were the Messiah, in order to regain my liberty, or rather to win it again by handing over the key of the house to M. d'Eltz. It seems, however, that it will be here about the 10th of this month. We shall pass four or five days free at Leghorn, and then *vogue la galère*. It appears that the feminine part of the Portuguese Court is coming. This makes the ladies' journey to Brazil very doubtful. Of these ladies Madame de Khuenburg is estimable, and has most agreeable manners; Madame de Lodrin is tall, and Madame de ——— ugly. Both are very good. There you have their finished portraits. Old Edling is very well.

His fall has bleached him; nothing is left of his olive-colored Brazilian cheeks but the cheek bones. His mind has recovered, but he still wanders sometimes. For example, he asked me yesterday (the subject was Marie Louise), "Is she not at Paris?" I said to him, "Good God, no; she is at Parma." "True," said Edling; "I had forgotten that the Emperor Napoleon had bought Parma! You may be sure I said nothing more to him, for I do not like to waste my words.

My health is very good. I have tested anew the perfections of the Court *cuisine*.

I had a charming walk yesterday evening. All the surrounding country is a succession of hills more or less high. All offer the most delicious prospects, all are planted, and too much planted for effect. The trees are olives, figs, bignonias, catalpas, all in bloom; the gardens, even those of the peasants, are filled with orange trees; the hedges are composed principally of jasmine, others of the flowering arbutus; there are clematis blossoms large as pompon roses, pomegranates covered with flowers. The vines are not planted in the same way as on the other side of the Po; a vine is planted by the side of a tree, and, being allowed to climb up it, ends by covering more or less the whole of it, so that the grapes appear to belong to the tree. All the plants smell twice as sweet as they do with us; and the grass and the plants at the roadside are so aromatic that by the evening one knows not what it is, but that all the air is perfumed. What adds to the charm of the first part of the night is the immense quantity of small luminous flies, which they call here "*luciole*." They fly in millions about all places covered with grass and round the trees. Their light is at least as sparkling and strong as the sparks from a steel. The whole country seems on fire. The moon of Florence, which, like that of Vienna, is near the full, is clear as she never is with us. The air is calm at that hour, about fourteen or fifteen degrees, light and clear. One can well understand how this beautiful climate has produced so many painters and poets.

I intend to order at Rome two bas-reliefs from Thorwaldsen. I will have them placed in the two panels, which I will make in stucco, at the end of the small drawing-room at the villa. I assure you people will come to see them.

Metternich to his Wife, Florence, July 10.

223. Here we are, my dear, at the 10th of the month, and we do not yet know the exact day of the arrival of the fleet. This is my plan of campaign. I shall leave here on the 20th, whether the Archduchess has been surrendered or not. I shall take eight days from here to Vienna, for I shall stop one day at Modena, and I only wish to travel from five in the evening to six in the morning, so as to allow the hours of intense heat to pass, during which I shall rest and dine. Consequently I shall be with you from the 27th to the 29th. I shall spend three clear days at Vienna, and shall leave again on the 4th for Carlsbad. If the fleet arrives here on the 20th, I shall effect the transference before my departure, if not, I shall make over the affair to Eltz. The day after to-morrow I shall probably pass four-and-twenty hours at Leghorn, to inspect the place and arrange everything proper for the ceremony. The weather is so calm that the vessels cannot make much way; it is therefore necessary to reckon on three or even four weeks' sailing, although with a fresh wind the route from Lisbon to Leghorn takes fifteen or sixteen days at the most.

The Archduchess Marie Louise has been here since the day before yesterday. We form quite a colony at Poggio. After all, it would hold three times as many people.

224. *Poggio, July 17.*—I set out for this place on the 14th, at six in the evening, with MM. d'Appony and de Maccalon, the faithful Floret, the amiable Hudelist, and Prince Jablonowsky, who had arrived from Naples. We had five coaches. We arrived at three in the morning at Leghorn. As we all had been clever enough to sleep in the carriage, none of us cared to go to bed. It was beautiful and fresh, and we had the prospect of a very hot day before us. We therefore decided to go at once to see the port and everything that would have exposed us to the heat of the sun. We began by ascending the beautiful lighthouse which is at the end of the new pier. There we beheld the first rays of the sun gilding the rocks of the islands of Gorgona, Capraja, Corsica, and Elba. About two miles seaward was the American squadron, which had just left the roadstead of Leghorn, and also two Neapolitan frigates and a brig which the Dey of Algiers had bought at Leghorn, in order to carry off Tuscan subjects in the open sea close by. The whole view was magnificent. Gorgona is about fifteen miles off; it is

nothing but an immense rock inhabited by fishermen and a small Tuscan garrison. Capraja and Corsica were so flooded with the bright morning light that every valley could be distinguished; the island of Elba was very plain, but Porto-Ferraio is too near the level of the sea to be perceived at that distance. I could not see that island without thinking of my forced march on March 5, 1815, in consequence of the news of Napoleon's departure. Having surveyed the whole neighborhood of the port, we returned, and then took some hours of repose; at mid-day we hurried through the shops, of which that of Michelis is the most beautiful and certainly the only one of its kind in the world. There are sold the most beautiful alabasters and magnificent marbles. No one could look at Pisani's who had examined those made at Leghorn. I bought several charming things at a ridiculous price, considering the workmanship. I went over the spot where the surrender of the Archduchess will take place. We dined at the principal hotel—which did not deserve that title—and at six in the evening we embarked to pay a visit to the American Commodore. To avoid the firing of guns I would not be announced, and I remained on board till sunset, when they do not salute. The flagship has eighty-four guns, and is one of the most beautiful vessels I have ever seen. The Americans, who have a great rivalry with the English, owed their success in the last war to the new construction of their ships of the line, some of which carry as many as ninety guns. They are constructed like frigates, but without quarter-decks, and are fast sailers like frigates, and can consequently overtake these vessels, which in England never carry more than eighty guns. They can also avoid with the same facility vessels of the line of greater tonnage. The Commodore received us with much distinction; he immediately placed the whole crew under arms, and showed me over every part of his ship. Its whole appearance and neatness are admirable. I do not know if in these respects it does not even surpass the English ships; on the other hand, the style of the crew does not equal that of the latter. The Commodore is a great amateur of the fine arts and fine animals. He has pictures in his cabin, among others a copy of the portrait of Pope Julius II., after Raphael, and between decks and on the upper deck African gazelles and a great Canadian bear. Between decks, where the sailors dine, there is on each table a pyramid of very clean vessels, which contain the drink for the sailors, and a Bible distributed by the Bible Society of Boston. The *maladie biblique* extends through both hemispheres. After

leaving the fleet we had another look at the shops, which the principal merchants had taken care to have well illuminated. We retired at eleven, and at six we started in the carriage for Lucca. Leghorn is a beautiful town, or rather it has one fine square, and one fine street. There is great confusion in this street, and it is like a very busy market. I saw the synagogue, the most beautiful in Italy (there are twelve thousand Jews at Leghorn, who enjoy great privileges). I wanted to visit the Lazaretto for quarantine, but could not find a moment.

I reached Lucca at mid-day. The town is old and quite lovely; the country is as charming as it is possible to see. Lucca is situated in a small plain, in the midst of beautiful high mountains rich in vegetation. They are clothed with olive trees to the very summit. The country is not cut up as it is in other parts of Italy, and the soil is excellent. At two o'clock I went to Saltocchio, a villa belonging to M. Canamy, who was Madame Elisa's *ecuyer*, and with good reason; she is charming. About two thousand steps from that is Marlia, a quite divine place, which Madame Elisa has had built and planted. The house recalls to my mind the most comfortable French *châteaux*. The garden is planted in the English style, and that marvellously; it is large and has a very uncommon appearance, perhaps even unique of its kind, for I know of no other garden in the English style on this side of the Alps planted with such a profusion of trees and exotic flowers; there are, for example, whole groves of magnolias. The climate of Lucca is a great deal milder than that of Florence; the heat is not so excessive during the summer, and the cold is never more than two or three degrees below zero during winter, so that the most delicate plants grow in the open air. After taking a turn in the gardens, we dined at Marlia, where I had invited the first people in Lucca. We started again at six in the evening and arrived at Florence at midnight. Two days could not possibly have been spent better or more agreeably.

225. *Florence, July 12.*—I shall go to-morrow to Leghorn, to prepare for the arrival of my Princess, and I shall leave here to-morrow at six in the evening. I shall be at Leghorn at one or two in the morning; I shall remain there the whole of the 14th, and leave Leghorn on the 15th at two in the morning; by daybreak I shall be at Pisa, which I have seen; I shall go to the stud of camels belonging to the Grand Duke, the only establishment of the kind in Europe; from there to the baths of Pisa, and dine at Lucca, where

I shall pass the rest of the day. On the morning of the 15th I shall return to Poggio, so I shall have seen a great deal in a short time. The Portuguese fleet should, according to letters from Lisbon of June 10, have left that port on the 18th or 22nd, so it may be expected at Leghorn at any hour. I shall be delighted if it arrives there exactly on the 14th.

Here is a charming anecdote of Charles Zichy, the younger. He was at Parma last spring. The Archduchess invited him to dinner. A famous improvisatore, Gricci, was to give a representation after dinner. Zichy took care to arrive first; after him the Cardinal Archbishop of Parma. These two gentlemen did not know one another. Zichy, however, guessed by the red stockings of the Cardinal that he must be some one of importance, and ended by breaking the ice, and presenting himself to the Cardinal, saying "*Io sono Zichy.*" The Cardinal overwhelmed him with compliments, and would have embraced him: "*Signor Gricci, ah! Signor Gricci; che piacere, che reputazione, che talento! Avremmo il piacere di sentirla, d'ammirarla.*" Zichy, delighted to see that his name produced such an extraordinary effect, being pressed by the old Cardinal to give him a specimen of his *savoir faire* just to pass the time, hesitated, talked of his small merits, his services, of the Chamber, of all he had done for twenty years without advancement! The arrival of Marie Louise alone put an end to the scene. She herself told me the story to-day.

226. *July 23.—L'homme propose, chère amie, et Dieu dispose!* This devil of a fleet is just eight days too late. A courier arrived here yesterday from Lisbon, having taken fourteen days, and he informed us that the fleet set sail on the 6th of this month. It may arrive to-morrow, the day after, or in a week or ten days, according to the wind. It is not likely that it will take more than three weeks coming, and in that case it will be at Leghorn from the 27th to the 29th. The embarkation of the Archduchess cannot take place for seven or eight days after it has anchored in the roads; it must take from three to five days for revictualling and embarking the luggage. I told you in my last, that if I had no news on the 22nd I should leave on the 25th. Now I cannot see that this will be possible. The ceremonies would not detain me except for the sake of decency, but business will. I must see the Portuguese Commissioner, at least I can hardly help it, as he has business with me, and it will at least be very difficult, if not impossible, to avoid waiting till the moment of arrival.

227. *July 26.*—That blessed squadron has at last come to anchor at Leghorn. It was recognized and signalled yesterday at mid-day, at the distance of twenty miles. It entered the roads two hours and a half ago.

According to my calculations, it must take ten or twelve days to revictual. Consequently I leave to-day for the baths of Lucca, where I shall be at six this evening. I shall begin my cure to-morrow, and I shall only interrupt it during the two days which I shall spend at Leghorn, in order to complete my task. These days depend on the above-mentioned question of the revictualling of the Portuguese fleet.

AT THE BATHS OF LUCCA.

Extracts from the private Letters from Metternich to his Family, from July 28 to August 1817.

228. Description of Lucca. 229. Numerous guests. 230. Visit of the Archduchess to Leghorn—arrival of the English Admiral Penrose—description of the Portuguese ships. 231. The ceremony of surrendering the Archduchess—farewell. 232. The Archduchess's ship sets sail—Marie Louise. 233. Metternich's departure from Lucca.

Metternich to his Wife, Baths of Lucca, July 28, 1817.

228. I am here in the most charming spot in the world. The road from Lucca to the waters passes through the most picturesque valley that can be conceived. The mountains which border it are as high as the Styrian Alps (excepting of course the summits covered with perpetual snow). A majestic torrent rushes through it, and this most beautiful road brings us, at the distance of fifteen miles, to the baths and waters. I am living in the part called the Villa de' Bagni, a house which Elisa had built, or rather arranged, for herself; this will tell you that it is comfortable and well situated. I have a bath in the house itself, and the waters for drinking are close by. About a mile from this are the *bagni caldi*; they carry any one who wishes to go there in a chair. It is a curious sight to see the quantity of open and covered chairs which cross a large wood of chestnuts and a very steep mountain. I can only compare the situation to that of Styria; add to that the vegetation of Italy, and you embellish the picture amazingly. The air is excellent, it is neither too hot nor too cold; the establishments for the baths are well conducted, and luxuriously carried out. Everything that with us would be of wood is here of the most beautiful Carrara marble.

The news which I receive from Leghorn do not allow me to suppose that the embarkation can take place before August 15. This proves to me that the Portuguese are the slowest people in the world. The ships require a number of things which the Government at Lisbon had not time to procure, although they had eight

months in which to do it. The Admiral requires ten days for re-victualling; I give him twenty, and that brings us to August 15. If such is the case, I shall try to finish my course of waters before quitting Leghorn, and I shall leave that port straight for Vienna. If the Admiral is, contrary to my expectation, more expeditious, I shall make an interval of two days in my cure.

229. *Baths of Lucca, August 2.*—My house is full of visitors; I have with me MM. de Maccalon, de Navarro, and de Mello; Wallmoden and his brother, and D'Aspre; Louis Kaunitz and Golowkin; the Abbé Justel and two painters. I have, therefore, been obliged to take another house to lodge those who cannot find room in my palace. Everybody is enchanted with the place; they all declare that there cannot be anything more beautiful, and I am of the same opinion. I think the life of a prince of Lucca is, without doubt, one of the happiest and most to be envied. This little country has everything and not too much; it contains a town, a country-house, a bath, a seaport, a lake, a river, &c. You see the *embarras des richesses* is not excessive, while that of choice does not present itself at all: in fact, here ambition and enjoyment never being directed to more than one object, the first must ever be limited, and the second become constant.

230. *Leghorn, August 10.*—I arrived here at eight in the evening. I found all the Courts and four thousand visitors. I have been to see my Princess, and I went with her to the theatre. The house is magnificent, not much smaller than La Scala, and has five rows of boxes. They gave us the "Orazi," by Cimarosa, a superb opera, but unhappily sung by those horrible Germans from the Pergola of Florence, against whom I have already expressed my wrath at the time of my arrival in this town. I find they have added to the troupe a second dancer from Milan.

I have just returned, and write to you immediately. The surrender will be effected the day after to-morrow, and the embarkation the day after that. The vessels will set sail the same day. I will tell you all about the ships when I have seen them. Admiral Penrose arrived here to-day in a seventy-four gun ship. We have, therefore, a fleet of several different nations, who will add to the splendor of the *fête* by the number of their salutes. The Portuguese declare that they will deliver their Princess to their Prince in forty or forty-five days, counting the passage of the strait.

August 11.—I have been on board the Portuguese vessels this morning. They are very fine. The "Jean VI." is pierced for

ninety guns: it carries only thirty-six, for in every place where there should be one beyond that number they have made a cabin for one of the numerous ladies we are sending to Brazil. The Archduchess's apartment is as well cared for as possible; it is spacious and furnished with much luxury. She has a fine grand dining-room, a bedroom, dressing-room, and bath. Besides all this, there is a great tent on the deck, which would easily hold three hundred people. The "St. Sebastian" is of the same power, and Eltz will consequently find himself lodged as if he were the ambassador of Neptune himself. It is difficult to imagine all the people that these vessels contain: besides the Austrian ladies, there is the Portuguese Court—that is to say, three officials of the Court. Each of these gentlemen has his wife and children with him, and they all have large families; the Grand-Master, Castel-Melhor, has five children. The father, mother, and children have been ill the whole way from Lisbon to this place. The number of officers of every grade has been tripled. Above all, remember that a considerable number of cows, calves, pigs, sheep, four thousand fowls, some hundreds of ducks, and from four to five hundred canaries, and large and small birds from Brazil, and you must see that the ark of old Noah was a child's toy in comparison with the "Jean VI." May God preserve this floating world from shipwreck! The Admiral promises well: he engages himself to arrive in thirty-five or forty days; you see, therefore, that the Portuguese can sometimes be prompt.

231. *August 12.*—I have concluded my ceremony to-day, and *con brio*, I flatter myself. The act of giving up the Archduchess was very beautiful and very solemn. Every one assembled at eleven, and a quarter of an hour afterwards the ceremony commenced. It lasted a good half hour, and M. de Castel-Melhor received his royal Princess from my hand—unworthy from this moment to touch hers—as the Portuguese, both men and women, in kissing it kneel on one knee. At two we had a grand dinner, which, by the by, did not do honor to the cook of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty. At four we all paid a visit to Admiral Penrose, on the "Albion," a superb vessel of seventy-four guns. The Admiral gave a grand collation to the Archduchesses and the Grand Duke. The guns fired, and the show was magnificent, with the immense number of pleasure-boats that accompanied the Grand Duke, in which were the princes and great personages. All the men-of-war gave the royal salute, which is in my opinion one of the most beau

tiful sights that the ingenuity of man has invented. At six we conducted the Prince of Salerno and Monseigneur the Archduke on board their frigate, and left them there. They left that night with a fair wind for Naples.

This same "Albion" was a good deal knocked about before Algiers. The vessel bears no marks, but there are a number of men on board who have only one arm; among others the Admiral's son-in-law, who commands the ship.

August 13.—To-day at four I conducted the Archduchess on board. We embarked on that grand ship the "Jean VI. As we passed through the port we were saluted by all the batteries of the fortress, and by an immense concourse of spectators. It took us half an hour to reach the ship, which the Archduchess now saw for the first time. She thought her apartment very beautiful, and with reason: it would be difficult to make it more elegant. All the ladies on board are well lodged: other people as best they may. At six the Archduchess Marie Louise came and joined us, upon which all the guns began firing again. The sea was covered with boats, and the most lovely weather favored the *fête*; at night the two Portuguese vessels were illuminated. Their outlines stood out marvelously on a sea calm and smooth as ice. At ten, the wind becoming stronger and the sea rising very much, we re-embarked on our frail bark and re-entered the port.

The sea having been smooth all the evening, no one of the Princess's suite was sick except one of her maids, who will most probably not accompany her. The wind is contrary, the immense quantities of luggage and different packages must be put in order, so that the squadron will not be able to set sail for four-and-twenty hours. I shall go on board again to-morrow, and at three I shall leave for my baths.

Before I start I will write you a line. The only person to be pitied on board is Madame de Lodron. She can only stand upright between the beams which form the ceiling of the cabin. Her bed is too short, so that it will be wonderful if she does not arrive at Brazil bent double by circumstances instead of age. You may guess what she will be like when she returns.

232. *Baths of Lucca, August 16.*—I have taken leave of my Archduchess. The squadron set sail yesterday morning at half-past five; before ten it was lost to sight, and our poor ladies were left to their fate. Marie Louise left Leghorn yesterday, after the departure of her sister. She arrived here at mid-day; dined with me and slept

at Marlia, from whence she departed this morning by the Pontremoli road, which she wishes to see, because it will go through a great part of her duchy. A road which exists only on paper is not convenient for travellers; so she will have to ride fifty miles on horseback. I shall go one of these days by Sarzana to the Gulf of Spezzia. It would take thirty hours for this excursion, which would be interesting to me partly from curiosity: it would be interesting to see the plan of this road, which is of very great importance to us; and I should visit in passing the quarries of Carrara. I shall sleep at Massa, and the next day I shall return here. I shall choose for this expedition one of the days of interruption ordered in every cure.

233. *At the Waters of Lucca, August 29.*—I shall leave here to-morrow morning and sleep at Massa, after having visited Carrara. The day after to-morrow (the 31st) I shall start early in the morning for Lerici, where I shall see the Gulf of Spezzia, then I shall return to dine at Massa and sleep at Pistoia. On the 1st I shall go to Modena. On the 2nd I shall sleep at Parma, where I shall remain on the 3rd. On the 4th I go as far as Verona, where I shall have a meeting on business with Saurau and Goëss. At Verona I shall decide according to the weather on the route by Bozen or by Ponteba, I shall then also be able to tell you the precise day of my arrival, which will not be before the 11th or later than the 12th September.

My visit here has had the best results for all the affairs which brought me to Italy, and for some which I had not expected, but which came before me during my visit. I regret nothing in my involuntary change of plan, happy as it is in its results. I am leaving a little country which is in every way very interesting, and from which I carry away a remembrance very dear to my heart. I have had the happiness of repairing many faults and follies, and I have prevented new ones being committed in a time more or less remote, which is very important for a country about to pass under another Government. I am more and more convinced that one only does well what one does oneself, and that one ought to be everywhere do well.

My visitors have dispersed into all parts of Europe. Golowkin started this morning for his retreat in Switzerland. Wallmoden returned here from Leghorn yesterday. He will start to-morrow for Florence, with the intention of reviewing the troops which marched through that place from Naples. Kaunitz will accom-

pany me to the Gulf, and we shall separate at Lucca the day after to-morrow.

Here you have an exact summary of all my doings and all my movements. I leave these places with real regret, but I look forward to seeing you again with infinitely more pleasure, so that the balance is altogether in my favor. One must see this country to know that such a country exists, and this knowledge is a great consolation.

CONCLUSION OF THE COURSE OF BATHS, ETC., IN LUCCA.

234. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Lucca, August 29, 1817.

234. The course of waters and baths which have had so beneficial an effect on my health being now quite concluded, I shall to-morrow commence my journey back to Vienna.

My first business after my return will be to give your Majesty an account of my travels in Italy, to Rome, Naples, Florence, and Lucca (No. 245). I am glad to think that I have lost neither time nor opportunity of furthering your Majesty's service. It only remains for me to-day to offer your Majesty my most respectful thanks for so graciously permitting me to stay here and devote four whole weeks to my health, which has again given me strength to serve your Majesty with the same feelings of personal devotion your Majesty has long known me to possess.

METTERNICH.

I see with pleasure that the baths of Lucca have been of service to you, and take note of the other information.

FRANCIS.

Fogaras, September 12, 1817.

VISIT TO THE COURTS OF MODENA AND PARMA.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his Family, from September 2 to September 9, 1817.

235. From Modena—Massa and Carrara—differences of climate. 236. From Mantua—visit to Marie Louise at Parma. 237. From Verona.

Metternich to his Wife, Modena, September 2.

235. I have arrived here, my dear, after the most charming journey possible. As I told you, I left the baths of Lucca on the morning of the 30th. I arrived at Massa the same day at two o'clock. After resting for half an hour, I went to Carrara, and I have returned to sleep at Massa.

The road from Lucca to Massa is charming. On reaching the summit of the high mountains which form the basin of Lucca, a magnificent plain opens to view of from three to four leagues in extent, and the immense reach of coast along the Mediterranean. The port of Viareggio lies at one's feet, and when it is clear Corsica can be seen directly opposite. The weather was superb. Massa is a small but very well built town; the *château* is large and very well arranged. From my bed I have a boundless prospect. The road from Massa to Carrara is newly made; it is lovely, and you leave the most beautiful country to find yourself plunged in a wild valley not less beautiful because the scenery is of a different kind. You arrive at Carrara, and if you did not know where you were, you would find it out from every stone of the pavement. The worst stone of the country is a beautiful marble. The poor people's houses are of gray or white veined marble. The inhabitants are, for the most part, comfortably off, for every one can find employment in the numberless workshops connected with sculpture. There are at least thirty studios, large and small, in which may be seen everything that one can desire. The best Roman sculptors have their statues made at Carrara; they choose a block, put it in hand, and finish it afterwards in their studios at Rome. Others

come themselves to live for several months at the fountain-head for marble. I found there Rauch and Tieck, two Prussians of great talent, who make the most beautiful things for the King. Among other things, Rauch is now making a copy of the Queen's mausoleum. After having seen everything, I returned to Massa. The next day, at six, I started for Lerici. The view, when you arrive at the top of the mountains, and perceive the Gulf of Spezzia quite under your feet, is of the greatest beauty. I embarked at Lerici, and crossed the Gulf as far as Porto-Venere; from thence I went round the Gulf itself, in order to see it thoroughly, and returned to Massa at four o'clock. I dined there and slept at Lucca. Yesterday I slept at a cursed place called Paulo, in the Apennines, where the Archduke had the kindness to send me a cook and attendants, which assuredly were not unnecessary. I arrived here this morning at eleven, and have spent the day in seeing the few curiosities Modena has to offer.

One thing which strikes me is the extreme difference of the climate of Tuscany from that on this side of the Apennines. I have often been told that Italy proper commences on the south of that chain of mountains, and this is quite true. I here find Lombardy and Venetia again, while Tuscany is quite a contrast. The plants peculiar to the south are not found here. The fact is most striking at Lucca, and above all at Massa. Lucca is farther south than Tuscany, and Massa is like Sicily. The coast being narrow and the mountains acting as reflectors, it never freezes, nor is there even snow at Massa. Oranges grow abundantly in the open fields, and all succulent plants can be acclimatized.

236. *Mantua, September 5.*—I arrived here this evening at nine, and I intend to leave again to-morrow at midday, and sleep at Verona, where the Governors of Milan and Venice are expecting me.

I stayed nearly two days at Parma—that is to say, I arrived there on the third at seven in the evening, and I left to-day at noon for Colorno, where the Archduchess gave me a dinner. Her establishment could not be more comfortable; her Court is marvellously arranged, and there is neither too much nor too little of anything. Parma in itself contains a number of objects of interest. This town was the cradle of Correggio. The halls and walls are covered with his works; he is for Parma what Giulio Romano is for Mantua. Nothing can be imagined more enchanting than what he has bequeathed to an age unhappy that it cannot imitate him, but happy to be able to admire him.

237. *Verona, September 6, 10 o'clock in the Evening.*—This morning I have seen all there is to see at Mantua, and much even that is not worth taking the trouble to see. I arrived here at three o'clock. At Verona I have been to see all that my unfortunate eye prevented me from seeing in 1816, and I shall leave in an hour with the intention of staying to-morrow night at Bozen, which is twelve posts from this.

I write by the present courier to Pepi* at Klagenfurt, where I shall be on the 10th. You will receive news of me from that town by the courier who orders my horses, and who will arrive at least fifteen or sixteen hours before me.

I hope I shall find you all in good health. I am most anxious about the *pauvre petite*,† but I am far from flattering myself that I shall find her convalescent. May I but find her better!

Adieu! I have still to get rid of Saurau, Goëss, and at least twenty people who are in my antechamber. My travels have ceased to be a pleasure. I am always tormented with honors, and consequently by annoyances of every description.

* Count Joseph Esterhazy, subsequently Metternich's son-in-law.

† Princess Hermine, Metternich's daughter, who still survives.

THE EXISTENCE OF SECTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

238. Metternich to Lebzeltern at Petersburg, Florence, June 28, 1817.

238. The progress of sects which are beginning to threaten the peace of many countries, especially in Central Europe, is an object worthy to occupy the attention of Cabinets.

The human mind generally revels in extremes. A period of irreligion, a period in which pretended philosophers and their false doctrines have tried to overturn all which human wisdom has recognized as intimately connected with the eternal principles of morality, has been necessarily followed by an epoch of moral and religious reaction. Now, every kind of reaction is false and unjust, and it is only given to wise and consequently strong men to be neither the dupes of false philosophers nor the sport of false religions. If any one doubted the intimate connection which exists between the moral and material world, proofs would be found in the march and progress of certain maladies of the mind, which present all the symptoms of true epidemics. For some time the Methodists have made great progress in England and America; and this sect, by following the track of all the others, is now beginning to extend its proselytism to other parts of Europe. There are at the present moment, principally in Upper Germany and Switzerland, hundreds of thousands of individuals morally affected by mysticism. The kingdom of Wurtemberg, the Grand Duchy of Baden, contain an entire population, fanatical to the point of abandoning all the comforts of this world to seek existence and happiness in the holy places which they regard as the proper preparation for a future life. There are in Swabia whole families who practise the greatest self-denial, young men who will do nothing unless they are allowed to emigrate either to Palestine or to some desert place, where, withdrawing from all society, they can constitute among themselves a theocratic government more or less similar to that of the Jews after their departure from Egypt. Some of these sects have an exclusively moral and religious object. Others betray decided tendencies

towards a political malady, and as Jacobinism, even extreme as it is, still admits of further extremes, many of these sects wish to found their new society on the principles of the agrarian law.

You will have heard, Sir, of the extraordinary errors into which the so-called *Poeschlianer* in Upper Austria have fallen. A ramification of this same sect has been discovered in the country of Wurzburg, and young men, and especially young women, have given themselves up to the most frightful torments, and even to death, in order to render themselves worthy of Paradise. In Swabia there are a number of Independents, a religious and political sect, who dream only of an agrarian law, theocrats who wish for the law of Moses, and many other associations, each one more fanatical than the other.

You have doubtless seen in the Swiss newspapers, and especially in that of Aarau, articles which the Governments have been forced to publish against the predications of Madame de Krüdener; the tendency of this woman is more dangerous than all others, because her predications are all intended to excite the indigent classes against the proprietors. She invites the poor to put themselves in the place of the rich, and her fanaticism no doubt prevents her from perceiving that she thus establishes the most vicious circle possible, as she would, in fact, thus give to people formerly rich but now poor, the undoubted right of ameliorating their condition in their turn, by putting themselves again in the place of those who had dispossessed them.

It is, doubtless, worthy of the wisdom of the great Powers to take into consideration an evil which it is possible, and perhaps even easy, to stifle in its beginning, but which can only gain in intensity in proportion as it spreads. The Courts must not forget that there exist in Europe disturbers of the public repose, who are deceived in all their calculations by a firm and continued progress, and the just and liberal principles of the great monarchs who have saved Europe. These men, desperate, and forced from their last intrenchments, regard as their own property all questions of disorder whatever, and it is perhaps reserved for us to see the editors of the "*Nain jaune*" and the "*Vrai Libéral*" preach against the vanities of this world, and to see Carnot and Barère make themselves the apostles of the New Jerusalem. This subject deserves the most serious attention; it is connected with the well-being of society and the tranquillity of States more closely than is supposed, and the great Courts should not be slow to take into consideration

the means of checking the designs of these fomenters of a new kind of revolution.

I beg you, Sir, to sound the Russian Cabinet on this subject, and to inform us of its ideas. The Courts will easily find means within their reach, whenever they come to an understanding with each other about the matter, and it belongs doubtless to the first Powers of Europe to confine their views to measures beyond the reach of the Governments of small States, who can only expel a dangerous individual from so small a territory, and who, if they endeavor to save their own people from the contagion, can only pass it on to their neighbors.

THE BIBLE SOCIETIES AND THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER.

239. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Lucca, August 29, 1817.

239. I have to-day the honor to lay before your Majesty a matter perfectly new to diplomacy.

Some days ago a courier arrived from the Russian Cabinet, whom I at first supposed to have been entrusted with some important communications. The value of these communications your Majesty will see from the copy I enclose of Count Nesselrode's letter (No. 240); the second enclosure is my answer to the same (No. 241). Your Majesty has no doubt been long convinced that the Emperor Alexander can never keep to the ordinary ways of men. In 1815 he abandoned pure Jacobinism, but only to throw himself into mysticism; his tendencies being always revolutionary, so also are his religious feelings, and therefore he could not avoid assuming the protectorate of Bible Societies.

I pray your Majesty to regard my answer to Count Nesselrode as meant exclusively for the Emperor Alexander, and so to judge it. If I have entered into many special details, I did this to put an end, at the very commencement, to correspondence between the two Cabinets upon Biblical subjects and religious police measures. The Emperor Alexander will assuredly cease to love and care for such narrow-minded Christians, when I, as your Majesty's Minister, represent your Majesty's views.

I wish to leave no doubt in his mind that his notions of religious enlightenment are not those of your Majesty, and that consequently such questions do not admit so easily of amelioration. It is very hard to determine to what extent this madness will reach. In all the ideas of the Emperor Alexander, the design of proselytizing stands first: with this object he wins over Jacobins in Italy and sects in Europe. Now "the rights of man" give place to "Bible reading." It only remains for us quietly yet curiously to see what will be the next

answer to my last despatch to Lebzeltern (No. 238), with respect to the dangers of mysticism and the common action of the Cabinets against its miserable results. METTERNICH.

Nesselrode to Metternich, July, 1817.

240. Count de Stackelberg has informed us, my dear Prince, of your opinion with regard to the interview of the Sovereigns. His despatch crossed ours, and at this moment you doubtless know what we think on this point. You will have seen that we are agreed as to the utility and object of this interview. I may add to-day that we are not less so as to the locality of the conference, as well as to the indispensable necessity of inviting to it one of the most noted members of the French Ministry, and M. de Richelieu in preference to any other. The Emperor is entirely of your opinion, that no capital or even residence would be convenient or useful for the conduct of the affairs which must be treated of there, and this conviction applies even more to small than to great capitals. It seems to him, therefore, that Aix-la-Chapelle or Mannheim would answer every purpose, and his Imperial Majesty will go with pleasure in the course of next year to whichever of the two places is chosen. Before the meeting, but not till within a short time of it, the Emperor will propose an unimportant change. Instead of fixing on the month of June for the interview, he is anxious that it should not take place till some months later, for after the different arrangements his Majesty has made, and some necessary journeys into the interior of Russia, it would be scarcely possible for him to arrive in either of the places above mentioned before September 10 of our style. I do not think, Prince, that this delay can present the least inconvenience, considering that even on November 14, when the third year of occupation expires, we shall still have two months to discuss and decide this important business.

The uniformity which has characterized the opinions put forth by our Cabinets on the subject of France promises happily for the discussions which will take place on this subject. That being decided, the other questions which may be mooted at this meeting of Sovereigns and Ministers would not seem to be of a nature to present insurmountable difficulties. All leads one to hope that it will essentially contribute still further to consolidate the happy agreement which subsists between the principal Powers of Europe. The Emperor is so convinced of the beneficial effect of this grand har-

mony of principles among the four Courts who have laid down the bases of the general association, that he feels it a matter of regret when, even in questions which are not of general interest, he sees that particular circumstances have provoked, in the States of one of the four sovereigns, measures which do not entirely correspond to the views of the others. Thus, his Majesty has been grieved that you have not allowed the Bible Society to exist among you, although it is formed by Protestants, and notwithstanding certain considerations, which his Majesty respects as much as he regrets, have obliged you to abolish so beneficial an institution, and above all one so agreeable to the tolerant principles of your august master. I need not tell you, my dear Prince, how much his Majesty looks forward to the time he will pass with the Emperor Francis, and if the interview is of real utility as far as business is concerned, it will be not the less agreeable to the Emperor to enjoy the consolations of the most cordial and unalterable friendship.

From what Count de Stackelberg tells us, I conclude you are still in Italy, and I have charged the courier to join you there. I hope this journey will bring you all the pleasure you hoped from it. You have my best wishes. Allow me, Prince, to join, &c., &c.

Metternich to Nesselrode, Lucca, August 20, 1817.

(Supplement to No. 239.)

241. Your courier, my dear Count, joined me here on August 18, in a corner altogether out of the world, where I am taking care of my health, of which for some years it has had much need. I am sure now that I have done right to take the Lucca waters, as I cannot take those of Carlsbad. I am very well, and I regret not having more than ten or twelve days longer to remain in a charming retreat which unites all that can be desired in the way of health and repose. Imagine to yourself the most beautiful parts of Switzerland and Styria under the best Italian climate; perfect waters, not so strong, but very much resembling those of Carlsbad; good and pleasant society, a charming residence, which Madame Elisa Bacciochi certainly did not prepare for me, and you may conceive how I shall soon be regretting the pleasures of the past.

The despatch which I have addressed to Lebzeltern will have proved to you, my dear Count, that our views coincide with those of your august master concerning the interview of 1818. In reply, I may say that the Emperor Francis will repair to Aix-la-Chapelle,

or to Mannheim, whichever is most convenient to the Emperor Alexander. The result of the conference will be like all those which have preceded it, the Sovereigns and the Cabinets will part once more with perfect harmony of views and wishes.

I am pleased, my dear Count, to rectify an error which I find in your letter. We have never abolished a Bible Society among us, for one never existed. I believe, however, that I am in a position to assure you that the Emperor will never allow the establishment of one, and the confidence you have in me induces me to acquaint you with his Majesty's reasons.

I begin by referring to our position with regard to the Holy See—that is to say, by assuring you that no Catholic Power is more independent than we are of all direct submission to the Court of Rome. The heir of so many Emperors of Germany, and the nephew of Joseph II., knows what is due to God and his crown. Our ecclesiastical departments perhaps even push their dogmas on the rights of the Crown too far, but if so, the excess is assuredly not in favor of the Court of Rome.

The Catholic Church does not encourage the universal reading of the Bible, and it acts in this respect like a father, placed above the passions and consequently the storms of life. The Church not only allows but recommends the reading of the Sacred Books to men who are enlightened, calm, capable of judging the question. She does not encourage the reading of mystical books, or of passages full of crimes and obscenities which the Book of Books contains only too often in histories simple like the first ages, and like all that is true. For myself, I think the Church is right, and I judge by the effect which the reading of the Bible has on me at the age of forty, so different from that which the same reading produced on me at the age of fifteen and twenty. I can only compare this difference with that of the impressions produced at different periods of life by the reading of the classics, the contemplation of the beauties of nature, or the monuments of art.

I read every day one or two chapters of the Bible: I discover new beauties daily, and I prostrate myself before this admirable book; while at the age of twenty I found it difficult not to think the family of Lot unworthy to be saved; Noah unworthy to have lived; Saul a great criminal, and David a terrible man. At twenty, I tried to understand the Apocalypse; now I am sure that I never shall understand it. At the age of twenty a deep and long-continued research in the Holy Books made me an Atheist after the

fashion of Alembert and Lalande, or a Christian after that of Chateaubriand; now I believe, and do not criticise. I have read too much, and seen too much, not to know that reading is not necessarily understanding: that it would be too bold in me to condemn what through ignorance, or insufficiency of knowledge, I comprehend so imperfectly. In a word, I believe, and dispute no longer. Accustomed to occupy myself with great moral questions, what have I not accomplished or allowed to be wrought out by the simple course of nature, before arriving at the point where the Pope and my Curé beg me to accept from them the most portable edition of the Bible? Is it bold in me to take for certain that, of a thousand individuals chosen from the millions of men of which the people are composed, there will be found, owing to their intellectual faculties, their education, or their age, very few who have arrived at the point where I find myself?

Now, my dear Count, in this very simple reasoning, which is also the Emperor's, we find the motive of his Majesty's constant opposition to the introduction of Bible Societies, and in this matter his ideas coincide with those of the Holy Father.

There is another consideration which bears upon this at the present moment, and which seems no less strong than the reasons above set forth. The world just now is sick of a peculiar malady, which will pass away like all other epidemics; this malady is called mysticism. I have recently addressed to Lebzeltern a long despatch on this subject (No. 238), which he has probably shown to you. I assure you that at the present day it would be easier to renew successfully the sermons of Peter the Hermit, than to make individuals attacked with this malady understand that God desires to be served otherwise than by the spilling of blood, and that men are not to be judges of their neighbor's conscience. See what is passing in Germany; see the success of the preaching of Madame de Krüdener, whom you have very wisely sent back to Russia, and of so many other unfortunates who understand the Sacred Books in their own fashion, which, be sure, is not that of God and the Saviour.

It is commonly believed that the Pope does not wish Catholics to read the Bible, with the view of preventing their being enlightened. It is possible, and I admit that Gregory VII. and Alexander VI. may have taken this into account; but that was not the reason of the ancient practice of the Church and the moral precepts of the Councils. A Pope may sometimes fear the light, but it is permitted even to the wisdom of the Church to fear the fire. if a Pope

does not wish the faithful enlightened, the Church does not wish them to be dazzled. The Pope is wrong, but the Church is right, and the Emperor Francis takes in this matter the side of the Church, while at the same time he despises and rejects all prejudice.

You see, my dear Count, that I am writing to you from a retired place, where I have plenty of leisure to write, and also to forget that you will have scarcely time to read my letter. Throwing myself at the feet of the Emperor, I beg you to rectify the mistake he has made when he supposed that any Bible Society whatever has been suppressed among us.

For the rest, no transaction in the kingdom is more free than the reading of the Bible according to all the different rites. You may find thousands of copies in all the libraries: it is bought, and extracts carefully chosen are distributed in the schools. The Protestants in Austria read it, as everywhere else, in their own language and according to their own version. For myself, I read only Luther's translation, the best which has ever been made in any country, and in a living language.

Adieu! I need not tell you how happy I am to think that there is no longer any such thing as distance in Europe, thanks to the resolution taken by the sovereigns of meeting in person at places where they think they can act together for the common good. This gréat and noble brotherhood is of far more value than all the treaties, and will ensure for a considerable time what the good Abbé de St. Pierre wished to establish forever. Receive, &c.

P.S.—I believe I said in my last despatch to Lebzelttern on the subject of the interview of 1818, that the Emperor my august master would arrange the meeting to suit the convenience of his Majesty the Emperor Alexander. If I have not said it, I do so now, and I hasten to inform his Imperial Majesty of the project of September 10.

INTENTIONS OF NAPLES WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPALITIES OF BENEVENTO AND PONTE- CORVO.

242. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Lucca, August 17, 1817.

242. The Court of Naples seems to intend to improve the occasion of the death of the Holy Father to lay violent hands on Benevento and Pontecorvo, and it appears that this was one of the principal reasons for the removal of your Majesty's army corps from the kingdom. The Neapolitan ministry has, in consequence of this idea, engaged in an intrigue in Petersburg, and even ventured to make a similar attempt in England. The first I discovered in a secret manner; the other was told in confidence by Herr Aroust to our ambassador. I undertake to say that these designs shall not succeed.

The very first notion, the groundwork of modern politics is and must be peace, and the fundamental idea of peace is the security of property. If the first Powers of Europe depart from this principle, States which are small and scarcely independent must follow them, willingly or unwillingly.

Whether Benevento and Pontecorvo shall belong to the King of Naples or to the Roman See is immaterial; but that Naples, either by intrigue or force, should in 1817 give the first example of an alteration of possessions settled by the act of Congress—this is a most important question.

I will myself give your Majesty an account of the whole position of affairs, and the explanations of the Cabinets, so soon as they are given. It is not possible to wait for your Majesty's commands, therefore I proceed exactly in the strictest sense of the principles above set forth, because I know they are those of your Majesty.

The Neapolitan intrigue gives me a good opportunity of making all the Courts aware of your Majesty's principles, and the nature of the Imperial politics. If heaven has, in the last few years, richly blessed the efforts of Austria, the world has to thank for this hap-

piness the upright and invariable character of her policy. All that may be attempted by others against it will be shipwrecked. I beg your Majesty to accept this consolation from my hand at the moment of parting, while the consciousness that I have never misled your Imperial Majesty is the highest reward I can receive.

One new and fortunate turn in great political affairs is the vigilance, almost amounting to tension, of England against the views of the Russian Emperor. The conduct of the latter, and his interference in the internal affairs of Spain have brought about this advantage. England, France, and Prussia draw closer to us, and we have beaten Russia and Spain out of the field by the Parmesan victory. I will very shortly despatch a courier to your Majesty with information on these matters. Your Majesty is at the present time the only preserver of peace in Europe; and not peace merely, but all forms of it lie in your Majesty's hands.

METTERNICH....

God grant that I may be able to secure peace in Europe during my own life and, if possible, to my successors. Your greatest pride and consolation must surely be to have conducted me to the position in which things now are.

FRANCIS.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
IN AUSTRIA.

243. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, October 27, 1817.

244. Report.

243. May it please your Majesty ! For some time your Majesty has been pleased favorably to regard my views on certain points in the internal administration, and to-day I consider it my duty to touch upon the first steps in the execution of this very important matter.

In the enclosure (No. 244) your Majesty will find the plan worked out, which, as a first draft, is slight, but still contains, I believe, all that is really important.

Your Majesty knows from long experience that all desire for unnecessary alteration and dangerous disturbance is far from me. In my Report there is nothing glaring, nothing revolutionary, not a single dangerous principle. I uphold order, because, from an administration internally too complicated, disorder must ensue. In a kingdom like Austria, where so much has been prepared by the glorious government of a Maria Theresa, and the theoretical experiments of your Majesty's predecessor—in a kingdom in which every occasion proves that true public spirit animates the majority of the nation; lastly, in a kingdom where your Majesty comes forward in your own august person as the most successful lawgiver for the welfare of the people—it requires no extraordinary efforts to act for the general good. The cause of the existing evil (and where is there none?) must be sought and found, and the result of this attempt must be set forth in simple phrases. This work I have undertaken as soon as I felt myself sufficiently enlightened and strong enough for the task.

Everything that I now bring before your Majesty I bring as the result of a conviction which—standing the test of a long self-imposed probation—has grown in my mind from the strongest evidence. Your Majesty will find in my work nothing new to your Majesty. All the points now shown in a connected form I have

brought before your Majesty separately in many confidential conversations; the defect in the administration and the means of remedy have long been evident to me, but I hesitated to express without consideration and proof what must have such important consequences.

With every day my mind has gradually limited itself to rendering the propositions more simple. I have looked into everything and considered everything, and the result of what I venture to call my *certainly true propositions* is, without any doubt, extremely gratifying.

No time is less suited than the present to bring forward in any State reforms in a wide sense of the word. But, happily, the machine of State is constructed on such good principles that, in a wide sense, there is really nothing in the machine itself to be altered. Everything that I have proposed concerns the first principles of the whole. And here I do not venture on one reform tending to the overthrow of normal forms, but merely a regulation of the parts, and those, indeed, the already existing organic parts of the central authority of the State.

In my plan I am intentionally silent on the future condition of Hungary. This subject, one of the most important which can occupy the attention of the State, is of so complicated a nature that it cannot be handled in a fragmentary manner. Your Majesty has heard the proposal for the subversion of the Hungarian Government often and boldly expressed. Even in the year 1811, at a period in which such an undertaking would inevitably have caused the overthrow of the monarchy—and in 1813, when, if not so dangerous, even then every energetic expression of it would have been impossible—this question was brought forward as if it were a mere matter for peremptory decision. If I at that time expressed myself against the idea, I did not at all mean to deny that, with time and opportunity, with cooler reflection and more undisturbed repose, the great work of the *civilization* of Hungary—for this must first of all be the question—should be brought forward with due effect. The few remarks which I have made on the connection of my ideas on the central government of the whole monarchy with the position of Hungary are indisputable. In proportion as the action of the supreme power is strengthened will the obstacles disappear which even now are so powerful against a more reasonable and, for Hungary itself, invaluable alteration in her administration and constitution.

That by the carrying out of my proposals every evil will be avoided in the future, I am far from expecting. But that a reliable Government, resting on enlightened principles, set forth in the clear words which are the necessary consequence of clear ideas, smooths the way for all good, while, on the contrary, a confusion of ideas in the Government stands in the way, is not to be denied. Besides, there is no human institution which, if it rests on clear fundamental principles, does not improve as it progresses; while a tendency to still greater inability and confusion is the inevitable result of a contrary position.

And in this truth, confirmed as it is unmistakably by the experience of all ages, lies one of the chief reasons which must incline your Majesty to enter upon a firm organization of the very foundation of the administration.

The Government, as it is at present, rests in its daily working too entirely on the principle of centralization. The machine of government goes on, because its springs are well put together and well guided, and because there is at the head of the administration a monarch capable of ruling. How little this would be the case on the occurrence of that sad catastrophe which in the course of nature must befall the monarchy is known to your Majesty; for your Majesty is as man and as father what your Majesty is as monarch—clear and unprejudiced in opinion and judgment! Your Majesty is called to look forward and provide for that time, and to this end there is but one road which promises success.

Under your Majesty's eyes, under your Majesty's fostering hand, the chief Government must be organized in such a manner as may best preserve it from going astray, or at least not make it easy to do so. Let your Majesty only think what would be the present progress of affairs without your Majesty's presence, without the influence on which that progress is almost exclusively founded. But the strength and durability of a great Government rests not alone on the establishment of principles; at first (and for States, years are often no more than moments), not only the chief leader, but all the instruments must grow accustomed to the new sphere of action. Your Majesty has done nothing for posterity even if during the latter period of life your Majesty should pass some great administrative measure intended for the future; for the only possible guarantee for the duration of a moral work lies, not merely in principles, but in the choice of means for the execution and maintenance of the new system. A feeble successor to your Majesty would then

find it as difficult to overthrow a sound and well-established Government as it would be impossible for him to produce or inaugurate one.

Your Majesty will be pleased to accept this my humble Report with the same gracious favor of which I have already received so many proofs. It expresses my deepest conviction shortly and simply, as alone is worthy of my aims, and of your Majesty's comprehensive insight.

Report.

244. The daily observation of the course of public affairs in the monarchy affords proof that, with a number of good laws and administrative rules, the Government still does not possess that degree of strength which constitutes the true idea of a monarchy. The cause of this want of strength is, I believe, confined to the organization of the supreme administration. To discover without prejudice how this evil became possible and in what it consists we must above all consider the principles of the formation of the collective monarchy into its present whole. This idea clearly and truly set forth will make evident the means of improvement.

In political and administrative respects, the Austrian Empire, from its numerous constituent parts, forms a federal State under one common monarch.

The greater portions of the monarchy—Hungary, Bohemia, the two Austrias, Transylvania, Croatia, &c.—have old and peculiar constitutions, which are more or less in force, but still always exist. New additions, such as Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Galicia, the two Italian kingdoms, &c., even those which were ancient possessions of the Archducal house, have had permanent constitutions granted by their monarchs, with due regard to their former circumstances and present needs. These countries, so different in climate, speech, manners, and customs, had their own crowns, which were all borne by the Austrian Emperor, and three separate coronations took place on his accession to the Government.

These circumstances are undoubtedly worthy of the deepest consideration of the Government, for in them are seen the separate nationalities of the different parts of the Imperial State. In this as well as in many other respects the position of the Austrian monarch is like that of no other.

In its political and geographical aspects the Austrian State forms

an open country in the midst of the European continent. Surrounded on all sides by greater or smaller neighbors, it lacks, from the highest point of view, a connected military frontier. The monarchy must consequently seek in itself, in the common feeling of its peoples, in their political, military, and financial administration, its greatest strength.

Convinced of this truth, I am none the less sure that, if Austria requires a greater expenditure of strength for her self-preservation than any other European State (Prussia excepted), with us, as ever, true and independent strength is only found as the result of an intelligent, definite, and well-arranged system of government.

In following out this idea, there are for Austria but two positions worthy of consideration:

Either the entire merging of all the separate parts of the monarchy in one single form of government;

Or, the careful regulation of the reasonable long-existing differences sanctioned by speech, climate, manners, and customs in the various districts of the monarchy, under a strong, well-organized Central Government.

The idea of thorough incorporation was the foundation of the Emperor Joseph's system of government. During his time the boldest theories were launched. He made an attempt at fusion, and a few years sufficed to see it repealed.

Although the unity of all the executive means which an administration has at command may be the most active and convenient form of power for a Government, certainly the thorough amalgamation of such heterogeneous parts can only be the result of a mighty revolution; or at best, a Government can, under such circumstances, only escape the dangers of a revolution by the greatest consistency and energy. This truth is undeniably proved by the events of the three last decades. How difficult a real system of fusion must be in a kingdom which contains so many different languages and races of people; whose provinces were mostly brought together by conquest, follows from the nature of things. The miscarriage of the attempt, and especially its entire repeal by the Emperor Joseph, renders the case still more difficult, so that I am quite convinced that a forcible system of fusion is an empty and dangerous hypothesis, and since something of the kind is now necessary, I desire to bring forward the *Idea of a Central Representation of the nation*.

Only the investigation of the question remains—In the Austrian

kingdom how can the greatest possible increase of strength be attained—

(a) In respect to the nationalities of the populations and their existing constitutions;

(b) With the least possible modification of the present forms of government.

I lay it down as an undeniable position that a Government in order to be strong needs more than good laws. Besides sound principles, its mode of action must be in harmony with its position, and this is not the case in Austria. The monarchy consists, as we have said, of the most heterogeneous elements. This heterogeneous character, however, is regarded unequally; sometimes insufficiently, sometimes too decidedly, even on the very steps of the throne itself. Hungary and its annexed States enjoy privileges which even tend to impair the action of the great machine of State, while other provinces divided from each other both by name and constitution lose their distinctive features only too entirely in the existing central administration.

Hence for Hungary there arose a privilege which nearly amounted to the idea of independence, while the nationality of the other Austrian States was lost by friction between the Government and the provinces. By its present organization the supreme German power withstood the undeniable tendency to fusion, while the machine of State itself—as I have shown above—rested and must rest on an entirely opposite principle, in accordance with its best interests. This tendency, arising as it did from the organization of the chief authorities, became powerless by continued friction; under its influence the healthful object of the centralization of administrative power degenerated into a mania for details, which would destroy the spirit of the highest administration. This evil can be checked by a word of the monarch, by one single measure; and the disappearance of most of the present difficulties will give the Government that degree of strength and activity which it requires for the good of the monarchy. As I do not believe that a true and enlightened centralization is possible in the ways hitherto attempted, it is the object of my endeavors to attain this end, and that, too, by a much easier path.

From a certain stage downwards the monarchy is very well and wisely organized. The arrangement of its provinces, its organization in *circles*, &c., could certainly not be replaced by any other with greater respect for the nationalities of its subjects, or greater care

and regard for justice and mercy in its administration. But in the very highest stage of all is the Government itself, the centre of all power, and of this only we here speak.

Good must follow from an explanation of the official positions in the Government, grounded on fundamental principles clearly put forth and practically employed.

The supreme power in every great monarchy is subdivided in the branches of the administration, which are separate offices, yet all united for one end. These spheres of action are, in modern times, in which the public feeling busies itself principally with political and administrative subjects, certainly better understood and explained than they are in most States, and perhaps than they ever were before.

The different branches or departments of business in every great State may be properly divided as follows:

1. Foreign affairs.
2. Internal administration (home affairs).
3. Finance.
4. Military affairs.
5. The administration of justice.
6. The police.
7. The Board of Trade (*Rechnungs-Controle*).

It is hardly possible to think of any business which does not fall under one or other of these heads.

The business in each of these separate departments may be divided into two parts:

a. Affairs as seen from the highest—that is, the moral—point of view.

b. The executive, or technical part.

In every well-ordered body these two parts must be separately considered, and the technical part, as containing the means of execution, is ever closely connected with the moral part, though always subordinate to it.

In this sense the appointment of a Finance Minister, who already supplies the place of the President of the Chamber of Commerce, is an arrangement which answers extremely well. The immediate and natural sphere of the Finance Minister cannot be questioned.

A similar arrangement—the inevitable consequence of every improved organization—should now take place in the administration of home affairs. To express my ideas plainly on this reform, I can only ground them on the above-mentioned principles.

I begin with the axiom that the system of fusion, requiring as a first measure the renaming of the kingdoms and provinces (as happened in France at the beginning of the Revolution), is excluded from all consideration. On this hypothesis the following arrangements seem to be the most suitable:

1. The head of the department of Home Affairs shall receive the title of High Chancellor and Home Minister.

2. Under him four Chancellors, forming with him the Ministry of Home Affairs. Their sphere is marked out by the nationalities of the provinces and the relations arising from local considerations.

To these may be nominated:

- a.* A Chancellor for Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia, under whose care these countries should be placed.

- b.* An Austrian Chancellor, under whom should be the Austrian provinces above and below the Ems, Styria, the Innviertel, Salzburg, and Tyrol.

- c.* An Illyrian Chancellor, over Illyria and Dalmatia.

- d.* An Italian Chancellor, over Lombardy and Venice.

In this organization the Home Minister is the guardian and representative of the unity of the Government.

Each Chancellor in the Ministry represents the immediate affairs of the provinces under him. He represents in those provinces the idea of the unity of Government and maintains its principles as much as possible under the given circumstances.

Every Chancery (*Kanzellariat*) must have the necessary number of officers of different grades.

All the fundamental and higher points of administration will be brought before the Home Minister in conference. The immediate arrangement of the administration belongs to each Chancellor in his own sphere.

It is evident that by this organization the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancery will be reduced from the high position they take at present to a share in the general administration.

In this course I see the first step to a gradual reformation in both these countries. But since in the present work I do not wish to confuse the real and immediate improvements easy of accomplishment with the far more extensive and difficult reforms required in Hungary and Transylvania, I will enter no further into this matter.

As in the Chamber of Commerce so in the administration of home affairs the evil exists that matters, which, though of the most different forms, yet belong to one and the same branch of the adminis-

tration, are, for want of centralization, the business of inferior officers or managed still more injuriously by means of Reports from the different countries (*Länder-Referate*). It is necessary for the general good that these matters should be brought under proper direction. . . .

It is not, however, at all my intention to carry out every possible improvement without preparation, as it were at one blow, and—as is unhappily the case at present—without a strong administrative Government. My Report is to-day confined to the following measures:

1. That your Majesty will vouchsafe to decree the formation of Ministries, and first of all, in addition to the existing Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Finance, a Home Minister and a Minister of Justice. Neither the Police nor the Board of Trade seem to me at all suitable to be raised to Ministries, and they may retain the title of Presidents without injury.

2. The organization of the Home Ministry under a Minister and four Chancellors.

The natural and inevitable consequence of the first measure will be the organization of this Ministry in all its different departments.*

METTERNICH.

* It is known that in consequence of this Report a single high office was established under the name of the "United Chancery" (*vereinigte Hofkanzlei*), which added to the Bohemian, Galician, and Austrian, the Illyrian-Italian provinces, hitherto under the *Central-Hofcommission*, and brought them all under one common head.

The Royal Patent referred to described this measure, declaring that "This Supreme Central Home Ministry shall, in accordance with our system of unity, lead all countries and peoples to the same individual and general welfare, bring the public obligations into equal proportions, spread culture and education on just and uniform principles, and at the same time observe and foster, with the greatest tenderness, the various peculiarities and differences in speech, manners and customs, climates and hereditary distinctions.

"As a result of these principles, we are led to the formation of one great Chancery, and to appoint and nominate, under our Home Minister—

"A Bohemian-Moravian Silesian,

"An Austrian-Illyrian,

"A Lombard-Venetian, and

"A Galician Chancellor."

Count Saurau was at the same time appointed Home Minister and High Chancellor; Count Lazansky was made Chancellor for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia; Freiherr von Geiszlern was Austrian-Illyrian Chancellor; and Count Mellerio the Lombardo-Venetian Chancellor.

In the same year Prince Metternich wished to proceed with the reform of

the central administration. It was part of his plan to reorganize the provincial Diets (*Provinzial Stände*) and to form from these bodies a central representation of Austria—a *Reichsrath*. In the above Report mention is made of a "central representation," and if it is not placed in the most favorable light, yet the connection of such an institution with the greater centralization of the administration is pointed out. The attentive reader will not fail to observe the prudent care with which the minister evidently strives to preserve his proposals for reform from any appearance of novelty. But that Metternich's ideas of reform were not limited to the creation of a Home Ministry is proved, beyond doubt, by evidence in the Chancellor's own hand of a subsequent period. The passage alluded to was apparently written for the unhappily imperfect "Autobiography," and is as follows:

"While I declared [it was in the year 1817] as a fact defying all scrutiny, that the Austrian Empire possesses peculiar and exceptional conditions of existence and prosperity, and that it could only be a question of using, not removing, those conditions, the problem was, as far as I was concerned, limited to the discovery of the forms to be used and the means of carrying them out. The first is expressed in the idea of the strengthening of the Central Government; the other led me to the point whether this increase of strength was to be found in centralization according to the French idea, or by a consideration of the separate parts of the kingdom in relation to the Imperial power. My answer could not be doubtful. The question was of the preservation, not of the disintegration, of the Empire, and I took my stand on the principle of the legislative regulation of the parts and the simultaneous strengthening of the Central Government in its legislative and executive departments.

"In those parts there exist representative Diets which must be formed into one central body. The task was then, in spite of the difficulties inseparable from such a form, easier to define than the present state of things. I propose, therefore, a revision of the Diets in order to form a *Reichsrath*, which would extend from the centre outwards—from the Emperor to the landed proprietors selected—to be completed by delegates from the different Diets. To this new central point the scrutiny of the budget and every law will be submitted which concerns the community.

"The Emperor Francis saw the importance of the thing, but put off its examination from year to year, and, after his recovery from a severe illness which he had in the year 1827, declared his firm determination to take my Report into consideration. At the end of the year 1834 the Emperor told me that he reproached himself for not having carried out the matter, but that before the end of the year 1835 the declaration should be made. Two months afterwards he was no more!"

We must confine ourselves to these extracts, for we have not succeeded in finding the Report to the Emperor Francis here alluded to, which is hardly to be wondered at, considering the dilatory conduct to which the matter was exposed for eighteen years.—Ed.

THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF ITALY, AND METTERNICH'S DESIRE FOR A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE LOMBARDO-VENETIAN KINGDOM.

245. A memorandum by Metternich to the Emperor Francis.

246. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), Grätz, November 3, 1817.

245. Your Majesty will vouchsafe to remember that in October of last year I took occasion to lay before your Majesty the necessity of becoming acquainted with the action of the Government and the particular causes of the general dissatisfaction of the Italian States.

My principal object was, first, if necessary, to be able to act beneficially on the Government; secondly, from the data collected, to gain a firmer footing for administrative principles in our own Italian provinces.

At the same time I took the liberty of getting well-informed men to go to Florence, Modena, Parma, and Rome, and bring reports to your Majesty for this purpose. Your Majesty vouchsafed to look favorably on my views, and allowed me to accept from Counts Diego Guicciardi and Tito Manzi the offer I had invited them to make.

These gentlemen have now returned from their travels. Tito Manzi cannot but confess that everything which he saw and heard during his mission in Italy convinced him of the great and general dissatisfaction there prevailing. He divides the evils weighing upon Italy into two classes, namely:

General trouble, from which no State in the peninsula is free; and Particular grievances of each of these States.

Manzi ascribes the first of these to two principal causes: one resting, according to him, on nature itself, which has for three years been very severe on this country; the second he ascribes to the results of the conquest, which, by overthrowing political order, has shattered the foundations of the public welfare.

On closer inquiry into the particular grievances, Manzi described

the attitude of the separate States given back to Italy—rulers being set against the people, as well as the latter against their Governments. He began with Naples and Sicily, then came to Rome, and from thence to Tuscany, Lucca, Modena, and Parma, concluding with Piedmont.

Your Majesty will permit me to follow the same course.

Naples and Sicily.

Manzi regrets that Austria did not support the party which strove to raise Prince Leopold to the throne of Naples, and had not made the division of the two crowns conditional on the union of that Prince with the Archduchess Clementine. The prejudice of the ex-minister of an illegal Government for these revolutionary ideas ought not to cause surprise, and it is quite natural that he should look at Austria's advantage in this matter after the fashion of Napoleon, Murat, &c. But what would have been useful and serviceable for them would be prejudicial to a legitimate Government, whose policy must rest on the indestructible foundations of justice and integrity.

Your Majesty will vouchsafe to remember that in the course of the winter of 1815 the attempt was made by the ambassador, Prince Jablonowski, to find out the point of view from which his Court regarded these ideas; being ordered, however, to reject immediately any such communication, as so contrary to the principles of your Majesty that our ambassador dare not venture to bring it to your Majesty's knowledge.

It is not surprising that Tito Manzi, who knows nothing of the negotiations which accompanied the Act of Union of the two kingdoms, dwells on the unpleasant impression which this measure has produced on the Sicilian nobles, who had wished to be released from the constitution of Lord Bentinck, on condition of a complete reinstatement in their rights and privileges. The Neapolitan Government, on the other hand, intended the overthrow of Bentinck's constitution, because it was not in itself adequate to the end proposed, and because it tied their hands. For the same reasons also they could not wish to restore the old, and this the less because Sicily, instead of contributing in just proportion to the burdens of the State, was financially, under both constitutions, itself a considerable burden. By the union of the two kingdoms, however, the Government secured the great financial advantage of a gradual introduction of the Neapolitan administration into Sicily.

Your Majesty will remember that the happy conclusion of these negotiations was a great cause of satisfaction to King Ferdinand IV. He owes it also unquestionably to the interposition of your Majesty with the English Government. It was no easy task to induce the British ministry to surrender a constitution drawn up by Lord Bentinck, and introduced into Sicily under English influence—a question which, as it was a Parliamentary question, was exposed to two-fold difficulties. But it suited our interest to enter into the designs of the Neapolitan Court, and thus prevent Sicily from serving as an example to the kingdom of Naples subsequently, and also to prevent the numerous constitutionalists of this kingdom (supported by this example) from seeking to induce the ministry to give them also a representative form of government. The union of the two kingdoms was, moreover, the surest means of rendering impotent the awkward reports which were current with regard to Austria's design of placing Prince Leopold on the throne of Naples, and made the separation of the two crowns impossible for the future.

These were the grounds which moved your Majesty to support the present negotiation. To your Majesty King Ferdinand owes its happy termination, but he and his ministry attributed the greatest importance to the carrying out of this change, and to the declaration of Austria and England that it would not be opposed by these two Powers. It would, then, be false and ungrateful of the King to wish it to be believed that he was constrained or forced to these measures by your Majesty. Such an assertion could be believed by no one, and if it were really made would redound only to the disadvantage of the King himself.

Rome.

It is certainly remarkable that a former minister of Murat's should do such full justice to Cardinal Consalvi and his views as is done by this Tito Manzi. Whether he speaks of him well or ill, both are with foundation; and although one may regret that the Cardinal-Secretary supported his own work so feebly and was himself the cause of the *moiù proprio* failing so entirely, nevertheless the great service cannot be denied him of having had the courage to inaugurate in the States of the Church a form of government and principles well suited to prevent (at least during the course of his ministry) a violent reaction which would have been dangerous to all the Italian States.

If the course of the business of the administration was often interrupted by the disorder existing in the bureaux, yet it cannot be denied that the action of Cardinal Consalvi and the strength of his policy were successful in securing the peace of the capital, getting rid of the brigands or holding them in check, and by means of a very small armed power (a body of from 15,000 to 17,000 well-clothed and well-disciplined men) making the Government respected.

The Cardinal's political principles are known to your Majesty, and Manzi does him injustice, I think, when he doubts the sincerity of his feelings for Austria. Cardinal Consalvi is certainly as much devoted to us as the head of the Papal Ministry from his office can be, and certainly no less sincerely desirous to remove the hindrances which arose in consequence of Prince Kaunitz's negotiations (No. 249) with the Papal See, for he shared our feeling of the necessity (for the maintenance of peace in Italy, and the support even of the Papal Government) of a thorough agreement between the Roman and Austrian Courts.

Monsignor Pacca, Governor of Rome, and Head of the Police, is, according to Cardinal Consalvi, of all the Government officials, the most important. He seems to be a man of great resources, strong character, and much activity, but perhaps somewhat too severe. He would, if he were not restrained, be inclined to take energetic measures against the dissidents (*Sectiver*), and especially against the adherents of the last Government. Happily we succeeded in bringing him into confidential relations with us, and we made use of them to persuade him to a similar course with ours in police business.

As Manzi remarked, there can be no doubt that in the Legations, and especially in Bologna, there existed a so-called Austrian party, which cherished the hope that your Majesty would on the death of the Holy Father take this province under your protection. During my residence in Tuscany an attempt was even made to gain me over to this. I, however, rejected this idea as contrary to your Majesty's principles and opposed to the late transactions. And, in fact, in spite of all the advantages that a union of the Legations with the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom seemed to offer, I was far from being convinced that this union would be a real gain for the monarchy. I believe rather that Bologna, from the day when it belonged to Austria, would have become the centre of the opposition party against the Government in Italy, and that the same unquiet spirit

which now led to the desire to join us would be turned against us as soon as Bologna came into our possession.

Tuscany.

Unpleasant as is the picture drawn by Manzi of the present state of Tuscany, of the weakness of the ministry, of the individuals composing the Archducal ministry, and of the sadly altered feeling in this country, I cannot but feel that it is quite a true one. The data which I was able to collect during my stay in Florence, the results of my own observations, my conversations with the Grand Duke and his ministers, convinced me that no State in the world is more easy to govern and make happy than Tuscany. It would likewise depend on your Imperial Highness, even while materially lightening the burdens of the people, to become the richest monarch in Europe. Manzi calculates the revenues of these States alone at twenty million livres. I reserve to myself to show your Majesty in a separate Report that the revenue amounts to nearly double that sum. With such comparatively important resources, one cannot but be astonished that the Archduke's treasury is always empty, that the loans to the fiscal board make twelve per cent., that many useful public institutions lie idle, that all classes of the population are more or less discontented; and, lastly, that a land so highly favored by nature should have lost even the hope of a happier existence.

I will report verbally to your Majesty on this matter, and on the little I was able to effect during my residence in this interesting country, as well as give an account of my efforts to prepare the way for more confidential relations between the two Courts.

Lucca.

Some months ago (May 1817), I was able to lay before your Majesty, through Lieutenant Werklein, Manzi's views on the causes of the discontent in this country, as well as on its government. The provisional Governor may have allowed himself to be urged by his subordinates to many false measures; but yet he is a worthy man, who by his zeal, activity, and integrity, has a claim on your Majesty's favor.

At my departure I had the opportunity of observing that all classes of the population, although they desired the termination of

the provisional (Austrian) Government, did full justice to our principles—indeed, that they even reckoned on our support if their future ruler tried to govern them at ail in imitation of the Madrid Court.

Modena.

The short time (twenty-four hours) that I stayed in Modena did not suffice to show me whether and how far Manzi's assertion of the dissatisfaction reigning there among all classes was well founded, and whether it was true that the Archduke does not enjoy the affection of his subjects. I should be more inclined, however, to suppose that there is some exaggeration in Manzi's opinion of the administration and the ruler of this country. If the country is really badly governed, which I am far from positively asserting, certainly the fault must be with the Archduke, for he alone administers the government. To judge from some conversation with him, I should, however, suppose that he carries on this administration more like a wealthy and prudent landowner than as a sovereign.

What Manzi observes of the general discontent may arise from some cause easy of explanation. This little country furnished the greater number of the distinguished servants of the State in the late Kingdom of Italy, and many of them had reached the highest places in that Government. Deprived of their offices, without prospect for the future, they regret their former influence, their emoluments—in fact, they have lost all that nourishes and flatters human ambition. The latter circumstance made it necessary to return to their fatherland, where they were but coldly received by their sovereign, and apparently subjected to a strict observation; hence they naturally formed in Modena a centre of opposition to the present Government. Now, however, the Duke begins, in spite of his prejudice against the whole class, to give some of them civil and military appointments.

It is certain that between the Duke of Modena and the Roman Court, or, more properly, between that Prince and the Cardinals, close relations exist, and that this powerful party in Rome exercises in Modena a real influence detrimental to our interests in Italy. There is also no doubt that the Courts of Modena and Turin are in daily confidential agreement, which, far from being favorable to us, is intended to undermine our influence in Italy. Lastly, it is not to be denied that the Duke of Modena takes a part in complete opposition to our interests, which are, indeed, difficult to be com-

prehended by any Prince not of the House of Austria. But your Majesty knows him, and that he holds obstinately to his opinions; hence I believe that to attack these too sharply would risk the danger of alienating him from us permanently. These considerations led me, during my very short stay in Modena, not to touch on so delicate a question, but to confine myself to laying the foundations of the happiest relations.

Parma.

• If my residence of two days in Parma was too short to learn the course of the Government there, its defects and its advantages, as well as those of the persons entrusted with its direction, and to gain a right idea of the grounds of the dissatisfaction and its influence on public feeling, yet this short stay was sufficient to convince me that Manzi's deplorable picture is in many respects too strongly drawn. Since the removal of Count Magaroli, her Excellency the Archduchess devotes herself eagerly and anxiously to business. She presides over the ministerial councils, and the final decision rests with her.

Parma is not a fertile district; its commercial resources are unimportant. It has suffered much of late years from the passage of troops, from the want so prevalent in Italy, and, lastly, from an epidemic resulting from this distress. It is therefore possible that the public burdens are not connected with the present position of affairs; moreover, the finances do not seem to be so badly managed as Manzi describes, since I have found a balance in your Majesty's coffers, in spite of the expenses of a too costly army, an expensive Court, and large assistance to the public institutions.

Piedmont.

Of all the Italian Governments the Piedmontese is indisputably the one which calls for the most anxious attention. This country unites in itself all the different elements of discontent, and from this point of view I find Manzi's representation correct.

His remarks on the anxiety which the arming of this Power must create are not so just. The King of Sardinia, indeed, constantly occupies himself since his restoration with the formation of his army, and chiefly with the preparation of the means of bringing it quickly to a strength out of all proportion to the population and

finances of his States. However, the results have not so far corresponded with his efforts or his expectations.

I observe, too, that notwithstanding the widespread and well-founded grounds for dissatisfaction in the Sardinian States, and even in Genoa, which bears the yoke of this Power with great impatience, and does not conceal its annoyance, a revolutionary movement is not to be feared in this country.

Consequently, it is the intriguing policy of the Turin Cabinet alone which requires our careful observation. Your Majesty will have seen on many occasions that my attention has been directed to it, and that I have given this Cabinet itself distinctly to understand that none of its intrigues are unknown to us, and that we shall find means to prevent their success.

There is no doubt that the Turin Cabinet entertains ambitious views which can only be gratified at the expense of Austria. I had lately the opportunity of giving the Cabinet of St. James's a convincing proof of this, and urged them to join us in keeping watch on the proceedings of the Turin Cabinet. To this our efforts must, in my opinion, for the moment be limited. The Sardinian Court is, especially since its union with Genoa, too much bound to maintain its relations with England to venture on a political course contrary to that Power. This powerful motive must therefore weaken the ambitious designs entertained against us by the Sardinian Court long enough for us to ally ourselves closely with Great Britain, and we shall always have this counterpoise also to oppose to its intrigues at the Russian Court. In addition to which the King's present Ministry neither appreciates nor enjoys the confidence of the other branches of the Government; it is divided in its views and intentions.

Under such circumstances, the present position of things in Sardinia affords us the means by constant observations of its movements, and a continuance in our own straightforward and proper course, of rendering innocuous the feeling entertained against us by that Government.

The Affairs of the Dissidents in Italy.

I have for some time been certain of the existence in Italy of several secret fraternities, which, under different names, foster a spirit of excitement, discontent, and opposition. The designs and resources of these, their leaders and relations to each other and to foreign nations, are all points needful for us to discover in order to

form an estimate of the dangers which may grow out of them for the peace of Italy. Two years of active and unbroken observation convinced me that the actual existence of these different sects cannot be denied, and if their tendency is mischievous and in opposition to the principles of the Government, on the other hand they fail to enlist leaders of name and character, and lack central guidance and all other necessary means of organizing revolutionary action. In design and principle divided among themselves, these sects change every day and on the morrow may be ready to fight against one another. Manzi is here, I believe, quite right when he observes that the surest method of preventing any one of them from becoming too powerful is to leave these sects to themselves.

If these explanations are for the moment less disquieting, yet we must not look with indifference on such a mass of individuals, who, more or less adversaries of the existing order of things, may easily be led to disturb the public peace, especially if it is ever united by the alluring pretext of Italian independence.

England has for the moment relinquished these chimeras, and since she gave her consent to the union of Genoa with Piedmont and the withdrawal of the Bentinck constitution in Sicily, she has almost entirely lost the confidence of the Independents.

If we can accept Manzi's idea, the Roman Court secretly protects the sect of Guelphs, and makes use of the assistance of Modena to counterbalance the influence of Austria in Italy and extend its own. He thinks, too, that this Court constantly trembles lest disturbances should break out in these States caused by the Independents and numerous adherents of the late Kingdom of Italy. The present Papal Ministry is too enlightened not to see that no Italian State has more reason to guard against a revival of the agitation than the States of the Church, and that their greatest strength lies in close relations with Austria, and I cannot believe they will attempt to use against neighbors so dangerous a weapon, which may be turned against themselves.

France, whose policy has always consisted in upholding a party in Italy to paralyze the influence of Austria, has under her present Government too great an interest in holding in check the revolutionary elements which are obstructive to her own government, to encourage and support similar elements in foreign countries.

Spain, not hitherto of much political importance, will at first confine herself to gaining some adherents in Lucca and Parma who certainly do not belong to the class of Liberals.

Our anxiety regarding foreign influence can, therefore, only reasonably fall on either Prussia or Russia.

Prussia is too seriously engaged with the moral position of her own provinces to turn her attention outwards. The influence of Austria in Germany is necessary to her, and our relations with the Prussian Court exempt us from any anxiety lest, under present circumstances, she should encourage complications in Italy.

As to Russia, though I do not permit myself to entertain any suspicion against the feelings and views of the Emperor Alexander, which I believe to be sincere and pure, I am yet very far from being easy as to the spirit and the principles revealed by his ministers and innumerable agents in Italy. It is unknown to me whether the latter are or are not provided with instructions from their Court in this respect. In either supposition it is clear that they are actively employed in a way quite contrary to the interests of Austria, and furnish their Court, if ever a war breaks out between Russia and Austria, with the means of preparing very perplexing complications for us on the side of Italy. It has long been my endeavor to obtain such undeniable proofs of this as will enable me to appeal to the rectitude of the Emperor Alexander, and call upon him to stop a scandal so opposed to the feelings which he expresses to your Majesty.

If the Russian Cabinet is carrying on this game without the knowledge of its sovereign, he will know how to put a stop to it. If this is being done by his command, the Emperor Alexander will never be able to stand by a proceeding so different from the just principles he has proclaimed; and since it must be a matter of interest to him not to place himself in a false light before the eyes of Europe, or to compromise himself prematurely, the certainty that none of the intrigues of his agents are unknown to us will induce him to restrain their dangerous activity, at any rate for a time.

If these views be correct, I may flatter myself with the hope that, even if we admit the supposition of foreign influence, the sects in Italy will, for the present, occasion no real danger, if without active interference we continue to watch them.

Résumé.

The consideration and review of these data on the moral condition of all the Italian Governments (with the exception of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom) furnish the following results:

That the discontent is universal; that if this discontent was a natural consequence of the sufferings engendered by the last unfavorable years, and of the political changes which have taken place since 1814 and 1815, it must also be ascribed to the bad administration of the Governments; that in Italy, especially in its southern regions, and in Bologna and Genoa, there is undoubtedly a great ferment in the minds of the populations supported by the different sects, the tendency of which is without doubt dangerous, while the sects themselves, from the want of known leaders and of concerted action among themselves, are not nearly so dangerous as we might fear; that, notwithstanding the existence of this explosive matter, a revolutionary movement in Italy is not to be feared so long as it is not set on fire and maintained by some foreign Power; lastly, that at the present moment no Power can in this respect occasion real alarm.

If this picture is very far from being satisfactory, it yet gives us some ground to moderate our fears, and at the same time some advantages by which we may profit to make the Austrian Government popular in Italy, and to gain reputation and win the alliance of neighboring nations, none of whom are content with their present lot or with their Governments.

Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom.

Even the most zealous adherents of the last Government admit that the administration of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom had many essential advantages in comparison with the other States of Italy. They allow that all classes of the population were equally subject to the laws in Lombardy and the Venetian provinces; that the nobles and the rich did not maintain the upper hand; that the clergy were kept in subjection; that the changes made in property and sanctioned by law were respected, and that a veil of oblivion had been drawn over the past—that is to say, that no one was exposed either to public or private persecution. Apart from the justice done in this respect to the principles of the Austrian administration, it would, however, be a mistake to infer from this that general dissatisfaction was not prevalent in the provinces subject to your Majesty. Your Majesty has been informed of this state of things by the governors of the provinces and by the presidents of the police courts, and it cannot be unknown to your Majesty that the tedious progress of business; the design attributed to your Majesty of wish-

ing to give an entirely German character to the Italian provinces; the composition of the courts, where the Italians daily see with sorrow German magistrates appointed to offices; and the prolongation of the controversies between the Vienna Court and the Papal See, are the main causes to which this discontent is ascribed. Since these causes appear to me to be all more or less of a kind capable of removal, and since the paternal views of your Majesty have in this respect long been known to me, I think it my duty to repeat again, with the greatest respect, how important it would be, from a political point of view, to remove as soon as possible these defects and shortcomings of the administration in this most interesting part of the monarchy, to quicken and advance the progress of business, to conciliate the national spirit and self-love of the nation by giving to these provinces a form of constitution which might prove to the Italians that we have no desire to deal with them exactly as with the German provinces of the monarchy, or, so to speak, to weld them with those provinces; that we should there appoint, and especially in the magisterial offices, able natives of the country, and that, above all, an endeavor should be made to unite more closely with ourselves the clergy and the class of writers who have most influence on public opinion. I do not doubt that it is possible to attain this most desirable and beneficial end without encountering great difficulties, and even without being exposed to the necessity of departing from those general principles upon which the administration of the other parts of the monarchy are based—principles which unquestionably must be preserved in the interests of the common weal, though their application may admit of many modifications. I cherish, lastly, the hope that whenever your Majesty is induced to set in motion the salutary designs long contemplated, and to establish the well-being of these provinces on an enduring basis, public opinion will declare itself for Austria, discontent will disappear with its causes, and the Italians will at last regard Austria as the only Government which can afford a sure support to public tranquillity. If ever this day should come, then the influence of foreigners will cease to be feared, and we shall gain one far more essential with our neighbors—the influence given by opinion.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Grätz, November 3, 1817.

246. I have the honor to submit to your Majesty in the accompanying documents the results of the labors which I undertook in

Italy, and of the observations which I there made. That my chief work, which I enclose with this (No. 245), is drawn up with perfect truth, and contains a faithful picture of the present state of things in Italy—for this I vouch. The result of my observation, which has grown to be absolute conviction, is that the Austrian Government has only to observe a steady course in order to play in Italy a part to which your Majesty is in every respect called. A great work has been done by the new relations in which your Majesty has placed the Government of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom. In consequence of this constitution public opinion will pronounce entirely in favor of your Majesty, and in these measures lies all the good which we are entitled to require of administrative measures; they fulfil naturally the just wishes of a nation, and they are of a nature to strengthen the power of a Government. This purpose can always be attained in the ways now indicated.

In our Italian provinces there prevails at this moment the greatest dissatisfaction with the measure—in itself very natural, and supported by solid grounds—for the extension of the general custom-house laws to these countries. This extension has been made with a view to local demands and local relations; against which nothing can be said. Wherein, then, do the difficulties (among which I include some natural and easily obviated grievances) consist? A casual conversation with the President of the Chamber of Commerce has given me information on this point.

In the Lombardo-Venetian province there is little taste for manufactures: most of the articles in daily use Italy imports from foreign countries. France and England have made the greatest advances in manufactures. These two States, with an industry peculiar to them, supply all the markets of Italy. In Austria, too, the manufacturing spirit is in a torpid condition. Our manufacturers care but little to make themselves known in foreign countries, and the Italian provinces were and are in this respect for Bohemia and Austria still foreign countries. Now we have made such decrees for protection and prohibition that none of our manufactures are known in Italy. The merchant beyond the Alps, therefore, naturally thinks himself abandoned and neglected. Impressed with a feeling of this great disadvantage, the Board of Trade now makes arrangements to send samples and patterns to Italy.

The sending of samples, the renewal of correspondence between the retail dealers of Milan and the manufacturers of Bohemia, ought to have been the first measure. The Government ought to have

taken care that on the day of the prohibition the Italian merchants had had before their eyes the equally good and equally cheap, if not cheaper, wares. The second measure would then have been quite naturally the prohibition of foreign wares, and this would have silenced the outcry, or reduced it to an empty groundless criticism of a few ill-affected persons.

I will venture to touch on another circumstance which deeply affects the minds of your Majesty's Italian subjects.

Your Majesty is too well acquainted with the state of things in Italy not to be aware that, in nearly the whole of the peninsula, it is the custom in all the most cultivated classes to send the sons who are destined for literary or commercial professions to Tuscany for instruction in the language. If your Majesty will authorize the provincial guilds in Tuscany to grant permission for the study of the *Humaniora* to young people from ten to twelve years old on the representation of their parents, without further interrogation, this would produce an excellent impression on the cultivated part of the community, and it would be a great object to the Government to retain business men who are masters of the Italian language. This remark is the more important as the educational arrangements in the monarchy are not only such as to interfere with or prevent the journeys of young people, but even those of foreigners and strangers.

ANNALS OF LITERATURE.

247. Metternich to Professor Matthäus von Collin, December 10, 1817.

248. Metternich to Carl Böttiger, December 27, 1817.

247. His Majesty the Emperor has commissioned me to take the new literary journal under my immediate though unacknowledged direction.

The notice I herewith inclose may therefore, with the slight alterations I have made, immediately appear.*

The contract is concluded with the Messrs. Gerold, the publishers. I appoint you, sir, to be chief editor.

As second editor I appoint M. Pilat. It will be his business to be entirely at your disposal, and to act as middleman whenever it happens that you are prevented from direct intercourse with me. The conduct of the business, however, rests, sir, entirely with you.

The criticism of the journal may be divided into two parts. To the political part I will myself attend. The literary and scientific part will be entrusted to one who was well known when President of the Chief Court of Police. The necessary introduction I will forward without delay.

In carrying out this matter and in all measures necessary for the

* The object of the *Jahrbücher* may be inferred from this notice: "Everything properly considered as belonging to the duty of a literary journal will also be the object of this *Jahrbücher*. It will endeavor to include reviews of the most important writings by contemporaries in the whole sphere of knowledge; impartial criticism will be its first law and the groundwork of our best efforts.

"The *Jahrbücher* will devote especial attention to the encouragement of knowledge in the Austrian States, where great industry is already shown by the learned men of the Fatherland in many branches of knowledge, and there is a great increase in the peculiarly Italian literature; it will also strive to bring before its readers those works in every literature by which science or art can be advanced. The object of this institution is especially this: to give a satisfactory survey of the most important of the great and noble works of contemporaries who, however divided by national peculiarities, are all led by one and the same aspiration for the advancement of knowledge."—Ed.

conduct of the business, I shall, sir, always await your reports and suggestions.

Metternich to Carl Böttiger, Vienna, December 27, 1817.

248. I have received your esteemed letter and first literary report, and read them with great pleasure. I beg of you to continue the same and to rest assured of my gratitude.

In the enclosure you will find an invitation to take part in an undertaking long proposed and always desired by yourself. The new journal rejoices in the protection of the Government. The first expenses of an institution which can only be maintained by its success will be granted on the part of the State. His Majesty the Emperor, from a feeling of the utility of the more than ever laborious work of which the truly learned men of the present day are capable, will furnish the necessary funds for the undertakings of our most eminent men in particular departments of science and literature. This is the only kind of interference suitable for the Government. The character of the learned men who have been invited to join in the editorship will insure that the criticisms in the *Jahrbücher der Literatur* shall always be of a thoroughly learned and truly cosmopolitan character. I should, however, not have thought it proper, sir, to send you this invitation myself if I had not been encouraged to do so by my former personal acquaintance. Receive, &c.

RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH ROME ON ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS.

249. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, December 1817.

249. When I left Vienna for Florence last June the chief subjects of negotiation with the Holy See with which I was charged by your Majesty were the following:

(a) His Holiness to renounce the right he has hitherto held of nominating archbishops, bishops, and other dignitaries in the former Republics of Venice and Ragusa.

(b) The practice to be given up of requiring the newly appointed Italian bishops to go to Rome to have their appointments confirmed by the Pope.

(c) The proceedings against the preconisation of the newly appointed Bishop of Brünn to be given up, and the misunderstanding removed with regard to the Bishop of Munkatsch.

(d) The differences to be arranged which had arisen on the part of the Pope, as to the oath to be taken by the Austrian bishops at their installation, and the ceremonies to be observed thereat.

(e) The reservations to be made for the preservation of our rights on the cession of the clerical jurisdiction hitherto practised on Piedmontese territory by the Archbishop of Milan and Bishop of Pavia.

(f) The Papal confirmation to be obtained for the new dioceses arranged by your Majesty in the States of Lombardy and Venice, in Tyrol and Vorarlberg.

Your Majesty knows the reasons why I thought it best not to make use of your Majesty's kind permission to go to Rome, which reasons restricted me to a confidential correspondence with the Cardinal Secretary of State, Consalvi, and this at a most unfavorable time* in consequence of the illness of the Pope and the un-

* Metternich reported to the Emperor Francis from Florence, July 19, 1817: "The Pope's health is always in the same very uncertain condition. The state of things in Rome, however, is such that we shall gradually gain all rea-

usual compliance just then shown by France towards the Holy See in the formation of a concordat. I am, however, happy to be able to inform your Majesty that all these points have been arranged according to your Majesty's wishes, except concerning the journey of the newly appointed Italian bishops to Rome; and with regard to this latter point, such modifications have been arranged that (by putting aside the *questio juris* to be decided at a more favorable opportunity) there is every hope of attaining the aim *de facto*.

With regard to this, the following explanations will give further details:

(a) His Holiness the Pope has not only agreed to the renunciation in question but has issued a bull, by virtue of which the sovereign right of your Majesty and your successors is acknowledged for ever—the right, that is, to nominate the Patriarch of Venice and all archbishops and bishops in the whole territory of the former Republics of Venice and Ragusa, as far as they are incorporated in the Austrian kingdom.

(b) Unsuccessful attempts have been made to induce the Roman Court to declare that the newly appointed bishops in Lombardy and Venetia are exempt from the obligation that binds all other Italian bishops to go to Rome to have their appointments confirmed, but we have been given to understand, confidentially, that his Holiness may probably be willing to grant dispensations in single cases, where the newly appointed bishop, from age, weakness, or want of means, is unable to take the journey to Rome.

(c) The Bishops of Brünn and Munkatsch nominated by your Majesty have, in consequence of the negotiations, already received the Pope's confirmation with the bulls referring to it, and consequently have taken their episcopal seats.

(d) The Roman Court makes no further objection to the explanation as to the oath of the bishops and the ceremonies observed at their installation, and has tacitly acknowledged the practice by giving the apostolic confirmation to the above-named Bishops of Brünn and Munkatsch without insisting upon an alteration of the usual oaths and ceremonies.

(e) In order to be secured against the disadvantages which might have arisen from giving up the clerical jurisdiction hitherto prac-

sonable objects without an actual negotiation. My non-appearance in Rome causes much surprise, and I make use of this feeling in the way which seems to me most useful."—ED.

tised by the Bishops of Milan and Pavia, an official declaration has been obtained from the Court of Turin that this renunciation shall have no effect whatever on the temporalities and corporations, seminaries and religious institutions, which have had property, personal or otherwise, or drawn their revenues from Piedmontese territory, but that they shall continue in their undisturbed possession and enjoyment.

(*f*) His Holiness has declared his willingness to sanction the new division into dioceses as arranged by your Majesty, and to send the bulls concerning it as soon as the documents still wanting have arrived in Rome. These documents I shall therefore despatch immediately.*

* Besides the measures mentioned in this paragraph, referring to the regulation of the home affairs of the Empire, Metternich had a great influence on many other arrangements of importance for the Empire, although documentary evidence of the same is not forthcoming. Thus Tyrol got back its old constitution of States; Dalmatia was divided into five districts; the kingdom of Illyria was formed of Carinthia, Carniola, and parts of the maritime States; all the provinces of Austria in Germany were declared parts of the German Confederation, &c. All these arrangements were brought about by the co-operation of Metternich during the first years of peace, 1816 and 1817.

A statesman of Prince Metternich's character, who enjoyed the full confidence of his monarch, and possessed a great amount of experience gained in difficult times, as a matter of course extended his care to the internal development of the Empire, because of the close connection of the internal condition with the foreign affairs with which he was entrusted. But the nature of a well-arranged official organization accounts for the fact that only on rare and very important occasions are any documents to be found by the head of a department on subjects foreign to his sphere of action. For the personal intercourse with the monarch the proceedings at the green table of the conference, where the interchange of ideas takes place verbally, leave, as a rule, no written traces—at least none of a kind to be accessible to future inquiry. Besides, it is to be remembered that during Francis's reign, nobody more strictly enforced the legal limits of competence in his officials than the Emperor Francis himself, while during Ferdinand's reign the power of the Chancellor of State in the home administration (much overestimated by contemporaries) was baffled by many paralyzing influences. The want of autobiographical memoirs for this and the next period, explains our being induced by the title of the book which here closes to make these short remarks (illustrating the subject and partly forestalling its history) on Metternich's proceedings in the department of home policy.—Ed.

BOOK V.

*LUSTRUM OF THE CONGRESS.
PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS.*

1818-1822.

LUSTRUM OF THE CONGRESS.

1818.

THE WATER-CURE AT CARLSBAD.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his Family, from July 8 to August 26, 1818.

250. Arrival at Carlsbad. 251. Begins the waters. 252. Arrangement of the day. 253. Madame Catalani—Valabrègue and Goethe. 254. From Königswart—Strassenbau—the Abbot of Tepl. 255. Anxiety about Metternich's father. 256. His death. 257. Departure from Königswart.

Metternich to his Wife, Carlsbad, July 8, 1818.

250. Here I am, my dear, in this place of charms and delights. It will deserve that name from me the day I am thoroughly re-established in health. I came at a deuce of a pace from Vienna here; I took only forty hours on the journey; they could not do more in England or Italy. I left Collin at five in the morning yesterday, passed three hours at Prague, and reached Carlsbad at midnight precisely. The town is overflowing with strangers.

251. *July 11.*—I am still expecting Staudenheim,* naturally enough, for he could only arrive to-day if he did not leave Vienna till Wednesday. I do not trust his talent as a courier; I have never seen a little man like him post quickly, and I give him eighty hours to make the same journey as I did in forty. If he does not arrive during this day, I shall begin to-morrow to drink the Neubrunn. It is the best known and the safest spring, although the least powerful. After that I shall go wherever Staudenheim wishes to take me; you know that I always follow blindly the advice of my medical man. For the rest, I shall begin my cure under very good auspices. My health is improved by the journey, and were it not for a cursed lumbago which seized me yesterday when stooping to wash my

* Dr. Staudenheim was Count Metternich's private physician.—Ed.

face, I should be very well. Yesterday I could hardly walk ten steps during the day. To-day I am better, though still suffering very much. I do not know how it is that I have the talent of getting ill on every occasion.

I have arranged my manner of life according to the customs of the place. I am in bed every night at half-past ten, and I rise at six. Everybody is at the waters at half-past six; they breakfast at ten, dine at three, and eat no supper.

252. *July 13.*—I wish Baden was situated like Carlsbad, which is really charming. I have never stayed here long enough to know all the surroundings; the roads are all good: during the last twelve years they have been made on all sides. One can now get to Eger in three hours, and consequently to Königsward* in six. We have the most beautiful weather: it is very hot, and you know how I appreciate heat at this season. I live entirely by rule. From six to eight in the morning I rush about with seven or eight hundred persons like so many fools. We meet at nine for breakfast, and this is very pleasant; the tables are laid before the different houses, and those who like join together; so I made them take mine to the door of the house where Schwarzenberg lives, for it is better situated than mine; we recommence our walking after breakfast till midday. I dine alternately at home and with Charles or Joseph Schwarzenberg. We take every day, at five o'clock, a walk of two or three miles. I go to the Salle at eight, or I have a whist-party at home; and all Carlsbad is in bed at ten. This way of life would suit you very well.

253. *July 30.*—Madame Catalini arrived here yesterday, having been expected with much impatience. She will give a concert on the 1st. I shall therefore not leave till the morning of the 2nd, though I finish my course of waters to-morrow. Staudenheim, who never trifles, forbids me to drink them on the 1st, for he says they have made me well and that too much of them would be luxury. On the other hand, he wishes Madame Catalini to take them with great assiduity for thirty days, for she appears to him an excellent subject for Carlsbad. For the concert the day after to-morrow the orchestra will be composed in the following manner: *Leader of the orchestra*: an old organist of the chapel, who has been trying to cure a liver complaint for three years and not succeeded; *clavichord*: a Prince de Biron, who always lies, except when he says he plays this

* A property belonging to Count Metternich.

instrument well; *first violin*: a Saxon Colonel; *second violin*: a Prussian Captain; *violoncello*: the Prussian General Count de Hacke. We are still in search of other instruments; the trumpeters only are hired. They are the keepers of the great court, who announce the arrival of visitors with the sound of the trumpet. If this concert creates a *furor*, it will be fortunate!

At the first rehearsal of the concert, which took place at my house, Goethe arrived. I introduced him to Madame Catalini, saying he was a man of whom Germany was proud. Valabrègue* asked me, "Who is Goethe?" I told him that he was the author of "*Werther*." The unhappy man did not forget this; for lo and behold! some days afterwards he went up to him and said: "My dear Goethe, what a pity it is you could not see Potier in the part of '*Werther*!' It would have made you burst with laughing."

254. *Königswart, August 3.*—I came here yesterday, and shall remain until the 5th. Besides, Franzensbrunn is so near that I hope often to return here, in order that I may see that the most is made of the new establishment at Marienbad, which is a real godsend for this property. Within the last three years I have added more than four thousand *toises* (six feet) of roads. Now, one is able to go from Eger to where the road branches off from the Sandau and Altwasser road to the *château* on one of the finest roads possible, and I am going to have it planted with trees. The peasants, who formerly destroyed all the trees, are now beginning to preserve them. We must next make a road from Grossichdichfür to Marienbad, and this road will be costly, on account of a steep hill in the Walderl which it must avoid. I shall finish it, however, in less than a year. The Abbot of Tepl, who is coming to dine with me to-day, ought to contribute towards it. This Abbot is terribly afraid of me; I do not know how the absurd story has been spread through the country, that the Abbey is to be secularized, and that the Emperor wishes to make me a present of it. I contradict it in vain, the noble convent trembles none the less, and I can obtain from it all which is just and reasonable, in consequence of its dread that the Emperor may be unjust and myself unreasonable. The Königswart property is at any rate much improved by the neighborhood of these new waters.

* Catalani's husband.

Metternich to his Mother, Franzensbad, August 13.

255. It is with a broken heart, my dear mother, that I write to you in the most painful moment of my life and yours. A letter which I received to-day from my wife does not allow me to hope for my father's restoration to health. From all I hear I feel sure that he is dying the death which nature has reserved for advanced age—a gentle death, free from the suffering which accompanies acute disease. If I consulted only my own feelings, I should start immediately for Vienna, but everything is against my doing so. Staudenheim actually forbids me interrupting the cure which has begun, and which promises the most satisfactory results. He declares that the waters here must not be interrupted in their course, and that by interrupting them I should undergo all the inconveniences he is anxious to avoid. And should I find my father, even if I set off immediately? Everything is arranged for my journey and arrival on the Rhine before the end of the month. I shall find there all the men whom I ought to meet before the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle, and the delay which attends this meeting, far from being inconvenient, may be of incalculable advantage in its results. In conclusion, should I be performing a duty which would benefit my poor father? Would not my sudden arrival do more harm than good? This is the consideration which has most weight with me, but the sad event which we are now expecting could not have happened at a moment more painful to me. If my father should live, and expresses a desire to see me, were it only for one moment, I would put aside all these considerations and come to you. A moment's happiness in this world would not encroach on the eternal joy which awaits him.

You see, my good mother, it is for you to direct and decide what I ought to do. There are times in which it is scarcely possible one's self to know how to act for the best.

If the sad event takes place, apply to Bartenstein for everything. I have given him full directions. My brother has written to me (for which I beg you to thank him) to assure me that he will do all he possibly can. I believe I thought of everything in my last letter to Bartenstein.

I would strongly advise you to go and join my family at Baden. You will be better there than at Salzburg; you will avoid the trouble of a long journey, and will feel at home.

. . . In conclusion, my dear mother, take care of yourself, and remember that, if you can do no more for him, you owe it to us to think of yourself.

My poor father in leaving this world will at least have the consolation that I have never given him a moment of unhappiness, and this is the sweetest feeling of my life. He cannot refuse me his blessing, and I shall know how to deserve it.

Adieu, my dear good mother. I embrace you, and implore you not so much to think of yourself as of all of us.

256. *Franzensbrunn, August 14.*—I wrote yesterday, my dear mother, in all the anxiety of a painful uncertainty; to-day, when I have received the news of the loss we have sustained, I can only repeat what I said to you yesterday. Although the blow was expected, it is not the less dreadful. The courier arrived yesterday just as I was going to bed. It consoles me for my absence to think that my poor father was unconscious. He died without perceiving that he was treading the valley of the shadow of death, and he felt none of its horrors—a happy death, not reserved for every one!

. . . I have ordered here everything necessary for depositing the remains of my father, as far as arranging a more suitable place of repose than the tomb which now exists in the parish of Königswart. I intend to make a place of sepulture which will one day contain us all. Those who ought not to be separated in this world should not be isolated in their last resting-place. I have ordered obsequies in all the parishes, here as well as at Ochsenhausen and in Moravia. If my father needed prayers to assist him to his place in the other world, those of his own people will not be wanting.*

Adieu, my dear mother. May God preserve you for many years, and give you in this heavy trial that strength of mind which should never abandon us, even in the most trying moments. I charge all my family, who are no less yours, with those duties which I should have desired to fulfil myself.

Metternich to his Wife, Königswart, August 26.

257. I write to you, my dear Laura, a few hours before my departure. I am feeling very sad. Everything which separates us is painful to me, and I feel more and more every day the pain of being separated from my dear little family. I should like to have you

* See on the same subject No. 283.—Ed.

always with me, or never to leave Vienna. Few lives are so fatiguing as those which are spent in the highest walks of life, and in the midst of important and intricate affairs. Formerly these affairs could be carried on quietly. How many difficulties there are in my career, and how different are they from those of all former ministers, and perhaps even from those to come !

I shall be at Frankfurt on the 29th, and spend two busy days there. I shall have the entire Diet on my hands. I know already that most of the ministers there are trembling at my appearance; of my forty-eight hours I shall take at least from twelve to fifteen to lecture the well-intentioned and to do justice to those who are not. My two days at Frankfurt will, however, be worth at least a hundred as far as business is concerned.

On the 1st I shall go to see the Duke of Nassau, and from there go on to Johannisberg. The Duke has paid me many attentions, and deserves at least a visit from me in return. They write to me from Frankfurt that he has a hundred men at work making a road as far as the *château* from the point where one leaves the main road. The monks of Fulda had taken care to leave this road impracticable, for fear of attracting too many visitors. My cellars being empty, I do not run the same risk, and I prefer some *toises* of a good road to many bottles of wine. He has, moreover, ordered his keepers to furnish me with game, and his gardeners with the fruits of his forests and gardens. As I shall probably only remain there a short time, I shall make no great ravages in either the one or the other.

I am also informed that, since the inhabitants on the banks of the Rhine have learnt that the Emperor is coming down the river, they have been making immense preparations along the whole route. It is no doubt the part of Europe where the Emperor is most loved, more even than in our own country. The whole scene will be admirable. The Emperor will have a real fleet. There is not one more yacht or boat to be hired on the river; all are taken by the people living on the banks, and the whole population will be on the river side. I foresaw this, and I believe it will be a success. These demonstrations prove better than the Jena newspapers what is the opinion of the people. We shall have a splendid article for the "Observer."

I wish you were all with me, my dear ones !

JOURNEY TO THE RHINE.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters, from August 31 to September 24, 1818.

258. Arrival in Frankfurt—illness. 259. Metternich's appearance at the Bundestage. 260. The result—Staudenheim on the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. 261. First visit to Johannisberg. 262. Description of Coblenz. 263. Project for the erection of a national monument—the “*Volks-sagen*”—the “*Brömser von Rudesheim*”—made Duke of Portella. 264. From Mayence—arrival of the Emperor Francis. 265. From Bingen—splendid scenes on the Rhine—feeling for the Emperor Francis—dinner to the Emperor at Johannisberg.

Metternich to his Wife, Frankfurt, August 31, 1818.

258. I arrived here comfortably, my dear, the day before yesterday, in the evening, and alighted as usual at Mülhens' house, where I am lodged as I should like to be all my life. One cannot understand how a little retired grocer has had the taste to build and furnish a house like this, nor how a man so avaricious could spend six hundred thousand florins to be well housed.

Yesterday I spent the most agreeable morning in the world. From ten till four, I received all the Confederation, deputations from the magistrates, *corps diplomatique*, &c. To increase the pleasure, I had caught on the way, from the intense cold and infernal damp, one of my nice colds in the head, and as the Diet *in corpore* is not made to heal anything, I was obliged to go to bed in the evening and try to get into a perspiration. Staudenheim, who never trifles, told me this morning that I had better remain in bed all day, and I, a gentle invalid, submit.

I shall stay here to-morrow and the day after, and go to Johannisberg on the 3rd. One has no idea of the difference of the climate of this country from our own. I was ready to die of cold in Bohemia, and here we have not had one single cool day. It has rained for eight days, and been warm all the time, which is very promising for the wine. I have had extravagant offers for the vine-

yards of Johannisberg, but I have refused them all. One was an offer of fifty thousand florins to be paid immediately, the wine to be sealed and laid down for six years at Johannisberg, then sold for our common benefit—that is to say, that I should divide the profits besides the fifty thousand florins. But I do not wish to divide, and I hold, moreover, that it is better to establish the reputation of the cellar.

259. *September 4.*— . . . You can have no idea of the effect produced by my appearance at the Diet. An affair which perhaps would never have ended has been concluded in three or four days. I am more and more convinced that affairs of importance can only be properly conducted by one's self. Everything done second hand is vexatious and troublesome, and makes no progress. I have become a species of moral power in Germany, and perhaps even in Europe—a power which will leave a void when it disappears: and nevertheless it will disappear, like all belonging to poor frail human nature. I hope Heaven will yet give me time to do some good; that is my dearest wish.

260. *September 11.*—At last, my dear, I am ready to start. I shall sleep to-morrow at Johannisberg, and go on the following morning. I shall dine at Coblenz, and spend the 14th and 15th there, and on the 16th I shall return to Johannisberg and remain there till the 22nd.

I derive real pleasure from these different journeys; I go to revisit the scenes of my youth, and I expect to find them changed, as I am changed myself. The walls remain intact, but the men have nearly all disappeared. I am convinced that I shall not find five persons of my acquaintance at Coblenz; I will give you all the details, and though they cannot interest you, they will my mother. I shall go and visit all the spots she knows, and where she passed the best years of her life. She was beautiful and beloved there, and what more is necessary to make a place pleasant and its remembrance dear? This is the good side of women. We men need more to make us carry away agreeable recollections of our sojourns. I count my recollections only by public affairs, negotiations, and treaties—happy if the latter do not ruin me altogether.

My visit here has been crowned with great success. I arrived at Frankfurt like the Messiah to save sinners. The Diet wears a new aspect since I have taken a part in it, and everything which seemed so impossible is concluded. I do not believe that twelve days ever bore more fruit at an equally important period. All that the in-

triguers were aiming to take to Aix-la-Chapelle, to interrupt the progress of affairs, is no longer in their power. In a word, I have a conviction that I have served the cause better at this moment, which does not appear to offer immense advantages, than on twenty other more brilliant occasions. This will, however, be none the less useful.

I shall see Johannisberg for the first time to-morrow, and it must be very beautiful, for all who have seen it rave about it. I have seen it in imagination twenty times: now I am going to see it in reality, and I hope I shall not be disappointed. I often think of my poor father: he would have taken a thousand times more pleasure in the place than I do; and it would have been worth more, because he would have been the proprietor. Neither had he the happiness of seeing a good arrangement for the *médiatisés* which will shortly appear. I promised it to him during my stay at Frankfurt, and felt that I was fulfilling a duty towards him in keeping my word, and I declare to you I have more satisfaction in that feeling than in the thing itself. What a happy time he would have passed in my place this morning! Perhaps he envies me from the other world—if envy can be felt there—the hour I have had the misfortune to pass with an infernal M. de Schmitz, the man of business to the house of Linange, and all the *médiatisés* whom he adored when here on earth. I do not know if at the age of seventy I shall like tiresome people and pedants: I certainly cannot stand them now.

I was present yesterday at a conference which Staudenheim had with the hereditary Prince of Hesse-Homburg. The latter consulted him about a malady which Staudenheim declares to be flying gout, but which with the Prince takes the appearance of everything—that is to say, it resembles insanity. I am sorry I had not a short-hand writer with me; he would have furnished an excellent chapter for a comic romance. The point on which the negotiation between the doctor and the sick man was broken of was that of the sick man's breakfast. The Prince did not wish to be deprived of half a yard of sausage with which he was accustomed to begin the labors of the day. Staudenheim got into a rage, the Prince began to swear, and they seemed to have the sausage by the two ends, and to be struggling who should wrench it from his adversary, Staudenheim ended by carrying off the sausage, and the cure is about to commence under the auspices of the Princess Elizabeth of England.

261. *Johannisberg, September 12.*—I have been here, my dear

Laura, since five o'clock this evening. I arrived early enough to see from my balcony twenty leagues of the course of the Rhine, eight or ten towns, a hundred villages, and vineyards which this year will yield twenty millions of wine, intersected by meadows and fields like gardens, beautiful oak woods, and an immense plain covered with trees which bend beneath the weight of delicious fruit. Thus much without. As for within, I find a large and good house, of which in time a fine *château* may be made: but we are still far from having that. I have spent nearly ten thousand florins in the last two months to make it what may fairly be called passable. My friend Handel has chosen the paper-hangings and furniture. The papers he has put on the walls are inconceivable: above all, it is inconceivable where he could have found what he has chosen. The evil is, however, confined to three rooms; the rest of the apartments are painted in one color.

First of all, I ran through the *château*, the stables, and places for making the wine. I have not visited the cellars, because there is no wine in them, and because I am just recovering from rheumatic fever. I have made the acquaintance of Father Arndt, the famous manager of the place, and the best of *employés* for an estate of this kind. Picture to yourself an old abbé of about sixty, virtuous from position, and I believe by conviction, who has not even the first and commonest defect of old monks. This good man has such a horror of wine that he has not drunk one bottle since he has been at Johannisberg; yet he is the best *connoisseur* of wine in the canton, but he judges of it by his nose. It is sufficient for him to smell a bottle of wine to decide its quality, its growth, and its year; he can even distinguish mixtures, and has never been known to make a mistake. Heaven made him for this business, as he was not born a pointer. He reckons on forty-six casks this year, *at least*: when he adds this phrase, it is understood in the country that forty-six means fifty-two.

I am here with Floret, who only regrets that the year 1817 was so bad, and that he cannot find a small remnant from the preceding years; Swoboda, who does not believe that beyond the frontiers of our beautiful kingdom there can be a tolerable country; and M. de Handel, proud as Artabanus of the choice he has made of the furniture. He has particularly drawn my attention to a cupid, which unfortunately has all its limbs dislocated, and which is conspicuous above one of the doors from its excited attitude. He seems to have drunk all that Father Arndt has not drunk. Handel boasts, too, of his

choice of a great round table, the top of which weighs a hundred pounds, and which rests on a crane's foot so small that Gentz will never enter the room in which it stands for fear of being maimed.

I hope to start to-morrow at ten in the morning, so as to arrive at Coblentz at six in the evening.

Metternich to his Mother, Coblentz, September 15.

262. I must write to you, my dear mother, were it only that you may have a letter from your son, written at this place.

I arrived here the day before yesterday, just as night was closing in. It would be difficult to imagine anything more beautiful than the road from Bingen. I believe it is even preferable to the descent by the river. One rolls along an excellent road, which in another two years will leave nothing to be desired; at present the railings by its side are in many places only too necessary.

The environs of Coblentz are greatly improved by the fine roads which meet there from every direction. One is astonished to find oneself in the avenues in front of the *château* without having been jolted at the foot of the Chartreuse and across the gardens where old Kintelius used to fancy he was practising gardening. The trees that we saw planted in front of the *château* are very large; it is like being in the midst of a forest. This is a sad sight for those who saw them when they were mere sticks. The *château* itself has the look of a deserted house: doors, windows, all are broken. It is at present used as a military establishment. The King wishes to rebuild it, but its destination is not absolutely decided. The town itself is where we left it. The interior of this old town is improved—not that the houses are changed, but the streets are better paved, and the terrible signboards which obstructed the view have given place to boards like those in Paris. It is evident that the town has passed some years under French domination; its influence is visible in many things—notably in the shops. Among other things, the fountains in the squares are well constructed. In front of the church of St. Castor there is a fountain with the following inscription: “*Érigée par le préfet l'an 1812, mémorable par la campagne de Russie;*” and below, “*Vu et approuvé par nous, Commandant russe à Coblentz, le 1^{er} Janvier, 1814.*”

They are making fine strong fortifications on the three points which command the town—at Ehrenbreitstein, on the mountain of St. Peter (*das ehemalige Brunnenstübchen*), and behind the Chartreuse.

The environs of Coblenz are certainly among the most remarkable on the Rhine. Our garden near the Moselle is now a field. I have been to see the house, the entrance to which is as it must have been always, but the riding-school, the coach-house, the old door, the walls between the two courts—all have disappeared. There is a little wall, with two doors with pillars forming the entrance to the court, and a small public square has replaced the houses which obstructed the entrance. The house is in the most pitiable state, and very dirty; there are no traces of what it once was. The Court of Appeal occupies the greater part, and the small house is inhabited by a general, who, I suppose, finds himself pinched for room. I went through the garden; the English part is replaced by a score of large trees, planted without order where the old thickets were; the hermitage has disappeared: the hillock on which it stood still marks the spot. The meadow remains; the *espalier* is converted into great trees such as grow in the fields; on the terrace the lime-trees are immense, and partly obscure the view. The frescoes alone have resisted the ravages of time; the stable wall is covered with them, and they struck me as being exceedingly bad.

Of our old acquaintances there only remain here the old Count d'Eltz (who is dying), and Count Remus, who lives in the Burreheims' house for some months in every year. The two ladies, his aunts, are alive, and intend to marry when they can find husbands. The rest of the gentry have disappeared, they and their little fortunes. Faithful to the customs of the country, all these gentlemen have ruined themselves more than the Revolution has ruined them. Count de Boos is the last to leave; he is now at Sayn, where he is dying in consequence of a visit he made to Paris, where he destroyed his health and lost all his fortune at play. Kerpen's house displays the name of a linendraper's shop. Leyen's house, which is in very good condition, is occupied by the military governor. The castle of Kesselstadt is transformed into an iron manufactory. Bassenheim's house will, one of these days, fall on the head of a general who is living in it. The Laacher-Hof bears beneath its ancient name an innkeeper's signboard. I lodge at the Hôtel de Trèves, which is one of the worst inns in Europe—the best is at Thal.

There are no traces of the old *château* below Ehrenbreitstein: it is replaced by a battery of twenty-four guns.

This rough sketch will give you an idea of the town, which is, indeed, in its old place, but is not at all the old town itself. Since

I have been here I have not met two people I know. It is quite sufficient to come here, as I have done, to see that five-and-twenty years will swallow up a whole generation. The streets are full of the children of the children of our time, and they look upon me as upon a being from another world.

I spent yesterday morning in receiving the civil and military authorities and those of the town; I took a walk with Chancellor Hardenberg—whom I found, to my great satisfaction, in the best of health—and I dined with the Governor. To-day I go to Engers; dine with minister Ingersleben, do some business, and to-morrow return to Johannisberg. This is all I have to tell you; nevertheless, I suppose, my dear mother, that you will read my letter with the interest one always feels in old memories.

Metternich to his Wife, Johannisberg, September 18.

263. I am here, not as if in the country, but as if at a Congress. Yesterday I had Chancellor Hardenberg, Count de Goltz and General Wolzogen, Count de Buol, Steigentesch, Wessenberg, Caraman, Maccalon, the Counts Münster, Rechberg, and Wintzingerode. I have with me Mercy, Spiegel, Langenau, and Gentz. The Chancellor left yesterday for Kreutznach; Bethmann and half a dozen Frankfurtese arrive to-day. To lodge all these people I have hired two houses at the foot of the hill.

What a view! What a rich country! What indescribable beauties for a man who does not know the Rheingau! Every one who arrives stands amazed on the balcony, and yet the view is nothing in comparison with that from the drawing-room, which forms the eastern corner of the *château*. When the air is clear you can follow the course of the Rhine in a direct line for more than nine leagues; when it is hazy, the river, which is immense, touches the horizon, and looks like the sea. It is continually covered with two-masted vessels in full sail, and its banks are like those of a little stream, the grass reaching to the water's edge. I have just had plans made of the *château* and the neighborhood. I have sent for an excellent architect from Frankfurt to arrange the plan according to my directions; it will be only necessary to make a very few changes to turn the *château* into a very comfortable habitation, able to accommodate a numerous family and a dozen visitors. Near the *château* is a place which is cultivated as an English garden, and which is suited for nothing else. In it, facing the Rhine, there is

a hillock on which I intend to erect a monument, probably an obelisk, in remembrance of the events of 1813 and 1814. I shall thus raise on the most classic ground of Germany, and at very little expense, a truly national monument. Freestone costs nothing, and a few blocks would make a beautiful thing, which above all should be simple. M. de Handel has been ordered to send you a work which contains a very good description of the course of the Rhine. I intend it for Marie, so that she may know what she will see one day. Have it sent to her, but read the chapters from Mayence to Coblenz, and especially the one at the end of the book, which is called *Volks-sagen*. You will read there the most charming histories, which will recur to you on taking this journey at every step. There is not one picturesque site which does not contain a ruin, and each ruin has its history; each story is full of gallant and chivalrous sentiments; the subjects might inspire the most beautiful pictures in the world to adorn a beautiful edition of this work. Read particularly the history of the Emperor Frederick of Adolphseck and *Ritter Brömser von Rudesheim*. This family is merged in ours; we were its heirs; the scene of the events belonged to us, and I was obliged to sell it to satisfy some usurers. The ruin, the most beautiful on the banks of the Rhine, has been bought by Count Ingelheim, who occupies himself in transforming it into a dwelling-house, and that in the best possible taste. He manages the exterior very well, and hollows out, in the walls, which are from twenty-five to thirty feet thick, commodious apartments in a most suitable style. This old *château* could only have been a Roman castle, and this is proved by the discovery lately made of a vault in which were a number of funeral urns very well preserved, and beside each urn a sabre, a lance, the top of a helmet, and many Roman weapons. Not wishing to disturb anything, they cleared the entrance to the vault, and closed it with a glass door.

. . . I have received a splendid decree from the King of Naples, giving me the title of Duke of Portella, the first place in the kingdom where the Imperial troops halted in the campaign of 1815. There is a compliment in the choice of the name, and it is a good remembrance to perpetuate in the family.

264. *Mayence, September 23.*—I left Johannisberg with great regret yesterday and I took a tender leave of it. When you see it—and that will be a happy day for me—you will understand my regret. I found my quarters here prepared in the old house on the *Bleiche* which my father occupied, and which I left in 1788 to go to Stras-

burg. That is thirty years ago; I have grown old; the house has renewed its youth without having improved; it has lost the appearance of a mansion to take that of a middle-class house.

The Emperor arrived here at seven o'clock. You will see from what Hudelist tells you what he has done to-day. I spent the day in work, then in walking in the streets, dining with the Emperor, and paying visits to the Princess of Hesse-Homburg and the Princess of Denmark, who is very pretty. I passed three hours in the evening with the Emperor, who is glad to see me again, and then went to see the last scenes of "Titus," which was very tiresome this evening. There is no worse theatre than that of Mayence, unless it is that of Baden.

We shall prolong our visit here until to-morrow, so as not to meet the King of Prussia at Coblenz. The Emperor will embark on the 25th, and dine at Johannisberg; we shall be a large and pleasant party, including nearly all the princes who are here.

We shall sleep on the 25th at Bingen, on the 26th at Coblenz, on the 27th at Cologne, and on the 28th at Aix-la-Chapelle. The Emperor Alexander does not go to Italy. I need not tell you that delights me.

265. *Bingen, September 24.*—I arrived here in such good time, my dear, after a charming day, that I am able to take this opportunity of sending to Frankfurt, and write to you by the military courier.

You will read in the paper an article containing the details of our day, but neither papers nor letters can convey to you the truly ravishing scene we have enjoyed. I do not believe that the voyage of Cleopatra, that beautiful queen, with all her nymphs and adorers surrounding her, could have been more picturesque than ours. The skies were extremely favorable; the most beautiful day, the best wind, the best people and the most *amoureux*: this is the only word which expresses the sentiment all feel here towards the Emperor; hundreds of boats, thousands of cannon and petards firing, about twenty bands, besides the music of the Austrian regiment and garrison at Mayence; a burning sun, a cool wind, and thousands of smiling faces; all this on the Rhine and on its banks. These are the elements which composed the *fête*, which nevertheless was only a simple journey.

The Emperor was struck with the view of Johannisberg, and the Prince of Denmark declares that in Denmark and even in Norway there is not a more charming situation under the softest sky. I gave him a very good dinner, and I found that I had enough Jo-

hannisberg of my own without having to borrow. I am, moreover, convinced that it never attained more celebrity than during the last fifteen days. But, I am far from desirous that it should preserve that character; I should very much prefer to pass some weeks there with you and the children, with neither sovereigns nor ministers. The book I have placed there to receive the names of visitors looks to-day like a protocol of Congress. May God spare me from seeing it filled thus !

We shall leave to-morrow at eight in the morning, and shall be at Mayence between one and two. The Emperor, who much likes to see attachment shown to him, is enchanted with the country.

We have superb weather, and Father Arndt announced to me to-day with an air truly Bacchic that he will answer for the year. I said my *fiat* with much benignity.

RESIDENCE IN AIX, AND RETURN JOURNEY TO VIENNA.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters, from October 1 to December 25, 1818.

266. Arrival at Aix—waits at Cologne for the Emperor—triumphal voyage up the Rhine—visit to the Cathedral—the Emperor Alexander—beginning of the Conferences. 267. Dinner of the King of Prussia in honor of the Emperor's name-day—whist-party. 268. The Treaty of Evacuation signed with France—journey to Italy. 269. Amusements. 270. Death of Hudelist—excursion to Spa. 271. Lawrence at Aix. 272. Travelling plans. 273. Conclusion of the business. 274. With Wellington to Brussels—Princess Mary. 275. From Donauwörth. 276. Return to Vienna—the Emperor Alexander. 277. Parallel between Paris and London.

Metternich to his Wife, Aix-la-Chapelle, October 1, 1818.

266. Here I am at last, my dear, in this town, at the end of my journey, but far from the end of my wishes.

I wrote to you last from Bingen. I coasted the Rhine as far as Coblenz, where the Emperor arrived by water some hours after me. We slept there, and I pursued my route next day as far as Cologne. I dined at Bonn, and walked about the town for about two hours. Nothing is so charming as the situation of Bonn; the beautiful mountains which terminate the valley of the river seem to embellish the scene so as to make you leave it with still more regret. These mountains, known by the name of the Siebengebirge, have a magical effect. On one side are the ruins of Rolandseck, and on the other, those of Drachenfels. In case they did not send you from Frankfurt the description of the Rhine by Schreiber, I enclose a copy now. You will find in the article "*Volks-sagen*" the history of these two castles. Further on begins the immense plain which loses itself in the Ocean and the North Sea—a luxuriant plain, covered with towns, villages, fertile fields and superb forests.

I arrived at Cologne about seven o'clock. An immense crowd had assembled to meet the Emperor. My six horses and the carriages of my suite made them take me for him. In vain I stopped

every five minutes to assure the people that I was unworthy of so much honor—it was no use; on arriving at the gate they began again in fine style. The bells, the shouts, the excitement of a population of sixty thousand souls who crowded against my carriage, drowned my voice as well as Gentz's, whom by chance I had met at Bonn and induced to come with me. It was as much as I could do to prevent them taking the horses out of the carriage. I was furious, and Gentz trembled in every limb. I only heard one sensible voice in the crowd: a man to whom I declared that it was I, myself, said to me: "Well, we love our Emperor enough to shout twice, if you are not he."

I arrived at last at the house of the old patrician Geyger. Monsieur, Madame, and Mesdemoiselles, his daughters, whom I had never seen, took possession of me as I alighted from the carriage. I was covered with old and young kisses; the whole household wept, shouted and swore. They wept with joy at embracing me—me the Austrian Minister; they shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* and they swore at the fate which had overthrown the ancient order of things. Surrounded by all the authorities of the place, I dragged the family into a room, and implored them to be reasonable. They replied by a spontaneous and positive assurance that they believed they were so, and they could and would not act otherwise. I began to see that my attempts were futile against such a determination, and delivered myself up to their kisses with heroic abandonment. Restored to liberty myself, I saw that Giroux* had been seized by the servants; they seemed not to perceive that he had neglected his beard for a week.

At last the Emperor arrived at his house, two doors from mine, and the crowd and the kisses moved twenty steps farther on.

Certainly if any one imagines that the happiness of having been French and being now Prussian has at Cologne and on the banks of the Rhine obliterated the remembrance of ten centuries, he is much deceived. The Press nevertheless groans under this lie!

The voyage on the Rhine has been one continual triumph for the Emperor, and has ended by becoming quite embarrassing to him. The whole thing recommenced on his arrival at Aix-la-Chapelle. Everything breathes of the Empire in the natal city so beloved by Charlemagne. The people see in the Emperor only his successor; they are silent when any of the other Sovereigns passes, and never

* For many years a faithful valet of Count Metternich's.

cease shouting wherever the Emperor appears: *Es lebe unser Kaiser!*

The situation of Aix, of which I had only a confused remembrance of twenty-six years' length, is very picturesque. It is very undulated, and well cultivated. The weather is magnificent and tempts one to walk. We are very well lodged, and the measures which have been taken to prevent a crowd of diplomatists from arriving leave us very much at liberty.

After dinner this evening, we went with the Emperor to visit the Cathedral. The King of Prussia came too, for he had not seen the relics, which date from the time of Charlemagne, and which are only shown to the public every seven years, or when a Catholic crowned head comes to visit them. We were shown:

1. A small coat of Jesus Christ, which we call in Vienna *ein Kinder-Röckerl*.
2. A dress of the Holy Virgin.
3. The girdle which Jesus Christ wore on the cross.
4. The linen in which Herodias carried the head of St. John the Baptist.

One can hardly believe that these objects are correctly named, but it is none the less true that when they were given to the church by Charlemagne a thousand years ago, that prince would not have acquired them had they not shown proofs of the highest antiquity. Their preservation can only be accounted for by the extreme care that is taken of them. They also show the skull of this Emperor and many of his bones, which show how tall he was. *A prie-Dieu* had been placed on his tomb, and the Emperor knelt on it and prayed. The people, who had forced the doors to see the Emperor, all fell on their knees instantly, and I thought the King seemed very uncomfortable, standing in the midst of his people. In his place, I would not have come.

The Emperor Alexander arrived here the same day, in the evening. I spent three hours with him, and we were just on the same terms as in 1813.

Our conferences began to-day under the most favorable auspices, and I have every reason to hope that in three, or at the most four, weeks we shall finish our labors.

The results will be generally satisfactory. The Emperor Alexander will go from here to Vienna. No more is said about his journey to Italy and I do not think he will stay more than a fortnight at Vienna; consequently, by December 1 all will be restored to order.

267. *October 5.*—It is horribly cold to-day: it hails, and it freezes. The Emperor, who suffered much inconvenience yesterday, remained in bed; to-day he feels better, and has risen. As for me, I had a bad cold yesterday, and I am very little better to-day. The result of this happy coincidence was that neither the Emperor nor I was present yesterday at a dinner given by the King of Prussia in honor of St. Francis, nor at a grand ball given by the town. It is perhaps for the first time in my life that I felt really glad that my health prevented me from going out. I will wager that the whole town thinks that the Emperor and I have sacrificed their *fête* to some profound political calculation. We must let them believe this, and, to keep up the delusion, I shall acquit myself perfectly to-day.

Our business is progressing quite marvellously: this means that it will soon be finished. I have never seen a prettier little Congress; this one will produce no bad blood in me, I promise you. You will excuse me from telling you about our protocols, and they are what occupy us most. I make one of a party of whist every evening with the Prince de Hatzfeld, Zichy, Baring, Labouchere, Parish—that is to say, with men who do not find themselves distressed, or even incommoded, by the loss of a good round thousand or so. We met at first at Lady Castlereagh's, but there is an inconceivable atmosphere of *ennui* connected with that house. By common consent we renounced the charms of my lady, and fixed upon my drawing-room, which is somewhat smaller than your little room hung with nankeen.

268. *October 10.*—We signed yesterday with France the treaty of evacuation. We have lost no time, having in eleven days settled the diplomatic affairs, made a payment of two hundred and sixty-five millions, and arranged everything relating to the march of the troops. The effect which this has produced in France is already known, for we receive our letters from Paris in forty hours; all goes well and will continue to do so.

Our affairs here will be concluded by the end of the month. I shall be at Vienna most probably on November 15, or soon after.

I informed you lately of our plans for the journey to Italy. The Emperor intends to leave Vienna between February 10 and 15. He will pass the last days of the Carnival at Venice; the four first weeks of Lent at Naples; the last two weeks and Easter week at Rome; three weeks in Tuscany; three in Lombardy; this will bring him back to Vienna towards the middle of July.

269. *October 18.*—Our affairs here are advancing rapidly. I will give them no margin beyond the 4th or 5th of November.

As for amusements, there are none. We are overwhelmed with youthful talent: every day there are concerts of virtuosos aged four and nine years. The last arrival is a little boy of four years and a half, who plays the double-bass. You can easily judge of the perfection of the execution.

There are not even any remarkable shops, and the trash they offer costs just double what the best of its kind does in Paris and London. If the shopkeepers have speculated on our purses, they have reckoned without their host. I do not know any one who buys more than what is strictly necessary.

Our ladies here are Lady Castlereagh, three or four English more or less old—that is to say, they are between fifty and sixty (quite youthful for London)—the Princess de la Tour, Madame de Nesselrode, and three Russian ladies. It is with the ladies as with the shopkeepers: there is a total want of admirers.

270. *October 27.*—The courier bringing the sad news of the death of poor Hudelist arrived here this morning, and I need not tell you how much I regret him. He possessed the most essential qualities, and merits which I shall scarcely be able to replace. My labor will be doubled, and perhaps even trebled, for some time; I have been so accustomed to depend upon him for all details, that I shall always regret what I can no longer have done by him, and certainly not so quickly by any other *employé*.

I am writing to Madame Hudelist, and I beg you to send the letter to her yourself, telling her that I have chosen this way, because I am convinced that it will make its reception less painful to her. I hope the Emperor will do something for her, the more so as I am sure her husband left very little money.

. . . The day before yesterday I went to Spa with M. and Madame de Nesselrode, the Count and Countess de Lieven, Steigentesch, Zichy, Lebzeltern, the Prince of Hesse, and Floret. We passed the night there; and yesterday morning went through the environs of Spa; dined there, and returned here at eight in the evening. The weather was superb and our trip well arranged. Spa is empty: we were the only strangers there, therefore we excited much interest. The road from here to Spa is charming: nothing is so beautiful as the country about Limbourg, with its meadows and innumerable houses.

271. *November 3.*—Our affairs here are in their decline. I do not

believe that they can go on beyond the 15th of this month, the day fixed for their conclusion. If this is the case I shall be at Vienna by the end of November or the beginning of December, and certainly I shall be glad enough to find myself there.

Lawrence, the greatest painter in the world, is here by command of the Prince Regent, to take portraits of the sovereigns and ministers. That of the Emperor is almost finished, and mine also. I suppose you will see these two, for Lawrence is going to Vienna to paint Prince Schwarzenberg. I do not believe that there could be a better picture than that of the Emperor. My portrait, I believe, will be excellent. I shall try to get Lawrence to paint Clementine.*

Our life goes on much as usual: we confer, we walk, we dine. I have my party in the evening, and I go to bed. All the strangers have left us; there are none remaining.

272. *November 11.*—I may now tell you, my dear, that we are very near the end. The last conference will take place—unless anything unforeseen occurs, which is not likely—on the 16th or 17th. The Emperor will leave the same day. He will be at Vienna on December 2, after stopping five days at Munich.

I expect to leave on the 18th for Brussels; I shall remain there until the 23rd or 24th, and I shall be at Vienna on the 7th or 8th or 9th.

I shall certainly not go to Paris. I could only stay there four or five days, which would be entirely taken up by Princes and ministers, and I see no good reason why I should wantonly expose myself to such drudgery. I shall therefore part from the children at Brussels.

Marie is wonderfully well. She has had all the success possible here; and as it does not amount to much altogether, I think I may boast of it. She has been to see the Emperor, who—to please her, I believe—put on a Chasseur's uniform. She spent yesterday evening in dancing polonaises with the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, and at this moment she is at the theatre, to see a man named Wurm, an excellent comic actor from Berlin, with whom she is enchanted.

You will read in all the newspapers, among other things, that I have had a frightful fall from a carriage, and that I remained unconscious during, I believe, five or six hours. The fact is that I have had no fall, and consequently have had neither accident nor

* Princess Clementine, the Prince's daughter.—ED.

fainting fit. About a fortnight ago in starting from the Emperor's house in one of the excellent Court equipages, the axle-tree broke, the carriage leaned on one side, my servant opened the door, I got out of the carriage, and went on foot to a *soirée* at Madame Catalani's. The coachman fell off, and has been made famous. All the English papers have correspondents here: they must write something, and, having nothing to say about the progress of affairs, they amuse themselves with killing the ministers.

Our portraits by Lawrence are really *chefs-d'œuvre*. Mine, which is almost finished, is one of the best.* He will take it to Vienna, where I shall make him copy it, as I shall never be painted again.

I am sure Marie will tell you her ideas about it. You will laugh when you see it.

273. *November 16.*—Our business is concluded. The Emperor Alexander left this morning for Brussels. Our Emperor starts to-morrow for Vienna. I leave the day after to-morrow, early in the morning, for Brussels, where important business awaits me. I shall be detained there four days, between that and the infernal etiquette which naturally accompanies it.

I spend my days in work, and all I can tell you is that I am marvelously well, and not yet quite driven out of my mind. A courier leaves this evening for Vienna. I shall return here on the 22nd or 23rd, and remain two or three days, because the Conference is in abeyance until my return. I shall be at Vienna from the 8th to the 10th of December, and the Emperor will be there on the 2nd. The Emperor Alexander will follow me closely; he will arrive at Vienna on the 12th.

274. *November 21.*—I wished to leave to-morrow, but the impossibility of carrying out my intention was shown at the Conference this morning. We do not know how to avoid having one to-morrow morning, and probably another in the evening, which will be the last. I send on my carriages in advance to-morrow evening, and I shall leave with the Duke of Wellington. We shall be at Brussels in fourteen or fifteen days. You know my plans as far as Vienna. I do not foresee that they can undergo any important change.

On November 23, Brussels; the 24th, 25th, and 26th, I stay

* The portrait of Prince Metternich engraved by Professor Unger for this work is the one mentioned here.—ED.

there; the 27th, Antwerp; the 28th, Aix-la-Chapelle; the 29th, Cologne; the 30th, Coblentz.

December 1, Johannisberg; the 2nd, Frankfurt; the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, the journey to Munich; the 6th and 7th, I stay there; the 8th, Alt-Cettingen; the 9th, Wels; the 10th, Kemmelbach or Amstetten; the 11th, Vienna.

You see that I shall be only one day in advance of the Emperor Alexander, which is certainly not too much. His visit to Vienna not being on business, the mere fact of his presence will not trouble me, for we have become the most intimate friends. Marie, when she saw us the first time, was quite astonished—she had never seen us except on bad terms with each other. She danced several polonaises with him, and also with our Emperor, at the ball given by the town to the sovereigns on Sunday last. The Emperor was as charmed to see her as if he had known her all his life. "*Sie ist eine der Meinigen,*" said he to me twenty times; "*Die habe ich lieber als alle die Anderen.*"

Our business is over, and our conference of to-morrow is nothing more than a winding up; everything is well arranged, and I believe that we shall gain honor in Europe. I have never seen more perfect agreement between the Cabinets; our affairs—the rough as well as the smooth—ran as if they went of themselves. The result is what I foresaw and above all desired.

I do not know what I would give now to have got over the rest of the journey between this and Vienna. I shall take this journey with the feeling of a postillion who returns empty to his starting-point, and who twenty times curses the length of the road he still has to traverse before he can get to his bed.

275. *Donaucörth, December 6.*— . . . I found Prince Hardenberg at Aix-la-Chapelle, and worked with him all one day. I passed a night and a morning at Johannisberg, where I saw forty grand casks arranged in the finest cellar in the world. The wine will be excellent, and twelve thousand ducats' worth might be sold to-morrow. It will be worth twenty thousand in five years. I shall have neither rest nor respite till you have seen this place, which is really a glorious possession. Nothing resembles it in beauty, and the house only requires a little care to become very beautiful. If one had only a cottage there, one would seem to possess the world.

I shall stop at Munich on the 8th, and I shall be at Vienna on the 11th, in the evening, or, more probably, on the morning of the 12th. You will be forewarned of my arrival by one of my carriages, which

I shall send on from the last place I sleep at, which will be at either Wels or Enns.

. . . . Good God! everybody seems to be dead amongst us! I learnt all these catastrophes in a way which would have been pleasant if it had been on any other subject. I saw Count d'Eltz at Coblenz. He had just returned from Brazil, and is there on business connected with the property of his father, who is dying a frightful death. . . . I offered my sympathy, and asked him for news from Vienna. I had not heard for more than a week, as my letters were waiting for me at Frankfurt. "They have cut off Jean Palffy's leg," said he; "but his brother is still more to be pitied, for he lost one part of his body after another in his journey to Italy." "That is dreadful," said I. "Yes, two days before the death of Count de Wallis." "What! is he dead?" "The Count de Keufstein is buried." "What! he also!" "The sacrament has been administered to Marshal Colloredo; and his brother, Marshal Wenzel, is dying." I implored him to leave off, for he did not seem to have half finished.

Metternich to his daughter Marie, Vienna, December, 17.

276. Here I am, my dear Marie, at home; but you are not there, and I assure you that you are much wanted. We think much more of you than of ourselves. We follow all your steps, and I think I can guess most of them.

On my arrival I found Mamma and the children in the best of health. Victor is as tall as a full-grown man. Clementine is improved. I do not think Leontine has grown much. Herminie is really as well as possible. Mamma has told you of the funny mistake I made when I arrived, in taking Leontine for Herminie. I inquired about her leg, and she thought I was mad. She was sleeping in her new room, instead of her sister. I thought she had grown very much; but never mind. Thoughts make a slip sometimes, like the tongue, and one cannot extricate one's self.

We are here, not amongst *fêtes*, for the Emperor Alexander does not wish it, but in the sweet and quiet little pleasures of the Court. The Emperor Alexander has at length made the acquaintance of his aunt.* He passes whole days in kissing her hand, and calling her "my dear aunt." The presentation took place before dinner

* Duchess Pauline von Würtemberg, sister to Prince Metternich.—Ed.

by the Empress. At the very moment the Emperor kissed the hand of his dear aunt I thought of Herminie, and I agree with her that Aunt Pauline is everybody's aunt.

Good bye, my dear Marie. The journey to Italy is decided upon, but there is an alteration in it, which is in your favor. The Emperor will leave on February 13, and in the beginning of March he will be at Florence instead of Naples—that is to say, he will begin by spending nearly three weeks of the month of March in Tuscany; from there he will go to Rome for Holy Week, and after that, about April 17 or 18, to Naples.

277. *December 25.*—I was sure that Paris would suit Pepi very well. He has taste, and is accessible to good impressions. Paris is the city for society, as London is for commerce. The one cannot be compared to the other, for they are perfectly different. Vienna is like other populous cities; she may count more streets than some perhaps, but cannot boast of being greater. The human mind needs continual friction to enable it to rise above the common level. It is natural that an assembly of more than five hundred thousand individuals in one place, under a beautiful sky, in a fertile country, must offer facilities to a development, to an industrial and commercial activity, very different from that of other less populous centres. This is the secret of the perfection of Paris and London, which both resemble ancient Rome, ancient Heliopolis, and still more ancient Babylon. The same causes always produce the same effects, and the latter are only modified by the progress of knowledge, science, and art. Now, a very slight elevation of mind or refinement of taste leads people to prefer the very best to the tolerably good. Be sure that as often as this preference does not take place, it is from the lack of these qualities, or the result of the presumption inseparable from ignorance. This is not, however, at all connected with happiness. Happiness may depend on a single object or a single taste, and consequently on a single necessity; it is sufficient for happiness to find some small corner in which this individual taste may be satisfied. This explains why you are happy at Lanschütz, I in my garden, and Mamma in Herminie's room. Nevertheless, everybody is not equally exclusive or equally moderate in his tastes; so, though you and I are happy at Lanschütz and at Rennweg, we are equally happy on the Boulevards, at the Museum, and even in the Catacombs; while Mamma is only happy in that one room at the *Chancellerie*.

METTERNICH'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE EMPEROR FRANCIS ON THE JOURNEY TO AIX.

Twenty-one Reports from Prince Metternich to the Emperor Francis, with his Majesty's notes, from July 8 to November 17, 1818.

278. Arrangements concerning Schloss-Hradschin. 279. Death of the Queen of Sweden. 280. Ultra-Royalist conspiracy in France—approaching conflict of the ministerial party with Monsieur. 281. The Emperor Alexander and the condition of the Russo-Polish Provinces—Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg. 282. Alexander's journey put off—Metternich's idea of a journey to Paris. 283. Death of Francis George von Metternich. 284. Interview with Capo d'Istria. 285. Affection for Prince Schwarzenberg. 286. Business in Rome. 287. Approaching reconciliation of the King with Monsieur. 288. Kindly feelings towards the Emperor Francis on the Rhine. 289. The Emperor Alexander's plan of the journey. 290. Proposed Chamberlain. 291. Favorable state of feeling in Frankfurt. 292. Death of the Queen of England. 293. Preparations for the journey of the Emperor Francis. 294. The Elector of Hesse-Cassel wishes for Royal dignity. 295. Military organization of the German Bund. 296. The Emperor's portrait. 297. Pregnancy of the Archduchess Leopoldine. 298. Delay of the journey.

278. *Carlsbad, July 8, 1818.*—I hasten with much respect to inform your Majesty of my arrival here yesterday. Carlsbad is very full of strangers, among whom are diplomatists from all countries, who are here, some only confer with me, some to observe my meeting with Count Capo d'Istria, who is expected here on the 10th.

As I passed through Prague yesterday, the chief burgomaster came and asked me whether a meeting of the monarchs would take place at Prague. I asserted the contrary. He then told me that a few days before, he had received an official order to repair the second story of Schloss-Hradschin at his own cost. I assured him there was some extraordinary mistake, and advised him to wait your Majesty's commands before he incurred any expense. I therefore beseech your Majesty to make your commands known; it is possible that some reparation was intended, but this did not appear in the instructions, and evidently some great mistake must have been made. In any case, I consider it my duty to inform your Majesty

of an error of this kind, which must cause a great outlay, the object of which I cannot see.

I consider Prince Schwarzenberg is in much better health. He is in good spirits, and the cure is so far quite successful.

METTERNICH.

Received this Report, and I have already given the necessary orders for the case to be inquired into as to the repairs to be carried out at the Castle at Prague.*

FRANCIS.

Baden, July 15, 1818.

279. *Carlsbad, July 9.*—Letters from Copenhagen announce the sudden death of the widowed Queen of Sweden. She had been with the King in the evening, and died at five o'clock in the morning.

The King, who was going to Norway, has put off his journey till after the funeral of the Queen.

As a political event, this is of no importance.

METTERNICH.

Received this Report.

FRANCIS.

Baden, July 14, 1818.

280. *Carlsbad, July 14.*—May it please your Majesty to observe enclosed, a very interesting letter from Lebzeltern, in London. The English Cabinet is most favorably disposed, and the opinions of Lebzeltern in every respect well founded.

Your Majesty will also find enclosed a private letter from Marquis de Caraman, which contains information of a so-called Ultra-Royalist conspiracy. I say so-called, because it does not appear to me to be of that nature. A few days will suffice to prove the truth of this. I believe myself that the whole thing is an intrigue of the Ultras on some party grounds. From Paris I have very little news of the matter.

May it please your Majesty to notice that the French Ministry, or, more properly speaking, Count Richelieu, hopes, since the late retreat, that my intervention between the Ministerial party and Monsieur the King's brother may bring about some approximation.

* This note, as well as all those on the following letters, is written by the Emperor Francis himself.—ED.

Monsieur himself has come to me with the same end in view. In a few days I shall be in a position to lay before your Majesty the steps I have taken in this important matter. No moment is more proper than the eve of a meeting of the monarchs to be crowned with a result of this kind, hitherto certainly unattainable. I intend to use these last hours, so full of tension, with all my might to guide both parties to straightforward and thoroughly confidential ways. It is a great satisfaction to me that equal confidence is placed in me by both parties.

According to private letters received from Berlin to-day, the King will arrive with the Emperor Alexander towards the end of this month. A military encampment which the city had intended to prepare for the diversion of the sovereigns has been countermanded, and the Emperor Alexander will employ the interval between his arrival in Prussia and the meeting in visiting his sister. Whether this will include a visit to Stuttgart I know not, but I rather doubt it.

In any case no good can come of the Emperor's moving about in this way before the interview takes place; but I cannot confirm the truth of the intelligence I submit to you until the next official news from Berlin, which I am hourly expecting. METTERNICH.

This Report received and enclosures returned. FRANCIS.
Baden, July 21, 1818.

281. *Carlsbad, July 22.*—May it please your Majesty to receive a statement of Count Thurn's, by which your Majesty will see that the Emperor Alexander continues to treat the Prince of Hesse with the greatest attention.

The Emperor now begins to occupy himself with the condition of the peasantry in the Russo-Polish provinces. That there is plenty of good material is undeniable; but, on the other hand, the Emperor runs some risk of kindling a conflagration in the interior of his kingdom. The Russians are in general very well under control; what would be the result of further progress is very difficult to determine.

Count Capo d'Istria comes here about the 26th or 27th of this month, to await his master's arrival from St. Petersburg, which will not be before the 15th of next month.

In the meantime I am looked upon by the chief people here as bearing an accredited mission from your Majesty, and to me there

is no difference between Vienna and Carlsbad, except the change of place. I endeavor to get as much time for distraction as possible, and can heartily praise the waters here. On the 31st of this month I leave Carlsbad, and as there will be three or four days' interval between the two courses of the water-cure, I shall give myself till about August 4. On the 5th I shall begin the waters at Franzensbrunn. The difference in the condition of Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg is most astonishing. His internal complaint gets better every day; the Carlsbad waters do not, however, act directly on his other complaints, and he is, therefore, ordered to try some baths, from which his physician hopes the best possible result. His weakness has already been so far conquered that he can walk for some hours.

METTERNICH.

Received this Report, and I hope that the waters and baths may have the same happy results for you as for Prince Schwarzenberg.

FRANCIS.

282. May it please your Majesty. The news that the Emperor Alexander will arrive on September 27 instead of the 15th, and that the opening of the Conference must be delayed for fourteen days, will create a very bad impression in France. Matters are not really altered, but the delay and uncertainty are trying, and must be equally unpleasant to the Government and the nation.

This gain or loss of time leads me to consider whether I could not make good use of those twelve free days by going from the Rhine to Paris.

The following considerations are in favor of this:

1. I should see for myself clearly what at a distance is often obscure.

2. It would give me an entirely different position at the Conference at Aix among the other Cabinet ministers, who have not, like me, been on the spot.

3. If there is any chance of Monsieur's agreement with the Government, to bring about which I am urged by both parties, I would not willingly lose any opportunity of helping forward so desirable an object. The situation requires great management. I have sent the Marquis de Caraman from Carlsbad to Paris with a mission on this subject, and have sent back with him an individual whom Monsieur sent to me about eight days ago. In the success of this affair lies a considerable guarantee for the future, while from the

continuance of this unhappy disunion there is every chance of the most distressing consequences. The moment before the interview of the monarchs is urgent, and requires urgent means to be used to act on both parties.

4. I should, lastly, find a very strong inducement for the journey to Paris in the fact of Lord Castlereagh's journey through that city, which seems possible.

If your Majesty is pleased to entertain these opinions, I will proceed to Paris, and act according to circumstances under your Majesty's full authority. These circumstances being every day liable to change, I must make the best use I can of them at the time.

I therefore beseech your Majesty to keep this mission a deep secret. If I am to carry out the affair I must receive a command, the day when the meeting of the monarchs is put off, to make use of the delay to ascertain the state of things on the spot. If I do not take this journey, the public must know nothing of the matter.

In any case I shall go up the Rhine at the end of this month, and the Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, Count Münster in the name of the English Cabinet, and several others, intend either to meet me, or to come to me at Johannisberg, so that we may talk over the affairs of the Conference.

Should your Majesty be pleased to entertain my idea of a sudden journey to Paris, I should in any case not go before September 7, and return on the 23rd to your Majesty at Mayence.

I humbly beseech your Majesty to give your gracious commands as soon as possible concerning this secret commission.

METTERNICH.

Franzensbrunn, August 7, 1818.

I allow you to go to Paris, if you find it will be useful, and I shall expect you in any case on September 23, at Mayence.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 11, 1818.

283. May it please your Majesty. The sad event which has befallen me and my house makes it my duty to express to your Majesty my deepest gratitude for the favor your Majesty has continually vouchsafed to my lamented father during his long career. In his earliest youth he was attracted to the service of your Majesty by the example of his ancestors, and still more by his own feeling. His only wish and all his efforts had but one end—the honor and

advantage of the Imperial House and of the State. Your Majesty has lost a servant, weakened, it is true, by age, but still a faithful and attached servant. His constant desire was to see me fulfil the duties which his age and circumstances no longer permitted him to undertake, and his greatest consolation was the feeling of the success of my exertions during the troubles of a most anxious time. When he was asked by my family, a few days before his end, whether he did not wish to see me in Vienna, he said, "My son is doing his duty. I can give him my blessing as well at a distance, and to-day belongs to him and his business."

These words console me for not having seen him, and having been unable to fulfil the duties of a son.

I now implore your Majesty's favor for the house of which I am now the head. For myself, your Majesty has so long treated me as a father that gratitude alone is becoming in me. If the subversion of things of late years has placed my family merely in the relation of all other vassals and subjects of the Imperial House, my only wish is that my successors may do from a feeling of duty what they would in all probability have done of their own free will.

METTERNICH.

Franzensbad, August 19, 1818.

I feel deep sympathy for the loss of your father, and count as surely on your attachment to my person as that you will influence your family and successors to follow in your footsteps, and become able and faithful servants, like yourself.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, August 19, 1818.

284. *Franzensbrunn, August 18.*—May it please your Majesty. I went yesterday to Carlsbad, to have some conversation with Count Capo d'Istria, who had been there for some days.

The result of this conversation was, in my opinion, important and satisfactory. I can indicate the principal points in it to your Majesty, who always desires to be informed of the course of great political affairs.

These are as follows:

1. The Emperor of Russia, though hesitating between many conflicting moral motives, does not abandon the fundamental principle of the maintenance of peace. To this he is impelled both by his distance from all that is influenced by the playing with soldiers, and by his religious principles ever growing more vigorous.

2. The Emperor and his Cabinet give themselves up more and more every day to moral and political proselytizing. Hence the many intrigues, great and small, so irritating to us and most other Governments, and hence the deluge of emissaries and apostles.

In this active movement the intention is, however, not to be mistaken (it lies, obscurely or plainly, in the Emperor's mind)—of trusting to time and the course of things to favor the extension of Russian influence. But an influence of this kind does not even grow to be a power.

3. Count Capo d'Istria is extremely against the form of the next meeting.

First, he does not wish the monarchs to appear personally at the same, and he regrets that his master should be the special and almost only cause of this. With this opinion I quite agreed.

Secondly, he desired either no meeting of the monarchs and the Cabinets, or that it should be universal.

His reasons are as follows:

He believes that so great a measure will only excite the jealousy of the Powers not admitted, strain the public mind excessively, and injure both monarchs and Cabinets by the want of results.

Here I differed entirely from him. My reasons are the following, and I explained them to the Count so far as possible, considering the difference between the plans and actions of our two Governments.

The five Courts which are assembled at Aix are not only invited there, but by the treaty of November 20, 1815, they are bound to come. All the European Courts have by their consent acknowledged and confirmed this treaty and all its stipulations.

The fulfilling of a right, and still more of a duty, cannot excite the jealousy of those who are beyond that right and duty. No Government fears the question which is referred to Aix being decided by the five Courts, for they are summoned for that purpose; but all Governments fear lest the four or five Courts should venture to bring forward more than that one business. Therefore, the four Courts must carry out this one business only at Aix, and therefore have we insisted that the four Courts long before the meeting should solemnly make this engagement. Our care must now be that it is maintained and fulfilled.

The feeling of the revolutionists only is excited, not at all that of well-disposed persons. Since this is undeniably and certainly the case, the beneficial result of the interview will be that nothing

will be altered in the existing order of things. This result will be for your Majesty and the Cabinet—which since 1815 has taken a decided course—the highest triumph.

But for the Court which pays homage to the so-called spirit of the times on every occasion, and revives by its expressions the hopes of innovators and sectaries of every kind—for this Court the result will be, at so important an epoch as that of Aix-la-Chapelle, in the highest degree injurious even in the eyes of these innovators themselves.

In these short sentences lies the important difference between the Austrian and the Russian calculations. Ours have, up to this time, been triumphant, and I doubt not that this will be again the case at Aix. That the Russian Minister does not like the coming conference in the shape it has already taken is quite natural. That we, on the contrary, are agreeable to the said form is no less so. Much here depended on the first word, and we spoke it at the right moment, and thereby avoided a number of difficulties in a sense totally different from Count Capo d'Istria's fears.

I have, moreover, already gained so much ground in the English and Prussian Cabinets that in the conferences I foresee no possible digression from the course appointed.*

285. *Franzensbrunn, August 20.* May it please your Majesty. As I am aware of your Majesty's gracious feeling for Field-Marshal Prince von Schwarzenberg, I consider it a duty respectfully to inform your Majesty of an opportunity of doing him a great kindness with very little trouble. His eldest son, Friedrich, has been for more than a year a cadet in his father's regiment of uhlans. By strenuous efforts he has distinguished himself to the satisfaction of his father, and it is his wish that he should be promoted to be sub-lieutenant. If your Majesty would deign to do this as of your Majesty's own thought, so great a mark of favor to the Field-Marshal would excite his deepest gratitude.

If your Majesty vouchsafe to grant this request—which I make

* On the document of which this is a copy is written a note in the Chancellor's handwriting, but of a much later date: "This Report is important because it shows the grounds of the difference in the views and course of the two Imperial Cabinets. Count Capo d'Istria was the representative of a trifling political school; personally he had in his eye only the Hellenic cause, which was in the year 1818 in preparation. The alliance system between the great Powers was detested by him for this reason, and for its opposition to the Liberalism which found a zealous representative in the minister who was more Greek than Russian."—Ed.

without his knowledge—I suggest most respectfully that your Majesty should write to this effect to the Field-Marshal, and that as soon as possible, since otherwise he may come forward with a direct request.

I am the more inclined to take the present step, as the King of Prussia has, since the arrival of Field-Marshal Blücher at Carlsbad, sent an adjutant to him almost weekly to inquire after his health, which is much declining.

METTERNICH.

I will immediately act upon your suggestion.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 25, 1818.

286. *Franzensbrunn, August 20.*—Enclosed in this your Majesty will deign to receive a Report from Prince Kaunitz, which shows how the cause is progressing in Rome.* If the Roman Court follows the course hinted at, it is hardly possible to foresee what complications it may bring about in Germany. It is our duty to make this clear, and to give our support at once to the reasonable party among the Cardinals.

Your Majesty has deigned to approve my last instructions to the ambassador, Prince Kaunitz. I will immediately write to him urgently in the same sense.

I respectfully beg your Majesty to have the present Report, with its enclosures, handed to Councillor von Hudelist.

METTERNICH.

Noticed, and the Report given to Von Hudelist. Our endeavor must be to act in such a way that the Catholic religion may not be needlessly injured by hasty measures or an excess of zeal.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 25, 1818.

287. *Königswart, August 26.*—Your Majesty will be pleased to receive, in two enclosures, the instructions I have issued on the 23rd instant to Freiherr von Vincent, in the extremely important

* This Report, of July 10, expresses the fear that in Rome a party of *Zelanti* among the Cardinals were striving against the conciliatory attitude of Consalvi, and urging the Pope to vigorous measures against the Courts of Bavaria and Baden—the former, because it stultified by new laws the Concordat just concluded; the latter, because it took under its protection the Vicar-Capitular Wessenberg, at Constance, who was threatened with an interdict.—ED.

affair of the reconciliation of Monsieur with his brother the King of France.

Your Majesty will deign to remember that in the spring your ambassador was instructed by Monsieur to express his wish for a possible reconciliation. Baron Vincent at once informed the Duke of Wellington of the circumstance, and of his conversation with the Prince; he also informed the Duke of Richelieu of the matter.

I at once answered Freiherr von Vincent, begging him to make known to the King's brother the readiness of your Majesty to co-operate in the good work of reconciliation, but expressing my personal conviction that, first of all, Monsieur himself should make all possible efforts to attain this end.

I took this course—

1. Because, from the steps taken by His Royal Highness in consequence of my reply, his own standpoint will be made clear.

2. Because I wished to ascertain whether Monsieur had taken the resolution from motives of his own, or whether he had been impelled to do so by the Ultra-Royalist party, or one of its numerous subdivisions.

3. Because your Majesty's intervention in a domestic matter can only safely be permitted if the intervention of a third person is desired by both the parties at variance.

My expectations in this respect were fulfilled: several attempts at reconciliation were begun, partly by Monsieur, partly by the ministers. They were all without any result.

Nearly at the same time, in the course of June, steps were taken on the part of the Ultras and the Duke of Richelieu, to invite me to take part in the business. I informed the Duke that I should certainly be empowered to act in this matter by your Majesty, but that the moment did not seem to have arrived when the intervention would be really successful, and then I must have to do, not with one or other of the Ultra-Royalist parties, but with Monsieur himself.

I had this information also conveyed to Monsieur.

Upon this, Monsieur actually sent to me at Carlsbad a confidential person, who had no direct contact with the party, and negotiated as the immediate organ of the Prince himself. This individual was sent back to Paris to inform Monsieur—

1. That the matter was now placed on a proper footing.

2. That Freiherr von Vincent would be commissioned to act personally as mediator.

I informed the Duke of Richelieu of the state of things through the Marquis of Caraman, whom I sent to Paris, showing him also that, in order to gain time, I would push on the negotiation as near as possible to the interview at Aix-la-Chapelle, feeling convinced that success could only be secured by the greatest despatch. Monsieur is weak; he must himself make the approaches to reconciliation, and if time is given for him to confer with the party all will be lost.

The Duke of Richelieu agreed with my views.

When all these things were discussed I sent the above-mentioned instructions to Freiherr von Vincent, the purport of which will itself explain to your Majesty the standpoint in the business which I must think to be the best.

Despatch No. 1 is to be shown to both parties.

Despatch No. 2 contains the instructions for Vincent alone.

Not till we reach the Rhine shall I be able to tell your Majesty the result of the steps your Majesty's ambassadors have taken.

I received yesterday, just as I was starting for Franzensbrunn, a letter from the Duke of Richelieu, in which he urgently entreated me to come to Paris, to conduct the business in person. I shall not come to a decision till I know the result of the first steps. These, at any rate, must be taken by some other person: if I find they go well I will take the journey; if not, I will make my excursion to Paris depend on the circumstance of Lord Castlereagh's presence in Paris. If he does not choose that road, and there is no certain prospect of the success of the mediation, I shall not take the journey.

I flatter myself that your Majesty will vouchsafe to approve of the conduct of the business so far. I consider it the most important affair of the moment, but I am far from being confident of success. The parties stand so aloof from each other that very great impartiality will be necessary on both sides in order to bring about an approximation. Although the success of the affair does not depend on the mediator alone, it is none the less honorable for your Majesty and your Majesty's Cabinet to be chosen by both sides to carry out so excellent an object, and nothing, perhaps, shows so well the position of your Majesty in the political affairs of Europe as this very thing.

METTERNICH.

Acted upon, and the enclosures returned. Only one thought strikes me—namely, whether Monsieur, if he is weak and thought-

less, may not perhaps bring about some mischance or mistake from his knowledge of our views with regard to Russia and the conduct of the Emperor Alexander.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 30, 1818.

288. *Königswart, August 26.*—Your Majesty will please to receive in the enclosed Report from Herr von Handel, information as to the reception your Majesty may expect on the Rhine.

I know the feeling of the people in those districts, and have advised your Majesty's journey up that river because I was convinced that it would have the character of a triumphal procession.

Besides, the party of the disaffected will receive a serious blow from the demonstrations made by the Rhinelanders. The open and spontaneous expression of a hundred thousand people is better and more convincing than all the declamations of Jena Professors and students.

The great difference will also be seen between the journey of your Majesty and those of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, and this will certainly be for the advantage of Germany.

METTERNICH.

Noticed with pleasure.

FRANCIS.

Baden, August 30, 1818.

289. *Frankfurt, August 30.*—May it please your Majesty. At the moment of my arrival here I received the enclosed letter from the Prince of Hesse, which a courier brought me from Berlin.

I think it would be well for your Majesty to send the necessary orders to Prague, in order to show every possible attention to the Dowager Empress.* Everything had been arranged for her reception at Schloss-Hradschin; the cooks she will of course bring with her. That your Majesty should send part of the household depends entirely upon your Majesty's wishes. Four gentlemen in attendance seem to me necessary, and an individual who can act as Master of the Household. For this purpose one of the Princes of Prague—perhaps Prince Lobkowitz—would be suitable.

Your Majesty will find in your impending journey a reason for not visiting the Empress in person. In any case I have the honor

* Empress of Russia.—Ed.

to enclose the draft of a letter which, when your Majesty has received the news of her arrival, can be sent to Prague.

The inferences which might be drawn from the Prince of Hesse's letter are entirely contradicted by what Count Capo d'Istria told me, that the Emperor Alexander had unfortunately not given up the plan of travelling—at least in Upper Italy—till the end of the meeting at Aix.

Which of them is here mistaken, Count Capo d'Istria or the Prince of Hesse, seems to me only too certain. I have, however, in any case written to the former fixing the arrangements in Carlsbad, so that his answer to me may reach your Majesty with the desired information without delay.

What the Emperor Alexander intends to do in Switzerland in November, and why he chooses to make the passage of the Simplon at this time, is, indeed, by no reasoning to be discovered.

The Emperor's resolution will, however, no doubt decide your Majesty to go to Milan, but no preparations can be made until the truth is known with regard to the travelling plans of the Emperor Alexander.

METTERNICH.

290. *Frankfurt, August 31.*—Your Majesty has requested me through the Lord High Chamberlain to propose certain gentlemen to attend your Majesty to Aix, besides the two in permanent attendance.

In my opinion, these should be chosen from reliable young men of good address, who may be of service for any mission that is required.

I propose therefore:

1. Count Ladislaus Wrbna.
2. Count Bellegarde.
3. Count Felix Woyna.

Count Wrbna wishes very much that his nephew, Major Pozzo, might be chosen for this honor; I find nothing to object to in his person, but, in the present case, very much against his name. Since he is a lord-in-waiting (which he ought not to be, for the Pozzo family was never one of the Corsican nobility), he would be suitable, like any other lord-in-waiting, for attendance on your Majesty; but just at this meeting at Aix, a kind of attention might be anticipated which would be in no way beneficial.

If your Majesty wishes for four instead of three lords-in-waiting,

Count Schönfeld or any other good-looking young man might be chosen.

I much regret that not one Italian seems to be at the disposal of your Majesty.

METTERNICH.

Noticed; and, as Count Felix Woyna is with his regiment in Hungary, I have chosen Counts Wrba, Bellegarde, and Schönfeld to accompany me to Aix-la-Chapelle.

FRANCIS.

Baden, September 9, 1818.

291. *Frankfurt, September 4.*—May it please your Majesty. My residence in this place, which was not at all intentional, but arose from a slight attack of rheumatic fever (the consequence of exposure to some extremely bad weather during my journey from Bohemia), has, however, had the most happy results. Since my appearance in Frankfurt a thorough moral revolution has taken place; the different parties had, as was expected, made some attempts at reconciliation, and what has never happened before has been accomplished under my immediate direction.

I can now answer for it that the Report of the Bundestag on the military organization of the Bund will be returned by the assembly in the course of this month. This Report is the very work itself, for it is the result of the unanimous deliberation of the first and most influential Courts with the co-operation of the military representatives of the whole of the German Governments. As soon as the Report is returned the assembly will adjourn for two months and take holidays. This time coincides with that of the conferences at Aix. In this way, all political difficulty is obviated, and by the conclusion of the business all Russian interference will be prevented.

During the journey your Majesty will see some of the German Princes. At the right moment I will send your Majesty a short sketch of the sentiments which it is much to be wished should emanate from your Majesty. Every word spoken by your Majesty at this time will produce the greatest effect. One must be in the midst of Germany to understand on what a moral height your Majesty's Court now stands. In this respect so much ground is gained that it can only be lessened by its own fault.

I shall be at Johannisberg by the 7th inst., and on the 13th I shall

go to Chancellor Hardenberg, with whom I shall go to Coblenz on the 14th and 15th. On the 16th I shall return to the Rheingau, where Count Münster and several other diplomatists will be waiting for me. On the 22nd I shall pay my respects to your Majesty at Mayence.

METTERNICH.

Noticed; and I shall expect the sketch of what you wish me to say in Germany.

FRANCIS.

Baden, September 9, 1818.

292. Please your Majesty. From the news which arrived yesterday by the Princess of Hesse-Homburg, of the health of her mother, the Queen of England, it seems that she is already given up by the physicians. They do not think that she can live more than a week longer.

The death of the Queen will hasten the meeting of Parliament within six weeks' time, in order that new measures may be taken for the care of the King. Lord Castlereagh, who had foreseen this, has already prepared the necessary measures, so as not to interrupt his stay in Aix.

METTERNICH.

Noticed.

FRANCIS.

Persenbeug, September 17, 1818.

293. *Schloss-Johannisberg, September 18.*—May it please your Majesty. There is a mistake in the arrangements made out for your Majesty's journey which I can alter from this place without any delay. They have stationed your Majesty's horses at Darmstadt: in the list the station of Langfeld is mentioned, which has long ago ceased to exist. The station is now removed to Dieburg; the road from Darmstadt to Mayence by Groszherau is disused and, in every sense of the word, impracticable, because bridges and roads have been built in a quite different direction. At Kostheim, your Majesty and the whole suite must from this old road cross the ferry over the Main, which would take more than half a day. There is certainly some error here, which has probably arisen from the use of an old post-book by the person who prepared the list.

The Elector of Hesse, too, is already in Hanau, or rather at Wilhelmsbad, close by, in consequence of the hope which was held out to him that your Majesty would alight there. At Frankfurt, your Majesty is expected by the whole population with indescribable joy. According to the list made out, your Majesty would avoid Hanau and Frankfurt and stop at Darmstadt, whose Court has taken such a miserable course in German affairs, and in no way deserves this distinction.

I have told Herr von Handel how the road now runs *de facto*, and that he must follow it, and station the horses on it, *de facto*.

Since your Majesty thinks the first day from Mayence too short, I will make preparations for your Majesty to stay the night at St. Goar. This is a good day's journey on the Rhine—that is, if your Majesty does not desire to travel after dark, which presents more difficulty, especially on the river. Your Majesty's retinue will travel by land along the banks of the Rhine, where there is a new high road. If the weather should be bad, your Majesty may choose this mode of travelling instead of going on the river.

As your Majesty will see by the enclosure, the Emperor Alexander will not come to Aix till the 28th. The King of Prussia hopes that your Majesty will not arrive till that day, in order to give him the advantage of himself receiving your Majesty. It will thus be possible for your Majesty to pass a day at Coblenz, where the new fortifications are well worthy of your Majesty's attention; I should the more wish that your Majesty should inspect these works with Duka (Ordnance-Master) as they are made on a new principle which with the greatest security unites a saving of expense of certainly two-thirds.

The works are very far advanced and conducted by Saxon engineers, who are distinguished by real talent. It is almost incredible that what is already finished has cost no more than 800,000 thalers. By the end of this year Coblenz will afford room for 60,000 men.

I send to meet your Majesty at Esselbach Herr von Handel, to receive your Majesty's orders for the journey from that place to Aix, and carry out all the arrangements, allowing for the proposed delay of one day.

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed. The enclosed Reports are herewith returned.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, September 29, 1818.

294. *Johannisberg, Sept. 19.*—In passing through Hanau, your Majesty will see the Elector. Annexed to this your Majesty will find a Report of General Wacquant concerning the Elector's very great wish to attain the Royal dignity.

My feeling is entirely against the thing. In relation to the Bund, nothing now ought to be altered, even in name; the dignity of the Crown certainly requires that the domain of a king should consist of more than one circle.

The Elector seems conscious of this, and suggests the most futile expedient of a collective Royal dignity, which must deprive that dignity of all value.

I propose, therefore, with all respect, that your Majesty should declare with regard to this matter that it is of a nature which your Majesty cannot alone decide.

If the Elector should ask your Majesty's advice, whether he should make any advances towards the other monarchs (he has already approached Prussia on the subject), your Majesty should advise him not to do so, and promise to talk over the matter confidentially at Aix.

With respect to the German Bund, your Majesty might say to the Elector—

“That your Majesty observes with sorrow the course that the Elector has lately taken at variance with his distinct promise to your Majesty's Cabinet.

“That your Majesty would make the proposal of a division of the combined contingents into three corps, which, however, would by no means allow Hesse to be with Wurtemberg. Each one of the confederation must keep to his own geographical position. The crossing of the regular line of halting-places must be avoided. The corps would have to be as equal in strength to one another as possible. Too strong corps would form armies, and too weak corps, divisions, which give a great opening to the passion for incorporation.

“How the three corps should be composed will have to be immediately arranged by your Majesty's minister; but that Hesse can never be with Wurtemberg results from the geographical position of the two States. That it could not be agreeable to the Elector to abandon his own country, and withdraw from it to an artificial line—a line on which the whole Bavarian army would be drawn up between Hesse and the corps to which Hesse's army wished to be attached: a line, too, which must be crossed by way of Saxony.”

If your Majesty should wish for more details on this question, Herr von Handel, whom I send to Esselbach to receive your Majesty's orders, is quite able to give your Majesty every information.

I have, besides, conferred with the ambassadors assembled here, in order to bring the military question to a conclusion in the first place here in Frankfurt—before Aix-la-Chapelle. I flatter myself that in this respect the last three weeks which I have spent here have effected more than anything which has been done, and have certainly led to the happy result of withdrawing every complication from Aix-la-Chapelle.

I shall have the honor to expect your Majesty in Mayence on the 22nd.

If your Majesty should give a regiment to the Elector, this could only be done in consequence of good conduct on his part as to the affairs of the Diet. I cannot express any desire for such a favor to the Electoral Prince. Neither his personal attitude nor the value of his services entitle him to receive it.

METTERNICH.

The Elector has spoken to me of his desire for the Royal dignity in a way that showed how much he is bent on attaining it. I gathered from what he said about the German contingents that he had given up his idea of joining his troops in one corps with those of Wurtemberg. No mention was made of the subject of the regiment. I return the documents that were enclosed, and take notice of the other contents of your Report.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, September 27, 1818.

295. *Aix-la-Chapelle, October 7.*—Annexed I have the honor to lay before your Majesty a preliminary survey of the military negotiation at Frankfurt.

A slight glance will convince your Majesty that the work touches on all the chief questions of a vigorous military organization. Your Majesty will deign to observe that it is worked out in detail with the same cogency as the Report to the Bund, which I expect in two or three days.

This affair is certainly one of the most important at the present time, and, if I do not regret the great and continuous labor it has cost me for more than a year, it is only from the feeling of having

rendered a true service to your Majesty and afforded substantial support to society in Europe. The most difficult matter was the bringing to an agreement at the right moment so many opinions or feelings, often separated by the most paltry and unworthy considerations. Nothing, too, could be more judicious than to show that, at the very moment of the evacuation of France, Germany is able to bear arms, and to render impossible any interference from Aix-la-Chapelle with purely federal affairs.

In this respect I consider my last stay in Frankfurt as a moment favored by fortune beyond all calculation.

The Bund will adjourn from the 12th instant till January.

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed. You will lay before me as soon as possible the details of the military organization of the German Confederation, for what you enclose is only a summary of the subjects which this organization concerns.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, October 8, 1818.

296. *Aix-la-Chapelle, October 25.*—Your Majesty. The painter Lawrence has received the necessary materials which he was expecting, and will wait upon your Majesty to begin his sittings. He has made his arrangements in the Town Hall.*

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, October 26, 1818.

297. *Aix-la-Chapelle, October 28.*—Your Majesty. I hasten to lay before your Majesty a Report that has just arrived here from Rio Janeiro, as it contains the news of what we may hope is the happy prospect of the pregnancy of the Archduchess Leopoldine.

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed. The Report enclosed is returned herewith.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, October 29, 1818.

* The portrait of the Emperor Francis taken by Lawrence is in the Waterloo Chamber at Windsor.—ED.

298. *Aix-la-Chapelle, November 17.*—Your Majesty. In the Conference to-day the Duke of Richelieu made a proposal as to the affairs of Spain with regard to her colonies, which will be followed by so important a discussion that I was obliged to submit to the unanimous wish of my colleagues that I should assist at the debate. In any case I must be back here next Saturday, the day when the Duke of Wellington will take part in the Conference.

I have therefore determined to leave for the Conference at Brussels on Saturday, the 21st instant, instead of to-morrow, the 18th. Most of the ambassadors will then leave Aix-la-Chapelle also on the 22nd.

This delay will not affect my whole journey, but I have thought it proper to inform your Majesty of it.

The King of Prussia is still so suffering that he probably will not be able to go to Brussels at all.

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed.

FRANCIS.

Aix-la-Chapelle, November 17, 1818

THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

Autograph (pencil) memoranda by Metternich on loose sheets.

299. The Act of Guarantee.

300. The Coalition and Quadruple Alliance.

301. A glance at the state of things, November 1, 1818.

302. Right Principles.

Act of Guarantee.

A.

299. The Emperor Alexander proposes a reciprocal Act of Guarantee concerning the present possessions of each of the contracting parties.

It appears that the Emperor Alexander even aims at establishing the *casus fœderis* on a common basis, against any extension whatever, by any of the parties, of his present possessions. He explicitly confines the act and the guarantee to possessions in Europe.

B.

Not only is there no difficulty about the Courts of Austria and Prussia taking part in such an act, but they will find it a great security. It is not so with the British Government, who will find it impossible to take a direct and obligatory part in so extensive an act of guarantee.

C.

Ought the Continental Courts to reject the proposition of the Emperor Alexander because England cannot be one of the contracting parties?

Ought they to conclude the treaty with the exclusion of England?

These are the most important questions of the moment.

Is there any form which would offer all the advantages resulting from such a treaty?—namely,

1. The feeling of security which would follow such a transaction;

2. The moral impossibility for the Emperor Alexander to attempt any extension of his frontiers;

3. The strength which the civil party in the Prussian Government would acquire over the military party, who aim only at disturbing the possessions of their neighbors;

4. The effect which such an act would produce on the minds of people and parties, especially the latter, who would no longer see any chance of success for their criminal hopes, except in political movement.

Considering the principle of harmony and moral solidarity which ought to exist between all the Powers, and especially between those of the Continent and England, what could be the form which, without making the material question of the guarantee bear upon England, would show the moral concurrence of that Power?

The Coalition and the Quadruple Alliance.

300. The Coalition was a general alliance. The Quadruple Alliance is not that, and never has been.

It is formed on a peculiar element in the Coalition.

It is to last twenty years, for its moral aim is applicable to all times and all circumstances, while the Coalition had, and could have but one aim, and consequently must have a definite termination.

The Coalition dates from the alliance of the two Powers which were first united against France; it was strengthened at Kalisch, at Teplitz, at Frankfurt, at Basle. It was completed in 1814 by the passage of the Rhine; it came to an end at the signature of the Peace of Paris.

After the opening of the Congress of Vienna no trace was left of the Coalition. France was at the Congress placed on the same level as the other powers.

The Quadruple Alliance, however, remains strong and intact in its moral and general dispositions. This it was which on March 15 served as a nucleus for the new Coalition, which came to an end, like the first, by the signature of the Treaty of Paris on November 20.

The Quadruple Alliance, therefore, is not to be, and cannot be, confounded with the general alliance, which was nothing more than the Coalition.

The Coalition was, and could only be, an element of war.

The Quadruple Alliance is, and has always been, a principle of peace.

Now, it would be almost as impossible to merge the Quadruple Alliance in a general alliance as it would be to merge the elements of peace and war together.

And to this principle of peace, which forms the first and essential basis of the Quadruple Alliance, France chiefly owes it that she was not subdivided in 1815, and that the ill-feelings which the reception of Bonaparte in France necessarily provoked among the Courts and the peoples of Europe were mitigated and controlled.

Abridged Summary of the Situation on November 1, 1818.

I. PRINCIPLES.

1.

301. One alliance exists, the Quadruple Alliance.

The *casus fœderis* of this alliance is specially suitable to its form.

The safety of the four contracting Courts requires that it be explicitly maintained.

The interest of France requires it also.

Consequently, prudence indicates one law for the five Courts:

1st. The maintenance of the Quadruple Alliance.

2nd. In this maintenance, any appearance of menace to France—tranquil, governed by her legitimate King and under constitutional forms—must be avoided.

The means of attaining this double end should be sought in the choice of forms and expressions in the political transactions to be settled during the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle.

2.

France, however, does not find herself placed in a situation analogous to that of the other Powers.

She is just issuing from the revolutionary movement; she is a prey to many parties; her territory has been set free; the Quadruple Alliance exists, and this fact alone makes possible coercive action against France, if the latter should be again thrown into a revolutionary crisis. France should not be, either in her own interest or in that of the four Courts and of Europe, abandoned thus to herself. It is therefore necessary to unite her to these Courts by a political combination.

This end cannot be attained by means of a treaty of alliance—

1st. Because it is not in the interest of a system of peace to create new alliances;

2nd. Because a treaty of alliance demands a *casus fœderis*.

There is no possibility of establishing a *casus fœderis* between the five Courts, and the endeavor to establish one on the maintenance of peace among States not admitted to the alliance would be absurd.

The means of attaining the end desired by the four Courts, and which ought to be desired by the King of France, may be found—

1st. In the terms of Article VI. of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815;

2nd. In the form of a diplomatic agreement (other than a treaty) between the five Courts, having for its one definite end the maintenance of the general peace.

3.

The diplomatic agreement bearing only on the five Courts, it would be necessary to deprive it of any tendency to disturb the other Courts of Europe. The means will be found—

1st. By its being drawn up in an exceedingly clear and precise manner suited to establish the agreement between the five Courts on the principle of the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the best relations among themselves;

2nd. In a definite engagement between the five Courts not to attempt to extend the action of their agreements to interests peculiar to other Courts;

3rd. In the enunciation of these facts to the Courts which have acceded to the transactions of the last few years, and in the positive assurance of the determination of the five Courts—

(a) That they do not wish to arrogate to themselves the right of discussing or deciding a question which is beyond their direct interests;

(b) That they are decided, and engage themselves, never to touch upon a question connected with the interest of a third party without the direct intervention of that third party.

II. FORMS.

1.

The sanction of the Quadruple Alliance must take place between the four Courts.

Confidential communication of the act which contains this sanction should be made to the King of France.

2.

The establishment of the diplomatic agreement between the five Courts.

3.

The communication to Europe of the fact of this concert.

Ad 1st. The sanction of the Quadruple Alliance should be recorded in a secret protocol.

Ad 2nd. The concert to be established between the five Courts demands—

An invitation to France;

A protocol which will regulate the agreement between the five Courts.

Ad 3rd. A communication to the other Courts should take place, either under the form of a declaration of the five Courts, or that of a uniform and circular despatch of the five Cabinets to their accredited ministers at the Courts of Europe.

Right Principles.

302. The treaty of Chaumont forms the basis of the Quadruple Alliance.

This treaty contains some permanent stipulations, and others which are temporary.

The treaties between the four allies, subsequent to that of Chaumont, contain the same differences.

It is now necessary to maintain: 1st, the permanent clauses of the Quadruple Alliance; 2nd, the *casus fœderis* against France; 3rd, to fix the meetings on the principle—

(a) Of periodical meetings, with six months' notice if there is no necessity to hold one;

(b) Of extraordinary meetings, to be called for on special occasions.

THE RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS AT AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

MEMOIR, BY FRIEDRICH GENTZ, AIX-LA CHAPELLE,
NOVEMBER 1818.*

303. It is neither by the number of its decisions, nor by their direct importance, that the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle stands forth in the political transactions of our time. It had in reality only one question to decide,† and it honorably acquitted itself. The moderation, the kindliness, the delicacy with which everything was treated in these conferences that related to the evacuation of French territory, and to a number of points connected with it, might serve as a model to future negotiations, and if France herself has not done sufficient justice to these proceedings, they will not the less be a matter of history.

* This memoir was sent by Gentz to Metternich with the following lines: "I have drawn up, for my new correspondent (Prince Souzo), a sketch of the most important negotiations at Aix, as an introduction to my future communications. Of this the accompanying *Observations générales* form the conclusion. It is very possible that your Excellency may find their point of view somewhat too elevated; I feel it myself, to a certain degree; but it is difficult to tone one's self down in handling so great a subject. In any case, I believe, your Excellency will find these remarks not quite unworthy of your approbation, and if I am not deceived in this hope I shall be sufficiently rewarded." These concluding remarks have been published (Prokesch, *Dépêches inédites*, 1876, vol. i. p. 396).—Ed.

† An article in the Treaty of Paris, of November 20, 1815, contained the declaration that after the space of three years the Allied Powers, in concert with the King of France, were to decide whether the condition of France was such that the foreign troops could be withdrawn, or whether the occupation must continue for five years. It was to decide this question that the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was summoned. Besides the three allied monarchs, there were there assembled the Austrian diplomatists, Metternich, Vincent, and Gentz; the Russians, Capo d'Istria, Nesselrode, Lieven; the Prussians, Hardenberg, Humboldt, Bernstorff; the English, Wellington, Castlereagh, Canning; the French, Richelieu, Rayneval, and Mounier.—Ed.

Considerations of the greatest weight prevented the sovereigns and ministers there met together from approaching, without urgent necessity, other subjects of discussion—especially from approaching them in regular and official forms. But all those which were the subject of their confidential deliberations were treated in a spirit of peace, justice, and wisdom, and not a resolution was taken, not a protocol signed, which did not tend to consolidate public order, or to devise remedies for complications which might endanger it.

Nevertheless, it is not by its positive and material results alone that we must judge of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle; we must look at it in its general effect, in the whole of the political and federal relations which it has established or materially strengthened, and in the influence which the mind which directed it may exercise on the present and future destinies of Europe. From this elevated point of view the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle is an event of the highest importance, of which the superficial observer takes in perhaps only a few separate features, and which a statesman alone—looking into the hidden causes and meanings of things—can appreciate.

Not being able to include here all that belongs to so vast a subject, I shall confine myself to some observations on the political and moral tendency of the conferences of Aix-la-Chapelle, under three heads, which seem to me to deserve particular attention.

I. Concerning the General Political System.

The whole of the European Powers have since 1813 been united, not by an alliance properly so called, but by a system of cohesion founded on generally recognized principles, and on treaties in which every State, great or small, has found its proper place. One might deny that this state of things is what, according to the old political ideas, characterized a federative or well-balanced system. But it is not the less certain that, in the present circumstances of Europe—circumstances which she will not quickly get rid of—this system is the one most suited to her needs, and that the destruction of that system would be a dreadful calamity; for, as not one of the States comprehended in it could remain isolated, all of them would enter into new political combinations, and adopt new measures for their safety; consequently new alliances, changes, juxtapositions, intrigues, indescribable complications, by a thousand different

chances, all equally fatal, would bring us to a general war—that is to say (for the two terms are almost synonymous), to the entire overthrow of all social order in Europe.

We must remember that during the year 1817, and up to the summer of 1818, some of these terrible dangers occupied, not only the idle conjectures of the public, but the thoughts of statesmen, filling them with great uneasiness and the most sinister presentiments. At that time a change of policy in Russia was particularly dreaded: different symptoms, perhaps misunderstood at the time, had given rise to the suspicion that the Emperor Alexander aimed at a close alliance with the House of Bourbon in France, Spain, and Italy. Such a combination would have put all the intermediary States in the most critical position. It would have certainly provoked a counter combination between Austria, Prussia, and England. The Powers of the second and third rank would have been divided between the two standards. Germany, the central point of Europe, now united, would have run the risk of again being torn in pieces, in more senses in one. The jealousies, fears, disputes, provocations—inseparable from such a state of things—would have soon placed these two opposite political bodies in a thoroughly hostile attitude, and the first serious contest would have caused an explosion.

It is true that these suspicions and disquietudes had in a great measure disappeared some months before the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle; but that meeting has brought about two inestimable advantages. First, that of having entirely cleared the ground, removed all doubts, and fully re-established the confidence of each of the Cabinets in the proceedings and principles of the other, and in the stability of the general harmony. Secondly, that of having by confidential interviews, earnest discussions, and the contact of intelligent minds, imbued the sovereigns and their ministers with the necessity of maintaining intact a system which, whatever its theoretical merits or defects, is at present the only one practicable, the only one which conduces to the real interests of all the Powers—the anchor of salvation for Europe.

II. Concerning the Position of the Powers with regard to France.

The confirmation of the Quadruple Alliance, in case of new catastrophes occurring in the interior of France, and menacing the repose of her neighbors, is one of the most solid benefits which we

owe to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was not easy to draw the line between an imperious attitude, which, instead of subduing a storm, might perhaps have raised and accelerated it, and a contingent measure of precaution, merely sufficiently imposing to carry weight; but competent judges will acknowledge that it has been done with much prudence and discretion. It is allowable to consider the danger against which this measure was aimed as more or less probable, as more or less imminent; but it is impossible not to admit the reality of its existence, and that, in the present state of things, France is the country least disposed to respect the general tranquillity, the best placed and least organized to disturb it, and the one which some years hence will be able to attack it most successfully. So long as the Quadruple Alliance exists, strengthened as it is at present by the whole military weight of Germany, the most audacious head of a party, or even a King of France carried away by popular excitement, would not lightly give the signal for fresh conflicts. Thus at least one of the clouds which threaten our dark horizon will be held in check by a proper union of strength; and, had we only given this one security—enclosed, so to speak, in the general association which makes the basis of the state of peace—the Congress would have deserved well of mankind.

III. Concerning the Moral and Political State of Europe.

All European countries, without exception, are tormented by a burning fever, the companion or forerunner of the most violent convulsions which the civilized world has seen since the fall of the Roman Empire. It is a struggle, it is war to the death between old and new principles, and between the old and a new social order. By a fatality, so to speak inevitable, the reaction of 1813, which has suspended but not terminated the revolutionary movement in France, has aroused it in the other States. All the elements are in fermentation; the equilibrium of authority is threatened; the most solid institutions are shaken to their foundations, like the buildings in a city trembling from the first shocks of an earthquake which in a few instants will destroy it. If in this dreadful crisis the principal sovereigns of Europe were disunited in principles and intentions; if one approved what the others condemned; if but one amongst them looked on the embarrassments of his neighbors as a means of advancing his own interests, or if he regarded the whole prospect with blind or criminal indifference; if, in short, the eyes

of all were not open to the revolutions which are preparing, and the means which remain to them for preventing or retarding the explosion, we should all be carried away in a very few years. But, happily, such are not the dispositions of the princes who are protectors and preservers of public order; their intimate union, "*calme et constante dans son action*," is the counterpoise to the disorder which turbulent spirits try to bring into human affairs; the nucleus of organized strength which this union presents is the barrier which Providence itself appears to have raised to preserve the old order of society, or at least to moderate and soften the changes which are indispensable. Now, this truly sacred union, of which the Holy Alliance is but an imperfect symbol, was never manifested in a more reassuring manner than at the time of the conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle. Not that they approached any of these dangerous questions, which would have been pretexts for general agitation; they discussed neither the form of governments, nor the representative system, nor the maintenance or modification of the privileges of the nobility, nor the liberty of the press, nor anything touching the interests of religion. They carefully avoided giving opportunities for malevolence or indiscretion by putting into the formal documents wishes or declarations of which each carried the principle in his mind, but the enunciation of which would have provoked vexatious and hostile criticism. They did better than that. Sovereigns and ministers understood what the common good required. They felt keenly the need of mutual confidence and more direct agreement than that which treaties could establish; they sacrificed secondary interests, which under less serious circumstances, might have divided them, to the paramount interest of uniting to defend the trust which Providence had confided to them, and put aside every other consideration, to preserve authority in the shipwreck by saving the people from their own follies. Without entering into unnecessary engagements, they have all agreed on the course to be followed amid the tempest, and the only title which they have solemnly brought forward to justify and authorize this course is the declaration that justice, moderation, and concord shall ever preside in their councils.

Thus it is that the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle has fulfilled its high mission. The general impression it has made in Europe is its best witness. While maintaining a silence suited to its position and dignity, only interrupted by a small number of publications, it has everywhere encouraged the friends of order and peace, and terrified

innovators and the factions. A Congress of diplomatists cannot, as such, change the destinies of the world; but it can guide them, it can moderate them, it can prevent many evils which would aggravate them; and if the effects which may reasonably be expected from the last meeting of the sovereigns should be stultified by events above human calculations, it will still have the glory of having been the support and the consolation of right-thinking men.

METTERNICH'S PROJECTS FOR DIFFERENT REFORMS IN PRUSSIA.

304. Metternich to Prince Wittgenstein, Prussian Minister of State, Aix, November 14, 1818 (with two enclosures).

• 305. On the condition of the Prussian States (Enclosure No. 1).

306. On educational affairs—Gymnasium and the Freedom of the Press in Prussia and Germany (Enclosure No. 2).

304. I have the honor to send you, my dear Prince, the two sketches enclosed, confident as I have long been of your patriotism.

I do not come unbidden to plead for a cause strange to me. I have in these sketches laid down plainly my creed as the head of the Austrian Cabinet. Our intention is pure, like our views; we do not separate our fate from the State which in every respect is nearest to us. The moment is urgent. What to-day may yet be possible will not be so to-morrow, and assistance is only possible as long as free power is in the hands of the King.

I beg you, my dear Prince, carefully to consider both these documents. I have divided them because they belong to different branches of the administration.

The first (No. 305) is my view of the next form of administration suitable for Prussia, and rests on one single proposition:

The central representation by representatives of the people is the disintegration of the Prussian States.

It is so because such a reform takes place in no great State without leading to a revolution or following upon a revolution; because in the Prussian State, from its geographical position and its composition, a central representation is not possible; because this State requires before everything a free and sound military strength, and this does not and cannot consist with a purely representative system.

According to my firm conviction, the King ought to go no further than the formation of provincial Diets in a very carefully considered, circumscribed form. If the idea of a central representa-

tive body, chosen from the different Diets, is referred to by me, this is because a similar idea already exists in the Royal declaration, which is known to the public and is the only one possible. Beyond this all is pure revolution. Will these very limited ideas not also lead to revolution? This question the King should ponder deeply before he decides.

The second paper (No. 306) is no less important in its object, and is as urgent as the first in its application. It needs no comment, for fact speaks daily for my proposition.

I have, under the seal of secrecy, imparted these two projects to the Chancellor of State, Prince Hardenberg. I put the present copies into your hands, my dear Prince, and I leave it to your judgment whether you will submit them to his Majesty. In the first audience granted me by his Majesty some propositions were received with such free and outspoken conviction that his Majesty made me wish to write them down. I believe, too, that I fulfil a duty to my own Fatherland in offering our true and impartial opinion on the position and the dangers of our closest allies. Receive, my dear Prince, this proof of confidence, &c. &c.

On the Position of the Prussian States.

305. It would be superfluous to enter upon a consideration of the importance of the existence of Prussia for the whole of the European State-system. This springs from the nature of things; it is founded on the present condition of Europe, and this universal admission is manifested by the late negotiations.

But for Austria the existence of Prussia has a special and peculiar value.

In a similar position with respect to neighboring States; the chief members of a Bund which has the right to reckon on their support, and the duty of rendering the same support to them in return, the two States can never separate their interests without danger and difficulty to both. They must together prosper or together suffer; the peace, the strength, or the weakness of the one will always react for good or evil on the other.

The strength of States rests on two fundamental conditions—their political and their administrative conformation.

The first is at the present time more than ever beyond the calculation, as beyond the will, of Governments. The limits of States are of late years firmly and inviolably fixed by diplomatic negotia-

tions. What might be improved in them lies consequently beyond the sphere of discussion. Political repose rests on fraternization between monarchs, and on the principle of maintaining that which is. To oppose these fundamental principles would be to shake the edifice to its very foundations; the consequences of such an undertaking must certainly be to any State more productive of danger than utility.

But the form of administration remains in the hands of the Government wherever the power has not been given away. The efforts of parties are constantly directed to lead Governments astray from this truth. The revolutionists always calculate on the paternal feeling of the reigning princes; wisdom, however, bids the monarch, above all, to maintain the right, to protect his people from theoretical projects, and to prove and consider everything, and make choice of the best.

Wherever the limit has not yet been overstepped—that is to say, wherever the monarch can still act independently—the carrying out of this last principle is quite possible, and this holds good for Prussia. The course now chosen by the King will decide much more than the fate of his own kingdom. What an incalculable influence the next internal organization of the Prussian States must have on Germany and Austria is self-evident. This is felt by the unelected representatives of the so-called voice of the people. The party has so far remained true and consistent in its course. It has sought in Prussia the support for its lever, and perhaps has found it only too readily. The moment has arrived for the King to give his verdict. His decision may be the certain triumph of the revolution over the whole of Europe, or may save and maintain the peace of Prussia and the world.

What will the King do? This question may, perhaps, be answered in a few sentences.

The main condition of every form, its utility or its worthlessness, will be determined by a true knowledge of the body to which it is to be applied.

The Prussian States, although united under one sceptre, consist of many different portions, separated by geographical position, climate, race, or language. It has in this respect much similarity with the Austrian, although the position of the latter is in every way more advantageous. The separate parts of the Austrian monarchy are more solid; their geographical position is better; they all form a well-rounded whole. Of the two kingdoms Austria would

herself be more suited for a pure representative system than Prussia, if the differences of her populations in language and habits were not too important. How can that which is impossible to be carried out in Austria succeed in Prussia?

Under existing circumstances in the two monarchies the certain result of the attempt would be that in the desire for a really representative central system, the kingdom would fall into separate parts—parts which have not then to be made, but which are already there as parts, and show more substantial differences than even Holland or the Netherlands.

The success of the central representation in this kingdom does not need consideration; the introduction of it has given to all Europe a great and decisive proof of the uselessness of such a scheme in a whole formed of such essentially different parts, and in this way it may have done some good.

In another respect the kingdom of the Netherlands offers a second experience which is not to be despised. This kingdom requires above all for its maintenance a strong military power, and this very important condition of its existence as well as that of Prussia is enfeebled by its constitution, as would be the case in Prussia if a central representation were introduced. This has been felt by the civil party in Prussia, which has long ago raised its voice against the army, and proposed a senseless system of a mere arming of the people in the place of the standing army. The Prussian State would approach its internal dissolution if ever the King of Prussia should appear, not at the head of an army, but as the leader of seven or eight separate masses of men.

Promises, however, have been made on the part of the Government; they must be redeemed. The pressure of the people is to obtain some guarantee against despotism, especially on the part of the Germans, from a remembrance of former times, and from the dreadful abuse of power of which the German princes, in their arrogance, have been guilty since the year 1806. This pressure was originally for the restoration of government by Diet, until, overpowered by the voices of the revolutionists, it made its appearance in the form of a desire for a central representative system. It is easy to imagine from the obscure ideas of the majority as to the real nature of popular representation to what delusion this gives rise; and if the national mind has really changed, it becomes all the more incumbent on the monarchs to examine everything, and to resolve only upon what is truly good.

The King has promised a purely representative system. He will accordingly give to his people the guarantees which alone are suitable to his kingdom.

The Prussian monarchy may be divided naturally into several divisions:

1. The Marks of Brandenburg;
2. The Kingdom of Prussia;
3. The Grand Duchy of Posen;
4. The Duchy of Silesia;
5. The Duchy of Saxony;
6. The Duchy of Westphalia;
7. The Grand Duchy of the Lower Rhine.

It is still to be considered to what divisions Pomerania, Lower Saxony, and Berg will be joined. They are at any rate not fitted to form single States, and it is probable that Pomerania will be united to the Marks, Lower Saxony to the Duchy of Saxony, and Berg to Westphalia.

Each of these provinces is entitled to take part in a representative system by Diet, but these Diets are by no means to be cast in exactly the same forms without regard to their local concerns, which are, for instance, in the Grand Duchy of the Lower Rhine very different from others, as Silesia, the Marks, &c. &c. By an enlightened regard for local concerns, the surest foundation will be laid for the happiness of each State in itself and the welfare of all the States as a whole.

Such Diets should be formed before anything else is done.

If ever the Budget question or legislation in the highest sense should make a central representation advantageous to the State, or if the solution of this question should be hereafter unavoidable, an expedient might be found by choosing not less than three members to be sent from each Diet, expressly called together for that purpose.

This central body would at least be more easy to guide aright than a combination of deputies strange or even hostile to each other, who would never be brought to agree in one political aim.

The following main points will suffice to show briefly our views:

1. The Prussian State shall continue to exist in the form of separate provinces.

The executive power to reside in the King. He will have ministers at the head of the different departments, and a Council of State.

Each province to have an Upper and a Lower administrative board.

2. Each province to be represented in a way suitable to its local relations.

The presidents of the Diets to be named by the King.

The principal features of the action of the Diets will be as follows:

In their assemblies, legally summoned, they shall have the right to transmit to the Government all requests and remonstrances on matters concerning the welfare of the province, the Diet, or single individuals.

It will rest with them to distribute the taxes according to legal principles, to watch over the just division of the public burdens in the provinces and prevent all abuse and injustice in this respect.

3. The King will introduce this system of representation and reserve to himself the subsequent decision as to the co-operation of the provincial Diets by means of a central representation composed from them for the passing of the Budget and higher legislation,

The Government must be careful, before the introduction of Diets, to arrange the provinces in their different parts and regulate their administration, and a central representation can only be the result of such arrangements.

4. It is no doubt a question worthy of consideration, what connection there might be between a Council of State in the extensive form of the Prussian Council and the central representation as chosen from the different Diets, and whether some members of the Council of State, as such, might become members of the central representation.

On Education, Gymnastic Establishments, and Liberty of the Press.

(Supplement to No. 304.)

306. As important perhaps for the decision of the Prussian Government are the questions arising from the intrigues of the various peace-disturbing parties in Prussia as well as Germany.

The means of checking the growing evil are twofold. The first and principal the King will find in his own will; the second, in the closest agreement with Austria. The first refers to the Prussian State itself; the second to a common course to be followed at the Diet. These last might gain in safety by an agreement between the two chief German States, and confidential conferences with the

chief Courts before they can with advantage be brought before the Diet.

The subjects which we think necessary to point out here are:

I. The question of Education.

II. The establishments for Gymnastics.

III. The Liberty of the Press.

I. EDUCATION.

No impartial observer can now doubt that the innovators in Germany—and most of them are found among the learned caste—have relinquished the hope of actively influencing the present generation with their revolutionary spirit, and still more of moving them to action. The characteristic features of the Germans will always hinder the success of such an attempt. The German is cold, prudent, and faithful. He speculates more than he acts, especially when the action involves a rending of the civil and domestic ties. The patriotism of the Germans has various aims; there are in the common fatherland separate voices of the people; provincial patriotism is the nearest to the German citizen: he grasps it from the cradle, and thirty generations have shown no reason why it should not be honored as the deepest and most natural feeling, for the Branderburger and the Austrian, the Bavarian and the Hessian, are all alike Germans. The political formation of States often operates on the mind of the people for centuries longer than the institutions themselves exist; the remembrance of the German Empire, too, is still fresh and vivid, particularly in the lower classes. Even if there is no more an Empire, there is still a Germany, and the nucleus of ancient provinces under ancient Princes.

Conscious of the futility of the undertaking, the plan of the innovators—for they act on a settled plan—has taken quite a different character, a character which suits itself to the feeling and personal relations of the leaders: that which the present generation cannot perform is reserved for the next, and in order that the next generation may not follow the footsteps of its predecessors, the youth must be seized as he leaves boyhood, and he must undergo a revolutionary training.

Where the revolution in its coarsest form cannot pervert and incite to insurrection the already educated, a people shall be educated for revolution.

This plan is followed at some of the German universities, and if we have not the necessary information to enable us to judge exactly

how far many professors at the Prussian universities join in it, we believe we are not wrong in considering it more than probable that they do so.

The Royal Prussian Government is well aware of the signification of the German *Burschenschaft*, and that the mischief cannot be too soon checked is beyond a doubt. But that this can only be accomplished by the united action of the German Governments is just as certain.

II. GYMNASTIC ESTABLISHMENTS.

The mischief here is closely connected with life at the universities: the inventors, the invention, and the execution belong to Prussia.

The gymnastic establishment is a real preparatory school of university disorders. There the boy is formed into the youth, as in the higher school—the university—the youth is formed into the man.

We here declare our firm conviction that it has become a duty of State for the King thoroughly and entirely to destroy this evil. Palliative measures are no longer sufficient. The whole institution in every shape must be closed and done away with, offenders being made liable to legal censure.

As the institution was founded and still exists in Berlin itself, and as the branch institutions seem all to depend on and spring from the mother institution, the evil must there be uprooted. If offshoots continue to exist, this will be a fit subject for consultation with those German Governments which may not be clear-sighted enough, and may further encourage the evil.

III. LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

This point, the most difficult of all, can only be regulated by a close agreement between Austria and Prussia, and by this means with the other German Governments—if, indeed, it possibly can be regulated.

Every measure must be grounded on the following principles:

1. The broadest views as to real substantial works;
2. The most decided difference between such works and pamphlets and journals;
3. Respect for the independence of the single States forming the Bund, and the certainty that no State may remain in the Bund which does not possess some efficient law on this subject, whether it be preventive or repressive.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE JEWS.*

307. The Edict of the Emperor Joseph is in full force in all the German States of Austria. The Hungarian Constitution is opposed to one part of its execution, but this fact is independent of the wishes of the King.

Schools for Jewish girls exist everywhere. Where the community is not large, the children of both sexes frequent the Christian schools; every Jew is at liberty to educate his children in Christian educational establishments.

Jews can, under certain restrictions, and in countries where the constitutions do not directly oppose it, become landed proprietors.

They are subject to the military conscription, like the Christians. All grades of the service are open to them. there are staff-officers at this day who are Jews.

Distinctions of every kind—except those which require the formula of a Christian oath, such as the orders of knighthood—are given to them. Men remarkable for their civil virtues and honorable estate have acquired titles of nobility, which place them in the same rank as Christian noblemen.

They may adopt any profession they like, if there are very few in the Civil Service, it is because they do not choose that career, or, rather, that those who do aspire to it enter the bosom of the Church.

Nevertheless, in many places it has been necessary to take measures of precaution in carrying out the edict of the Emperor Joseph, even after it has been in force many years, because of the abuse by Jews of the concessions granted them. Devoted to business, from

* The occasion of this judgment seems to have been the appearance of a "*Mémoire sur l'état des Israélites*, par un Ministre du Saint Evangile," which was dedicated and presented to the monarch assembled at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Besides which, the representatives of the Jews in Vienna presented a petition to their Majesties, imploring an inquiry to be made into the state of the law in respect to the civic rights of members of the Israelitish faith.—ED.

father to son, assisting each other with large capitals, they prefer to gain by either lawful or unlawful trade what would cost both care and trouble to attain by other means.

The laws of the Emperor Joseph have, however, been of real benefit; the most satisfactory example that could be cited in support of this truth is the difference between the Jews of Galicia and those of ancient Poland.

One of the great difficulties in devising any measure relating to the position of the Jews arises from their number. Any hasty reform bears heavily on an immense mass of men whom nothing can persuade to renounce old customs or adopt new ones.

1819.

ROME, NAPLES, AND PERUGIA.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters, from March 5 to June 22, 1819.

308. The journey postponed. 309. From Friesach. 310. From Florence—reception of the Emperor. 311. Grand banquet in honor of the Emperor. 312. Arrival at Rome—description of the city—audience by the Pope—St. Peter's—the Vatican—Palm-Sunday—the Coliseum. 313. Good-Friday at St. Peter's—the blessing *Orbi et Urbi*—death of Kotzebue. 314. End of the festival—illumination of the Cupola. 315. Arrival at Naples. 316. Pozzuoli and Baja—the miracle of St. Januarius. 317. Visit to Pompeii. 318. The Grotto of the Sibyl. 319. Ascent of Mount Vesuvius. 320. Excursion to Salerno and Pæstum. 321. The Emperor on Mount Vesuvius. 322. Postponement of the Emperor's journey—the plan for Metternich's journey—Tivoli—Lawrence in Rome. 323. The procession of *Corpus Christi*. 324. From Perugia—the portrait of Clementine by Lawrence—Metternich's bust by Thorwaldsen. 325. Description of Perugia. 326. Cardinal Consalvi.

Metternich to his Wife, Vienna, March 5, 1819.

308. Very much against my will, my dear, I have been obliged to put off my journey till the 8th. I have yielded to Staudenheim's orders, and he has found a powerful ally in the worst weather that heaven ever sent to any part of this lower world. The thermometer is constantly at one, two, or three degrees above zero. It rains, there is a thick fog; sometimes a few flakes of snow come to enliven us; the men cough, the women sniff, the children squall. Here in three sentences, I give you a picture of society in Vienna, and its charms.

This is the plan for my journey. I intend to sleep on the 8th, at Schottwien; the 9th, at Leoben; the 10th, at Klagenfurt; the 11th, at Ponteba; the 12th, at Conegliano; the 13th, at Verona; the 14th, at Modena; the 15th, at Scarica l'Asino; the 16th, at Florence.

309. *Friesach, March 10.*—Thanks to the despairing anticipations of Floret, who always thinks it is impossible to reach any place, I have arrived here in such good time, my dear, that I am able to write to you. I shall send my letter by post to Klagenfurt, so as to ensure your getting it safely. I left Kraupach at seven this morn-

ing, the most wretched hole on earth; I dined at Unzmarkt, and here I am at Friesach at seven in the evening. I found a good deal of snow between Kraupach and Neumarkt, where the level is high, but it disappeared as we descended towards Carinthia. I shall find it again in the Julian Alps. To-morrow I shall sleep at Tarvis.

You see, my dear, that the journey is going on very well. Everybody is in good health, and Kaunitz is just the same as in 1799. He does not speak of his grievances: it seems as if he had none; he eats, sings, whistles, laughs, and sleeps, like everybody else, and carries it so far that I believe he is only restive, like some horses, which are very gentle and quiet for months together, and begin to rear and kick at certain times and in certain places.

In the course of my travels I have made a discovery in natural history. The magistrate of Judenburg was waiting at the door to compliment me. All magistrates everywhere are constantly complaining; he of Judenburg had no complaint to make of men, so he fell back on *mice*. The burgomaster having assured me that the mice had ravaged the fields, I asked him if this plague had existed for a long time. "My God, yes—ever since the French came!" "What! did the French bring mice in their train?" "No, but those devils of men encamped near the town; they eat so much bread that they filled the fields with crumbs, and we have had all the mice of Styria since." Hate is blind!

310. *Florence, March 18.*—I write to you at last, my dear, after having waited from hour to hour for the possibility of sending this off. I have had the quickest and the best journey possible. Once on Italian soil, it was so much accelerated that I was obliged to increase the number of my stations. I slept at Tarvis on the 11th, at Conegliano on the 12th, at Verona on the 13th, at Bologna on the 14th, and arrived here on the 15th, in nine hours, a thing without example. The Emperor made the journey in ten hours, and it was said to be a miracle; I made it in one hour less, and the miracle was one no longer. Where ordinary travellers ascend the high mountains of the Apennines in carriages drawn by oxen, I went at a quick trot with eight horses. The animals in this country must have lungs made differently from those of our ultramontane cattle. I have had nothing to complain of on the way, except an excess of attention. At Bologna, the Cardinal-Legate waited upon me with invitations from two societies, and to two suppers—one at his own house, and the other at Marescalchi's, where I lodged. In my difficulty of choice I went to bed, and left the two parties to arrange the

suppers as they like, after having fraternized with his Eminence for nearly two hours "*in camera caritatis.*"

. . . We are here in the midst of flowers; the houses are still cold, but there are good chimneys, and even stoves in all the rooms.

The Emperor has been received with real enthusiasm by the Tuscans. He is marvellously well. Venice gave him a cold in the head; I was right enough to avoid that charming resting-place.

Florence is still full of English; they are beginning to move towards Rome. The Emperor leaves on the 29th of this month. I intend to start with Marie on the 26th. We shall go that day to Leghorn, on the 27th to Pisa, the 28th to Sienna, the 29th to Radicofani, the 30th to Viterbo, and we shall be at Rome on the 31st.

I am lodging here at the Palace Dragomanni. The mistress of the house is a widow, and is that wild dancer of the *Furlana* whom you have seen at Madame Elisa's balls in 1810 at Paris. She is nine years older, and dances no longer, but my virtue is as safe as if she still danced with her old impetuosity. I have never liked paroxysms or hurricanes. The windows of my bedroom look on a garden where everything is in flower. Just beneath me there are orange-trees in the open air, covered with fruit, and the flowers just peeping out. I am astonished, for, after all, the heat is not great; the sun is everything here, and the sun of Tuscany is quite a different thing from the sun beyond the Alps.

311. *March 22.*—The town gave a *fête* to the Emperor yesterday. The *fête* was beautiful, simply owing to the locality; it was held in front of the Palazzo Vecchio. The people assembled in the old palace inhabited by the Medici before they acquired the Pitti Palace. Everything there breathes of their presence, though it is three hundred years since they left it. The Uffizi galleries were illuminated. There was a colored fire, which did not add much to the beauty of the illumination. What I liked best of all was to see the beautiful statues of Michel Angelo, Benvenuto Cellini, &c., the *chefs-d'œuvres* of architecture of that epoch, brilliantly illuminated, which, in fact, enables me to say that I have seen it all as the creators themselves saw it. Caraman raves about Florence; he declares that to be there is like being in an enchanted palace; and he is not far wrong. Nothing that one sees there is like anything one sees elsewhere.

I shall leave on the 26th, and will follow strictly the route I indicated in my last letter.

312. *Rome, April 2.*—Here we are, my dear. I shall not undertake to tell you what we find in Rome; I leave that to Marie. Do

not think, however, that she is exaggerating, for that is simply impossible. Imagination attains to what has been presented by the senses—in vain we delude ourselves: that circle is never left. Rome must be seen to be believed in. All that the most beautiful cities in the world can show of magnificence in detail is gathered together here, and certainly surpassed.

Rome has been to me like a person I tried to imagine without having seen; such calculations are always deceptive. I have found everything different from what I supposed; I expected Rome would be old and sombre—it is antique and superb, brilliant and new. I do not know what I would give to take you for a single instant to the window of my drawing-room; and this window is nothing compared to one in a dressing-room which is prepared for the Empress! Picture to yourself the most splendid view, so rich that one would accuse of excessive exaggeration the painter of such a scene. Opposite and beneath me I have St. Peter's, the Castle of St. Angelo, the Column of Antoninus, innumerable obelisks and palaces, each one more magnificent than the other; fountains throwing up an enormous volume of water; to the left, the Coliseum, St. John Lateran; opposite, the Vatican, &c., &c. These, indeed, are a number of names, but they give no idea of the objects. St. Peter's and the Vatican together are as large as the city of Turin, which contains sixty thousand souls. The square of St. Peter's alone would contain two hundred thousand. The only thing which could give any idea of these spaces are the Tuileries, the Square of Louis XV., and the Champs Elysées. The *garde-meubles* are, taken separately, only miserable hovels compared to twenty private houses which count for nothing in Rome. The Farnese Palace is one of the largest and most lofty—well, the high-altar of St. Peter's is six feet higher than the palace, and it is in bronze.

We arrived here the day before yesterday, before nightfall. The cupola of St. Peter's may be discerned a little this side of the last posting-stage. The country is nothing but a desert. The soil, the best in the world, requires only hands to cultivate it. At last, after the most disagreeable journey, one arrives among ruins, with numbers of posts here and there, on which hang the bodies, old and new, of brigands who have committed murder on this very spot. It is more like the gates of Tartarus than those of the Holy City. But, once free from all this, the grandeur of Rome becomes overwhelming.

Arrived at the Consulta, where I live, and where Cardinal Con-

salvi waited upon me with a crowd of men whom he had provided for my establishment, I was literally terrified at first at the sight of my apartments. They consist of twenty-five magnificent rooms. Marie has at least half that number for herself. I began yesterday by going to see the Pope, whom I found in very good health, much better than I had expected. He is infirm, but with an infirmity quite natural to such an advanced age as his. He let me know, through the Cardinal, that he will see me whenever I like.

I sallied forth, therefore, first of all to pay my respects to him. He received me as he would an old friend; he spoke to me of our correspondence while he was a prisoner at Savona. He came forward to meet me, had a stool placed beside him for me, and we conversed for an hour. Pepi and my gentlemen were waiting in the ante-chamber. I begged for permission to present them to him; he walked to the other end of the room to ring for them to be shown in. I presented them; he said a few words to them, and ended by conducting me, on leaving, as far as the first room. I defy even those who are too attentive to do more. He converses very well, with great facility and much liveliness. During an hour of conversation, on everything in the world, he laughed for a good quarter of an hour. Certainly no interview between Pope and minister, meeting for the first time, could have been more kindly. He likes to speak of his troubles under Bonaparte, and he reminded me of more than twenty anecdotes of my conversations with the latter on his account. He told me to come and see him, how and when I like.

The apartments destined for his Majesty are of ravishing beauty. Besides the magnificence of the locality, the greater part of the furniture was made under Napoleon, who had intended the Quirinal for his own palace. The Pope has had everything finished, so that in these apartments may be found all that is beautiful in ancient and modern art. When the Louvre is finished it will not bear comparison with the Quirinal. The first ante-chamber—a room as large as the Redoute at Vienna—is common to the Pope and the Emperor. It is used as a peristyle to the chapel, which is prepared for some of the functions of Holy Week. This chapel holds five hundred; three thousand have applied for admission. There are more than forty thousand foreigners in Rome, counting both masters and valets.

The apartments of the Pope contrast singularly with the magnificence which surrounds them; they are more than simple.

From the Quirinal we went to St. Peter's; from St. Peter's to the Vatican. What say you to this life?

It is a fact that St. Peter's seems small, in consequence of the harmony of all its parts. It is only when one examines, when one measures, that one begins to doubt the evidence of the eyes. The marble angels which support the basins for holy water are placed on the two first pilasters beyond the entrance. You think them quite near; they seem to be about the height of Leontine: as you approach them they increase till they become colossal. The four pillars on which the cupola rests, which is six feet more in diameter than the Pantheon, seem merely of ordinary dimensions. Well; the thickness on the narrow side is thirty-two paces. Picture to yourself this church, which has twenty chapels, each of which would make an enormous church, and each of which has a cupola higher and larger than that of St. Charles Borromeo, all inlaid with marble, all the ceilings in mosaic, representing magnificent pictures. There is not an ornament which is not either in marble, porphyry, antique alabaster, or gilt bronze; not a corner which is not as completely finished as a snuffbox; gigantic monuments everywhere, executed by the first masters of all times; such magnificence of every kind was never gathered together in ancient times.

St. Peter's as a church is the chapel of the Vatican. You remember the gallery of the Louvre. Put twenty like that one after another, and you would hardly have the space which is filled with statues, marbles, monuments of every kind! Nevertheless, in November next they will open a new wing with halls and galleries, which they will fill with statues that are now in warehouses. Besides all these halls and galleries, there are also eleven thousand rooms and closets, all habitable, in this same house.

What galleries are those painted in fresco by Raphael! This marvellous man painted one—perhaps the most beautiful—at the age of eighteen.

We walked straight on, we did not stop at all—looked about us very little, and yet we walked for five hours.

Our days are arranged. We shall go out every day from eight till midday, and from four to six. It is too hot between midday and four o'clock. To-day it has been warmer than it generally is with us in the month of June.

April 3.—Yesterday morning we went to see the Forum of Trajan, a magnificent ancient ruin.

Then we visited the studios of Canova and Thorwaldsen, two

very remarkable artists. What Canova has done already, and what he is at present doing, is inconceivable. This man reminds one of the best days of Greece.

The Emperor arrived at half-past four. We waited upon him in his own apartment. On arriving he went first to see his Holiness, who came to meet him as far as his own legs would carry him. The Emperor has been received with much pomp and great enthusiasm by the people. The whole population of Rome turned out to meet him.

April 4.—I close my letter just as I am starting for the Quirinal, for the Feast of Palms. The ceremony will last three hours: I shall be consequently too late to write to you on my return, as the courier must start so as to arrive in Munich in time to meet the one who goes from Vienna to Paris.

Marie has doubtless told you of our walks yesterday morning. We passed four hours in the Rome of the Cæsars, in the midst of the most magnificent ruins of edifices the most sublime and the most gigantic that human genius ever created. The *Forum Romanum* is a town of temples and monuments. The excavations made by the French and continued by the Pope allow one to walk once more on the pavement of the *Via Sacra*, along which all the triumphal processions wended their way.

A mass—partly upright, partly lying confusedly on the earth—of trunks of gigantic columns of porphyry, and the most beautiful marbles and granites from the East, of capitals and other *débris*, shows what this place must have been. Imagination alone cannot realize it. The Pope, who does an immense deal for art (or rather Consalvi does it in his name), intends to excavate the whole of the Forum. It is a great undertaking, for the old pavement is covered by from fifteen to twenty feet of earth and ruins, and the great difficulty is to know where to throw the earth from the excavations.

The Coliseum cannot be described. Its ruins do not resemble those of a building: they look more like those of a mountain. According to the most moderate calculations, eighty thousand spectators could have been seated there with ease. Each place still bears its number, like the stalls in the Court Theatre at Vienna, which, however, has only this one resemblance to that of the Rome of the Cæsars.

313. *Rome, April 10.*—We live in the midst of Pagan temples and in Christian basilicas; the last three days we have alternated be-

tween the Sixtine Chapel, the Museums of the Vatican, and the Church of St. Peter's. The last of the grand religious ceremonies will take place to-morrow; the place alone would make it very beautiful, for it is to be at St. Peter's. The functions on Holy Thursday and Good Friday were beneath my expectations. For one thing, the Holy Father did not officiate, so the High Mass was reduced to the ordinary service; besides, there is no doubt that what I have seen at the Sixtine Chapel was not equal to the ceremonies which formerly took place at the Electoral ecclesiastical Courts; and the washing of feet and the repast of the Apostles are infinitely more imposing at Vienna. The ceremonies here take place in halls and chapels much too small, although in the largest palace in the world. These places are encumbered with strangers: for one Catholic you see eight or ten Protestants, for the most part English. The guards are obliged to use their halberds: the Pope, the Apostles, the sovereigns—all is confusion. On Holy Thursday they pass from the Sixtine Chapel to the Pauline Chapel: from thence to the hall where the Apostles dine. There is a fight at each door, and generally blood flows. Yesterday, for example, an English lady, fancying herself stronger than a guard, had her cheek pierced by a halberd. One hears nothing but cries of "My shoe!" "My veil!" "You are crushing me!" "Your sword is running into my leg!" "Give way, please!" and then "knocks and blows" in abundance. The noise ceases, and the ceremony is over. Last year an Englishman, determined to pass between two guards who were in line, forming a passage for the Pope, had his nose taken off between the shoulders of the two guards (they wear cuirasses on Holy Thursday). You may imagine that the holiness of the place and the unction of the service gain nothing by these occurrences.

In my opinion the effect of the illuminated cross in St. Peter's surpasses all description. This immense basilica, enveloped in darkness, is lighted from a single focus; the cross, about fifty feet in height, so suspended as to have the appearance of sustaining itself, is wonderfully beautiful.

The effects of light in the side chapels are marvellous; the tombs seem to be reanimated. On one of the pillars Pope Gregory XIII. seems to be coming out of his niche. The magnificent lion on the tomb of Clement XIV., by Canova, has the appearance of springing to defend the approach to the tomb. Seen from the end of the church, the cross is framed by the four columns of the high altar; each step presents a new and magical effect. Picture to yourself

all this space illumined by a single ray of light, this light losing itself in the vast space, and only reflected by the ceilings in gilding and mosaic; this is the time to judge of the immensity of the edifice. The door is opened in the middle of the church, and thus the cross is seen from the other side of the Piazza of St. Peter's. At that distance it seems about the size of a bishop's cross. The Piazza is dark, and the cross is the only light visible.

The Pope's benediction has also a striking effect. The moment when the Holy Father, carried in a chair, appears at the window in the front of the church, and rises to bless the people, all the people falling on their knees, is most solemn. But it seems as if bad luck attended all the religious ceremonies at Rome. After the benediction the Holy Father sits down; he remains at the window; a cardinal advances and throws to the people indulgences written on sheets of paper. All the ragamuffins assemble, struggling and fighting to get one of these papers. There are shouts and laughter, as when one throws money in the street: the victors make off as fast as they can, and use—I know not how—their indulgences.

I acknowledge that I cannot understand how a Protestant can turn Catholic at Rome. Rome is like a most magnificent theatre with very bad actors. Keep what I say to yourself, for it will run through all Vienna, and I love religion and its triumph too much to wish to cast a slur upon it in any manner whatever. In all this it is evident that Italian taste has much influence in the ceremonies; what pleases and excites laughter on this side of the Alps causes weeping on the other, and *vice versa*. One ought never to forget to make this allowance—looking on and keeping silence, but above all taking good care not to betray it.

I can imagine Gentz's fears, which, however, are certainly more reasonable than many others which he has had within the last few years. The assassination of Kotzebue is more than an isolated fact. This will be seen by-and-by, and I shall not be the last to take advantage of it, notwithstanding the blows which I do not fear, however much I may be exposed to them. I do not allow myself to be put out; I go my own way, and if all the ministers did the same, things would not be as they are. I assure you that the world was in perfect health in 1789 in comparison with what it is now.

Marie will tell you more than I can of what we are doing; she can only tell you what is good, except of two dinners which we had yesterday at the Vatican—oily dinners, without butter or eggs:

infernal, and worse than all the doctors' stuff. We took the only sensible course—that is to say, we ate nothing.

314. *April 13.*— . . Here we are safely through our feasts and fasts, which is indeed a happy circumstance. Marie will tell you of the pomp of Easter Day, which surpasses all that one can imagine of splendor and magnificence. Even what is not in good taste is fine; I mention specially the decoration of St. Peter's, which is much more magnificent when the pillars are simply of marble and porphyry than when they are draped in crimson damask. But these thousands of yards of damask, lace, and festoons silence the criticisms of the enlightened amateur; they overwhelm him, and he can criticise no longer under so immense a weight. The religious ceremony in this vast building, where strong barriers arrest the impetuous strangers; the crowd of cardinals, bishops, priests, guards; the immense space which is given up to worship alone, a space in which men seem to dwindle in the same proportion as the mind expands—all is magnificent.

The illumination of the cupola is equally so. On this occasion it was not confined to the cupola, the whole front and colonnade were on fire. The first illumination was designed by Michel Angelo. The second, which in less than two seconds encircled this immense edifice as the clock strikes a certain hour (eight at night), was simply beyond description. After looking at this for some time, one wished the first to return, which shone at intervals between the torrents of light from thousands of jets of fire.

The fireworks at the Castle of St. Angelo were the most beautiful I have ever seen, and I suppose the most beautiful that possibly can be seen.

You doubtless remember the *girandole* let off in the Place Louis XV. in 1810. Well, this was the same number of rockets fired from a separate plateau, and thrown to a height of a hundred and fifty or two hundred feet, giving to the whole the appearance of Vesuvius in eruption. The rest of the fireworks represented the ancient edifice, with its hundreds of columns, its immense fountain, &c. The whole thing ended with three clusters of rockets, of which one was let off from the top of the building; the two others were on a lower level and extended on each side. To complete the effect, guns were fired from the batteries of the castle. The sight was worthy of the best days of Rome.

I beg you to show this letter to Pilat: it will save me having to send him a description, and will furnish him with a good article for his

"Observer." I hope it will arrive before he is assassinated by some Jena Liberal.

Good-by, my dear; we are all as well as could be wished. I hope that you are well too. We walk, we see all there is to be seen. I work, I dine, and I sleep. This is my way of life at Rome, and Staudenheim may be easy, for my health was never better. The weather is just like the end of June with us. The trees are all green, the lilacs are in blossom, the roses have been out some time.

Good-by. My love to you all!

315. *Naples, April 30.*—We have been at the foot of Vesuvius, my dear, for four days.

The situation of Naples is more beautiful, and at the same time more grand, than I had imagined. Everything there is on an immense scale. The mountains are high and rugged like the Alps. Vesuvius is a prodigious mass, certainly larger than the Schneeberg. It is seen from everywhere, except the house in which I live. It forms part of the inner frame of the great basin of Naples. The Pompeian side is charming, although exposed to continual risks. This terrible neighbor will fall in some day; it will die out as twenty other volcanoes have done in the chain of the Apennines; but it may still cause many disasters before it disappears. Since April 13 it has been unceasingly active; a large column of smoke is rising from the three craters, and a stream of lava rolls down its side. It is sometimes so bright as to be seen by day. At night it resembles a stream of molten iron.

The cultivation and charm of the country have far surpassed my expectations. The country between Terracina and Naples is very like Upper Styria, especially the environs of Cilli and Laybach; add to this valleys the size of those on the Rhine, vegetation quite inconceivable for richness and intensity, Vesuvius always in sight, at every instant new vistas over the sea and over the most picturesque islands in the world, and you have an idea of travelling in this country. I have seen many things in this world, but nothing more beautiful, nor more satisfying both to mind and body.

Marie will tell you all I have left unsaid. She has so much my way of seeing and judging of things that I can trust perfectly to her letter. The bad weather is in our favor. Marie will be able to write you a volume.

The difference of age, sex, and tastes is, however, evident in her letters and mine. She does not hesitate, for example, between

Naples and Rome. I should have great difficulty in giving the preference to Naples over Rome, and I should wish for both cities, to be able to enjoy alternately the marvels of nature, and those created by the grandest human intelligence.

The Emperor will remain here until May 25. I shall leave one day before him.

316. *May 3.*—Marie, in her last letter, gave you a description of what we have seen. I have made one more excursion than she has, for I took advantage of an hour of beautiful sunshine a few days ago to pay a visit to the magnificent Bay of Pozzuoli and Baiæ. Marie, meantime, was in attendance at the Court, and she revenged herself to-day, while I was engaged at a grand dinner with the King, by going to Pozzuoli itself. All these places are so near each other that it only takes one or two hours to go from one to the other. Heaven has been pleased to create the most beautiful sites in the world, and men have had the good sense to make use of them.

There is no greater proof of the good taste of the ancients than the choice which they made of Herculaneum, Pompeii, Baiæ, &c., in which to pass the most beautiful months of the year. All these places were to the Romans what Hietzing, Hütteldorf, and Baden are to the Viennese.

This is a fair comparison, even from the point of view of the moral grandeur of the men who live no longer and of the men of to-day who live too much.

The weather being in a state of convalescence, we intend to-morrow to take a trip to Pompeii. This can be done in one morning.

We were present yesterday at the procession of St. Januarius, who worked his miracle at eight o'clock in the evening in the church of St. Clare. This procession, which we saw leave the cathedral, is most curious. Thirty-six busts of saints and *saintesses* in good solid silver, carried by *lazzaroni* clothed in a sort of mountebank livery or dressing-gowns, more dirty even than those who wear them, and that is saying a good deal—these *lazzaroni* have their heads covered with ragged caps; priests and monks, who are not more occupied with their holy functions than the spectators; all running, shouting, dashing against each other, and crowding pell-mell. This is what I saw. As the miracle is performed during a whole week, I shall be present at it one of these days. It is necessary to see the people here to form any idea of them, and it is

a fact that they are a hundred times cleaner and more civilized than they were twenty years ago. The Government has done much, and does more every day.

St. Carlo will not be opened till next Sunday, at the end of the double *neuvaine*. In the meantime, I was present yesterday at a rehearsal of "*Zoraïde*," Rossini's opera, and I saw the house thoroughly. It is unquestionably the most beautiful in Europe. Like St. Peter's, it seems smaller than it is, owing to its perfect proportions and rich decorations. It has a hundred and eighty boxes, all very large, and it accommodates six thousand spectators. Nevertheless, we can hear perfectly in every part of the house. We shall have eight of Rossini's operas, and the last of his compositions are perhaps the most beautiful. I spend my evenings in listening to the singing of Davide and the principal artistes of Italy.

All our servants spent last night on Vesuvius. I could not help laughing when I heard some one say to the King this morning that the *coup d'œil* which he had seen last night of Vesuvius covered with flambeaux was superb. I doubt whether Giroux will go to see Vesuvius; he still denies that the mountain as he sees it is a volcano. He says that, as it only spits fire and vomits smoke, it cannot be a volcano; and that he is not fool enough not to know that a volcano is just like the fireworks which he saw at Rome.

This Vesuvius, my dear, is a most imposing and splendid spectacle. Unhappily, I cannot see it from my window, but from everywhere else—that is to say, a hundred steps from my house. It can be seen as soon as it is dark, like an immense beacon. A great eruption, such as that of 1814, must indeed be a wonderful sight. The mountain is so near the city, the slope to it is so direct, that a new crater—and a new one is being formed with each eruption—will one day place it in great danger. The Neapolitans, however, never think of this; they are like sailors, who forget that there is only a plank between them and the deep, and one is tempted to forget, in the perfect enjoyment of a nature so beautiful and smiling, that danger may be so close at hand.

317. *Naples, May 4.*—This morning I went to see Pompeii. Nothing is more curious than this relic, seventeen centuries old. Fate seems to have buried it to give future generations a complete idea of Roman customs. Scarcely a twentieth part of Pompeii is uncovered. One can walk in the amphitheatre, the forum, the basilica, in two theatres—one for tragedy and the other

for comedy—in four temples, in the midst of the tombs, through three streets on the original pavement; one can enter more than a hundred shops and houses, on the doors of which the name of the proprietor is written: and all these places are just as they were the day they were engulfed. The altars of the temples and the tombs are as fresh as if they were in a sculptor's studio; the town is large enough to have contained from thirty to forty thousand inhabitants; the temples, the forum, and the theatres are as beautiful as they could be in a Roman capital, and as they ought to be in a Christian one. We have all very bad taste in 1819.

318. *May 7.*—I meant to have despatched a courier to you eight days ago. We lead such a busy life here that days pass like hours; it will leave us, however, a very agreeable recollection. I suppose Marie has given you an account of what we have done lately. Our trip to *Baiæ* was certainly one of the most beautiful that could be imagined; that district is as classic as it is beautiful, and that is saying a great deal.

I do not know if you have a translation of Virgil's *Æneid*; at any rate, try to get one, and read the beginning of the sixth canto. He describes all the places where we have been, and really it is difficult to express what one feels on setting one's foot on the *Champs Elysées*, approaching the banks of *Acheron*, and the ferry where *Charon* crossed and recrossed with his boat. You find yourself on the very spot where *Æneas* embarked, you enter the grotto of the *Sibyl of Cumæ*; in a word, you do all that seems to belong only to the domain of fancy. It is natural that a religion entirely sensual should find its paradise in a land of delights: the Christian religion, entirely intellectual, looks beyond the clouds, to a country vast and vague as thought itself.

Marie will tell you that we drank your health on the highest rising ground on the *Champs Elysées*. No description could do justice to the beauty of this situation. Twenty different points of view, immense rocks, islands as picturesque as possible, unparalleled richness of vegetation, a soft and gentle air; in the distance *Vesuvius* throwing an immense column of smoke high in the air; the ground covered with ruins of palaces and temples—I can only give you a very feeble picture of what is indeed far beyond imagination.

The Gulf of *Baiæ* bears the palm even over that of *Naples*, and the Romans had some of their principal establishments there also. *Pozzuoli*, *Baiæ*, *Cumæ*, were three large towns, and, to judge

by what remains, the country must have been for miles covered with houses. The sea has, besides, gained on the coast in consequence of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The shore is always strewn with fragments of mosaic and remains of architecture deposited by the waves.

We are going to-day to make the ascent of Vesuvius. Have no uneasiness on our account. We shall dine at home at one o'clock; we shall be on the summit about six o'clock, and from it we shall see sunset. We shall want a little darkness to judge of the effects of the lava, and we shall be at home by ten or eleven o'clock. Vesuvius is paying us great attention. Without being in complete eruption, it has been active for nearly a month. Last night, for example, it was furrowed by five streams of lava. In this state it has the effect of an immense charcoal fire, suspended some thousand feet in the air; every five or ten minutes there rises from the crater an immense jet, like the bouquet in fireworks. The column of fire is of different colors; in this respect, again, it resembles fireworks. Nature works here in a manner at once very patent and very mysterious. One sees but cannot understand it.

319. *May 12.* I begin my letter to-day, my dear, with Vesuvius. I told you in my last that we were going there, and I promised you that we should return safe and sound. We have kept our word.

On May 7 there met at my house Tini Grassalkowich, Thérèse, her pupil; Schönburg, Kaunitz, d'Aspre, Paar, and all my gentlemen except Mercy; we dined at one o'clock, and we arrived at the hermitage, which is about a third of the distance, at four o'clock. We let our horses rest for half an hour, and went on again for half a league, to the foot of the great cone which forms the modern Vesuvius, since it separated from Mount Somma to engulf Herculaneum and Pompeii. Between the hermitage and the cone there are immense torrents of old lava, a veritable chaos, worthy of the lower regions. Up to this time it is tolerably easy, but here begins a fatigue one may call supernatural, for God never made Vesuvius to be climbed by men. Picture to yourself a slope, not like the roof of a house, but something like the bell in St. Michael's tower, many hundred feet high, covered with rolling stones large and small, rocks, hardened lava, the scorix of lava, not a plant, not a place to rest.

We had prepared four seats. These seats were placed on two litters, which four men carried on their shoulders, two others drawing them with ropes. These men had to be relieved every five

minutes. Those who walked were dragged by two men, who had belts round the waist for that purpose.

Tini, Marie, Kaunitz, and I occupied these seats. I left mine when we had got about a third of the way, for I would rather have broken my leg than be carried any further. Of the four porters, there was always one at least on the ground. What completes the charm of this journey is that, once undertaken, there is no going back. No one can descend by the same way he came, and the descent, which I will describe to you by-and-by, only begins at the summit of the mountain.

After going up for an hour and a half of this climbing, we arrived at the fresh lava, where every one is obliged to walk. They choose for a path the streams of three or four days old, for they are hard on the surface and less rugged. Imagine a canal covered with flagstones of all shapes, badly joined, and instead of water a mass of iron red-hot just beneath the surface, and you will have some idea of this path. At this point Marie would go no further. You know what a coward she is, and I cannot understand how she allowed herself to be carried so far up. But when she felt her feet scorching, when the first puffs of sulphurous vapor reached her, she began to cry, and I had her taken down by the help of Pepi and four men. There only remained about fifty feet more to climb, and our task was accomplished.

Once arrived at the summit, we saw craters on all sides, and quite close to us, for the present plateau is not much larger than two thirds of the Place de la Cour at Vienna. It is in the form of a funnel in the middle, and on each side rise two veritable chimneys made of sulphur and calcareous substances, about six feet high, and of which one has an opening of perhaps fifteen feet in diameter, and the other of four feet at the most. It is from these chimneys that the flames and fire issue, for the lava makes its appearance nearly a hundred feet below the summit on the side of the mountain.

The smoke and flames rise unceasingly from Vesuvius in its present state; the form and appearance change every instant; the chimneys alone remain the same. Every five or ten minutes an eruption is announced by a subterranean noise, and a slight trembling of the mountain. The noise resembles a discharge of twenty large guns in the interior of a vault. Then an immense jet of fire rise above the craters, like the bouquet in fireworks; burning scorix shoot up to the height of eighty or a hundred feet, and fall

back into the funnel and on the sides of the mountain. There is no danger if one stands out of the wind.

The flames, the smoke, the burning substances hurled into the air, the noise of the explosions, are as different from the most splendid fireworks as are generally the grand spectacles of nature from those of human device.

I could scarcely tear myself away from a spectacle full of beauties beyond description, and at the same time full of awe impossible to describe.

The view from the summit of the mountain is simply magical; it takes in all the islands, bays, and coasts; the whole country lies before one as on a map. We watched the sun sink down into the waves of the sea, and then sought for a safer place to wait the approach of night; we found it about fifty or sixty feet lower down, out of the way of the eruptions, and above the flow of lava, which at night takes quite a new aspect. Rivers of lava, reaching as far as one can see, there issue forth. The course of lava is very slow; I do not think it advances more than two feet a minute. About half past nine we began our descent, by the light of the volcano, the lava, the beautiful Naples moon—that moon which Caracciolo compared to the London sun—and twenty torches.

This descent, which is made on the opposite side to the ascent, is at once more convenient and more inconvenient, more serious and more ridiculous. Sinking to the knees first in cinders then in sand, one allows one's self to slide down perpendicularly, and in ten minutes you are at the foot of the cone, like an avalanche, and with a real avalanche. There is no danger, no fatigue, and it is like nothing that one has ever done before in one's life.

Marie came to meet us at the spot where we fell—for it was a fall most literally. She was in raptures at seeing me again, and we had an excellent supper, which Jablonowsky prepared for us at the hermitage.

All that I have told you is a very faint sketch of a most extraordinary picture. Well, in the midst of so many perils, no misfortune ever happens to any obedient pilgrims. There are sometimes amateurs who pretend to know much more than their guides, and some accident may happen then; while if you are docile you get off with little fatigue and no risk. Our principal guide generally goes three or four times between Portici and the summit of the mountain in twice twenty-four hours. None of our guides, porters, guardian angels—call them what you will—allows a single day to

pass without taking this journey, for a sum of barely six francs. The path from Portici to the crater is constantly—day and night—like a great thoroughfare: all foreigners wish to have seen Vesuvius; the Neapolitans themselves are the only persons who never go up; just as I have never been to the top of the Kahlenberg.

I am delighted to have seen what I shall never see again. No one has any idea of the thing without having been there, and an eruption of the volcano would no longer astonish me. The road by which we went up to the summit a few days ago exists no longer. The stream of lava is much larger, and it is necessary to take a different direction.

I suppose Marie has told you of the Villa Gallo, a veritable *chef-d'œuvre* of nature, and one of the rare examples where the proprietor has had the good sense to embellish it by beautiful plantations. A summer passed in this place must be enchanting. Yesterday the king gave a ball at his Palace of Capo di Monte. It was a beautiful *fête*, and any *fête* illuminated by the lava of Vesuvius is always most striking to strangers. The Neapolitans alone do not trouble themselves about it.

320. *May 19.*—I can only write a few words, my dear, for I write between our return from Pæstum and the departure of the courier, whom the Emperor has delayed only to await my arrival.

We left Naples the day before yesterday, and slept the same night at Salerno. We stopped on the way to see a temple, or rather a church, built near Nocera by Guiscard, the Norman king, with *débris* taken from Pæstum; and the Abbey of Cava, a charming place, celebrated for its scientific collections. Yesterday we passed the whole day at Pæstum, and returned to Salerno at eleven o'clock at night. This morning we visited Vietri, and came back to Naples two hours ago.

Pæstum is worthy of the highest admiration. The three temples, still standing—and which may, from their great solidity, stand for many centuries more—date back to fabulous times. They certainly belong to a time anterior to the foundation of Rome. Their style of architecture resembles the Doric, but it is not so refined as that which has borne this name in later periods. Placed originally in a city renowned for its delightful environs, and for the quantity of roses its gardens contained, they stand now in the midst of a plain given up to buffaloes and aquatic birds. The situation is magnificent, for it stands on the Gulf of Salerno; but the country ceases to be habitable towards the middle of June. The malaria arrives in

this country as soon as it is depopulated. This place is interesting to me, among other things, because it is the most southerly that I have ever visited. The distance from Naples in a straight line is nearly sixty miles. The weather was very favorable for us; it is now settled fine, and "fine" here is a very different thing from what it is with us. Marie complains of the heat—I think, without cause, for though the sun is certainly scorching between eleven and four o'clock in the afternoon, there is always a breeze from the sea; the air is cool, the heat is slight, and I am in my element. Also, I never remember to have felt better in health.

The departure of the Emperor is fixed for the 31st of this month. He did not wish to refuse a pressing invitation from the King to remain here for his *fête-day*, the 30th. I intend to start on the 28th, on account of the arrangements for the horses; the King will perhaps not like it, but I shall do all I can to get a few days more at Rome, where there are still many things for me to see.

Metternich to his Mother.

321. *Naples, May 21.*—The Emperor's journey has been in all respects a success, and my only regret is that what we now see in passing is not what I shall have to see all the rest of my life. Our tastes are so much alike that I am convinced you would be the happiest person in the world in this country. All that nature has ever made most beautiful, most majestic, and most charming she has thrown here in a perfect flood on all that one sees, feels, and touches. You love mountains: well, this is like Switzerland; you love a clear bright sky: you have it here with a constancy unknown among us. This country is all that one could wish; it contains all that one finds wanting in other countries, and if the people were but in harmony with nature nothing would be left to be desired.

. . . The Emperor was on Vesuvius last night. He saw the sun rise, a superb sight from such an elevated spot, which looks over countries equally magnificent.

. . . I intend to leave for Rome on the 28th of this month. I shall leave the Emperor at Milan in the beginning of July, and I shall be at Carlsbad on the 15th, or soon after. I go there simply because Staudenheim wishes it, for my health is very good. Hot climates are made for me—or rather, which is more modest, I am made for them. I sleep better, I have a better appetite, and, in a word, I am a different being than when seated behind a stove. I

have the same nature as the palm-tree, which will not grow where it is cold, and which dies in a hot-house. Here they grow sixty feet, and without asserting that I shall reach the same height, I can boast of flourishing like them under the influence of the same sky.

Metternich to his Wife.

322. *Rome, June 6.*— . . . The Emperor, who intended to leave to-morrow, has put off his journey till the day after the feast of Corpus Christi; not because he wished to see the religious ceremony at Rome, but because the little Archduchess Caroline is slightly indisposed, and Stifft has advised the Emperor to let her stay here a few days longer. Instead of leaving on Friday the 11th, I shall start on Saturday the 12th.

. . . You are mistaken in thinking that I shall not be at Carlsbad in time. I shall be there for certain between the 15th and the 20th of July, and I beg you to tell Staudenheim that I shall be delighted to see him there.

. . . Besides, a great deal of business awaits me there, for while I go to establish my own health, I cannot forget that Europe, and especially Germany, is in a far worse case than all the drinkers of water whom I shall meet at Carlsbad. I shall return to Vienna in the beginning of September, and I should be very glad if I could have been there sooner.

The Emperor, however, cannot arrive till about the same time; if, therefore, I had continued to travel with him all the time, I should not be much more advanced.

. . . Two days ago we took a trip to Tivoli. Everything in this country is gigantic. Tivoli far surpassed my expectation with respect to its situation, the magnificence of its falls and of its vegetation. The word *cascatelle* sounds so small that one does not expect to find twenty cascades, containing an immense volume of water, precipitated from a height of four or five hundred feet, dashing over rocks of a form and structure altogether extraordinary, for they are themselves only the product of the waters. I cannot understand why there is not a single exact picture either of Rome or its environs: only portions of the city or the neighborhood are represented. I suppose it is the extent of the undertaking which frightens the artists. I will bring you a view taken from one of the windows of my drawing-room, which was drawn for me by a French artist of great merit. This view is exact, and you will tell me if ever you

have seen, at any theatre whatever, a drop-scene which could be compared to it. The decorations of the *Triomphe de Trajan* are the merest trifles compared to what is seen here from every window, provided always it does not look on a blind alley.

Lawrence has taken up his abode at the Quirinal, and all Rome goes to see him. His reputation is made as thoroughly as that of the Coliseum. Cammuccini says he is the Titian of the nineteenth century. My portrait meets with great approbation; Clementine's is charming, and I am sure that if ever she comes to Rome she will be obliged to wear a veil, in order not to lose too much in the eyes of the many curious people who are anxious to see her because of her portrait. He has begun the portrait of the Pope, and is next going to take Cardinal Consalvi.

323. *June 10.*—This morning we had a grand ceremony, one of the most beautiful in Rome—the procession of Corpus Christi. It may well be superb, for the procession passes through all the colonnades of the Piazza of St. Peter's. The ceremony is so thoroughly religious, that it seems to me nothing could be added or taken away without injury. I do not care for ceremonies in general: they leave a void in the heart, and do not even satisfy the senses: but I must do justice to that of this day. It would be impossible to adore the majesty of God with more submission or with more dignity.

324. *Perugia, June 17.*—What is most annoying to me in the matter * is that probably I shall be obliged to leave the Emperor at Florence, and consequently shall not go to Milan. I shall console myself no doubt for not going to Lombardy, but I believe I should have been able to be of service to the Emperor there, and I therefore regret that I cannot accompany him.

You see that in any case I am determined not to arrive later than the middle of July at Carlsbad. In this I am not yielding to Staudenheim's pedantry, for it may be as hot, and even hotter, towards the end of August than in the middle of July at Carlsbad, as it is everywhere else; but such important business requires me at a certain time that I choose the opportunity of being most useful, and sacrifice the chance of being less so. Besides, I reckon on the most beautiful weather coming at the end of the summer, for the spring, and even the month of June, have been so cold that warmth must surely have its turn.

. . . . Marie has sent you a most beautiful rosary which the Pope

* The illness of the Archduchess Caroline.

gave me. I make you a present of it, but it must remain in the family as a *souvenir*. The Pope has been good and kind to every body. I passed two hours with him the last day I was there, and I am convinced there never was a man in his position so plain and simple, and at the same time so enlightened. He had tears in his eyes when he spoke to me of his regret at the Emperor's departure, and he told me why. He had from the first been more than pleased with the Emperor, who always improves on acquaintance, and he said he should again feel so lonely! The Quirinal has really become once more a cloister. In this immense palace there only now remain the Pope—whose Court is not larger than that of a "*Hof-rath*"—Cardinal Consalvi, and Lawrence. The annual expenses of the Pope amount to three thousand crowns.

The portrait which Lawrence is painting is a real *chef-d'œuvre*; he has taken the Pope full-face, seated in the grand chair in which he is carried during the solemn ceremonies. The Pope's countenance is good and *spirituelle*; he is somewhat worn, but his eyes are those of a young man, and he has not a single gray hair. You know how clever Lawrence is at eyes and hair; so he is here on his own ground. Lawrence spent all his time with me at Rome, and he cried like a child when I left. I asked him the price of Clementine's portrait; he said to Floret, whom I sent to ask him, that he should have looked upon the very question as an insult, only he knew me so well. "I painted Clementine," said he, "for the love I bear her father, her mother, all her family, and for self-love too!"

. . . . Thorwaldsen has finished my bust. It will be perfect. This artist will see you very soon; he will spend a fortnight at Vienna on his way to Warsaw, where he is going to erect a monument to Poniatowski. I have given him a letter for you; you will be well pleased with him, for he is as modest as he is clever. These qualities always go together.

325. *June 19.*—I am waiting to leave here till the Emperor goes, or rather I wait for the chance of meeting Capo d'Istria at Bologna. In this case I shall go from here to that city by the Forlì route, to join the Emperor at Florence afterwards. I shall leave Italy on July 20 at the latest. You shall, however, have the exact itinerary. You see I shall not accompany the Emperor to Milan.

. . . . I am at this moment passing through one of the most magnificent and picturesque countries in the world. I have never seen a situation like that of Perugia. Every side is alike grand. The town is situated, like most of the towns in the Apennines, on

a high elevation, and looks over more than a hundred leagues of country. The land below is hilly, and covered with fields, beautiful as gardens. The mountains in the distance are as high as the Alps. Every inch of the ground is famous. To the right, near the Lake of Thrasimene, Hannibal defeated the Romans. Before me is Assisi, famous as the birthplace of St. Francis, and for a Temple of Minerva, built by Augustus, and one of the best preserved I have seen; Spoleto, the ancient residence of Astolphe and Desiderius, kings of Lombardy; thousands of olive-trees, green oaks, a magnificent vegetation. The orange-trees have ceased since Rome.

At Spoleto I was shown as a curiosity an *espalier* of lemons, which were only covered during the three months of winter. I felt rather melancholy when they told me that; I had just come from a country where they are always in flower! I have often told you my nature is the same as that of the orange-trees. Their climate is necessary for me to bear good fruit. The air here is as cold as on our mountains; it is very healthy, and the best proof of this is furnished by a visit which Jaeger paid to the hospital to-day. He says it is an immense place—everything is large in Italy—and he only found there ten or twelve old invalids. The doctors told him they could not make a living here, the hospital being always the most deserted place in the town, which has nevertheless a population of seventeen thousand souls.

By comparing the country towns of Italy with those of any other country one is able to form an idea of the intrinsic value of these places. Perugia is what Iglau is with us—a country town about fifty leagues from the capital. Here there are ten palaces, each of them larger than the old Liechtenstein palace. I occupy one which is certainly more than twice the size. These palaces are full of old but beautiful furniture. There are also splendid pictures, and a great number of marbles. The palace which the Emperor occupies would be the most beautiful house in Vienna. The proprietor is a young man who has married a sister of Prince Odescalchi, and he refurnished it three years ago, at the time of his marriage.

There are two theatres at Perugia going on at the same time; an opera-house as large as that of the Kärntnerthor, and one for comedy as large as the Wieden; three large churches, magnificent, of which two are painted entirely in fresco by the best masters, among others Pietro Perugino, Raphael's master; a university in a magnificent situation, and an academy of fine arts better appointed than that of Vienna.

In all these palaces, which are full of idlers, there are singers who would give great pleasure at Vienna, bad comedians playing detestable pieces, a crowd of mendicants too lazy to gather the fruits which fall into their mouths and the vegetables on which they walk. After all, out of a hundred of these sluggards, eighty of them are clever, and often not one who would be unbearably tiresome. There is not one who has not all the appearance of poverty, yet nevertheless has his purse well furnished.

I do not believe that any two countries can be less alike than Germany and Italy, and yet our wiseacres at Vienna wish, cost what it may, to make Italians of the Germans. Their plan will succeed marvellously!

Metternich to his daughter Marie, Perugia, June 22.

326. So you are at Trieste, my dear Marie!—and I am at Perugia—just as you left me.

. . . . We had the Cardinal here for two days. He shed tears on hearing you were gone. The last battle I had with him was about an armchair, which he never liked to sit upon, because at my writing-table I had only a common chair. Now, there were at first none but grand yellow armchairs in my room, and, as they are too high, I had had an old chair brought from the ante-chamber for my writing-table. The dispute was settled by the Cardinal marching off to the ante-chamber to find a similar chair for himself, but he did not allow me to accompany him.

When he left he again embraced Giroux, who gave me an account of this second embrace with tears in his eyes. “That Abbé is a very good man,” said Giroux to me; “but I do not know why he loves me so much. He patted me on the back, and then embracing me said, ‘Good-by, old man; if ever you need anything write to me, or to our mutual friend, my old valet.’ He is a good man, is that Abbé.” I remarked that his friend was not an Abbé, but a Cardinal. “Well! how the devil should I know? Abbé or Cardinal! the first are black, and the second are red; what does it matter to me?”

HOMEWARD JOURNEY FROM ITALY TO CARLSBAD.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his Family, from July 4 to September 1, 1819.

327. Plan of the journey. 328. Postponement of the journey of the Emperor Francis to Milan. 329. From Verona—difference of climate. 330. From Innsbruck. 331. From Carlsbad. 332. From Teplitz—reminiscences of the year 1813. 333. Walks with Adam Müller. 334. End of the Carlsbad Conferences.

Metternich to his Wife, Florence, July 4, 1819.

327. I have made my plan to-day, my dear.

I intend to leave here next Saturday, July 10. I shall be at Bologna on the 11th, at Verona on the 12th, at Trente on the 13th, at Brixen on the 14th, at Innsbruck on the 15th, at Munich on the 16th, at Ratisbonne on the 17th, between Ratisbonne and Carlsbad on the 18th.

The Emperor will arrive here on the 7th. It is possible that my departure may be delayed for one or two days; you see that, even in this case, I shall be at Carlsbad on the 20th or 21st, at the latest.

328. *July 9.*— . . . The Emperor is right to postpone his journey to Milan. The season is over for a tour in Italy, and instead of being grilled for fifteen days in Lombardy,* he will return there one day to spend two or three months in a manner more useful, and also more cool. I declare that Carlsbad is a real sacrifice for me, as the Emperor is going to Vienna. Nevertheless, I ought to go, for so many people are expecting me there that it would be doing a very bad turn to these poor travellers to leave them all in the lurch. The affairs which I have to arrange there are, besides, so important

* In a communication from Metternich to the Emperor Francis, from Verona, dated July 14, 1819, Metternich writes, after a consultation with Bubna, in these terms: "Bubna agrees with me as to the resolution your Majesty has taken to postpone your visit to Milan. Better no visit at all than one of only a fortnight."—Ed.

that I suppress my regrets by the feeling of duty. I declare, however, frankly, that Carlsbad is insupportable to me.

329. *Verona, July 14.*—I arrived here yesterday about eleven o'clock in the morning, my dear, after having suffered tolerably from the heat.

I left Florence on the 11th, at nine o'clock in the evening. I went as far as Bologna in one stage, where, of course, a cardinal met me with all sorts of music, a grand dinner, etc. I went to bed in the midst of the *fanfares*, and slept six hours as if it were night. I left Bologna at seven o'clock in the evening, and made my triumphal entry into Verona yesterday, the 13th, at ten o'clock in the morning. When I get back to Austria there will be a truce to trumpets and cymbals. I shall leave this evening, and go in one stage as far as Brixen, where I shall sleep to-morrow, and on the 16th I shall be at Innspruck.

The difference of climate is very striking from Salerno to the foot of the Alps. Tuscany is the hottest without being the most southerly for vegetation. Different plants mark the different regions: aloes and cacti are found as far as Terracina, myrtles and orange-trees as far as Narni, olives and pomegranates as far as the highest chain of the Apennines, which separates Tuscany from the Legations. From the northern declivity of these mountains the climate is much the same as with us. The mulberries alone show a difference of climate, although they do very well with us. The sky loses its brightness; the Alps are covered with thick clouds; and the atmosphere is slightly foggy.

330. *Innspruck, July 16.*—I wish to let you know, my dear, that I am in Germany. I made a good and rapid journey from Verona here, but my *cara patria* has received me badly. I arrived at Innspruck twenty-four hours after the snow. The cold here makes one shiver, especially a man who comes from the Cape of Policastro. I hope Carlsbad will treat me better; I shall at any rate find hot water there. I, who, scarcely six days ago, drank a large glass of iced orangeade every night before going to bed, will this evening drink hot punch to prevent myself freezing. No more orange-trees, but firs; no more magnolias in blossom, but elders; no more grapes, but strawberries beginning to redden. I saw the harvest at Naples two months ago, and I have just passed through fifty leagues of country where, in the best cantons, the fields are just beginning to turn yellow, and where, in the colder places, the summer crops are still in blade. I come from the Cenerentola, and have just left Hans

Dachel. High mountains are most beautiful, and I like to see them; we shall be on the level at Innspruck, but that will make no difference to the view, there is so much fog.

331. *Carlsbad, July 26.*—I did not write to you by the first courier whom I sent from here, for I could not find a moment to do so.

I leave to-morrow for Teplitz, where I shall spend three whole days. The present moment is one of life or death. It appears that Teplitz is a place destined for my great operations.* By the help of God, I hope to defeat the German Revolution, even as I have vanquished the conqueror of the world. The German revolutionists thought me far away, because I was a hundred leagues off. They have deceived themselves; I am in the midst of them, and I will now deal out my blows. You will observe a singular coincidence between the discoveries and arrests in Prussia and Germany and my passage of the Alps. I suppose this will be seen at last when it is known that all Germany is assembled round me. Count Münster is here; Rechberg, Wintzingerode, Berstett, Baron de Marschall (acting minister of Nassau), and Bernstorff (the Prussian), will be here before August 1. We shall do a great work. Will it be a good one? God will decide. It will be great, for on it will depend the welfare or the definite destruction of social order. This is between ourselves.

332. *Teplitz, July 27.*—My dear, I am writing to you in the same room, and on the same table, where I signed the Quadruple Alliance six years ago. It is just about the same time of year. Everything has changed since then, except myself.

I have not revisited this place since 1813. It has been a long road to get here again. What events have happened since the day of my arrival here in that year of grace! Seated at the same desk, thinking over all which then occupied my mind, bringing before my mind's eye what existed then, and what exists no longer, I cannot resist a slight sensation of vanity, and an immense feeling of contentment and satisfaction. But if I think over what is, if I compare it with what ought to be, and with that which so easily might have been, I deplore the fate of the world, ever given up to the gravest errors, and to great faults committed in consequence of petty calculations and great illusions. My mind conceives nothing narrow or limited; I always go, on every side, far beyond all that

* See Metternich's interview with King Frederick William III. in Teplitz, No. 351.

occupies the greater number of men of business; I cover ground infinitely larger than they can see or wish to see. I cannot help saying to myself twenty times a day: "Good God, how right I am, and how wrong they are! And how easy this reason is to see—it is so clear, so simple, and so natural!" I shall repeat this till my last breath, and the world will go on in its own miserable way none the less.

Reason and justice can only be departed from by paths covered with blood and tears. To hear people talk one would think they were giants; follow them, and you soon perceive that you have only to do with phantoms. The one giant produced by the eighteenth century is no longer of this world; all that moves that world at present, is of a miserable character. It is very difficult to play well with bad or indifferent actors.

333. *Carlsbad, August 22.*—I have brought here, for my own private pleasure, a man of more mind and knowledge than almost any one in the world. A certain Adam Müller—not the prophet, but the Austrian Consul-General at Leipzig. When my head is worried with business, I make him come; he accompanies me to the Posthof, and beyond, and I talk with him without rhyme or reason. This morning he proved to me that he is the most learned man in the world about clouds. He thinks that he knows as much as I know little about them. He says there are two kinds of clouds, male and female: that separated, they produce nothing, absolutely nothing, like a monastery of Capuchins separated from a convent of nuns. These clouds end by meeting: they are excited, they marry, and behold rain, thunder, and all the noise in the world.

At the first rain, say to your neighbor that two loving clouds have just been made happy; you will seem to have said something foolish, but this is true physics, and even philosophy.

334. *September 1.*—Here I am, thank God, delivered of my great work.* The labor passed off happily, and the child has come into this world. I have every reason to be satisfied with the result, and I ought to be, for all I wished has come to pass. Heaven will protect an enterprise so great and so worthy of its support, for it concerns the safety of the world. What thirty years of revolution could not produce has been brought about by our three weeks' labor at Carlsbad. It is the first time that a number of measures have appeared together so anti-revolutionary, so just, and so per-

* See Results of the Carlsbad Conference, No. 353.—Ed.

empty. What I have wished for since 1813, but what that terrible Emperor Alexander has always prevented, I have accomplished, because he was not there. I have at last been able to follow out my own thoughts, and publicly declare all my principles, sustained as I am by thirty millions of men—or rather fifty, if we count all the Austrians not Germans. Now the great thing is to carry them out well, and I believe they will be well carried out.

My colleagues have addressed such thanks to me as I believe no Minister has ever received.* Victor was so touched that he carried away the letter to copy for you, and he tells me he sent it to you yesterday. Make no use of it, however, except to read it.

One thing is certain, that there never was seen more exemplary agreement and submission than in our conferences. If the Emperor doubts his being Emperor of Germany, he deceives himself greatly.

A curious fact is that the worst German Jacobins have not dared to attack me. That which they have not done they will soon not be able to do. I have shown, moreover, that the best means of attacking an evil is to attack it in front. This is true of political blows as well as those of a cudgel. The dead shout no longer, and among the living I shall have many to shout in favor of my theories. It will yet take fifteen days, however, before the shell explodes at Frankfurt.

I shall leave to-morrow for Königswart, where I shall remain five or six days. From thence I shall go direct to Vienna. I intend to arrive there from the 10th to the 12th. You will be informed of my arrival at least twenty-four hours beforehand.

* See Letters of Thanks in No. 355.—Ed.

THE ASSASSINATION OF KOTZEBUE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Correspondence between Metternich and Gentz, April 1 to July 1, 1819.

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, April 1, 1819.

335. Your Excellency will, in all probability, have heard from Mannheim the dreadful occurrence which has taken place there more quickly than by letters from this place. We learnt the news early yesterday through the "Allgemeine Zeitung" and by despatches from Carlsruhe addressed to Tettenborn, of which I enclose copies* (Nos. 336-337).

The thing is dreadful enough in itself, but its origin and evident connection with the great maladies and dangers of the time elevate it in the eyes of those accustomed to take a large and comprehensive view of things to a still higher degree of horror and terror. When we lifted the first warning voice against the excesses at the Wartburg our mouths were stopped with allusions to "the innocent, virtuous efforts of German youth" and their "meritorious teachers;" and this is what they have come to.

Your Excellency will have already followed up the whole history of this widespread malady with such assiduous attention, and appreciated it with so much intelligence and wisdom, that it would be quite superfluous here to attempt to follow out the past, which no longer belongs to us. Empty lamentations lead to nothing, and all personal considerations must be silenced when such important concerns are in question. The greatest catastrophes in the moral as in the physical world may be, not, indeed, for those who fall under them, but for others, useful and even beneficial, if results are brought about and measures accelerated which would have been

* "I looked these through yesterday in haste: I now remark that only one of the papers deserves the name of a despatch, the other is a letter from Varnhagen, which I send with it."—Note by Gentz.

much longer in coming into operation, or would, perhaps, never have done so.

The practical reflections which this last outrage have produced in me are roughly as follows:

1. The hatred of the revolutionary rabble against Kotzebue was of long standing, had many causes, and was fostered with a devilish art. But I am quite convinced that the attempt on his life was caused principally—indeed, exclusively—by the delusion that he excited the Emperor Alexander against popular writers and the universities, and made him averse to liberal ideas. It is well known how much the whole party had formerly reckoned on the support of that monarch; and that his apostasy was a frightful blow to them was sufficiently evident. The consequence of the senseless challenge to Stourdza, which seemed to make an end of all uncertainty, had brought the party quite to despair. Actuated in turn by rage and by fear, it sank into a state of frenzy, from which sprang this crime. Then, too, Kotzebue was murdered because these madmen in their delusion believed that he had caused the desertion of a protector from whom they had the greatest expectations. This view will hardly escape the Emperor of Russia. He is personally insulted by this crime against a Russian Staatsrath, as well as by former proceedings against another. His attitude at the time of the Wartburg excesses, his utterances on every opportunity since that time, the principles and dispositions which he displayed at Aix-la-Chapelle, all lead us to expect that he will take this matter in the most serious light. I do not wish the explosion to be too violent or too loud, because it might be embarrassing to us in many ways. But I should consider it a happy thing if he took this opportunity to declare without reserve his own way of thinking, seeing, and feeling, and then endeavored to act upon Prussia, Bavaria, and Germany with prudence and moderation, but yet in a very determined manner—a manner calculated to put an end to all indecision and uncertainty.

2. I hope that through this dreadful occurrence and the consequences which must inevitably follow it, we shall for some years escape the debates on the freedom of the press in Germany. For I can hardly believe that any State of the Bund would be shameless enough now to expect the carrying out of the freedom of the press by those Governments who have not hitherto sanctioned it. And it is my firm conviction that Austria must seize the first occasion when such a word is uttered in the Bundestag to declare emphatically

that she considers the article of the Bund (an article never to be pardoned) that speaks or dreams of uniform arrangements in this matter—which concerns the duties and rights of supremacy and sovereignty—once and for all impracticable and abolished, and will take no part in any discussion regarding it.

3. The necessity of taking some steps with regard to the condition of the German universities will now be more evident than ever. We are, indeed—this I feel only too strongly—still not one step nearer the solution of this difficult problem; but yet we have gained so much that no one can now stigmatize discussions on this point as high treason against Germany. But it is my most earnest desire that on this important matter nothing may be brought before the Bundestag, nothing publicly said or written by authority (the lampooners may write what they like), before the first German Courts (I mean only Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover, to the exclusion of all others) have arrived at a decided and mutually binding understanding on the measures to be adopted. This will cost much time and trouble, but the effect of the last blow will not pass away in six months, and Kotzebue's blood will cry for vengeance somewhat longer than to-day and to-morrow. The result is no slight matter, and it is not to be arrived at in one or two conferences. But the greatest evil of all would be hasty, undigested, feeble measures, which must inevitably lead to mischief. It is a misfortune that, for reasons known to your Excellency, we cannot in this matter claim the first and leading part; but this cannot prevent us from being active and useful.

The murder has created no very great sensation here. The only man, to my knowledge, who has spoken out well and strongly about it, is Count Sedlnizky, who understands somewhat better than most people what we have to expect.

Some matters have very much vexed and oppressed me. Among the latter I do not count the rude and unseemly speeches of Baron d'Aspre, because I have never expected anything better from him, but they annoy me because you bestow on this man favor which is envied by many who are more modest. I am very sorry that he is going to Italy; for he will talk very foolishly about matters there too, and unless your Excellency keeps a strong hand over him he will compromise you frightfully.

This letter will probably go by Cæsar. Lawrence, who wished to leave three days ago, still remains, and therefore cannot now be in Rome by Easter. The trees begin to come out, but a green Easter it cannot possibly be.

Freiherr von Berstett, Minister from Baden, to Freiherr von Tettenborn, Ambassador from Baden to Vienna.

(Enclosed in No. 335.)

336. Your Excellency will be no less dismayed than we all are at the following very sad news.

(Extract from the Directorial Report of the Neckar Circle,
March 23, 1819.)

“Yesterday evening at five o'clock the Russian Staatsrath von Kotzebue was mortally wounded in his own house. Stabbed in several places with a poniard, he died of his wounds after giving his evidence. The assassin—a man to all appearance about four-and-twenty years of age—hurried out of the house after accomplishing the deed, and in the street, in front of the house door, he stabbed himself in the breast. At the present moment he is still alive, but whether he is still conscious is not known with certainty. From papers found in his coat pocket it appears that he is a student in the university, named Carl Friedrich Sand, and was *studiosus theologiæ*. At the tavern, where, according to the landlord's account, he had arrived that morning alone, he had given the name of Heinrichs, a student from Erlangen. From some documents found upon him it is evident that he had long premeditated this crime, and devoted himself to death. He seems to have bound himself to this, which makes the crime the more horrible. We expect in the morning still more exact circumstantial evidence, which we shall not fail to forward as soon as possible.”

The paper found on the murderer was also sent, and was a proclamation to the Germans, of extraordinary form, calling upon every one to arm, and containing a number of extravagant and enthusiastic ideas which betokened revolutionary frenzy. The Grand Duke has given orders that the strictest investigation should be made, to find out all traces connected with it, in order that these dangerous and fantastic disorders may be checked by some comprehensive measures. Your Excellency is implored to use every effort to bring forward all matters connected with this insane conspiracy of heated fantasies, which thinks to find Germany's welfare in criminal acts; and, above all, to endeavor to bring about that people should seriously consider and comprehend the general measures the necessity for which this frightful event only too loudly proclaims. His

Royal Highness is much grieved that this horrible deed—although an isolated act, as it certainly seems, and performed by a student from a foreign university—has taken place in your country. I earnestly beg of you to let me know as quickly as possible all that you hear on this matter.

*Varnhagen von Ense to Tettenborn, Carlsruhe,
March 24, 1819.*

(Enclosed in No. 335.)

337. I hasten to give your Excellency the full particulars of the dreadful occurrence in Mannheim, which has this day filled every one here with horror and dismay! A young man, who had called yesterday morning to speak to Herr von Kotzebue, was told to return in the afternoon about five o'clock. Kotzebue received him in a sitting-room and talked with him some time, but the man, approaching to give him a paper, pulled out a dagger, and almost in a moment the unfortunate man fell, and in a few minutes breathed his last. The noise summoned a servant, who found his master on the floor and the murderer brandishing the dagger and crying, "Does any one else here wish to die?" Threatening in this way, he accomplished his exit, ran frantically up the steps, and fell on his knees at the house door; and while he joyfully thanked God for the success of his great work, he stabbed himself twice, making himself unconscious, which, however, did not last, and although he still lives he is very weak, for he wounded himself most seriously. This deed, said a paper found by his side, he had done for (pretended) love of Fatherland and freedom, with full consciousness and after long premeditation: he called upon the humiliated German people to a courageous rising, to the slaying of all the evil-disposed, to the perfecting of the Reformation, to the union of Church and State, he wished his example to be followed, &c., &c.—all in a fantastic, ranting style, foolish enough, but not mad. Another paper found near him contained the words: "Sentence of death against August von Kotzebue, executed March 23, at half-past five in the afternoon, according to the decree of the University of . . ." This statement leads to the supposition that there is some conspiracy and fraternity, which fills all hearts with horror and fear. What can be done against a man who kills himself? Shall the Order of the Assassins be reproduced in the West? With us, in Germany, the thing will make a frightful impression! The murderer is a *studiosus*

theologie from Erlangen, about four-and-twenty years old, named Carl Friedrich Sand; no one knows his birthplace, but he is supposed to be from Courland or Anspach.

The Grand Duke is very much shocked by this event: he will have it dealt with carefully as a matter of interest to all Governments. But I fear that all investigation will be fruitless.

The Russian Emperor will be beside himself; but what can he do, with all his power? To whom will he turn? All ministers and councillors will believe themselves threatened. I would not be Herr von Stourdza just now, nor, indeed, many others! I am so affected that I could eat nothing this morning, and poor Rachel is beside herself with tears and hysterics. Certainly it is a dreadful affair. With great respect, I am, your Excellency, &c., &c.,

VARNHAGEN VON ENSE.

Metternich to Gentz, Rome, April 9, 1819.

338. I have received the news of Kotzebue's assassination, with all the preliminary details. It remains to be seen whether the Grand Duke of Baden has strength enough to follow up the investigation, and, if he has this, whether he has people in his courts of justice who will conduct them fairly. Things are at the present time so that no definite idea can be formed beforehand about anything.

I have, for my part, no doubt that the murderer did not act simply from motives of his own, but in consequence of a secret league. Here we find great evil and some good, for poor Kotzebue now appears as an *argumentum ad hominem* which even the liberal Duke of Weimar cannot defend. It will be my care to draw from the affair the best possible results, and in this endeavor I shall not be found lukewarm.

It appears to be quite certain that the assassin was an emissary of Behme of Jena. The university which was to carry out the plan may have been chosen by lot, and which of the fraternity was to follow up the deed by the sacrifice of his own life may also have been chosen by lot; and there is no doubt that it was followed out. Many data go to establish this view.

We shall now very soon see what the Emperor of Russia will say to the loving treatment of his *Staatsrath* in Germany.

While in Germany Russian agents *propter obscuracionem* are murdered, in Italy the Russian agents preside over the clubs of the Carbonari. This abomination will soon be checked.

Our residence here has already had very happy results. The Emperor will, as it seems, be loaded by the Holy Father with honors and all marks of respect. His attitude and manner are excellent: the public, who received the Emperor with true delight, begin to adore him personally. All the foolish reports spread abroad by the many who like activity of that sort before our arrival have disappeared, and people begin to see that here, as at Aix-la-Chapelle, we alone have not lied with respect to the object of the journey.

I beg of you to mention these assertions, which rest on simple fact, in Vienna, and to contradict all rumors to the contrary. Especially you may assure people that the Emperor will not bring one single Jesuit back to Vienna—which will not much delight the Penkler Society.*

Rome is very different from the picture I had made for myself of the place. I thought Rome would be ruinous and sombre. Instead of this it is splendid and cheerful. Everything which shows the grandeur of antiquity is here united with the grandeur of the middle ages. The new has two sides. The two last Popes—*i. e.* Pius VI. and Pius VII.—have done more for art than all their predecessors in the way of discovery of the old. Consequently it is impossible to imagine the splendor of the galleries of the Vatican. Think of twenty galleries like the one *Musée du Louvre*, and you will still be far from the truth as to the situation and collections of the Vatican of the present day. This wealth of treasure far exceeds the idea I had formed. The Papal residence, the Papal Court, is the most gorgeous that worldly power can produce. The spiritual grandeur I have hardly yet discovered. This remark applies even to St. Peter's. To my mind it is the most magnificent of churches for splendor and size, but the least spiritual in the world. Me, at least, it can never invite to pray.

What impression it makes on Schlegel I do not know, for he finds

* Of the "Penkler Society" were several men who were intimate with the writer of this letter, as well as the person to whom it was addressed—such as Adam Müller, Friedrich von Schlegel, Zacharia Werner, Josef Anton Pilat, and Friedrich von Klinkowström. Besides these there were also Zängerle and Ziegler (afterwards bishops), Professor Ackerman, Domherr Schmidt, Stift, Dr. Johann Emmanuel Veith, and others. Affinity of sentiments, and similar aims in a strong Catholic direction, united all these men in a circle, the centre of which was P. Clemens Maria Hofbauer. The hospitable house of Herr von Penkler was open for their social meetings: hence the name of the society.—*Ed.*

the Papal cook so excellent that he has hardly any time left to see anything.

The remains of antiquity are also far beyond every imagination. All other buildings in the world, in extent, massiveness, and perfection, are nothing compared with the remains of ancient Rome. The Palace of the Cæsars, which covered the whole Monte Palatino (the whole of the original city of Rome), a palace as large as the city of Vienna within its walls; the Coliseum, in which 80,000 men could be comfortably seated; the Baths of Caracalla, in which 8,000 could bathe in separate rooms, where there are only marble baths, each as large as the ladies' baths at Baden; the remains of all these palaces, in separate fragments each as large as ever a new palace, are mostly covered with luxuriant vegetation. This all makes a sight of which one can form not the least idea, let one have seen what one may all the world over. Rome remains to-day among the cities of the old and the new world like Chimborazo among the mountains.

And all this splendor lies in a plain of the most glorious soil in the world! In the neighborhood of Rome—the so-called *Campagna di Roma*—is contained the hardest problem to be solved in the present day. How can this, under any supposition whatever, be once more brought under cultivation?

Canals must be dug, trees planted, fields ploughed, and houses built. About five years ago a cardinal, born in the Legations, attempted to settle a colony of 300 families in the healthiest part of it, and had them well supplied with all necessaries. In two years the malaria had reduced the colony to twenty persons. In the city three quarters are no longer habitable; so that at present the finest palaces, such as the Villa Borghese, the Villa Albani, &c., &c., stand empty, for to spend one night in them is most dangerous. And yet close by one of these pest-houses may be one in which the air is fine and wholesome. The water is excellent.

Cæsar arrived to-day, and your letter of April 1 tells me that you regard the affair of Kotzebue as I do. Your remarks on the immediate motives for it appear to me quite correct. But just because they are so they show that this horrible crime is not the affair of a *studiosus theologie*. Sand was a young student distinguished at the University of Erlangen for quiet, good behavior. In the year 1817 he left Jena, and distinguished himself at the Wartburg. In the year 1818 he went back to Erlangen, and lectured for the *Burschenschaft*. He was ravished with the glorious *Leben der Freien* of Jena and lectured boldly, and then went back to Jena.

I beg of you earnestly to entreat Tettenborn to urge this Government to go thoroughly into the investigation, and not to allow it to be cut short.

At the same time I beg of you yourself to revise the article which Pilat will have inserted from Rome in the "Observer," so that there may not escape in it any *capucinades*. My constant efforts are directed against ultras of all kinds, till at last I, too, shall be stabbed by the dagger of some fool. But, if the rascal does not come behind me, he will get such a box on the ear as he will long remember, even if he hits me.

Till then farewell, and pray continue to write to me.

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, April 14, 1819.

339. Enclosed you will find the copy of a letter I have last week received from Adam Müller.* I hear that he has written directly to your Excellency, but since I have no knowledge of anything which goes through the Chancery, I do not know whether and how far the letter to me contains facts which are not perhaps included in the Report to your Excellency. The circumstance of the news of the murder having arrived earlier in Leipsic seems, on further explanations, not to be anything remarkable, for it is a fact that immediately after the murder a courier was sent from Mannheim to the Academic Senate at Jena, and returned there on the 26th.

I should bewail it as a real calamity if Sand does not die of his wounds. His preservation can do no good, and may do much harm. I do not believe, as I have already said, that any further statement of his will be of the least value. A conspiracy properly so called certainly will not come out, and the men whom it would be of the greatest importance to convict would not be caught. We should be in no way benefited by the misfortune which the complicity of other young men would have brought upon this, and perhaps many other honest families. On the contrary, it is hardly possible to imagine what may happen if Sand lives. If the stern course of the law is stopped, or it is delayed in the course of its processes (as I have many reasons for thinking possible, and, indeed, quite certainly foresee), all the good effect which might be produced by so sad an event will be lost. If the matter is taken up in earnest, and the criminal punished with the whole force of the criminal law,

* Adam Müller was then Austrian Consul-General at Leipsic.

it cannot but be, with the present general feeling, that thousands and thousands, excited by a romantic enthusiasm for him, will fancy him a hero, a martyr to the good cause, a victim of obscurantism, and become ten times more violent and culpable than they already are. For these reasons I shall thank God very heartily if His hand cuts the knot.

For the rest, all German papers watch like bloodhounds for the first word of the "Observer," on this unhappy history. But my conviction is decided and immovable that the "Observer" must keep silence. No one can doubt our feeling on the matter. We spoke when every one else was silent. Our articles on the excesses at the Wartburg, which are not forgotten, contain everything which can be said on the late event, which is a natural consequence of what before happened. Just because it would be so easy for us at present to swagger with our warnings and wise sayings, it is more noble and dignified to relinquish this easy business, which has already been partly assumed for us by others. Besides, our silence will be more imposing to these miscreants than the most persuasive article. They will undoubtedly believe that there is some secret behind—that we will not speak because we are determined to act. And this—I will answer for it to your Excellency with life and limb—will terrify them much more than the most threatening words.

Now as to the action required: I do not see any necessity for your Excellency's return to Germany. The condition of the German universities is an illness which calls for a particular consultation of the physicians, to conduct which, time and a conjunction or concurrence of favorable circumstances is required. As soon as I am made in some measure acquainted with your Excellency's views on this important and critical affair, I will endeavor to explain to you my ideas on the form of the negotiation itself. I see plainly that the Bundestag must join in it; but if the Bundestag is left to take the initiative and conduct the business, without a firm, systematic course being agreed upon beforehand, I am quite certain that no good result will be attained.

Müller to Gentz, Leipsic, April 3, 1819.

(Enclosed in No. 339.)

340. . . . With regard to the Kotzebue history, I beg you not to be led by the Berlin newspapers to believe that Varnhagen is the author of that despatch.

In order to see that the *coup* comes from Jena, I beg you to remark the following circumstances:

The murder took place on the evening of the 23rd and was known in Frankfurt on the 25th. The news would, in the ordinary way, only have reached Leipsic by the first Frankfurt post on the 29th. Instead of this, it had already arrived on the 27th, through two Jena students, and that by the roundabout way by Jena. On Saturday the 28th, the President of Police and the Rector of the University betook themselves to these two students to learn the details, for no courier or other news had arrived. It is also not to be denied that the murderer was known as a fanatical adherent of Professor Luden in Jena, and there studied anatomy for his purpose for a fortnight; also, that immediately after the reception of the news of the success of the attempt, the Burschenschaft evidently broke up and constituted themselves into several fictitious associations of Allemanns, Markomanns, Suavians, Vandals, and so on: while on March 23 a portrait of Kotzebue, with a dead bat fastened beneath it, was to be seen on the black-board at Jena.

Further, do not imagine that this is to be considered merely as one dreadful specimen of the kind, and that the murderous band will allow themselves to be intimidated by a few measures, and those half-measures such as the present Government can take. The confusion of ideas, and the firmness in an evil direction, are far greater than you can imagine.

Here, in this quiet place, you may hear Sand publicly called a Scævola. The only satisfaction is that the Grand Duke of Weimar, Krug, and such like people, are greatly embarrassed. . . .

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, April 23, 1819.

(Answer to No. 338.)

341. Your Excellency's kind letter of the 9th inst. has delighted and relieved me, and I thank you heartily that, surrounded as you are by so many interesting objects, which certainly claim all your time, you were able to send me so much interesting information.

The reasons which your Excellency points out for attributing the assassination of Kotzebue to a regular, perhaps wide-spread, plot, have certainly some weight, and I wish that nothing may be omitted which can serve to clear up this point. But still I do not give up my opinion about it. The most important points on which it depends we have long discovered and known. That our academic youth

have arrived at this degree of criminal madness is known to us, and we need no further explanation about it. We must act on the root of the evil; the ramifications are unimportant affairs, and can at most lighten the labor of the arm which must lay the axe to the wild stem itself—its true strength must be in itself.

Your Excellency will notice what trouble the newspaper writers are taking to describe Sand as a highly-interesting youth. They may be right for what I know. I myself do not believe that Sand was a mere miscreant; but all the worse for those who could push on a spirit good and noble in itself, to go beyond the worst of criminals! The real culprits are, and will ever be, Fries, Luden, Oken, Kieser, and others of the same kind, of whom the universities must be purified at any price before any reformatory measures can have the slightest effect.

Metternich to Gentz, Rome, April 23, 1819.

342. I have now given the necessary instructions to Count Buol with regard to the regulation of the affairs of the German universities. The last proposal of the Duke of Weimar appeared to me a good ground to act upon, and if you will look at my instructions, I hope for your approval. I have used really liberal words to set a limit to ultra-liberalism, and it belongs to my fortune—to which you have so often contributed—that I can raise my edifice on the soil of Weimar and ornament it with the example of the worthy Sand, at the cost of poor Kotzebue. For your comfort let me tell you that no *Spiegelish** work has gone to Frankfurt, that not one *Spiegelish* idea obtains with me, and that “*Christ*”† whom I have found here, thinks my proposals practical, and highly approves of them.

It is one of the strange facts of my life that here in Rome I have been called to work for hours together about the German universities, and from all the Cabinets of Germany letters have arrived containing the most urgent requests that I would make an end of the disorder which each German prince provoked and encouraged in his own country, and is now no longer able to restrain. An example of the kind must really be sufficient to excite in every

* Count Spiegel was Hofrath at the Chancellery, and entrusted with the Report on German affairs.—ED.

† The identity of this person, then in Rome, cannot be ascertained.—ED.

sensible man the greatest contempt for the character of many of these Governments.

My people are so overwhelmed with work that I do not know whether I shall be able to send you a copy of my ostensible and of my secret instructions to Count Buol by the present courier: in any case you shall have them by the next; but, without waiting for them, let nothing hinder you from letting me know your views.

My proposals are confined to the discipline of the universities, and do not at all touch the studies themselves—two questions which are very closely related, but yet in the present discussion necessarily separated. If we meddle with the latter, nothing at all will be done, and a letter from Müller sufficiently points this out to me, in which in speaking of this affair he observes “that the disorder in the universities proceeds from the Reformation and that it can only be really set right by the recall of the Reformation.” I deny neither the assertion nor its justice. But here on the Quirinal I cannot meddle with Dr. Martin Luther, and I hope that nevertheless some good will come of it without even touching its source—Protestantism. The last very excellent letter of Müller’s reminded me involuntarily of Golowkin’s proposition for the investigation of “*Causes primitives de la révolution française.*”

Our stay in Rome is coming to an end. It has been as splendid as safe and useful. The Emperor is greatly pleased with the Pope: not only that no single dangerous points happened to be mentioned by the latter, but the Emperor (whose principles in canonical respects are unquestionable) said to me yesterday, on leaving his holiness after a visit of two hours, “that he was sorry the Pope could not be his own first archbishop, for he would certainly never find one better qualified to oppose the exorbitant pretensions of the Roman Curia.” So among other things the Pope assured the Emperor that the fundamental defect of the Institution of the Jesuits was their pretension of independence of the bishops, an assertion contrary to every true idea of ecclesiastical discipline, and which could only lead to disorder without measure! Our clerical Chateaubriands would, if they knew this, certainly be alienated from the poor old excellent Pius: wherefore keep this saying by all means to yourself, for *entre deux* the Chateaubriands are much dearer to me than the Benjamin Constants and Lanjuinais. The sacred *via media* is only reserved for a few, and since on it truth stands, truth is but little known.

My ideas of the splendor of Rome are every day surpassed. One

sees here of what man at his highest is capable; and if I hate the old Romans as thorough Bonapartists, yet I must give them heartfelt thanks for the grandeur which they had strength and sense to leave behind them for posterity.

As a botanist you would find here the greatest delight. What glorious plants! The flowers here bear the same relation to ours that Rome as a city bears to Vienna. I am bringing a great many with me, and I will send you some beautiful seeds.

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, April 25, 1819.

343. I must on every opportunity come back to the Weimar declaration as among the most important documents of our time. One of the chief authors and protectors of all the mischief in Germany—eight days after a crime that called on him and his ministers for vengeance—was pleased to intimate to the German Bund through his ambassador, that “Freedom of thought and teaching must remain at the Universities; for there, in the open conflict of opinions shall truth be found by the students; there shall the scholar be preserved from *devotion to authorities*, and there shall he be raised (not educated) to independence.” So far have the great and mighty of this earth gone that they can swallow such childish stuff! And not a voice, not a sound, raised in the assembly! And we—oh! that I too must again renew this *infandum dolorem*!—we must still bear the ignominious honor that, shortly before these objectionable words (the quintessence of all revolutionary teaching) from the opening speech at the Bundestag, we were called to a position, extolled by the criminal principles, not of Freiherr von Hendrich, but of the universities, as a proud memorial of German superiority against the unrighteous judgment of foreigners.

As none of the ministers at the Bundestag were inspired or vigorous enough there and then to tell the Plenipotentiary of the Duke (or, as some one wittily called him, the Ober-Burschen) of Weimar the horror which such teaching, at such a moment, must call forth, I am myself again convinced that the time is not ripe for great and comprehensive measures. But for this reason I fear more than anything formal and public consultations on these important questions. When I consider how far one must go back, how deep one must cut into the wounded flesh, thoroughly to check the evil, it seems to me quite madness to believe that in any court like the Bundestag—indeed, even in a congress of the first German princes

—such harmony, insight, courage, and determination (and none of these should be wanting) should be found as will secure, not merely good, but victorious results. Now, in a malady of so evil a character, nothing can be more injurious than unsuccessful or half-successful—that is, half-unsuccessful attempts. I am quite convinced that in revolutionary times the whole authority may more easily be re-conquered than the half. Half-results are in such crises worse even than none. One often sees, too, that when the truly efficacious, the decisive, is not attainable, wisdom enjoins that the appearance be quietly and patiently maintained, of only commanding what is most pressing and immediately practicable, while keeping the true end of all efforts constantly in view, for by true zeal and untiring perseverance the moment will at last come when a decisive blow may extricate us from all difficulties.

But I understand by half-measures, in the present question, everything which attempts a reform of the discipline of the university without touching the personality of the teacher and the students, and without acting directly on the spirit which animates the whole institution. Such (to my mind) are all attempts to limit or remove the academic jurisdiction; every setting up of a police authority foreign to it, be it high or low; every mixture of authority in the systems and methods of teaching; every regulation prohibiting the young people from associations, unions, &c., even if public and harmless; and, in fact, every alteration in the material organization of the universities. To pass such measures the Bundestag would certainly be competent; but if at last, after a thousand difficulties and oppositions, we succeeded, what would be gained? Those who had taken an active part would be decried as enemies of academic freedom in Germany, branded, proscribed, and outlawed. The rebellious principles (the banishment of all authority, the independence of individual judgment, the free conflict of opinions, and everything proclaimed by the Weimar declaration) would still continue; they would soon rise in a different form, stronger than before, and mock at all organized laws; the spirit which has seized the university, not weakened or even restrained, but rather encouraged by feeble opposition, would become only more frightful and mischievous.

So long, then, as we are not strong enough to declare open war against the principles from which the academical as well as other dangers arose, and to treat the abuses of the universities as only the necessary companions of greater disorders, every legislative pro-

ceeding exclusively directed to the universities will remain weak and fruitless: and in this state of things it would be wiser quite to draw away from them and take only such provisional steps as without any great alteration of the outward form should act simply on the personality of the teacher and the students.

Adam Müller, who, to my no small satisfaction (for his opinion is of weight), without any collusion with me—indeed, with the fear that I might take it quite otherwise—considers the matter from the same point of view, even protests against all legislative measures and proposes two expedients as follows:

1. The nomination of a curator for each university in the person of a distinguished (N.B. decorated) man of the world, if not learned, yet not unacquainted with literature, of kindly and pleasant manners, who would be answerable for the whole university, and consequently must reside in the district. Could not eight or ten such men be found in Germany who would undertake such an honorable office, the more honorable at present because of its difficulties; and if it required sufficient or even handsome salaries, what State expenditure could be more beneficial and honorable than this?

2. A purification of the professorial chairs without noise or passion, especially by the appointment of objectionable professors to other civil positions where they can do no harm. The ringleaders are known: their number is not large; if they can be dismissed quietly and their places filled with peaceable, refined men of learning (as for talent, there is not one in any class who could not be replaced by a far better man), an extremely important step towards the reform of the universities will have been taken.

These two measures require no formal negotiations, they can only be quietly arranged between Prussia, Saxony, Hanover, Bavaria, and Baden; and, in short, they would have the blessing of all well-disposed people. Jena must be set in order when all the others are arranged. The Grand Duke must (as the smallest penalty for his former transgressions) from the first be neither asked nor admitted to the consultations, least of all, as is now the case at Frankfurt, must he take the lead. He must agree to what the other Courts decide; and at the worst we will set the Emperor of Russia upon him, or put Jena, as a university, under a formal and general interdict.

By these preliminary steps I do not, however, mean to set aside the usefulness, or, indeed, the necessity of a thorough discussion of the great problem between the principal German Governments.

But if such a discussion does take place (and it should be as secret as possible), it should above all be considered that questions concerning the universities should not be handled alone—that they should not be separated from the questions concerning the freedom of the press or constitution. How far the latter must be decided I cannot here enter upon, as it would lead me too far, but I reserve to myself to make further remarks on that subject.

My *résumé* would then be:

1. At first no common legislative negotiation either in Frankfurt or elsewhere.

2. Confidential discussion of the most urgent preliminary measures with the exception of all those that touch on the material organization of the universities.

3. Conferences between delegates of the principal German Courts, in which everything relating to the universities, the freedom of the press, and even the arrangement of the statutes, should be as far as possible thoroughly discussed. If these conferences had no other result, they would certainly be a most valuable means of mutual understanding, explanation, and instruction.

In this plan no part is assigned to the Frankfurt *Gremium*. Since I positively know of nothing useful which these gentlemen could undertake, but much more probably foresee from their proceedings in Frankfurt incalculable injury, difficulty and danger, I cannot possibly propose anything of the kind.

My proposal *ad* 2 might perhaps be carried out most easily and quickly this summer in Carlsbad; and perhaps simply correspondence, if preferred, might be sufficient.

No. 3, on the contrary, is of greater importance—requires time, quiet, and much consideration. If such conferences are decided on, they must of course be at Vienna, and not be opened before next winter.

Postscript of April 27.

I have received your Excellency's letter from . . .* about an hour ago, just as I was about to send off the above. What you say makes me fear that you will not be quite satisfied with my proposals; however, as I do not know the communications you have addressed to the Court, it is possible that they may not be altogether incompatible. At any rate, in such an important affair your Ex-

* The date is not given; probably an answer to No. 342.—Ed.

cellency shall have my views as clearly as possible: and, grieved as I am in other respects to be away from you at this moment, I am glad to have written down my thoughts before I was acquainted with yours, because it will be easier to me to submit to your better insight and conviction than to surrender my own.

Pilat has received a letter like the one I lately had; and I hear that the Crown Prince, too, has received an anonymous threatening letter. Pilat was called an infamous wretch, fit for nothing but death, if he did not leave off disseminating his evil principles. The letter to me may have been a bad sort of April-fooling; but when the same thing is repeated, it wears a more serious aspect.

Metternich to Gentz, Naples, May 7, 1819.

(Answer to No. 343.)

344. From your letters of April 25 and 27, I hope that we shall be agreed about the university affairs.

I have told you long ago that I did not think the Bundestag suitable to conduct this business. There is, however, no other central point, and when you know (as I do only too well) how feeble the German Governments are, you will certainly see that nothing can come of private consultations, and now every German Prince, even if (like Bavaria) he dislikes the Bund, will find in the Bund the strength which he lacked in himself to favor similar arrangements.

Time there is none to lose, for the Governments are now so terrified that they are willing to act; soon their fears will be overcome by their weakness. If nothing is done now, the strength of the agitators will be doubled, and their courage will extinguish the last spark of the courage of the Governments. My previous communications will have informed you that I limited the question for Frankfurt to some necessary preliminary propositions.

I have adopted Müller's views and made some additions, which certainly are not less important. Among these are the improvement of university law and the decision that obnoxious professors must not be placed in other universities.

In taking as I do the Weimar proposal for my starting point, I think I do well. With contempt we shall never fight the old fellow there. He is accustomed to it. His mad views, on the contrary, will make a fine exhibition, and it seems to me far better to catch him on his own ground or give him the lie.

I have not forgotten the Emperor of Russia. I have to-day given

Stürmer the commission to write a letter to him—and send it to Count Nesselrode by one of his own couriers—which will show you that I can handle the Emperor quite suitably without committing any mistake in respect to German politics.

I shall remain in Carlsbad certainly till the middle of July. I do not know whether you still think of your journey to Switzerland. The time does not seem to me very well chosen. But I should be very glad if you could join me at Carlsbad. I desire this the more as I appoint a Prussian here, and other Germans may very likely come.

People are asking me from all directions about a conspiracy against the Emperor in Italy. If such a report should come to your ears you may be assured that it is a wicked invention of the party. Italy is quite quiet. Events in France, and the Constitutional farce in Germany excite the hopes of the parties, which, however, in Italy never repress themselves except in secret societies. But so long as no great political event takes place in Europe, no movement of any kind is to be expected in Italy. Amongst the Neapolitans, in particular, there is great satisfaction with the course of the Government, and since it is different from its former course, this reacts advantageously upon us, for the public believes that we have something to do with the attitude of the King—and the public is right.

If Russian agents did not go about in Italy and encourage the sects to hopes founded on the liberalism of the Emperor Alexander, there would be hardly any active agitation in the minds of the people. In Italy they have got over their former dissatisfaction. Italians talk loud, but do not act. The history of the last thirty years is an example of this, for during that time, in spite of all intrigues, Italy was never revolutionized, properly speaking. With Italians hatred never expresses itself against a cause, but only against a person. Therefore, in Italy provinces are against provinces, towns against towns, families against families, and—men against men. If a movement broke out in Florence, the Pisan or Pistoian would take the contrary side, because he hates Florence; thus Naples hates Rome, Rome Bologna, Leghorn Ancona, Milan Venice.

I hope, however, soon to make an end of Russian intrigues. I have taken some very peremptory steps in this respect.

Meanwhile, farewell.

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, May 21, 1819.

(Answer to No. 344.)

345. I received your Excellency's kind letter of the 7th instant yesterday evening, and, heartily as I wish you all pleasure at Naples, I am delighted that when this reaches you your Excellency will already be on the return journey to Germany.

As your Excellency does full justice to my reasons against negotiating the university affairs at the Bundestag, all further lamentations on the course chosen are useless. The argument which you oppose to my reasons is indeed crushing, but also striking and decisive. If the German Courts are so weak that nothing effectual can be done by private consultation with them (and that they are so, unhappily, I can believe without much difficulty), certainly nothing remains but to make an attempt in Frankfurt. . . .

On the point of taking the Weimar proposal as a foundation I cannot satisfy myself, in spite of your Excellency's most acute explanation of the matter.

Count Sedlnitzky has given me the acts relating to the students' affairs. They consist of a sketch of a general Constitution for the students (*Burschenverfassung*), a protocol of the assembled delegates at Jena in March and April 1818, and an address with reference to this protocol to all the sister universities; lastly, a copy of the statutes for the general German *Burschenschaft*, corrected from the sketch, October 18, 1818, at Jena. It would not be possible to have these documents printed without commentary, even if it were to be done privately. But I would not undertake so important an affair—in which there is no *periculum in mora*—in your Excellency's absence. Moreover, the whole *Burschenschaft* is in itself—without any regard to the abuses to which it has led, and may still further lead—an institution so thoroughly objectionable, and so dangerous and criminal its aims, that no stone of it should be left upon another, and if the universities are to be retained, it must be forbidden under the severest penalties. This I will demonstrate at the proper time with the greatest clearness.

If I may hope that it will be in any way useful or agreeable to your Excellency I am quite ready to give up my journey into Switzerland for this year, and to take up my quarters in Carlsbad. . . .

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, June 3, 1819.

346. I send your Excellency a copy of a letter from Müller, and take the liberty of accompanying it with the following remarks:

1. From what Müller says of many proselytes to the revolutionary sects,* of their uncertain and doubtful position, and of the indifference of the public, and even of the young men, to their writings, it is evident how much can be accomplished if only forty or fifty of the most dangerous men in Germany are carefully watched, and rendered harmless, either by direct alterations in their positions, or by winning them over by hope, or frightening them by a display of power—by fighting them, in fact, in a dexterous manner. This would be one of the most serviceable diplomatic performances of our time. But to this end we ought to have at a central point like Frankfurt one of the most important men for the cause. And where shall we find such a one? And what ostensible sphere of action shall we give him?

2. Certainly the transition of so many—particularly so many young people—from political fanaticism to religious mysticism is very remarkable.† I do not consider this an advantage. The fact calls for the greatest attention. The malady evidently takes a new form, and the medicine must be different. Here, indeed, we go beyond the last limit of police measures, and if we do not find means to work on the mind, and lay hold of the evil by its deepest roots, we are at the end of our art. A close connection, a true coalition of the noblest and wisest men in Germany, a living *Bund*, an actively deliberative and actively working society of the first statesmen and learned men, can alone solve so great a problem.

3. The papers which have appeared about Kotzebue's assassination cannot possibly make any impression, because they deserve

* Adam Müller, in his letter, speaks of Fries, Wieland, Oken, and Froriep.—Ed.

† Adam Müller mentions, in corroboration of this, that in Halle students were every day leaving the other faculties and going over to the theology lectures, and the good old Knappe did not know what to do for the crowd. In Halle the *Mystikers* drew all the applause, and the well-known Schubert, a kindred spirit, established his lecture-room there. The physician Windischmann opened his *Cursus* at Bonn, before all the professors, with a speech, in which, after a series of obscure natural philosophical expositions of the history of the time, he concluded with the declaration that only in the revelation of Jesus Christ could peace be found for the conscience and for knowledge.—Ed.

little or no respect. Krug is a mere common babbler, without vigor or strength, who is hardly fit to keep a tobacconist's shop. Görres, after the old accustomed manner, with hollow threats and dark prophecies, only gives it to be understood that in every misfortune the Governments alone are guilty, and neither gives the grounds of the accusation nor speaks it out clearly. I consider his writings not merely bad, but in the highest degree objectionable and culpable. Beckedorf's speech to the students is animated by a good spirit; it is, however, too much like a sermon, and for an oratorical attempt not well enough written. La Motte Fouqué cuts antics in doggerel like a rope-dancer: a fool, whose hour has long passed. Steffens alone has risen to the level of the subject. He is known to be a natural philosopher deeply entangled in all the false tendencies of the time. Anything thoroughly correct is not to be expected from him, and Satan, to whom he has sold himself, often peeps out. His judgment on the deed is thoroughly clear, straightforward, and excellent, and contrasts finely with all the indirect apologies, soft infatuations, and underhand sophisms glaring, to the shame of Germany, in all the public papers. Steffens is a man whom the revolutionary party fears, because it confesses his superiority, and Müller is wrong if he thinks that his word will not have much weight.

4. The story of the 3,000 copies of the Grävel book is quite correct, and certainly gains grievous ridicule for our public,* but the connection of the thing must be known in order to see how it looks. This pamphlet, published by Gerold, is patronized most zealously (God knows why) by the different officials of the police-courts, sent into all the provinces, and disseminated as much as possible both openly and secretly. It seems to me that Count Saurau must be at the bottom of it. The favor of it goes so far that a short review of it in the "Observer," in which Pilat found fault with some coarse deistical errors of the wretched scribbler, was suppressed by the police officials. For me, however, the history has an important and reassuring side. It shows what can be accomplished with us by authority, if it takes up a cause earnestly and *con amore*.

The deep silence of the Emperor of Russia on the attempts against

* Adam Müller wrote on this: "The great story in the bookselling world, a real scandal for Vienna and Austria, is that 3,000 copies were sold, in Austria only, of the notorious pamphlet '*Der Mensch von Grävel*.'"—Ed.

Stourdz and Kotzebue has a most peculiar appearance. I cannot say that I grieve over it very much, for he would not have mended matters much if he had taken the right line, and there were a hundred chances to one that he should miss it. But how this silence will be explained excites my curiosity to the highest degree, and if your Excellency knows anything you can communicate to me, I beg of you to have the kindness to remember me.

Metternich to Gentz, Rome, June 6, 1819.

347. The Commission is opened in Frankfurt, and I have letters of thanks from all sides for having taken the initiative.

I beg you to understand the founding of our proposal on the Weimar memorial only in the sense in which I myself put it—namely, not as if the Weimar propositions were the immediate object of the deliberations. This is not so: but the Weimar move served us as the immediate occasion on which a conference might be grounded. Imagine a wood where a captured robber calls for help. I hasten up to him, not to help him to get away, but to hold him as fast as possible.

The Weimar clique is besides in great anxiety. Jena begins to grow empty, and the college funds dull. The *enragés* exclaim against the unanswerable step of the Grand Duke, and call him a counsellor to the good cause. Why should we not follow up this theme? We cannot, at least, be accused of Obscurantism if we, instead of speaking from our own grounds, take up the cry of distress of the Liberal Grand Duke. But with these first steps the part of the Grand Duke concludes, for we all renounce his help.

I see, too, with a real feeling of anxiety for my earlier arrival in Carlsbad, that I am here too far from the battle-field. Between July 16 and 20 I shall certainly be on the spot. Take your own measures accordingly.

I hope that you have not for a moment believed in my journey to Paris which all the newspapers have blazoned forth.

The Liberals have raised a great hue and cry over the Archduke Rudolf's dignity of Cardinal. The Italian Independents rejoice over the cause, for they believe the Archduke will become Pope, take a wife, and call himself King of Italy. I see in the affair a red hat and a pair of red stockings, as well as the proof of good political relations between the first Catholic Power and the Church.

You may take my word for it that our Italian tour has in every respect answered the expectations I had formed.

P. S.—Tell Pilat that there is a terrible eruption of Etna, and that Catania is threatened with great danger. Vesuvius, too, has an enormous stream of lava running in the direction of Pompeii. I am very sorry not to be there. A considerable earthquake has been felt in the neighborhood of Viterbo. As Pilat is the only reporter of earthquakes, this information will be welcome.

The Emperor has put off his journey till the 11th because the Archduchess Caroline is slightly unwell. I shall follow the Emperor on the 12th.

Gentz to Metternich, Vienna, June 17, 1819.

(Answer to No. 347.)

348. I see with great pleasure, from your kind letter of the 6th inst., that you have not given up the journey to Carlsbad, as some sceptics here wished to make out, and that you even give it a certain importance. Your residence in Carlsbad may certainly do good and will at any rate furnish material for observations and combinations which will not be lost to your fertile intellect. My lodgings are taken from July 15.

I look forward with impatience to the time when I shall draw anew from so rich a source, correcting and confirming my views afresh, and I hope your Excellency will have the kindness to inform me further of your travelling plans.

Metternich to Gentz, Perugia, June 17, 1819.

(Answer to No. 346.)

349. I thank you for your very interesting account of the 3rd inst. I entirely share the views of Adam Müller, and in sharing them I find myself strengthened in the course I have taken. That the students' folly declines or turns to some other side than that of politics does not surprise me. This is in the nature of things. The student, taken in himself, is a child, and the *Burschenschaft* is an unpractical puppet-show. Then, I have never—and of this you are a witness—spoken of the students, but all my aim has been directed at the professors. Now, the professors, singly or united, are most unsuited to be conspirators. People only conspire profitably against things, not against theories. The last, indeed, may grow to power, but this can never be the case if they leave the sphere of theology. Where they are political, they must be supported by deed, and the deed is the overthrow of existing institu-

tions, and the *ôtez-vous de là que je m'y mette*. This is what learned men and professors cannot manage, and the class of lawyers is better suited to carry it on. I know hardly one learned man who knows the value of property; while, on the contrary, the lawyer class is always rummaging about in the property of others. Besides, the professors are, nearly without exception, given up to theory; while no people are more practical than the lawyers.

Consequently, I have never feared that the revolution would be engendered by the universities; but that at them a whole generation of revolutionaries must be formed, unless the evil is restrained, seems to me certain. I hope that the most mischievous symptoms of the evil at the universities may be met, and that perhaps from its own peculiar sources, for the measures of the Government will contribute to this less than the weariness of the students, the weakness of the professors, and the different direction which the studies may take. But this feeling will never restrain me from taking steps from above; and, indeed, what seem to me the only possible measures are taken.

If we are together I can give you many satisfactory explanations of the course of the business, which at a distance I could not communicate to you without an enormous correspondence, and even then must remain futile and imperfect.

The greatest and consequently the most urgent evil now is the press. The measures referring to it which I intend to bring forward at the Carlsbad Congress I will tell you all the more gladly as I wish you to give me your opinion on my ideas without reserve, and put yourself in a position to help me effectually in Carlsbad, where the business must begin without delay.

My proposals are, briefly, the following: All the German Courts shall unite in measures which seem necessary for the maintenance of the public peace, and from a full sense of the right of mutual support which is the foundation of the German Bund.

They here start from the fundamental idea of the Bund, which consists of Germany and the Sovereign States, that have agreed mutually to support and help each other, and which, while they are separate in administrative respects, form one common power against foreign countries.

The inward peace of the Bund may be endangered and even destroyed by one of the German States attacking the sovereign power of the others. But this can also be done by the moral action of the Government on others, or through the intrigues even of a

party. If this party should be supported by a German State—or only find protection in one of them—if with this protection it finds means to rest its lever against neighboring States on a neighboring State, then the inner peace of the Bund is threatened, and the Prince who allows this disorder in his country is guilty of felony against the Bund.

All the German Governments have arrived at the conviction that, at the present time, the press serves a party antagonistic to all existing Governments. The nationalities spread over all Germany make it impossible for single States to guard their frontiers from this evil; if this is the fact for single Governments, it will be no less so for all German Governments if but one German State—let it be even the smallest among them—shut itself out from the acceptance of common measures for the maintenance of the general peace.

The Bund has the right of calling upon every single member to fulfil the common duties. In case that member is not found ready of himself, the Bund has the right of compelling him.

From the constitution of the Bund it also arises that everything that is possible to independent sovereigns and European States is not possible to the sovereign States of the German Bund.

For instance, France and England certainly can permit the freedom of the press, and even assert the principle that this freedom is an indispensable condition of the real representative system.

In France and England laws can be made which confine the abuse of the press in relation to the constitution of those two kingdoms.

I doubt, however, whether either of those States would consider it a fundamental idea of the freedom of the press to tolerate all works which are systematically concocted and disseminated in one of the States, even to the generation of rebellion, by a party that is undermining the existing institutions of the other State. In this case the English Government would certainly complain to the French (and *vice versâ*) of the toleration of foreign instigators of rebellion; and if the Government complained to did not render its assistance, the Government complaining has the undoubted right to declare war, and so obtain help and redress, or at the least to stop all intercourse between the two States.

These remedies, grounded on the rights of peoples, are not practicable in Germany. What can be done among European Powers in this respect by repression, must be accomplished in the German Bund by preventive laws.

In these propositions there is no Obscurantism, and therefore they are not to be assailed as such. Even the instigators of rebellion, indeed, feel this, and will not object to them. They may decry such a state of things as a great evil for Germany, and express a wish for the only alternative known to me—the union of all Germany in one whole, undivided body. This wish has already become the fundamental principle of the fraternization of practical German revolutionists.

Since, however, this can only be fulfilled by a single German monarchy, or one German free State, it is to be supposed that no German Government will be found, from German feeling, to submit to be chased from Court and home—an inevitable condition to be expected by the victim to the love of carrying out that idea.

The means to this end seem to me to be the following:

1. There must be a settled difference made between books (real works), and journals and pamphlets.

Scientific matter characterizes the former, and, where this is not evident, the number of sheets. Thus, for instance, I take for granted that a Dissertation on Trigonometry consisting of three or four sheets might be reckoned as a *work*; while a political work, to be reckoned as such, must contain at least five-and-twenty sheets.

Periodicity and the political or moral subject-matter decides their character.

2. It is reserved to every German State to decide whether they will have a censorship of all literary productions which appear within their limits, or whether they will pass repressive laws.

In the second case the law must be for the whole Bund one and the same law: that is, every State which permits the freedom of the press for works must accept the law which the Bund has passed for all States in the same position.

3. All journals, pamphlets, &c., &c., in Germany must be under a censorship.

4. Where freedom of the press for works is permitted, the local Government (*Landesregierung*) must through their public prosecutor carry on the suit which any other German Government may bring in a diplomatic way against either the author or publisher. This suit must be instituted and carried on in the name of the local Government, and the subject of complaint must be considered and treated by it as affecting that Government itself.

In the same way every German Government must be responsible

for its own censorship. Every complaint against the latter must be considered as a complaint of Government against Government.

5. The usual regulations as to the printing of the author's name, or at least the place where the work is printed, and the publisher's name, must everywhere be observed.

No publication can be allowed at any bookseller's in Germany except under these conditions. Every anonymous writing in the Bund falls under confiscation.

These are my principal ideas, and I hardly think that any reasonable objection can be made to them. I deplore, indeed, that the censorship cannot be instituted for all writings without exception. But I am convinced that in many German States great opposition would be made if it were applied to true works. The most pressing evil is, however, certainly met by a firm administration of my proposals, and I doubt not that they will be accepted by the majority of eminent men. The most important German States—as, for instance, Prussia and Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover, even Baden—have to make no backward step in principle, for they all have either a general censorship or at the least a censorship of the journals. In Bavaria the latter is even constitutional: the Government, too, from its incomprehensible toleration, is more culpable than any other.

Postscript.—I beg your indulgence if in my letter you find some undigested expressions. I have much to do, and I hope that in reading, and still more in estimating, my ideas on the laws respecting the license of the press, you will hold more by the spirit than the words; but I submit both to your better knowledge and experience.

Gentz to Metternich, July 1, 1819.

(Answer to No. 349.)

350. Your Excellency can easily imagine what an impression your letter from Perugia has made on me. My spirits rise and all dark troubles seem to fly, when, at so grave a moment, I see the only man in Germany who can still act freely and firmly treat not only principles and feelings but resolutions from so lofty a level.

I have thought over with great attention your Excellency's resolutions concerning the limitation of the press in Germany. If these proposals are carried out, certainly much will be gained. I set no great value on the censorship of the greater works; I shall be extremely delighted if all the German Governments will consent to the censorship of the journals, in which, however, I would propose some different modifications, or rather supplementary measures,

without which the censorship itself degenerates into mere empty tomfoolery.

But I expect great opposition to the censorship of the journals from Wurtemberg, Weimar, and other quarters. The point is whether the dangerous question of the right of the majority to pass such a measure may not be mooted. But I reckon confidently on the steps your Excellency has already taken, and chiefly on the ascendancy which cannot be denied to your Excellency when once you declare yourself with decision and energy.

I will, to approach the matter more in detail, endeavor to express and arrange your Excellency's propositions as clearly and methodically as possible. Where it seems to me that explanatory remarks would be useful, I will carefully add them. In a word, I will bring with me to Carlsbad a work on the subject formed entirely on the groundwork of your proposals, which perhaps may serve as a guide for verbal conference, and of which you can take or reject what seems to your Excellency useful or not.

Where this letter will find your Excellency I do not know, but I believe already in Germany. I think, however, that I shall have a hint from some one or other before your arrival in Carlsbad. In any case, I shall start from here on the 15th, for I shall then (in the usual way) take five or six days for the journey, so that I shall not arrive there before the 20th. But neither do I expect your Excellency to arrive before that date.

Postscript.—I perceive with the greatest satisfaction that your Excellency is enjoying the best health and spirits. A good stock of both was seldom more necessary than now. The present crisis taxes all our powers to the utmost, and it is a question of nothing less than the prevention of the probable disruption of the united German Confederation—therefore, of one of the most dreadful European revolutions. In the last four weeks the symptoms have taken from one day to another so malignant a character that I fear heroic means alone—even amputation in a certain sense—can save the parts not yet attacked.

I knew not whether to laugh or cry when this morning a very worthy tradesman said to me that, till now he had always thought that in Germany too much was made of events, but now he no longer doubted that the danger is great and pressing.

*Durate, et vosmet rebus servate secundis,** is the prayer which I make to Heaven daily for your Excellency.

* Virg. *Æn.* l. 207.

METTERNICH'S MEETING WITH KING FREDERICK
WILLIAM III. AT TEPLITZ.

Preliminaries to the Carlsbad Conferences.

351. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, July 30, 1819.

352. Metternich to the Emperor Francis, August 1, 1819.

351. I arrived here the day before yesterday in the evening. Immediately after my arrival, the King of Prussia sent word that he would receive me at home the next morning. This circumstance was only remarkable because since his arrival here the King had received no one at home—all, even his own official audiences had been held in the Clary Gardens. Prince von Hardenberg arrived here from Berlin a few hours after me.

Early yesterday I went to the King, who received me in a most friendly manner, inquired particularly after your Majesty's health, and then said: "You come here to see me at a most important moment. Six years ago we had to fight the enemy in the open field: now he sneaks and hides. You know that I have great confidence in your views; you have long warned me, and all you have said has come true."

I answered his Majesty that, knowing your Majesty's feelings, I could assure him (the King) that every truth I had before told him, and especially at Aix-la-Chapelle, was quite as evident to your Majesty as to me. I added that he must be already aware of your Majesty's prompt decision in virtue of which you had without regard to the interests of the Lombardo-Venetian provinces given up that journey. Your Majesty is accustomed always to do that which is most pressing, and the state of things in Germany fixes your whole attention in the double respect of the common weal of the German States and that of your own empire. The Emperor is, said I, convinced that the evil has reached such a height in Germany that the day has arrived for the decision between the principle of preservation or entire submission—consequently, of political death. How the Emperor thinks for Prussia he has shown: that

he will grant your Majesty help if you help yourself there is not the least doubt. But the Emperor has, above all, very great and very difficult duties as a ruler: with united strength he may strive to dam up the impetuous stream, but alone he will never risk the danger of shipwreck. In order to help, the Emperor must first see clearly. He must know what Governments there are worth the name to carry out his plan. Prussia, too, is not exempted from taking part in this. But though the King is there, we do not find the kingly power; if the King leaves a free course to the evil which threatens his throne and—as the examination of the conspirators shows—even his person, the Emperor must withdraw, and for his own benefit take a line very different from the one he is to-day pursuing.

“You know,” answered the King, “that no one has a better will than I have. But my position is very difficult, for I lack *men*. The possible, however, must be done, and therefore I depend upon you to help me to come to an agreement on a certain definite course.”

I answered the King that it would be no more than my duty by investigation of the evil and by careful consideration to discover the means of safety: that, however, such a difference existed between the determination and the execution of beneficial measures, and that I was so thoroughly acquainted with the internal state of the Prussian Government, that I must freely confess I cherish but small hopes of bringing the affair to success. “I can speak freely to your Majesty,” I added, “for you have always taken it in good part. I will do so now, as I did once before when your Majesty invited me to do so. Either the counsel which your Majesty receives is not good or it is badly carried out. The discovered conspiracy is nothing but the action which always follows the teaching. This conspiracy has its origin and its abode in Prussia; the subordinate conspirators are now known, the superiors are still undiscovered, but they are without doubt to be found in the highest region of your own servants. Your Majesty knows what I think of the State Chancellor. He has rendered your Majesty priceless services, but he is now old and feeble both in mind and body. He desires what is right, and only too frequently supports what is bad.”

“You are aware,” answered the King, “that I know Prince Hardenberg thoroughly; his misfortune is the men who are about him, among whom are some very strange characters.”

"Why does your Majesty tolerate these men? Why have you allowed bad and dangerous institutions so much latitude?"

"You are quite right," replied the King, "but it is always thus when people get old. My desire is that now, whilst you are here, principles should be established which then must be most strictly carried out. I wish that you should settle this absolutely with the State Chancellor."

"The whole thing is restricted to one point," I answered. "If your Majesty is determined not to introduce any representation of the people into your kingdom (which is less fitted for it than any other) help will be forthcoming, otherwise there is no possibility of assistance. You can fulfil your promise in meaning, if, indeed, you had promised the very opposite; the present time is entirely different from the past. I am ready to impart my views to the State Chancellor, but I beg your Majesty also to nominate Count Bernstorff and Prince Wittgenstein to this conference."

"I had intended to do so," said the King, "and I beg you to try and bind these people in writing; you can thoroughly rely upon Prince Wittgenstein."

I have laid before your Majesty the principal points in a long conversation, in order to give your Majesty the plainest possible illustration of the position of the King, and of the administration in its highest sphere. Where such things can be said there is hardly a Government; everything is sunk in weakness; this weakness is in the men; the only one who has lately acted with any vigor is Prince Wittgenstein. . . .

I will extend my stay here till August 2, because the State Chancellor has much pressed me to do so. As he stays here with pleasure, he is in a very good humor. He is, moreover, not in mind but in feeling close on childhood. The King leaves Teplitz on August 1.

I will arrange everything here as well as I possibly can, and as soon as the basis is established I will lay my views before your Majesty.

In Berlin the well-disposed—and that is the majority—rejoice over the first strength the Government has shown for years; and this gives the Chancellor more courage. The German newspapers do what they can to mislead the public as to the exact state of affairs. These must first of all be silenced.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Teplitz, Aug. 1, 1819.

352. My Report of yesterday (No. 351) will have thrown as much light as was for the moment possible on the state of my negotiations here.

To-day I am able to lay before your Majesty their definite results.

Having ascertained the wishes of the King of Prussia, I entered into conference with Prince von Hardenberg, Prince von Wittgenstein, and Count von Bernstorff, in order to place as clearly as possible the foundation of our future course before them. To this conference I also invited Count Zichy.

My plan consists in the main of the following propositions:

1. The almost inconceivable perverseness of the course of most of the German Governments (the Prussian above all) has given such an impetus to the revolutionary spirit that perhaps the last period has arrived when help is still possible.

Formerly the German revolutionists were as much separated as the States in which they lived; that under such circumstances no effectual blow could be struck by them was soon clear to the conspirators. The military party in Prussia at first thought of aggrandizing themselves by the conquest of Prussia; the civil party in Prussia limited themselves to employing their efforts for the transformation of Prussia. Some men (and it is noticeable that they are nearly all persons engaged in teaching) go much further, and from a revolutionary point of view take the right road. They direct their eyes to the union of all Germans in one Germany.

For this the generation already educated cannot serve them; they therefore turn their attention to those who are to be educated, a plan which commends itself even to the most impatient, for the student generation includes, at the most, a space of four years. Now, the systematic preparation of youth for this infamous object has lasted already more than one of these generations. A whole class of future State officials, professors, and incipient literary men, is here ripened for revolution.

If we now reflect that in the Prussian Government the most numerous and important positions, both in the centre of the Government and in the provinces (especially is this the case in the Rhine provinces), are occupied by pure revolutionists, it is not to be wondered at if Prussia is considered quite ripe for revolution.

Two circumstances have unexpectedly assisted this deep laid

plan—the disaffection, almost amounting to madness, of the press in general, and the introduction of demagogic Governments in South Germany. What Prussia's weakness had prepared for years, Bavaria accomplished with one blow, Baden imitated, and Wurtemberg sought to extend still further.

2. To complete this work it now only requires to set up a democratic Government in Prussia. That this measure is not yet full depends on the personal timidity of the King and—I say without hesitation—the systematic efforts with which I have made it my duty to frighten the King from every step which must have resulted in the inevitable overthrow of all the existing institutions. To this end it was necessary that the King, and even the high officers of the State, should be imbued with the most undoubting confidence in the true friendship of your Majesty, and to obtain for myself personally the good opinion of the King. How thoroughly this has succeeded is shown by the present result.

3. As the first steps were attained by your Majesty's personal course in German affairs as well as in your Majesty's personal attitude towards the King, I made use of the last meeting of the Courts at Aix-la-Chapelle to make myself at home in the internal affairs of Prussia; and your Majesty will remember the steps which I then took to explain to the King himself his position with regard to his people—or rather with regard to the administration—and to draw his attention to the difference between the principles which must cost him the throne and those which may yet save him. The salvation of the Prussian monarchy may therefore probably date from Aix-la-Chapelle.

That this evil by its extension produces the means of its own extinction is also seen in Prussia. Moral, like physical, evil always reaches such a height, if it is not destroyed in its first germ, or at any rate in its very first period, that at last its weakness becomes plainly evident. The illusion disappears, its imminent and entire dissolution is palpable, and courage often comes in the last hours to the help of the most dejected, and it is fortunate if then the elements of relief are still at their disposal.

This is the present position of the King of Prussia. It is known to your Majesty that, by one of those happy chances which often occur in the life of States as in the lives of men, my journey to Carlsbad happened at the moment of a decision most important for Prussia. That I consider the present crisis momentous for the whole of Germany I have shown your Majesty by my plan, not

only of going to Carlsbad myself, but of there conferring with the ministers of the chief German Courts. But a good resolution generally leads to manifold benefits, and so it has here turned out.

That the great conspiracy overspreading the whole of Germany would be unmasked just at this moment was so little foreseen by me that it was part of my plan to discover it at Carlsbad. In the same way your Majesty's idea of going straight to Vienna, instead of to Milan, was one of those happy inspirations the object of which can only be known beforehand by Providence.

4. I came here by the pressing invitation of the King, and found him, as I mentioned in my last despatch to your Majesty, in an excellent and, for him, unusually confidential mood. How much this disposition has been increased by my efforts here was yesterday made most evident. The day before yesterday I had begged the King to grant me another audience. Yesterday morning the King came to me himself with Prince Wittgenstein. In a conversation of two hours, and in the presence of that excellent and faithful witness, I unfolded my views, feelings and convictions with the same candor with which I always make it my duty to speak to your Majesty. I thoroughly penetrated the mind of the King, and found the means of exciting in him the most active principle of his character—the repressive—to such a degree that we may hope he will never take the most hazardous of all steps; the introduction of a constitution for his kingdom, without granting me a preliminary examination of what is to be done.

In order to lead the King to right principles, I had prepared a short work which clearly pointed out the true difference between such institutions as the Diets and a so-called representative system. I thought it all the more necessary to place this work in the King's own hands as I saw that he had placed the greatest value on a far more superficial paper which I had presented to Prince Wittgenstein, as well as to the State Chancellor at Aix-la-Chapelle (No. 305).

I take the liberty of sending your Majesty a copy of the above-named paper.* If your Majesty condescends to look it over, you will be convinced that only the utterance of a few sentences—only a few blunders in the choice of the system to be followed—is needed to frustrate forever any possible rescue of the good cause.

* This paper is not to be found, but it was evidently analogous with No. 305.—Ed.

5. During my conversations here with the first Prussian statesmen, I have convinced myself of the following evident facts.

Prince von Hardenberg is morally, as well as physically, in a state of weakness bordering on childhood. He desires what is right, he knows even what is right, but there are in him two elements always most dangerous for a statesman of the highest grade, even if his strength of mind were greater than ever was the Prince's. The one is an extraordinary impulse towards liberalism: the other an unfortunate inclination to get strange people about him. It may be said without exaggeration that at the present time there is not a man near him whose opinions are not either of the purest democracy, or who is not already an active participator in the conspiracy against the very throne of Prussia itself.

The King is thoroughly informed of the state of things. There are in Prussia also two negative powers in conflict—the weakness of the King with that of the State Chancellor. The first is the least dangerous, for the King's weakness is coupled with indolence: that of the Chancellor, with the greatest activity.

Count Bernstorff is thoroughly right-feeling in principle. He is, however, extremely weak, and he has such a deep consciousness of his painful position that he is quite enfeebled by it.

Prince Wittgenstein thinks as I do: he is in the main active, but not nearly so much so as he should be. His influence on the King is far more thorough since the last discoveries so well conducted by him.

The director of the Royal Cabinet, Albrecht, is a quiet and extremely well-meaning man. In Aix-la-Chapelle he already began to draw near to me, and has here laid aside all timidity in this respect. His part is negatively very important, for he makes it his duty to restrain the King from many inconsiderate steps. . . .

I do not wish my presence here to be limited to an empty convention; therefore I have written out the sketch of an agreement, and laid it before our second conference.

This document contains the basis on which alone I seek the safety and prosperity of Germany, and at the same time is a proof that Prussia herself joins with us. The principal features of this basis are as follows. I start from the point of view—

1. That to me purely Austrian must, in the abstract, stand closer than Austro-German affairs.

A good and vigorously managed union of States (*Bundes-Verhältnisse*) is certainly the best and truest weapon of defence for your

Majesty's own State: and more, there is no other political combination which can outweigh or replace the advantages arising from this union of States. The more firmly these propositions are established, the more true it is that the same element which if well managed will lead to safety, may through mismanagement or bad and careless execution become highly dangerous.

Therefore from these propositions arises the rule, a real rule of life for Austria—

That we must do everything to regulate and maintain the prosperity of the Bund, or, in case this should prove impossible, we must, relying on our own strength, assume a position very different from that we are taking to-day towards the German Princes outside the Bund.

Faithfully to follow out this principle we must first show most exactly the true position of affairs, and then point out the appropriate ways and means to improve the defects in the Bund.

The course to be followed is clearly laid down in the agreement signed with Prussia.

It is divided into two periods—

(a) The present meeting of the ministers of the most important German Courts at Carlsbad;

(b) A second meeting at Vienna supplementary to the first.

At the first our principles must be made generally known, and the necessary temporary measures founded on them.

Among these I reckon—

(a) The suspension of the license of the press;

(b) The appointment of commissions for the investigation of the German universities, and the removal of notoriously bad professors;

(c) The formation of a special judicial commission, acting in the name of the whole Bund, to investigate the conspiracy discovered against the Bund.

The second meeting can only be devoted to discussions not of a kind to be accomplished in a few hours or days. Among these I include the correction of the thirteenth article of the Act of Confederation.

All that is most necessary here is provided for by the engagement of Prussia to grant no representation of the people—that is, not to give themselves up with one stroke to the Revolution.

Your Majesty will have been long convinced (and the present Report will show this truth afresh) how little I reckon on any firmness in the proceedings of Prussia as to their home affairs. This much,

however, is certain, that all danger is for the moment averted, and with this state of things comes the possibility that future evil may be avoided by vigorous measures at the present time. My great desire, therefore, in regard to Prussia, is to make use of this present time, and I cling to this firmly.

The means of leading the revolutionized South German States back to a better footing are so critical in their application that they require the most firm and calm examination, and it is only thus that the desired result can be attained. I hope by this hasty but plain representation to convince your Majesty that this matter, which from the harmony of Austrian and Prussian views begins so prosperously, chiefly depends on this—

To save the German Bund by the help of Austria, or to leave Austria the possibility—difficult as it may be—to save herself.

I feel sure that I shall never be called upon to solve more difficult problems than the present. But they do not come of my choice; the evil exists and must be conquered: the causes of the evil lie deep; they must therefore be grasped from the root: this outbreak already overspreads all Germany; the fight must therefore take place in the open field. In these assertions there is no exaggeration: they are the expression of pure truth.

METTERNICH.

On this Report I think it right to make the following remarks:

1. I think it would be best that every State which has still no representation by Diet should have the bestowal of it deferred, and that at present there should be nothing said on the matter, in order not to put troublesome people in movement, who would with difficulty be satisfied with representative Diets such as are meant in your Report.

2. I hesitate to grant to the Diets a share in the legislation;

3. Or to grant the proposed assembly of Deputies from the provincial Diets, which it would strengthen against a monarchy formed out of different bodies.

4. I shall never allow my universities to be examined by a commission, for they would thereby be brought into the very disorder and confusion which it is intended to avoid.

5. The formation of a special judicial commission to try the discovered conspiracy against the Bund I think doubtful and unjust. Every subject has the right to be tried according to the laws of his own State, or that in which the offence occurred. Now, the Bund

has no peculiar laws against crimes, no tribunal: therefore, who shall judge, and according to what law shall judgment be given? One must not by unjust measures give occasion to just complaints, which might here be the case. Besides, who will answer for it that the judges shall be properly chosen, and that there will not be long disputes at the Diet as to the manner of trial without bringing matters to a point, thus making them still worse? . . .

But it is best, as I have already told you, not to go to work inconsiderately, and perhaps resort to such remedial measures that the evil in question may be made either to take another form or to give place to a new one.

What We can do depends on Us, but we have to do with weak sovereigns and weak Governments, whose fears we must use to induce them to severe but righteous measures, and if this cannot be done, or should the means ordained by the Diet prove insufficient against the inaction or treachery of others, we must isolate ourselves, and then—as I have explained to you—act as the Austrian kingdom, as the welfare of my subjects, requires. This you can threaten to do, if you should see that it is necessary.

FRANCIS.

Schönbrunn, August 7, 1819.

RESULTS OF THE CARLSBAD CONFERENCES.*

Metternich to Count Buol in Frankfurt, Carlsbad, September 1, 1819.

353. Enclosed I have the honor to send your Excellency a presidential Report on several matters debated here among the assembled plenipotentiaries of the different German Governments.

From the great importance of the deliberations, and with the happy conviction that a corresponding result will procure the security of internal peace in the Bund and confirm the federation in its organic formation, I thoroughly confide in your Excellency's sound, wise, and in every respect efficient co-operation. I expect, therefore, as soon as possible, intelligence of the further course of the deliberations, and only remark that in case of any doubt the two ambassadors, Von Plessen and Von Marschall, can give every explanation required, for these two ministers are acquainted with the negotiations so far, and with my views and feelings.

Presidential Proposition.

(Enclosed in No. 353.)

354. The Royal Presidential Embassy has received orders to make the following proposals to the assembly of the Bund.

His Imperial Majesty believes that the wish of all the members of the Bund corresponds with his own when he calls upon that assembly, before their adjournment, to direct their whole attention to the restless agitation and fermentation of feeling prevailing in the greater part of Germany; to discover the causes of this doubtful appearance, which for some years has day by day been more plainly made known, till at last it was unmistakably revealed in sermonizing writings, in widespread criminal confederations, even

* There were present at the Carlsbad Conferences—besides Austria—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wurtemberg, Baden, Mecklenburg, Nassau, Hesse, and Saxe Weimar: the two last without full powers.—Ed.

in single deeds of horror; and to take into serious consideration the means whereby to secure order and peace, respect for laws and confidence in Governments, general contentment, and the undisturbed enjoyment of all the benefits which, under the protection of a durable, secure peace, would fall to the share of the German nation from the hand of their princes.

The source of the evil—to limit the further progress of which is at present the sacred duty of all the German Governments—lies partly, indeed, in the circumstances and relations of the time, on which no Government can immediately act, but it partly depends on definite needs, errors and abuses, which may certainly be amended by united action and well-considered measures.

Among the subjects which in this latter respect require the closest and most careful consideration the following are most prominent:

1. The uncertainty with regard to the meaning and misunderstanding of Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation;
2. Incorrect ideas of the powers of the existing Assembly of the Bund, and inadequate means of improving those powers;
3. The defects of the school and university systems;
4. The abuse of the press, and especially the disorders excited by newspapers, journals, and pamphlets.

It is the most earnest wish of his Majesty that the assembly of the Bund should occupy itself immediately with these important matters. And the Presidential Embassy is hence appointed to impart these designs for measures concerning the four points above mentioned, and also to nominate a central commission, whose object and business will be more fully shown in the course of this Report.

His Majesty is convinced that the members of the Bund will see once more in these plans and in the accompanying remarks those principles of justice and moderation which his Imperial Majesty has always taken for his guide, and that the well-disposed in all the German States will misunderstand neither the pure and benevolent views which have exclusively guided his Majesty, nor the straightforward, hearty, and unalterable participation in the general lot of the States called by the Bund to equal advantages, equal duties, and equal efforts.

I. Uncertain Meaning of Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation.

When the illustrious originators of the German Bund determined, at the time of Germany's political regeneration, to give their people

a pledge of their love and confidence by the preservation or reconstruction of representative Diets, and to this end signed Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation, they certainly foresaw that this article could not be fully carried out to the same extent and in the same form in all the States of the Bund. The great difference in the position of the States of the Bund—of which at that time some retained their old provincial representative institutions wholly or in part; others had possessed but entirely lost them; while others again had never had such institutions, or lost them in the earliest ages—must necessarily lead to as great a difference in the management of this important affair. This difference was greatly increased by a new arrangement of territorial boundaries, by the union of States dissimilarly constituted into one common State, and by the fusion of districts to whom representative institutions were more or less foreign with provinces where they had existed for ages.

In this respect, not only the founders of the Bund but also afterwards the Princes of the Bund of that time hesitated to listen to the wish everywhere expressed (and most loudly at the Diet) that for the formation of the above-named representative institutions mentioned in Article XIII. a general standard might be determined upon. If from the non-fulfilment of this wish many evils arose for Germany, yet it would be unjust to mistake the motive which caused this silence of the Bund on this important point—namely, respect for the right of each State of the Bund to regulate their internal affairs according to their own views—and the fear lest by vigorously outspoken general principles, single States of the Bund should be thrown into confusion, and perhaps into indissoluble difficulties.

But the founders of the German Bund could never have supposed that constructions would be placed on Article XIII. in contradiction to its plain words, or that results should be drawn from it which reversed not only Article XIII., but the whole text of the Act of Confederation in all its chief provisions, and rendered the continuance even of the Bund in the highest degree problematical. Never could they have supposed that the unambiguous principle of representation by Diets (on the confirmation of which they laid so much value) should be changed into pure democratic principles and forms, and claims be grounded on this misunderstanding incompatible with the existence of monarchical States, which (with the unimportant exception of the free towns belonging to this body) are the

only constituent parts of the Bund, as will appear immediately or in a very short time must be made plain.

As little ground did there seem to be for the fear that any one in Germany would ever harbor the idea of curtailing the substantive rights and attributes of the Bund itself by means of the provincial Diets, or that it was really attempted to sever the only band by which one German State is bound to the others, and the whole of Germany united with the European system. Yet all these sad misunderstandings and errors have not only developed during late years, but, by an unfortunate chain of circumstances, have taken such a hold on the public mind, that the true meaning of Article XIII. has been quite lost sight of. The daily increasing tendency to fruitless or dangerous theories; the influence of deluded writers, or of those who flatter the popular folly; the foolish cravings; the institutions of foreign countries, whose present political form is as unlike that of Germany as their whole former history is from ours—the desire to plant on German soil these and many other similar and mostly deplorable causes have produced that general political confusion of language which threatens to consume this grand and noble nation, once so gloriously distinguished for solidity and sense. These causes have, even to many members of the Diets, so obscured the standpoint on which they were constitutionally placed, and so destroyed the limits of their true efficiency, that the Government itself is hindered and disturbed in the fulfilment of its most essential duties.

The grounds which had formerly decided the Bund not to interfere directly in the affairs of single States of the Bund must now make place for higher considerations. If the German Bund is not to be destroyed, if Germany is not to abandon its rights and well-being to all the horrors of internal divisions, lawless caprice, and incurable disorder, it must secure a firm and universally recognized foundation for its future institutions. Hence it must be the first and most pressing business of the Bund to enter upon a thorough explanation and interpretation of Article XIII. of the Act of Confederation, in a way applicable to all the States of the Bund in whatever position they may now be, and this derived, not from popular theories or foreign models, but from German ideas, German rights, and German history, and above all by the maintenance of the monarchical principle to which Germany can never be unfaithful, and the maintenance of the Bund, as the only support of her independence and her peace.

In all the States of the Bund where the provincial diets are not firmly established, the work must be put in hand without further delay, and, indeed, with redoubled activity, so desirable is it to prevent new misunderstandings and to facilitate a final agreement on the carrying out of Article XIII. by the works relating to the provincial Diets already introduced into many of the States of the Bund; and so imperative is it that no resolution should be taken which in any way whatever is in contradiction to the views here expressed, and to the explanation of that Article which may be very shortly expected from the Assembly of the Bund.

II. The Powers of the Bund and the Means of carrying them out.

It lies in the very idea and existence of the German Assembly of the Bund that the authority represented by it constitutes the supreme legislative power in Germany in everything relating to the self-preservation and essential aims of the Bund, as is set forth in Article II. of the Act of Confederation. Hence it follows that the resolutions of the Assembly, in so far as they have for their objects the inward security of the whole, the independence and inviolability of single members of the Bund and the maintenance of the legally existing order inseparable from both, must be of universal obligatory force, and that the carrying out of such resolutions must not be opposed by any isolated legislation or any separate resolution. Without a firm and vigorous maintenance of these principles the existence and duration of the Bund is not to be thought of as possible. The further development, as well as the definition of the powers and attributes of the Diet in general, must be reserved for further deliberations on the improvement and maintenance of all the conditions established by the Bund. Meanwhile it will be at once admitted on all sides that (and this the deliberations will prove) the great principle cannot in itself be observed, nor can the laws and resolutions of the Bund have any guarantee for their operation, if the Assembly of the Bund has not entrusted to it the means and strength to carry them out. The composition of an executive law with this object must therefore be one of the chief objects of the deliberations above mentioned; and his Majesty believes he may take for granted the fullest agreement among his allies in the Bund as to the urgent necessity for such a law.

Since, however, the Diet should not be left without the necessary means for the administration and execution of such resolutions and

measures as the internal safety of Germany requires, the Imperial and Royal Presidential-Embassy is authorized to submit for immediate examination and deliberation the draft of a provisional executive law drawn up with express regard to Article II. of the Act of Confederation.

III. The Defects of the School and University Systems.

The attention of the Assembly of the Bund, as of individual German Governments, was long ago directed to this object, with the exceeding importance of which all Germany is penetrated. A sound and salutary direction of the educational institutions in general, but especially of the universities which immediately prepare the entrance into practical life, will be considered in every State one of the chief matters for the royal care. But the German Governments lie under peculiar obligations and more than ordinary responsibility in this respect; in the first place, because in Germany the education for the public services and for official life is entirely left to the university; and then because these universities are a principal member in the whole union of Germans, and as the good which emanates from them is spread over the whole nation, so also their defects are felt more or less at every point in Germany; lastly, because Germany has to thank her universities (famous from of old) for part of the reputation and consequent rank in the European commonwealth which up to this time it has happily maintained, and in the unbridged maintenance of which his Majesty on his side takes the warmest and most active interest.

That the true position of the German universities, with some well-known and honorable exceptions, no longer corresponds with the reputation gained in better times can hardly be doubted. For some time past, sensible and right-thinking men have remarked and deplored that these institutions have lost their original character and deviated from the objects aimed at by their illustrious founders and supporters. Carried away by the stream of agitation, the greater part of the academic professors have mistaken the true ends of the universities, and substituted for them those that are capricious and often injurious. Instead (as was their first duty) of training the youth confided to them for the service of the State to which they were called, and awakening in them a sense of what is expected of them by the fatherland to which they belong, they had followed the phantom of a so-called cosmopolitan cultivation, filled the minds so sus-

ceptible alike to both truth and error with empty dreams, and inspired them, if not with bitterness, yet with contempt and opposition to legally established order.

By this perverted course they have gradually, to the great prejudice of the common welfare and injury to the rising generation, engendered the obscuring of the higher wisdom, contempt for all positive teaching, and a pretension to reform social order after a peculiar untried system, till a considerable number of the youth who ought to be learners have transformed themselves into teachers and reformers. This dangerous degeneracy of the universities has not escaped the notice of the German Governments in the past, but partly from their praiseworthy wish not to restrict the freedom of teaching so long as it did not encroach on civil matters, partly from the troubles and pressure of a twenty years' war, they were prevented from combating the evil with sound remedies.

But in our days, under the beneficial influence of restored external peace and the hearty and active efforts of so many German sovereigns to prepare a happy future for their people, it may fairly be expected that the universities should return to those limits within which they formerly worked so gloriously for the Fatherland and for mankind. Yet from this very quarter proceed the most determined hostilities to the principles and rules on which repose the present institutions and the internal peace of Germany. Whether by criminal co-operation, or by inexcusable carelessness, the noblest powers and efforts of youth are abused by being made the tools of extravagant political schemes which are not the less mischievous because they are weak. These dangerous courses have, indeed, led to deeds which disgrace the German name, and further indulgence would degenerate into culpable weakness, while indifference to further abuses of such a distorted academic liberty would render the whole German Governments answerable before the world and to posterity.

Certain as it is that, in the present grave position of affairs, every other consideration must give way to the maintenance of public order, the Governments of the States of the Bund will not lose sight of the great question how to remedy the deep-seated abuses of the educational systems in general, and especially to prevent the further estrangement of the universities from their original and only beneficial ends; and his Majesty therefore holds that the Assembly of the Bund is bound to occupy itself with questions equally important for learning and for public life, for the welfare of families and

the strength of Governments, and not to desist until a sound and happy result has been gained by their efforts.

But, in the first place, the evil immediately threatening must be met, and care taken that by efficient measures foolish enthusiasts or declared enemies to existing order may not seek in the present distressing state of many of the German universities further materials for the excitement of men's minds, deluded instruments for the execution of senseless plans, or weapons to turn against the personal safety of citizens. His Majesty has therefore no scruple, in consequence of the provisional authority granted by the Bund in this affair, in offering the annexed sketch of some preliminary measures for the immediate consideration and further deliberation of the Assembly.

IV. Abuses of the Press.

The Press in general, especially that branch of it which supplies the journals, newspapers, and pamphlets, has of late years enjoyed perfect liberty in nearly every part of Germany: for even where the Government has had the right to limit it by preventive measures, the efficiency of such measures has been enfeebled by the power of circumstances, and consequently opened a wide field to all kinds of further extravagance.

The countless evils which the abuse of this liberty has spread over Germany have been seriously increased since the publication in different States of the proceedings of the Diets, including subjects which ought not to leave the sacred keeping of the Senate and appear before the world, but in a regular and solemn form, nor serve as the sport of idle curiosity and careless criticism, preparing new food for the rashness of authors, and affording a pretext to newspaper scribblers to raise their voices on subjects which cause doubt and difficulty to the greatest statesmen. How far these injurious pretensions would at last extend, what confusion of ideas, what fermentation of minds, what degradation of authority, what strife of passions, what fanatical errors, what crimes shall proceed from it, need not be further insisted on, and there can hardly be any difference of opinions among the well-disposed and really enlightened portion of the German nation on so notorious an evil.

The peculiarity of the relations in which the States of the Bund stand to one another gives to the dangers connected with the license of the press a power and extent which they can never have in States where the supreme power is united in one and the same centre,

and excludes the employment of the legal means by which in these States an endeavor is made to check the abuse of the press. A confederation of States like that which is formed in Germany with the sanction of all the European Powers is wanting in that mighty counterweight which in close monarchies protects public order from the attacks of presumptuous or evil-disposed authors. In such a confederation peace, harmony and confidence can only be maintained by the greatest mutual care in averting troubles and difficulties. From this high point of view, with which the lawgivers of other lands have nothing in common, must the questions connected with the freedom of the press in Germany be considered. Only in a position of the most perfect peace can Germany, with its federal constitution, endure the unlimited freedom of the press in so far as it is specially united with that constitution. The present moment is less suited for it than any other, for the efforts of so many Governments to secure the present and future welfare of their peoples by good institutions cannot, amid a wild discord of opinions, possibly succeed in the midst of a disorganized contest, which shatters all principles, and throws doubt and suspicion on all truth.

The temporary measures to be taken against the abuse of the press under these pressing circumstances must in no wise hinder the activity of useful and excellent authors, fetter the natural progress of the human mind, or hinder communication or information of any kind, so long as it only keeps within the limits which no legislation has yet permitted itself to overstep. That the supervision of periodical writings shall not degenerate into oppression is guaranteed by the feeling which is openly expressed by all the German Governments on this occasion, and no friend of truth and order need fear the reproach that any tyranny over men's minds is intended. But the necessity for such supervision can no longer remain in doubt, and since his Majesty may expect from all the Governments a harmony of views on this important matter, the Presidential Embassy is commissioned to lay before the Assembly of the Bund the annexed sketch of a provisional resolution for the avoidance of the abuse of the press in regard to newspapers, journals, and pamphlets, for their immediate examination and deliberation.

V. Nomination of a Central Investigation Commission.

Next to the resolutions and deliberations mentioned in the last section of the Report, there may still be necessary a measure both

for the protection of public order and the calming of all the well-disposed in Germany, which his Majesty commends to the immediate consideration of the Assembly of the Bund.

The discoveries which have been made in different States of the Bund at the same time have shown traces of a widespread and in several parts of Germany active union, with many ramifications, each more or less matured, whose continued efforts seem to be directed, not merely to the greatest possible spreading abroad of fanatical, dangerous, and revolutionary doctrines, but even to the encouragement and preparation of mischievous schemes. If the extent and connection of these criminal intrigues are not yet thoroughly known, yet the mass of facts, documents, and other evidence already collected is so considerable that the operation of the evil is no longer to be doubted. Opinions will always be divided as to the greatness of the danger; it is enough that such sad errors should gain so much ground in Germany, that so considerable a number of individuals should actually be led astray, and that, even if the whole may be considered only as a malady of the mind, the neglect of the necessary remedies may bring with it the most dangerous consequences.

A thorough investigation of the matter is therefore of unavoidable necessity. It must in one way or another lead to a beneficial result, for the really guilty will, if the suspicion is confirmed, be disarmed and brought to justice, and the deluded will have their eyes opened to see the abyss near which they stand, and Germany will be placed in a position neither to be deceived as to real dangers and cradled in false security, nor disturbed and misled by exaggerated cares.

But if these investigations are to be successful, they must be made by the Diet as the common centre, and conducted under its immediate supervision. The intrigues and schemes already discovered are directed quite as much against the existence of the German Bund as against individual German Princes and States; consequently, the Diet is unquestionably both competent and by Article II. of the Act of Confederation strictly bound to take cognizance thereof. Moreover, a central authority so constituted is far more competent than single Governments to arrange the data already prepared and to collect what has still to be ascertained, to examine them with justice and impartiality, and to take a comprehensive view of the whole state of the case. Lastly, by the official publication of the whole proceedings at the close of the investigation by the authorities, the fear will be most effectually averted that the

innocent should be suspected, or the guilty escape punishment, and in any case an end will thus be put to many doubts, anxieties, and restless agitations

These are the grounds on which his Majesty is impelled to propose the appointment of a central commission of investigation with the objects here described, and the Presidential Embassy is directed to lay the annexed sketch of a resolution on these measures before the Assembly of the Bund for their immediate consideration.*

Letter of Thanks from the Ministers assembled at Carlsbad to Prince Metternich, Carlsbad, August 30, 1819.

355. Most gracious Prince. Your Excellency will not refuse, at the last moment of our present memorable meeting, to give to one and all of us the pleasure of offering you the unanimous expression of our unbounded respect and gratitude:

If we may venture to hope that the difficult and honorable task to which you summoned us has been fulfilled in a manner not displeasing to you, we have to thank your prudent guidance, your ceaseless efforts, and the confidence you have so kindly shown in us and have also so implicitly received.

When you, on the other side of the Alps, heard the audacious, fatally prophetic clamor of licentious writers, and the news of a crime in which superficial or prejudiced observers could see only an isolated action, you discerned with equal clearness the depth of the evil and the means of meeting it, and what we have here achieved and called into life is only the realization of what you then designed.

The results of our efforts lie mostly beyond our calculation, but

* In the "instructions" sent to Count Buol, at the same time as the above presidential Proposition, Count Metternich shows that "the Cabinet" assembled in Carlsbad "have agreed to give similar instructions to their ambassadors to the Diet, instructing them to agree to the Presidential proposal, and to declare their assent to the resolutions drawn up." These were, in fact, four sketches or plans for resolutions—namely, (a) a provisional executive statute, (b) provisional measures regarding the universities, (c) a law regulating the press, and (d) the appointment of a central commission of investigation in Mayence—and at the sitting of the Diet at Frankfurt on September 20, 1819, were unanimously adopted and officially published for the general information in the different States of the Bund; which makes it unnecessary to include them in this work, as the substantial contents of this codification is known to the reader without this, by the present document.—Ed.

you have secured for us a rich harvest in the feeling that we have, by the results of our deliberations, prepared for our august masters the means of fulfilling their most sacred and indispensable duty towards the common fatherland.

Accept, your Excellency, the assurance of our unalterable and devoted respect.

Carlsbad, August 30, 1819.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF, RECHBERG, STAINLEIN, SCHULENBURG,
GRAF MÜNSTER, HARDENBERG, WINZINGERODE, BERSTETT,
MÜNCHHAUSEN, MARSCHALL, PLESSSEN.

*Metternich to the Prince Regent of England, Carlsbad, September 2,
1819.*

356. Sire,—I am too sensible of the favor which your Royal Highness deigns to bestow on me, to deny myself the satisfaction of offering my congratulations on the happy agreement established between the German Cabinets at Carlsbad, and the expression of my thanks for the support which the ministers of your Royal Highness have given to all the measures which I have been able to propose. A new era is beginning, and it will be an era of salvation if the German Courts do not go beyond the limits assigned to them.

Your Royal Highness foresaw the importance of the subjects which might be submitted to the discussion which I had arranged to take place on my return from Italy, and you furnished a signal proof of this by sending Count Münster to Carlsbad. Your Royal Highness is always sure to be met in the path of those principles which would have achieved the great work if they had not so often been lost sight of in many negotiations of the years 1813 up to the disastrous epoch of 1815. Therefore it remains to me to make a request to your Royal Highness, to the fulfilment of which I attach a very high value. Questions of as great an interest for the Germanic Confederation as those we have just settled have been reserved for the conferences which will open at Vienna on November 20 of the present year. Less urgent in their execution, but not less useful in their consequences, these questions will need to be strongly supported by the Courts who wish to do good, because they are above petty fears, petty jealousies, and many lower motives which generally interrupt the development of useful institutions. You must not, then, be surprised, sire, if I consider the direct support of Count Münster in the course of the negotiations of Vienna a real

benefit. My wish is simple—it is only that the action of Austria may thus be strengthened. I do not believe that our next conferences can extend beyond six weeks, but those will count for much in the future existence of the Confederation.

Permit me, sire, to take the present opportunity of entreating your Royal Highness to continue the gracious favor with which you have long deigned to honor me, and which is due to my devotion for your august person. Deign, &c., &c.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Königswart, September 3, 1819.

357. The assembled ministers at Carlsbad have just terminated their business. I had the honor to inform you, at the time of my arrival in this town, of the object which called me here. It is with very lively satisfaction that I can now assure you that all I wished to submit to the common deliberation of the principal German Cabinets has received their unanimous sanction.

A great affair has, perhaps, never been treated with more harmony and agreement in all its parts than that which we are just bringing to an end. The evils which menace the repose of Germany have been examined with calmness and candor. The German Cabinets have met together there as if they were members of one and the same family. They have placed thorough confidence in the wise and steadfast principles which direct the political and administrative steps of the Emperor. The results of the harmony which is established between the Governments will operate usefully on the present and future measures of the Diet; and I allow myself to entertain great hopes of the influence which may be brought to bear on the whole of Europe by this first example of the maintenance of monarchical principles by a political body so imposing as the Germanic Confederation.

The labors of the Conference may be divided into two parts, which include all the most essential objects of the Confederation.

The first bears on the measures to oppose to the demagogic spirit, which has made immense progress in Germany within the last two or three years.

The second bears on the organic laws of the Confederation, which are most essential to strengthen and complete the existence of this great political body.

The measures of the greatest interest at the present moment will be proposed at the Diet by the President about the 15th of this

month. It was necessary to permit a fortnight to elapse between the definite agreement of the majority of the federal Courts and the proposition at the Diet, in order to allow time to inform those princes who were not represented at Carlsbad of the result of the conferences, and to enable them to give the necessary orders to their ambassadors at Frankfurt, so that they may add their votes to those of the majority.

The organic laws agreed on in principle will be discussed in detail at a second meeting of the Cabinets, which will take place at Vienna after November 15. The Federal Diet will adjourn after having made the first Imperial propositions into laws, and it will be enabled to sanction at the opening of the session of 1820, and in constitutional forms, the resolutions adopted by the majority in the conferences at Vienna during the vacation of the Diet. . . .

I beg you to present the enclosed letter to his Royal Highness (No. 356). I have taken the liberty of addressing him directly, to thank him for the support I received from Counts Münster and Hardenberg at a most decisive time for the salvation of Europe. There ought to be nothing surprising in seeing the ministers of his Royal Highness on all occasions professing the same principles as those of our august master the Emperor—the only ones which may yet be able to arrest the torrent of the revolution. It is nevertheless rare, in the progress of a very complicated affair, considering the essence of the German federation, to meet with Courts so indissolubly united as our own and that of Hanover. If this fact is perhaps connected with the position of the two Courts, the men who are charged with the defence of such great interests are not the less meritorious if they strictly follow the line most favorable to the interest of their prince and their country, and consequently the most consonant with their duty.

I cannot doubt that the Cabinet of St. James's will give its assent to the result of our labors at Carlsbad, as well as to those which have been merely sketched out.

The scenes which many towns in England present show what partisans folly has gained. The easiest trade and the most certain of success during the last few years has been that of rebellion against social order, against the laws existing in all civilized countries, and against reason founded on the experience of all time. A grand example of vigor has just been given in Germany, which must resound in every corner of Europe. It will give an impetus to minds whose principles are most opposite; the effect which it

produces will be different according as more or less strength, calmness, and wisdom is displayed by the Governments. We already begin to see that many men who quite recently hoisted the democratic colors are retiring little by little from the scene; there are even some who secretly offer their services in favor of the cause which we defend, and a simple meeting of the Cabinets sufficed to accomplish this, without their resolutions being even known! The gauntlet, besides, was thrown down by the revolutionists; we have had the courage to pick it up, and I beg you to assure the English ministers that I flatter myself I am personally sufficiently well known to them to allow me to admit that they are not mistaken as to the nature of the principles which we are opposing to the revolutionists, and the energy which we shall display in the conduct of the affair.

Metternich to Freiherr von Hruby, Austrian Ambassador at Munich, Vienna, October 25, 1819.

358. I lost no time in laying before the Emperor your Excellency's Report. His Majesty is deeply agitated by its contents, and thinks it well to write to the King himself. This letter your Excellency will find enclosed in this.

At the audience which you will request you will have a convenient opportunity of imparting to his Majesty clearly and openly the views of the Emperor, as follows:

Your Excellency cannot describe too vigorously the impression made upon his Imperial Majesty by the strength which has been shown by his Majesty the King in time past, as well as in contrast to the attacks of the revolutionary party against the Carlsbad decrees. The Emperor conjures the King to continue firm, and not to allow himself to be overcome by the intrigues of that party. What that party desires (their words may be as hypocritical as possible) has been made evident to the King by the proceedings of the Chambers.

The Carlsbad decrees are directed against all the evils experienced at present. They are the result of the voluntary agreement of the German Princes; they were called together by their own feeling of danger; the Emperor had not summoned them to the council for his own needs or his own danger: he had spoken and acted only for the general good. He was placed above the crowd; he must help

it to rise or he must separate from it, and what the common efforts cannot save, he must save for itself.

The King is deluded; he risks his sovereignty. He will never be endangered by the means used to secure his rights, but by the weakness of the Governmental measures. How long has the word of a demagogue or wrong-seeing speculator deserved more attention than his own experience? The King should remember the fine promises which were made to him before the Congress by the Chambers, and their results.

It is said that the King cannot perjure himself. No, never! How thoroughly the Emperor feels this he has shown by the answer he commanded me to give to the question, What would Austria say to the overthrow of the Government? But if it is shown that the Bavarian Government requires some alteration in its different parts to secure to the Crown, and consequently to the people, justice and peace, the King will find means in the sovereign assembly of German Princes itself to bring into harmony all the parts of a work so important for Bavaria.

All the laws after September 20 are nothing but means for the security of the much-threatened peace in Germany. What is wanted here is some remedy, some repose, some principle. Help can only come from proportionate remedies, and a State which excludes itself from the general necessities exposes itself and the community to inevitable dangers—dangers the immediate consequences of which are incalculable if they are encouraged by the miscarriage of the measures already decided on.

Lastly, your Excellency is authorized to draw his Majesty's attention to the Emperor's position in the affair. His Imperial Majesty has already bestowed his protection, and only demands to be supported faithfully as far as lies in the King's power. He demands this as a friend of the King, of his throne, and of his peace. . . .

Metternich to Freiherr von Hruby, Vienna, Oct. 25, 1819.

359. I have no cause to be surprised at anything we may live to see in Munich. This Court has for years gone on in this ever vacillating way, and would still have followed that course but for the iron hand of Napoleon, who knew how to enchain it by prospects of advantage. So soon as the first had lost his strength, and the second had disappeared, the Bavarian Court turned round. . . .

If you think it would be at all useful, invite his Excellency Marshal Wrede to come here himself. I fear no one to whom I can speak face to face.

Your Excellency can say to Count Rechberg, without reserve, that we have received through couriers from Warsaw the excellent declarations of the Emperor of Russia in regard to the course of affairs at Carlsbad; that the only objection he made to those beneficial measures was an expression of fear lest the German Princes should carry them out partially and feebly, since most of them had long since lost all power of government. . . .

FROM CARLSBAD TO VIENNA.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from September 3 to December 22, 1819.

360. Pleasant feelings—portrait of Metternich as a boy of five—characteristics described by himself. 361. Making bridges and roads at Königswart. 362. Recollections of 1813. 363. Return to Vienna. 364. Marshal Marmont. 365. Views on the Carlsbad decree. 366. The final decree at Vienna. 367. Commemoration of the Battle of Leipsic—Napoleon—Metternich's memoirs. 368. Commencement of the Conferences in Vienna—speech of Talleyrand's. 369. The Conferences. 370. Reflections on Metternich's activity—a German deputation demand Metternich's head. 371. On novels. 372. Progress of the Conferences. 373. A tedious day.

360. *Königswart, Sept. 3, 1819.*—The peace and quiet reigning here all around me excite the pleasantest feelings in my heart. I do not belong to those who think that movement is the object of life. There is a very grave tinge about the place where I live. The neighborhood is rich in picturesque spots. Enormous forests, high mountains, wide valleys, much water, lovely streams surround a well-furnished house pleasant to live in, containing old family pictures, among which there is a portrait of myself as a boy of five years old. I must have been a most ill-favored child, or the painter not extremely clever.*

The weather is horrible. This high ground is always either cold or rainy; it would inspire Lord Byron with a truly melancholy poem. Whether the English poet will honor Vienna next winter with a visit, as is reported, I leave still undecided. Near the good town of Vienna, too, I am always uneasy. I do not love it for its own sake, and still less for my own. But if heaven listens to my secret wishes, I shall end with leaving Vienna very willingly. So it is with all places where people live—they are nothing in themselves, but everything from circumstances. Then, too, there is nothing in Königswart to attach me, not one remembrance, and per-

* This portrait is still at Königswart.—Ed.

haps, too, no particular thought—unless, perhaps, the thought that one day my ashes will be brought here to repose by those of my father. I do not, however, find anything sad in this idea, for I believe and heartily trust in God. I shall be regretted by many of the great and good—execrated by those who are neither. The standpoint from which I have thought and acted is of such a height that my name remains identified with great events, for the very reason that I had the misfortune to live in a period of revolution.

This period will pass away like all human folly. Happy they who have known how to maintain themselves upright amidst the ruins of generations! I have arrived at the middle of the life of a generation, and fate has laid upon me the task of warning the generation now coming to the front and preserving them from straying on to the steep incline which would surely lead them to their ruin. The Carlsbad epoch is hence one of the most important of my life.

361. *September 4.*—In the last three years I have had a high-road, seven miles (German) long, made at my own cost, and I have come to a place where it is very difficult to carry it on, across a deep and muddy valley. I have therefore had a bridge of three arches constructed, which has cost me over 70,000 gulden, and will require some 60,000 gulden more. The bridge will be beautiful, and very convenient for travellers. Many people, when they cross it, would think it had been standing there forever; but I have had a stone placed on it with an inscription saying that I made the bridge. Of a hundred travellers ninety-nine will think the builder must have been either a Cræsus or a fool.

362. *Prague, September 9.*—I never come to Prague without thinking I hear midnight strike. Six years ago, at that hour, I dipped my pen to declare war with the man of the century—the Man of St. Helena—to kindle the beacon which was the signal for 100,000 men of the allied troops to cross the frontier.

363. *Vienna, September 14.*—What the return to his own house of a poor man like me is nobody knows, because few people are watched with so much envy and jealousy, few so beset, so celebrated, so decried, and so praised. Why has fate brought me what I never desired, and what (besides its being a womanish fuss) seems to me the most horrible of human destinies?

364. *September 21.*—Among the strangers whom I have met here is Marshal Marmont, an intellectual man, whom I knew very slightly. I have talked much with him, and I see that he finds me different from what he had expected. I can speak with him the

more openly, as he is here on family affairs only. We meet, therefore, as merely private persons. After our last conversation, in which for three hours we talked over past events, and the present internal condition of the country, he said: "Since the last time that I heard Napoleon speak, before he became mad, this is the first reasonable conversation I have heard."

365. *September 25.*—I have just received the news from Frankfurt that the child which I have carried nine months will at last see the light ! Its birthday falls on September 20.* Each party wishes to baptize the child by a different name. Some call it a monster, some a good work, some a piece of stupidity. Truth lies between them. The first legislative word which has been spoken for thirty years, uttered from a sense of reason, justice, and experience, without reserve, as well as without disguise, plain but not dry, with neither mystic nor secret meanings, this word is a great fact, one of the most important of my life. If the world thinks that I am right, I shall rejoice; if it thinks I am wrong, I will excuse it beforehand. Nothing is so free as man's thought, and certain shades in it even contribute to the charm of life and its relations—relations which give to life its greatest value. My part is, moreover, not doubtful. I have never worn a mask and those who have mistaken me must have very bad eyes. My resolution is taken. Nothing can turn me from it, as nothing can drive me in a direction I do not wish to take. Shall I succeed ? By God, I know not !

366. *October 13.*—I fall from one pregnancy into another. Hardly have I returned from Carlsbad than a new labor is prepared for me within three months. My Carlsbad child is ill-tempered: it fights and bites; it deals heavy blows at many bad people, and more fools. My Vienna child will be gentle and well mannered, but horribly tiresome.† Why must I, of all people among so many millions, be the one to think where others do not think, to act where no one else will act, and write because no one else can ? And what will be the end of it to me ? I am really a slave, with a heart full of disgust. A function is laid upon me which takes me away from everything that is according to my taste, and embitters the happiness of life. If ever you meet with a really ambitious man—and they are rare—send him to me. I will talk with him for a couple of hours, and he will be cured for some time.

* See No. 354.

† This refers to the Ministerial Conference at Vienna. See No. 374.—ED.

367. *October 18.*—I write to you to-day on the anniversary of the greatest event of modern history. This day six years ago the fate of the world was decided. Napoleon would, however, have been as entirely lost without the battle of Leipsic as he was after it. But this day enlightened the world, and will always be looked upon in the annals of history as the turning-point of that memorable epoch, showing the beginning of a new era. The hand of God was armed with twenty nations to subdue one man, who, to master a people whom he had placed above all other peoples, had put himself above all other men. My soul was never more filled with holy reverence than during the course of that long day, which I passed between the dead and dying. Yet peace was in me and around me. Napoleon could not have had a similar feeling; on that day he must have experienced a foretaste of the Last Judgment.

You said lately that you were reading with great interest Napoleon's correspondence. You are quite right. This correspondence and the "*Mémoire de Ste. Hélène*"* are doubtless, of all the writings which have lately appeared, the most worthy to engage the attention of the enlightened. The correspondence gives a picture of the most marvellous man the world has ever seen; it gives his picture at the moment of his ascent, and every letter of Napoleon's shows that the upward movement was quite a natural one, and arose from the force of circumstances itself. The manuscript from St. Helena, on the contrary, includes everything that explains his decline. It is remarkable that the causes of his necessary and inevitable downfall are the same which bore him to the summit of power and military fame.

I passed the grandest years of his life with Napoleon or near him. I think few men have known him better than I, because I have not confined myself to bare symptoms, but have endeavored to discover their foundation. When I saw that the whole power for good and evil was embodied in that one man, I could do no otherwise than study him, and only him. Circumstances placed me near this man; they have, so to speak, chained me to him. Hence my study of him was thorough, and every day taught me that it was complete. After my death a very interesting memoir will be found of this man and his influence on the events of his age.† I say his age, because this age really belongs to him. By the writings I leave behind me

* See vol. i. p. 201.

† See the "Portrait of Napoleon," vol. i. p. 171.—ED.

many circumstances will certainly be explained, many doubts dispelled, and many errors rectified. For many years I have written and labored at this work. I shall complete it, for I have already made considerable progress, but it will not be published for thirty or forty years, because I will first give time for the death of living persons. This work is one of my favorite employments; it includes the time from the year 1806 till after the Peace of Paris in 1815. Of these nine years I know much. It is hardly possible that any one should now know all that I knew. I conclude my work with the year 1815, because everything which came after that belongs to ordinary history.* Since that date the age was left to itself; it progresses because it cannot be held back; but led it will never be again. It is more agreeable to me, during the rest of my life, to amplify my notes on this period of nine years than to compile a new memoir on the later period, which has become a *simple story*. We have fallen upon a time when a thousand small calculations and small views on the one side, gross mistakes and feeble remedies on the other, form the history of the day. The sea still runs high, but it is only from the storm which has passed over. One may easily upset in such a sea—for the wind is more difficult to reckon on than the storm—but the spectacle is no longer imposing.

I have often told you that in writing I follow the impulse of the moment; and to-day I feel this, for I fancy I hear that noise so strikingly described by the expression “the roar of the battle,” that sound which was called forth by the clashing together of the strongest forces of modern times. The Austrian army alone had on the 18th shot off 60,000 cannon balls, and since this army represented only a third of the assembled powers, one may venture to assert that on that day more than 300,000 cannon balls must have been fired. Then if we reckon twelve to fifteen million musket-shots, and the whole distributed in the space of ten hours, some idea may be formed of the noise made by the fall of a single man.

368. *November 25.*—I have this day opened the Conferences.† I have spoken more than two hours, and I am sorry not to have had a shorthand writer at my disposal, for if my words were not spoken to the winds, unhappily they nevertheless fly like the wind. . . .

Talleyrand once said, “Austria is the House of Lords of Europe:

* This may explain the gap which is found in the Memoirs after 1815.

† See the opening speech, No. 379.—Ed.

as long as it is not dissolved it will restrain the Commons." A very true saying.

369. *December 2.*—I have found a moment's quiet. The business of the Conference proceeds very well. I have gone to the root of this matter—a rare thing in moral and political discussions. I told my five-and-twenty friends in an upright and decided manner what we want and what we do not want. On this avowal there was a general declaration of approval, and each one asserted that he had never wanted more or less, or, indeed, hardly anything different. Now I am surrounded by people who are quite enchanted with their own force of will, and yet there is not one among them who a few days ago knew what he wants or will want. This is the universal fate of such an assembly. It has been evident to me for a long time that among a certain number of persons only one is ever found who has clearly made out for himself what is the question in hand. I shall be victorious, here, as in Carlsbad: that is to say, all will wish what I wish, and since I only wish what is just, I believe I shall gain my victory. But what is most remarkable is that these men will go home in the firm persuasion that they have left Vienna with the same views with which they came.

370. *December 15.*—Business always requires a certain time; this time will be filled up by the beginning of the business and by its more or less tedious course, and it is generally found that its conclusion is only the beginning of a new affair. Of all positions the last is, for a man who represents important interests, the most vexatious. For eleven years I have been what I am, certainly far from the beginning of my task; but twenty years remain to me, and then I shall be entitled only to ruminate on past affairs, and certainly I shall undertake the conduct of no great business from the day in which I discover in myself irresolution. What have I done during the past eleven years, and what remains for me still to do in the next twenty years? What I have hitherto done has been negative: I have fought against evil more than effected good. If I consider my task from its beginning onwards, I may well be permitted not to love those tyrants and fools who, under the names of philosophers, philanthropists, socialists, democrats, religious fanatics, are nothing, or much worse.

Up to this time I have met with little opposition; I have sought it in vain, and hitherto have not discovered it. Perhaps for that reason a newspaper has brought the news that a German deputation is coming here to demand my head! The deputation may lose

some time about this, but the poor devils would gain very little by beheading me, for the cause has made too great a progress to be now retarded. Shall an earthquake throw down the edifice, or a volcano open beneath our feet? Such catastrophes are beyond our calculation. It will ever be the same! But with my head many others would fall, and probably I should see many others fall before mine.

371. *December 17.*—I have the bad habit of not going to sleep without reading for an hour or half an hour. I generally, however, read nothing which is connected with my business. I busy myself with scientific literature, discoveries, travels, and simple narratives. Novels I never read, unless they have become classics and thus have some literary value. The common novel does not interest me; I always find them far beneath what I conceive; impressive situations come before me always too strongly, and I cannot prevent myself from looking at the last page—where people are married or killed—at the same time as the title-page. Then nothing is left for me but to say, Amen, and the romance for me is lost. If the heroes of a romance are to be admired, they are no better than I am myself; if they are not, they are indeed worth but little. I have no need to learn how people express their feelings. I have always been afraid of meeting with empty phrases, where my heart would not find a word. . . . My heart belongs entirely to me: my head does not; it is concerned in the affairs of the world, which were never so important for me as happiness.

372. *December 21.*—Our affairs here will not extend beyond the end of the month of February. Everything goes on as I had hoped—indeed, as I predicted.

373. *December 22.*—I have passed a very tedious day, which seldom happens. Work often fatigues me, but tedium kills me outright. I cannot stand great dinners, and I have been obliged to be present at one which lasted three hours. This is the unpleasant consequence of a Congress, and one from which, unfortunately, I cannot escape. Happily, I can be alone in a crowd, and the greater the crowd the better I am able to isolate myself.

BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES.

Metternich to Baron Neumann, in London: five letters, from October 31 to December 17, 1819.*

374. *Vienna, October 31, 1819.*— The great German business will be completed here in November. All is going on well; rage is in the enemy's camp; it vents itself in lies, not being able to take its revenge. In the meantime we are doing our very best. Nevertheless, the thing is not easy, owing to the petty fears, the small measures, and the real terror of some of the German Governments. But the affair is not in their hands. It rests with Austria and Prussia. As long as they do not deviate from the route they have marked out, they will be sure of success, and the Prussian Government, which has not an easy part, will go firmly and well.

375. *November 16.*— I beg you to tell Lord Castlereagh that the opening of our important deliberations will take place on the 20th of this month. All the German ministers will be here at that time.

As we only desire what the most ordinary reason and common-sense dictates; as, far from any divergence, there exists an absolute conformity of views between us and Prussia; as the conduct of the King of Wurtemberg is not of a kind to attract imitators, I flatter myself that the Bund will come forth from our conferences stronger than it enters them.

The only question is to consolidate the Bund on the same basis and in the same position. The Carlsbad measures will neither be strengthened nor weakened: they exist, they need only to be executed, and they will be.

I enter into these details because it is just possible that the Gov-

* Baron Neumann, a man very much in the confidence of the Prince, was at that time head of the Austrian Embassy in London.—Ed.

ernment of his Britannic Majesty might receive the most contradictory reports from its representatives in Germany. I venture to say there is not one of them who sees clearly the actual state of things. This is the game of the party we are pursuing, who take all possible pains to disguise the truth. It is curious to observe that we have not remarked a single criticism bearing on what was done at Carlsbad; all bear on what was avoided there. It is especially the Commission of Inquiry which torments the factious: they attribute functions to it which it does not possess, for they are fully aware that they would not receive the least support from the public if they raised the real question, which is: If it is good that the Governments should assure themselves of the real existence, the extent, and the means employed by the demagogues, who simply aim at the total overthrow of all society in Germany? This aim is known, proved, followed, and sustained by most criminal means.

This Commission has opened its sittings. The materials on which they work are immense; at present they are principally occupied with the result of judicial inquiries against convicted persons. Unhappily we shall dispose of only too large an amount of material! Europe will receive, when the result of the labor is published, a great lesson on the danger of encouraging revolutionary ideas, sustained by blind or foolish Governments, and directed by the factious under the mask of a kindly liberalism!

376. *December 6.*—Our conferences just now take a very prosperous turn.

Will you reassure Lord Castlereagh from me as to any alteration of the mind of the Confederation on the important question of political relations, or on the question of peace and war? There have never been held any secret committees at Frankfurt on this latter question; as to the question of the Federal Act, we shall treat it to the satisfaction even of Lord Castlereagh, and to the great displeasure of Capo d'Istria, who is waiting for us there. I beg Lord Castlereagh to believe that I know all the dangerous sides of the thing, and that I shall take care to avoid the rocks. The sea upon which I sail is so well known to me that we shall enter the port when we are thought to be far from approaching it.

An immense point will be gained by the consolidation of this great social body, founded on a pacific basis in the very centre of Europe.

377. *December 9.*— I flatter myself that Lord Castlereagh will be satisfied with the two first things I have submitted to

the Conference. He will be convinced by reading them that we are determined to prove to the allied States what the Emperor understands by federation, and to convince them as well as foreign Powers that we do not wish to make any change either in the bases of the Bund or in the application of those bases. We recognize but one fundamental law, and that law is the Federal Act itself. In the first of our sittings I declared that the Emperor regarded this act as so sacred that if by chance any fault of expression should be found in the original copy, his Imperial Majesty would not allow it to be corrected. This declaration, and the fact of having approached the discussion on the most difficult side—by settling the legal functions of the Confederation—will ensure us the most complete success.

Lord Castlereagh has sometimes reproached me for not pushing things forward on certain occasions; I hope he will now change his opinion of me. I shall always be found very exact on positive questions, for they are the only ones for which I have any inclination.

378. *December 17.*— The progress of the German conferences could not be more satisfactory than it continues to be. The most complicated question, perhaps—namely, the interpretation of Article XIII. of the Federal Act—is almost terminated. A short but precise paper which I submitted to the Committee charged with the Report has been adopted eagerly and unanimously. All the corollaries which were to be drawn from it, in order to arrive at an agreement, were brought forward, debated, and settled in three sittings of this Committee; the Report was made by the Committee in a general sitting held yesterday, and adopted, except some amendments proposed by the too zealous friends of the good cause. You see that, although we are here only as the representatives of Cabinets, we have also our *ultras*. I am myself sometimes accused of too great liberalism, when I am simply defending what is right, and above all what is possible and of real utility. But happier than Lord Castlereagh, the adversaries with whom I have to contend are men who wish only for what is good, though not always in a practicable way. It is not in my nature to yield to them.

OBJECT AND IMPORTANCE OF THE VIENNA
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES.

379. Opening address by Prince Metternich.*

379. The Emperor has commanded me to open the conferences to which we are called, by making known his principles and wishes by a simple and sincere statement, such as becomes his Imperial Majesty at a time of so much importance for the country.

I believe I could not better fulfil the intentions of his Imperial Majesty than by placing before the representatives of the Governments of Germany the idea which has led to our present meeting.

The Confederation of the Bund was formed at the time of the foundation of the European system, for the protection of the internal and external peace of Germany; to offer to the nation as a whole the only possible centre of unity, and to guarantee the independence of each of the Federal States, both in regard to its neighbors forming part of the federation as well as of the federation towards the foreigner.

This Confederation formed by the sovereign princes, with whom were associated the four free towns of Germany, secured to the whole, and to each of its members in particular, whatever their means or their strength, a common and reciprocal pledge of preservation and protection, an inestimable advantage, which could only be received with the most lively satisfaction on all hands. The importance of such a union established in the centre of Europe, and the salutary influence which it must exercise in the consolidation of the general peace, cannot be forgotten by those Courts who took part in the transactions of 1813 and 1814, and the Germanic federation was, from its birth, placed under the express and solemn guarantee of all the European Powers.

This federation had received its first fundamental laws by the Act which formed its basis. The Diet may commence its action; but

* This speech was translated into French for communication to the foreign ambassadors. The German original cannot be found.—Ed.

the point is, after further deliberation to fix its functions, the extent of its jurisdiction, the limits of its powers, and even the forms to be followed in the most essential parts of its work. This deliberation, so necessary to complete and consolidate the edifice of which the Federal Act had only traced the chief outlines, should, according to the custom generally adopted, have taken place in the midst of the Diet itself. Obstacles of every kind have caused this important affair to be put off from time to time. This was the first opposition Germany has experienced since the foundation of the federal constitution.

An evil of a different nature, the efforts of which are not less perceptible, has been added to this first cause of stagnation: namely, the injurious influence of a revolutionary party in all the countries of Europe, whose alarming progress makes itself felt in more than one part of the Germanic Confederation; a scourge destroying the basis of all social order, in the beginning restricting itself to a small number of individuals moved by discontent or by political fanaticism, but soon drawing after it whole generations, exciting the enthusiasm and raising the passions of the multitude by the abuse of a few sacred words, and the deceptive bait of philanthropic theories; a contagious disease, misunderstood by many of the German Governments, while others have treated it with too much indulgence, and others again have applied useless remedies, which have only brought on new complications.

During the Emperor's last visit to Italy, many of the German Courts addressed confidential overtures to his Imperial Majesty, placing beyond a doubt what at last is beginning to be recognized everywhere—how necessary it is to take measures against a danger which every day becomes more formidable. All the enlightened men in Germany, who are sincerely attached to their country and to the maintenance of order, are filled with the same sentiments and share the same conviction.

Always disposed to devote his attention and his powers to the general good, his Majesty has not hesitated to accept the idea of a confidential agreement between those Courts, where the necessity of combating the evil has been most felt, and others, which by their situation are not so easily reached. His Imperial Majesty has nothing to fear for himself; he hopes that, under the protection of God, the calm and regular action of a well-established government will preserve his States from contagion. But it is not sufficient for the Emperor to see his throne and his people preserved from danger;

he desires to fulfil his duty towards his allies, as much as circumstances will allow. The candor and firmness which his Imperial Majesty has evinced in the first deliberations which have taken place on this subject, the zeal with which he has undertaken the most difficult part in this enterprise, are plainly shown by the proposals which he has caused to be made to the Diet. Thanks to the glorious unanimity which characterized the conferences of Carlsbad, thanks to the support which the resolutions prepared in those conferences have received from the Diet from the time they were drawn up, a decided step has been taken towards a better state of things; and, provided the Governments of Germany are all equally determined not to swerve from the path they have chosen, but to follow it, not only in the spirit of justice and wisdom which dictated the presidential proposals of September 20, but with that inflexible perseverance without which nothing great has ever been consummated, the greatest success must crown our efforts.

If the measures adopted by common agreement, and on the scrupulous execution of which his Imperial Majesty thinks he can reckon with entire confidence, justify the hope that the interior tranquillity of Germany will not be disturbed, that none of the pernicious plans which are the object of our just apprehension will be realized, we have still to get over another source of danger—namely, the want of exact definition in many essential points of our federal constitution.

This question was not broached at Carlsbad, except in some general and preliminary observations. But all opinions being agreed as to the necessity of treating it thoroughly, his Imperial Majesty proposed to devote some deliberations to it later on. This proposition was received on all sides with that spirit of concord and patriotism with which the conferences of Carlsbad were constantly animated; and thus our present meeting was arranged—a decisive moment for the future destinies of the Germanic Confederation.

It seems to me not without use to consider for a few moments the reasons which have induced his Imperial Majesty to propose this meeting. The Germanic Confederation of the Bund is an integral part of the political system of Europe. All which at present forms the public law of Germany is inseparably connected with the covenant which forms the basis of this Confederation, for not only the rights which it exercises in common, but also the separate rights of sovereignty of each of these States in particular,

depend on this covenant. It is no longer in our power to question the existence of the Confederation; and it would be as contrary to the interests as to the dignity of the Princes who have taken part in it to allow it to languish in a state of imperfection, condemning it to impotence and inaction. A common duty, an indispensable duty, requires us, on the contrary, to raise the federal union to that degree of strength and perfection which, according to the intentions of its founders, it should reach. The progress made during the last three years is far from fulfilling that intention.

His Majesty is persuaded that a delay so annoying does not proceed from opposition to the aim of the federation; that the principal cause, if not the only one, is to be found in the fluctuation of ideas, in the incorrect, vague, and contradictory notions of the nature of the federal covenant, and on the relations, rights and duties connected with it.

To determine these notions, and to apply them in a safe and precise manner to the different problems which claim our attention—such is, in the opinion of his Imperial Majesty, the principal object of the present deliberations. Experience has shown how difficult it was to arrive at satisfactory results by the discussions opened on this subject at Frankfurt, and it is in the nature of things that direct explanations between the Cabinets should far better advance this work. The Emperor is assuredly as far as any of his great allies from wishing to restrain the activity of the Diet, or from offering the slightest want of respect to an assembly the authority of which, on the contrary, all the members of the Confederation are interested in maintaining and strengthening.

But this assembly is composed of delegates proceeding in legal forms, and according to the instructions of their respective Governments, with the affairs on which they are called to treat. The extent and limits of their jurisdiction must therefore be fixed, and it is not the assembly itself which can or should be charged with fulfilling this condition.

When once the Governments which constitute the Confederation of the Bund shall be agreed on the fundamental principles of their union, and on the sense in which they should be applied to positive questions, the progress of the Diet will become safer and more easy, and this advantage will make itself felt in all branches of its transactions.

The President of the Diet has set forth in a separate proposition—forming one of those of September 20—different subjects of de-

liberation, about which the ambassadors have requested instructions from their Courts. The same subjects have been indicated in the letters of invitation addressed by the Cabinet of his Imperial Majesty to all the Governments of Germany, as those which are chiefly to occupy us in the present conferences. Many other important questions already submitted to the deliberations of the Diet, but which were left undecided, or only provisionally arranged, are connected with the above-mentioned subjects. All these matters, the discussion of which at the Diet must be prepared and facilitated by agreement between the plenipotentiaries of the federal Governments, are presented in the list annexed to this discourse.

His Imperial Majesty values too highly the preservation and the glory of the great political body of which he himself is one of the principal members not to have the sincerest wishes for the success of the conferences which are about to be opened. His Imperial Majesty has decided to communicate to that illustrious assembly, without reserve, his principles and views on all the points submitted to our deliberations. He indulges the hope that his confederates will see in this step a new proof of zeal for the general good, and for the closest union between all the Governments of Germany, that his example will be generally followed, and that every one will acknowledge the value of an occasion, perhaps unique, for consulting all opinions, for dissipating all doubts, and for removing all obstacles. Thus we can take credit to ourselves for giving to the Germanic Confederation that perfection, that stability, and—what will be the infallible effect—that external consideration which rightfully attaches to the union of thirty millions of Germans, equal in rank and influence to the first European Powers, and, at the same time, to secure to each particular State that common guarantee against internal and external dangers which, according to the letter and spirit of the Federal Act, was the principal aim of this Confederation.

Prince Metternich's Second Address.

380. In my first discourse I had the honor to inform the Conference that his Majesty the Emperor considered the principal object of our meeting to be that of fixing definitely the meaning (too little understood up to this time) of our federal system, as well as the relations, rights and duties which belong to it, and to apply these notions to the different questions which we are called upon to resolve.

Before we proceed to this business I think it my duty to unfold

some general principles, indicating the point of view from which the Emperor has constantly regarded the federation, and the sense in which he has associated himself with a system of which his Imperial Majesty was one of the founders, and to the maintenance of which he will never cease to devote his care.

I. In the pact of union concluded by the sovereign Princes and free cities of Germany, the sovereignty of each of the confederate States is placed under the direct guarantee of the rights of the people, and recognizes no other limits than those required by the maintenance of German unity in relation to foreign Powers, and those resulting from common measures for the internal safety and tranquillity of the Confederation. It follows from this first principle that, in settling the prerogatives of the Confederation, there can, in any case, be no question of infringing the sovereign rights of those States which are members of the union—rights expressly guaranteed by the compact upon which this union rests; his Imperial Majesty having, besides, the inward conviction that, placed in their true light, the engagements towards the federal body impose no real sacrifice on the sovereigns who have contracted them, that, notwithstanding these engagements, their rights of sovereignty remain intact, and that the federal union simply tends to secure to these rights an increase of strength and extent.

II. The Federal Act is the first fundamental law of the Union. No resolution, whether it has for its object the development of the principles of the federation, whether it bears on the interests of the whole, or whether it regards individual affairs, can be opposed to the dispositions of this Act.

Although by this declaration the inviolability of the Federal Act is recognized in the most positive manner, the confederate Governments do not the less preserve the power of interpreting and developing the fundamental law in such a way as seems most convenient to them. This reservation is stated in the text of the Federal Act itself, while Article X., in demanding supplementary laws, has made over to the Diet the drawing up of these laws. Now, experience and careful examination having taught us, as I observed in my first discourse, that it is in all respects better to assign this business to the direct deliberations of the Cabinets, it is evident that our present meeting is fully qualified to discuss the necessary regulations for completing the federal institutions, in order to arrive as soon as possible at satisfactory results on the above-mentioned conditions previous to any subsequent transactions.

III. The assembly which represents the Confederation (the Diet) is responsible to the political body which constituted it, just as the ambassadors at the Diet are responsible to their respective Governments. In a higher sense, each federal State is responsible to the federal body for the faithful accomplishment of obligations immediately connected with the fundamental pact, or which, in virtue of this pact, it has contracted by its consent to common resolutions.

IV. The resolutions of the Diet, given in legal form, being the result of the united wish of the Governments which form the Bund, and consequently obligatory on the whole and on each member of the federation, it follows that, for all the common business of the Bund, the supreme legislative power rests in the Diet.

This principle, incontestable in itself, leads us to the important question of defining those subjects which may be considered as the common business of the Bund. The elements for resolving this question are found either in the text of the Federal act itself or in a simple and natural interpretation of its dispositions. But the precise determination of the sphere of legal activity—or, as it was formerly called, of the competence of the Diet—is a task with which the present meeting must and ought to occupy itself; and his Imperial Majesty is of opinion that, both from the importance of the thing and on account of the facilities which will result from it for the whole of our labors, it would be well to give this question the priority in order. The question of competence being directly connected with that of votes in the transactions of the Diet, this question will make a natural transition to Article I. in the table of subjects for deliberation.*

* For the further progress of the Vienna Ministerial Conferences and their results see the documents Nos. 468 to 476.—ED.

EVENTS OF THE DAY, AND FAMILY LIFE.

1820.

Extracts from Metternich's private Correspondence from January 8 to May 15, 1820.

381. The Conferences. 382. Reminiscences occasioned by the appearance of Koch's "History of the War of 1814." 383. Praise by the "Moniteur." 384. The Prince's convalescence. 385. Description of Metternich's apartments in the Chancellery. 386. Prince of Hesse sent to London to offer congratulations to the new King. 387. Assassination of the Duke of Berry. 388. Longing for air and sun. 389. Anxiety respecting Princess Clementine—Capo d'Istria. 390. Metternich's double nature. 391, 392, 393, 394. On Princess Clementine. 395. "History of Cromwell," by Villemaine. 396. Flies and spiders. 397. Conclusion of the Conference. 398. Metternich's property at Bodensee. 399. Significance of the cries for Burdett & Co. 400. Clementine's convalescence. 401. Relapse. 402. The situation still more grave—Clementine's portrait by Lawrence. 403. Approaching dissolution. 404. Death of Clementine. 405. Her beauty. 406. Metternich's birthday—signature of the final act of the Conference. 407. The family party reassembled.

381. *Vienna, January 8, 1820.*—I have worked to-day like a galley-slave; the conferences have lasted quite fifteen hours. I cannot, however, complain of it, because our business goes on so well. Never perhaps have I found more unanimity, a better spirit or a better will. Poor Capo d'Istria has taken quite a wrong standpoint for his last circular.* Surely a man cannot avoid compromising himself when he informs people of the contrary of what they know, what they alone can know, and what cannot be judged of six hundred miles off. . . . How few are the statesmen who deserve the name; each one thinks he can meddle in affairs at a moment when all ideas are confused. when nothing is so rash as to form a judgment on the gravest and most difficult affairs. It is the fate of

* Apparently an allusion to some circular of Capo d'Istria's, by which Russia endeavored to excite the smaller German Courts to withstand Metternich's claims.—Ed.

those men who have no principle and little knowledge to form a world of their own and place events in it as they wish. Theorizers of this kind see what does not exist, believe the contrary of what is, and will not admit any truth which conflicts with their hypotheses. But since there is nothing more positive than fact, and nothing more true than truth, these hypotheses go off like rockets, which when once they have burst, do not equal even the most feeble light which burns on undisturbed. And truth remains truth in spite of all antagonists.

382. I have passed a strange night. A history of the war of 1814, by Koch, has just appeared in Paris: one of the best works which has yet been written on that subject. Apart from some errors which an author placed, as he is, outside the affairs can hardly escape, the book contains much that is true. I took this book to bed with me yesterday evening, and read it with the greatest interest. To read the history of an important epoch in which one has one's self played a prominent part is a most curious thing. I found myself placed before posterity, and felt called upon to judge myself. During this three hours' reading I did not, indeed, feel inclined to accuse myself; but how much could I have added to every occurrence, to every page, indeed to every line of the book. In matters of fact I have really an excellent memory. I need only to replace myself in the situation alluded to, and the whole circumstance and everything connected with it comes clearly before my eyes. I found the account of the violation of the Swiss frontiers contained in eight or ten lines—one of the greatest events at the beginning of that campaign, and one of the very greatest influence on the result of the war. The author is, indeed, right enough in attributing to me alone the full use which was made of this event; but where he does not know, he romances. How is it possible to know so much and at the same time not to know so much as the author!

On this occasion I learned what the will of one man can do when boldness gives such a one the feeling to do the right thing, and that a well-considered plan carried out with vigor is sure of success. In regard to this affair, I was at that time alone in my opposition to the Emperor Alexander. I knew everything, both his obligations and the enormous compromises which might arise therefrom both to the cause and to myself if I held fast to my conviction—to a conviction which included both the excellence of the plan and the happy prospect of success. And see! I have not deceived myself. The outbursts of anger have passed away, and the good

remains. This last is my reward. My reading finished, I put out the light, and turned round to sleep. He does not sleep, however, who wills to do so: I lay there with 1814 in my head and in my heart—that year with its blessings, its prodigious consequences, its gross errors: all this took possession of my mind, and I could not sleep till five in the morning. If I had had a secretary near me, I would have dictated some notes. This was another historical night.

383. *January 27.*—To-day I hear every one fuming about a foolish laudation of me which has appeared in the “*Moniteur*.” What do people want? From the moment when a man steps on the stage he belongs to the public, who have a perfect right to applaud or hiss, and who make use of the right. If he who treads the stage does but possess a clear character and right feeling he will take both praise and blame as mere reminders that he is placed in the foreground; his own head and his own heart must tell him whether he is right or wrong. The noise is nothing, the action everything.

To me undoubtedly, I openly allow, stupid blame is pleasanter than stupid praise: the first may amuse, but cannot anger me; the latter, on the contrary, might make me treat my awkward friend somewhat rudely.

If any one wishes to write my history, let him leave full freedom to the judgment of posterity, which alone can speak with authority of the men who have contributed to make the history of their time.

384. *February 16.*—I have returned to the world again*; to-morrow evening I reopen my *salons*. Already I tremble at the prospect of the crowd of tiresome people whom I must receive. Nothing delights such people more than a death or a return to life, *i. e.* the opportunity of condoling or congratulating. If it were only possible that this cursed race would confine themselves to the first of these occasions, at least as far as concerns me! To die is nothing: but to live for these people—that is worse to me than death!

385. *February 17.*—Here we have snow ankle-deep. The winter seems as if it would never have done, which is dreadful to me, for I have my garden, and therefore need spring and air and sun. Talking of the sun, you have no idea how beautiful my rooms are when the sun shines. They lie to the south, and are therefore

* The Prince had been ill for twelve days.—Ed.

pleasant and warm, and I can hardly guard my furniture from its beams. I have a spacious ante-room, a large room where the people who want to see me wait. This opens into my library, which is a splendid room. It is filled quite up to the ceiling with books in fine open mahogany shelves. As it is about eighteen feet high, my library must contain nearly 15,000 volumes, though it does not look as if there were so many. In the middle of the room is Canova's beautiful Venus, whose pedestal is surrounded by a circular settee. Then comes my study, a fine large room with three windows; in this are three great writing-tables. I like to change my place, and I do not like to be disturbed at my desk by any one else writing at the same table. This room is full of works of art, pictures, busts, bronzes, astronomical clocks, and all kinds of instruments. For to science I gladly dedicate my few hours of leisure, and these hours, if lost for business, are a gain for life. The large table in my bedroom is covered with portfolios of engravings, maps, and drawings; besides which I have a considerable collection of works of art arranged under glass. I am often amused at the distraction of strangers, who have to make out their visit amid such a varied collection of things.

In this treasury I pass seven-eighths of my time. Why should I not surround myself with all these objects so dear to me? I live unwillingly in small rooms, and still more unwillingly work in them. In a contracted space the mind contracts, the thoughts hide themselves, and even the heart grows withered.

When my children are good their mother, as a reward, brings them to pay me a short visit. I cannot flatter myself that the children come so gladly from love to me. It seems to them just like a market, for my rooms are very similar to shops. There is no artist in Vienna, nor any artist who comes here, who does not send his works to me. There are always easels standing about with new pictures, new engravings, new drawings, which the worthy artists gladly send to me because I see and receive so many people.

Whenever I have a grand ball my library must be used, and several round tables are placed there, on which covers can be laid altogether for thirty-two. The difficulty then is the Venus, who is in this arrangement somewhat embarrassing. The statue is indeed of the most scrupulous propriety in front, which cannot perhaps so well be said of the back view.

386. *February 18.*—The Emperor is going to send the Prince of Hesse to London with his congratulations to the new King. This

is in every respect an excellent choice. His first adjutant is Count Lato Wrba, one of our most fashionable young men, and a good fellow too, whom for his improvement I lately sent to Brazil, where he went through some remarkable adventures. On board a pirate ship a young and very pretty Spanish lady wanted to have him hanged; she implored on her knees that they would fasten him upon the great mast, because she had never seen this proceeding, and Count Wrba seemed to her to be the most splendid model for it. What can the women all have in their heads? Their fancies are unfathomable!

387. *February 20.*—I have just heard of the assassination of the Duc de Berry. Liberalism goes its way; it rains murders; there have been already four Sands in nine months.

All is lost in France if the Government does not turn round. Those who are deluded by the ruffians are indeed children, but the criminals are no children. I know the element of intrigue which the Government has now taken up, in the delusion that it would be an element of strength. That is certainly the strength of a wild animal, that will never allow itself to be civilized. It must be admitted that this is not a pleasant moment for a minister.

388. *February 25.*—I really hunger and thirst for my garden on the Rennweg; for a whole long month I have not been able to pay it a visit. My room is full of the most beautiful flowers from my conservatories, but that is not the one thing which charms me. I long for air and sunshine. I am a child of light, and need brilliant light to be able to live. People who are really bad have no such need.

389. *March 16.*—I have the gravest fears for my poor Clementine. She has now for the third time an attack of fever. She had the first on January 22, the second on February 20, and now she is again attacked with severe fever. She is in such a state of exhaustion that it is impossible to see how she is to get over it. I cannot see a being so dear to me suffer. Clementine is, besides, so good a child; and so attached to me that she will have me constantly near her bed. Since her illness she has grown four inches. In December she was still small: now she is quite tall. Although she is fifteen, she is still quite a child. I have a kind of superstition which experience has unhappily strengthened in me. The extraordinary is always attended with more dangers than the ordinary. Clementine, for instance, is remarkably pretty; it must really be so, for when she goes out the people gather round her. I would rather she

were a child of more common appearance, for such children grow like weeds. I have to-day summoned eight *matadores* of the faculty to a consultation—I myself being present—and all the physicians were of the same opinion. To my heavy heart is added the severe task that is laid upon me. Our great work approaches its end. The complete confidence of my fellow-workers is beneficial, but burdensome. Amid all the confusion Capo d'Istria continually whispers in my ear. He reminds me of a musical amateur who practises on the bugle in the next room. He blows extremely hard without ever getting a tune. His expenditure of breath is enormous, but nothing good comes of it. All is wrong—wrong time, wrong notes, wrong key; *piano* tones where *forte* are necessary; *sostenuto* where it should be *con brio*; *largo* in the quickest time, with *obbligato* accompaniments. If there is really any sense in it, I have none. With such sense as that, France will come to a 1789 or a February 13. Good heavens, why is it that so many fools are thoroughly good men, as is the case with Capo d'Istria? If they were not, some way would be found of making them harmless; but as it is they must be heard, and they and their nonsense must be admitted to the debates.

390. *March 22.*—My poor Clementine is still very ill. Nothing breaks me down like a sick child; never anxious about myself, I am always so for the children. There are, indeed, no new bad symptoms, but I hold that in itself the long continuance of the fever is very serious.

Meanwhile, whether I like it or not, I must sit for many hours at my writing-table. In painful moments like the present it is more than ever necessary to turn my second nature outside—that nature which makes many people believe that I have no heart. They would deny me a head, too, if I did not occasionally let them know that it remains firm when they knock at it.

My news of the Emperor Alexander shows that people where he is are aware that phrases ruin the world, but save no one.

391. I am still thoroughly miserable. My daughter, indeed, is a little better, but has still so many hills to climb before level country is reached that a father cannot feel easy. My only hope is in God, who knows better than we poor men what is right and good. I go from my writing-table to the sick-bed, and back again. If my heart is restless, so are also my nights, which never happens to me when my head only is in question: a proof what a quite different power the heart has—just that heart which is denied me by the crowd.

392. *March 30.*—My poor Clementine's condition improves very slowly. He who has children himself knows what anxiety is caused by a sick child. It is not enough for me to know that those I love are happy. I want them also to be prosperous. Heaven, if it sees fit, will protect them.

In a position like mine, in which one is smothered with business for twelve hours every day, it is a real happiness to spend some leisure moments in the family circle. If then received by the children with joy, the whole world takes a different color. In my family circle it is unhappily to-day most gloomy, and I go from the Revolutionists and Demagogues who people my study, to find care and sorrow in the sick-room.

393. *April 2.*—The doctors are more cheerful; they think I should smile, which the father's heart cannot yet succeed in.

I am finishing the building of my garden house; it only wants the last touches, it will be quite a museum of works of art. The fine arts are indeed good friends; they are always to be found; their company always delights, and their *cultus* never leads to disappointment.

Lawrence, whom I expected, unhappily cannot come to Vienna. He is a man full of mind and heart, and I am vain enough to believe that he likes me. I wrote to him yesterday that he is made a member of the Academy here. He may perhaps attribute less value to this nomination than to the circumstance that I have obtained it for him.

394. *April 8.*—My daughter's fate still seems doubtful. For me, alas! it is already decided. If she remains with me, I shall take it as a gift from Heaven. From earthly help I expect nothing more. It is her age which makes me most anxious. For the last eight days she has not grown worse, but neither has she improved. No one can imagine how miserable this state of things makes me. The happiness of my life consists of such simple elements that at least these might be left to me.

395. *April 10.*—Society, like nature and like man, has adopted laws of its own. Old institutions are like old men, they will never be young again; but the moderns must go through their young time of lawlessness and folly. Man cannot make a constitution properly speaking: that is made only by time. Just as little is a Charta a constitution as the marriage contract is a marriage. Let people write as much as they like—and the less will always be the better—and yet you will have nothing in your hand but a sheet of paper.

England alone has a Constitution, of which the Magna Charta is but a subordinate element. The English Constitution is the work of centuries, and, moreover, streams of blood and anarchy of every kind supplied the means. Social order ever progresses in this way; it cannot be otherwise, since it is the law of nature. What is called a constitution to-day is nothing but "*ôtez-vous de là que je m'y mette.*" What in quiet times disappears like foam, is lashed by the tempest into great waves, and the moral like the material world has its storms. If it be asked whether the revolution will flood the whole of Europe, I cannot wager against it, but of this I am determined, that I will fight against it till my latest breath.

The "*History of Cromwell,*" by Villemain, has appeared in Paris: a good book which the author has flung into a world haunted everywhere by Cromwell. Political madness, religious madness, is seen in all classes of society and in the army; usurpation, democracy, despotism, or weakness in the Government; a low state of feeling in men; brilliant surfaces and decaying bodies; lastly, a general relaxation—these are always the first symptoms at all times and in all places, of the return to order. The dead speak no more, but their sons return ever and anon to their frenzies, the names of which, indeed, are altered. They call them Reason, and give to the new discovery of old errors the name of the Society of Man.

396. *April 11.*—The invalid is in the same condition; fresh medical consultations only amuse us with hope for the future. Nothing pleases me, for happiness is not without us, but within.

My garden house is gay, but I am sad. Great beds of hyacinths and narcissuses diffuse their fragrance far and wide; to me they all seem withered. It is best for me to be at my writing-table, because there I am obliged to think of something else. Capo d'Istria still gives me some trouble; but he does not catch me. I begin to know the world well, and I believe that the flies are only eaten up by the spiders because they die naturally so young that they have no time to gain experience and do not know what is the nature of the spider's web. My axiom is all the more correct, because it is impartial, for the real spiders interest me. I very often watch them, they are the best barometers, and, their ugliness apart, they are quite dear little animals, always busy arranging their dwellings in the neatest manner.

397. *April 13.*—I have this day undertaken to read through the copy of our conferences. This great and important work will be concluded in spite of the joy which all Radicals would have felt if

it had been otherwise; it is a legislative work of the very highest order.*

398. *April 19.*—I still lead a quite wonderful life; I am everywhere and nowhere. I have estates which I have never seen, and among them some which I hear travellers describe as paradise. Among others a castle on the lake of Constance, which commands the whole lake and gives a panorama of Switzerland. I have only once stayed a night at the castle, and then I arrived at eight in the evening and had to leave again at four in the morning; for a courier who arrived during the night urged me not to lose a moment. If only Heaven had given me for some consolation the smallest portion of that ambition which finds an enjoyment on the most trifling occasion which it never offers to me! Ambition I have, but it is of so grave a kind that its enjoyments are like those of virtue. My ambition is to do well what I have to do, and to combat evil wherever I find it. It is just this circumstance which gives me so cold a tinge, which comes not simply from patience but rather from perseverance. To me it is really nothing to work; titles and so-called honors are indifferent to me. I am much more loaded with them than I desire, and if they were taken away, I should hardly remark it. Posterity will judge me—the only judgment which I covet, the only one to which I am not indifferent, and which I shall never know.

399. *April 20.*—Many people would be delighted to make their entry in a Roman car of triumph amid the noisy shouts of some thousand bawlers. I do not care for triumphal cars or cries; the shouts of the mob are worth nothing. Rejoicings are only worth anything when the angels smile and evil spirits flee. A man must be like me, born and brought up amid the storm of politics, to know what is the precise meaning of a shout of triumph like those which now burst forth from Burdett and Co. He may have read of it, but I have seen it with my eyes. I have lived at the same time as the Federation of 1789. I was fifteen, and already a man. The most beautiful sun beamed on a hundred thousand enthusiasts who all believed in the dawn of the Golden Age. I was under a tutor who in the year 1793 was an intimate friend of Robespierre, and on August 10 presided over the Committee of Marseillaise; this tutor was the best man in the world; he wept for joy, and filled the whole world with his love and his philanthropy. I was his scholar, but, nevertheless, my heart was absorbed in misery.

* See No. 476.—ED.

400. Clementine's condition seems to be something better, but if all goes well her restoration will yet be a work of time. But this long time is dearer to me than the moment when I must give her up entirely. She is a quiet, good child. The day before yesterday she said to me that she had the feeling of coming back to life again, and was greatly delighted, because she would now have all the longer time to show me how much she was attached to me. It seems that the leech which was lately put on her throat gave much relief. An inflammatory complaint which has now lasted three months is indeed severe. Unhappily, she feels very much the return of cold weather; she is quite benumbed with it.

401. *April 29.*—The improvement was, alas! of short duration. The inflammation returned next day, and in a few hours it took the form of severe inflammation of the lungs. On three successive days she had to be bled. This excessive loss of blood after an illness of three months must weaken her dreadfully, so that we can no longer hope to save her. There are cases where the remedy seems worse than the disease itself.

402. Clementine's condition grows still more serious; it is now evident that this last inflammation has attacked her lungs most severely. To-day she was so ill that the physicians expected her end. In the course of the afternoon she had sat up for some moments. She then went back so that four-and-twenty hours afterwards she lay in a deathlike stupor.

Yesterday the portrait of Clementine, by Lawrence, arrived from Florence. I intended to leave the box for a month unopened. Clementine, during her lethargy, must have heard us speak of it. The first conscious words she said to me were to ask me to unpack the picture and show it to her. I allowed it to be brought. She smiled at the picture, and said: "Lawrence seems to have painted me in heaven, for he has surrounded me with clouds!" She wished to have the portrait placed upon her bed. This, however, we could not do—life and death cannot be placed so close together.

To-day Clementine performed her devotions. For several days she had imploringly begged to do so. She seems not to have the least fear of death. She is perfectly calm.

Worn as I am with this agitation, I have still to go through long conferences. Yesterday I had one of the plenipotentiaries with me in my room when they brought me word that the physicians had assembled, and were waiting for me in the sick room. When I got up to go, my visitor said to me: "Pardon me, allow me to draw

your attention to some of the Rhine tolls!" I assured him that I must go, though the Rhine should flow back to its source! The man stood there quite confounded, and I left him with astonishment on his face that any one should do business in that way. But my first business is the preservation of my happiness—a business which, indeed, I do not often follow.

403. Elegies do not belong to my character. I cannot lament. Heaven has doomed me to suffer in silence.

Clementine gets rapidly worse; her departure may take place any day. She does not suffer—indeed, that follows from the nature of her illness, which is, nevertheless, very severe. Feeling and duty chain me to her bed. I suffer more than she does. She is generally unconscious, and her dreams are sweet but they are all among the fields where in imagination she is wandering. To-day she had herself turned round in bed. To my question why she did so, she replied: "I do not want always to see the same things;" but added immediately, "Look at that bed [a second bed had been placed in the room, to make a change for her]; is it not extraordinary that they give me a stone bed?" I replied that she was mistaken: that the second bed was hung with muslin. "Stone or muslin," said she, "both are alike to me; both are white, and that pleases me." Her presentiments guide her more correctly than her reason. I do not believe that she can last more than three days. Her face is quite disfigured, and Lawrence himself would not know her. Her features are only to be recognized if she smiles; but this smile comes from a heavenly rather than an earthly being.

404. *May 11.*—Our worst fears were realized on the 6th. At half-past nine on the evening of the 5th my wife called me. Clementine was greatly distressed. I hurried to her, and I had only to look at her and feel her pulse to know that her dissolution was at hand. In spite of every remedy she became worse and worse, so that at one moment I thought she was gone. It was but a swoon, from which she revived and regained her full consciousness. She asked for her confessor, and at midnight breathed her last gently and calmly as she always was in life. I learn from her confessor that she had expected her death for the last fortnight, and only the fear of grieving us gave her strength enough to show the greatest calmness with respect to her state. After her last attack she implored that she might receive the sacrament, under the pretext that it was Eastertide. Her confessor, who had also been her tutor for ten years, gave her some excellent counsel respecting her future; but she

answered very quietly, with a smile, "What you say is beautiful and good, but it is nothing to me: my future is not here below!" Thus died the innocent, who has now no remembrances and no pain. The next morning I took my wife to my daughter Marie, where I stayed two days. Business called me back, and I have despatched it as one might empty a cup of poison.

405. *May 12.*—I am still here alone. My wife and my son are with Marie. I work and think of my misfortune. A most beautiful being has been snatched from the world. There is in society here a lady who is very like my daughter; when I met her yesterday I was overcome with tears.

I can truly say that I have a certain anxiety about all very lovely girls. The cause of their beauty is mostly the cause of their death. Too great delicacy in the features, a quite transparent skin, a certain blending in the figure, are all proofs of an extremely tender organism. A climate like ours acts on such a one like the north wind on the flowers of spring. I have, happily, the gift of keeping my feelings to myself, even when my heart is half broken. Of this I have given certain proof during the last months. The thirty men with whom I sit daily at the conference table have certainly never guessed what I was going through while I talked for three or four hours, and dictated hundreds of pages.

406. *May 15.*—On this day in the year 1773, precisely at twelve o'clock, I was presented to the world. On the same day, forty-seven years afterwards, I have signed the final act of our conferences. We sat together the whole day yesterday, and we might have come to an end then if my colleagues—or, rather, my children—had not wished to celebrate my birthday by the conclusion of our work.

Seven-and-forty years is a long time, quite too long. I have, in this weary life, thank God, preserved that strong vitality of heart which is a preservative against the passing away of any feeling. At twenty I was the same man I am to-day. I was always what I am, good or bad, strong or weak.

407. *May 16.*—The family circle has assembled again. My wife does not leave the room in which my daughter died. She has collected around her everything which belonged to her. I cannot enter the room without tears, and I soon return to my business, which makes a barrier between me and myself.

EXCURSION INTO BOHEMIA AND COBURG.

Extracts from Metternich's private Correspondence from May 27 to July 9, 1820.

408. From Prague—Palais Fürstenberg. 409. Marriage of the Archduke Rainer with the Princess of Carignan. 410. Recollections of Prague. 411. The same. 412. From Theresienstadt—reflections. 413. From Carlsbad—Count Czernin. 414. From Königswart—at Clementine's grave. 415. Business. 416. Management of two earthenware manufactories—the pitcher goes to the well till it breaks. 417. Arrival of Queen Caroline in Dover. 418. Mineral waters at Königswart. 419. Visit of Prince Schönburg. 420. Plan for a family vault. 421. At Rosenau—reception in Coburg—popular festival. 422. Inspection of the country in company with the Duke. 423. Plans for the Castle at Coburg—Queen Caroline of England. 424. From Franzensbad—victory over Capo d'Istria. 425. The London affair.

408. *Prague, May 27, 1820.*—I live here at the Palais Fürstenberg, the same Prince who married a Princess of Baden last year. He is having his house put in order, to settle here next August with his young wife. If the Prince comes, and is not beside himself with anger, he must be the most tasteless man that ever existed. His steward received me yesterday, and conducted me through an immense suite of rooms. When I saw the way they were decorated I did not know how to keep my countenance. Wherever the hand of the artist or artisan was busy, sculptures, pictures, furniture, hangings, and other works stare at the spectator like the phantasmagoria of a fever dream. The great chairs in the chief saloon of black polished wood stand on four gilded eagles' claws, and at their backs, in the form of a shield, are different arrangements of cupids and eagles in gilded wood. The furniture is of blue damask, ornamented with white muslin in great bunches, and edged with gold and silver, intermixed with green and red colors. All the rooms are alike. The two beds in the principal bedroom are hung with what represents shell-work and rock-work—on which are squirrels (as thick as your fist), toads, and bats of gilded wood—and stand in an alcove, at the entrance of which hangs a lamp in the shape of a

colossal owl, which draws a globe out of the satin hangings; if the globe is covered the light shines from the eyes of the owl. This horrible steward wished to hear my opinion of all these arrangements. I asked him whether his master had sent him the designs for everything. He assured me, with an expression of the greatest self-satisfaction, that this was not the case—he and the upholsterer had prepared all these things as surprises for the good Prince. “How delighted the Prince will be,” said he, “when he learns that all these beautiful things have only cost 80,000 gulden.”

The steward wished me to sleep opposite this owl. I assured him that I could not be the first to desecrate their Excellencies’ marriage-bed, and betook myself to a room at the back, in which there were neither owls nor cupids. Hardly was I left alone in this room when a clock began to strike which made as much noise as a church bell. I got up to seek for the clock, but in vain. At last I found a small picture, representing a village with a church, on the tower of which was a clock, which struck so loudly that it could be heard four houses off. As I did not wish to lose my night’s rest, I had the unlucky picture taken down and put away. I lay down, when just at midnight a flute began to play quite close to my bed. Looking about, I found it was my night-table which made this noise. After long search I found a knob, by pressing which the musical box close to my ear was temporarily silenced; but from time to time it repeated its efforts to go off again, sounding something like suppressed groans. This morning, early, I sent for the steward and begged him to take away this piece of furniture, as I did not like to hear music at such unusual hours. “It is the *somno*,” answered the good man, “which I had made for the Princess; the Prince’s night-table contains a trumpet.” “Good heavens!” I cried, “then do not their Excellencies sleep at all?” “Oh yes,” answered the steward; “but young married people are easily tired, and that makes them sleep: besides; the music can be stopped.” “But why,” asked I, “should there be any music to be stopped?” “Well now,” answered he, with a self-satisfied air, “all sorts of pleasant things may happen to the Prince, and then he has always a trumpet ready.” This is all like a dream; but I would not advise any lady to have a *somno* that plays like a flute, or to allow her husband a hidden trumpet. Such amusements would wake up the whole neighborhood.

I hope to sleep well to-night, for I have had the noisy contrivances one and all removed, to the great anger of the steward. I am

certain the poor man despised me heartily for my stupidity and bad taste.

409. *May 28.*—The marriage of the Archduke Rainer with the Princess of Carignan took place to-day. The bride is very lovely. Although she is half a head taller than I am, she has a pretty figure. Her head is particularly fine, her eyes long and tender, her nose small and finely cut, the well-formed mouth conceals the most beautiful teeth I have ever seen; yet, in spite of all these beauties, I cannot think so large a woman charming.

410. *May 31.*—The memorable epochs at which I have visited this town followed quickly upon one another. In the year 1812 I spent two months here with the Empress of the French, and in 1813 gave her husband his death-blow.

Yet, what to me is all that has rushed through my head and flowed from my pen during my public life? My life may be unpleasant for me to experience, but my biography will certainly not be tedious. Especially interesting must be the years which I have passed with Napoleon as if we were playing a game of chess, and during which the object of both was—I to checkmate him, and he to surround me with all his pieces. These fifteen years seem to me to have passed like a moment of time.

411. *June 1.*—This day seven years ago I left Vienna to accompany the Emperor, when he went to place himself at the head of the troops assembled in Bohemia. At that very time I found Nesselrode on his travels in a small town; he thought we were quietly in Vienna. I gave him a despatch for the Emperor Alexander, which was so short that I still remember every word of it. It ran thus: "Your Majesty, we are there; patience and confidence! In three days I will see you, and in six weeks we shall be your allies."

Confidence did not exist then, but came after a time, and was justified. The patience could not be wanting, because we were quite determined not to move a step more quickly.

412. *Theresienstadt, June 7.*—I have spent half a day at a very beautiful estate. The whole country as far as Weltrus* is adorned by nature. The park is worthy of England.

Often when I have happened to visit a hospitable domain which, far from the world, is removed from all the whirl of diplomacy, I feel like a prisoner who discovers a sunbeam. This light is not for me; I know that it is only shown to me in order to put me back in

* An estate belonging to Count Chotek.—ED.

my dark cell, and yet my heart is agitated and dreams of a happiness with which I am not permitted to enchain myself. I am certainly one of the men least accessible to ambition, and most accessible to happiness. Wherefore has fate entangled me in a labyrinth which never leads to happiness? We have a saint who attained to heaven because he stood on a column for I know not how many years on one foot. I, though I stand on two feet, may yet compare myself to St. Simon Stylites. His service was an uncomfortable position—mine is not better. He was patient, and I, too, have given many proofs of that virtue. But yet I fear that I shall not attain to heaven, for I have moments of such impatience that in a second I annul the service of many years. The legend asserts that the saint was never impatient, and that made his colleagues despair.

413. *Carlsbad, June 11.*—Here I am again in the Carlsbad so much decried by the Radicals of Germany during the last few years. The night before last I slept at Teplitz, at Prince Clary's; and last night in Schönhof, a *Schloss* belonging to Count Czernin. According to all accounts, this is a good and honorable man, but notoriously very ugly. Prince Louis Rohan called him for several years "ambassador from the dead," a name which has clung to him ever since.

414. *Königswart.*—I came here two years ago to visit the grave of my father. Who could then have thought that I should so soon return to pray by the grave of a child then overflowing with youth, beauty, and happiness! One of my friends has sent me the following verse, freely translated from Ossian: "Rest softly, lovely beam. Early didst thou sink behind the mountain, and dreadful was thy departure. Like the moon on the blue trembling waves. In darkness hast thou left us, O first of maidens, come back!"

No one must think that the last line expresses the feeling of the poor child; she was simple, like all true beauty, and had no suspicion that she was more noticeable than any of her friends. How often has she said to me, when the passers-by stopped to look at her, "The people can never have seen a hat like mine:" or she looked herself over to see if there was not something wrong with her toilet. She always thought others more beautiful than herself; and I saw once that she envied a little ill-shaped girl her head.

I am certain that Lawrence grieves for her, not on account of her beauty, for he has painted others still more beautiful, but because he likes me, and knows what I feel. Lawrence is a very good

man; he has plenty of sense, which a man must have to be really good.

It rains here again, as it always does. As I want to build, I have sent for my architect, Nobile.

415. *June 14.*—The most necessary article here is an umbrella. Vegetation thrives with this weather; the trees and meadows are wonderfully green.

I had hoped to have eight or ten days here without being obliged to work, but I found to my horror four couriers assembled here from all corners of the world. The enjoyment of retirement is evidently not to be expected by me. I have spent the whole day in writing, and it is now striking midnight. Of all my dependants, surely no one is awake longer than I am.

416. *June 15.*—Since my last arrival here I have established two manufactories of earthenware, which look very modest, but are all the more useful. In one they make jugs for the Marienbad waters; in the other, earthen pots for the Bohemian cooks. The object of both is to burn up some thousand stacks of wood which would otherwise rot to pieces in the forests. Nothing is more difficult than to promote the interests both of the wood and of my person, and if the former is transformed into pots, I am afraid the same thing may happen to me also.

I do not wish, moreover, any one to pay me the same compliment which one of her ladies once paid to our Emperor's second wife. The Empress was near her seventh or eighth confinement, and expressed her dread of it; the lady wished to reassure her. "But," said the Empress, "the pitcher goes to the well till it breaks." "But your Majesty forgets," returned the lady, "what a very superior kind of pitcher your Majesty is." There are different kinds of pitchers, it is true, but I know of none which do not break at last; and I fear that the same lot which I prepare for them will happen to myself.

417. *June 16.*—Queen Caroline has arrived in Dover, and was drawn by the hands of the people from Dover to Canterbury. This does not astonish me; a virtuous Queen, worthy of the crown, would in all probability be bespattered with mud by the people; *she* of course must be drawn in triumph.

418. I am making a thorough course of mineral waters, of which I have twenty-two on the estate. I have had public baths built at one place, where there are three excellent but different springs close together.

This is the feast of St. Antonius, which is very ceremoniously solemnized in my private chapel. There is hardly any place in Bohemia where there is not a full orchestra and good chorus and solo singers. At the mass to-day my orchestra surprised me with a *Gloria* which was sung to the air "*Ombra adorata*," in which the first singer was accompanied with trumpets and kettledrums. The Latin Paternoster was ornamented with *roulades*, whereby the words became most absurd, as, for instance, "*Da nobis papanem papanem, nem pa nem, pa pa*." Certainly there could not be a child in the church who would not be convinced that he understood Latin. The melody pleased the peasants greatly.

419. *June 21.*—To-day arrived an excellent and pleasant companion, Prince Schönburg, an enthusiastic sportsman and gay young fellow—a very agreeable guest in a lonely house.

My plans for rebuilding the house are ready. My *Schloss* consists of a centre and two wings, of which one is only half-ready. When the whole is finished I shall be able to house thirty persons comfortably.

420. *June 29.*—I have for some time decided to build a new vault. The old vault, where my ancestors and my poor daughter are buried, is badly placed. I have found a suitable spot for the building itself. I wrote to you some months ago of the destruction of a *Schloss* and a village by fire. Now, instead of rebuilding there a residence for the living, I will make a resting-place for the departed—for me and mine. A mausoleum shall be erected to which there shall be no second in Bohemia, and perhaps not in Europe. I like everything which defies time. I will therefore make an Egyptian monument—not, indeed, a pyramid, but a chapel with a vault in the Egyptian style, the only style which resists time and age. There is plenty of material lying on the spot itself; I only need to lay one stone upon another. There shall not be a bit of wood in the whole monument, which shall be placed in a garden on a mound sixty feet high.*

421. *Rosenau, July 2.*—I left my place on the 3rd, and stayed a night on the way, so as not to reach Coburg too early. The lodging was very bad, which, however, did not signify to me much, for I always take with me my bed and my cook.

Yesterday, at noon, I entered Coburg, and was surprised by all

* Schloss Miltigau, burnt in 1820, seems to be alluded to. The family vault was built subsequently (1828).—Ed.

the doubtful pleasures of a strict etiquette. Marshals, chamberlains, pages, &c., awaited me when I alighted from the carriage. I was conducted to my abode like the Holy Father in the procession of Corpus Christi. Visit of the Duke, return visit, visit to the Duchess, to the Dowager Duchess, to the Duchess's sister (Duchess A. von Wurtemberg), then a great dinner, and a greater Court, a great concert and a great supper. My sleeping time only was small enough to enchant me. To-day we shall leave the capital and establish ourselves in the country; etiquette, happily, will remain behind. Rosenheim is a very small *Schloss*; we are only five here: the Duke, the Duchess and a cousin of hers, one of my gentlemen and I. The neighborhood is charming, the park is six miles round, and is well laid out; I have seldom seen anything prettier or more convenient. In the evening the people had a festival, at which all but I danced with the peasants. I could only escape from dancing with a pretty villager by the story that I had a gun-shot in the calf of my left leg.

422. *July 4.*—The Duke himself shows me about his territory. I find it, not a great, but a very beautiful country.

The Duke is having his *Schloss* at Coburg rebuilt in the Gothic style. It will be very fine, but very costly, and he will devote to it the third part of his income.

As etiquette is banished, I enjoy my present life very well. Besides I have not touched a pen for three days, which makes me quite happy.

423. *July 5.*—Yesterday the Duke's architect showed me the plans for the new *Schloss*. The man has much talent; his plans are excellent. If the Duke carries them out, it will be an edifice of magnificent dimensions.

The London news makes me quite unhappy. This Queen is really a horrible woman. If people knew what I know about her, they would be surprised at her audacity; and yet there is no cause for surprise when one reflects how many people are taken in by it.

424. *Franzensbad.*—Yesterday, after breakfasting with the Dowager-Duchess, I left Coburg, and was awaited here impatiently by my gentlemen and four couriers. This was the punishment for four days' freedom. The courier from St. Petersburg brings me the news that the Emperor Alexander is somewhat more satisfied with me. I am always pleased when I observe that with time reason ever triumphs over unreason. I have gained a victory over Capo d'Istria, and therefore he does not talk to me any more. The

book of the Apocalypse appears for the moment to be closed, and as John preaches no more, he must be in the wilderness. How easily would things go on in this world if every one would but move in the direction in which their noses lead them. This sometimes apparently useless part of the body seems to have been given to us by the Creator only for the purpose of showing us the way in which we ought to go, as you see sign-posts set up to point out the right road to travellers. These roads are always straight unless there is a pit or a swamp to be avoided.

425. *Carlsbad, July 9.*—The Queen's trial in London is a heap of dirt which one cannot touch without defiling one's self. Wellington is quite right, but if I had seen the Prince Regent a year ago, everything would have been prevented. Castlereagh and Co. have not behaved cleverly. Two years ago I could have put them in a position to manage matters differently. Alarm and want of quickness have brought them into a position from which they will not easily emerge.

I gather that this shameful trial makes a shocking impression in England. What would it be if people knew the circumstances more exactly? No English mothers can allow their daughters to read the newspapers for a long time to come.

OUTBREAK OF THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION AND OTHER EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from July 17 to October 16, 1820.

426. From Weinzierl—news of the catastrophe at Naples—grave anxiety for the life of the Princess Marie (Countess Esterhazy)—the Neapolitan event. 427. Death of the Princess Marie. 428. Emperor Francis. 429. Metternich's family to be sent to Paris. 430. Firm attitude of the Emperor Francis and Metternich. 431. Life like that of the year 1815—military preparations. 432. Much work. 433. What is to be done? 434. Napoleon's day. 435. Universal echo in Europe. 436. Tedium. 437. Clementine's birthday. 438. Meeting of three monarchs in Troppau. 439. Day of the beginning of the Conferences. 440. Departure of the family to Paris. 441. Practical or obstinate? 442. Too early or too late?—the "Journal des Débats." 443. Metternich's wife in Paris. 444. From Hollitch—good news from St. Petersburg. 445. From Schloss-Wiczomiricz.

426. *Weinzierl, July 19, 1820.*—Since yesterday I have been at the Imperial Schloss. At eleven I left Carlsbad, arrived at Vienna on the 13th, and on the 14th went to my people at Baden, where, however, I could only stay one night. On the 15th, I was summoned back to Vienna by the news of the Neapolitan catastrophe. On the 16th I came here to the Emperor.

In Baden I have much to go through. For three or four months Marie has been unwell: all the symptoms of pregnancy were present. These symptoms disappeared and were replaced by the dreadful certainty of a serious malady. I think her fearfully altered, so worn, so weak, that I have no hope for her. In less than two months I shall have lost two daughters. Heaven sends me hard trials: I submit to its decrees, and I hope they will be imputed to me in a better world.

The Neapolitan event is beyond all calculation; the consequences will be quickly seen, the remedies must not be long waited for. Are any of these to be depended upon? I do not yet know, but I shall not be the last to put myself in the breach. Fate has made it easy for me—that is, fate will soon have left me so few ties to bind

me to earth that it will be but a small service to put forth all my strength of mind and heart.

This event must make a deep impression on the Emperor Alexander, all the more as the rebels boast of his countenance. Since 1815, Italy has been flooded with Russians, who always were thought to spread the false idea that every so-called liberal movement would find a protector in their Emperor. Here is the first movement: two squadrons of cavalry overturn a throne, and throw all the world into inexpressible troubles. It will not go in Naples as it did at Madrid. Blood will flow in streams. A semi-barbarous people, of absolute ignorance and boundless credulity, hot-blooded as the Africans, a people who can neither read nor write, whose last word is the dagger—such a people offers fine material for constitutional principles!

To-morrow I shall remain here, and on the 19th go back to Vienna, where I shall divide my time between the capital and Baden. In Vienna I expect hard work, in Baden severe sorrow.

427. *Vienna, July 25.*—On the 16th I left my daughter: on the 20th she was no more! I received this dreadful news at the last post before Vienna. I found my wife and children at home, having just returned from Baden. My daughter departed this life at eight in the morning; her death was like her life, gentle and calm, as the entrance of a spirit into its true home should be.

My son-in-law remains behind by the body of his wife; so great was his despair that he was obliged to be watched. In the afternoon he came here and watered my knees with his tears. He was harassed with the thought that I should not forgive him for this misfortune—he who had given up everything to make happy the being whom he loved so supremely. My grief is that of a man on whom great duties are still imposed. I must forget that I am a father—must silence all that nature itself finds it so difficult to overcome. I throw myself into my task like a desperate man on the enemies' batteries. I no longer live to feel, but to act. The burden which Providence lays upon me is very heavy, and would crush many men. As I loved this daughter, she on her side loved me more than as a father. For many years she has been my best friend. I had no need to confide my thoughts to her: she divined them. She knew me better than I knew myself. She had never a thought which did not become mine, never spoke a word which in her place I would not have said. I was constantly impelled to thank her, that she was what she was. I have sustained an irreparable loss.

The only blessing is that I feel myself but lightly bound to earth. My daughter would have died at my death; I do not die at hers. She was therefore better than I am.

In such a mood of mind the world weighs upon my shoulders with all the important matters it has of late heaped up. Even on the day of my daughter's death, I had to sit six hours in a ministerial council and eight at my writing table.

I will do my duty, and from this time forward duty will take the place of life.

428. *July 26.*—Heaven has placed me near a man who seems as if he had been made for me. The Emperor Francis does not lose a word. He knows what he wishes, and his wish is always good. Putting aside secondary considerations, he always goes straight to his object. He never throws down the gauntlet, but is ever ready to pick it up if it is thrown to him. The difficulties are great; destiny will decide whether we shall conquer. But what strength of mind, what purity of conscience, and calmness of judgment can accomplish, will be accomplished. I also am as if made to continue the fellow-worker of the Emperor on his thorny path.

In this I seek my refuge. The load at my heart oppresses me less; work rather does me good. Whether I live I know not, and neither do I inquire. I treat myself like a sick man.

429. *July 28.*—It is just eight days to-day since my better half was placed in the grave. Why was it not myself? How much trouble should I have been spared. My poor child rests to-day in foreign soil. Her husband would have her laid in his vault; my ashes will, therefore, never lie by hers. I comfort myself with the thought that I shall be united with her, and that forever!

I and my wife, the poor mother, have arrived at a determination which lies very near to her heart as well as to mine. We will make a new sacrifice to duty and reason. Since the three other children have all delicate chests, a continued residence in Vienna would be too dangerous for them. My wife would like to take them for some years to Italy. My son, who must continue his studies, I should gladly send to the University of Padua or Sienna. In my present position and under present circumstances Italy would be impossible for them. Neither could I send my son to Germany; he might be murdered. For such plans I am too much exposed to the attacks of Radicals of every country. Therefore I will, next September, send the whole family to Paris, where they can remain as long as it is necessary. I shall remain alone in the world, but I shall find com-

fort in thinking that my family are together, and are removed from the effect of the Vienna climate. During the last twenty years eight persons have died in my house, seven of them from lung disease. Experiences like this cannot be withstood; one must bend before them.

430. *July 29.*—I have no longer any domestic life. Everything is being prepared for the journey. My son-in-law goes with them to Paris, and will remain there, which is a great advantage for my son, as he will serve as father and tutor to him.

The Emperor and I will give the world a great example; we will not leave our posts. If we are destroyed, many will have to smart for their crimes and their folly first. The high character of the Carbonari, the party which has led all the others, is the anxiety.

I have good news from St. Petersburg. Capo d'Istria feels himself thoroughly beaten. Much has to be settled between the Emperor Alexander and me. It is not possible to form an idea of Golowkin's simplicity; it can only be tolerated on account of his good intentions, which are decidedly good. He is one of those men who have no leading thought. Correct and incorrect, ultramontane and liberal, Christian and heathen—such are his changes in one quarter of an hour.

431. *August 1.*—The whole day yesterday I was with the Emperor at Schönbrunn. My life is now like that which I led in the year 1815. I am busy with generals and military affairs of every kind; at first it was only a question of 50,000 men, but with the 38,000 who are already in Italy it will increase to quite a large army. Many people are astonished that we can so quickly set it in motion. No country is so quiet as Austria in time of peace; none so active as Austria when it is necessary. No great movement is visible, but everything goes forward quickly. At the battle of Leipsic our allies had only one-third, but Austria brought to the battle-field the other two-thirds of the main force. We are very bad proclaimers of our wares. What will come of it? God knows. But I know what has to be done to-day, and I shall know what to do to-morrow.

432. *August 6.*—I sit at my writing-table like a bankrupt in a tavern. He drinks to forget the loss of his goods: I work to drown the distress of my mind. My head remains clear; it is with me as if I had two minds, which are like the double bellows that maintain the fire in the great furnaces, making me always blaze up: if one fails, the other increases, which has this result—that I always go forward.

My position has this peculiarity that all eyes, all expectations are directed to the point on which I find myself.

My days and part of my nights are dedicated to my work. I am more strange to myself than all the people who pass by my window. In the evening, at the sight of all I have accomplished, I perceive that life still remains in me, but of the feeling of life I have none.

433. *August 8.*—My head is tired and my heart dried up, and in this state I feel the world resting on my shoulders. If I should deceive myself for a moment I am brought to recollection by the arrival of some courier with the declaration, “What will you do?” They say, “We have confidence only in you. Our fate is in your hands; what shall we do?” That is the substance of all the despatches which arrive, and two-thirds of the questioners are always ready to perpetrate some folly, because they have neither spirit nor courage.

A little while ago the Emperor Alexander made the following declaration:—“Since the year 1814 I have often been mistaken as to the mind of the public: what I thought true I find now to be false. I have done much evil; I will make every effort to make it good again.” Indeed, there are many errors which are not known till the evil is to be seen. The man who allows errors to be seen is no statesman; but if he admits that he has made a mistake, he is at least an honorable man, and that the Emperor Alexander is.

Capo d'Istria appears to have retired to the second rank, out of which he ought never to have advanced.

One of my plagues is the residence of the Emperor at Schönbrunn. True, it is not far off, but the backwards and forwards takes me an hour, and I often have to go twice in the day.

434. *August 15 (Napoleonstag).*—This is the day of the great accursed! if he were still on the throne, and he were alone in the world, I should be happy.

This day twelve years ago, I was at one of Napoleon's *cereles*; he had the notion of placing himself at the head of the army in Spain, we on our side were making preparations for the war of the year 1809. I was openly and sharply questioned by him with regard to these preparations, and I had the satisfaction of telling him several truths in the presence of the assembled plenipotentiaries of Europe. He expected to do a good stroke of business, and it turned out that it was done by me. In the evening he sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs to me, to assure me of his friendship and perfect satisfaction. Nothing spoils a trick so much as the

bold utterance of truth. I would certainly as soon be cunning as stupid, but I should prefer to be neither of the two, and if God does not forsake me, the world will not have to reproach me with either one or the other.

435. *August 17.*—I am well pleased with all that I hear from every side. I hear an echo everywhere in Europe. There is as yet no breath of air from the North, but it too will soon reach us. If it blows from the highest summits it will not be warm: if it comes from the low ground it will smell of mud!

436. *August 20.*—It is said that from uniformity comes tedium; the uniformity in which I live is not without change, and the result is that I feel no tedium, without being any the happier.

I do not always sleep well. If my thoughts get the mastery over me, I often lie awake; I often remain lying for an hour without altering my position, and ruminate; then I feel what is laid upon me, and the burden seems to me out of proportion to my strength. Difficulties and dilemmas crowd upon me, till at last I hear a voice which rises in me notwithstanding every obstruction. Then I feel myself grow continually larger, and I end *par me croire immense*. Everything is in extremes at such a moment when the mind is disturbed by no outward object. Tired out I fall asleep, and when I wake in the morning I find a plan in my head quite ready; this plan I have not thought out: it seems to arise of itself.

Not to misunderstand what is here said, it is necessary to be placed exactly in my position.

437. *September 1.*—My poor Clementine would have been sixteen to-day. She keeps her birthday in that place where there is neither sorrow nor pain. Full of pity, she looks down upon her earthly remains, which so short a time ago were so full of charm. She pities her father and mother, and prepares for them a sweet and eternal union. Time is nothing to those who stand beyond it; she must feel one with us, but it is more sad for me because I am so far away from her.

The day before her death Clementine said to her mother, as I went out of the room: “Don’t you think it must do any one good to see Papa? He looks so gentle and calm, that I cannot understand how it is that some people are afraid of him: as for me, I always think he makes me well and happy.” The poor little thing did not guess that what she thought was calm, was death at my heart!

438. *September 3.*—It is proposed that the three monarchs shall

meet at Troppau in the latter part of September. Lebzeltern has just come. To-morrow I shall examine him.

439. *September 17.*—The new Conference will begin on October 20. I am so accustomed to conferences that it does not alarm me. This will be the third conference in less than a year. If I do not learn the business it is my own fault. Nesselrode is coming: the Emperor Alexander will not meet me alone.

Will any one come from London? and who? Castlereagh is desired by many, but he will not be able to come; for this matter Wellington would be nominated. Will he come or will they choose to send him?

After the Troppau Conference is over, a permanent Conference shall be established at Vienna. This I had proposed more than a year ago. Mean passions have prevented it, and urgent necessity now brings it forward.

440. *September 25.*—My family has started; I am now alone here in my great abode. As for me, I have lost one hour in my day, the only one in which I was quite sure to belong to myself. I always spent the time from 9 to 10 o'clock with my wife and my children. This hour was happiness to them, to me it was a consolation. I have made this sacrifice also. My life consists of sacrifices, and one more privation counts for nothing to one whose life is all privation; my existence is too much like that of a clock, *Je marche toujours pour marquer les heures*. I serve others while I wear myself out.

441. *October 1.*—The society of the present day has come to its latter end. Nothing remains quiet, either in the moral or physical world, and society has reached its zenith. Under these circumstances so-called moving forwards is moving downwards. The evil, too, attains its highest point, and then falls. Such times appear to contemporaries very long, but what are two or three centuries in the journal of history?

I have not been able to reconcile either my understanding or my judgment to what has happened since the year 1814. That was the possible moment for salvation. I consider myself practical; that I was so then has been made evident.

The world has judged me as it is accustomed to judge itself, and has deceived itself about me as well as about itself. I believe I was not deceived; I cherish but one passion, that for justice and moderation. They bring me, however, daily perplexities. They urge me to the greatest of all sacrifices—the sacrifice of my private life, and

all the enjoyments, great and small, which contribute to make up the life of a man. But if I had to begin over again, I would place myself upon the same ground, because it is the only ground approved by my reason and my conscience.

442. *October 6.*—My life has fallen at a hateful time, I have come into the world either too early or too late. Now, I do not feel comfortable; earlier, I should have enjoyed the time; later, I should have helped to build it up again; to-day I have to give my life to prop up the mouldering edifice. I should have been born in 1900, and I should have had the twentieth century before me.

The journal "*La Gazette de France*" contains some articles signed by a certain Colnet, which are malicious, but well written. The articles always hit hard; they are indeed ultra, which I am not; but as I cannot bear the Radicals, I always rejoice over every well-dealt blow that they receive.

Whoever takes up the "*Journal des Débats*" will, without knowing it, read me; there is hardly a week in which I do not send it some papers. But still no one must suppose that all the articles from Vienna in the Paris newspapers are from my pen. The chief correspondent is a ladies' hairdresser; of ten pieces of information which he gives, not one is true. Besides which, he offers his absurdities in a style which could not be more shallow or more stupid.

443. *October 9.*—I have news of my wife. She will be in Paris in two or three days. Her letters breathe of health. She is safely out of the town, and that was the necessity; had she remained in Vienna she would have fallen into marasmus. From great misfortunes comes a peculiar reversed sort of home-sickness directed to foreign countries, and that was the case with her. A place in which one has been happy may, by the loss of that happiness, become unbearable. Every corner, every face, indeed every shadow, recalls our pain. The house in which I live is certainly too large: the part which I use is quite separate from that of my wife and children. What in ordinary times is an evil will now be a real benefit to me. The whole of that part is cut off. I cannot without horror go into the room where my poor Clementine died, and I have not been able to prevail on myself to revisit my Marie's house.

444. *Hollitsch, October 14.*—I have instinctively made a circuit to come here. My instinct has often before had to replace the talent Heaven has denied me. Yesterday evening, as I entered Brunn on one side, Lebzelttern came in on the other. I have thus gained an

evening and a forenoon, and a few hours in my life are as much as months with other people. What Lebzelter brings me from Petersburg is both excellent and important—excellent as to the moral feeling of the Emperor; important as to the confusion of Capod'Istria's thoughts, as he takes in all my plans. An experienced commander does not allow himself to give way to a feeling of anxiety the evening before the battle; and I must, under present circumstances, fearlessly bear the thought of joining in the great debates.

445. *Wiczomirciz, October 16.*—I write to-day from one of my estates, the name of which I spare you. It is Ultra-Sclavonian, and, therefore, difficult to pronounce. Since this property lies between Hollitsch and Troppau, I have so arranged that I can remain here two days. In 1817 I came here with Marie, and have not been here since.

Wiczomirciz and Kojetain make a fine estate. The latter, an insignificant market-town, lies in an extremely fruitful pleasant country. Everything here looks pleasant and well-to-do. The meadows in the foreground, the Carpathian mountains in the distance, the beautiful plains, with their fertile fields and well-to-do people, all form the picture of a cheerful rich country.

FROM TROPPAU.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from October 19 to December 24, 1820.

446. Arrival at Troppau. 447. Arrival of the Emperor Alexander. 448. Capo d'Istria. 449. Conversation with Capo d'Istria. 450. Conversation with Nesselrode. 451. The Duchess of Wurtemberg, Metternich's sister—a curious incident. 452. Utopia. 453. Good results. 454. Constant kindness of the Emperor Alexander to Metternich. 455. The freak of the Semanoffsky regiment. 456. Capo d'Istria at the Conference. 457. Scandal of Queen Caroline's trial. 458. Decision to await the answer of Naples—conference with the Emperor Alexander. 459. Mud in Troppau. 460. Nesselrode. 461. End of the first act. 462. Love of tea. 463. Everything frozen. 464. Golowkin a Tea-anthrope. 465. No news from Naples. 466. Search for news. 467. The King of Naples arrives and we go to Laybach.

446. *Troppau, October 19, 1820.*—Here I am. What I shall accomplish I know not. What I shall do I know. Will anything happen? Yes! Will anything good happen? Yes! Will the general result correspond with the great sensation? I fear not! This is my catechism till the moment when deeds can take the place of words. The first I love, the latter I hate.

My Emperor is already here; the Russian monarch comes to-morrow.

I am well-lodged, and that is something. I shall have no time to be weary, and I hope even that I shall have the opportunity of making my stay here comparatively pleasant.

447. *October 20.*—The Emperor Alexander has arrived. The Emperor Francis was confined to his bed, and therefore could not go to meet him. I awaited him on his arrival. He received me like an old comrade in arms: there are, it is true, arms of various kinds.

I find him grown stronger, but not aged. The little town contains an extraordinary number of pretty and convenient houses, and the Conference is very well accommodated. The Troppau people are quite proud of the noise they are making in the world; they

are more astonished than I am, and I am not a little astonished to find myself here.

448. *October 21.*—I have made use of my morning in reading and understanding the Russian Premier. Judge of my amazement; he did not make one apocalyptic utterance. This is unnatural, but it is nevertheless true. However, the true is often not probable. What has happened in Capo d'Istria's seventh heaven? He has simply fallen to earth—like truth, but not with his eyes blinded, like hers.

Our conversation began in this way: with both my feet on the ground I had chosen—the ground of simple reason—I broke in at once. He stood quite firm. By way of experiment I left him there. He did not follow me. I again sprang upon him, and found him taking even a firmer position; in fact, a mountain is not firmer. "*Pour le coup*," I said to myself, "this is too strong. I will put him to the proof. Now I will make an attack on the apocalypse." He went with me, even bearing the torches to light the *auto-da-fé* for the book of the unreal John. I attacked his past; he cursed it. I placed the future firmly before him; he seemed quite agreeable. At last I laughed—and he laughed. I believe if I had wept he would have dissolved in tears. From that moment I thought to myself, "Now we can go forward; and oh, the miracle! he goes too!"

So is also the Emperor of Russia. He blames himself—nay, condemns himself. This is too beautiful, and if I did not touch myself, I should think I was dreaming. During my three hours' conversation with the Emperor Alexander yesterday, I found in him the same pleasant manners which surprised me in 1813· but he has become much wiser than he was in 1813. I begged him to explain this change to me. He answered quite openly: "You do not understand me: I will tell you. From the year 1813 to 1820 is seven years, and these seven years are like a century to me. In the year 1820 I will at no price do what I did in the year 1813. You are not altered, but I am. You have nothing to regret, but I have." "As is the master, so is the servant," I said to myself. Now we will wait; Nesselrode is to come.

449. *October 29.*—To prepare myself for my conference to-day I had an hour's conversation with Capo d'Istria. I was quite well disposed to hear him. This encouraged him. He went off and lost himself in a long investigation of middle-class society; its strength, its weakness, its nerves, its sensitiveness, its component parts, its

health or sickness, and its disintegration or death. The deuce take me if I did not know all this at twelve years old! As my attention was directed only to the outcome of his long discourse, I was at last thoroughly disappointed. The endless tirade concluded with the declaration: "This is the position of the affair!" This I call political pathology, and nothing strengthens me more in the supposition that I have some sense than those occasions when any one, like him, wishes to be very clever in order to show off his intellect. In my opinion, he only really has mind who speaks clearly. The mind must be a light without smoke. It warms and vivifies everything that it touches. If it does neither the one nor the other it is of bad quality. A small, mean intellect is nothing but small, mean stupidity. My intellect says to me, "Capo d'Istria has none." I wager that he will say the same of me; and this only a jury can decide.

450. *November 1.*—Evenings on which the storm rages and beats with heavy rain-drops on the windows seem to be made for confidential communications. This often repeated experience is newly confirmed by the long conversation I have just had with Nesselrode. He sat just in front of me at the same table at which I write, and left me ten minutes ago. Nesselrode began himself to speak of the impossibility of leaving Golowkin in Vienna; the Emperor will no longer read his Reports, and Capo d'Istria will not listen to him. This is certainly a very useful man at all times, but especially in the present.

451. *November 3.*—My sister (Duchess of Wurtemberg) came here two days ago. She came to give the Duke a good opportunity to speak to the Emperor Alexander. The latter, who is always glad to find any one to talk to, has for two days hardly left his aunt. People like much both to see and listen to her, for she has plenty of sense and is also very pleasing.

A comical incident took place between aunt and nephew. He was quartered in a small and bad house. Towards the end of the second evening after she arrived she remarked something move in one corner of the ceiling. On looking closer, she discovered a very small window, which the house-steward during these two evenings had let for so much a head to any one who was curious to see the Emperor of Russia in friendly society without being remarked. Happily the interview was quite harmless, or we should have had seemingly a new edition of the English trial. If ever Queen Caroline travels through Troppau, care must be taken that she is lodged in this apartment.

452. *November 4.*—People say the kingdom of the Utopians will soon begin. One may rely for that on De Pradt, Benjamin Constant, Wilson, as well as Lady Jersey. . . . The whole Russian policy forms an interesting object of observation. There are people conducting it of whom each one pursues a different end. The Emperor has not only returned to his former views, but takes a standpoint entirely opposed to that which he has occupied for some years. Capo d'Istria must turn with the wind, but against his will, which causes him to make a constant see-saw. Nesselrode is morally dead; it is just as if he were not there at all.

453. *November 8.*—Horrible weather! Winter has begun, and will not leave us again for four long months. The most beautiful winter sun is no sun to me, because a warmer cold is not warmth, and light alone is no fire. The Congress has its dark sides: first, the quantity of work; then, the small town; lastly, the bad time of year. Such small details are unnoticeable by the Lords of the Creation, but I find that I never accomplish much with a bad setting for my work. Placed on the Tribune of the Capitol, I should speak quite otherwise than I possibly can in Troppau. I require plenty of space, and cannot accommodate myself to the small and contracted.

However, we are coming to great and fitting results.

In my whole life I have only known ten or twelve persons with whom it was pleasant to speak—*i.e.* who keep to the subject, do not repeat themselves, and do not talk of themselves; men who do not listen to their own voice, who are cultivated enough not to lose themselves in commonplaces; and, lastly, who possess tact and good taste enough not to elevate their own persons above their subject.

454. *November 10.*—The friendliness of the Russian Emperor for me continues. It is a return to the year 1813. If he had been in the year 1815 as he was in the year 1813, there would have been no 1820.

455. *November 15.*—We to-day received the news of the *boutade* of the regiment of Semanoffsky: there is not much in it, and yet it is unpleasant.* There is nothing in the fact itself, but much in the significance which the general public will give to it. Three couriers

* In the orders of the day left by the Emperor Alexander, dated Troppau, November 14, we find, with regard to this affair, that a company of Semanoffsky's body-guard regiment, renouncing their duty and their obedience, had assembled on their own authority, late in the evening, to make complaints against their officers, and that, when for this violence they were put under control, the other companies refused to submit.—Ed.

arrived last night one after the other. Immediately afterwards the Emperor Alexander called for me, and told me of the affair. We looked at it exactly in the same light. The Emperor has so altered altogether that these agreements are now more common.

The Emperor Alexander thinks some ground must have been given to induce the three thousand Russian soldiers to conduct which is so little in keeping with the national character. He thinks, indeed, that the Radicals have made this stroke to intimidate him and bring about his return to St. Petersburg. I do not believe this; it would be, indeed, too shocking, if the Radicals in Russia could already control whole regiments; but this shows how the Emperor has altered.

456. *November 20.*—If I must sit opposite to Capo d'Istria at the Conference table and read his elaborations, which is worse than to hear him speak, I am so confused, and my thoughts wander so much that I am always uneasy lest I should perpetrate some stupidity. In all the documents sent forth the thoughts are mine; but the drawing up is by Capo d'Istria, in consequence of which I very often do not recognize my own thoughts. We lose much time in correcting and amending. Thus we yesterday had a discussion of two hours over the choice of the two words *réclamer* and *inviter*. Of what avail was it to point out that the word *réclamer* betokens a right, whilst *inviter* asserts no right? The grammatical difficulty over, no other difficulty arose.

It is really inexplicable how the Emperor Alexander can have patience with Capo d'Istria. I am still not quite clear whether the Emperor knows what he wants; but his language is as plain as mine. I am on the same footing with him as I was in 1813, go to him when I may, and we talk for hours together without ever disagreeing.

457. *November 27.*—I consider the lawsuit against the Queen of England, its beginning, its conduct, and its consequences, as one of the most unfortunate catastrophes of our time. Everything suffers under this scandal—the public morals, the honor of the throne, and the honor of both sexes.

Here, we are gradually attaining results. They are unhappily not successful to the degree I had wished; with Capo d'Istria it is even difficult plainly to carry out a plain benefit. The division of our influence runs, indeed, as follows: I shall gain eighty-five per cent. of the victories, and with the rest he will bring the world to peace, reason to his way of thinking, and sound human sense to do

him honor. Capo d'Istria is not a bad man, but, honestly speaking, he is a complete and thorough fool; a perfect miracle of wrong-headedness. He lives in a world to which our minds are often transported by a bad nightmare. Besides, he is a man of such overpowering vanity as passes human comprehension; yet such a man is placed in such a position!

458. *November 29.*—We have just decided that we will await here the answer from Naples: wait, at the least, that is, till the end of December here—still many days to be consumed, therefore, of that shoreless ocean which men call Time. I arrive at the end of one of these days, as I shall once arrive at the end of my existence—*i.e.* without having lived. What remains of me will by that time have been devoured by the paper-worms in the chests, with the exception of that which fifty years after my death will see the light. Then my grandchildren, if I have the happiness of having any to leave behind, will learn that they had a grandfather who could see, think and desire.

I conferred this evening for three hours with the Emperor Alexander. Since we have no particular business to do, our conversation included the whole extent of the horizon. People might think that the Emperor now first came into the world and opened his eyes. He is now at the point where I was thirty years ago. Only from a great elevation can one see well in this world; but first of all one must stand below in wind, rain, and storm, because from so elevated a position one can only form a true idea of objects when we have already seen them closely. We do not learn to fight in the arsenal, nor to foresee, defy, and master the storm in a harbor.

When I think of things in this way I see how easily it might happen to me, in case I were a Radical or a demagogue, to prostrate the mighty ones of this world.

459. *December 1.*—The soil of Troppau is as greasy and soft as butter. People paddle about in it as if it were iced chocolate; so a very good idea has occurred to the town authorities. As no one can go out of any door without sinking up to his knees, the magistrate has had some thousand planks laid down one after the other. This forms a narrow but very convenient path, which is trodden daily by the Congress, the Court ladies, their admirers, and others. This is all very well when people are going in one and the same direction, but not so when they meet; the more polite must make way for the less polite, and put at least one foot off the plank. The Emperor Alexander walks every day on these planks, and of course

all men who meet him walk into the mud; and when any lady comes from an opposite direction the Emperor himself must go into the mud, unless she contrives to do so first. Consequently there ensues a fight in the mire which would give Mr. Cruikshank opportunity for endless caricatures. Moreover, what happens to his Imperial Majesty happens also to the most discreet Minister and clerk. Since the civilization of the world, never was such a contest between duty and disgust, or policy and mud. These walks are the best test of individual peculiarities. They bring many virtues to light—*i.e.* neighborly love, respect for superiors, homage to the fair sex, &c. Unhappily Troppau affords another and a sad proof of how little this wretched century knows how to reward virtue. The most virtuous invariably step into the mud. But enough on this subject.

460. *December 5.*—It is a pity that Nesselrode keeps himself so entirely in the background. I do not comprehend how a man can put himself so completely in the shade that he should put on another person's cloak and wear a mask instead of showing his own face. . . .

In writing it very often happens that I leave out many a verb or noun—a very bad habit. In my private office I have a secretary, whose duty it is to supply these omissions. As he has filled this position for ten years, he knows my thoughts; but sometimes he does not succeed in guessing, and then he asks me. Generally I take the pen out of his hand and strike out the whole sentence, which is both convenient and useful, for in business one always says rather too much than too little. . . . *A propos* of letters, there is in Paris a very good arrangement, by which a packet or letter can be taken, and a receipt given for it, with a number and device. The packet or letter will then only be given to the person who shows the same number and device. Writer and receiver are by this means forever unknown.

461. *December 11.*—We have arrived at the end of the first act of the play. As a hundred arrangements have to be made, my study is more than ever like a head-quarters. The King of Naples may come or he may stay away: measures must be taken to suit both cases. If he does not come, action must be taken as quick as lightning, and Jupiter only can thunder by knitting his eyebrows. Ah! what easy work had Jupiter!

462. *December 15.*—The day before yesterday, in the evening. I had a remarkable conversation with the Emperor Alexander. We

remained from seven till eleven o'clock together. One great proof of our mutual friendly feeling lies in Tea. If we drink tea alone together we agree very well.

That reminds me of a story of an acquaintance of mine in Paris who had a mistress. Daily, or rather nightly, he visited her at three o'clock in the morning, talked with her for an hour, then sat down near her bed and took up his violin, which he played till six o'clock. Then the fair one had to get up; he lay down and slept till two o'clock. Now, if his mistress was pleasant his violin was taken there: if they had a quarrel no violin was to be seen. Tea is our violin. If we don't get on well together—there is no tea.

During the above conversation I expressed myself about Capo d'Istria—tea made it more easy. After I had read to the Emperor a very interesting document, I asked him, "Does your Majesty understand me?" "Yes, thoroughly." "How is it, then, that Capo d'Istria never understands me?" "I have often reproached him with that: it comes to this, that he always thinks you want something else." "And he is not mistaken; above all I wish that with his good heart he had also a sound, manly understanding."

Thanks to tea, everything was well taken. Ah! if that aromatic beverage could only set Capo d'Istria's head a little right! Good heavens! what a cargo of tea would I have from China!

463. *December 18.*—It freezes sharp. The boards have become unnecessary; the whole country is a board. Everything that comes to us from London is most miserable, which neither astonishes nor surprises me. If I can do what I will with Capo d'Istria, all will go well and quickly. The Emperor Alexander will be, through his Minister, only an obstruction; but for the latter, everything would have been finished to-day.

464. *December 20.*—This evening my cousin (Flora Wrba), who does the honors in Troppau, offered Golowkin a cup of tea. He answered her with a thoughtful air: "Do not ask me, for I like it, but it does not agree with me. I am an unfortunate Tea-anthropist."

Golowkin would have less trouble if he studied a greater simplicity of language. It would have been less pretentious of him if he said simply, as the lady said, "I am very glad not to take spinach, for since I once ate it, I cannot bear the sight of it."

Here it must be remarked that Golowkin, who considers himself a philanthropist, is especially pleased with the word, although he neither knows the meaning of the thing nor that the Greek An-

thropos means man, and the first word means friend. Philo-tea would, therefore, be more correct, and would sound better than Tea-anthrope.

465. *December 21.*—Still no news from Naples—a proof that the scamps there are still quarrelling: to give each other a good beating they have not the courage.

466. *December 23.*—One runs to the other for news: “Are they going?” “Will they wait?” “Now?” “When?” Since the invention of embassies—a very old and honorable invention; since that of writing—a not less old but often less honorable invention—I have never experienced anything so perfect as the silence of our representative in Naples. But for a little Prussian Jew who is there, because he is everywhere, we should know absolutely nothing. From the little we learn from this Jew, we imagine that the King is coming.

467. *December 24.*—The courier has just arrived. The King is coming, and we are going to Laybach. I start to-morrow morning, my Emperor the next morning, the Emperor Alexander on the 27th.

This is decisive.

FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE VIENNA MINISTERIAL
CONFERENCES.*

468. Metternich to Neumann (Letter), Vienna, January 25, 1820.

468. I have no doubt that Lord Castlereagh will be satisfied with the turn which I have been able to give to the political and military question. It is on this question—the most important, without any doubt, for Austria and Prussia—that there have always been the greatest number of opposite ideas and wishes in the German Courts. Some, such as Prussia, wished for what would have been dangerous for the federation and dangerous for Europe to agree to. Others, such as Bavaria and Wurtemberg, have always wished to isolate us in this question of federation. In case of war between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, Bavaria would thus be found at the head of the purely German federation. This attitude would have commenced by a declaration of armed neutrality. The progress of events would have regulated the rest without the possibility of judging of its extent.

The substance of these thoughts is found in many of the instructions brought here by the different plenipotentiaries. It is partly owing to the care which I have taken to adjourn the discussion on this matter that I have gained my cause. It was necessary to establish for the allies such security, and even such advantages, as to blind them to what they consider sacrifices. The acts will be submitted for the ratification of the Courts. It is possible, and perhaps even probable, that on this occasion Bavaria and Wurtemberg will make some resistance, but they will be obliged to give way. One does not pull down a whole building because one corner is inconvenient to live in; my anxiety is, so to unite the different parts of the federal edifice that even to wish to pull down one is to attack them all.

I have no doubt that the complete result of the Conference will be sent to the Courts from the 12th to the 15th February. An immense

* In connection with the documents of the year 1819, Nos. 374-380.—*Ed.*

work will have been done in a very little time ! Only the experience which I have acquired in the course of the six last years of Congress could have brought about such results as those which we offer to Europe.

Metternich to Rechberg, Bavarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, end of January, 1820.

469. . . . The whole of Germany—her right-thinking men as well as the others—is deceived as to the object of our meeting at Vienna.

Everybody thought we were going to overthrow all that is connected with the forms, which unhappily have been transplanted to the German soil (that soil so historical, so classical, and so great), in the course of the two or three last years. Some have thought we were right to do so, others have raised a great outcry. Now, we are not doing what they expected, and I declare frankly that in my soul and conscience I do not allow myself to regret it, because I cannot regret what is impossible.

This arises, too, from what is now taking place among you, and what will probably present itself still more strikingly in Wurtemberg, as it does everywhere and always, when people only follow the impulse of a party. . . .

I have taken care to hasten the interpretation of Article XIII.,* for I foresaw the necessity of removing, both from you and from Wurtemberg, the only opposition which had any real foundation in justice.

Your Constitution is, without any doubt, the least bad of any in the south of Germany; whilst that of Wurtemberg seems to me not to work well. I have written lately to St. Petersburg, that I believe the result of our Conferences will be most disastrous for the King of Wurtemberg and for his people, seeing they will be condemned to preserve their Constitution.

This is not exactly the case with you. You can be conservative without positive harm, and by a vigorous regulation you may even gain much. That this regulation should be real, it appears to me urgent—

I. That it should be adopted by all those States which are in a position to do so.

* Article XIII. of the Federal Act concerning the affairs of the States of the Bund.—Ed.

II. That to strengthen it still more, such principles should be expressed in our labors here as may serve for the support of feeble or timorous Governments.

I have spoken on the first of these subjects to Zentner,* and he agrees with me.

As for the second, I shall find some means of bringing it forward, and I have spoken to no one about it.

If you entertain my idea, try to give some instructions to your plenipotentiaries with reference to it; for I have no reason for not addressing myself directly to Zentner, if it were not that I desire to do nothing *in bavariis* unless you take the initiative.

I extend this question to one of the gravest complications presented by the form of the new Constitutions. namely, the publicity of the sittings and the shorthand writing of the protocols. I maintain that no monarchy of less than ten or twelve millions of people has the right to resist this form. In the smaller States men are too close to one another; injuries are too deep, and nothing can compensate for their effects, for the objects of ambition are too mean. I declare that, as an ambitious man, I should prefer to play the part of a Liebenstein to that of a Berstett at Carlsruhe. . . .

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, February 2, 1820.

470. I am able to tell you that all our business here is concluded. The most important work, the longest and the most directly connected with the whole of the federal system, has already passed once to the *Plenum* and it has been admitted, except for certain grammatical errors which will be corrected here in two days. I will send it to you by the next weekly courier. You will not be able to get a clear idea of all we have done here until you have read it.

You will see from it all the work of this grand Confederation, You will see the rights and the duties of the allies stated, and the sphere of action allotted to the Diet. I hope that even M. de Capo d'Istria will end by understanding them both. He will see that the Confederation is united, and that the Diet is not its sovereign; that there are several differences between the German's monarchical confederation and the Swiss republican confederation; that the Canton of Basle has no point of resemblance to Bavaria or Prussia, and

* Minister and Bavarian Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Ministerial Conferences.—ED.

even that the part of Director Landamman is not that of the Emperor of Austria.

The States of Baden are about to reassemble. This fact will cause fresh discomposure to Count Capo d'Istria. He will think we are falling into imbecility. Reassemble the States, and make laws against Liberal assassins! Make the laws of September 20, and talk no more of it at Vienna? There is something in all that, sufficient to confound all systems. It is, in fact, that here we do not renew, but we build up: we do not return to what has been, but we make good laws against excesses of every kind, and we leave to each State to watch over its own internal safety by guaranteeing a vigorous and general support whenever they may require it.

In a word, we make peace and tranquillity in so far as laws can assure either.

WURTEMBERG'S RESISTANCE TO THE COMPETENCE
OF THE CONFERENCES AT VIENNA.

471. Metternich to the Emperor Francis.

471. *Vienna, March 31, 1820.*—Nearly at the end of the negotiations which had been so happily matured here, an attempt is made by the Royal Court of Wurtemberg to frustrate all that we have endeavored to accomplish during the last four months.

That is, the Wurtemberg Court objects to consider these deliberations as finally concluded here in Vienna, but wishes them to be regarded as merely preparatory works to be concluded at the Diet.

The former would bring peace to men's minds, the latter disquiet. All the German Governments have openly shown their wish for the welfare of the Bund. Your Majesty needed only to speak the word and the coalition took place, for it was in accordance with the minds of the German Princes and the enlightened designs of their plenipotentiaries. The King of Wurtemberg, however, seems to be otherwise inclined. The King, or—as I still venture to hope—his counsellors, desire to bring the wants of their country again before the Diet, although they are already secured by preliminary deliberations, and are inseparable from the general welfare of all the German Governments. These resolutions of the Conference they wish to produce at the Diet, with so-called liberal explanations, objections, and phrases whereby an appearance of oppression would be produced as to the community, while the King of Wurtemberg would gain the reputation of patriotic feeling. The thing may, indeed, have to be done, but the King will gain the appearance of only yielding to force.

Carlsbad has greatly enlightened us on this point. The plenipotentiary from Wurtemberg at that place concluded almost every one of his proposals with this addition: "That, however, it must be drawn up by the other members of the Bund, and imposed on his Royal master." In the same way this plenipotentiary spoke

and wrote about military demonstrations, of the concentration of the Imperial troops in Tyrol, and of Prussian troops on the Lower Rhine. This was the conduct of the King at the deliberations in Frankfurt in the month of September last, and at his visit to Warsaw, as well as since his return to Stuttgart; and now he behaves in the same way here, and it is beyond doubt that he acts systematically. . . .

The King of Wurtemberg has made an attempt in which he shall not succeed. Your Majesty's firmness and the excellent spirit which animates all the other Governments and their deputies are sufficient to prevent this.

When Count Mandelslohe made this communication to me I thought it my duty to take no step of myself alone.

On the day of battle every combatant must be sure of his next man, and the German Bund can only prosper under the protection and guardianship of a firm and united will. I made this declaration verbally to Count Mandelslohe, and immediately began to consult the other deputies. From the document annexed your Majesty will see the prosperous result of this first step.

Furthermore I venture to lay before your Majesty the sketch of a letter to the King of Wurtemberg. When it has received your Majesty's signature I shall immediately despatch the courier to Stuttgart.

Metternich to Wintzingerode, Vienna, March 31, 1820.

472. When handing to me your Excellency's letter of the 21st of this month, Count von Mandelslohe at the same time made the confidential communication which he was charged to present with the protocol of the Conferences at this place.

On this communication being made, my first wish was to discover whether the Royal Wurtemberg Court declared against the substance as well as the form, or only against the latter. This is a point of the greatest importance, and one which I was justified in doubting, although in the protocol delivered mention is only made of the form.

It is not merely whether the results of the Conferences here are binding without further discussion at the Diet, or whether they must be placed before the Diet in the usual manner. The question is of far greater consequence. The Cabinets assembled here have worked out the chief subjects of their negotiations so successfully,

they have so happily settled what is most important for the whole of Germany—the question of the competence of the Bund—that the work already accomplished is likely to fulfil our best hopes. Shall this hitherto prosperous work, now so far advanced, be fully accomplished, or shall it be put aside as an unsuccessful, useless attempt? This is the chief question to-day—a question which I believe (and my opinion is shared by all the plenipotentiaries here present) touches more deeply the future fate of the German confederacy than any difference of opinion about this or that form to be observed with regard to the assembly of the Bund.

As Count von Mandelslohe could not give me much real information on this subject, I had further to inquire whether he was strictly ordered to make this declaration at the first full sitting after our conference, or whether he was authorized to delay this step till an answer is obtained to the present despatch. The Count declared himself bound to execute his commission without delay.

Under these circumstances I could only inform Count von Mandelslohe that I did not feel called upon to enter into the discussion and explanation of the form which had been unanimously liked and agreed upon at the eighteenth session, and that I could take no further step in this matter without a previous conference with all the other plenipotentiaries. I added the necessary reservation that the protesting Court must be responsible for any evil consequences resulting from the retardation of negotiations equally important for the whole of Germany.

This conference I immediately arranged, and the result is:

1. That no interruption must be allowed to take place in the course of the negotiations here.

2. A unanimous determination to hold fast the work which, after four months' application, is so nearly completed, and a general resolution of March 4, in pursuance of which they mutually engage that none of the plenipotentiaries of this conference will condescend to any repetition of the deliberations at the Diet.

Feeling the necessity, for the sake of the German Fatherland and all Europe, of preventing the sad spectacle of a fruitless or inconclusive four months' conference between the German Cabinets, I have taken upon myself to communicate to your Excellency in the enclosure the unanimous opinion of the plenipotentiaries as to the form to be observed on closing the conferences. . . .

In fulfilling this duty I am particularly charged by his Majesty the Emperor to declare solemnly that, in his opinion, there are but

two alternatives in the manner of bringing the business here to a conclusion:

Either to issue the resolutions taken in Vienna (as results definitely accepted) in the form of an Act ratified by the Governments belonging to the Bund, leaving it to the Assembly of the Bund to deposit these Acts in the archives of the Bund, and publish them in the usual constitutional manner;

Or to make known these resolutions to the Diet in the form of a Presidential Report, all the Governments pledging themselves to direct their deputies at the Diet to give an absolute consent.

All the votes have been given in favor of the former of these modes. It was all the more necessary to reject the latter as his Majesty the Emperor (for reasons shown in the enclosure) feels obliged totally to decline any co-operation in this form.

His Majesty the Emperor does not acknowledge a third mode. He is firmly determined to ground no Presidential Report on a merely preliminary and provisional agreement on the matters negotiated here, and not to allow what is already—by the most careful discussion and deliberation of all German Courts and Cabinets—on the point of accomplishment, to be again called in question.

Your Excellency will see from this paper and its enclosure, not only the opinion of all the German Cabinets, but also that it thoroughly coincides with that of his Majesty the Emperor.

The desire which animates the Emperor, no less than all the members of the Bund, to secure the welfare and maintenance of the German Bund in the most prompt and judicious way to which their general competence extends—the real existence of which desire is proved by the course hitherto taken by the negotiations here and by the present step—justifies the expectation that the King of Wurtemberg will not refuse his consent and co-operation in a work hitherto carried on uninterruptedly in the glorious harmony so beneficial for Germany.

Metternich to Wintzingerode, Vienna, March 31, 1820.

473. You will receive to-day communications of the greatest importance. The moment is come, Count, when all that is hard of understanding must be understood, and all that is not clear must be made so. It is impossible that all the Courts of Germany should have met together for five months in the same harmonious spirit, with the same feeling of the necessity for consolidating their fed-

eral relations, that our conferences should draw near to their close, and that all that has been said and done should only benefit the enemies of general order. And yet this would certainly be the case if what has led to an harmonious agreement should be relinquished at the very moment of this agreement.

I venture to flatter myself that the details into which I entered in my official letter will remove the feeling which could only have arisen from some great mistake. You believe that Austria and perhaps Austria and Prussia wish to exercise a pressure on their allies. The fact is not so; the Emperor knows the dangers of the moment and the necessities of all times. . . .

I frankly confess that I do not comprehend the declaration which M. de Mandelslohe has been ordered to insert in the protocol. The case is plain, although I do not allow myself to attach to it the only definite interpretation of which it seems to admit. If it has not this meaning, the letters I send you ought to remove all difficulties: if this is not the case, the cause will not be far to seek. You wish to prevent what has for five years been impracticable at Frankfurt, but is now about to be concluded under the immediate influence of the Cabinets, from coming to anything.

You are very badly served here. Mandelslohe acts the man of honor; Trott does his part—and the part of men behind the scenes never is to arrange affairs. To place two such individuals as you have is the most certain means, not to correct mistakes, but to embroil everything, and render all efforts abortive.

You will see that I am too much occupied with the one affair to be inclined to return to my last letters. Your reply, far from proving that I may be deceived, proves on the contrary that I am right in everything. Yes, I know all that has passed since Carlsbad; I know what you call a momentary support in public opinion, the only advantage that you have obtained. Against whom is this ephemeral support required? Is it against the enemies of social order or against your allies? . . . If at Stuttgart they think that Austria's policy is small, very tortuous, and very dangerous to those who allow themselves to be deceived, at least the Minister for Foreign Affairs for Wurtemberg could never reproach the Emperor's minister with perplexing him with a very diplomatic controversy.

There is only one passage to be remarked on in your last confidential letter. You say to me, "Pray do not forget that we have a Constitution and responsible ministers."

I do not, in fact, know of Constitution and responsible ministers

anything which concerns the question with which we are occupied. The Constitutions are in the Confederation, and neither above nor below it. The responsibility of ministers does not concern the Confederation. You are responsible for the employment of your public money and the acts of your administration. If you admit that the Confederation can suffer in its vital principle from the responsibility, you must at least also grant to this same Confederation the right of naming the ministers. Ask your *soi-disant* friends of the people if they do not find my axiom correct. they will be ready to reply in the affirmative. But what will become of the sovereignty of your King if men like Jahn and Arndt are produced in Germany?

I wait patiently for the new orders your plenipotentiary will receive. . . .*

* The result is known. The King of Wurtemberg gave up his opposition and empowered his ambassadors to sign the document. See No. 475.—ED.

METTERNICH'S GERMAN POLICY.

Metternich to Berstett, the Ambassador from Baden at the Austrian Court, Vienna, May 4, 1820.

474. Your Excellency has informed me of the wish of his Royal Highness the Archduke of Baden to be exactly informed of the ideas of the Imperial Cabinet on the political state of Germany. This challenge on the part of a Prince who shows daily the most praiseworthy marks of his strong desire to support the right, and his thorough knowledge of the elements that oppose it, is the more honorable for me, as it imposes on me the duty of apprising your Excellency unreservedly of the point of view from which the present state of things has to be considered.

Time moves on amid storms: the attempt to check their violence would be vain. Firmness, moderation, and a union of well-directed forces—this is all that remains to the defenders and friends of order; in this alone lies at present the duty of all sovereigns and right-minded statesmen, and he only will have deserved this title in the day of peril who, having satisfied himself of what is possible and just, suffers not himself to be turned aside from the noble aim of his efforts either by impotent wishes or by relaxing his zeal. The object is easy of definition: in our times it is neither more nor less than the maintenance of what already exists. This is the only means of preservation; and it is perhaps the most likely method of regaining what has been already lost. For this end, therefore, the efforts of every one must be combined as well as the measures of all those whom one and the same principle, one and the same interest, unite. Combustible matters long in preparation broke forth in the epoch between 1817 and 1820. The false step which was taken by the French Ministry during this period; the toleration which was evinced in Germany to these dangerous doctrines; the weakness shown in suppressing the abuses of the press; the precipitation, finally, with which Constitutions were given to the States of South-

ern Germany—all these causes have excited the parties whom nothing can please to the most miserable abuses.

Nothing shows the impossibility of pleasing these parties more than to remark that the most active intrigues have taken place exactly in that very State where the most indulgence was shown to their supposed wishes.

The evil had reached such a height before the Congress at Carlsbad that only some trifling political combination was needed completely to overthrow social order. The wisdom of the system adopted by the great Courts has protected us from this danger, which might even at this moment be fatal. What course, then, must an enlightened Government take under such circumstances? By putting this question the possibility of salvation is taken for granted, and we believe we are justified in such a hope.

When we now examine the means by which we are to attain so great an end, we find ourselves led back to the point from whence we started. In aiming at a happier future, we must at least make certain of the present; the preservation of that which is must consequently be the first of all cares. And by this we mean, not only the old order of things as they have been preserved in some countries, but also all the new legally constructed institutions. The importance of preserving them firm and steady is evident from the attacks which have been directed against them, with a perhaps still greater irritation than against the old institutions. At the present time the change from old to new is attended with as much danger as the return from the new to what no longer exists. Both may equally bring about the outbreak of disturbances which it is important to avoid at any price.

To deviate in no way from the established order, whatever may be its origin, and where alterations are absolutely necessary to make them only with entire freedom and well-considered resolution—this is the first duty of a Government that desires to resist the evils of the age. Such a resolution, however just and natural it may be, will certainly cause obstinate conflicts; but the advantage of building on a known and recognized basis is evident, because this gives a firm point from which it will be easy to examine and frustrate the necessarily uncertain movements of the enemy in all directions.

We consider as perfectly unfounded the objection which might possibly be raised, “that amongst the Constitutions hitherto given in Germany there is none which rests on any foundation: that, therefore, none of them offers a point of support.” If this were so,

the indefatigable demagogues would not have given up undermining those Constitutions. Every order of things legally introduced bears in itself the principle of a better system; they must therefore be the work of caprice or of a wild delusion, like the Constitution of the Cortes of 1812. Moreover, a Charter is not a real Constitution; this forms itself with time alone, and it always depends on the judgment and will of Governments to direct the development of the constitutional manner of government, to separate good from evil, to strengthen the public authority, and to protect the peace and happiness of the nation from every hostile attack. Two great means of salvation are at present secure to every Government which, from a feeling of its dignity and duty, is resolved not to ruin itself. One of these means consists of the happy conviction that no misunderstanding prevails among the European Powers, and that also, according to the unalterable principles of monarchy, none is to be anticipated. This fact, which is beyond any doubt, secures and guarantees our position and our strength. The other means is the union formed between the German States during the last nine months, a union which, with God's help, will become indissoluble.

The conferences of Carlsbad and the resolutions prepared there have acted more powerfully and more beneficially than we may perhaps acknowledge to ourselves at a moment when we still feel the embarrassments which constrain us, and when we can only superficially estimate all the advantages which have been gained. Important measures of that kind can only be estimated at their full value when all their results are to be seen. These, however, cannot be seen in the epoch immediately following; but we may already calculate the effects of the resolutions of September 2 by considering the probable advances which the enemies of the public order would have made without them.

The results of the conferences in Vienna, although of the grandest kind, are not so brilliant in their immediate effects, but are all the deeper and more lasting. The consolidation of the German Bund now affords to each of the States of which it consists an effectual guarantee—an inestimable advantage, which could only be certainly secured by the course which has been taken. The uprightness and moderation with which this important work was carried on may have delayed us and prevented bolder and more vigorous measures; but, even supposing these had been possible, the work would have been wanting in one of its most essential conditions—namely, the free conviction and sincere confidence of all who take

part in it. Nothing could compensate for such a want, which would have been especially felt when the resolutions adopted under such auspices had to be carried out. Generally speaking, moral strength is as great a necessity to the Bund as legislative power, and the increased conviction of the necessity for this league and of its beneficial results is in our opinion the most important, and fortunate result.

The rules to be observed in future by the German Governments may be pointed out in a few words. They are :

1. Confidence in the duration of a state of peace in Europe, and in the harmony of the principles guiding the great Powers.
2. Conscientious attention to their own system of administration.
3. Perseverance in maintaining the legal principles of existing Constitutions and a firm determination to defend them against every attack ; but also at the same time—
4. The removal of the principal defects in these Constitutions, carried out by the Government on adequate grounds. Lastly,
5. In case of our own resources being insufficient, the Bund may be appealed to for support, a support which every member has the most sacred right of demanding, and which can less than ever be refused after the present determinations. This is, according to our judgment, the only beneficial, legal, and enduring course. The political system of his Majesty the Emperor rests on the same foundations, and Austria, inwardly calm in the possession of an imposing assemblage of intellectual force and material means, will not use them merely for her own support, but will always apply them for the benefit of her allies whenever duty and prudence require it of her.

I wish that your Excellency may take the opportunity of this candid representation to offer to the Archduke a new proof of our true feelings, and of the lively interest which the Imperial Royal Court takes in gratifying his Royal Highness, as well as in the welfare and security of his States.

RESULTS OF THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCES IN
VIENNA.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, May 17, 1820.

475. The consent of the Court of Wurtemberg to our Closing Act has arrived this evening. In a full sitting, which I have fixed for to-morrow morning, the protocol about this first part of our business here will be concluded, and the day after to-morrow I shall bring the Acts to be signed.

The second part—the instructions for the assembly of the Bund—has meantime so far advanced that we shall be able to dissolve our conference on the 21st or 22nd of this month.

The work having reached its termination here, all has been done that could be done at present, and I already see the consequences which the propriety of our course will make more and more manifest every day. All the ministers are making preparations for their departure, and there is not one who did not ask from me to-day instructions as to the course to be taken in future by his Court in regard both to policy and administration. One word spoken by Austria will be inviolable law throughout all Germany. Now first will the Carlsbad measures come into their true life, and all those which are requisite for the peace of Germany will be quite naturally added.*

I intend, if nothing happens to prevent me, to start from here on the 24th, and to be with your Majesty at Prague on the 26th.

METTERNICH.

* The document generally known under the name of "The Concluding Acts of Vienna," in sixty-five articles, treats of the measures for the security of the public rights of the members of the Bund by a permanent court, as well as the introduction of a definite order concerning the execution of the sentences pronounced by this tribunal; it refers to various military questions; it gives the authentic interpretation of Article XIII. of the Acts of the Bund, and regulates the relations of the single States to the Bund. By a resolution of the Diet of June 8 the "Concluding Acts" were raised to a fundamental law of the Bund and published as such.—ED.

I am glad to know this, and I expect you with real pleasure.

FRANCIS.

Prague, May 17, 1820.

Sketch of a Statement to be made by the President.

476. At the session of the Diet on September 20 last year, it was resolved, on the report of the President, to ask for instructions as to various points most important for the improvement of the Bund, so that these points could be discussed immediately after the reopening of the session, and brought at once to a definite conclusion.

Meanwhile his Majesty the Emperor, my most gracious master, guided by the conviction that it is not only the common interest but also the common wish of all your allies in the Bund to develop, improve, and strengthen the indissoluble union by strictly maintaining the original convention with all its aims, has caused Ministerial Conferences to be held in Vienna to which all the Governments of the Bund have sent their plenipotentiaries. These conferences should, according to their original purpose, lead to direct communication and discussion of opinions on both sides, and a common understanding on the subjects on which instructions are to be given.

At the negotiations opened for that purpose it was soon evident, however, that by a thorough treatment of the proposed subjects many others connected with them would be drawn into the discussion—subjects which had been already discussed at the Diet, but which had remained undecided or been regulated provisionally. At the same time it was acknowledged on all sides that the first condition of successful progress in the legislation of the Bund was an exact definition of the nature of the Bund and the circumstances, duties, and rights resulting from it.

The business resting on these principles presented, during its whole course, a remarkable example of harmony, public spirit, and mutual confidence, the surest pledge of the future strength of the German Bund. Gradually the resolution was formed to bring together the chief results of the conferences into one whole, which, being immediately derived from the *Acts of Confederation*, should have the same force and legality as that fundamental law—thus satisfying the general desire for the completion and development of that law, and facilitating the conduct of affairs at the Diet.

But this work required a peculiar form, because it differed essen-

tially in origin, contents, and aim from common instructions on a particular subject, or only introducing further deliberations. It was, therefore, resolved to include the above-mentioned chief results of the negotiations held in Vienna in an Act drawn up by the assembled plenipotentiaries in the name of their Governments, to have this Act presented to the Diet in the usual constitutional way, and to let it be there declared law in a formal resolution.

Accordingly, I am directed by my Court to lay before this honorable assembly the "Concluding Acts" of the Ministerial Conferences on the development and strengthening of the Bund, requesting at the same time that a resolution be drawn up, as agreed upon, and signed by all the ambassadors in the name of their respective Governments.

The Austrian Vote.

The Imperial Royal Embassy is instructed to declare by protocol the consent and approbation of their Court to the elevation of this Act to be a law of the Bund, according to the agreement made, and to deposit the original in the archives of the Bund, adding a copy of it to the protocol.

Sketch of the Resolution.

1. The Concluding Acts of the Ministerial Conferences at Vienna, drawn up by the plenipotentiaries of all the States of the Bund for the development and strengthening of the Bund, is to be raised to be a fundamental law, equal in power and legal force to the Acts of the Bund.

2. The original document in question, duly signed and attested, is to be deposited in the archives of the Bund; and

3. A copy of it is to be added to the present protocol.

STATE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN MAY 1820.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, May 18, 1820.

477. Nothing of an unexpected nature has happened in the political world since your Majesty's departure.

In France there is a great conflict of parties. The Ministry stands firm; the election law will pass.

In England the relation between the King and the Ministry is very gloomy. The cause of this is the Queen, who is in Paris, and who either goes to England herself or works as a partisan for the Opposition. The proceedings against the Radicals have come to a favorable termination.

Anarchy is seen in Spain day by day more distinctly. The revolution of March 8 will soon bear its bitter fruits.

A courier has arrived here to-day from Russia. The Emperor thinks a great deal of the Spanish cause morally, but he will not insist upon taking an active part.

I merely signify to your Majesty the present state of things most respectfully, but in the shortest possible manner.

The collection of Reports I will myself lay before your Majesty, as I need them for the despatches which I must still send out before my departure.

The King of Prussia does not accept your Majesty's invitation, for it just happens to fall at the time of his daughter's marriage with the Archduke of Mecklenburg. The show of politeness has therefore been made, and your Majesty is set free as to your Majesty's travelling plans.

AUSTRIA'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE REVOLUTION IN NAPLES, AND BAVARIA'S AGREEMENT WITH METTERNICH'S POLICY.

Metternich to Count Rechberg, Foreign Minister at Munich, Vienna, July 26, 1820.

478. The late events in the kingdom of Naples have shown more evidently and significantly than any former occurrence of this kind that, even in a well-regulated and well-governed State, among a quiet, peaceable nation, contented and satisfied with their Government, the pernicious influence of revolutionary sects can cause the most violent agitation, and quickly lead to an entire revolution. For it has been certainly proved that the movements of the Carbonari alone, without any foreign impulse, without even a show of pretext, have excited those rebellious movements which have induced his Majesty the King of Naples, in a moment of embarrassment, to lay down the Government, dissolve all existing authority, and proclaim a Constitution strange to his country, which even where it is found is still new and untried—in other words, he has proclaimed anarchy as law.

His Majesty the Emperor is convinced that this unexpected event will have made the greatest impression on all German courts. It teaches, by a remarkable example, the danger of looking with scornful indifference on the action of secret unions and stealthy conspiracies, and shows the wisdom of the German Princes in opposing with vigilance and severity the first symptoms of such criminal attempts.

His Majesty the Emperor is particularly interested in these unfortunate incidents by his political and personal ties, by his relationship with several Italian princes, and by the geographical situation of his own countries. The political order of things established in 1815, and guaranteed by all the European Powers, has made Austria the natural warder and protector of public peace in Italy. The

Emperor is firmly determined to fulfil this high vocation, to keep away all peace-disturbing movements from his frontiers and those of his nearest neighbors, to allow no infringement of the rights of the Italian Princes, and if legal and administrative precautions should not afford sufficient protection, he will resort to the most vigorous measures.

Fortunately, the present position of the European Powers, and the peaceful spirit which animates them all, are pledges that such measures would not provoke political hostilities or wars. In case force (which his Majesty's well-known love of justice and clemency will only employ in the greatest necessity) should be unavoidable, it would only be used against rebels in arms, and never against a legitimate power.

But even in this case (only alluded to with the greatest reluctance) the Emperor would not claim immediate assistance on the part of his allies in the German Bund. The measures requisite for the maintenance of peace and order in Italy lie entirely beyond the sphere of co-operation of the German Bund as it was originally settled; and, far from intending to deviate from established principles, his Majesty is ready to make every effort and every sacrifice to prevent such co-operation being required, and to put forth all his strength to avert such danger from the frontier of the States of the German Bund.

In return, it is certainly desirable and important that Austria, while devoting her care and strength to a matter of public benefit, should be able confidently to rely upon undisturbed peace in the interior of Germany. However much now, or in future, the fate of Italy may occupy the Emperor's attention, his Majesty will always feel the same lively interest in German affairs, and fulfil to the utmost his duties as a member of the Bund. But it is the greatest satisfaction and consolation to know that there need be no fear for our Fatherland as long as the German Courts are guided by the strong feeling of the duty imposed on them by the present critical state of the political world, and by that spirit of harmony, firmness and wisdom which revealed itself so unmistakably during the last negotiations at Vienna (and even since the conclusion of the negotiations) on the part of the chief German Governments. A great honor is reserved for Germany, if she finds in the prudence and resolution of her rulers, in the steadfast support of her existing Constitutions, in the loyal feelings of her people, and in the powerful guarantee of the alliance of the Bund, the means and power she

needs in this stormy time to preserve and maintain her inward peace, her lawful order, her independence, her dignity, and her ancient character. His Majesty is convinced that none of your noble allies in the Bund will be insensible to glory of this kind; and you will one day congratulate yourself when called upon to accept your share in it, conscious of having spared no effort, no sacrifice, for so great and glorious an aim.

At a time when the latest events in Italy appeal only too strongly to the attention of the German Courts, his Imperial Majesty considers it fitting to express to his allies in the Bund his own opinions, as well as his firm confidence in his Majesty the King.

With the greatest respect, &c., &c.*

Gentz to Metternich, Salzburg, August 1, 1820.

479. . . . On Sunday at eleven o'clock I betook myself to Nymphenburg. The King received me with his usual kindness and affability. He had just received the declaration from Count Rechberg (No. 478), and promised to read it with the most serious attention. This gave me the opportunity of speaking of its contents, to which he listened with an unconcealed "Bravo!" He expressed himself thus: "That the firmness of his Majesty the Emperor, his calm steadfastness in good and evil days, is well known to him, and that he (the King) can easily imagine what the Emperor must think of such scandals as the revolution in Naples; that all of us must thank God that we have still in Germany a man like the Emperor to take the lead." He said that he (the King) was as far from being a friend of Constitutions as the Emperor, and that if the . . . Congress of Vienna in 1815 had not spoiled his whole game, he certainly would never have committed himself so far. That, however, he has come off with little injury, and that he will not be led on one step further by the d—. During this tirade some angry, but only passing, blows were struck at former times and occurrences between the Imperial and Bavarian Courts, and the whole ended with a very good-natured and honorable declaration about the great fame your Highness has lately acquired in Germany.

The King then read me his latest letters from Naples, which came down to the 15th. His only anxiety seemed to be lest we might not send troops enough to Italy. He said he had heard of twenty

* Similar declarations were also sent to the other German Courts.—Ed.

thousand men, which did not please him. I said that, of course, I did not yet know anything definite on this point, and that his Majesty was well aware that large armies could not be put in motion in a few days or weeks. From the point of view taken in Vienna, however, I felt confident that Austria would not be wanting in anything requisite for her own safety and the protection of her nearest neighbors.

The King seemed to fear nothing from Sardinia. He gave me to understand he had good reason to believe that the King of Sardinia "would not bite," especially if the Carbonari exercised much influence on Genoa. He must resolutely join for life and death with Austria, for no revolution could be tolerated. I perfectly agreed with this very just remark.

According to an idle rumor, which has circulated in Munich for more than a fortnight, and which the King also mentioned, the Neapolitan Court was said to have begged auxiliary troops from Austria before the outbreak of the insurrection, which could not be granted, because the Russian ambassador in Rome had declared he must protest against every Austrian march of troops. I assured the King, and all those who asked me about this affair, that the whole story was false from beginning to end, and probably spread abroad by the Carbonari from very intelligible motives.

The King—who does not seem to love the Emperor Alexander very much—expressed his anxiety lest he might, in our sense perhaps, "immediately put his hand to the work" in Italy, which would always be hazardous. I answered that, of late years, the Emperor Alexander has shown only the best and noblest sentiments, and that, however important, under present circumstances, his moral and political agreement with our Court might be, any obtrusion of substantial help by him was not to be thought of and not needed by Austria.

Amongst others the King put this strange question—whether I did not believe the Crown Prince of Naples had a direct share in the conspiracy. I assured him I had never heard the least hint of this; whereat the King replied very significantly, "I believe it is quite certain, and for this very reason, that my son—who, as you know, also loves Liberal principles—has told me a great deal too much good of him."

The King believes that Reggio—a great place of meeting for the Carbonari in Upper Italy—and Modena generally are seriously threatened.

The conversation then returned to Germany. The King did not speak favorably of the King of Wurtemberg, and still less so of his minister; neither did he seem to have a good opinion of the Grand Duke of Baden.

At last I turned the conversation to Baron Zentner, and his honorable conduct in Vienna. What I said seemed to please the King exceedingly; and when I further told him that your Highness had particularly charged me to express to Count Rechberg your deep satisfaction with the whole course so far of the assembly of the Bund, and added that "I knew from your Highness that the Emperor had several times spoken in the same sense," it could not escape me with what lively interest the King listened to all I said.

My audience lasted about an hour and a half. His Majesty dismissed me with the words, "That I might greet your Highness in the most friendly manner from him."

Afterwards I was invited to dinner at Count Rechberg's, where Baron Zentner, Count Thurheim, Count Arco, Baron Hruby, and others were present.

After dinner I had my last and, if not most important, yet most solemn conversation with Count Rechberg. He led Baron Zentner and myself into an anteroom, and here he made a sort of political confession, from which I mention only the following remarkable words: "I begin by passing judgment on myself. For fifteen years I have, prepossessed by old prejudices, opposed Austria as an enemy. I accuse myself, but I excuse myself also. My opinion was the reflection of that which universally obtained in my fatherland, and although I might have corrected many a false opinion in Vienna, the noble principles of his Majesty the Emperor at that time appeared to me only through dim and often distorting glasses. It is one of the ever-enduring services of Prince Metternich to have first shown the true character of the Austrian policy, not only to Bavaria, but also to all Germany. To consider Austria now as anything but a beneficent and protecting power would be to fight against reason and our own interests: with Austria Bavaria must in future stand or fall. We—at least all who think honestly amongst us—heartily acknowledge this; we wish we could express it with a hundred voices. How far other German Courts participate in these feelings I cannot decide, but they all acknowledge it, and even Wurtemberg cannot but see that she would not long exist without Austria."

He had tears in his eyes when he spoke these words.

He then begged me to report to your Highness "that he thought the declaration he received yesterday in the highest degree just, consolatory, and glorious for Austria—one which could not fail to produce a very great impression. If Austria had been uncertain, if she had hesitated at this important moment, he would, for his part, have given up Europe as lost. Now he could still see hope, and if all German Courts would do their duty, as Bavaria was determined to do, he thought he might assure your Highness that, in spite of the restless machinations of the enemy, peace would not be disturbed in Germany."

Baron Zentner joined in every word of these declarations. . . .

I have very much regretted that I was not able to speak to Prince Wrede. He was not in Munich, and I could not meet him in Mondsee, because he left that place the very day that I left Munich, and took the Regensburg road to his distant estates.

I left Munich on the morning of Monday, the 31st, and arrived yesterday about noon in Salzburg, where I found very unfavorable accounts concerning my further journey to Gastein.

Metternich to Gentz, Vienna, August 10, 1820.

480. I received your report from Salzburg, my dear Gentz. I immediately laid it before the Emperor, and he has done it the full justice it deserves. The picture of Munich is quite true, the elements that rule there are such as you describe; and I am rejoiced that you see that I was under no delusion as to the people and the situation. . . .

Nothing decided can yet be said from Italy—there, as everywhere else, the immediate future is uncertain. The Governments desire what is right: will they be steadfast in the day of danger? Our position alone puts a curb on Italy at present. In Naples no one, not even the first leaders, know where they are going, where they can go, or even where they want to go. There the revolution has really dropped from the clouds; it lies like a spectre on the land. Those who summoned it have gained their end so quickly that they are quite astonished to be suddenly obliged to rule; and turn the thing as you will, there remain always the same wants and the same means of Government. The State needs money; it requires to be guarded; justice must be administered. From whence is the money to come? from whence the protection and the justice? I believe, if the game were not too dangerous, the best means of

quieting the babblers in the opposition would be to select here and there some, and lay upon them at once the affairs of government. This is the situation of the Neapolitan rulers, and the part they play is very different from that in Spain, for with them everything was good, and now must become absolutely bad. Nobody will pay, and nobody will obey. The return of Prince Cariati must have caused a frightful sensation.

Things look very dangerous in the Roman district. But when common sense is so shaken and perplexed as it now is, one can no longer calculate on the future. I freely confess, therefore, that I know not what can or will be the end of the affair. However, we are here quiet, and with our great resources may go calmly forward.

In France the Neapolitan event has caused quite a sensation. At the first glance the communications from the Cabinet seem to be good. No one will be turned out of doors by Pepe and his companions.

In St. Petersburg the Neapolitan news has arrived after the King's departure; in the course of a few days we shall know the impression it has made on him. Meantime, the peasants on the Don have taken up arms on hearing that the Emperor had declared the peasants from Esthonia and Courland free, asserting their desire to be free also. Many troops have marched there to drive out the Liberal devil with the knout.

From Germany I have always quiet, unimportant news. On all sides we are entreated, for God's sake, to send a great many troops to Italy. By September 85,000 men will be on the spot.

I hope soon to see you again. I miss you very much, especially at the present moment.

RESULTS OF THE TROPPAU CONGRESS.*

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Troppau, November 6, 1820.

481. In order to bring about the fullest understanding, I wrote down the annexed paper (482) during the conversation that took place to-day between the three Cabinets.

The Russian Ministers agreed that it suitably expressed the feeling of their master. I lay it before your Majesty for approval, to know whether I may deliver it as truly representing your Majesty's opinion.

Principles of the Policy of Intervention.

(Enclosed with No. 481.)

482. The allies agree together:

1. That their aim and object, moral as well as physical, is not limited to giving liberty of thought and action to legitimate power, but is also to enable that power to consolidate and strengthen itself in such a way as to guarantee peace and stability to the kingdom and to Europe.

2. They recognize that to this end the power should, in its reconstruction, consult the true interests and needs of the country.

3. That what the King in his wisdom considers satisfactory for the interests of the kingdom, and consequently satisfactory to the sound part of the nation, will be taken as the legal basis of the order to be established in the kingdom of Naples.

Approved and accepted.

FRANCIS.

* At the Congress of Troppau, assembled at Metternich's suggestion, there were the Emperor Francis of Austria, the Emperor Alexander and Grand-Duke Nicholas of Russia, King Frederick William III. of Prussia, with the Crown Prince, the diplomatists, Metternich, Zichy, Gentz, Mercy (for Austria), Nesselrode, Capo d'Istria, Golowkin, Alopäus (for Russia), Hardenberg, Bernstorff (for Prussia), Stewart (for England), De la Ferronnays (for France).

Circular Despatch of the Courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, to their Ambassadors and Agents at the German and Northern Courts, Troppau, December 8, 1820.

484. The events of March 8 in Spain, and July 2 in Naples, and the catastrophe in Portugal, must cause in all those who have to care for the peace of States a deep feeling of grief and anxiety, and, at the same time, a necessity for meeting, in order to consider in common how best to meet the evils which threaten to break out all over Europe.

It was natural that these feelings should be very active in those particular Powers which had lately conquered revolution, and now saw it raising its head again; and also natural that these Powers, in resisting the revolution for the third time, should resort to the same means which they had used so happily in the memorable combat which delivered Europe from a twenty years' yoke.

Everything justified the hope that this union, formed under the most dangerous circumstances, crowned with the most brilliant success, fostered by the negotiations of 1814, 1815, and 1818, as it had released the European continent from the military despotism of the representative of revolution, and brought peace to the world, would be able to curb a new force not less tyrannical and not less to be despised—the power of rebellion and outrage.

These were the motives, and the purpose, of the meeting in Troppau. The former are so evident that they do not require an explanation: the latter is so honorable and beneficial that doubtless the wishes of all honorable men will follow the allied Courts in their noble career.

The business which is imposed on them by the most sacred obligations is great and difficult; but a happy presentiment bids them hope for the attainment of their aim by a firm maintenance of the spirit of those treaties to which Europe owes peace and unity among her States.

The Powers exercise an indisputable right in contemplating common measures of safety against States in which the Government has been overthrown by rebellion, and which, if only as an example, must consequently be treated as hostile to all lawful constitutions and Governments. The exercise of this right becomes still more urgent when revolutionists endeavor to spread to neighboring countries the misfortunes which they had brought upon themselves, scattering rebellion and confusion around.

Such a position, such proceedings are an evident violation of contract, which guarantees to all the European Governments, besides the inviolability of their territories, the enjoyment of those peaceful relations which exclude the possibility of encroachment on either side.

The allied Courts took incontestable fact as their starting-point, and those ministers who could be at Troppau itself supplied with definite instructions from their monarchs, therefore made an agreement as to the principles to be followed as to States whose form of government has been violently disturbed, and as to the peaceful or forcible measures to be adopted to lead such States back into the Bund.

The results of their deliberations they communicated to the Courts of Paris and London, that those Courts might take them into consideration.

Since the Neapolitan revolution takes daily fresh root; since no other endangers so directly the peace of the neighboring States; since no other can be acted upon so immediately, the necessity of proceeding on the above-mentioned principles with regard to the kingdom of Both the Sicilies soon became evident.

To bring about conciliatory measures to that end, the monarchs assembled at Troppau resolved to invite the King of Both Sicilies to meet them at Laybach, a step which would free the will of his Majesty from every outward constraint, and put the King in the position of a mediator between his deluded and erring subjects and the States whose peace was threatened by them. Since the monarchs were determined not to acknowledge Governments created by open rebellion, they could enter into a negotiation with the person of the King only. Their ministers and agents in Naples have received the necessary instructions for that purpose.

France and England have been asked to take part in this step, and it is to be expected that they will not refuse their consent, since the principle on which the invitation rests is in perfect harmony with the agreements formerly concluded by them, and is also a pledge of the most upright and peaceable feelings.*

The system established between Austria, Prussia, and Russia is no new one; it rests on the same maxims which formed the founda-

* England, according to a despatch dated January 17, 1821, declined to join in the measure in question. Not so France, whose king wrote to the King of Naples urging him to accept the invitation of the allied monarchs.—Ed.

tion of the agreements by which the union of the European States in the Bund has been effected. The hearty concord existing between the Courts which form the centre of this confederation can only be strengthened by it. The Bund will be maintained on the same footing as that on which it was placed by the Powers to whom it owes its existence, and as it has been gradually accepted by all, from the conviction entertained of its evident and undoubted advantages.

No further proof, however, is required that the Powers have not been guided in their resolutions by the thought of conquest or the desire of interfering with the internal affairs of other Governments. They want nothing but to maintain peace, to free Europe from the scourge of revolution, and to avert, or shorten as much as possible, the mischief arising from the violation of all the principles of order and morality. Under such conditions they think themselves justified in claiming the unanimous approbation of the world as a reward for their cares and their efforts.

Metternich to Count Rechberg, Vienna, December 31, 1820.

485. I take advantage, my dear Count, of the first moment at my disposal, which is the last of my stay here, to give you some account of what has been done and what is going to be done. . . .

Here are the facts in all their simplicity.

Any catastrophe such as that of Naples presents different periods, whether regarded from a domestic or foreign point of view. The revolt breaks out; it is indubitable and evident; it is the beginning of a conflagration; if they are in good order, take your fire-engines there; ask no questions; do not hesitate; extinguish the fire; success will be certain. Do not take empty fire-engines, but let them be well filled.

Then comes the second period. The revolt takes the appearance of Reform. A feeble sovereign swears to put a knife to his throat. A chorus of Liberals and Radicals join in his hymns; the sovereign is praised to the skies; and the people seem to adore him. Milk and honey are to flow in all the veins of the State abandoned to anarchy; tyrants alone could hinder the development of so fine a work!

This is the history of the months of July to November.

Our fire-engines were not full in July, otherwise we should have set to work immediately.

In the second period, it did not seem to us that our neutral attitude was sufficient; the Naples affair threatened Italy, Austria, Europe equally. It is therefore for the latter to declare itself in principle with us. We take upon ourselves the material part. To go to Naples is nothing at any time, but to remain at Naples and re establish order in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies is certainly more difficult.

Europe has frankly and well seconded us. We, who were free to hold whatever language we liked, have spoken: those of our allies who could do the same have done so. Those who are more bound by forms have acted according to our principles. The Neapolitan revolt and all its charms have been put in quarantine. You have done more than even the great English and French. You have sent back the agent of the Carbonari who came to boast to you of the happiness of his country; you have done this, my dear Count, and it was worthy of you.

Agreed in their principles at Troppau, the three Cabinets have carried them into effect. The idea of inviting the King to meet us at Laybach was acceptable. This invitation was made on very simple but the only correct grounds. You know the autograph letters of the Sovereigns: they are all friendly, for no one is an enemy of the King. The *ostensible* instructions for our plenipotentiaries were more precise. They were ordered to declare:

1st. That the Powers would never recognize anything which is the work of the rebellion.

2nd. That before resorting to extreme measures, they desire to exhaust every means of conciliation, *not between the rebellion and lawful power, but between the real interests of the kingdom and those of Italy and Europe*. That, knowing but one proper instrument for a work so great and salutary, his Majesty the King was invited to meet the three monarchs.

3rd. That at Naples it is asserted that the King is free. That the King, being free, should feel it his duty to take upon himself this great work; that if the King did not come he would be surrendered.

4th. That as the King's person is not on this occasion to be replaced by any other, the invitation is personal. That our ambassadors would in consequence refuse passports to any other individual, were it even a Prince of the Royal House; that on the other hand, it would depend upon the King to be accompanied by whomsoever his Majesty should think fit.

5th. That the King, if he were prevented from leaving the Kingdom, should be placed under the safeguard and responsibility of every Neapolitan.

The order has gone, and there is not a folly that our agents have not committed. Unhappily, there is not a single head among them. These stormy times, my dear Count, are weak in heads.

What we had foreseen came to pass among the parties at Naples. The Radicals and Doctrinaires, or, if you like it better, the Demagogues and the Liberals, who at Naples call themselves *Carbonari* and *Muratistes*, are divided; they had agreed together before, during, and after July, with the sole object of overthrowing the existing order of things, and we were certain that the muratists (who must be ruined in any state of the case) would try to make the King go. But they went further: they wished to turn the circumstance to advantage to overthrow Carbonarism and assert themselves. This is the secret of the declaration of December 7 last. And to do this the better, they placed our ambassadors in a false light by making them be present at a Council where the Duke of Calabria produced that declaration, while the Neapolitan ministers were met together in another room close by. Zurlo, who had conceived the project, sent the declaration in haste into the provinces in the hope of exciting there a strong feeling in favor of Liberalism; but its language was like so much Hebrew to the Neapolitans. The funds rose; the Parliament, which is merely the *élite* of the sect, attacked the Ministry, and once more the *Doctrinaires* must be convinced that in revolutions (which they will adore none the less) they are, and always will be, crushed by the extreme parties.

The man who desires the whole is very strong in comparison with him who only desires the half.

Our ambassadors not only took no part in this action, but they declared themselves incompetent. Why then sit at the round table?

But good often comes out of evil. We should have had to fight the *Muratistes* at Laybach. They died on the road, and of the two I prefer to take in hand Carbonarism rather than Liberalism, and you will be of my opinion. The importance which the King and his Government, including the Prince Royal, attach to the oath of July 8, was proved on December 7.

But, however, there is the King. From this moment everything is simplified, and the positions are made clear. The King's duty is to speak and enlighten his people. He has to pacify his kingdom

and organize it so as to procure present and future peace. At the same time he must do nothing which will disturb the repose of his neighbors; and it is for them to guard against that. We have also invited the Princes of Italy to send representatives to Laybach. Austria will furnish the means of pacification, and the Powers, including Austria, will guarantee the results, and these results we are to bring about.

Here then, my dear Count, is a very short statement, and a very heavy budget.

Naples has in the meantime exhausted her treasury. Fifteen millions of ducats have been wasted in four months; there are no soldiers, no arms; no place is provisioned; but the Carbonari, who had not a *sou*, begin to feel their pockets filling, while the proprietors feel theirs empty: undoubted benefits resulting from this beautiful enterprise which the Duke de Campochiaro, at the commencement of his ministry, assured me was quite falsely called a revolution, being nothing but a little family arrangement.

Now see how things stand. The first moments at Laybach will decide the development of affairs. Be quite easy, my dear Count; we shall not swerve from our principles.

You will be grateful to me for writing such a long letter at the very moment of my departure, though perhaps it shows signs of my haste; but as I wish you to know how things are, the principles which guide us, and to give you a new proof of my confidence, I do not deserve any credit.

To conclude, this letter is only for the King, yourself, and the Marshal.

Adieu, my dear Count. The King of Naples will beat Laybach on the 5th, the Emperor of Austria on the 6th, and the Emperor of Russia on the 7th of January. I shall be there on the 5th.

Accept my good wishes for the new year, and, in it, may the same friendship and confidence unite us as in that which is passing away.

METTERNICH'S POLITICAL CONFESSION OF FAITH.

486. Metternich to the Emperor Francis (Report), Troppau, December 2, 1820.

486. May it please your Majesty to receive enclosed my "Confession of Faith" to the Emperor Alexander.

I beseech your Highness to read this short diplomatic composition in the sense in which I have drawn it up, and which is known to your Majesty.

METTERNICH.

The enclosed herewith returned.

FRANCIS.

Troppau, December 2, 1820.

Metternich to the Emperor Alexander, Troppau, December 15, 1820.

487. Sire, I have the honor to send to your Imperial Majesty the enclosed statement. I received your Majesty's commands, and have fulfilled them with an ardor which gives full liberty to my thoughts. Your Imperial Majesty will find it complete on all the questions most worthy of the meditations of every public man, of every man entrusted with grave interests—in short, of every man sufficiently enlightened to feel that to a world of folly he should oppose another full of wisdom, reason, justice, and reformation. I should have despised myself, Sire, long ago, if I did not say what I think. What in a private individual might appear a merit is simply a duty to a man in my position.

What is contained in this statement would excite a disdainful smile from the superficial persons who, full of complacency at their own imperfect knowledge, are impudent criticisers of the first interests of Society—that crowd of bawlers with crude ideas, who are the victims of their own errors, and false prophets, whenever they allow themselves to predict anything but groundless errors. This same smile would appear on the lips of a better class of men—those men who think that the most useless of all enterprises is to say what

is self-evident. My conviction, Sire, is that it is always the duty of men who wish to do good to speak, for at all times, and above all at times disturbed by passion, those men who wish to do evil, the vain and the foolish, will speak. It is therefore necessary not to abandon the moral atmosphere to them altogether.

Deign, Sire, while receiving this paper, dictated by my conscience, to accept the homage of my profound respect.

Confession of Faith.

Metternich's Secret Memorandum to the Emperor Alexander.

(Supplement to No. 487.)

488. "*L'Europe*," a celebrated writer has recently said, "*fait aujourd'hui pitié à l'homme d'esprit et horreur à l'homme vertueux.*"

It would be difficult to comprise in a few words a more exact picture of the situation at the time we are writing these lines!

Kings have to calculate the chances of their very existence in the immediate future; passions are let loose, and league together to overthrow everything which society respects as the basis of its existence; religion, public morality, laws, customs, rights, and duties, all are attacked, confounded, overthrown, or called in question. The great mass of the people are tranquil spectators of these attacks and revolutions, and of the absolute want of all means of defence. A few are carried off by the torrent, but the wishes of the immense majority are to maintain a repose which exists no longer, and of which even the first elements seem to be lost.

What is the cause of all these evils? By what methods has this evil established itself, and how is it that it penetrates into every vein of the social body?

Do remedies still exist to arrest the progress of this evil, and what are they?

These are doubtless questions worthy of the solicitude of every good man who is a true friend to order and public peace—two elements inseparable in principle, and which are at once the first needs and the first blessings of humanity.

Has there never been offered to the world an institution really worthy of the name? Has truth been always confounded with error ever since society has believed itself able to distinguish one from the other? Have the experiences bought at the price of so many sacrifices, and repeated at intervals, and in so many different places, been all in error? Will a flood of light be shed upon society

at one stroke? Will knowledge come by inspiration? If one could believe in such phenomena it would not be the less necessary, first of all, to assure oneself of their reality. Of all things, nothing is so fatal as error; and it is neither our wish nor our intention ever to give ourselves up to it. Let us examine the matter!

The Source of the Evil.

Man's nature is immutable. The first needs of society are and remain the same, and the differences which they seem to offer find their explanation in the diversity of influences, acting on the different races by natural causes, such as the diversity of climate, barrenness or richness of soil, insular or continental position, &c., &c. These local differences no doubt produce effects which extend far beyond purely physical necessities; they create and determine particular needs in a more elevated sphere; finally, they determine the laws, and exercise an influence even on religions.

It is, on the other hand, with institutions as with everything else. Vague in their origin, they pass through periods of development and perfection, to arrive in time at their decadence; and, conforming to the laws of man's nature, they have, like him, their infancy, their youth, their age of strength and reason, and their age of decay.

Two elements alone remain in all their strength, and never cease to exercise their indestructible influence with equal power. These are the precepts of morality, religious as well as social, and the necessities created by locality. From the time that men attempt to swerve from these bases, to become rebels against these sovereign arbiters of their destinies, society suffers from a *malaise* which sooner or later will lead to a state of convulsion. The history of every country, in relating the consequences of such errors, contains many pages stained with blood; but we dare to say, without fear of contradiction, one seeks in vain for an epoch when an evil of this nature has extended its ravages over such a vast area as it has done at the present time. The causes are natural.

History embraces but a very limited space of time. It did not begin to deserve the name of history until long after the fall of great empires. There, where it seems to conduct us to the cradle of civilization, it really conducts us to ruins. We see republics arise and prosper, struggle, and then submit to the rule of one fortunate soldier. We see one of these republics pass through all

the phases common to society, and end in an almost universal monarchy—that is to say, subjugating the scattered portions of the then civilized world. We see this monarchy suffer the fate of all political bodies: we see its first springs become enfeebled, and finally decay.

Centuries of darkness followed the irruption of the barbarians. The world, however, could not return to barbarism. The Christian religion had appeared; imperishable in its essence, its very existence was sufficient to disperse the darkness and establish civilization on new foundations, applicable to all times and all places, satisfying all needs, and establishing the most important of all on the basis of a pure and eternal law! To the formation of new Christian States succeeded the Crusades, a curious mixture of good and evil.

A decisive influence was shortly exercised on the progress of civilization by three discoveries—the invention of printing, that of gunpowder, and the discovery of the New World. Still later came the Reformation—another event which had incalculable effects, on account of its influence on the moral world. From that time the face of the world was changed.

The facilitation of the communication of thoughts by printing; the total change in the means of attack and defence brought about by the invention of gunpowder; the difference suddenly produced in the value of property by the quantity of metals which the discovery of America put in circulation; the spirit of adventure provoked by the chances of fortune opened in a new hemisphere; the modifications in the relations of society caused by so many and such important changes, all became more developed, and were in some sort crowned by the revolution which the Reformation worked in the moral world.

The progress of the human mind has been extremely rapid in the course of the last three centuries. This progress having been accelerated more rapidly than the growth of wisdom (the only counterpoise to passions and to error); a revolution prepared by the false systems, the fatal errors into which many of the most illustrious sovereigns of the last half of the eighteenth century fell, has at last broken out in a country advanced in knowledge, and enervated by pleasure, in a country inhabited by a people whom one can only regard as frivolous, from the facility with which they comprehend and the difficulty they experience in judging calmly.

Having now thrown a rapid glance over the first causes of the

present state of society, it is necessary to point out in a more particular manner the evil which threatens to deprive it, at one blow, of the real blessings, the fruits of genuine civilization, and to disturb it in the midst of its enjoyments. This evil may be described in one word—presumption; the natural effect of the rapid progression of the human mind towards the perfecting of so many things. This it is which at the present day leads so many individuals astray, for it has become an almost universal sentiment.

Religion, morality, legislation, economy, politics, administration, all have become common and accessible to every one. Knowledge seems to come by inspiration; experience has no value for the presumptuous man; faith is nothing to him; he substitutes for it a pretended individual conviction, and to arrive at this conviction dispenses with all inquiry and with all study; for these means appear too trivial to a mind which believes itself strong enough to embrace at one glance all questions and all facts. Laws have no value for him, because he has not contributed to make them, and it would be beneath a man of his parts to recognize the limits traced by rude and ignorant generations. Power resides in himself; why should he submit himself to that which was only useful for the man deprived of light and knowledge? That which, according to him, was required in an age of weakness cannot be suitable in an age of reason and vigor, amounting to universal perfection, which the German innovators designate by the idea, absurd in itself, of the Emancipation of the People! Morality itself he does not attack openly, for without it he could not be sure for a single instant of his own existence; but he interprets its essence after his own fashion, and allows every other person to do so likewise, provided that other person neither kills nor robs him.

In thus tracing the character of the presumptuous man, we believe we have traced that of the society of the day, composed of like elements, if the denomination of society is applicable to an order of things which only tends in principle towards individualizing all the elements of which society is composed. Presumption makes every man the guide of his own belief, the arbiter of laws according to which he is pleased to govern himself, or to allow some one else to govern him and his neighbors; it makes him, in short, the sole judge of his own faith, his own actions, and the principles according to which he guides them.

Is it necessary to give a proof of this last fact? We think we have furnished it in remarking that one of the sentiments most

natural to man, that of nationality, is erased from the Liberal catechism, and that where the word is still employed, it is used by the heads of the party as a pretext to unchain Governments, or as a lever to bring about destruction. The real aim of the idealists of the party is religious and political fusion, and this being analyzed is nothing else but creating in favor of each individual an existence entirely independent of all authority, or of any other will than his own, an idea absurd and contrary to the nature of man, and incompatible with the needs of human society.

The Course which the Evil has Followed and still Follows.

The causes of the deplorable intensity with which this evil weighs on society appear to us to be of two kinds. The first are so connected with the nature of things that no human foresight could have prevented them. The second should be subdivided into two classes, however similar they may appear in their effects.

Of these causes, the first are negative, the others positive. We will place among the first the feebleness and the inertia of Governments.

It is sufficient to cast a glance on the course which the Governments followed during the eighteenth century, to be convinced that not one among them was ignorant of the evil or of the crisis towards which the social body was tending. There were, however, some men, unhappily endowed with great talents, who felt their own strength, and were not slow to appraise the progressive course of their influence, taking into account the weakness or the inertia of their adversaries; and who had the art to prepare and conduct men's minds to the triumph of their detestable enterprise—an enterprise all the more odious as it was pursued without regard to results, simply abandoning themselves to the one feeling of hatred of God and of His immutable moral laws.

France had the misfortune to produce the greatest number of these men. It is in her midst that religion and all that she holds sacred, that morality and authority and all connected with them, have been attacked with a steady and systematic animosity, and it is there that the weapon of ridicule has been used with the most ease and success.

Drag through the mud the name of God and the powers instituted by His divine decrees, and the revolution will be prepared! Speak of a social contract, and the revolution is accomplished!

The revolution was already completed in the palaces of Kings, in the drawing-rooms and boudoirs of certain cities, while among the great mass of the people it was still only in a state of preparation.

It would be difficult not to pause here to consider the influence which the example of England had for a long time exercised on France. England is herself placed in such a peculiar situation that we believe we may safely say that not one of the forms possible to that State, not one of its customs or institutions, would suit any Continental State, and that where we might wish to take them for models, we should only obtain inconvenience and danger, without securing a single one of the advantages which accompany them.

According to the bent of minds in France, at the time of the convocation of the *notables*, and in consequence of the direction which public opinion had received for more than fifty years—a direction which, latterly, had been strengthened and in some sort adapted to France by the imprudent help which her Government had given to the American revolution—all reform in France touching the very foundations of the monarchy was soon transformed into a revolution. What might have been foreseen, and what had been foretold by everybody, the Government alone excepted, was realized but too soon. The French Revolution broke out, and has gone through a complete revolutionary cycle in a very short period, which could only have appeared long to its victims and to its contemporaries.

The scenes of horror which accompanied the first phases of the French Revolution prevented the rapid propagation of its subversive principles beyond the frontiers of France, and the wars of conquest which succeeded them gave to the public mind a direction little favorable to revolutionary principles. Thus the Jacobin propaganda failed entirely to realize criminal hopes.

Nevertheless the revolutionary seed had penetrated into every country and spread more or less. It was greatly developed under the *régime* of the military despotism of Bonaparte. His conquests displaced a number of laws, institutions, and customs; broke through bonds sacred among all nations, strong enough to resist time itself; which is more than can be said of certain benefits conferred by these innovators. From these perturbations it followed that the revolutionary spirit could in Germany, Italy, and later on in Spain, easily hide itself under the veil of patriotism.

Prussia committed a grave fault in calling to her aid such dangerous weapons as secret associations always will be: a fault which

could not be justified even by the deplorable situation in which that Power then found itself. This it was that first gave a strong impulse to the revolutionary spirit in her States, and this spirit made rapid progress, supported as it was in the rest of Germany by the system of foreign despotism which since 1806 has been there developed. Many princes of the Rhenish Confederation were secretly auxiliaries and accomplices of this system, to which they sacrificed the institutions which in their country from time immemorial had served as a protection against despotism and democracy.

The war of the Allies, by putting bounds to the predominance of France, was vigorously supported in Germany by the same men whose hatred of France was in reality nothing but hatred of the military despotism of Bonaparte, and also of the legitimate power of their own masters. With wisdom in the Governments and firmness in principles, the end of the war in 1814 might nevertheless have insured to the world the most peaceful and happy future. Great experiences had been gained and great lessons, which might have been usefully applied. But fate had decided otherwise.

The return of the usurper to France, and the completely false steps taken by the French Government from 1815 to 1820, accumulated a mass of new dangers and great calamities for the whole civilized world. It is to the first of these misfortunes that is partly due the critical state in which France and the whole social body is placed. Bonaparte destroyed in a hundred days the work of the fourteen years during which he had exercised his authority. He set free the revolution which he came to France to subdue; he brought back men's minds, not to the epoch of the 18th Brumaire, but to the principles which the National Assembly had adopted in its deplorable blindness.

What Bonaparte had thus done to the detriment of France and Europe, the grave errors which the French Government have since committed, and to which other Governments have yielded—all these unhappy influences weigh heavily on the world of to-day; they threaten with total ruin the work of restoration, the fruit of so many glorious efforts, and of a harmony between the greatest monarchs unparalleled in the records of history, and they give rise to fears of indescribable calamities to society.

In this memoir we have not yet touched on one of the most active and at the same time most dangerous instruments used by the revolutionists of all countries, with a success which is no longer doubtful. I refer to the secret societies, a real power, all the more

dangerous as it works in the dark, undermining all parts of the social body, and depositing everywhere the seeds of a moral gangrene which is not slow to develop and increase. This plague is one of the worst which those Governments who are lovers of peace and of their people have to watch and fight against.

Do Remedies for this Evil exist, and What are They?

We look upon it as a fundamental truth, that for every disease there is a remedy, and that the knowledge of the real nature of the one should lead to the discovery of the other. Few men, however, stop thoroughly to examine a disease which they intend to combat. There are hardly any who are not subject to the influence of passion, or held under the yoke of prejudice; there are a great many who err in a way more perilous still, on account of its flattering and often brilliant appearance: we speak of *l'esprit de système*; that spirit always false, but indefatigable, audacious and irrepressible, is satisfactory to men imbued with it (for they live in and govern a world created by themselves), but it is so much the more dangerous for the inhabitants of the real world, so different from that created by *l'esprit de système*.

There is another class of men who, judging of a disease by its outward appearance, confound the accessory manifestations with the root of the disease, and, instead of directing their efforts to the source of the evil, content themselves with subduing some passing symptoms

It is our duty to try and avoid both of these dangers

The evil exists and it is enormous. We do not think we can better define it and its cause at all times and in all places than we have already done by the word "presumption," that inseparable companion of the half-educated, that spring of an unmeasured ambition, and yet easy to satisfy in times of trouble and confusion.

It is principally the middle classes of society which this moral gangrene has affected, and it is only among them that the real heads of the party are found

For the great mass of the people it has no attraction and can have none. The labors to which this class—the real people—are obliged to devote themselves, are too continuous and too positive to allow them to throw themselves into vague abstractions and ambitions. The people know what is the happiest thing for them: namely, to be able to count on the morrow, for it is the morrow which will

repay them for the cares and sorrows of to-day. The laws which afford a just protection to individuals, to families, and to property, are quite simple in their essence. The people dread any movement which injures industry and brings new burdens in its train.

Men in the higher classes of society who join the revolution are either falsely ambitious men or, in the widest acceptance of the word, lost spirits. Their career, moreover, is generally short! They are the first victims of political reforms, and the part played by the small number among them who survive is mostly that of courtiers despised by upstarts, their inferiors, promoted to the first dignities of the State; and of this France, Germany, Italy, and Spain furnish a number of living examples.

We do not believe that fresh disorders with a directly revolutionary end—not even revolutions in the palace and the highest places in the Government—are to be feared at present in France, because of the decided aversion of the people to anything which might disturb the peace they are now enjoying after so many troubles and disasters.

In Germany, as in Spain and Italy, the people ask only for peace and quiet.

In all four countries the agitated classes are principally composed of wealthy men—real cosmopolitans, securing their personal advantage at the expense of any order of things whatever—paid State officials, men of letters, lawyers, and the individuals charged with the public education.

To these classes may be added that of the falsely ambitious, whose number is never considerable among the lower orders, but is larger in the higher ranks of society.

There is besides scarcely any epoch which does not offer a rallying cry to some particular faction. This cry, since 1815, has been *Constitution*. But do not let us deceive ourselves: this word, susceptible of great latitude of interpretation, would be but imperfectly understood if we supposed that the factions attached quite the same meaning to it under the different *régimes*. Such is certainly not the case. In pure monarchies it is qualified by the name of “national representation.” In countries which have lately been brought under the representative *régime* it is called “development,” and promises charters and fundamental laws. In the only State which possesses an ancient national representation it takes “reform” as its object. Everywhere it means change and trouble.

In pure monarchies it may be paraphrased thus: “The level of

equality shall pass over your heads; your fortunes shall pass into other hands; your ambitions, which have been satisfied for centuries, shall now give place to our ambitions, which have been hitherto repressed."

In the States under a new *régime* they say: "The ambitions satisfied yesterday must give place to those of the morrow, and this is the morrow for us."

Lastly, in England, the only place in the third class, the rallying cry—that of Reform—combines the two meanings.

Europe thus presents itself to the impartial observer under an aspect at the same time deplorable and peculiar. We find everywhere the people praying for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, faithful to God and their Princes, remaining proof against the efforts and seductions of the factious who call themselves friends of the people and wish to lead them to an agitation which the people themselves do not desire!

The Governments, having lost their balance, are frightened, intimidated, and thrown into confusion by the cries of the intermediary class of society, which, placed between the Kings and their subjects, breaks the sceptre of the monarch, and usurps the cry of the people—that class so often disowned by the people, and nevertheless too much listened to, caressed and feared by those who could with one word reduce it again to nothingness.

We see this intermediary class abandon itself with a blind fury and animosity which proves much more its own fears than any confidence in the success of its enterprises, to all the means which seem proper to assuage its thirst for power, applying itself to the task of persuading Kings that their rights are confined to sitting upon a throne, while those of the people are to govern, and to attack all that centuries have bequeathed as holy and worthy of man's respect—denying, in fact, the value of the past, and declaring themselves the masters of the future. We see this class take all sorts of disguises, uniting and subdividing as occasion offers, helping each other in the hour of danger, and the next day depriving each other of all their conquests. It takes possession of the press, and employs it to promote impiety, disobedience to the laws of religion and the State, and goes so far as to preach murder as a duty for those who desire what is good.

One of its leaders in Germany defined public opinion as "the will of the strong man in the spirit of the party"—a maxim too often put in practice, and too seldom understood by those whose right

and duty it is to save society from its own errors, its own weaknesses, and the crimes which the factious commit while pretending to act in its interests.

The evil is plain; the means used by the faction which causes these disorders are so blameable in principle, so criminal in their application, and expose the faction itself to so many dangers, that what men of narrow views (whose head and heart are broken by circumstances stronger than their calculations or their courage) regard as the end of society may become the first step towards a better order of things. These weak men would be right unless men stronger than they are come forward to close their ranks and determine the victory.

We are convinced that society can no longer be saved without strong and vigorous resolutions on the part of the Governments still free in their opinions and actions

We are also convinced that this may yet be, if the Governments face the truth, if they free themselves from all illusion, if they join their ranks and take their stand on a line of correct, unambiguous, and frankly announced principles.

By this course the monarchs will fulfil the duties imposed upon them by Him who, by intrusting them with power, has charged them to watch over the maintenance of justice, and the rights of all, to avoid the paths of error, and tread firmly in the way of truth. Placed beyond the passions which agitate society, it is in days of trial chiefly that they are called upon to despoil realities of their false appearances, and to show themselves as they are, fathers invested with the authority belonging by right to the heads of families, to prove that, in days of mourning, they know how to be just, wise, and therefore strong, and that they will not abandon the people whom they ought to govern to be the sport of factions, to error and its consequences, which must involve the loss of society. The moment in which we are putting our thoughts on paper is one of these critical moments. The crisis is great; it will be decisive according to the part we take or do not take

There is a rule of conduct common to individuals and to States, established by the experience of centuries as by that of everyday life. This rule declares "that one must not dream of reformation while agitated by passion, wisdom directs that at such moments we should limit ourselves to maintaining."

Let the monarchs vigorously adopt this principle; let all their resolutions bear the impression of it. Let their actions, their

measures, and even their words announce and prove to the world this determination—they will find allies everywhere. The Governments, in establishing the principle of *stability*, will in no wise exclude the development of what is good, for stability is not immobility. But it is for those who are burdened with the heavy task of government to augment the well-being of their people! It is for Governments to regulate it according to necessity and to suit the times. It is not by concessions, which the factious strive to force from legitimate power, and which they have neither the right to claim nor the faculty of keeping within just bounds, that wise reforms can be carried out. That all the good possible should be done is our most ardent wish; but that which is not good must never be confounded with that which is, and even real good should be done only by those who unite to the right of authority the means of enforcing it. Such should also be the sincere wish of the people, who know by sad experience the value of certain phrases and the nature of certain caresses.

Respect for all that is; liberty for every Government to watch over the well-being of its own people; a league between all Governments against factions in all States; contempt for the meaningless words which have become the rallying cry of the factious; respect for the progressive development of institutions in lawful ways; refusal on the part of every monarch to aid or succor partisans under any mask whatever—such are happily the ideas of the great monarchs: the world will be saved if they bring them into action—it is lost if they do not.

Union between the monarchs is the basis of the policy which must now be followed to save society from total ruin.

What is the particular object towards which this policy should be directed? The more important this question is, the more necessary it is to solve it. A principle is something, but it acquires real value only in its application.

The first sources of the evil which is crushing the world have been indicated by us in a paper which has no pretension to be anything more than a mere sketch. Its further causes have also there been pointed out: if, with respect to individuals, it may be defined by the word *presumption*, in applying it to society, taken as a whole, we believe we can best describe the existing evil as the *con-*

fusion of ideas, to which too much generalization constantly leads. This is what now troubles society. Everything which up to this time has been considered as fixed in principle is attacked and overthrown.

In religious matters criticism and inquiry are to take the place of faith, Christian morality is to replace the Law of Christ as it is interpreted by Christian authorities.

In the Catholic Church, the Jansenists and a number of isolated sectarians, who wish for a religion without a Church, have devoted themselves to this enterprise with ardent zeal: among the Protestant sects, the Methodists, sub-divided into almost as many sects as there are individuals; then the enlightened promoters of the Bible Societies and the Unitarians—the promoters of the fusion of Lutherans and Calvinists in one Evangelical community—all pursue the same end.

The object which these men have in common, to whatever religion they may ostensibly belong, is simply to overthrow all authority. Put on moral grounds, they wish to *enfranchise souls* in the same way as some of the political revolutionists who were not actuated by motives of personal ambition wished to *enfranchise the people*.

If the same elements of destruction which are now throwing society into convulsion have existed in all ages—for every age has seen immoral and ambitious men, hypocrites, men of heated imaginations, wrong motives, and wild projects—yet ours, by the single fact of the liberty of the press, possesses more than any preceding age the means of contact, seduction, and attraction whereby to act on these different classes of men.

We are certainly not alone in questioning if society can exist with the liberty of the press, a scourge unknown to the world before the latter half of the seventeenth century, and restrained until the end of the eighteenth, with scarcely any exceptions but England—a part of Europe separated from the continent by the sea, as well as by her language and by her peculiar manners.

The first principle to be followed by the monarchs, united as they are by the coincidence of their desires and opinions, should be that of maintaining the stability of political institutions against the disorganized excitement which has taken possession of men's minds; the immutability of principles against the madness of their interpretation; and respect for laws actually in force against a desire for their destruction.

The hostile faction is divided into two very distinct parties. One

is that of the Levellers; the other, that of the Doctrinaires. United in times of confusion, these men are divided in times of inaction. It is for the Governments to understand and estimate them at their just value.

In the class of Levellers there are found men of strong will and determination. The Doctrinaires can count none such among their ranks. If the first are more to be feared in action, the second are more dangerous in that time of deceitful calm which precedes it; as with physical storms, so with those of social order. Given up to abstract ideas inapplicable to real wants, and generally in contradiction to those very wants, men of this class unceasingly agitate the people by their imaginary or simulated fears, and disturb Governments in order to make them deviate from the right path. The world desires to be governed by facts and according to justice, not by phrases and theories; the first need of society is to be maintained by strong authority (no authority without real strength deserves the name) and not to govern itself. In comparing the number of contests between parties in mixed Governments, and that of just complaints caused by aberrations of power in a Christian State, the comparison would not be in favor of the new doctrines. The first and greatest concern for the immense majority of every nation is the stability of the laws, and their uninterrupted action—never their change. Therefore let the Governments govern, let them maintain the groundwork of their institutions, both ancient and modern; for if it is at all times dangerous to touch them, it certainly would not now, in the general confusion, be wise to do so.

Let them announce this determination to their people, and demonstrate it by facts. Let them reduce the Doctrinaires to silence within their States, and show their contempt for them abroad. Let them not encourage by their attitude or actions the suspicion of being favorable or indifferent to error: let them not allow it to be believed that experience has lost all its rights to make way for experiments which at the least are dangerous. Let them be precise and clear in all their words, and not seek by concessions to gain over those parties who aim at the destruction of all power but their own, whom concessions will never gain over, but only further embolden in their pretensions to power.

Let them in these troublous times be more than usually cautious in attempting real ameliorations, not imperatively claimed by the needs of the moment, to the end that good itself may not turn

against them—which is the case whenever a Government measure seems to be inspired by fear.

Let them not confound concessions made to parties with the good they ought to do for their people, in modifying, according to their recognized needs, such branches of the administration as require it.

Let them give minute attention to the financial state of their kingdoms, so that their people may enjoy, by the reduction of public burdens, the real, not imaginary, benefits of a state of peace.

Let them be just, but strong; beneficent, but strict.

Let them maintain religious principles in all their purity, and not allow the faith to be attacked and morality interpreted according to the *social contract* or the visions of foolish sectarians.

Let them suppress Secret Societies, that gangrene of society.

In short, let the great monarchs strengthen their union, and prove to the world that if it exists, it is beneficent, and insures the political peace of Europe: that it is powerful only for the maintenance of tranquillity at a time when so many attacks are directed against it; that the principles which they profess are paternal and protective, menacing only the disturbers of public tranquillity.

The Governments of the second order will see in such a union the anchor of their salvation, and they will be anxious to connect themselves with it. The people will take confidence and courage, and the most profound and salutary peace which the history of any time can show will have been effected. This peace will first act on countries still in a good state, but will not be without a very decided influence on the fate of those threatened with destruction, and even assist the restoration of those which have already passed under the scourge of revolution.

To every great State determined to survive the storm there still remain many chances of salvation, and a strong union between the States on the principles we have announced will overcome the storm itself.

1821.

THE CONGRESS AT LAYBACH.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from January 4 to May 21, 1821.

489. Arrival in Laybach—journey—lodging. 490. Feast of the Three Kings—the King of Naples. 491. Prince Paul Esterhazy. 492. Agreement with Emperor Alexander. 493. A sentence from Capo d'Istria's despatch. 494. Probable duration of the Congress. 495. Frau von Hittroff. 496. Results— anecdotes. 497. The army crosses the Po. 498. A lecture for the insurgents— reflections— evening with the Emperor Alexander. 499. Writing. 500. The Congress—Capo d'Istria's star declines. 501. Direct news from Naples—Nesselrode. 502. Hard work. 503. Dissolution of the Congress. 504. The army takes the offensive—Laybach empty. 505. Commencement of hostilities. 506. The army. 507. Lord Holland's conduct. 508. Insurrection in Alessandria and Turin. 509. Entrance into Naples. 510. Suppression of the Piedmontese revolution. 511. What will Lord Holland and Co. say? 512. A war of thirteen days. 513. Remarkable position. 514. Greek revolution. 515. Holiday during the military operations—results of the last nine months. 516. Parting reflections. 517. Coronation in England—Prince Victor. 518. Promenade with Nesselrode. 519. Ypsilanti. 520. Conversation with the Emperor Alexander. 521. An unexpected result. 522. Excursion up a mountain. 523. The public feeling. 524. Italian opera in Laybach. 525. Departure from Laybach.

489. *Laybach, January 4, 1821.*—On December 25, in the morning, I left Troppau, and on the morning of the 27th arrived at Vienna, where I remained till New Year's Day. I started from Vienna on January 1, in fifteen degrees of cold. Till the mountain was crossed which separates Carniola from Styria the cold continually increased; but on the opposite side of the mountain I first felt the southern air, and the ice on my carriage windows, which was half an inch thick, melted in less than a quarter of an hour. I breathed new life, as servants often get a pleasant odor when they open the doors of a banquet hall. Laybach is like the anteroom to some comfortable apartments. If Görz were not too small to accommodate a Congress, we would have settled ourselves in that town, because there the Alps are entirely passed. A man can only really

live in a country where there is no winter, or not a long winter. I am still the only person here; the morning will bring an avalanche of statesmen—an avalanche that will cause no joy.

I am very well pleased with my accommodation. I have a good room to write in, a good bedroom, and a suite of reception rooms. The mistress of the house is as ugly as the seven deadly sins, and has seven children who each resemble one of the said sins.

Poor Nesselrode finds himself in a very strange moral position. There are fish which can only live in hard spring water; others which do better in ponds or stagnant water. The trout belongs to the first class: in soft, stagnant water it becomes flabby; but if you let a little fresh water flow in, the poor fish soon becomes lively, and gains that appearance of health and strength so peculiar to the trout in water, and its chief merit.

Now, there are men who have not sufficient strength of character to overcome the difficulties which surround them: others, again, who are more comfortable in the mud. Nesselrode by nature belongs to the class of trout, but unhappily he remains in the mud. Since I have let a little fresh water in upon him he has astonishingly revived. He has become lively, and longs for the harder but healthier medium. He will certainly not remain so, for what is a glass of pure water in such a swamp? The poor little man has moments when he thinks he is all right again; if he were a fish he would be carried away with the current.

Do you know an English novel called "Anastasius?" In it there is a description of the Greek character (I think in the fourth, fifth, or sixth chapter) which is very good and accurate, as indeed is everything in this book relating to Oriental, and especially Greek, customs. You will find there Capo d'Istria word for word, exactly as he is. It is really extraordinary that destiny should have brought us, who are of so opposite a nature, and have come into the world seven or eight hundred miles from one another, to meet upon the same ground. *Nemo propheta in patria*, says the proverb. Whether Capo d'Istria will ever be a prophet beyond his fatherland I doubt.

I should have liked Robespierre better than Abbé de Pradt, and Atilla better than Quiroga. A tyrant does not alarm me; I should know how to avoid his attacks, or bear them with honor. But the Radical maniac, the sentimental Boudoir-Philanthropist, makes me uncomfortable. I like iron and gold, but I hate tin and copper. This childish feeling is so decided in me that I never can endure plated things.

490. *January 6.*—To-day is the Festival of the Three Kings; it is very convenient, too, that they now come together. We are very gallant here, and will manage it so that the old Ferdinand (King of Naples) draws the bean.

For the second time the task devolved on me of picking him up—for he has the unfortunate habit of always throwing himself down. But many Kings fancy that the Throne is only an arm-chair, in which one can sleep quite comfortably. In the year 1821, however, a seat of this kind is inconvenient to sleep in, and badly stuffed.

My Emperor came to-day. For some months I have had but one quiet day, and that was yesterday. Such a day is a remarkable one in my life. The Emperor Alexander comes to-morrow, and the next day the King of Naples. My tasks are, unhappily, always of such a kind that it would be very pleasant if the end of one was not the beginning of another. A hard saying of the late Duke of Laval has the fullest application to my business. He said to me once, "I never lend any one a farthing; why should I? At the very best my money will only be given back to me." There lies in this axiom a truth which is irresistible.

491. *January 7.*— Paul Esterhazy was allotted to me for many years. He will be my best biographer, on account of his extraordinary memory. Whenever I meet him I am obliged to laugh, for he is always overflowing with old anecdotes which I had long forgotten. He knows my history from the year 1807 till 1815 better than I do myself. He does not know everything, but still he knows much, is shrewd—very shrewd—and perhaps knows more than I suspect. He is to me like a son, and loves me like a father.

492. *January 10.*—To-day, if the earth does not break up or the heavens fall down, or the commonest and vilest ruffians destroy all good people with right and strong wills, we have won the cause. Capo d'Istria twists about like a devil in holy water; but he is in holy water and can do nothing. The chief cause of our activity to-day arises from my thorough agreement with the Emperor Alexander. Here, again, the tea makes its astonishing power felt.

Is there anything in the world which can to-day take the place of ink, pens, a conference table with its green cover, and a few greater or smaller bunglers?

493. *January 13.*—Capo d'Istria has given us the benefit of a new miracle of his genius. Here is a sentence out of an official paper descriptive of the Neapolitan insurrection. Since Isaiah and Cicero,

the first as a poet, the other as an orator, nothing more eloquent has ever been uttered than the following words: "*La sédition, associée aux mystères impies d'une secte antisociale, profitant de l'égarement qu'elle avait provoqué, a adopté une monstruosité politique destructive du Gouvernement auquel elle devait l'obéissance, incapable de lui en substituer un autre, et incompatible avec la paix générale.*" Here we have an insurrection veiled in mystery—an insurrection utilizing a confusion, in order to produce a monstrosity, which monstrosity owed obedience to the Government. Further—and, indeed, this is the boldest stroke—this monstrosity, or this sect, or, if you like, the insurrection with its adopted daughter the monstrosity, is incapable of forming a Government, which Government, which cannot be made, is incompatible with the general peace!

These words apparently represent the roll of the thunder; at the proper place they are to strike like lightning. Can the result be doubted? What are battalions and artillery in comparison with such a phrase? May it not be expected that the Neapolitan volunteers will throw themselves in the dust, with ashes on their heads, and will they not with a voice of despair cry *pater, peccavi*?

Never was I more fortunate than in having (under present circumstances) arrived at a discreet age. Now I am safe in presence of such aberrations. At twenty they would have been dangerous: at thirty I might perhaps have become a fool or a maniac, but now I am well armed. I let them pass, listen like a Roman Senator without discomposing my countenance, and *swear*! Capo D'Istria has excused himself, and this is literally true, for the reason given is a mere excuse.

494. *January 16.*—We shall hardly get away from here till the end of March. An army takes thirty days to march from the Po to Naples, and we must await their entry here. At any rate, the present residence here is pleasanter than the former; it is much more agreeable. We have some public amusements, as, for instance, two masked balls in the week, the first of which they say was not very lively; among five-and-forty men there was one lady, who fell asleep in a corner of the room, which did not speak much for the gallantry of the gentlemen. Moreover, there are here some very pretty women, the prettiest being Countess Thurn, who is two-and-twenty. They talk also of two other ladies, one of whom is five-and-twenty, the other five-and-thirty; the first limps, which you do not notice if she is sitting; the other has stern manners, but is of a very enthu-

siastic nature. This lady I will endeavor to install as the poet of our Congress.

495. *January 24.*—Frau von Hittroff is here with her two very pretty daughters. All our Austrians are in love with both. One is to marry a rich young man of good family, who belongs to our embassy at Rome; and the other is to marry our ambassador at Florence, a very clever and agreeable man. He is two or three and forty, while the girl is not yet sixteen. If he is successful and it goes on, I shall be very glad, for I like this worthy man about me, and he is a sort of right hand to me. I am so much occupied with military matters that I hardly myself know whether I do not belong to the military profession.

496. *January 25.*—We are ready; the diplomatic fight is won; sound manly sense has conquered. The principle is clear and plainly set forth, and if heaven favors us the execution will be quick and successful. The evening before a battle no general can say if he will win; but he must count his troops, reconnoitre the ground, think of the retreat, and then let fly at the enemy. Providence only knows how the battle will go, but since providence has bestowed on us the gift of foresight, she at least expects from us that her priceless gifts, reason and conscience, should be taken into council. From the moment when I had the inward conviction of having satisfied this expectation I was calm and content. I am not accessible to fear; I know no other than the fear lest I should mistake what is good and right. One day a thief, or perhaps a murderer, got in at my window and stood by my bed; he thought I slept, but I observed him. I allowed him to come nearer without moving, but loosened my sheets so that nothing might be in my way. One jump and I stood up, seized him, threw him out of the window, and lay down again. "He or I" was my thought. That is logic in business as with robbers. This circumstance took place in the year 1811.

I was yesterday on the Redoubt, which is dreadfully knocked about. It seems that this beautiful country has not always beautiful inhabitants. I saw only one pretty woman's face, and that belonged to a Russian cook, who caused much mischief among the soldiers. As I am not a soldier, I did not prolong my stay more than a quarter of an hour.

497. *February 6.*—To-day sixty thousand men will cross the Po. In less than thirty days they will sit in the curulian chairs of the Parthenopian lawgiver as a proof that there is no procrastination

with me. My enemies must find me very inconvenient. The Austrian proclamation is good, simple, and to the point.*

To-day I have the same feeling as on August 15, 1813, but the feeling of having an army on one's shoulders is somewhat oppressive.

498. *February 7.*—Every hour now brings us news from Italy which, taken altogether, shows that it will not come to a battle. I confess I shall be sorry. If it is necessary to give the insurgents a lesson it ought to be strongly expressed. Nothing is useful which is merely done privately; it ought to be done openly.

At any rate the outcome of it will be a new example. For the first time for thirty years an evil will be publicly combated which has been represented to weak humanity as the highest good. Our children's children will think us very foolish, and this conviction often weighs upon my mind, for I belong to a class of men who live more in the future than in the present. My mind has an historical tinge which helps me over many present difficulties. With me the future is always before my eyes, and I believe I am far less exposed to the danger of error with regard to the future than with regard to the present.

* This proclamation to the Neapolitan people, which was written in Italian and signed by the Austrian General in Command, Baron Frimont, dated Foligno, February 27, 1821, may be translated as follows: "Neapolitans! At the moment when by my orders the army has crossed the frontier of the kingdom, I feel bound to make known freely and openly to you the object of my operations. Last July a deplorable revolution destroyed your domestic peace and severed the bonds of friendship which can only subsist between neighboring States on the basis of mutual confidence. Your king has lifted his voice and spoken to his people in a royal and paternal manner. He has warned you of the horrors of a useless war, which will not be brought upon you by others, but which you will bring upon yourselves. The old and faithful allies of your country have also expressed themselves. They have, indeed, duties to their own people, but your true and lasting happiness is also dear to them, and that you will never find by forsaking the path of duty or by insurrection. Withdraw, therefore, of your own free will from a miserable affair into which you have been led by strangers, and have confidence in your king. Your welfare and his are inseparably united. We are led by no hostile views to cross the frontiers of Naples. The army under my orders will meet as friends all Neapolitans who are faithful and peaceable subjects of their king; it will be always and everywhere under the strictest discipline, and only treat as enemies those who act as enemies. Neapolitans! Listen to the voice of your king and his friends, who are also yours: consider the mischief you would cause by useless opposition; remember that the fallacies to which the enemies of peace and order strive to win you over never can be the source of lasting prosperity."—ED.

However, I do not carry this feeling so far as to be dangerous to a man in my position. I do not overlook the present; I take it at its real value, but the present is not worth much. This is evident to me, and history has perhaps never displayed such a pitiable crowd of small personages who only busy themselves with follies. Heavens! how we shall all be abused when the day of reckoning comes—and that day will come. Then some worthy man who, among the hundred thousand pamphlets and in the grocers' shops, discovers my name, will find perhaps in the year 2440 that in this far-distant time one being existed who was less wrong-headed than his contemporaries, who carried self-estimation so far as to believe themselves arrived at the culminating point of civilization.

This evening I spent three hours with the Emperor Alexander. I cannot rightly describe the impression which I appeared to make on him. My words sounded like a voice from the other world. The inward feeling of the Emperor has, moreover, much altered, and to this I believe I have much contributed.

499. *February 9.*—I write in two hours what my copyist can hardly prepare in five; hence it happens that my writing as well as my style suffers from the necessary haste. Nine times out of ten I am quite ashamed when I read it over again. Alfieri asserted that to write really well a man should copy the manuscript four or five times before it goes to the printer; then the printed copy should be laid aside for some months, and then two days devoted to the correction of each proof sheet. What would become of the world if this process was imposed on us in the offices? Alfieri forgot to add that people should only write when they feel intellectually moved to do so. With us poor people the contrary is, unhappily, always the case. I generally write the most when I have the deepest feeling of my stupidity, because nothing puts me in this flattering moral position so easily as a long, often senseless, strife of words.

500. *February 12.*—The Laybach Congress is to-day like a father who knows a child is about to be born to him. Will it be a boy or a girl, an angel or a monster? The poor father cannot know this till the moment of the arrival.

The star of the Russian Premier begins to decline. The breach between Capo d'Istria and the Emperor constantly increases; in a team, if one horse pulls to the right and the other to the left, the carriage will not reach its destination till the stronger has dragged off the weaker of the two. The Emperor is the stronger, and for transparent reasons.

501. *February 17.*—We have to-day received the first direct news from Naples. The Prince Regent holds fast to his friends, and these assert that the whole nation are as one. Now, this will be seen when the first shot is fired.

Bignon's *brochure* on the Troppau Congress is from the first to the last page a tissue of erroneous assertions, doctrinaire rubbish, diplomatic pathos, and wilful untruth. I look through nearly all the pamphlets which come out; I read Bignon's in fifteen and Pradt's in five minutes. From the title I gather what it is all about, then I read the conclusion to ascertain the point to be arrived at, and then I dip into five or six places—more I do not need to enable me to have a knowledge of the whole. Just now there are two sexes in politics. The Doctrinaires are neither of the two, and with them I have nothing in common; I hardly ever read them and never listen to them; for such authors I am a good and also a bad public—good, because I buy all the trash with which they weary the world; bad, because I only turn over the leaves of the book without any very deep examination of it. Every malady has its positive symptoms, every writer of the day has a stamp of his own, and the name of the author is sufficient to tell me beforehand the contents of his work.

I lately had a sharp contest with Capo d'Istria, and was obliged to speak to the Emperor Alexander about it. I am certain that at the end of the Neapolitan question his retirement will not be very distant.

. . . I think it natural that Nesselrode should like me; he is an honorable, right-thinking man.

. . . Glorious weather; plenty of sun, which I like. If they give me the name of an *Obscurantist*, at any rate it can never be applied physically. I can always stand at the very focus of the light, that I may absorb and retain it in all my pores.

502. *February 23.*—I have two days of very hard work in store for me. You cannot imagine what stormy days are to be seen in my room. Twenty or thirty persons come in and out; one wants an order, another some advice, a third an explanation; then the newsmongers, the dissatisfied, &c., &c. No one believes that the Emperor Alexander and I understand one another thoroughly, and yet it is so. The influence of the last four months has been effectual; the stronger has carried off the weaker, according to all the laws of mechanics, physics, and morals. The Russian Premier lies on the ground. Will he ever get up again?

503. *February 28.*—To-day we dissolved the Congress. I made my closing speech. We are to meet in Florence, September 1, 1822. The Emperor Alexander has behaved excellently well. Capo d'Istria has lost the suit and pays the cost. If the Neapolitan affairs go well, he is lost; if they miscarry, certainly he will be saved; but I think they will go well.

504. *March 3.*—There is a stagnation in the news; the army will not take the offensive till the 4th. Laybach begins to empty, and one feels the emptiness more in a small than in a large space. The King of Naples left this morning; the Italians all follow him. I do not lament over the emptiness. It gives me much the same feeling that I have when I step out of a ball-room into my own house. The air is better, the temperature more agreeable, and comfort replaces etiquette. The chorus of Liberals will now strike up in a beautiful manner. I enjoy it beforehand: that is, abuse from people whom I purposely tread under foot pleases me.

505. *March 7.*—To-day the first shot will be fired. The affair may go well or it may go badly. If it goes well, our enemies will exclaim against the absurdity of our putting forth so much military strength; if it goes badly, they will make merry over an enterprise so far beyond our strength. If we had only looked out of the window to see what people in the street were doing, those good people would have jeered at the weaklings who had not passed beyond the A B C of the art of government. A fine time for the *métier* of a minister.

506. *March 7.*—You will have learned the success of our army from the public papers. The whole affair will go off in vapor because it was only vapor.

The populace are like children or nervous women who believe in ghosts; it belongs to my nature to go straight up to every mysterious power. I must see clearly and grasp firmly. When I was a child my playmates thought to frighten me with a ghost. I was then a boy of seven, and going down a dark passage a ghost came to meet me. But, unhappily for the ghost, I had a stick in my hand, and soon beat the masquerader. This story of my seventh year is the story of my public life. I am always flying out at what to others seems unassailable. There now exists an enormous power which is properly nothing but a marvel of phrases; but the latter are false, resting on false foundations, and leading to false results. People wish me to sanction as principles what goes against my na-

ture; if I wish to do it, I could not; rather death a hundred times than accept as truth what to my eyes is openly false.

The Neapolitans will receive us as friends and deliverers. They will load us with caresses and will become our defenders; one after the other they will leave the Rump Parliament with great politeness in the lurch: the people will have nothing of all that their so-called organs say in the press or from the tribune. They wish to live in peace and quiet, and enjoy the blessings of freedom and civilization, which are nothing but the feeling of certainty for the morrow. If I am wise, seven-eighths of the present world are mad. If I am a fool, how many wise people there are just now!

507. *March 11.*—What a deplorable part Lord Holland is playing!* Do you know what will happen to him? A fortnight will not pass by before he will wish to give half he possesses to be able to recall his shameful words. I know the patriotism of this kind of patriot: when they perceive that their insolence does not succeed, they are awe-struck and repent: such are the heroes of this century of enlightenment.

508. *March 15.*—On the 12th I was awoke very early by the news of the military insurrection in Alessandria and Turin. I said to my informant, "Well, I have expected it," got up and went to my Emperor, and then to the Emperor of Russia. We returned together to the first, and by twelve o'clock the following laconic orders were prepared and despatched:

1. The Neapolitan army is to accelerate all its operations, and not to trouble itself about what goes on in Piedmont.

2. Eighty thousand men are to march from Vienna and the neighborhood to Italy.

3. Ninety thousand men from Russia must cross our frontiers.

Whereupon we separated and ate our dinner as usual.

509. *March 22.*—If I calculate correctly we shall enter Naples to-morrow: this revolution will be annihilated. A great phantasmagoria is, in fact, broken up; in less than eight days this will be evident to the most unbelieving.

Our army has not lost one drop of blood, and has gained much glory, for no excess, not the slightest disorder, has taken place. They did not fire, because their fire could not be returned. Scouts were never employed, for the people everywhere came to meet our troops, received them as deliverers, and gave up to them the food

* In the English Parliamentary debates, February 19, 1821.—Ed.

they had concealed from the inquiries of their oppressors. Our army climbed over mountains, marched through narrow passes, and arrived in the city with the unanimous cry, "Long live the King ! Hurrah for Austria !" If the peasants are asked where the hostile army actually is, they reply, "They have fled: they have gone to eat macaroni." Behind this nation always stands Polcinello, and before Polcinello we were intended to bow !

This is all very pleasant: still I do not know where I shall find the time for so much hard work. Heaven has endowed me with the qualities of draught oxen. The more I work, the better I am. The last eight nights I have hardly slept more than two hours.

510. *March 24.*—The Piedmontese revolution goes on to meet its entire defeat. Yet a few days and the Reform people of the Directorial Committee in Paris will be unpleasantly surprised. They calculate there on two eventualities: the one, that we shall not venture to touch Neapolitan freedom; the other, that if we do we shall be beaten. Poor people !

511. *March 28.*—What do Lord Holland & Co. say? Pepe, Minichini and their friends? Sixty of these poor devils have gone on board ship, because they no longer knew where to lay their heads in their fatherland !

The first gunshot was fired upon us by the Generalissimo of the insurgents. This Generalissimo with his whole mob has disappeared as entirely as the cedar of Lebanon. The Prince de Carignan, too, has lost the taste for his undertaking. What will become of the poor country? It has a King who would sooner surrender than say Yes: his successor says No, and with that a revolution is destroyed. The example is not bad.

512. *March 31.*—A war of thirteen days, from the first shot to the capitulation of the whole kingdom, is not a very long war. General Foy was right in his wild speech of March 20, when he stated as his conviction that no Austrian would come out of the Abruzzi if ever they succeeded in getting in. The Delphian oracle never prophesied better, and the Sibyls, Madame Lenormant included, have never prophesied anything more positive. Certainly no Austrian will come out of the Abruzzi, because the army, after concluding the Neapolitan expedition, will be divided in order to settle the Piedmontese business for the execution of which it will choose a more convenient road.

513. *April 3.*—I am in the strangest position I have ever been in. I have on hand an extinguished revolution and two revolutions in

full blaze: one monarch who will not stir, and another who will go forward with double strides.* The first will not leave Florence unless I go there, and will only follow me; I may write to him ever so much, write to him through the two Emperors, let him be personally entreated by our Ambassadors—he remains deaf and dumb and gives no answer but “Send Metternich to me.” The other rushes like a madman at death and the devil, listens neither to Emperors nor ambassadors, but writes letter after letter, in which there is nothing but “Send me Metternich.” But meantime I cannot get away from here. I can neither get the one to go nor the other to stay. The Emperors are wroth and I cross myself. This is certain. Enemies are much the most easy to manage: you run straight at them and make away with them; but friends!

I write, and write, and I shall soon have used up as many pens as all the geese in Bohemia can furnish, which is certainly no small number.

The history of the Piedmontese Revolution is quite remarkable; nobody knows it thoroughly. Some do not wish for a Revolution, and yet make it; others wish for it, but work against it—a Babel of a confusion. This revolution, calculated on the assumed weakness of a man of strong character, and on the strength of will of an inexperienced youth (Prince de Carignan), supported by sects who desire the Spanish Constitution, and opposed by Liberals who do not—is also a horrible confusion. But yet the revolution seems almost superannuated, and this fashion, too, will pass away, as well as that of defending the virtue of Queen Caroline of England. I do not say that there will be no more revolutions, but they will be without substance, more like the angling of an old coquette, which among amateurs may perhaps still please, but real love only inspires youth and makes madmen.

514. *April 6.*—We have now three revolutions on hand. The one only needs to have its nose pulled to go down; the second is very ill; and the third seems to drag itself along very wearily. Standing behind the scenes as I do, and seeing the operations of this bad machinery, I feel ready to die of weariness. Certainly no one in Europe believes that this feeling of weariness steals quite over me. The only interest is in the worn-out patriots, such as Borelli, Poërio, and many others, who pledge themselves to give up the names of their confederates if a reward is secured to them. Who

* The Grand-Duke of Tuscany and Duke of Modena.—*Ed.*

will have such heroes for ten louis d'or apiece may inquire for them: I am selling off. And I am to bow my head before such patriotism, such citizen-like virtue!

515. *April 13.*—While military operations are going on a minister takes his holidays. The Neapolitan war gave me eight days: the Piedmontese only four. Every one must acknowledge that no time has been lost. The Radicals have lied so openly about it that they must now be somewhat ashamed.

The greatest result of the last nine months is the good understanding between the two Emperors. One thing is now certain, nothing will again divide them; I will answer for that. This result belongs entirely to me, like a child which one man and one woman have on a desert island. To have children there must be two, a woman and a man. I know certainly that in the above case I was the man on the island.

516. *April 18.*—In about three weeks Laybach will be as if extinct. We shall arrive at Vienna a little after the swallows. I am sorry to leave the beautiful country. Beautiful it is, in the truest sense of the word, here where everything is a lovely green and the high snowy peaks of the Alps bound the vast horizon. The sight of this beautiful nature revives the heart which had been stifled at the conference-table. What must my heart be like, that can sit for ever at that eternal conference-table—. But I will talk no more of this table: it has done its duty, and may now be put on one side.

517. *April 20.*—Within six weeks two wars and two revolutions have been concluded. We may hope that by sunset the third will be in the same condition.

The Emperor will send Prince Esterhazy as Ambassador to England for the Coronation. He will be accompanied by my son-in-law (Count Joseph Esterhazy), Count Gatterburg (the same who with his trumpeter took the fortress of Alessandria), and Floret. My son will join them in Paris. Victor is a tall and excellent young fellow, the quintessence of a "fashionable" new to the world, as people are at eighteen. He does not want for understanding, and if he is in a good mind he makes one laugh, for he has much humor.

518. *May 1.*—The country becomes daily more lovely; the diplomatists make great excursions. Yesterday, I was able for the first time to go out. Little Nesselrode and I slipped out of the office, and staid out for more than eight hours. Nesselrode is enchanted,

like a child who has never seen higher mountains than the banks of the Rhine.

519. *May 6.*—What may happen in the East is beyond all calculation. Perhaps it may not be much; beyond our eastern frontiers three or four hundred thousand hanged, strangled, or impaled, do not count for much. Ypsilanti, that masked Liberal, that Hellenist, will bring me into a dilemma.

520. *May 9.*—To-day I had a long conversation with the Emperor Alexander. I venture to say there is no one in this world clever and intelligent enough to add anything to what was actually spoken yesterday between me and the Emperor. If ever any one from black became white, he has. My greatest merit consists in this—by my present influence to prevent him from roaming beyond what is right and good; for the bad begins on the boundary of the good; and this boundary is so slightly marked that the understanding can hardly discover it without that powerful and wise assistance which is called tact.

521. *May 13.*—We have brought forth a work which may be acknowledged by the most honorable man without blushing. We have made a great epoch—great because the conduct of it was very difficult. More than great is the result of the concord here established between those who possess the will and the power for action. In three months no one will speak any more of the events of March and April. All will keep silence: the good, because they always are silent; the bad, because they are not flattered by their discomfiture; the stupid, because they really do not know what has happened, and others do not tell them.

522. *May 15.*—The spring days here are wonderfully fine: we have eighteen to twenty degrees of heat, and the pleasant influence of the sun acts on me powerfully. My corporeal frame is enamored of the sun.

I have climbed a mountain from which one can see the loveliest landscape for miles around. When I see such a sight I always wonder how people can settle themselves in an ugly country. The diplomatists have gone off very sorrowfully; the South has something attractive about it, and that explains several circumstances in the affair. For history is properly only the history of the human mind, which is full of virtues and passions, and really contains very few bad qualities. Perhaps it is the influence of the sun which incites me to so mild a philosophy.

523. *May 16.*—In London, as I foresaw, no one thinks any more

of the late events: a proof of how wrong one is to flatter popular feeling. If any of their apostles regard this feeling as a religion, they are at this moment, when they get such a slap in the face, bound to show their strength. But such popular feeling is only a piece of buffoonery played by bad performers. It brings inexhaustible treasures to the quacks, but to the wise not a penny. But wise men who use them tenderly are either children or jugglers, and, therefore, not wise. This feeling has with me the value of a real religion, which gives to me what fools call strength, but which, closely analyzed, is only reason, and, indeed, only that reason which is mere want of stupidity. That is my secret, but I do not betray it, because it makes people take me for an extraordinary man. I know this is the truth, but I do not wish others to know it.

524. *May 18.*—The town is turned into a village: the streets are empty, everything has passed away, even Laybach's greatness. My only amusement is the Italian opera, which, after many changes, at last became good. "Eduardo and Cristina," by Rossini, is what they are performing now, and it is certainly one of his best works. "Cenerentola," too, has been very well sung.

525. *May 21.*—I now part from this pleasant and beautiful town that has made so much noise in the world which, like every noise, passes away. But the result is imperishable. We have accomplished good and great things. They will not, indeed, be examined into, because a man is more concerned about an eight-days' fever than busied with eight years' health. My work has much in common with that of a physician: if the patient dies, people say the physician has killed him; if he gets well, nature has saved him. To-morrow I shall start, and after making a little digression towards the Veldeser lake with the owner of Radmannsdorf, I shall take the road by Wurzen to Vienna.

RETURN TO VIENNA.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from May 28 to October 1, 1821.

526. Arrival in Vienna—appointment as State Chancellor. 527. Reflections on the return. 528. The villa at Rennweg. 529. A blockhead. 530. Tedious dinner. 531. Good news from St. Petersburg. 532. Intentions of the Emperor Alexander. 533. Sad recollections at Baden. 534. A letter from the Emperor Alexander. 535. The die is cast. 536. False reports. 537. Mdme. de Staël's "*Dix années d'exil*." 538. Difficulties of the situation. 539. Unpleasantness of the Greek question. 540. News from St. Petersburg. 541. Hohenlohe's miracle. 542. Will the King of England come to Vienna?

526. *Vienna, May 28, 1821.*—I arrived here the day before yesterday at four o'clock, after a horrible night, from dreadful weather. Such a journey thoroughly exhausts me. I hate travelling, and in a carriage I feel so cramped, both physically and morally, that even in a not very long journey I fall into a sort of stupor. Certain it is that I cannot endure myself on a journey.

The public journals announce new honors for me (the appointment to be *Haus- Hof- und Staatskanzler*). This is a bomb which has exploded over my head, and which I could not avoid, because I could not see it coming. If I had only suspected the mounting of this battery, I should have endeavored to make it harmless, which would have been easy. My Imperial master has managed the business with the greatest possible kindness—indeed, with a studied care, which is not habitual to him. But the result is really a finishing blow for the sufferer. In this new position my sphere of action will be much enlarged. I do not like to take up too much, because I like to master what lies within my province. It is certainly a marvel of fate, that men are often brought into such a position who care the least about it. A part now falls to me which would satisfy twenty inferior ambitions. God knows that I have no other ambition than to do good. If, to attain this object, I had to go back into my hole, I should be happy and content. The thing is, however, done, and cannot be altered. But in my new position neither

a wig nor an ermine mantle is necessary. That would indeed have been the worst of all miseries.

I am back again in my own good city. Of course every one has foreseen and foretold everything. There is no one here who thinks that anything could have been otherwise: the case was so simple and plain. Who here ever thought that Pepe and Ansaldi were heroes? Carbonarism and intrepidity, liberalism and reason, have, indeed, always been shown to be opposites. Everything has happened so simply: just as all have wished and desired it: like my valet Giroux, who, if any one asserts exactly the contrary of what he has just said, answers, "*C'est ce que je vous disais.*" To discuss after an event is never possible; for heroes then spring out of the earth like mushrooms.

527. *May 30.*—How strange it is to return to a place where one feels as if one had never been away! The same furniture and arrangements remain as we left them. We alone were the sport of agitation, and nothing about us connected itself with it. If I then turn my gaze within and ask what has changed in me, I find no antithesis there. I have already seen some hundred persons; each thinks he must say something to me, and among them all there is not one who ventures to repeat to me what he certainly said to others a short time ago: people like my valet are quite innumerable.

528. *June 2.*—With the first sunbeams this morning I visited my villa, which has much improved in appearance. On the front of the villa I have had these words placed: *Parva domus, magna quies.* The first is true enough; the latter seems to me somewhat false.

The town empties itself just like a blown egg. The good people think that it is summer, because the almanac says so. But I stand out to the contrary, and maintain it is not true. A great quantity of ice must have come down from Newfoundland: that is the only explanation of this cold weather.

529. *June 7.*—No one is more busy than a blockhead, because everything is important in his eyes: no one is more active, because his activity leads to nothing. He soon finds it out, and cannot help himself; he may do what he will, and make the greatest efforts, still he succeeds in moving nothing but himself. . . .

I will stay two days in Baden, where I will take some baths, and I am now looking for accommodation. I have sold my house in Baden, for I was determined not again to cross the threshold of that unhappy dwelling, which is clouded with the sad recollections of the death of my dear daughter Marie.

530. *July 13.*—At last it is no longer cold, I can spend the day in my garden. I have had the most supremely tiresome people to dinner. Our town is quite empty. It is, indeed, never filled with very lovable people, but there are times when I feel myself lovable in comparison with all who come near me. This comparison happily does not flatter my vanity. My flowers are beautiful: this is the only impression the day has left upon me. I do not remember one single word that has been spoken. The newspapers, too, bring me no new fine thoughts. The Turks devour the Greeks, and the Greeks decapitate the Turks: this is the best news that I hear.

531. *July 18.*—From St. Petersburg, on the whole, I get very good tidings. The Emperor Alexander remains just the same as on the day of our separation. But this alone will bring nothing forward—for that my shoulder is needed. As the affair stands, there are three contingencies: the immediate outbreak of quarrel, an intervention, or localization.

In the first two cases, I am fettered on every side: not so in the last. Which of them will prevail, Heaven knows. The most improbable is that which the world considers the most probable—namely, my first supposition. I have despatched five or six couriers, who are all very quick in their movements. Nothing less is at stake than the life or death of sound common sense. And sound common sense will secure that end which I, in common with a small minority, hold to be the best, while a great number of fools and knaves take it to be the bad cause.

532. *July 23.*—My different despatches are ready. I feel in the midst of a web, like my friends the spiders, whom I love, because I have so often wondered at them.

The Emperor Alexander and I took the same views of the present affair. But he has changed his place of residence, and hence it is uncertain whether he will remain true to the point of view which is easy for me, but difficult for him, to take. The setting in which a man finds himself has immense influence on him; it requires great strength of mind to withstand surrounding influence, and still greater to break through it. The Emperor remains firm, but he stands alone. Some wish the contrary of what he wishes, and have pointed it out; others have not the strength to wish anything at all. To keep him right, the Emperor must be separated from his surrounding. He wills what I will, but those about him will the contrary.

With this feeling, the Emperor Alexander has taken the only

resolution that could be taken; he has withdrawn from all positive action and thrown himself morally upon me. This explains my cobweb. Such webs are pretty to look at, cleverly spun, and will bear a light touch, but not a gale of wind.

I have now made my operations morally complete in every direction; but this position of things keeps the poor spider at the centre of his fine web. Good for the moment, but as for what concerns the future, the similar views which subsist between the Emperor and myself must have results, or a breath of wind will destroy the web.

533. *Baden, July 24.*—I will take baths here for two days, then stay three days in Vienna, and so on. It has made me very sad to come here, to the place where I lost half my life. Many people, who perhaps are much better than I am, like to be in a place where sad recollections meet them. I, on the contrary, would have such places levelled to the ground: they should not only be uninhabited, but the last trace of them destroyed. I would have them covered with thorns and high grass like a wilderness, the only picture that has any resemblance to my heart. Just for that reason, I love the ashes, and the ancients were quite right to love and reverence them. Death is opposed to life, the past to the present, what is not to what is. To preserve the remains, while the form and substance are altered, is a beautiful idea, and the only one which suits my way of thinking and feeling. For where there is no longer life, man cannot call it back; what contains life should perish with him.

My wife has contrary views, and is, therefore, in despair that I have sold the house—the scene of such calamity. She would willingly have kept it, if not have lived in it. I, on my part, have the comfort of knowing that it will shortly be pulled down. In a year or two nothing of it will remain.

534. *Vienna, August 11.*—From St. Petersburg a long letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Emperor Francis, and one to myself, have arrived.* His position is a difficult one. It is no small thing

* The Emperor Alexander writes to Metternich, July 17, 1821: "The union between the three Courts, whose efforts Providence has so completely blessed, can in future only be founded on mutual and unrestricted confidence. That trust which your august sovereign has placed in my intentions and views will not be deceived, notwithstanding all the difficulties, more particularly inherent to the position of Russia, daily arising from affairs in the East. I have explained myself on this point without reserve to the Emperor Francis. He will, I hope, find in my letter a new proof of the constancy of my principles and the extent of my friendship."—Ed.

suddenly to turn in a direction entirely opposed to the course of his whole life! My position is far easier, on account of my antecedents; meanwhile it is difficult enough. The Prince Regent has decided to come to Vienna in October.

535. *August 21.*—The die is cast. Strangford has left Constantinople. It is not, indeed, war, but I am caught, as I feared, and cannot think of leaving Vienna, because everything rests on my shoulders. It is inadmissible for a soldier to leave his post during the battle. I shall at once cause the meeting of a new Congress.

536. *August 28.*—Eight days ago my mother invited me to visit her at her villa, which is a mile and a half from Vienna. I entered my carriage at eight o'clock in the evening. By nine o'clock the report was spread that I had posted off to meet the Emperor Alexander; hence it was concluded a very grave crisis was to be feared: while the same evening, at eleven o'clock, five-and-twenty of my intimate friends assembled at my house. Another proof that I cannot stir without making a sensation.

537. *August 29.*—I am now reading Madame de Staël's work, "*Les dix années d'exil*;" it is full of thought, very fanciful, but intolerable in style, like all that this remarkable woman writes. All the portraits, with the exception of Bernadotte's, bear the stamp of truth and genius. Fouché's portrait, for instance, is thoroughly given in the following sentence: "*Fouché est le seul homme qui peut véritablement seconder Bonaparte, en portant, malheureusement pour le monde, une sorte de modération adroite dans un système sans bornes.*"

Of the French she says very justly: "*Les besoins de l'amour-propre chez les Français l'emportant beaucoup sur ceux du caractère. Une chose bizarre, c'est que les Français, qui saisissent le ridicule avec tant d'esprit, ne demandent pas mieux que de se rendre ridicules dès que leur vanité y trouve son compte d'une autre manière. Il est inouï combien il est facile de faire prendre une bêtise pour étendard au peuple le plus spirituel de la terre!*"

How is it that a woman, who says and feels all this so truly, never for a moment doubts whether this same people is really fit for liberty, fraternity, and equality? Madame de Staël resembles all partisans gifted with imagination: she loves a cause, but not its consequences. As often as she enters the field of politics or government, or touches on any man's deeds, she is like a person who asserts that there is nothing more wholesome than arsenic, and who yet gives in every page of her book most clever and exact descriptions of the unspeakable suffering which is the consequence of this poison, and

depicts the agony before the approaching death. With such a one it is difficult to argue.

Napoleon has often spoken to me of her. She did, indeed, once beg me to obtain for her the permission she so specially desired—namely, to perorate in the *salons* of Paris. My head, however, does not seem to be easily turned, for I was able to withstand her without difficulty.

The story of her journey through Vienna in 1812 is worth mentioning. Herr Rocca, who accompanied her, was cited to appear as a deserter from the French army, and threatened with extradition. Madame de Staël was displeased because they barely promised her that Herr Rocca should not be given up, whereas she wished to introduce him in the Vienna *salons*. The man to whom she uttered her complaints (Police-President Hager) was the best of men, but certainly very dry. When she begged him to produce Herr Rocca, he answered, “But pray, Madam, are we to go to war about Herr Rocca?” To which Madame de Staël answered, “Why not? Herr Rocca is my friend, and will be my husband.” An example this of how little use mere *esprit* is in this world. Talleyrand rightly says, “*L’esprit sert à tout et ne mène à rien.*” Celebrity was a power to Madame de Staël. The longer I live, the more I mistrust this power.

538. *September 3.*—I daily receive additional proofs that the Emperor Alexander has taken root in my school. I understand him, and that is a great thing. His position is extremely difficult. What will be the consequences? Friend Wellington says, “*Le diable m’emporte si je le sais.*” I say the same; meanwhile I go on as if I were certain of being able to control the course of events. The least vain man in the world must in certain positions feign a security which, under ordinary circumstances, would be self-conceit—the most ridiculous of all peculiarities.

Capo d’Istria is in great perplexity. He desires agitation, but the Emperor does not.

539. *September 15.*—Time has so overwhelmed me with burdens that they are more numerous than the hair on my head. My hair, too, has become quite white, at which I am less astonished than at its tenacity in not leaving me altogether.

What pleasant things the Greeks have brought upon themselves! No chapter would be long enough to show what germs of evil this question conceals. The Russian ambassador in Florence is a horrible man; he kindles the fire with all his might. Happily, his sphere of action is less than the space his own comfortable person occupies.

The poor Emperor Alexander does not know what to do with this creature; but he still retains him. The weather is still execrable. Madame de Staël would not find it difficult to show that the weather is bad because the English Constitution is not introduced everywhere; Abbé de Pradt would say it was because the colonies are not emancipated; Sir Robert Wilson, because the Spanish Constitution has not yet made the round of Europe; and, lastly, Professor Thiersch, because his Teutonic expedition has not yet entered the harbor of Volo.

540. *September 26.*—I returned to-night with the Emperor from an excursion to see the manœuvres, and found whole volumes of letters from St. Petersburg. Anything good? No! Anything bad? No! Anything sensible? No! Anything unfriendly? No! Clever? No! Reasonable? Still, No! What then—contemptible? Yes!

If I did not know my men, it would be enough to drive one mad.

541. *September 26.*—There is something peculiar about these miracles of Prince Hohenlohe; the Pope and the King of Bavaria have put a stop to his miracle-making. When in our days I hear a cause cried up in favor of which public clamor raises its voice, I say to myself there is nothing in it, or some delusion is at the bottom of it. If I hear that a saint makes his appearance with his miracles in the *salons*, I utterly distrust the said saint and all his works; for though princesses are not exactly the best subjects for a miracle, yet they are very good prey for the artist in magic. There is, however, a gulf between Saints Hohenlohe and Cagliostro: the former appears on the boards at Wurzburg, the latter at Paris. Place, however, decides nothing with respect to the number of the credulous and the deluded, for these are everywhere as numberless as the sand on the seashore. Jesus Christ had more labor for thirty years to bring forward truth than Hohenlohe in thirty minutes with his magic. Such is the world. There are hardly any persons in the world stronger in faith than John Paar and Maurice Dietrichstein (the elder). The latter asserts that the blind whom Prince Hohenlohe has not healed, really see, and that it is only out of wilfulness that they stumble over the stones at every corner; and if he is attacked on this point, he shelters himself with the unanswerable argument, "But I actually saw it!" Thus every one has his own manner of believing or of convincing himself. I believe in the miracles of Jesus Christ, which I have not seen; Dietrichstein believes in Hohenlohe's miracles, which, he says, he has seen.

542. *October 1.*—We are here still waiting for the decision about the King of England's journey to Vienna. Nothing is more uncertain than everything done by his British Majesty. He will in any case choose a very bad time of year. I do not know how he is to be amused. Preparations will be made for some festivities and they will succeed thoroughly well, as all such things do in Vienna; but between enacting festivities and giving pleasure there is a very wide difference.

VISIT TO THE COURT OF HANOVER.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from October 25 to December 31, 1821.

543. From Hanover—friendly reception everywhere. 544. From Johannisberg—soirée in Cassel—tedium on the journey. 545. From Frankfurt—the Metternichs and Capo d'Istria's. 546. A happy hour—a saying of Napoleon's—feeling of isolation—farewell to the year 1821.

543. *Hanover, October 25, 1821.*—Since my arrival I have led the real Congress life, full of gala days. The hours when I am not sitting at the conference-table I lose at dinners three or four hours long, or at routs, where to be suffocated is the least evil you have to go through. The reception accorded me by the King was that of a dear friend. I do not remember ever to have been embraced with such tenderness, and I never in all my life had so many fine things said to me. After a perfect flood of praises, in which the King was so good as to compare me to all the great men of antiquity, the middle ages and modern times, I came at last to speak of business, and then nothing remained for me to desire. I will do great and good things, without making any pretension to be a Minos, Themistocles, Cato, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Pitt, Wellington, &c., &c.—all which names his Majesty called me as if he were saying a Litany of Saints.

544. *Johannisberg, November 4*—I left Hanover on the evening of the 31st, and stopped at Cassel on the 1st to see the Elector. There I found in the evening a grand and numerous company, invited by Count Spiegel to introduce me to the notabilities of the town. I left Cassel at two, went through Wilhelmshöhe—one of the finest gardens in Europe—to Marburg, where I stayed the night. On the 3rd, I entered Frankfurt. To-day I could not avoid a great dinner at Viebrich, given in my honor by the Duke of Nassau; and now I have been here some hours, and am enchanted to find myself here.

Travelling is a terrible affair in my present position: I am bored as monarchs are bored by the attentions of the Courts which enter

tain me on my journey; and I am bored as a prophet is who is constantly asked advice by every one. Since I was so fortunate as to get rid of the Carbonari, people think I need only show myself to destroy everything that is in any one's way. Every Government is at this time ill, and all from their own fault: since my German Conferences they look upon me as the chief legislator of Germany, and, since 1821, as the annihilator of the Revolutionists. Each one begs me to destroy *theirs*, or at least to give them my receipts for doing so. On the other hand, the Revolutionists (this is the *petite pièce*), all trumpery people, present themselves to me as far as possible to assure me of the sincerity of their feelings. It is, for instance, quite amusing to see what is now going on in Frankfurt, one of the most horrible towns in Germany. From the moment people knew that I was coming, they altered their looks and language. The first people who come to meet me at the hotels are the bitterest Radicals, and I do not remember ever to have endured rougher marks of respect. To listen to them one would suppose they had only waited for me to change their religion.

I have with me De Pont and a secretary, Langenau and Handel. I shall remain here till the 5th or 6th, and be at Frankfurt on the 7th or 8th, and at Vienna on the 14th or 15th.

545. *Frankfurt, November 9.*— . . . Here lie the most mischievous Jacobins at my feet, all full of excuses and protestations. During my journey, I visited no less than five Universities: Leipzig, Halle, Göttingen, Marburg, and Giessen. In Halle I dined on October 18 under the same roof with a hundred and fifty students, who were celebrating the battle of Leipzig, and I everywhere received nothing but marks of respect. When I was getting into the carriage on leaving Halle, all the hundred and fifty students followed me with uncovered heads and loud cheers. The whole day I had a crowd of men under my windows, and wherever I go, joyful cries accompany me. If these people are asked what they are there for, they answer: "We want to see him." It is the Italian business which has gained me this kind of notoriety in Germany. Inquisitive people want to see what the man looks like who made up his mind that the Carbonari were simply a number of ragamuffins, and cannot understand how he managed to solve this easy problem. The people hereabouts are good but childish. . . . In Russia, and in the whole Russian diplomacy with foreign countries, there are two parties, which are quite openly designated by the names Metternich and Capo d'Istria. This is not altogether flatter-

ing. These two parties detest each other, and are in opposition to one another, like the Right and Left sides in France. As the Emperor Alexander is a Metternich, the party is a respectable one; the others may be left to their fate.

. . . I shall start to-morrow, arrive at Wurzburg on the 10th, stay the night of the 11th at Nürnberg, on the 12th at Regensburg, the 13th at Schärding, and arrive at Vienna on the 15th.

546. *Vienna, December 31.*—A happy hour is not only good because it is happy (a thing good in and for itself), but also because it strengthens the mind. This reminds me of a saying of Napoleon's. During one of our long conversations we spoke of the time just past; suddenly he cried, "*Ah! vous ne savez pas quelle puissance est le bonheur! Lui seul donne du courage. Ne pas oser, c'est ne rien faire qui vaille, et on n'ose jamais qu'à la suite du bonheur. Le malheur affaïsse et flétrit l'âme, et dès lors on ne fait rien de bon.*" . . .

I now feel as lonely as a dweller in the desert; nothing makes me smile, and nothing occupies me except what wearies me. Follies are intolerable to me; words without thought are hateful; mere good nature is like stagnant water: and this is the picture of what people here call society. Words, nothing but words; of all I hear nothing is to be preserved—the best thing is to forget the sound of them. If then I ask myself when there will be a conclusion of all this, and find that apparently it will continue till the end of all things, I feel a pressure on mind and heart which is difficult to describe. Certain it is that the emptiness of men increases in proportion to the loftiness of their position. If I could lose myself in what makes so many other men happy, perhaps my moral position would be different. . . .

It is striking midnight, and the year 1821 is no more! Three hundred and sixty-five days are gone in a second of time. We stand at the entrance to a new era like a new-born child. May we hope that fortune will favor us, and that the cutting of the teeth—the first business the child has to go through—will be gone through successfully.

THE EXPENSE OF THE NEAPOLITAN EXPEDITION, AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE OR- GANIZATION OF NAPLES AND THE RESTORA- TION OF ORDER.

547. Metternich to Stadion (Letter), Laybach, March 10, 1821.

547. I now reply to two important subjects contained in your letter; I ought to have alluded to them some time ago, but I was obliged to allow the storm to pass over before I could write to you.

I. Financial part of the Expedition against Naples.

This question has something of the same character as all that concerns this grave enterprise. It touches at once on the past, the present, and the future.

In the financial question the past cannot be regulated by the present; it is therefore necessary not to be deluded about the future, thus avoiding false calculations, as deplorable in finance as in everything else. We have incurred, and are incurring, great expenses. It may perhaps be necessary still to continue them, but nothing is voluntary in these expenses, and they cannot appear so to any man endowed with good common sense.

The first question of all, which must be at once seen to be so, is this: shall we, or can we, abandon the revolution of Naples to itself, to its own remedies (for every revolution, as well as every evil, carries in itself its own punishment), or must we not rather erect a substantial barrier against it?

The solution of this alternative cannot be doubtful. We can deplore the revolution in Spain, and abandon it to itself; but it is otherwise with the Spanish revolution transplanted to the soil of Naples. Its triumph in the Italian peninsula would have been much more swift than its repression could have been, or than the punishment which it must bring upon itself.

We were therefore obliged to call to our aid considerable material

means. Our finances were heavily strained. None of this expenditure was unnecessary; it was, on the contrary, imposed by the first of necessities—that of existence.

My duty is to impose as few burdens as possible on our finances, and to endeavor at the same time to make these expenses, as far as possible mere advances. This is what I aim at, while making a calculation which is both financial and political.

As a financial calculation, I prefer the certain to the uncertain, and I never like to flatter myself with the impossible. As a political calculation, I have been able to examine the real state of affairs at Naples, and have endeavored to avoid any plan for the future founded on inevitable evils.

The Neapolitan revolution has utterly destroyed the finances of the kingdom. It has been brought about in part by the blind fiscal system of M. de' Medici: seeing in the State administration only a treasury, he taxed the provinces far beyond what he ought to have done, and, by overstaining his bow, has broken it.

The King told me he had seen the accounts which were made up to the time of his departure from Naples, and the revolution had not only swallowed up all that remained from former financial operations, but it actually cost during the first six months more than forty millions of ducats.

The financial future of Naples necessarily has two burdens—the maintenance of the army of occupation, and the consolidation of expenses occasioned by the revolution. It remains to be seen if to these two burdens we can add a third—namely, the reimbursement of expenses incurred by Austria for armaments, &c.

My conviction has been that by attempting too much we run the risk of accomplishing nothing. But, this truth demonstrated, I ask if it is not practicable to make a good use of what I can only regard as an impossibility. Our aim must be to repress the revolution, to consolidate peace, and not to risk new disturbances. On finding that the Emperor entirely shared my views, the declaration was made in the protocol which you have for some time possessed. You will have seen from this protocol that we sought to turn the financial impossibility into a political bait. We have declared loudly that we demand nothing, and we have attached a recompense or a punishment for the nation to this same nothing, to this veritable non-value; thus insuring to ourselves the chance of perhaps being able to bring in under the name of punishment that which we have declined as a recompense.

I enter into all these details, my dear Count, which your able mind and great knowledge of business and of the political situation would lead you to see at the time, and I beg you not to attach too much importance to a payment which I consider much less connected with battles and other realities of war than with financial possibilities or impossibilities, which must also be strongly influenced by political considerations to be decided by time alone—that is, by the preservation of peace in the kingdom of Naples. You see I have taken care to establish alternatives which will secure to us our incontestable rights. It will be wise and prudent to take care that they are rightly used.

II. Future Organization of the Kingdom of Naples.

This important question has engrossed my attention from the very day I heard of the overthrow of the existing order of things at Naples. I have thought the matter over with extreme care, and I believe I have arrived at the best terms. My conscience, at least, is easy; I only hope that events will justify my wishes.

If you now speak to any of the legislators who are to be found at the corner of every street and on every bench at the *cafés*, they reply, without hesitation, that the world can no longer do without the representative system. My conviction is that it will never do with it; for I do not understand by progress, overturning one's self and everything else, getting up and falling down again.

But we have not taken into consideration for Naples this universal recipe, seeing that we could not do abroad what we constantly refuse to do at home. It would have been hardly prudent, on the other hand, to patch up what has just been destroyed. We have called to our aid the principle of a qualified monarchy, thus excluding both despotism and the representative system.

The King has been very reluctant to acquiesce in our views, but has ended by doing so, and even by perceiving that, with a system of organization worthy of the name, he will have a better prospect of peace and repose than by a return to a complete despotism, the dangers of which we have already experienced both in Naples and in Sicily.

I send you herewith the protocol, or rather the addition to the protocol, which contains our idea exactly as if it were a spontaneous proposition from the King. By the next courier I will send you a more complete statement of the arrangements I have mentioned. You will see that it describes a constitution which, if quite

monarchical, is none the less worthy of the name, for it is not desirable to apply this term to the representative system alone.

How is the thing going on generally? I declare frankly that I do not know. Nothing is so useless as to speculate on happy chances, and nothing is more difficult than to prevent unhappy ones. The King has no credit in his own country, but he is beloved. The revolution has been forced to adopt a mild character, which is to be deplored, but is an unavoidable consequence of our armaments.

The object of the Neapolitan Liberals, who must not be confounded with the Carbonari, has been to arrive at a representative system through the intervention of the latter. From Madrid they would wish to get to Paris. We, who cannot consent to that, have ourselves neither one nor the other.

The whole depends, therefore, upon the blows which are struck. If they are decisive, the thing is done; if they are not, it will drag on; if they fall upon us, the world will be turned upside down. Then will happen what would have happened if we had done nothing, for Italy will go to the devil, and with her France and Germany, just as they would have done if we had remained neutral spectators of the revolution at Naples.

If we are successful, a great example will have been given to the world, were it only for the one fact that the *inviolability of revolutions* will have been shown to be a thoroughly false claim, although prodigiously convenient to the madmen, fools, blockheads, and weaklings who advance it. What a frightful list I place before you there, my dear Count!

THE NEAPOLITAN, PIEDMONTESE, AND GREEK INSURRECTION.

548. Metternich to Rechberg (Letter), Laybach, March 25, 1821.

548. Events succeed each other with such rapidity in Italy that we may hope this beautiful portion of Europe will not submit to the yoke of the revolutionists, notwithstanding the activity of their criminal efforts. If they will only run their heads against the energy and wisdom of our measures, this last crisis, alarming as it was by its terrible symptoms, will turn against those who have provoked it, and will rally the numerous body of honest men round the legitimate Governments, which are, I hope, convinced that, by following a consistent and determined course, it is still possible to suppress that spirit of faction which threatens society with total subversion.

Thinking that it must be of the greatest importance for your Court to be exactly informed of the real situation of affairs in Italy, of the dispositions of the two Emperors, who are, happily, still together here, and of the result of the first measures which they have adopted, I do not hesitate to despatch the present courier to your Excellency, and send by him a short but exact account of our position.

You will have been informed, sir, of the success of General Frimont's army, of the occupation of the province of the Abruzzi, so important in a military point of view, of the total disorganization of General Pepe's army, and of the way in which our troops have been everywhere received by the inhabitants. These first results leave us in no doubt as to the success of the enterprise, and the news which has since arrived from the head-quarters of the army fully justify our hope. Sora, defended by General De Concilj, the Quiroga of Naples, was carried by our troops after a very feeble resistance. General Frimont passed the Garigliano with his army, and bore towards San Germano, to attack that position, which it was said the Neapolitans had rendered impregnable. A detach-

ment sent by the general-in-chief to reconnoitre found it abandoned. Thus our army marches on without being able to meet the enemy, who is nowhere to be found; but our march is so rapid that the general still hopes to overtake and defeat them if they concentrate their forces.

Whilst the army was marching on San Germano, General Fardella, sent by the Duke of Calabria to the King, his father, bearing messages of respect and submission, passed by the Velletri route on his way to Rome and Florence. We are still ignorant of the details of this mission, which has, however, had no influence on the progress and operations of the army.

These details, which are indubitable, will convince your Excellency that the Naples expedition is on the point of being terminated, and that a fortnight's campaign will have sufficed to throw down this military erection with which they have tried for the last six months to alarm the whole of Europe. This result, and still more the reception given by the people to our army, at least proves that the Neapolitan nation has no sympathy with the revolution, which has precipitated that once happy country into an abyss of misfortune, and that this revolution is entirely the work of certain criminal sects, and of a few ambitious military men.

If the insurrection of Piedmont was at first of a more alarming character, and at the time it broke out made us fear a powerful and dangerous diversion in favor of the revolutionary cause, the progress of events in that country during the last eight days permits us to hope now that the danger will be more readily exorcised than we had dared to flatter ourselves. The plan of the conspirators—which was to induce the King to proclaim a constitution, and to declare himself for the Neapolitan cause against Austria—has been defeated by the abdication of the King. The Prince de Carignan,* who, owing to the circumstance that the Duke de Gênevois† was absent, was appointed to the Regency of the kingdom, very soon experienced all the awkwardness of the situation. Forced to promise and swear the Constitution of the Cortes, and to create a provisional revolutionary junta (which had not entered into his plans, nor into those of any of the ambitious officers about him), this Prince wrote to the Duke de Gênevois, entreating him to return and take the reins of government, which had devolved upon

* Afterwards King Charles Albert.—Ed.

† Ascended the throne under the title of Charles Felix.—Ed.

him by the abdication of the King. The Duke de Gênevois, who was then at Modena, not only refused to listen to the entreaties of the Prince de Carignan, but replied to them by an energetic proclamation. He wrote at the same time to the two Emperors to beg their advice and their support. The reply of the two august sovereigns was what it ought to be under the circumstances—cautious, wise, noble, and in every way suited to the principles they profess. They decided at the same time to send a courier to their Ministers at Turin, with orders to present himself to the Prince de Carignan, and give him a picture of the woes which would soon overtake the country over which he was one day to reign, and begging him seriously to consider his own situation, appealing to his feelings and his duty as the first Prince of the Blood to induce him to play, on this important occasion, the only becoming part—that of making the soldiers who had been led away by the factious return to their duty, thus restoring tranquillity to his country. These counsels were accompanied by the warning that the two Emperors would never recognize the revolution. We are still ignorant of the result of this step, but we know by the news which we receive daily from Milan that the progress of the revolution is very uncertain, that the perplexities of the Prince de Carignan are increasing, that Alessandria has become the rallying point of the revolutionists in the anarchical sense of the word, that Genoa and Novara still hold out for the King, that many regiments are faithful, that others have dispersed and returned to their homes, that the mass of the people are quiet and passive, that the King is generally regretted, and that there is no national movement in the country. Waiting the issue of this crisis, the Count de Bubna, Commandant-General of Lombardy, is preparing to overawe the factious; and, besides the garrisons of the strong places, he has an army already more than sufficient to defend our Italian provinces, and which increases daily. Milan enjoys the most perfect tranquillity, and public opinion expresses itself in the most satisfactory manner in favor of the Government.

A new event which must at this time of general commotion powerfully contribute to agitate men's minds is the insurrection of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor Alexander received all the particulars by a courier who arrived here on the 19th, and they have been confirmed by our agents.

Prince Ypsilanti, major-general in the Russian service, has put himself at the head of this insurrection, and Prince Soutzo, Hos-

podar of Moldavia, has declared for it, confessing himself that it is the work of a secret society, which has been preparing the materials for two years. This society is the same as that of the Carbonari, and we have for some time warned the Ottoman Government of it, but they attached no importance to its existence.

In this fresh emergency, the Emperor Alexander has given proof of his noble and loyal character; his views and principles entirely agree with those of the Emperor my august master. In a council which was held in the presence of their Majesties, it was decided "that the event should be left to itself." The Emperor Alexander cashiers and removes from his army all the military Greeks who take part in the insurrection; and refuses all support and help to the Greek insurgents.

The two monarchs have simultaneously declared at Constantinople that, faithful to the principles which they have publicly announced, they will never support the enemies of public order; that they will never lend any help to the Greek insurgents; that, on the other hand, they leave to the Porte itself the task of watching over its own safety. As it has remained up to this time estranged from all the affairs of Europe, we do not feel called upon to interfere in its affairs.

These determinations of the sovereigns will immediately be made public. In the mean time I pray your Excellency to lay them, as well as the contents of the present despatch, before the King, hoping his Majesty will see in them good cause for tranquillity. In this hope I send the courier who will have the honor to place it in your hands.

Metternich to Stadion, Laybach, March 26, 1821.

549. The Naples affair is at an end. I hope to be able to send a courier to Vienna in two or three days, to have the *Te Deum* sung and a hundred and one guns fired.

The revolt in Piedmont fares badly for a revolution. I will send to Vienna to-morrow unequivocal proofs that its principal champion, the Prince de Carignan, does nothing but weep. The country does not wish to rise, and all that is required now, in order to put down the small number of the lower orders who are in favor of it, is a decisive stroke on the part of one or other of the general officers, devoted to the King, who have put themselves *en rapport* with the Duke de G  nevois. In revolutionary crises, however, one

can never found anything on data, often put forth one day and contradicted the next. I therefore confine myself to facts on which positive calculations may be founded.

If order is restored in Piedmont it will be by its own efforts, and that will be an immense gain. If it does not return to duty of itself, it must fall into anarchy, and it is not in a state to dream of a military aggression on our provinces. With the exception of the army, which has remained faithful to the King, and which is at Genoa and Novara, the rest is disbanded, and the revolutionists cannot reassemble eight thousand men capable of marching. They recruit legions, but they are composed of students and bandits. Bubna is in great force. He could at the present moment dispose of ten thousand men of Frimont's army; but he will not concentrate them till we are firmly established at Naples.

There are two contingencies; either the Russian army is useless, or it is necessary. In the first case, it will turn back immediately, and perhaps will not even cross the frontier, if in a few days we hear that Piedmont has worked its own cure. If the revolution spreads over the whole of Italy, the Russians will do no harm, and the very news of the possibility of their arrival will prevent mere amateurs from rising.

We risk nothing by declaring war on Piedmont, for it declared war upon us by making a revolution. The Junta of Alessandria has formally declared war against Austria, and the revolution at Turin had no other means of doing so than by announcing that it would make a conquest of Milan.

For the rest, this revolution is nothing but a sudden blow on the part of some hot-headed men, supported by the Committee of Paris with the intention of helping Naples. But the inconceivable cowardice of the Neapolitans, and the masterly and prompt operations of our army, have defeated this plan. The only way in which they could keep the party together at Turin was by publicly asserting that all our bulletins were false, and that the Neapolitans were driving us towards the Po.

As for the Greek revolution—let it alone. I answer for it that the Emperor Alexander has as little to do with that now as with the revolution in Piedmont. You may have some difficulty in believing this, but it is none the less true, and I will send you proofs by to-morrow's courier. This affair must be looked upon as placed beyond the pale of civilization; it will end, I believe, badly for the Greeks, who depended on a support which failed them the very

day they took up arms. It is the same with the Neapolitans, who believed that Russia would be, if not for them, at least against us. You see the advantage of a good reputation in politics.

The question is at present occupying the undivided attention of France. The Government does not support, and never will support, the Piedmontese. The factious may do so; but they will not be able to accomplish much, unless indeed they overthrow the King and the Charter. If this should take place—that is to say, if France returns to 1793—then we shall certainly do nothing but come home and consider how to save ourselves. Any retrograde movement in Italy in the present position of affairs would be to make a revolution ourselves in the whole of the Peninsula; and how long could we keep our Italian provinces in such a contingency?

The world is on the eve of salvation or on the brink of ruin. It looks, however, as if the dawn of a better day were beginning to break. The success of the Naples affair may bring a period of repose. It will have cost much, but I have the conviction now, as I have had all along, that if we had acted differently, we should have been smothered in our beds.

What gives me great pleasure is the perfect way in which all our people have behaved in Italy. The armies of Bubna and Strassoldo deserve the fairest pages in our history.

Metternich to Rechberg (Letter), Laybach, March 31, 1821.

550. I send you, my dear Count, the last bulletin from the army at Naples.

A campaign of thirteen days has sufficed to show plainly the baseness of the Neapolitan Revolution. A great work of iniquity was scattered like dust as soon as the first attack was made; and as for the embellishments of patriotism, where is that national enthusiasm? Where are those patriotic phalanxes? Where the hatred to a return to order? Are the Neapolitans to be the interpreters of their own thoughts, or have the scoundrels in Parliament truly expressed them?

Heaven seem to will that the world should not be lost, and has protected our great enterprise. Wise men have followed it with their good wishes; enlightened Governments have done the same. We asked no more from them. The particulars in our possession prove to the most blind that, in spite of what is said on the spot, even by the wisest and most sober-minded men, yet the revolution

was begun quite independently of the people themselves. It is the same everywhere. It is therefore necessary to protect the people against the attacks of their fanatical enemies—their only enemies, those who deceive the people by directing all their venom against the Governments.

We shall finish the Piedmontese affair as we did the Neapolitan. Another French Revolution only could interpose grave—perhaps insurmountable—obstacles to this second enterprise.

All the venom is at present on the surface. The cure will be so much the more radical; and what we began together in July, 1819, can be finished with the help of God and for the salvation of the world in 1821. It is therefore from Carlsbad that the *era of salvation* must be dated.

CO-OPERATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

551. Metternich to Stadion (Letter), Laybach, April 21 and 22, 1821.

551. Baron Stürmer will have told you, my dear Count, of the reasons for detaining the Russian army on the frontiers. The orders are issued, and you will not see a Russian soldier. If I had not been able to make them retire even as we made them advance, do you think we should have had them put in motion ?

I received by yesterday's courier your letter of April 17. I tell you frankly, my dear Count, that it has given me pain. If you, knowing the principles which have directed our steps for years, knowing every shade of our conduct for the last nine months, knowing the dangers to which all society is exposed in a time of folly—if you, my dear Count, can reproach me with a Russian invasion, what means of safety remains to the world ? I confess that if it were in my nature to be disheartened, I should say to myself: How people seek to conjure up the perils which threatens us !

Success, doubtless quite unexpected by the knaves, has crowned our efforts. This success does not astonish me, for the simple reason that I knew both the means of attack and the means of defence. The Piedmontese affair has not cast me down, for the equally simple reason that it had entered into my calculations as a thing not only possible, but even probable.

The proof that such was the case is found in the continual reinforcements which I was the first to beg the Emperor to send into the Italian provinces, and in the threat of the arrival of the Russian armies, contained in our declaration against Naples. It was not alone to bring this country to reason that we had need of more than a hundred thousand men, and the assured prospect of foreign support. I knew for certain the efforts made by the faction on every side.

Now, from that moment it became necessary either to do nothing and live on from day to day, or to take steps in the right direction: and I do not believe any one could do that without means propor-

tioned to the difficulties. Among these means I placed first the Austrian forces, which were able alone to complete the certain task, and to avert possibilities; I had also to think of destroying Russian Liberalism, and proving to Europe that henceforth the Radicals will have to deal with the two Powers possessing most freedom of action.

The results now show whether my calculations were false. Facts alone speak in 1821. All the promises, all the speeches of the Emperor of Russia would have been valueless; but his setting in motion some hundred thousand men, their effective march, the expenditure on them of ten millions—these are facts. The command to halt is another fact not less important; and a hundred and twenty thousand men placed in the Russian provinces nearest to our frontiers, with orders to march at the first request of Austria, is certainly a third fact which will prevent these disturbers from counting so readily on the Emperor Alexander in future.

The conduct of Bubna is beyond all praise. In order to be advantageous and useful, it was necessary that he should have troops at his disposal, and above all, that he should have unlimited freedom of action. You, who know as well as I do, and perhaps better, the way things are generally managed, will see that the Emperor has done a good and graceful thing, by giving the commander of the province the power of simply consulting himself and the circumstances of the moment, so as to act unhesitatingly according to his own convictions and experience.

Immense good ensues from this; there is now just a possibility of our surviving. We must not deceive ourselves; we are not a single step beyond the possibility. With judgment, with a calm and firm step, with great rectitude and agreement of thought and action, good may yet be done in Europe. But the evil has arrived at a prodigious height. Public opinion is absolutely diseased, and since a single fact is sufficient to prove this, I will mention the state of our own capital. Be sure that at Vienna, as at Paris, Berlin, London, as in the whole of Germany and Italy, in Russia as well as America, our triumphs are rated as so many crimes, our conceptions as so many errors, and our views as criminal follies.

I possess some courage; I think I have shown a great deal in the course of the last nine months, for it was certainly required in order to take upon myself what I have done, and that with a full knowledge of the state of things as well as the responsibility; but there is nothing of illusion in me. I know how to appreciate all the good

which has been accomplished; the gain is immense, because it has brought to light a number of truths; a phantasmagoria such as the world has perhaps never seen has been destroyed; the spell is broken. Yet everything remains to be done. It is we who will occupy the strongholds of Novara and Alessandria. —

The Emperor Alexander is averse to do this, and his reasons are weighty. I will tell you the particulars by word of mouth; our public will charge me anew with folly or stupidity for being annoyed that we have to take upon ourselves this ungrateful task, which in its eyes will be a monument of glory! The public knows not what it says, for it is ignorant of the true state of the affair. The finances will profit, for the garrisons beyond the Ticino will be at the expense of the Sardinians, although they can reckon on as many forces in Lombardy which must remain to us. No matter; the thing is a positive evil, and it will require a great deal of skill to prevent its turning into an active evil for the whole of Europe.

I suppose the Emperor will return to Vienna about the middle of May. We are still detained here by the arrangements which have to be made with the two Kings of Sardinia.

The King who has abdicated must be replaced on the throne. — This affair must be promptly decided, or Piedmont will once more be ruined; we gain by the distance more than five days, and five days are much in revolutionary times.

Vincent and Pozzo will arrive here immediately; we shall send them on to Paris, for that country must not be abandoned to the folly of its Government, which is as feeble as it is badly disposed.

Now I have made a real profession of faith. I do not wish, my dear Count, that you should regard differently from myself a situation which must decide the life or death of the monarchy.

For the rest, I am much fatigued with my labors, and I am at present in the condition of a general who feels the need of repose just when the public are waking up to judge of his operations.

April 22.—The courier was just starting, when I received your letter of April 18. I must reply to you in a few words, my dear Count, for to go thoroughly into the subject will require some hours of conversation, and certainly I could not employ them more usefully.

The result of our conversation, which will simply be an examination of the present situation, as I know it and as it can only be known here—for it is a moral and material impossibility that, away from here, nay, even beyond a circle of four or five persons, it can

be known or even comprehended—the result, I say, will make you judge of the position quite differently from what is possible to you at present.

I will content myself with placing before you the following truths.

1st. There has never been a question of stationing a single Russian soldier in the Austrian monarchy.

2nd. Russia does not lead us; it is we who lead the Emperor Alexander, for many very evident reasons. He requires to be advised, now he has lost all his advisers. He looks upon Capo d'Istria as a leader of the Carbonari. He mistrusts his army, his ministers, his nobility, his people. In such a situation no one can lead.

3rd. France and England, far from being on good terms, completely distrust each other. England is entirely with us. Do not judge of England by what Lord Stewart told you; all he said is untrue. He would have you indignantly oppose the march of a Russian army into Piedmont; well, his Cabinet demands it with might and main, for it judges rightly, and foresees the incalculable complications which must arise between Austria and France in the event of an Austrian occupation.

France is at the head of all the revolutionary movements in Europe, and it would be difficult to say which does most harm and most encourages intrigues, the Government or the Jacobins. They both wish Europe to be revolutionized. The ministry aim at the introduction of the French Charter in all States of the second order, hoping thereby to consolidate themselves. The Liberals wish for the anarchical Constitution of 1791, so as to overthrow the dynasty in France. Thus the Piedmontese revolution has been the result of all kinds of efforts on the part of the Cabinet and the French Liberals.

4th. Piedmont could not exist for three months without a foreign army. The revolution is nowhere more threatening than in the whole of Italy. An important blow has been struck; some dozens of its chiefs have fled. But the revolution is still there, ready to break out afresh, and, without very firm and prudent conduct, we shall see next autumn a renewal of the scenes we have just come through. We do not believe the whole thing is over, but only that there has been a great defeat; the difference is immense.

Do you know the true, the only reason why the Emperor Alexander objects to an army, even of ten thousand men, being stationed

beyond his frontiers? Because he is convinced that this body would pass over to the enemy. So much have the liberal efforts of the good people who surround this Prince liberalized the whole army. With such a feeling a man could scarcely be a conqueror.

All that I now tell you is true, thoroughly true. Any calculation otherwise founded is erroneous. I will answer for all the facts, and the future will perhaps but too well justify the exactness of my information and my calculations.

What is the right thing to do when walking in the midst of darkness and confusion? To light a torch and walk steadily and firmly by its light. Do not trust any other lights; they are placed expressly for your destruction, or displayed by incendiaries who try to persuade you that they are only fireworks.

A few hours of conversation would tell you more than twenty pages in writing. The only thing I ask of you in the meantime is to weigh the facts already pointed out: and our material successes are facts. I do not speak at present of moral successes: these have yet to be waited for, and they are much more difficult to attain than material success.

RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS AT LAYBACH.*

552. Metternich to the Emperor Alexander, Laybach, May 6, 1821.

552. Before the separation of the monarchs and their Cabinets, may I be permitted to place in the hands of your Imperial Majesty one word of gratitude and homage? Of gratitude, Sire, for you deserve it, not on my part, nor on that of Austria, but from society at large.

You must do me the justice to admit that I discerned long ago the evil which has been lately unmasked with such awful intensity. You must also remember, Sire, that, although I knew the evil, I did not despair of the remedy. This remedy has begun to take effect; it is the intimate moral union between your Imperial Majesty and your august allies, each being free in his actions. The merit, Sire, belongs to you; for your situation was the most free, and certainly not so near to the danger as that of the other monarchs. Your Imperial Majesty has done an immense good; your conscience must tell you so; and that is the only recompense which a good man earnestly seeks after; it is the only one which can reach the man placed by Providence above other men.

There is but one act of homage which I consider worthy of your Imperial Majesty. Placed as I am between the Emperor, my master, and your Imperial Majesty, grave duties rest upon me. The first is perhaps the most difficult—that of seeking and finding the truth. The day when I lose confidence in my own calculations I shall regard myself as guilty in the eyes of my master and those of

* The monarchs assembled at Laybach were the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Naples; the diplomatists—for Austria, Metternich, Vincent, and Gentz; for Russia, Nesselrode, Capo d'Istria, Pozzo di Borgo; and for Prussia, Hardenberg and Bernstorff; for France, De la Ferronnays, Caraman, and Blacas; and for England, Lords Clanwilliam and Stewart, and Sir Robert Gordon. After the decision of the three northern Powers in favor of armed intervention in Naples, the English and French ambassadors took no further part in the Conferences.—*Ed.*

your Imperial Majesty. My homage, Sire, must simply be to tell you all my thoughts.

Society would have been irretrievably lost but for the measures which have been taken during the last few months. These measures could not have arrested its fall unless they had rested on the most correct principles. Such being the case, the dawn of a better future begins to appear: the day will succeed if we continue to walk on in the path in which we have placed ourselves. One single false principle, and the night will be upon us, and chaos will succeed that night.

There are two means of enabling us to continue in this path:—Reciprocal and unrestrained confidence, and a frank understanding of the principles on which our conduct must be grounded.

This confidence, Sire, is what the mind has most difficulty in seizing. It has been, and would forever have been, an insurmountable difficulty, if Providence had not created two sovereigns such as your Imperial Majesty and the Emperor Francis. You know each other perfectly, and this is ever necessary to a good understanding.

To establish for the future that perfect agreement of conduct so decisive for the fate of Europe, it is necessary to lay the foundation as simply as possible on clear, precise principles, and to secure their application by reciprocal engagements no less clear and precise. A great distance separates us, and this inconvenience we must remedy.

I will now state the principles, and point out the engagements to be made.

I. PRINCIPLES.

It is demonstrated that a vast and dangerous conspiracy has since 1814 acquired sufficient strength and means of action to enable it to seize upon a number of places in the public administration. This conspiracy was less evident to the eyes of the world as long as it did not court discovery, and contented itself with the domain of theory. In that domain nothing is surprising: discussions, pretensions, contradictions belong to it by full right. From the day that I saw sound doctrines attacked with impunity, and observed that they ran the risk of being suppressed altogether, I recognized revolution, with its inevitable consequences, disorder, anarchy, and death, where others saw only light fighting with prejudice. Up to that time the conspiracy had only reconnoitred its ground and pre-

pared it. It has grown, and it must grow, thanks to the instruments which a too deplorable folly has allowed it to create for itself.

It has not been slow in descending from the intellectual sphere into that of material facts. One word was sufficient to gain public favor. That word was Constitution, of all words the least precise, the most open to variety of interpretation, and the easiest to make popular, for it acts on the mass of the people through their hopes. Tell men that by means of a single word you will ensure them their rights, a liberty which the mass always confound with license, a career for their ambition, and success in all their enterprises, and you will have no trouble in making them listen to you. The mass once agitated, they give up everything: they listen, but do not care to comprehend. When the people do really comprehend, they are the first to re-establish order.

This ground taken, as the last resource, authority has been attacked. The factious have had recourse to arms; triumph seemed to them quite certain.

The clear and precise aim of the factious is one and uniform. It is the overthrow of everything legally existing. The ambitious and successful are always impatient and ardent in their demands. Every day in a revolution is equivalent to the career of a man. The day past is nothing, the present day is everything, and that will be nothing to-morrow. Influence, place, fortune, all that human passions most covet, are suspended and attached to the tree of liberty like prizes on the pole at a fair. The people do not want urging to flock to it in crowds. Go to the fair they must, and to get there everything must be overturned.

The principle which the monarchs must oppose to this plan of universal destruction is the preservation of everything legally existing. The only way to arrive at this end is by allowing no innovations.

Your Imperial Majesty knows me well enough to be assured that no person is farther removed than I am from any narrow views of administration. It is simply the attainment of real good that I desire, and on every occasion consider my duty to maintain. But the more positive I am of this the more I am convinced that it is impossible at the same time to preserve and to reform with any justice or reason when the mass of the people is in agitation; it is then like an individual in a state of irritation, threatened with fever, or already yielding to its ravages.

Let the Governments govern, and authority be something more than a name, for it is nothing without power.

By ruling, it really ameliorates the situation, but let authority remove nothing from the foundations on which it rests; let it act, but not concede. It should exercise its rights, but not discuss them. It should be just (and to be so it must be strong), and should respect all rights as it would have its own respected.

In one word, Sire, let us be conservative; let us walk steadily and firmly on well-known paths; let us not deviate from those lines in word or deed: we shall thus be strong, and shall come at last to a time when improvements may be made with as much chance of success as there is now certainty of failure.

II. MEANS

The monarchs should be furnished with such proofs of mutual confidence, and unity of principle and will, that they may have (to effect the good they desire) nothing to do but to maintain this attitude.

This state of things is less easy of attainment when the Courts are situated at great distances; therefore, I am most anxious, Sire, to make certain of the means.

With this object, it is necessary that before the separation takes place, your Imperial Majesty should come to an understanding with the Emperor Francis on the following subjects:

1st. The transactions of Laybach should be regarded by the two Courts as an unchangeable basis until the meeting of the Cabinets in 1822.

The ambassadors sent from these two Courts to the other Courts of Europe should receive instructions to regulate their conduct, on every occasion, with the greatest care, according to the principle I have just laid down. The factious and feeble, encouraged by the false policy of many of the Cabinets, will combine to disturb this union between the two monarchs. What they cannot succeed in destroying, they will try to injure in public opinion. The strongest and most persistent efforts of the abettors of the existing evil will be naturally directed against the most powerful barrier which could be opposed to it. All this is simple and natural, and consequently certain. Energetic and precise instructions should be given to the representatives of the two Courts, requiring them to support each

other on every occasion in all explanations respecting the transactions at Laybach and their consequences.

2nd. In a time of continual agitation cases may present themselves which it is impossible to define beforehand.

The two monarchs must agree among themselves:

To judge any fortuitous case according to the principles which were applied at Laybach in similar cases;

Not to hesitate to place themselves in an attitude agreeable to these principles;

Finally, to put off any explanation with other Courts until after an exchange of communications, which the two monarchs must immediately open, rather than run the risk of differing in their explanations or their conduct,

The geographical position of Austria should make your Imperial Majesty attach a particular value to this engagement on our part.

3rd. An affair of very grave importance, the revolt of the Greeks, requires the most perfect understanding between the two monarchs. Your Imperial Majesty's opinion on the matter I know, and I have taken the liberty of devoting to that subject a short separate paper. I shall have the honor of sending it to your Majesty, but it will contain your Imperial Majesty's own ideas.

4th. The most absolute uniformity of judgment on the dangers and exigences of the moment exists between your Imperial Majesty and your august ally, and, allow me to add, myself.

This addition, Sire, is not pretension. I would not allow myself to make it if I did not believe it to be really useful. It is proved that the factious of all countries and of all shades have established a centre of information and action. Chance, too, has its limits; therefore it was not chance that we have been so successful in the commotions and catastrophes of the last twelve months.

To this centre of information another must be opposed. Not so with action. Conspiracies alone depend on a single centre of action: the cause which we defend, Sire, the cause of God and man, must be assisted at every possible point. Our measures are all matured, and to be put in motion it is only necessary to follow a line of principles agreed upon. Legitimate power does not run the same chances of defeat as revolutionary action.

My wishes, therefore, are confined to the establishment of a centre of information, and for this Vienna offers every advantage. It is central, and our means of observation in Germany and Italy are numerous.

Your Imperial Majesty deigns to give me a certain amount of confidence. Assist me to justify that confidence by the triumph of a cause which is yours as much as ours, and in which the whole civilized world will one day proclaim its interest.

If, Sire, you can find a thoroughly trustworthy man, place him at Vienna and accredit him to me. Give him all the data which your Imperial Majesty can collect concerning the movements of the factious in the various countries of Europe. That man would know all that we know. The consequence will be a focus of light such as does not exist at present. We shall obtain results which perhaps we do not expect. We shall know the truth and not be led away by appearances, and in the end we shall baffle our opponents.

Such, Sire, are the moral and material measures which I propose to you. They are drawn up with the conviction that, without steady observation and continued action, we shall never do the good which is our duty; any divergence from our path will have an influence for evil, like a false movement in the day of battle: it is only by learning all we can that we can hope to beat the enemy; and, in short, to attain this end, the most glorious the mind of man can conceive, it is absolutely necessary to unite our efforts and make common cause.

Metternich's Circular Despatch to the Austrian Ambassadors at Foreign Courts, Laybach, May 12, 1821.

553. The meeting of the allied monarchs and their Cabinets at Troppau was held to determine the point of view from which they would regard the unhappy events which had overthrown the legitimate Government at Naples; to arrange a common line of conduct; and in a spirit of justice and moderation to contrive measures calculated to secure Italy from a general overthrow, and the neighboring States from most imminent dangers. Thanks to the happy agreement of views and feelings which reigned among the three august sovereigns, this first task was soon accomplished.

Principles clearly announced and embraced on both sides with all the sincerity of conviction could not fail to lead to analogous resolutions; and the bases established at the time of the first conferences have been invariably followed during the whole course of a meeting signalized by the most remarkable results.

Transferred to Laybach, this meeting took a more decided char-

acter, owing to the presence and concurrence of the King of the Two Sicilies, and the unanimity with which the princes of Italy acceded to the system adopted by the allied Cabinets. The monarchs were convinced that the Governments most immediately interested in the destinies of the Peninsula would do justice to the purity of their intentions, and that a sovereign placed in a most painful situation by acts of perfidy and violence associated with his name would resign himself with perfect confidence to measures which would both put an end to that state of moral captivity and restore to his faithful subjects the repose and well-being of which criminal factions had deprived them.

The effect of these measures was not long in manifesting itself. The edifice raised by revolt, as fragile in its construction as corrupt in its foundations, resting only on the cunning of some and the sudden blindness of others, disowned by the great majority of the nation, odious even to the army formed to defend it, has given way at the first contact with the regular forces. Legitimate power is re-established; the factions are dispersed; the Neapolitan people are delivered from the tyranny of those audacious impostors who, flattering their dreams of false liberty, practised upon them the most cruel vexations, imposed enormous sacrifices solely for the satisfaction of their own ambition and greed, and went far to irretrievably ruin a country of which they never ceased calling themselves the regenerators.

This important restoration is consummated by the counsels and efforts of the allied Powers. Now that the King of the Two Sicilies is again invested with his full rights, the monarchs content themselves with seconding by their most ardent wishes the measures adopted by this sovereign for the reconstruction of his Government, and the securing, by good laws and wise institutions, the real interests of his subjects and the constant prosperity of his kingdom.

During the course of these great transactions, we have seen burst forth here and there the effects of the vast conspiracy, so long directed against the Powers which have enjoyed happiness and glory for hundreds of years. The existence of this conspiracy was not unknown to the monarchs; but in the midst of the agitations which Italy has endured since the catastrophes of the year 1820, and the attendant confusion, it has developed with increasing rapidity, and its true character has come to light. It is not, as one might have believed at a less advanced period, against such and

such form of government particularly exposed to their abuse that the dark enterprises of the authors of these plots and the foolish wishes of their blind partisans are directed. The States which have admitted changes in their political *régime* are not more protected from their attacks than those whose ancient institutions have withstood the storms of time. Pure monarchies, limited monarchies, federative constitutions, republics, all are confounded and proscribed by a sect which treats oligarchy as something raised above the level of a chimerical equality. The chiefs of this impious league, indifferent to every kind of stable and permanent organization, aim solely at the fundamental bases of society. To overthrow what exists, and substitute whatever chance suggests to their disordered imaginations or their sinister passions—this is the essence of their doctrine, and the secret of all their machinations !

The allied sovereigns cannot forget that they have but one barrier to oppose to this devastating torrent—namely, the preservation of all that is legally established. This has been the invariable principle of their policy, the starting-point and the end of all their resolutions. They have been stopped by the vain clamors of ignorance or malice, accusing them of condemning humanity to a state of stagnation and torpor incompatible with the natural and progressive course of civilization, and with the improvement of social institutions. These monarchs have never manifested the least disposition to oppose genuine ameliorations, or the reform of abuses which creep into the best Governments. Very different views have animated them; and if the repose which the Governments and people had the right to believe had been secured to them by the pacification of Europe has not brought about all the good which should have followed, it is because the Governments have been obliged to concentrate their thoughts on the means of effectually stemming the progress of a faction which, spreading error, discontent, and the fanaticism of innovation, would soon have endangered the existence of all public order. Useful or necessary changes in the legislation and administration of States should emanate from the freewill, the thoughtful and enlightened conviction of those to whom God has given the responsibility of power. Any departure from this line of conduct necessarily leads to disorder, confusion and evils much more insupportable than those which it pretends to cure. Convinced of this eternal truth, the sovereigns have had no hesitation in proclaiming it with frankness and vigor; they have declared that, while respecting the rights and independence of all

legitimate power, they regard as legally void and unauthorized, according to the principles which constitute the public law of Europe, all pretended reforms effected by revolt and open force. They have acted in accordance with this declaration at Naples and in Piedmont, and in those events even which—in very different circumstances, but by equally criminal combinations—had given up the eastern part of Europe to disorder. The monarchs are all the more determined not to depart from this system, that they consider the firmness with which they maintained it, in an epoch so critical, to be the real cause of the success with which their efforts for the re-establishment of order in Italy have been crowned. The Governments of the Peninsula have proclaimed that they had nothing to fear for their political independence, the integrity of their territories, or the preservation of their rights, in begging for help, which was given to them on the sole condition that they should use it to defend their own existence. It is this reciprocal confidence which has saved Italy, and in the space of two months has arrested a conflagration which, without the intervention of the allied Powers, would have ravaged and ruined the whole of that beautiful country, and threatened for a long time the rest of Europe.

Nothing has more effectually shown the force of the moral power which connects the salvation of Italy with the determinations of the monarchs than the prompt and happy *dénouement* of the revolt which had broken out in Piedmont. Conspirators, partly composed of foreigners, had prepared this new crime, and to ensure its success had put in motion the most detestable of all revolutionary measures, that of inciting against authority the armed force whose function it is to obey it and to maintain public order. Victim of an inexplicable treason (if anything is to be called inexplicable while political crimes find voices to defend them in Europe), a sovereign justly enjoying the respect and affection of his subjects is obliged to abdicate a throne which he had adorned with his virtues; a considerable portion of his troops is dragged into the abyss by the example and intrigues of a small number of ambitious men; and the vulgar cry of the anti-social faction, echoing through the capital, reverberated in the provinces. The monarchs assembled at Laybach were not long in replying to this. Their union was strengthened and increased by danger, and their protecting voice was soon heard. When the faithful servants of the King saw that they were not abandoned, they employed all that remained to them of their resources to combat the enemies of their country and the

national glory. Legitimate power, though hampered and paralyzed in its action, was not the less mindful to maintain its dignity and its rights, and, help arriving at the decisive moment of the crisis, the triumph of the good cause was soon complete. Piedmont was delivered in a few days, and nothing remained of a revolution which had reckoned on the fall of more than one Government but the shameful recollections carried away by its guilty authors.

Thus, in following without deviation the principles established, and the line of conduct agreed upon in the first days of their meeting, the allied monarchs have accomplished the pacification of Italy. Their principal object is attained. None of the proceedings concluded there have belied the declarations which truth and good faith had inspired. They have remained faithful under every trial that Providence had in reserve for them. Called more than all the other legitimate sovereigns to watch over the peace of Europe, to protect it, not only against the errors and passions which might compromise the relations of one Power to another, but also against those fatal attempts which would deliver up the whole civilized world to the horrors of universal anarchy—they would feel that they profaned their august vocation by the narrow calculations of a vulgar policy. As everything is simple, plain, and open in the system which they have embraced, they submit it with confidence to the judgment of all enlightened Governments.

The Congress which has just concluded is to reassemble in the course of next year. It will then take into consideration the duration of the measures which, by consent of all the Courts of Italy, and particularly those of Naples and Turin, have been judged necessary to secure the tranquillity of the Peninsula. The monarchs and their Cabinets will approach the examination of that question in the same spirit which has hitherto guided them. Motives of undoubted weight, and fully justified by results, determined the sovereigns to interfere in the affairs of Italy. They are far from wishing to prolong this intervention beyond the limits of strict necessity, sincerely hoping that the circumstances which imposed this painful duty upon them may never again occur.

We have thought it useful, when the sovereigns are about to separate, to recapitulate in the preceding paper the principles which have guided them in their late transactions.

You are consequently charged to communicate this despatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Court to which you are accredited.

You will receive at the same time a declaration (No. 554) conceived in the same spirit, which the Cabinets have had drawn up and printed in order to make known to the European public the sentiments and principles with which the august sovereigns are animated, and which will always serve as guides to their policy.

Declaration.

(Supplement to No. 553.)

554. Europe knows the motives which induced the allied sovereigns to combine to suppress conspiracies and put an end to the troubles which threatened the general peace, the re-establishment of which has cost so many efforts and so many sacrifices.

At the very moment when their generous determination was accomplished in the Kingdom of Naples, a rebellion of a still more odious kind (if that were possible) broke out in Piedmont.

Neither the ties which for so many centuries had united the House of Savoy to its people, nor the benefits of an enlightened administration under a wise prince and paternal laws, nor the sad prospect of the evils to which the country would be exposed, could restrain the designs of these instigators of rebellion.

The plan for a general subversion was drawn up. In this vast combination against the repose of nations the conspirators of Piedmont had their *rôle* assigned to them. They have hastened to fulfil it.

The throne and the State have been betrayed, oaths violated, military honor despised, and neglect of every duty has speedily brought the scourge of all disorders.

Everywhere the evil has presented the same character; everywhere the same spirit has directed these unhappy revolutions.

Unable to find a plausible reason to justify them, or national support to sustain them, it is in false doctrines that the authors of these revolutions seek an apology; it is on criminal associations that they found a still more criminal hope. To them the salutary control of law is a yoke which must be broken. They renounce the sentiments which inspire true patriotism, and substituting for well-known duties arbitrary and indefinite pretences of universal change in the constituent principles of society, they prepare endless calamities for the world.

The allied sovereigns recognized all the dangers of this conspiracy

to their full extent, but at the same time they saw the real weakness of the conspirators behind the veil of appearances and declamations. Experience has confirmed their presentiments. The resistance which legitimate authority has met with has had no strength, and crime has disappeared before the sword of justice.

It is not to accidental causes, nor even to the feeble resistance made in the day of battle, that the speedy success must be attributed. This rests upon a principle more consoling and more worthy of consideration.

Providence struck terror into consciences so guilty, and the disapproval of the people, whose fate was compromised by these authors of mischief, made them drop their arms.

Destined simply to combat and suppress rebellion, the allied forces, far from maintaining any separate interest, came to the assistance of the subjugated people, and the people regarded their aid as a support in favor of their liberty, not as an attack on their independence. From that time the war ceased; from that time the States which rebellion had reached have been friendly to Powers which desired nothing but their tranquillity and well-being.

In the midst of these grave conjunctures and in a position so delicate the allied sovereigns, together with their Majesties the King of the Two Sicilies and the King of Sardinia, have thought it indispensable to take measures of temporary precaution, such as were dictated by prudence and regard for the general safety. The allied troops, whose presence were necessary for the re-establishment of order, have been stationed at convenient points, with the sole view of protecting the free exercise of legitimate authority, and assisting it to efface the traces of these grave misfortunes.

The justice and disinterestedness which have presided at the deliberations of the allied monarchs will always regulate their policy. In the future, as in the past, its aim will ever be the preservation of the independence and the rights of each State as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result of so dangerous a movement will yet be, under Providence, the strengthening of the peace which the enemies of the people endeavored to destroy, and the consolidation of an order of things which will secure peace and prosperity to the nations.

Moved by these feelings, the allied sovereigns, in fixing a limit to the conferences at Laybach, wished to announce to the world the principles which guided them. They are determined never to

depart from them, and all lovers of peace will see in their union an assured guarantee against the attempts of the ill-disposed.

With this object their Imperial and Royal Majesties have commanded their plenipotentiaries to sign and publish the present declaration.

Laybach, May 12, 1821.

Austria : METTERNICH, BARON DE VINCENT;

Prussia : KRUSEMARCK;

Russia : NESSELRÖDE, CAPO D'ISTRIA, POZZO DI BORGIO.

METTERNICH'S MISSION TO KING GEORGE IV. OF ENGLAND IN HANOVER.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis.

555. *Hanover, Oct. 24, 1821.*—True to my plan for the journey, I arrived here in good time on the 20th. I heard, when at Brunswick, that the King was confined to his bed with the gout. On my arrival I was told that this is only a slight attack, the consequence of a cold taken by his Majesty at the review of the troops.

I found everything ready for my reception on the part of the King. I have also spoken to Lord Castlereagh, and convinced myself that it is the King's wish, as well as his own, to bring about a thorough understanding between the two Courts in the present crisis. The first conversation was sufficient to show that this agreement would be accomplished without difficulty.

On the following day the King summoned me. He is residing at a country house which lies about the same distance from Hanover as Schönbrunn from Vienna.

I found the King looking much better than I expected. A well-known English *arcanum* called "Wilson's Remedy" had already moderated the attack of gout. The King was lying in a *chaise-longue* in a rather fantastic Austrian hussar's coat. He wore the crosses of the Austrian order.

He received me with all the marks of pleasure, and at once began the conversation by assuring me that your Majesty had done him two great favors in life. The first—and he pointed to the *toison* I always wear—the other that your Majesty had sent me to him.

He now began a long speech, which certainly lasted half an hour, and was meant to impress me with the feeling of his attachment to your Majesty, whom he never mentioned without saying "Our Emperor." My personal praises followed in a way that only embarrassed the man who was their object; between which he did not fail to make the most violent personal attacks against the Emperor Alexander and still worse against Count Capo d'Istria.

After these alternate attacks and laudations he came to the motives for my coming here. He began with a long recapitulation of the events of late years, in which he conceded the principal part to Austria, and ended with a frightful explosion against his own ministry, especially against Lord Liverpool, but entirely excepting Lord Castlereagh, whom he described as a faithful, vigorous man, quite devoted to the good cause, as proof of which he concluded by saying, "He understands you; he is your friend: that says everything."

When the King had finished (and I guarded myself from interrupting him), I took care to return to everything he had said. I passed over his fierce attacks, and endeavored to make him see the real position of affairs.

The result was that we arrived at the same point of view; the King became more calm, and expressed himself with the greatest justice and propriety.

After a conversation of more than three hours, he left me with the invitation to come to him when and how I should think well. He expressly reserved to himself the further unfolding of his views on the position of affairs, foreign and domestic.

I now first commenced a regular official negotiation with Lord Londonderry (Castlereagh). My courier from Vienna had arrived with copies of my last despatches to Constantinople and St. Petersburg, and I took these as the groundwork of our agreement. I have the satisfaction of assuring your Majesty that Lord Londonderry, when I had explained this basis, pronounced it so clear that he has adopted it unconditionally as the most reasonable and fitting.

My business here may be divided into two parts. The course taken here with regard to the Turkish complication is so firm and consistent that we shall certainly be able to prepare a very difficult solution for their evil game. Lord Londonderry and I have sent a courier to Count Bernstorff, to summon him from Mecklenburg, where he is just now. If he cannot come, I hope I shall meet him on my journey home.

Count Lieven has not arrived, for what reason is quite unknown. We know that he left St. Petersburg on September 25, but at the first halt he would find an invitation from the Emperor to go to him at Witepsk for the review, and as that may have detained him ten or twelve days, we expect him every hour, and I am very anxious for his arrival.

My second object here is the home affairs. It is necessary to

keep the ministry in their places, or if this is not practicable, at any rate to reconstruct a ministry under Lord Castlereagh's leadership devoted to the cause, or to us, which is the same thing.

In this critical question I quite agree with Lord Castlereagh's thoroughly right and judicious views. I hope to be able to support him with the King. That I, however, must keep within very precise limits, is a necessity of the case, for it can never be the true interest of one State to meddle in the home affairs of another. My part here, therefore, can go no further than to show myself an unselfish and calmly reflective friend of the good cause. My personal knowledge—which is, unhappily, only too great—of the obstructive character (combined as it is, however, with many talents) of Lord Liverpool, leads me to consider as a real benefit his leaving the ministry with a view to its recomposition under Lord Londonderry as Premier. Our political standpoint would certainly gain by England's taking a more vigorous grasp in the world's affairs.

I confine myself to this preliminary statement of my attitude with regard to the business of the hour the more willingly as the result will be seen in but a few days. . . .

Attachment to your Majesty's person and the whole Austrian system pervades every idea of the King. It is his great desire to visit Vienna in the course of the next year, and Lord Londonderry encourages the idea. If nothing unforeseen occurs, he will certainly come in June, and in July go to Carlsbad, then home by Berlin, Hanover, and Paris. From this short sketch your Majesty will be satisfied that my relations here, political and otherwise, leave nothing to be desired.

My journey through the whole of Upper and Lower Saxony has afforded me every kind of evidence that the preservation of peace lies entirely in the hands of the Governments. The student affair has been so turned to ridicule that its political tendency would have quite disappeared if the least vigor had been shown in the matter of some notorious professors. But even these are only like the few branded logs in a huge pile. If the Greek affair succeeds, so much is for the moment gained that a very little help will put all right.

The eyes of the well-disposed are everywhere turned on Austria; every word of ours tells, and if, when the present political crisis reaches a moment of repose, we only vigorously bring forward our system in Germany, much good will ensue. I am able to make this assertion with the more confidence as princes and ministers

pour in upon me from all sides, and beg from me orders rather than mere advice.

I cannot yet point out the route by which I shall go back. At any rate I will return in the early part of November to Vienna.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Hanover, Oct. 29, 1821.

556. The King of England has set out on his journey. He goes by Cassel, Marburg, Wetzlar, Coblenz, and Brussels. His health is quite re-established.

I believe I have thoroughly attained the object of my journey. My agreement with Lord Londonderry is concluded. England takes the same ground as we do, and this in the following sense:

1. The two Cabinets consider the maintenance of peace between Russia and the Porte as the most important object of their common efforts. To facilitate these, they will leave nothing undone to enlighten Russia as to the danger of a breach, at the same time calling upon the Porte for an exact fulfilment of the treaty and moderation in its demands.

2. Since the unanimity of the declarations of the two Courts that exercise the most direct influence on the Porte will have a most salutary effect, the two cabinets have drawn up one despatch to St. Petersburg and another to Constantinople, in which the above views are strongly and vigorously developed. These decrees are included in the despatch, and are drawn up with the care proper to remove from the Russian Court the delusion that a conference (on their part) between the ministers is necessary for an agreement in fundamental views. Lord Londonderry's instructions, therefore, are grounded mostly on English, mine on Austrian, arguments. On both sides the conclusion arrived at is, the necessity that Russia should maintain peace; for, under present circumstances, the evils consequent on any political war would be incalculable.

That the two Powers will exert their whole influence on the Porte to attain this all-important object; but that it does not come within the province of the Powers to interfere with actual force in case of opposition being made; that, lastly, the views which may be entertained by Russia of the greatest possible strengthening of the friendly relations between that Power and the Porte must be put forth by Russia herself, and can in no way proceed from the allies. In these sentences your Majesty will find the pure basis on which we take our stand thoroughly shared by England. My conversations with Lord Londonderry had the good result of very much

strengthening his language. Your Majesty knows the English ministry too well to doubt that the instructions to Bagot and Strangford would not have been nearly so precise as they are but for my co-operation. I have now the pleasure of pointing out to Russia how much can always be done with England if one knows how to speak her language.

With regard to the great question of the moment, I consider the result of my journey as all the more decisive as Count Lieven, who arrived here yesterday, has just left the Emperor Alexander, and, according to the first conversation which Londonderry and I had with him, is quite convinced that that monarch will certainly maintain peace. Everything that I have heard from Count Lieven shows me that the Emperor Alexander still remains in the same mind that he was at Laybach.

My presence here has been of great advantage in another way: I hope and believe, namely, that Lord Londonderry will be present at the Italian Congress next year.

As to the home affairs of England, I believe I have put an end to much mischief. I have spoken out to the King with much freedom and loyally supported the ministry. I do not think that Lord Liverpool can maintain his position: if this is not possible (and his resignation in a good manner would be a happiness for England and Europe), the King at least remains. If this happens, Lord Londonderry concedes to me the whole merit of a result which can only act beneficially on our future standpoint. . . .

The presence of the King will have a very good effect here, although it does not amount to quite so much as it ought to have done. He would make a much better appearance if he could put aside certain peculiarities in his temper and manner.

As to his attachment to your Majesty and to Austria's system, nothing more can be desired. He not only allows no opportunity to pass of making this feeling public, but he perhaps does too much in that way. At all his dinners the first toast which the Duke of Cambridge gives is, of course, the King; the second, proposed by the King, is your Majesty. With the first the band plays "God save the King;" with the second, "God preserve the Emperor." At state dinners, when the people were assembled beneath the windows, they accompanied these toasts with loud hurrahs, which were not more noisy for the King than for your Majesty. During the first toast the King remains quiet, and during the second his voice is louder even than that of his people.

Count Bernstorff cannot come here. As I cannot meet him on my road, and as I have no object of any kind to induce me to travel by North Germany, I will take the route by Frankfurt, which is better for travelling, and will only make a difference of a few hours. I can thus stop at Cassel and see the Elector, visit the Duke of Nassau, and confer with the ministers there and at Darmstadt, and put many things in order for the next sitting of the Diet. Once at Biebrich, I can go for four-and-twenty hours to Johannisberg, and reach Vienna by November 12. By the other route I should reach Vienna on the 9th, but in this short delay I see no disadvantage worth consideration.

METTERNICH.

Noticed and approved.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, December 27, 1821.

THE PRINCE DE CARIGNAN'S SHARE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY INTRIGUES IN PIEDMONT.

Metternich to Zichy, in Berlin, and to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, December 6, 1821.

557. His Majesty's ministers should be informed that the Provisional Government in Piedmont have been occupied in carefully collecting exact *data* concerning the part which the Prince de Carignan is supposed to have taken in the revolution in that country; that the result of this inquiry is very unfavorable to the Prince, who is seriously compromised by the depositions of several rebel officers; but that, nevertheless, there is not sufficient positive evidence against him to bring him within the power of the law. These *data* have been corroborated to me on my return from Hanover, by Baron de Binder, who is here on leave. The conversations which I have had with that ambassador, while leaving me no doubt on this head, have at the same time enabled me to see clearly enough that King Carlo Felice, who seems convinced of the guilt of the Prince de Carignan, has not given up the idea of removing him from the succession to the throne, which he wishes to secure for his own son by a pragmatic sanction. I am even afraid, from the manner in which Baron de Binder expressed himself in telling me of the project which they attribute to his Sardinian Majesty, that this ambassador, when he was confidentially consulted at Turin, did not pronounce against the project as decidedly as he ought to have done. This hesitation may have been caused by the general persuasion at Turin, even among individuals who are most devoted to the King and the monarchical cause, that the Prince de Carignan has not held himself aloof from the revolution in his country; that he was led away by some young ambitious military men, who wished to play a part under the sanction of his name; that, lacking entirely both temper and energy, he knew neither how to restrain or direct them, and has ended by displeasing all parties.

It is certain that when the heir presumptive to the throne is so

weak as to allow himself to be dragged into playing a part so derogatory to his person and his country, the friends of the monarchy must dread the moment when he will be called by Providence to reign; we can imagine the general fear at the thought that the Prince de Carignan, when he ascends the throne, will most probably become the sport of factions and parties, and that his reign may be the era of new internal troubles. There is, in fact, no doubt that the accession of the Prince de Carignan to the throne, after the part he played in the last revolution, may give just cause for anxiety. But, without deceiving ourselves on this point, we cannot discover in the fear of possible or even probable evil, any good reason for departing from those principles which the allied sovereigns have constantly professed; or permitting ourselves to prejudge a question so delicate as that of depriving Prince de Carignan of his right of succession to the throne, especially when there is no substantial proof of his guilt, so that he cannot legally be tried. It seems to me that the allied sovereigns have neither the right nor the power to do so, and that in arrogating either to themselves they would give an example as dangerous as it is contrary to their principles. Such is, at least, our opinion on this important question, and as we think it well that it should be known to his Majesty's ministers, your Excellency is requested to allow this despatch to be read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

* See Nos. 548-550. We know that the Prince de Carignan made use of his enforced absence from Italy to reinstate himself, for he took military service under the Duke d'Angoulême (1823), and so distinguished himself by personal bravery at the taking of Trocadero—the most brilliant exploit of the whole campaign—that a reconciliation took place between the Prince and King Carlo Felice.—ED.

1822.

COMPLICATIONS WITH CAPO D'ISTRIA AND OTHER
EVENTS.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from January 5 to August 25, 1822.

558. Power of custom. 559. The Vienna carnival. 560. Capo d'Istria's negligence. 561. Alexander desires an interview with Metternich. 562. Dispute between General Foy and Count Castelbajac—Metternich's portrait. 563. Canova's "Psyche and Amor." 564. Contest between Capo d'Istria and Metternich. 565. Capo d'Istria to be King of Greece. 566. Tatitscheff to Vienna. 567. His arrival. 568. Confusion. 569. Negotiations with Tatitscheff. 570. State of the Grecian question. 571. Capo d'Istria's tactics. 572. *Status quo*. 573. The Italian opera in Vienna. 574. Interruptions. 575. Oken's "Urschleim." 576. Tatitscheff's departure. 577. Order for Neumann. 578. Five despatches at once—"Des Séductions Politiques" de Lourdoueix. 579. The European army. 580. Charm of the present position. 581. Londonderry. 582. Uncertainty of the arrival of the King of England in Vienna. 583. Birthday. 584. Disentanglement of the Gordian knot. 585. Expectation of the result. 586. The Turks. 587. Success. 588. Tatitscheff's arrival. 589. Anticipated congress. 590. Between Baden and Vienna. 591, 592. Tatitscheff and Capo d'Istria. 593. The Emperor Francis in Baden. 594. Conclusion of the water-cure. 595. Capo d'Istria's Government. 596. German opera. 597. The Emperor Alexander comes: Capo d'Istria does not. 598. O'Meara's work—Napoleon's characteristics. 599. Translation of O'Meara's lecture. 600. Londonderry's suicide. 601. The same continued. 602. Details from Stewart—desire for Wellington.

558. *Vienna, January 15, 1822.*—The force of habit is so strong a power that one may come to take pleasure even in privations. I can quite comprehend that a prisoner to whom freedom is given after twenty years of confinement will feel quite strange in the outer world when he no longer hears the rattle of his chains.

It is remarkable how little is needed in order to act. The power comes of itself; will and memory are all that is necessary; but just for this reason so few know how to act. That the public thinks everything grand and difficult arises from the way in which the great mass of the people looks at things. Some really think it so,

others encourage the delusion in order to make themselves safe in case success does not follow; both these classes are active, and set great machines in motion; but great machines are inconvenient and cumbrous things. There is always one essential point, and one only; everything else is extraneous. Hence, if we go straight up to it, attack it, destroy it, or use it according to our needs, the enormous structure will disappear like smoke. This is, however, what most people do not do; rather, they become alarmed, or they begin to depreciate the importance of the matter, or they attempt too much at once, and thus sink in the mud, and are stifled in it. What, then, shall I say of Capo d'Istria?

I remember, when I was a boy of seven years old, saying to one of my professors, "Do you know what I think about the world? The laws which govern it go exactly contrary to optical laws; the closer you approach objects in the world the smaller they become." My professor did not allow me to pursue this theme, and broke out in anger. "My friend," said he, "you speak like an inexperienced youth; with such principles you will never accomplish anything, and will always go wrong."

559. *January 11.*—The Court ball, which took place two days ago, gave me the opportunity of making some truly philosophical if not amusing reflections on the Vienna carnival. There 200 persons of both sexes, locked in each other's arms, turn constantly round from Twelfth Day to Ash Wednesday; so that a sprightly pair may in this time make a distance of 400 miles, while another pair less nimble will perhaps accomplish only 200. When at last Ash Wednesday arrives, and the dancers separate, they are greatly astonished to find themselves in the same place from which they started. With us in Vienna, only our bodies turn, our heads not so easily, and only too frequently it happens that the mothers sadly discover in Lent that the vigorous waltzers on whom her motherly eyes lingered with especial hope had clasped her little daughters so tightly only to make the more sure of duly accomplishing the 400 or the 200 miles. As I have nothing to do with this pirouetting, and watch all the bustle very calmly, Lent brings me no disappointment. But yet I find the carnival very tiresome, although I only use my legs to get over the ground, for nothing is so insupportable to me as a ball where not a corner is to be found to enjoy a quiet chat. And this is my destiny at the *fêtes* at which I must be present. I grow weary and fly. It is really not worth while to set a whole orchestra in motion to produce such an effect. There

is nothing so frightful as movement without object, and noise without interest. Vienna is now full of such movement and noise. For some time after the ball I always speak in cadences, and divide my sentences into eight periods, just like the waltzes with their eight-time.

560. *January 21.*—The Russian Premier still keeps us waiting for his decisions. What a confusion of ideas! How mischievous is his example! How it agitates men's minds, pours oil on the fire, and spoils the position! Since the world began was there ever such a man? And yet he will end just like all the others who have gone before him, but who have not gone so far as he has by a long way. But this end, the surest remedy for deep-seated evils, will it not come too late? And before the dreamer is got rid of many things will have gone to rack and ruin. That the barrier is not yet demolished can only be explained by the equanimity of the Emperor Alexander; but is this equanimity sufficient? Will it never be broken through?

Nine-and-twenty years ago to-day Louis XVI. was executed. When I call to mind the share I then took in the world's affairs, I feel as if I must be a hundred years old.

561. *January 23.*—To-day I have received very interesting accounts from St. Petersburg, which may explain the relations between the Emperor Alexander and myself. Reading alone, however, will not suffice; one must also know. Health and disease can neither be written nor read. To judge of them, one must see and examine. The Emperor Alexander wishes very much that I should come to him—an absolute impossibility. He desires only a few moments, but I am not master of a single one. Alexander is dying to be rid of the whole concern—an astonishingly easy matter, and I really think a *tête-à-tête* of a few days would be sufficient to attain this end. But even that short space of time is now an impossibility. Alexander inquires how then was it possible for me to go to see the King of England. This question a child might answer, but the Emperor Alexander is of all children the most childish.

Poor little Nesselrode wishes to send Stroganow to Vienna in place of Golowkin. He thinks I require an amiable man. How little he knows me. To get this fancy out of his head I wrote as follows: "I have liked you for sixteen years; I respect you; you possess my confidence. If we meet we confide in each other. I believe in you and understand you. Now, are you amiable? Not in the least, and you never make any pretension to be so. There-

fore I beg you not to make me contradict myself." I do not know that this language is amiable. I quite fear that it is not so, but it is to the point.

562. *February 9.*—There cannot well be anything more scandalous than the debates in the French Chambers. What questions have been raised there! How extraordinary was the dispute between General Foy and Count Castelbajac on fidelity. It has been left to the French to show that there can be two kinds of it. The revolutionists attach the idea of place to that of fidelity, while the Royalists connect it with the person. The latter are right, for I may assert that General Foy would not pledge his fidelity to the bed, but to the person, for otherwise any trifler would be faithful if he only always lay in the same bed.

How can people enter into such absurd discussions? And if any one is so fortunate as to find an opponent stupid enough to start such a question, why is he not crushed with some sharp saying? What a capital answer Castelbajac, the ex-Bonapartist general, might have given if he had only repeated the compliment which Napoleon paid to Ségur when he met him in the Tuileries on his return from Elba. When Ségur assured him of his unalterable fidelity, "There are two kinds of fidelity," answered Napoleon: "the fidelity of the dog and the fidelity of the cat. You, gentlemen, have the fidelity of the cat, which never forsakes the house." In Castelbajac's place I would have asked General Foy whether he considers General Bertrand possessed fidelity or not?

One of the most wretched *coryphæi* of the *doctrinaire* party, Royer-Collard, informs the world that public liberties are "*des résistances.*" I, for my part, believe that public liberties are health. Health is a much more positive thing than mere resistance of death, which is a negative force; a kind of resistance which is only disease, and is therefore neither health nor death. According to Royer-Collard, an organized State might have arrived at the summit of perfection when disease was the basis of its existence; up to this time I have thought that health was the best regimen, but it seems that I am only an Obscurantist or a fool. All this nonsense talked in a place which is thought an Areopagus brings me to anger and despair. My mind is disturbed by nothing so much as by pretension to intellectual power and its consequences—impudence, vanity, ostentation, senselessness, and all the absurdities so boldly brought forward. Capo d'Istria takes Royer-Collard for a very deep thinker. I am so convinced that he considers me a blockhead that the conviction

is the greatest consolation—the only one, too, which he can give me. If ever the day comes that he thinks me right, I shall be inconsolable.

I have had my portrait taken very successfully. I have given the original to my mother, and am now having it copied. The workmen here are very slow, and there is no way of pushing them on, because they then punish one by working badly.

563. *February 10.*—I have just received a group in marble by Canova, and had it put in my pavilion. It is a charming work of art, which only troubles me in one way—I do not know, that is, what the innocent and the prudish will say to them. The first probably nothing; the second a great deal. This group was executed by Canova for Malmaison, and I believe the Emperor of Russia has bought it. I got Canova to make a copy of it himself. It is one of the most tender and at the same time one of the most voluptuous creations of the artist. He has modeled the marble with love and grace. The group represents the first kiss that Amor gave to Psyche, and the two children kiss as if they had never done anything else. But whenever the very pure and innocent visit me I must hang a dressing-gown round Amor and throw a sheet over Psyche, except on such occasions, however, I will leave them in their simple god-like forms. If these charming creatures did not weigh three-and-twenty hundred-weight I would have them set on rollers; but they are immoveable, and consequently faithful, like the cats and General Foy. I am delighted to think, therefore, that, in spite of his wings, Amor can never leave my house. These wings are a true work of art. In Rome there is an artist who only makes wings; the first sculptors employ him, and it is quite extraordinary how delicately he handles the marble.

564. *February 22.*—The famous courier from St. Petersburg has arrived, and he does not fall short of his predecessors, for he brings me only senseless double-meaning phrases, injurious to those who wrote them, having no relation to facts, and in thorough contradiction to all that lies before one's eyes: full of "nonsense" and badly written; the outcome of all this rigmarole is—nothing. So, as I always said, this "nothing" is not war, for war is something. It is not necessary to trouble one's head much to understand that, and, as I am in the right after all, there is in this feeling a great compensation for many annoyances.

My answer will be, that I will not answer; and of all answers that is the most decided. On this occasion as on so many others,

facts must speak for themselves, and they have mostly quite another power than mere words. The misuse of words is a misfortune of our age. The perfection of man's wit will not succeed in building even a hut with mere words, and the most eloquent phrases will never shelter any one from the rain though he may take refuge under a whole thesis. Capo d'Istria, too, will be wet to the skin—that I will answer for. The struggle between Capo d'Istria and me is like the conflict between a positive and a negative force. Forces of like nature would neutralize each other; and thus neither of them can prevail as long as one of them is not used up by friction. Now, I do not feel myself to have lost either weight or size; but for such a contest what patience is needed!

565. *March 3.*—Among the amusing incidents of the time is what has happened to the Emperor Francis. He has received a letter with the signature “from a friend,” inviting him to propose Capo d'Istria as King of Greece. That Capo d'Istria himself has no share in this I am convinced, for he thinks only of a republic. But this absurd step is significant of his friends. I at any rate would give my vote for his being placed on the throne, for he would be certainly much better placed there than where he is.

A remarkable request has been made to me, which I should have mentioned before. Ali Pasha, of Janina, sent to me—when he found his possessions limited to that town, and was in daily fear of his rebellion against the Porte coming to an end—a confidential messenger with a letter in which, with many pompous commendations, he requested that I would send him a “Constitution-maker.” Exclusively occupied with the welfare of his subjects, he had discovered that the best security for the happiness of his people lay in the bestowal of a Constitution; that he was convinced of this, but did not know what a Constitution really is, and therefore begged me to tell him of a person experienced in the matter. I gave the confidential messenger, a quite uncultivated Albanian merchant, my answer to the Pasha; it contained, in a very few words, the assurance that I had no “Constitution-maker” at my disposal, but that, since Ali Pasha did not himself know what a Constitution is, I begged to advise him, in gratitude for the confidence reposed in me, that the best Constitution for the Pashalic would be subjection to the Porte.

Janina had fallen before the Pasha's messenger returned to him.*

* It is well known that Ali Pasha had been executed February 5, 1822, by

566. *March 5.*—The bomb has burst; it was filled with cotton-wool. I have this day received a courier from Lebzeltern informing me of Tatistscheff's arrival.

Since no one knows what is to be done when the magazine of follies is exhausted, it is now desired to explain them. The man was chosen who came first to hand, for the simple reason that in Russia nothing is so rare as a man. The expressions of the Emperor Alexander to myself personally leave nothing to be desired. My despatch of January 28 to Lebzeltern* has caused the bursting of the gun. It was certainly composed for that purpose, and the moment evidently was not badly chosen.

Now the affair will go off! It is time too. In what a position is the Emperor Alexander! Since the world began nothing can be compared to the incredible character of his proceedings, and one will never be old enough not to live to see things which the boldest imagination could with difficulty conceive.

567. *March 6.*—Tatistscheff has arrived. I saw him, and I hope that Capo d'Istria will be considered wrong. He is wrong before God, but he must also be so before man.†

568. *March 8.*—I am now fighting with Tatistscheff. The good man is just like an eel. Happily, I am an old fisherman!

Since the fall of Carthage no affair has been conducted like this one. It is extraordinary that we must always be asking if people are misleading one, if they will fail one or act serviceably, what they will do, or what they will not do. Hence an Areopagus of the most loyal, upright, and far-seeing men of all times have to lose themselves in useless hypotheses. In the midst of all this, I have the feeling of not being mistaken myself, and of being able to point out what seems undefinable.

At any rate, I shall do nothing to embarrass the matter still further; I feel, indeed, that I shall clear up many things. . . . Whether anything happens or not will be decided by the small words Yes or No. I do not know a prettier word than the French *oui*, and much prefer it to the German *ja*, which stretches the mouth so terribly.

569. *March 11.*—I am working at some despatches and endeavoring to make my standpoint clear to the gentlemen. I think it is a

Kurschid Pasha, and his head sent to Constantinople, which caused great rejoicing there.—Ed.

* See No. 615.—Ed.

† See Nos. 616-621.—Ed.

good one, and unless I am much deceived, I shall bring the affair to a conclusion.

If any one could have overheard my conversation with Tatistscheff, he must think one of two things—either there was a wish to deceive me, or in his country it is not known what is desirable or feasible. The former would be too absurd to take into consideration; the latter is so in harmony with my knowledge of the country that without hesitation I adopt it as correct.

Tatistscheff must think that I am accessible to flattery, for he stuffs the censer right under my nose. But when one has lived so long as I have, one's nose is not very sensitive.

570. *March 22.*—I have been two days fighting with the storm. In Greece they begin to be furious. Between Greece and Russia there is just now a relation like that expressed by a certain Gascon nobleman: "If you go forward, I will go back; but take care! for if you go back, I shall step forward." This is the state of the affair, thanks to the Russian Premier. Although the thing will blow away like so much dust, yet it annoys me. Bad things occupy me day and night, while the good take but moments.—Capo d'Istria and a moment! That does not rhyme. If I had to read through all that I have written during the last ten years, I should certainly need four years and more for the work.

571. *March 27.*—Capo d'Istria wastes his life in trying to shove me to one side. After some months lost for the peace of the world, the Emperor Alexander in despair clapped both hands to his head, and came to me with the request that I would put its contents to rights for him. And this is the case again to-day. Capo d'Istria knows better than any man in the world how to complicate an affair, and the present one is so complicated that the Emperor Alexander can neither move backwards nor forwards. Since the month of June I have foreseen the thing, and even the very day when the head would again be brought for me to put in order. To-day, too, I must again begin the same labor which falls to me in every great affair. The whole thing only commences to-day. Capo d'Istria has the fault of certain authors, who write an interminable preface before they touch the real subject of their work. The reader then expects something which he does not find in it; and inquires, at the conclusion of the work, for what purpose the preface was intended.

The Emperor Alexander is certainly self-willed, but one must not forget that this self-will of his is of a grand style.

572. *April 3.*—The affair is to-day as it was nine months ago. I can now see thoroughly through Tatistscheff. I know all there is in the man. Unhappily, I find there many empty spaces—which the good man imagines to be full. If people think to play the cunning with me, they are mistaken. This, however, has not been the case. The Emperor Alexander wants to find his way in a labyrinth, and begs the clue from his old Ariadne.

573. *April 8.*—What a good episode in my life is the establishment of the Italian opera here; it has at last succeeded, and I have gained a real and great victory.

I have been present at a rehearsal of “Zelmira.” Everything in it is good: the music and the singers, and David is the first singer of his kind. He unites everything: a beautiful tenor voice with a depth and a compass that gives on the one hand the very idea and essence of manhood, and on the other has nothing of it. He takes, without effort, the upper C with the natural voice, and goes down with ease. His method is unrivalled, and his execution perfect; in a word, he leaves nothing to be desired; and there are few things in this world on which I could venture to pronounce such a judgment.

In the months of April, May, June, and July we shall have “Zelmira,” “Corradino,” “Moses,” “Elisabetta,” by Rossini; a little *opera buffa* by Generali; and “Gabriella di Vergy,” by Carafa. The troupe consists, besides Colbrand (now Madame Rossini), of a charming singer, Ekerlin, who bears a German name; beside Mombelli, David, Nazzari, Botticelli, Ambrogio, who are all one better than one another—with the exception of David, who surpasses them all. At the head of all is Rossini himself, with an orchestra and chorus which astonish every one. It may be supposed what delight this gives to a *melomaniac* like me. There are moments when the sunbeams penetrate the darkness of my prison, and so I feel most thoroughly.

574. *April 9.*—My workroom is always like a headquarters. Every moment brings a new interrupter, and if work wearies me, still more do these perpetual interruptions. Habit does much for most things, and I possess that of not losing the thread which is every moment broken, but my head suffers very much in consequence. There are times when my poor head is so tired that I long to lay it down anywhere alone and sleep.

575. *April 11.*— . . . I suffer, too, from some follies, one of which is the sea. I love it as I love few things; it seems to me

always so beautiful, and it is a real misfortune for me to be obliged to live so far from the sea. And I cannot look from a bridge into the water without longing to jump in, but certainly not from despair, for that is a feeling I do not know; I never despair, probably because my hopes are not too elevated. My folly is the water, which I love immensely. One of our principal German Radical professors has lately published a work in which he attempts to show that men proceed from water—*i.e.*, that we were fish, and in time became men.*

576. Tatistscheff is going back to St. Petersburg. I do not know what more I can say to him; if he has not understood me, it is not my fault: but I feel as if he had understood me. I have persuaded Tatistscheff to have his portrait taken—not because I want to have it particularly, but to let the painter (Daffinger) make fifty ducats by it. It is a very good likeness.

577. *April 19.*—I have obtained an order for Neumann; it will please him, because it will show that I do not forget him. The order cannot give him a larger *footing* in the world.† Tatistscheff has just entered his travelling carriage. To me his departure is a weight off my heart. I have gladly laid aside business. Tatistscheff, too, has gone off very well pleased with me, which is, at any rate, better than the contrary. Capo d'Istria will not agree, but how can one content the man?

578. *April 21.*—If I have to send off one courier I must always send five. To all I say the same thing, it is true, but to be understood I must speak to each one in his own tongue. Only Capo d'Istria is, in this respect, quite peculiar: since he speaks in order not to be understood, he has no occasion for refinements of meaning; and never saying what he does mean, he also never says what he does not mean. That is the whole secret of these famous apocalypses. Two months ago an excellent work appeared in Paris, "*Des Séductions Politiques*," by Lourdoueix, a friend of mine—according to my ideas, the best history of the time that has yet been written. There is not in it one assertion to which I would not have subscribed.

579. *April 20.*—I have news of Tatistscheff. He has met a courier (Russian) destined for London, where people will be frightened to death when they hear a European army spoken of! The concern

* *Urschleim*, by Oken (?).—Ed.

† Neumann had very large feet.—Ed.

hangs together by means of a conspiracy formed by Capo d'Istria, Strogonow, and Pozzo di Borgo. About this conspiracy I care nothing; I will break it up. The triumvirate may divide the world between them: one shall undertake Eastern, another Western Europe, and the third shall, according to the plan, hover equally over the whole. And in the midst is the Emperor Alexander!

To prevent the shrieks of Jupiter being heard by Saturn, care was taken that his cradle should be surrounded by drums. Here the opposite has been done; the joke is, however, too bad.

580. *May 4.*—Yesterday and the greater part of to day I have been in Eisenstadt. Its glass-houses are some of the finest in Europe. Yesterday evening we had a concert there. In that enormous mansion the company consisted of only six persons. I do not understand why I hear nothing from Paul Esterhazy. Londonderry will not know what to do, nor Wellington; they both wait till they know what I have done, or will not do. Thus do people endeavor to gain time; and this is no great evil, for it is better to make no use of the passing day if it is not clear what ought to be done in it. Certain it is that out of Vienna no one knows how the affair really stands. Does any one think Capo d'Istria knows? Not in the least—no more than the Grand Vizier! Does any one think the Emperor Alexander is better informed? God forbid! All wish something, without knowing how the thing is to be got hold of; and the peculiar charm of the position is that no one knows exactly how what he wants is to be attained. I know what I want, and what the others are able to perform. I am thoroughly armed; my sword is drawn and my pen mended; my thoughts are bright and clear as a crystal spring, while many people are now wading in turbid waters.

581. *May 8.*—A courier with despatches from Esterhazy has arrived to-day. It has happened in London just as I expected. The good people have fallen into a panic of fear. The difference between Londonderry and me is that he does not know, as I do, what the Emperor Alexander wants, and what Capo d'Istria does not want. What the Emperor Alexander may do is something different, because Capo d'Istria cannot be prevented from entangling him in a net, and setting him up to his neck in the mud. Londonderry does not know all this, because he has not been much in contact with the Emperor Alexander. Many things in this world must be seen to be believed, and then, too, one must have good eyes to see that which really does exist. Our last views on the Spanish

question of intervention must be well received in London.* But Londonderry will never understand the gist of the matter rightly, which is this, that the Emperor Alexander will have nothing to do with the Turkish question, and Capo d'Istria is horrified at the Spanish question. Capo d'Istria takes up the latter as a means of forcing the Emperor Alexander into the former. He now writes all his Reports in the following extraordinary form: "You see that the Emperor Alexander is going wrong; he is going to meet ruin, and you will go with him. You have only to choose between two evils; I beg of you, therefore, to choose the less."

Again, another case in which Londonderry and I go quite different ways. He breathes fire and flames; but I say, "Very well; come now, we will talk the matter over." Londonderry will have a memorandum written to point out that what is absurd cannot be reasonable. I, on the contrary, think it sufficient to send quite a little card of invitation, in which certainly "an answer will oblige" is not left out. Under these circumstances Capo d'Istria may say to his master: "See what people you have to do with! Propose what you may, you will never get hold of them; while you (the Emperor) will always be caught. Give up your friendship for their system, which is only an absurdity. Let every man bake his own cake, and do you bake yours. Let us go forward: fame and glory await us in Constantinople."

Now, if anything can save the Emperor Alexander and the cause of sound manly sense, it will be the card of invitation, and not the memorandum.

I do not know whether I am a fool, but certainly I am surrounded by them. It would be only polite of me to become a fool too—if I am not one already.

582. *May 13.*—Whether the King of England will really come here I do not know. Stewart writes to me that he does not quite believe it, and he may be right.

The decision is close at hand. On April 30 Tatistscheff arrived at St. Petersburg. My last news are down to the 29th. The next

* The following may serve to elucidate the matter. The King of Naples, to please his nephew, the King of Spain, had applied to the allied Courts in order that these Powers might be induced to unite to protect the throne and people of Spain from the threatened catastrophe. Russia was prepared for intervention, but only under the condition that this should be carried out by a European army, to which the five Powers should furnish contingents. Prince Metternich declared this condition inadmissible and impracticable.—Ed.

will bring the disclosure. I send this, however, without waiting, by a fresh courier, with some rather interesting accounts from Greece. Capo d'Istria is wroth with me, which I think very natural. He complains that in my thoughts I separate him from the Emperor, although they are always one. As proof of this, Capo d'Istria assured Nesselrode that the Emperor desires something quite different from what he desires; and this they call logic.

583. *May 15.*—Against this day (my birthday), without which I should not have been, I have only one charge to bring—that it already has taken with it a great number of years.

According to my latest news from Lebzeltern, affairs go on strangely in St. Petersburg, but not badly. I say not badly, because the Emperor Alexander deserves something different from his minister. How can these two people hang together so long? All the world is astonished at it but me.

584. *May 20.*—I have prepared a long and difficult work for Turkey, where they begin to go on quite tolerably. If the Gordian knot is disentangled, I may flatter myself with having accomplished a very great work quite alone.

585. *May 22.*—I am now in a most extraordinary position. I have nothing to do. I await results on all sides, and hence I have not to talk or write to any one. However, I am not dull; I am like old Kaunitz, who, when the beautiful Madame de Witt said to him that she did not know what dulness was, answered, "I have this in common with you, Madame, that I am not dull myself, but I suffer much from the dulness of others." Not to be dull and to enjoy are two very different things. Separated from my family, I have no family life, to which the greatest pleasures of life belong. I have indeed my two gardens, the sun, and the Italian Opera, which is certainly something, but yet not happiness.

I often make parties to the country, which always consist of fourteen or eighteen persons. The neighborhood of Vienna offers many occasions for such excursions; it is only necessary to drive a mile [German] in any direction to find one's self in a beautiful country. It is a good side of society here that all feel in the same family circle. If a stranger joins the party, he feels like a child of the house; he has no need to think what he will do—others do that for him. Politics are always kept at a distance and nothing reminds one of them, unless it be the occurrence of some great event. To-day I go to bed without being sleepy, and I will read two or three chapters of Livy, which I have already gone through five or six times.

I thus take rest from the scribbling of Abbé de Pradt and Company.

586. *May 26.*—I have news of the Turks; these people are not so stupid as the world believes or might believe, and as many wish to make one believe. I have reports from St. Petersburg which show me that I am not mistaken. On the contrary, I see that I have judged my people well, and more cannot be required of me. Capo d'Istria is quite calm again, and, moreover, will ruin himself. I accept no miracles now, but if I must do so, I would admit that Capo d'Istria is stronger than nature.

My accounts from St. Petersburg come down to the 11th. In the Cabinet the contest has begun, which was sure to happen, because I knew what I was doing. I am certain that the Emperor Alexander has never heard the language of his country spoken with such sincerity as I have caused him to hear it through Tatistscheff. Since Capo d'Istria does not speak this language, since, on the contrary, he uses a language foreign to the country and to its interests, a conflict must take place—a conflict which will end only with the one or the other party. The pure language of reason must at last prevail. If ever there be a liquidation in Russia, we shall see a moral bankruptcy, such as History has never seen; that bankruptcy will bring with it the most natural and truest interests of Russia. If this failure of the leading ideas of the day occurs—and it must occur—I shall have proved to the world what the will of one man can do, a will which rests on the simplest basis of common-sense.

587. *May 31.*—A courier from Lebzelter has arrived during the last week. The suit is won, and that so thoroughly that perhaps no one else knows that it has taken place.*

Tatistscheff returns in a few days. The Emperor Alexander has received all my Reports; Capo d'Istria is ready; Russia plays a wretched part. Therefore I will show that I can be a prudent, wise, and firm friend. I will do for the Emperor Alexander what the fools and rogues have not been able to do. I do not to-day think of Austria: that is not necessary; one must help those who need it, and therefore come to the help of the Emperor Alexander. But what people they are in St. Petersburg! Mere masks that must be known to know what they hide. The following maxim, taught me by experience, has to-day been again verified: Not romance, but history; not belief, but knowledge.

I can imagine the face that Londonderry makes at it. He must

* See "Victory of the Austrian Cabinet," Nos. 622-625.

feel as happy as a man who is going down under an avalanche. He is a fool if he does not consent to what I have proposed, which, moreover, every one must do who has honorable feeling and honest views. Equilibrium would otherwise be destroyed, which would enormously increase the evils. Capo d'Istria does now what he did during the Neapolitan question: he is silent. There are times when confused ideas and wire-drawn phrases only cause delay, but bring no consequences; other times, again, when they bring ruin and disgrace—and such a time is the present.

588. *June 11.*—Tatistscheff has just arrived. I will meet him, because I want to know how the weathercock stands; then I will return to my moral repose.

589. *June 14.*—I have despatches from St. Petersburg and London; the first are very plain, for they put the whole affair in my hands.

The Emperor Alexander will be with us in the beginning of September. I hope Londonderry has courage enough to come, but I foresee that he will hesitate; the reasons for his coming are, however, so weighty that his non-appearance would be a folly: a sad but true word. He will receive from Russia and Berlin the same invitation as from us.

In St. Petersburg they are astonished that Tatistscheff should for once have taken the straight road: he follows the direction of his own interests, and follows it well, because he is a cunning fellow. What few people understand is the advantage which can be taken of cunning people; I, for my part, have never feared them even if they are clever. As an opponent, only a thoroughly honorable man is difficult to conquer.

There is an enormous difference between rowing and steering. How many statesmen have mistaken their business—so many take the oar whose business is with the rudder! Everything in this world is but a “simple story,”* and one may be sure that the more intricate a matter looks the simpler it really is. I am a man not at all stiff-necked, but very persevering; nothing will make me deviate from my principles, and therefore I am an extremely inconvenient minister to my opponents.

590. *Baden, June 17.*—I came here yesterday evening. Tatistscheff followed me to-day. We go backwards and forwards between Vienna and Baden without making a trouble of it on either side. Our aim is to save time, and to do well what must be done.

* Refers no doubt to Mrs. Inchbald's *Simple Story*, published 1791.—Tr.

My position again is very remarkable: I am at the centre as the chief motive power in an affair which is quite simple, but has been for months embarrassed by unreason and unjustifiable measures. How different would everything have been if my Report had been accepted at first instead of at last; that, however, was not Capo d'Istria's purpose.

591. *Vienna, June 19.*—Tatistscheff is like my shadow. I work, too, a great deal. The Emperor Alexander wants to know what I think, and I consider it my duty to conceal nothing from him.

Capo d'Istria plays sometimes the part of a mouse in a hole, sometimes that of the watching cat. If the affair is going contrary to his wishes, he squeaks in his hole; if there are any difficulties, the cat shows her claws. To behave so is not worthy of a great man who has fifty millions of men behind him.

592. *July 1.*—Capo d'Istria is quite out of the affair, but still there. He counts on time, like me. So far he has been mistaken, but I have not: he will still go wrong, but I pray God to keep me from that.

Tatistscheff feels the necessity of going right so strongly that he does so. My talent has consisted in bringing him to a position from which he cannot deviate without breaking his neck—and the good man loves his neck.

593. *Baden, July 2.*—The Emperor Francis arrived here yesterday, which is very agreeable to me, because it will save me ten or twelve hours in the week. Like me, he expects his fate here. We shall know, in ten days or a fortnight, what are the intentions of the Emperor Alexander. What he intends we know, but we must learn the time he proposes. I take the middle of September for the date: I wish Londonderry may be here by the end of August. I hourly expect news from London. Expectation is always irritating to the nerves. Certainty is better, even if it is not good. I know many people who are contented to know nothing, but who also are never in expectation.

594. *Vienna, July 15.*—All I hear from St. Petersburg is good.

I have completed my water-cure at Baden. I had to stay for the eighteen days; but I could spare no more time for going into the water. Besides, the heat is very great, never below 22 degrees, often as much as 30. The temperature exceeds the average temperature of Naples, so that the vegetation has taken its departure for the year 1822. My meadows are turned to hay, and my trees to broom-

sticks. Happily, my pavilion is still quite habitable, cool and comfortable.

Since Vienna has lost her society I live quite in my business. Every two or three days I work with Tatistscheff. Fortunately, it is easy to work with him.

595. *July 25.*—From hour to hour I expect news from St. Petersburg. They will give me the only information I want. That is, they will tell me the day on which I shall see the Emperor Alexander. One other question will also have a certain interest—shall I meet Capo d'Istria? I trouble myself little about it. The man is dead, and I fear neither the dead nor ghosts. A dead man is nothing, and a returning ghost never represents anything but a very miserable living person. Man only lives once; to rise again, one must cross to another world. Being born again into the same world is only a shadow of the first life. Capo d'Istria's rule is over. I have fought with him for a long time, and yet I have always gone on my own way forwards. Capo d'Istria is an unskilful general; cunning, learned in pretexts, he lacks judgment of the situation, the strength and weakness of which he does not appreciate. He supports castles in the air by aphorisms which are not worth the trouble of attacking. If one is right and goes steadily forward, the adversary must be vanquished.

596. *July 27.*—This evening I was for the first time at the German opera. But a German voice is quite pitiable in comparison with an Italian. People don't open their mouths, and seem to think the nose is also an organ of the human voice.

It is remarkable that a wrong spirit and bad taste always go together; thus we see that all malcontents have a horror of Italian music. In Germany people are always quarrelling about whether German or Italian music is to be preferred. Our country joins in the fray. A dispute across the frontiers does not prevent the spread of the epidemic, just as it does not prevent the spread of knowledge and thought. Now, there is here a minority who wish to pass themselves off as the majority, and is Liberal, Radical, and Doctrinaire, hating, therefore, Italian singing. It was to be expected that this minority would be present at the German opera, which, however, was not the case. It recommends what it laughs down, and the house remains empty. These devil's advocates are always either the dupes of their own system (these are the most sincere), or they try to deceive others (these are the most numerous).

597. *August 1.*—To-day's news tells us that the Emperor Alex-

ander will arrive on September 7. The same news informs us of something which does not astonish me—Capo d'Istria is not coming.

The Emperor Alexander praises me beyond measure, and asserts that he has confidence only in me. Does any one wish to know what sort of impression that makes on me? It raises a smile, and nothing else. I know, too, that the same Emperor desires Londonderry's presence, and that is good. Here we shall remain for at least three weeks, and that is absolutely necessary.

Capo d'Istria has written to Golowkin a singular farewell letter.

598. *August 15.*—I have just begun to read O'Meara's work. There is occasionally some truth in it, in the same way as there is with a valet speaking of his master. In what Napoleon has said to his wretched biographer (O'Meara) there is a blending of great and little, true and false mingled together, but always with a background in which the relater's motives are evident. There are no such conversations as Napoleon held when he meant to treat a question thoroughly. The characteristics, however, of this celebrated man are well seen in these, especially for those who knew him. O'Meara, however, did not know him: O'Meara believed in him, and a man like Napoleon is only rightly judged of when we do not believe in him. In turning over the leaves of this book I often meet my own name. The more evil I find said of me the better I like it. According to my own conviction, Napoleon never knew me, and, still more, never divined me. The cause is very simple. Napoleon was the man in all the world who most despised the human race. He had a strange aptitude for discovering the weak sides of men, and all passions are weak sides or produce them. He loved only men with strong passions and great weaknesses; he judged the most opposite qualities in men by these defects. In me he encountered a calmness which must cause despair to one who founded his calculations on passions. Hence he denied the existence in me of every quality bearing on pure reason or which is reason itself. I have often in voluntarily laughed in Napoleon's presence, when I remarked that he judged me falsely. Therefore I knew Napoleon much better than he knew me. Seven years of resolute study suffice to know a man, especially a man whose nature and actions are all external—that is, for a calm observer who is not led astray by any feeling of fear and awe.

599. *August 18.*—I am still reading O'Meara's book. God in heaven! how the poor devil has been imposed upon. The account of the agreement between Napoleon and the Emperor Francis about

the flight from Elba is good. It is to me as if I, too, were listening to Napoleon; he has often tried to make me believe the same. I let him talk till he had done, and then I only said to him, "That is false." Then he looked at me, smiled, and said as he turned away, "*Sono bugie per i Parigini.*" What a book I could write after O'Meara's method, if I had every evening written down all the nonsense I had heard in the day. I see, too, that Napoleon was much grieved to lose his *Signor Dottore*. What good stuff for a romance-writer!

All may be said in two words: Napoleon was a very small man of imposing character. He was ignorant, as a sub-lieutenant generally is; a remarkable instinct supplied the place of knowledge. From his mean opinion of men, he never had any anxiety lest he should go wrong. He ventured everything, and gained thereby an immense step towards success. Throwing himself upon a prodigious arena, he amazed the world and made himself master of it, while others cannot even get so far as being masters of their own hearth. Then he went on and on, until he broke his neck. He ended as he must have ended, and was judged as all those are judged who find means to subdue the common herd. As a legitimate ruler of a small State he would never have been heard of except as an arbitrary monarch. As a military commander in any country whatever, as an administrator wherever the storm of revolution raged, he would always have come out strongly. In the situation in which he was, he must have played the part he did play, and which no man of better principles could have ventured to undertake.

600. *August 20.*—What dreadful news!* I have only a telegraphic despatch from Paris, but what a blow! I am armed against all contingencies; my cause will only be lost if I fall myself.

601. *August 22.*—I now know all, and that all is very sad. What poor weak creatures we are! It was madness! simple madness! Londonderry had had one attack some years ago. The Government and his family knew the secret, and everything possible was done to conceal the circumstance from the public.

His affair with the King and all his fears were but symptoms of the impending paroxysm. It is a great misfortune. The man is not to be replaced, especially not for me. He may be replaced by

* Londonderry's (Castlereagh's) madness and suicide.

a man of higher intellect, but not with his experience. Londonderry was the only man in his country who had gained any experience in foreign affairs; he had learned to understand me. Now it will take years before another reaches the same stage of confidence.

Through Stewart, who has arrived here to-day, I shall learn many particulars. There is something so horrible in the affair that the mind can hardly take it in. Londonderry was supposed to be very calm, but he was not so. The stupid world always judges the inner man by the outside, and nothing is so deceitful.

602. *August 25.*—Stewart has learned all the incidents which preceded the catastrophe. It is now known that Londonderry was seized with madness ten days before his end. He gave so many proofs of approaching insanity that it is incomprehensible to me that it was not obvious to the people about him, and that greater precautions were not taken. The catastrophe is one of the most shocking that I have ever known. He was devoted to me in heart and spirit, not only from personal inclination, but also from conviction. Much which would have been easy with him will with his successor, whoever he is, bring fresh labor. I awaited him here as my second self. My work would have been reduced by half, because I should have had him to share it with me; now I am left to my own strength. I am not alarmed at that, but I feel myself overburdened. I have just requested the presence of the Duke of Wellington, the only man who can in a measure replace him

ON THE JOURNEY TO VERONA AND BACK.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from September 17 to December 29, 1822.

603. Rendezvous with Prince Victor. 604. From Innsbruck. 605. From Verona—importance of the Congress. 606. Salon Lieven. 607. Satisfaction with Prince Victor. 608. From Veeice. 609. Gentz's arrival in Venice. 610. Farewell from Emperor Alexander. 611. His departure. 612. Alone in Venice. 613. From Innsbruck. 614. Parting of the two Emperors—departure of the Emperor Francis.

603. *Vienna, September 17, 1822.*—The route which I have suggested that my son should take, in order to meet us at Innsbruck, will bring him through the most beautiful part of Switzerland.* At Lake Constance he will stop at Hersberg† long enough only to enjoy the most glorious prospect in the world. The castle—or rather, house—consists of nothing but four walls, and I hardly think it contains anything more than a couple of chairs.

604. *Innsbruck, October 9.*—We arrived here at six o'clock on the evening of the 7th. Victor had been here already three hours. He received me on the steps of the hotel, is very well, and has become tall, strong, and handsome. How delighted I was to see him again I need not say, and how delighted I should be if I could pass some time with him. In a few hours we shall leave this place, pass the night at Brixen, in the morning travel to Trent, the next day to Lago di Garda, and stay the night at Roveredo. Early on the 12th we shall arrive at Verona. The whole journey will be made in company with Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo, and Lebzeltern. I take Victor in my carriage, and leave Lebzeltern to go with Floret. We are in good company, and our journey, which will take twelve days from Vienna to Verona, is a time of rest for us, and of the greatest enjoyment to me. I am so unaccustomed to the use of these two expressions, that I am quite astonished to see them come

* The Prince's family was then at Johannisberg.—Ed.

† Castle belonging to Prince Metternich.—Ed.

from my pen, but still more astonished to see the realization of these unwonted ideas. We travel through the loveliest country, in the most glorious weather, and as there is no hurry we can make excursions to the right and left. We are a small but happy company, and I shall number this journey among the pleasantest recollections of my life. Victor seems very glad to see me again. All he has said to me gives me great pleasure. I shall have the opportunity of talking much with him, and I will not lose it.

605. *Verona, October 22.*—I have just begun the greatest work! Confidence is placed in me, as I place confidence in the others, for the Congress consists of honest men. The evil element of perpetual dissension (Capo d'Istria) has ended his career, and with him disappear a thousand perplexities and difficulties. My personal relations with the Emperor of Russia are the most intimate possible, as for the peace of the world they ought to be. He believes in me just as my Emperor does, and the business gains thereby as it would by no other combination.

The Congress of Verona is the most important since the year 1814, and will bear, I hope, golden fruit. Good fortune has so often stood by my side that I now always invoke it to the victory of the good cause, and if I once have it I will not let it go.

606. *November 12.*—Count Lieven is here my only social resource. I pass most of my evenings with him, and many of the members of the Congress follow my example. The heart of the society is formed by the Duke of Wellington, Ruffo (Neapolitan ambassador), Caraman (French ambassador), Bernstorff (Prussian ambassador), &c. &c.—in other words, the *salon* of the Princess Lieven in Verona is like ours in Vienna.

607. *November 27.*—I am extremely satisfied with Victor, he will be a good and useful man. His conduct here is faultless, his heart is pure, and his understanding very sound. In the last few days I have allowed him to undertake a real work of art. In order to show me how he understands the English and French languages, I have given him a very important English despatch to translate. He throws himself thoroughly into his work, and gets through his task in a comparatively short time. His translation has astonished all my officials, and, indeed, the whole conference. There was not a word to alter, not an expression to change. It will be placed with the other documents as a work of the first rank. Moreover, Victor loves his work as much as his Vienna friends and comrades love the *Prater*.

608. *Venice, December 16.*—I left Verona this morning at five o'clock, and crossed over the Lagunes in a gondola at three in the afternoon. It was a beautiful day; the Emperor of Russia had made his entry into Venice two hours before. I saw only the remains of the splendor of his entry. The roads from Fusine to Padua were full of carriages, and the Lagunes were crowded with gondolas. I know the Emperor was ravished with the beauty of the scene. The sun did good service to the entry.

I have good accommodation, plenty of sun and even stoves; also a splendid state-bed, which seems more suited for a Danaë than for me, so I have my little camp-bed put in its place. In the evening I went to the Fenice, where they gave "*Il Matrimonio Segreto*," the history of a marriage so secret that I will be hanged if I could understand anything about it. What was wanting on the part of the singers was made up by the appearance of the house; the Fenice was in grand *gala* and looking wonderfully beautiful. I expected every moment to see Nesselrode climbing over the boxes: he is in the greatest enthusiasm about Venice.

But the old Venice is also most astonishing, when we think that in a very great city we are dwelling in the midst of the sea. Looking at the long circuit of embankments running for miles into the sea, which form a calm mirror of water out of the ocean itself, we cannot but be amazed at the creative power of man.

The first person to visit me was friend Rossini. Concerning his bad singers, I felt myself obliged to call out in an unpleasant manner, "*Vi siete ingannato.*" He comforted me about his wife's throat, and complained very much of his first tenor, an Irishman who had been three months learning Italian. When Rossini said to me, "*Canta come compone certo ambasciatore d'Inghilterra che si crede Maestro di capella,*" he thought he had said everything.

It is striking midnight on the Campanile, and I must go to sleep.

609. *December 17.*—Gentz has arrived. I have in regard to him a new proof of my knowledge of men. When I asked him how Venice pleased him, he answered in his pedantic manner, "Since my arrival I have been convinced that Italy really has charms, but I have not found anything of all that has been said about this country, do not tell me of Verona and her antiquities, or of Vicenza or Padua, where I can see nothing: but Venice! Do not, however, suppose that I am enchanted with the position of the city in the midst of the water: I hate the water; neither do the palaces or the churches, nor the Piazza San Marco, charm me, for a Piazza is

always a Piazza, and the larger the palaces are the more difficult they are to heat. All this does not make Venice answer to its reputation; it is the wonderfully pretty little streets! What genius it required to venture to build them so narrow, and with what taste were they ornamented by the shops!"

When I was yesterday walking about with Tatistscheff and Nesselrode in the city, I laid a bet that just these streets would please Gentz and gain his heart. Such are men! Every one measures things according to his own standard, and taste is as different as everything else. Gentz likes everything small, and is afraid of everything that is not small.

In the evening the Piazza was illuminated and the Church of St. Mark. Tatistscheff and Nesselrode then came to me and played whist.

610. *December 21.*—Our stay at Venice is coming to an end. The Emperor Alexander leaves in the morning. I have to-day taken a preliminary farewell; the last leave I shall take at Innsbruck on the 28th. He has been much pleased with his stay here; has seen and admired everything: the apartment which he occupied in the palace has a wonderful view of the Giudecca, the Piazza San Marco, and the Riva degli Schiavoni. He thinks the Giudecca like the Neva, and the Palace of the Doge like some of the palaces in Moscow. I am on the best footing with him, and there is but little danger now of its being otherwise. My work is no small one!

Yesterday we had a concert at the Court, at which Rossini was conductor. His wife begins to get her voice again, but I fear that it will never thoroughly return.

611. *December 22.*—The Emperor Alexander started to-day. Tatistscheff gets no title at present.

Before his departure the Emperor took a hearty leave of Nesselrode, and thanked him for the extraordinary service he had done him at Verona; and that was a comfort for Nesselrode, on which I heartily congratulate him.

The day after to-morrow I shall leave Italy, to return again in nine or ten months.

612. *December 23.*—I am to-day the only stranger remaining in Venice; I have not left my room, for it is so cold outside, and the loveliest objects in the world cannot please me in such weather.

The Londonderrys (formerly Stewarts), man and wife, left this place to-day. On leaving they both cried like children; I do not know what sort of a face I made, for my nature is not given to

weeping. They do not know what to do with themselves, and I should not be astonished if they soon come back again to us. Certain it is that they left Vienna very unwillingly.

613. *Innsbruck, December 23.*—I left Venice on the 25th, and arrived here the following night, crossing the Brenner Pass between ten and eleven in the evening, with a temperature of fifteen degrees of cold.

The Emperor Alexander has to-day returned from his excursion with his family, and I this evening spent three hours with him. He had talked a great deal to his son-in-law (King of Wurtemberg), and all that he said was good: what the son-in-law will do may not, however, be quite so much so, but it does not much matter to me. The great car is in motion, and since the small ones see fit to exclude themselves from the movement they run the danger of getting under the wheels and being run over. Very little special mechanical knowledge is required to see this, but unhappily there are men who do not possess even that.

I expect to remain here till the 31st. I may leave on the 30th, but may not; and my road runs through Munich, taking me into the midst of the New Year festivities; I shall not get to Munich till the evening of the great day, and shall remain there two or three days, and on the 6th enter Vienna.

614. *December 29.*—The separation took place to-day. Our two friends parted from one another in the fullest and happiest harmony. May Heaven protect them!

For the sake of propriety I had to go to the theatre this evening, but the cold drove me back in ten minutes. Certainly it was never before heard of to have the theatre placed over the ice-cellar of the town! Just near the entrance, I observed a quite peculiar sharpness of the air, of so cutting a cold that my curiosity about physical matters led me to try to discover the cause, and I was not a little astonished to find the fact I have mentioned, after which discovery I quickly hurried away. They gave a piece that has succeeded well in Germany, "The Little Alpine Rose." The first act represents a churchyard in Switzerland; the last, a masked ball at Moscow. The whole is taken from a pretty anecdote which appeared some years ago, in what collection I know not.

From the ice-cellar I went to the Lady-ruler of the land, where I found the remaining members of the Congress assembled, the number being reduced to eight persons.

AUSTRIA'S ATTITUDE IN THE EASTERN QUESTION.

615. Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg (Despatch), Vienna, January 28, 1822.

615. I believe the moment has come when it will be useful to explain to the Russian Cabinet all the steps we have taken in the Eastern question.

I intend to make the following observations with a freedom worthy of the greatness of the subject, and in agreement with the purity of intention of the Emperor, our august master. While the immediate future is still veiled is perhaps the most favorable moment to make known the truth without appearing to be influenced by calculations to which it is a stranger.

Here is a very brief sketch of our conduct relative to that question and the difficulties we have encountered.

The revolt of the Greeks, however different might be its long-standing and permanent causes from the revolutions which the Grand Alliance was called upon to combat, nevertheless directly originated in the plots of the disorganized faction which menaces all thrones and all institutions. This truth was immediately recognized by the monarchs assembled at Laybach; it was announced by them in the face of Europe, and the character of the abettors of this revolt would have warranted the first judgment of the two Emperors, even if this judgment had not been founded on incontestable data.

Nevertheless, I was persuaded from the time of the first news of the great explosion that neither the evidence of facts, nor the wise and enlightened views of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, would suffice to eliminate from the new complication many difficulties and embarrassments. Neither did I hesitate to submit my conviction to his Imperial Majesty, that the affair, whatever might be the firmness of the monarchs and the uniformity of their principles, could not fail to prove a heavy trial to the sovereign of Russia in particular—the most difficult perhaps that he has yet had to surmount. His Majesty the Emperor Alexander understood and

agreed with me. My opinion was founded on considerations which facts have but too well confirmed.

I have taken into account—

1st. The peculiar position of the Russian monarch with regard to the Porte, both in a political and religious point of view;

2nd. The impression that must be made on the Ottoman Government by the simultaneous insurrection of its Greek subjects in Europe, and the tone taken by that insurrection from the beginning;

3rd. The untiring efforts of the Greek religionists to make up by the popularity of their cause for what it lacked in solidity, and the support lent to them by zealots in religion like the Radicals in politics, atheists as well as visionaries;

4th. The stupor of the Turkish Government, its weakness, its jealousy, its fanaticism, supported by the fanaticism and barbarism of the Mussulman people.

The embarrassments resulting from this position of things could not but exercise a painful influence on the measures to be taken by the allied sovereigns. They had, to a certain extent, all the chances against them, while their opponents hoped to turn everything to profit.

If the Alliance remains intact, if peace is to be maintained in Europe, the Courts must expect to be overwhelmed with the reproaches of an ignorant multitude, easily deceived by words seeming to breathe only sentiments of humanity and religion. In case of a rupture of the peace, the malcontents would see new hopes and more flattering prospects opening before them than any they have been vainly expecting for the last eight years. The first and most certain effect of the war would be a general attack on the Alliance, the existence of which would become doubtful if one of the allied Courts should take upon itself the burden of the war, and which would cease to be formidable in the eyes of the revolutionists when the forces of several of the Powers were employed in the East.

In such a combination our course would not be doubtful. Forced to choose between two evils, we should feel bound to choose the less. We would rather abandon ourselves to the confidence with which the character and the intelligence of His Majesty of All the Russias inspires us than to the vain hope of repressing (with enfeebled resources) the enemy within any limits whatever. We have traced for ourselves an unvarying rule of conduct, and no consideration would make us deviate from it. To try to serve the cause of peace by all the means in our power; to maintain at the

same time, with all the zeal and perseverance our position allows, the just demands of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia; to push as far as possible, in terms which would certainly not be warlike, our declarations concerning the Porte; never to lose sight of the origin of the revolt of the Greeks, nor the consequences which may result from it for the future preservation of the internal peace of the Ottoman empire—such should be, and such have in reality been, the bases of our calculations and the principles which have guided us in our communications with the Courts, as in our explanations with the Porte.

However simple these principles may appear, they present great perplexities in their application. The steps we have taken may be taxed with a want of energy by a public frightened and excited by the faction; they may be exposed to false interpretations at St. Petersburg, and to entirely opposite ones at Constantinople. It was, however, better to run all these risks than to depart from a path which conviction and consideration point out as the only path practicable.

I do not fear from those who know how to judge of great affairs the reproach of not having uttered threatening words to the Porte. Such words, pronounced by a Power of the first rank, should be supported by material demonstrations. If any one accuses us of not having made use of the latter, cast a glance over Europe, Sir, and you will have the key to our reserve. The day that Russia and Austria allow it to be supposed that the employment of their united forces is indispensable in the Levant, Italy, Germany, and France will be lost. This is what the party has waited for with so much impatience during the last few months—a triumph which we most certainly must take care not to afford it. Do you believe that the military powers of Austria and Prussia, the only ones we can take into account on the Continent—the former weakened by the absence of some of their best troops in a remote country, which has just escaped total destruction; the latter less dreaded by the faction, because in its perfidious calculations it reckons on paralyzing them to a great extent—do you believe that these two forces united are not more than sufficient to overcome conspirators who count on the weakness of some Governments and on the blind ambition of others; on the defection, in short, of the greater part of the armies in Europe?

This reasoning appears to us so conclusive that in order to overthrow it one must deny all the facts which have taken place before

our eyes during the last two years, of which each day increases the number and weight.

But one might perhaps say, If this is the state of things, how have the decisions been so long protracted? I will tell you without hesitation.

The difficulties inherent to the individual position of each of the two Powers of which the insurrection of the Greeks has disturbed the pacific relations, have come forward in the course of the affair; this is the danger we have always feared more than any other, and which I regard as the principal source of our present perplexities.

The Porte, in removing the question from its primitive basis, and appealing to religion, has committed a grave error, which, however, does not surprise us much on the part of a theocratic Government, which can find no extraordinary resources except in the first cause of its political existence.

The position of Russia has been in this respect still more difficult than that of the Porte. At Constantinople they have only had to defend themselves on one ground; while at St. Petersburg they have had two questions before them, not only different, but absolutely opposite in their application. The Greeks, as rebels, had no title to the favor of the Emperor of Russia; these same Greeks, as persecuted Christians, placed in certain relations with Russia by virtue of existing treaties, were in some sort justified in invoking the support of that monarch. To get out of the difficulty it was necessary carefully to separate these two questions. If amongst the men who are firm enough in their principles to desire the preservation of peace before everything—and it is only they whom my calculations concern—there are still found at St. Petersburg some who have confounded these questions, they have certainly to reproach themselves with a mistake. That this mistake has not been shared by those who have considered the affair in its grand and true point of view is a fact demonstrated by the circumstance that the rupture has not yet taken place. It being nevertheless certain that it will take place, the problem, instead of being solved, is still more complicated.

We have at last arrived at the term of the decision, and I consider as such the first despatches we receive from you after the arrival of our courier of December 31.

The resolution to begin the war may have been taken at St. Petersburg—for it will not be taken at Constantinople—or perhaps the Cabinet of Russia may have preferred an amicable arrangement.

In the first case, while deploring the fact, we shall not cease to make the strongest remonstrances to the Divan, until the first Russian troops have crossed the frontier. Our conscience imposes this duty upon us; for the more we are convinced that a new era (which I certainly cannot regard as regenerative) is commencing for Europe, the less do we wish to have to reproach ourselves for not exhausting every means to prevent it. Tranquil concerning the intentions of his Majesty the Emperor Alexander, but keenly sensible of the dangers and catastrophes which menace society, we turn our eyes towards the West, and will defend the last barriers still arresting the torrent of general destruction, and if necessary we will perish in the breach.

In the second case, we see but one way of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement, which is to separate as clearly and explicitly as possible the questions which must be treated of with the Porte.

I understand by this separation the distinction between the rights which belong to Russia and the Porte by virtue of the chief existing treaties between the two Powers, and the very just and natural wishes which his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias may form for the security of the Greek nation, returned to duty and allegiance to the Ottoman Porte.

The first of these questions concerns the two Powers directly. As it bears only on known antecedents, it should be less difficult to treat and to decide. An enormous advantage which would result for Europe would be the ridding men's minds of the dangerous notions that have seized them, and bringing back the people to the hope of maintaining general peace.

The second question—essentially distinct from the first, with which it could not be amalgamated without both suffering equally—should be treated according to the principles of a clear and elevated policy. The insurrection which has just taken place in the Ottoman Empire has brought two nations together. These people are destined to live under one sceptre; it is their interest, as well as that of the sovereign, that scenes such as those which have just taken place should not be renewed. It is not less the interest of the whole of Europe that the internal peace of the Levant should not, ever and anon, be in danger of being disturbed, and the interest of Europe is greatly influenced by the general disposition of men's minds in that part of the world. Thus considered, this question seems to us to concern all the great Powers.

TATISTSCHIEFF'S MISSION TO VIENNA AND ITS RESULTS.*

Tatistschiff to Metternich, Vienna, March 8, 1822.

616. The Porte will declare officially and directly to the Russian Imperial Ministry:

“That it accepts all the conditions contained in the letter from the Imperial Ministry to the Grand Vizier, and in the note from Baron de Strogonow dated July 6 (18).

“That Russia is authorized by her treaties, and by the rights of protection which they secure to her in favor of the Greeks, to demand the inviolability of the religion which she professes, the reconstruction of the churches, and a just distinction between the innocent and the guilty.

“That Russia shall be fully satisfied on these three points.

“But that, for the present, considering the circumstances of the Mussulman nation, the Porte is unwillingly obliged to confine itself—

“1. To evacuating entirely and without the least delay the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia;

“2. To entrusting provisionally the administration of these countries to the respective divans, under the presidency of Greeks, chosen by the Porte, according to the rules established for the nomination of hospodars;

“3. To sending one or more Turkish plenipotentiaries to the spot, at the same time asking that the Emperor on his side should send there one or more Russian plenipotentiaries.

“4. To furnishing the Turkish plenipotentiaries with the necessary powers to enable them to settle with the Russian plenipotentiaries not only all that concerns the execution of the treaties in the Principalities and their provisional administration, but also to concert with them the measures by which the Porte should be associated with Russia, so as to secure a happy and peaceable existence

* See Prokesch, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*.

to those Christian provinces of the Ottoman Empire which the treaties have placed under the protection of his Imperial Majesty, and which these deplorable events have drawn into the gulf of revolution."

Tatistscheff to Metternich, Vienna, March 14, 1822.

617. The insurrection which has just taken place in the Ottoman Empire has brought two races face to face. These people are destined to live under one sceptre, and it is their interest, as well as that of the sovereign, that scenes such as those which have just passed should not be renewed. It is not less the interest of the whole of Europe that the internal peace of the Levant should not be ever and anon in danger of being disturbed, and the interest of Europe is strongly augmented by the general disposition of men's minds in that part of the world.

The measures which will be established in common in a negotiation between the allied Powers and the Ottoman Porte will have for their object:

1. To put an end to the war in those provinces which are still in a state of insurrection;
2. To secure their tranquil possession to the Ottoman Porte;
3. To make an arrangement, by means of which all the peaceable inhabitants of the insurgent countries and all those who lay down their arms will enjoy the free exercise of their religion, possess their lands in quietness, and see their goods, their persons, and their lives placed under constant and real protection.

Let the Porte preserve the *suzeraineté* over the Greek nation in the Morea and other countries where they have risen and demanded their absolute freedom; let these countries be included in the Ottoman Empire; and let not the repose of Europe be disturbed in the future by intestine war in any of these States; a complication which will be continually recurring unless new relations are established between the contending parties.

Metternich's Memorandum for the Emperor Alexander, Vienna, April 19, 1822.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

618. The present complication between Russia and the Porte presents two branches of different questions, which, in our considera

tion of the state of things, must not be confounded, and which, to ensure order and clearness, must still be separated, even if it is found possible to include them in the same negotiation.

The first concern what we may call *strict rights*; the second concern the *general interest*.

Questions concerning strict rights are all, or should be all, decided according to the existing treaties and conventions subsisting between the Empire of Russia and the Porte.

Questions of general interest should find their solution in the need common to the Porte and to all Christian Powers of consolidating the relations between the Ottoman Empire and its Christian subjects in such a manner that the internal tranquillity of the Ottoman Provinces, instead of being constantly threatened by troubles and disturbances, should be secured by just and wise dispositions, suitable to the rights and dignity of the Porte, the well-being of its Christian subjects, the tranquillity of neighboring empires, and the maintenance of the grand pacific system of Europe.

Actual Position of the Negotiation.

1. Russia has the undoubted right of requiring the strict fulfilment of all the stipulations contained in her different treaties and conventions with the Porte. Many of these stipulations having been infringed by the measures which the Porte has taken since the disastrous insurrection of the Greeks, Russia has demanded of the Porte, as the first condition of the re-establishment of pacific relations, the full and entire execution of these said stipulations. The Powers allied to Russia have supported this just demand with all the influence which their position enables them to use with the Porte. The Divan has invariably recognized the duty of executing existing treaties and conventions, and has openly declared its wish to conform to them; but it has added to these declarations restrictions founded on pretended difficulties either temporary or local—restrictions which have up to this time made all reconciliation impossible between Russia and the Porte.

2. On the other hand, his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, from the commencement of the present crisis, has seen that, in order to arrive at a definite arrangement, it would be impossible not to bring forward those questions which we call here of general interest. His Imperial Majesty's enlightened conscience, his religious principles, the particular interest which he takes in the happiness of

his co-religionists, and in fact all those feelings of humanity for which he is so remarkable, have induced the Emperor, in his direct communications with the Turkish Minister, to declare that, while condemning the Greek rebellion, he cannot remain indifferent to measures which are to decide the future fate of that interesting portion of the subjects of the Porte in Europe. Nevertheless this question, never having been distinctly treated of between the Cabinet of Russia and the other allied Cabinets, the latter have not mentioned it at Constantinople, and no proposition with regard to it has been or could be addressed by them to the Divan.

Such is at present the exact state of the negotiations with the Porte.

Subjects which these Negotiations will embrace in the Future.

His Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, applying those principles of justice, moderation, and benevolence of which the Cabinet of Austria is so deeply sensible, to an affair which offers such grave considerations for the personal dignity of the Sovereign of Russia and for the interests of his Empire, has invariably announced his resolution of not separating these considerations, however grave they may be, from those which concern the preserving intact the political system which is at present the only foundation and condition of the tranquillity of Europe and the preservation of social order. This generous resolution imposes on the allied Cabinets the duty of uniting all their efforts to bring the affair to an issue equally calculated to satisfy the just and magnanimous views of his Majesty the Emperor Alexander, and to preserve Europe from the dangers which the troubles of the Levant may create for it, either in the present, or in the immediate future.

With the object of forming a clear idea of the steps to be taken to arrive at this twofold object, let us still regard the question in these two great divisions.

1. The support and execution of existing treaties ought not to give rise to any difficulty. The respect due to treaties is the basis of public right in Europe, and the Porte, unless it wishes to renounce the position it has hitherto occupied among the European Powers, cannot hesitate for a moment to recognize this principle.

2. Questions of general interest should be founded on desires in themselves just, and as acceptable to the tribunal of good policy as to that of humanity. These desires should consequently combine

the advantage of those to whom they are addressed with the real interests of those in whose favor they are formed; it is only thus that the object can be attained.

As there can be no question of infringing the rights of the Grand Seigneur, it is clear that any ideas which the Cabinets may bring forward concerning the future condition of the Greeks, must be restricted to subjects of legislation and administration, and not touch on the fundamental relations between the Turkish Government and its Christian subjects.

Austria is certainly as far from claiming for herself as from recognizing in any other Power the right of intermeddling in the internal affairs of a foreign State, so long as changes introduced in its *régime* do not jeopardize the safety of neighboring States. But in the present position of the Ottoman Empire there are circumstances which warn the European Powers, and should convince the Ministers of the Porte themselves, of the necessity of some efficacious remedy to obtain, not a momentary lull bought with bloodshed, but a solid and permanent peace, without which the existence of that Empire, and the peace of Europe, cannot be secured. It is in this necessity that is found, not only the sole principle of right which would justify and direct the steps taken by the Powers in approaching the Porte with questions of general interest, but also the only means at their disposal to induce that Power not to repel their advances.

To work on this foundation it is above all indispensable that the Ottoman Government should proceed to an act of real amnesty, and that it should cause it to be observed and executed in its full extent. It is equally indispensable that the insurgents should submit to this act.

The Ottoman provinces on the left bank of the Danube are placed under certain regulations. The pacification of the two Principalities will not be difficult; for this their evacuation, the re-establishment of the old order of things, and the maintenance of the rights guaranteed by treaties, will suffice.

The difficulties of the question are therefore reduced, properly speaking, to the affairs of the Morea and the Isles. But these portions of the Porte's European domain again are under a great variety of regulations: and the difference of their position in this respect proceeds from their contact more or less close with the Mussulman population and the local authorities

It seems that the reasonable desires—desires compatible with the

sovereign rights of the Porte—which may be formed by the Christian population of these countries in general, would be very conveniently classed under the three following heads:

1. Free exercise of their religion;
2. Legislative arrangements for the safety of their persons and their goods;
3. Regular administration of justice.

It is not for the Austrian Cabinet to enter into a detailed analysis of these subjects, nor to examine how the general principles may be applied to different circumstances and localities. Many of the data required for such an examination seem to us to be wanting. But we do not hesitate to admit that there are wants and grievances, and that the common interest of the Government and the people should lead them to seek means of satisfying the one and remedying the other. We know, besides, that there are many laws and administrative regulations which time, ill-will, or negligence have caused to fall into neglect, but which might be made use of to facilitate the establishment of a more perfect *régime*, and better adapted to the present circumstances. In short, whatever the difficulties of the task, it appears to us that, the general principle once established, they need not be considered insurmountable.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

If, as we believe, the questions are clearly presented and defined in the preceding exposition, it would be on the following points that the Powers would henceforth direct their communications with the Porte.

1. The Divan having admitted the principle of the full and entire execution of the treaties, and there being nothing to discuss but the time and mode of application, it will be necessary to insist without delay on the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, the re-establishment of their old *régime* and all appertaining to it. The last overtures from the Russian Cabinet contain opinions and statements with regard to this which it will be certainly useful to bring forward.

2. Representations must be made to the Ottoman Government showing the necessity of publishing a new act of amnesty for the insurgent provinces, and stipulating for the return to order within a certain time, but adding to that representation the assurance that the allied Powers, if the Porte wishes to profit by their good offices,

will unite their efforts to induce the insurgents to submit to this act.

3. The Porte must be required to nominate plenipotentiaries to meet at some given place and time those who will be appointed by his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, also by the Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, to negotiate and agree upon measures considered necessary by the five allied Powers to secure to the Ottoman Empire a prompt, solid, and durable peace, and to restore the diplomatic and friendly relations at present suspended between Russia and the Porte.

In the first place we must discover whether the allied Powers are agreed on the point of view established and the plan traced out in the present despatch; and then whether they agree on the best means of making known at the Porte what it is as much for its own interest as for that of the Powers to comprehend and accept.

Taking into consideration the real position of things, the distances, and the exigencies of the case, nothing seems either premature or unduly protracted in the scheme of the present Memorandum.

Metternich to Tatistscheff, Vienna, April 19, 1822.

619.—In sending your Excellency the several despatches intended for his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, it only remains for me to mention an idea, favored by reason and experience, but which nevertheless I can only touch upon to your Excellency in the most confidential manner, as it is impossible for me to judge beforehand of the means of execution.

In my Memorandum (No. 618) of this day, I have said that if his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias approves the ideas in this despatch, it will be well to establish and confirm the identity of views and opinions between the five Cabinets, and to arrange with each other the best means of making known to the Porte what its own interest, not less than regard to the wishes of the Powers, should lead it to comprehend and accept.

Nothing will facilitate this agreement so much as a meeting of the monarchs and Cabinets. Next September is fixed for the meeting of their Imperial Majesties. But in regard to the object I have just pointed out, that period may appear remote. Can the time of the meeting be made earlier? It is not for us to decide, and the Emperor my master does not allow himself even to express an opinion on a question connected with so many special considerations,

which must be left to his august friend and ally to determine. His Imperial Majesty contents himself with declaring that for his part he will be ready to assist in bringing about an agreement between the monarchs by means of an earlier meeting. Still he cannot but acknowledge that, by fixing an earlier period, there would be a gain of precious time, and a better opportunity for negotiation, as no demonstration would make more impression on the Porte than the bare announcement of such a meeting.

As, nevertheless, from the moment that his Majesty the Emperor Alexander consents to the measure proposed in the Memorandum, it will be necessary to consult together as to the time and mode of putting it into execution; and as it will be very important to gain all that it is possible in the time, it seems to us that it will be no less desirable than easy to bring together at Vienna persons furnished with instructions from the five Courts, and authorized to exchange the opinions of the monarchs as to the best method of coming to an agreement as to their intentions, and the steps to be taken by the Powers.

In the very probable supposition that the meeting of the monarchs cannot take place sooner, the conferences between the Ministers will still have the great advantage of having prepared the work and accelerated the decisions which are so desirable.

I submit these ideas to your Excellency with entire confidence. Make them known to his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, if you find them worthy to be received; in any case it appears to me superfluous to assure him that they are dictated as much by the feelings of friendship which animate the Emperor my master for the Emperor Alexander as by the solicitude which his Imperial Majesty feels in the interests common to both of them.

Metternich to Nesselrode (Letter), Vienna, April 19, 1822.

620. I have made your negotiator my courier, my dear Count. M. de Tatitscheff felt what I feel—namely, that speaking is better than writing when one desires to be really understood. He will therefore speak to you, and he will speak truly when he assures you that we desire to come to a perfect understanding with you. But there is at all times and in all circumstances a condition *sine quâ non* in understandings: it is to speak clearly, to say what one wishes, how far one would go, and to what extent assistance can be given. As for possibilities, we need not waste time in talking of

them. Believe me I do not deceive myself in any respect, I see the necessities, the difficulties, the bad as well as the good side of the position. If M. de Tatistscheff does not carry away the conviction that for the moment there remains nothing for me to say to enable him to understand the Emperor's mind, it is because he has not comprehended my words; but I have a feeling that such is not the case.

The affair which occupies us is in itself very simple; it is only complicated by incidental causes, and they often suffice to make a really simple affair very complicated. I will tell you in a very few words my opinion of the situation.

Your Emperor desires what my Emperor desires—what in reality their allies desire no less.

Your Emperor sees as mine sees, that the faction is there, its mouth open to swallow social order at the first shaking of the great pillars on which that order reposes.

Your Emperor has to weigh many considerations, all of which we are ready to admit.

But the evil exists, and it is necessary either to conquer it or to run the risk of falling beneath it. Our sovereigns are strongly tempted to choose the first of these alternatives, and quite determined to avoid the second. It is therefore very necessary that they should understand each other. To the end that their agreement may be effectual, it must be extended to the Allies, and in order to this there must be a wise and scrupulous choice of terms, and great exactitude in the announcement of principles.

That granted, how are they to arrive at understanding each other? For this, my dear Count, allow me to refer to the explanations which your Ambassador will give you.

It only remains for me to beg you to believe yourself, and to convince his Imperial Majesty, that I have this desire; that I discussed the matter with M. de Tatistscheff frankly and unreservedly; that, in short, you are mistaken if you give to any of my words a meaning contrary to reason, and inapplicable, not only to Austrian but to European questions, those questions of life and death which absorb all our thoughts. If I were proposing an Austrian policy I should be very wrong to treat it as I do this, which occupies me from morning to night. But I cannot see that this is Austrian policy, unless that name is given to our extreme desire not to be eaten up by our brothers and friends. In that case my policy is Austrian policy, and I shall do my utmost to carry it out, and certainly shall succeed better than those good friends desire.

Adieu, my dear Count! For the love of God, no prejudices. Let them say all they can say: we despise words. Let us go on and understand each other. Will that be the end of the work? I hope not; then we can begin to act, and to do all the good things we have been hindered from doing since the events of 1821. Much evil to avoid and much good to accomplish—this is a grand and noble task.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, at St. Petersburg, Vienna, April 22, 1822.

621. I send off the present courier after the departure of M. de Tatitscheff. He left us on the 19th, in consequence of an understanding between him and me on that decision.

Your Excellency will find in the enclosure the last results of our transactions. They will prove to you that we have not ceded a single inch of ground; we have remained firm to the principle which has served as foundation to all our explanations since last May, and if we hope to gain opportunities for conciliation, we are still but following out our own plans.

I must make your Excellency aware of the attitude which M. de Tatitscheff and myself have taken and maintained during the whole time of our conferences.

My last despatches will have convinced you that your presentiments with regard to the real motives of M. de Tatitscheff's journey were realized from the opening of his mission. My anxiety was to make myself thoroughly acquainted with all that his mission concerned, which might include complications even with St. Petersburg itself.

I was not long in discovering a restraint on certain points which enabled me to perceive that he was the bearer of double instructions. My efforts have not been unavailing. As we advanced in our conferences the attitude of M. de Tatitscheff was more decided. It was very soon clear to me that although he was the bearer of the Emperor's words, it was impossible for him to forget entirely that he had instructions from the Cabinet. From that time in my conversations with him I laid the most stress on the first of his functions, and I showed him that with regard to the second he would find in me a safe ally, in order by removing difficulties of various kinds to arrive at the good end towards which the thoughts of our two monarchs uniformly tend. I must do justice to M. de Tatitscheff, whose whole conduct was agreeable to my wishes. If his

explanations were somewhat confused, this was merely the necessary consequence of double instructions not only different, but actually in complete opposition to one another.

One circumstance contributed to show this. M. de Golowkin had received from the Cabinet authority equal to that of M. de Tatistscheff. Your Excellency also saw these gentlemen presented together at our second interview. M. de Tatistscheff soon saw that in that manner we should never arrive at a conclusion, and that consequently the most important part of his mission would have failed.

I thought it best to seem indifferent to the embarrassment of M. de Tatistscheff, and I left him to manage his own affairs. The third time he came alone, and begged me for the future not to mention our transactions to his colleague, till we could show him a result arranged beforehand between ourselves. This was the cause of the division which your Excellency remarked in my despatches.

The only official part is the note which I signed on the 19th. M. de Golowkin knows nothing more of our work.

The Russian Ambassadors sent me on April 12 the proposal for the Protocol enclosed. I saw M. de Tatistscheff the same evening, and I told him I would not sign it. He said he had been obliged to send me the proposal to justify himself to his Cabinet, but that I was at liberty to do as I wished. I then told him that I would address a common note to him and his colleague, in the drawing up of which I should take care to avoid making use of any of the expressions in the Protocol, and therefore would not compromise our secret conferences.

All the confidential and secret despatches are therefore absolutely unknown to M. de Golowkin. M. de Tatistscheff has said that he wishes them to go to his Imperial Majesty direct. He has even prevailed upon me to introduce in a secret letter the idea of hastening the time for the meeting of the Sovereigns. I had inserted this proposal in the first Minute of my Memorandum; and M. de Tatistscheff struck it out. "It is possible, it is even probable," said he to me, "that the Emperor after having read this principal despatch, will communicate it to the Cabinet. If it is mentioned there, it is possible that the Cabinet, who dread such a meeting above everything, will make this a pretext to attack all the rest."

By the present and preceding despatches I flatter myself I have made your Excellency aware of the whole of the negotiation between M. de Tatistscheff and myself. It is for you now to serve

the cause by great reticence and by continuing in the course you have hitherto followed, weighing carefully what is to be said, and perhaps even communicating with the Secretaries of State.

I have nothing more to tell you except that on April 19, the very day of M. de Tatistscheff's departure, I received the Russian ambassadors and made over the official note to them. It was just as I had expected; M. de Golowkin thought the text too brief. I replied to this just criticism by remarking that M. de Tatistscheff having been sent to us simply as a bearer of words, I must for my part refer to my words. I added that in this respect I was in a far worse position than the ambassadors, seeing that I could not, like them, boast of having a witness to call in my favor.

As M. de Tatistscheff declared himself perfectly satisfied with this explanation, M. de Golowkin was fain to be so also.

I know, however, for certain, that there have been grave discussions between these gentlemen in the course of our conferences. Whilst M. de Tatistscheff and myself were making good progress, M. de Golowkin thought that nothing was being done; he therefore reproached his colleague, who told him that the responsibility rested on him, and on him alone. This circumstance is not without interest for your Excellency, for it will explain what may seem contradictory in the Reports of the two Ministers, and in the effects which they may produce, or have already produced, at St. Petersburg.

VICTORY OF THE AUSTRIAN OVER THE RUSSIAN CABINET.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, May 31, 1822.

622. By the courier who arrived an hour ago from St. Petersburg, I have a despatch from Lebzeltern of the 22nd inst., giving the details of perhaps the greatest victory that one Cabinet has ever gained over another.

The Emperor has adopted all our Reports. Tatistscheff will return here in ten or twelve days, in order to place the rest of the negotiations in our hands. The Emperor goes further. The news of the evacuation of the Principalities has made such an impression on him that Bagot and Lebzeltern are commissioned to make known to the Porte, through the two ambassadors at Constantinople, that his Majesty is ready to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Divan immediately. Count Capo d'Istria is quite beaten, and is for the present silent.

I feel myself very fortunate that I may venture to believe that the whole position of things in Europe can now take a definite and decided turn. We have here a power difficult to calculate, and that I, so far as the thing depends on me, will neglect nothing to demolish the party, of this your Majesty will not doubt. . . . The Emperor will not come before the beginning of September. As the matter stands we shall not want his Majesty sooner.

✍ METTERNICH.

The victory of which you here speak is perhaps the finest and the most difficult of your Ministry—one for which I cannot sufficiently thank you. But the world shall know also what a benefit you have brought about: hence you are to take pains to make this plain. I know too that I may depend on your making use of this victory with your accustomed zeal for the good cause and for my welfare, and I wait with impatience for Lebzeltern's despatches.

FRANCIS.

Laxenburg, June 1, 1822.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, June 3, 1822.

623. I have the honor to enclose for your Majesty's inspection Freiherr von Lebzeltern's extremely interesting despatches from the 16th to the 22nd May.

In reading these, your Majesty will share the feeling which they have excited in me. Since politics have been carried on in an enlightened manner, never has a Cabinet compromised itself like the Russian Cabinet.

All the remarks which your Majesty will find used by Count Nesselrode himself on the loss of Russian influence on the Turkish kingdom are correct. The present Russian Cabinet has with one blow destroyed the grand work of Peter the Great and all his successors. Everything is here on a new basis, and what Russia loses in moral strength the Porte gains. We have done them here a service which they can never sufficiently reward, and it will maintain ours as well as the English influence.

I have already prepared my despatch for Constantinople (No. 624). In a few hours I shall send it off.

In the morning I shall send a courier to the allied Courts.

I shall have the honor of laying these despatches before your Majesty on Wednesday.

METTERNICH.

The enclosures are herewith returned, and I await the arrival of the despatches to be sent for my inspection.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, June 3, 1822.

Metternich to Count Lützow, in Constantinople. Vienna, June 3, 1822.

624. A courier sent by M. de Lebzeltern on May 22 (N.S.) has brought news so important that I will not delay an hour in sending the present despatches to your Excellency.

The good genius seems to be triumphing over the evil one: our efforts have not been vain, and the faction which up to this time had restrained the generous disposition of the Emperor of Russia has been obliged to give way to reason. The despatches which your excellency and Lord Strangford should have received directly from Lebzeltern and Bagot, before the arrival of the present courier, will have told you so much.

The courier sent by Baron de Lebzeltern informs me:

That the Emperor Alexander has received the communications which we made through M. de Tatistscheff;

That the news of April 25, which Lord Strangford had wisely sent without loss of time to St. Petersburg, produced such an effect on his Imperial Majesty as to induce him to attempt a direct step at Constantinople by means of the representatives of the Courts of Austria and England; in short

That M. de Tatistscheff had received orders to return to Vienna as quickly as possible to carry out his previous conferences.

Such is the information on which I ground the present despatch to your Excellency.

Thus the affairs can be proceeded with, both at Constantinople and Vienna.

That I may have some idea of the direction affairs may take in the first of these places, it is indispensable that I should know the contents of the despatch which you and Lord Strangford received direct from St. Petersburg. That communication cannot be long in reaching me. I know exactly the business which awaits me after the arrival of M. de Tatistscheff; it is quite enough for me to know that the Emperor Alexander has approved of my secret despatch.

If I did not consider the present moment of immense value, I should have preferred to delay the despatch of these directions until the arrival of the first accounts from M. de Lebzeltern: they would then be more complete. But I am so anxious not to prolong for your Excellency and Lord Strangford a period of suspense (however short), that I send immediately without loss of time.

The information I am able to give you to-day, Sir, will much strengthen your position, and as I wish that Lord Strangford may be able to take a similar position, I beg him, as well as your Excellency, to consider the following overtures as addressed to you in common.

You will find in the enclosed* the details which I have sent to London concerning the whole of M. de Tatistscheff's first visit.

Consider this despatch well, and I beg the English Ambassador to do the same. You will both be convinced of the following facts:

1. That I felt from the first that the Russian negotiator must be charged with a double commission, and I was not long in convincing myself of the fact.

* These enclosures were Metternich's notes of the conversations with Tatistscheff. (See No. 616.)—Ed.

2. That from that time all my anxiety was to follow the line of the Emperor of Russia, and not that which his minister has followed for ten months.

3. That I founded the success of the enterprise on the following bases:

Removing the chance of immediate war;

Reserving to the Russian monarch the possibility of justifying himself in his own eyes and those of his nation with respect to the disastrous position of the Greeks which must ensue from the renunciation of the war, after the hopes of this people having been so long directed to the material support of Russia;

Keeping this within proper limits, admissible therefore by all the Powers.

4. That, in short, in the interest of the cause, I have sent M. de Tatistscheff to St. Petersburg with a double despatch similar to the instructions which he brought to Vienna.

The communication which I have made at London, Paris, and Berlin of the results of my negotiation with M. de Tatistscheff has furnished me with the most satisfactory proofs of the entire and uniform approbation of the three Cabinets. The only thing wanting to complete the work was the assent of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias. This arrived by the last despatch from St. Petersburg, in which are enclosed M. de Tatistscheff's letters.

The explanations which it seemed to me necessary to make, especially to Lord Strangford, as to the true spirit which guided us in the choice of means proposed to his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, by my Memorandum of April 19 (No. 618), are so fully given in my despatches to Prince Esterhazy, that I do not consider it necessary to recur to them here. It must be evident to Lord Strangford, that though I allowed myself to touch on the amelioration of the fate of the Greeks, I have not sacrificed the practical sense which has guided the allied Cabinets up to this time. The present complication has been brought about by a criminal faction, and, considering the end which at present awaits it, must not only injure the cause of the Greeks, but lessen that influence which the policy of Peter the Great and his successors had constantly exercised on the Porte until the end of the year 1820, and to which the Russian Cabinet knew how to give as much force as extension.

Several grave mistakes and the lapse of but a few months have been sufficient to destroy this influence and prepare a new era for the Ottoman Empire. If the Porte owes this benefit to the mis-

takes of the Russian Minister, it owes it no less to the rectitude of the conceptions and conduct of the allied Cabinets: it is to complete the work now commenced, that our labors must henceforth be directed, and it is in the hope of seeing them crowned with success that I address another appeal direct to the enlightened zeal, energy, and talents of Lord Strangford.

This is my opinion, and my whole opinion, on the necessities of the moment. I do not forget those of to-morrow; but before approaching them it is absolutely necessary that I should be informed on many essential points, upon which the next courier from our ambassador in Russia and the arrival of M. de Tatistscheff can alone throw the light required.

The examination of my transactions with M. de Tatistscheff will prove to you, Sir, as well as to Lord Strangford, that the basis of the pacific measures we have proposed may be divided into two periods:

The first must be occupied by the agreement between the allied Cabinets;

The second by the overtures which the allies, in consequence of an arrangement among themselves, will make to the Porte.

The Russian Cabinet has just made, through your Excellency and the English ambassador, a direct appeal to Constantinople. There is in this an inversion of the steps we proposed, and nevertheless a clear gain. I understand by gain—

1. The gain of precious time in the supposition that the Porte hastens the reconciliation;

2. The advantages we derive from the very fact that the precipitation of the Russian Cabinet, if it should lead to results contrary to the present apparently pacific intentions of that Power, could only fall on Russia herself.

Your Excellency is consequently authorized to proceed, together with the English ambassador, in the path which the correspondence of Messieurs Lebzeltern and Bagot may have indicated to you. Your Excellency sees that I do not admit that the English ambassador has found any difficulty whatever in accepting the invitation which Sir Charles Bagot must have addressed to him.

Russia has forestalled the agreement proposed in my Memorandum of April 19 by a direct appeal to Constantinople. It is necessary to separate the periods, and to understand that the more we gain now towards an agreement between Russia and the Porte, the less there will be to accomplish in the second period. It is impos-

sible not to see in this fact an immense victory for the cause of real and definite peace, and great facilities for subsequent negotiation between the allied Cabinets.

We therefore desire most ardently that you will succeed in effecting at Constantinople as much as possible with the least possible delay. If the Divan knows its own interests, it will share our wishes. It is Lord Strangford's part to make it feel this.

If the Porte should insist on diplomatic relations being re-established as soon as possible, it will be for you, too, to make the most at St. Petersburg of the advantages which would ensue to the Ottoman Empire from the condescension of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias in this respect.

Whenever it is shown that Russia will not maintain the exaggerated pretensions of the Greeks by force of arms, it concerns that Power to diminish, as much as possible, the number of victims caused by the continuance of the revolt. The Cabinet of Russia is convinced that freedom of speech is one of its most powerful weapons for promoting the submission of its co-religionists. It is therefore reasonable that it should seek to place itself in an attitude which would enable it to make use of this weapon. We could not give this advice, but on the part of the representatives of the two Courts at Constantinople it is simple and natural. You are thus equally with Lord Strangford at liberty to explain yourself to the Russian Cabinet according to the impressions you receive in the different places to which you have been sent by Russia herself, to make the most of the means of conciliation, whilst our attitude should lean to many other aspects of the question.

I will cause this courier to be followed by another as soon as I am in receipt of the next communications from St. Petersburg. In the mean time I believe I have given your Excellency all the latitude necessary to enable you to advance in the new direction affairs have just taken,

One thing I cannot too strongly recommend to you, and that is to take all your steps, in conjunction with Lord Strangford, in such a manner that the parts shall be distributed between you with the same success as before. I am equally desirous that you should both take care to keep on good terms with the representatives of France and Prussia, so that not only the Porte, but the Cabinets of these two countries, can have no doubt that, if there is any difference more or less of activity in the parts played by the ambassadors and envoys at Constantinople, there is none either in the principles

which the allied Courts profess nor in the determinations and wishes of the monarchs. It is by the demonstration of this grand concord that we shall find a powerful means of action on the Divan, and a means no less powerful to enable the Emperor to give full play to the principles which serve as a foundation and guide to his personal resolves. . . .

I request your Excellency to communicate the present despatch and its contents, without any reserve, to the English ambassador.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, June 13, 1822.

625. Herr von Tatistscheff has to present to your Majesty an autograph letter from the Emperor Alexander. I have promised him to inform your Majesty of it immediately on your Majesty's arrival, not doubting but that your Majesty will appoint the morning for its reception. At the same time I told him that one o'clock was likely to be the hour to suit your Majesty.

He awaits the commands which I beg your Majesty to make known to him through the Lord Chamberlain.

I have seen a copy of the Emperor's letter. Nothing more is to be desired either in that or in the whole despatch, of which your Majesty will receive an account to-morrow.

I pray your Majesty to say to Herr von Tatistscheff that you have been shortly informed by me of the state of things, and that your Majesty has appointed to-morrow morning to receive the fuller details.

Let your Majesty deign to add that you know the share that he (Tatistscheff) has himself had in bringing about this good position; that your Majesty doubts not that the Emperor Alexander desires only what is best in everything, but that his position was difficult, and that by the part he has taken he will cover himself with lasting honor; that he may reckon on your Majesty as his best and surest friend, which your Majesty desires to be on this as on every occasion.

Tatistscheff hopes that you will at the same time say that your Majesty counts on the arrival of the Emperor Alexander in September, considering this meeting as a means of present and future safety, and looking on the meeting of the monarchs as crowning the work.

I have spoken to him of the alteration in the choice of the place of meeting, and he agrees with me. The reason why he desires

that your Majesty should personally speak to him of the meeting is because the Emperor Alexander would feel himself strengthened by your Majesty's words, and would give his decision at once, which might otherwise be thwarted by Capo d'Istria.

METTERNICH.

I will see Tatistscheff at noon to-day, and speak to him as you desire.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, June 13, 1822.

OUTBREAK OF THE SPANISH REVOLUTION.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, July 21, 1822.

626. The accompanying newspaper contains the latest accounts of the state of things in Madrid.

From this it seems that the fate of that country either must be decided very soon or is already decided. It is evident that Spain must shake off the Revolution. Everything depends on one single step of the King—will the King take that step? According to my feeling he has already hesitated too long. Not on deliberation, but on action now depends the fate of the King and his whole people.

METTERNICH.

The enclosures are herewith returned. If, for want of courage and determination, the King of Spain does not conquer, that will happen of which I have once spoken with several of our Princes.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, July 22, 1822

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, July 23, 1822.

627. The house of Rothschild has received to-day by a courier from Paris the enclosed newspaper. This will inform your Majesty that the affair in Madrid has taken the turn which from the timid character of the King was only too much to be feared.

The King would have saved himself personally, and he would have saved his kingdom, if he had but for one minute shown personal moral courage. Instead of this, he seems to have been dissolved in tears.

The result must now inevitably be evil instead of good, which it might have been.

All faithful servants of the King will be sacrificed by the party.

What will happen to the King God knows! The insurrection in the provinces will not be put down the sooner from this state of

things, and Spain will lose the certainty of salvation in a civil war the consequences of which cannot be calculated.

If I had been in the Palace I would have taken the King and the Royal Family, and, with a strong guard, without delay I would have broken through the insurgents, and thus in a few hours saved the King, his family, and the kingdom. It appears that Morillo, who had the power to do this, must himself be bad. The Duke of Infantado, who apparently has contrived the whole thing, is known to me as a loyal but very weak-minded man. The reaction of this event will act very injuriously on the whole of Europe.

METTERNICH.

This outcome of the disturbances in Madrid is certainly very bad, and is a disgrace to the King.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, July 24, 1822.

AUSTRIA'S UNDERSTANDING WITH ENGLAND ON
THE EASTERN QUESTION.

628. Metternich to Lord Strangford, English Ambassador at Constantinople (Letter), Vienna, July 31, 1822.

628. My Lord,—The letter which you addressed to me on June 25* arrived so shortly before the departure of the ordinary post for Constantinople that it was not possible for me to reply to it by that medium. This letter contains much that is interesting; it embraces questions so important, and treated in such a luminous manner, that I have had no difficulty in making myself master of the contents before writing to your Excellency. Even this delay will show you the value I attach to your communications.

That we may understand each other, my Lord, it seems to me necessary to go back to the time when you wrote that letter.

The invitation of Bagot and De Lebzeltern reached your Excellency at the same time as that of Count de Lützow. The mere fact of this invitation must have convinced you not only that the pacific disposition of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia corresponds in its course with the grand character of that sovereign, but that the desire of advancing the arrangement of a difficult and painful affair determined the Emperor to declare the evacuation of the Principalities a sufficient reason for beginning a negotiation with the Porte as soon as possible, so as to further the re-establishment of its relations with Russia.

On the other hand, the Internuncio has communicated to your Excellency my despatches of June 3. They contain the Memorandum of April 19 (No. 618), and will have informed your Excellency that M. de Tatitscheff had taken that despatch to St. Petersburg to submit it to his august sovereign.

At the time of the drawing up of these despatches I had already

* Published by Prokesch in his *Abfall der Griechen* (1853), tom. iii. page 368.
—ED.

made sure that his Imperial Majesty agreed to them, and that he would send the same negotiator to us again to meet in conference with the ministers of the allied Courts at Vienna, to concert means of action on the principles settled between M. de Tatistscheff and myself during the first visit of that minister. Since then your Excellency will have heard of the arrival of M. de Tatistscheff at Vienna, and of the confidential conferences established here between the ministers of the five Courts.

To these conferences I owe the advantage of being able to extract from the explanations which have already taken place the substance of the reply which I have to make to you, my Lord. While placing the principal subjects in the same order which you have followed in your letter, I shall try to explain with as much precision as possible my feeling on the questions you have treated.

The first is the evacuation of the Principalities. Your remarks on that important subject are as judicious as they are true; they are open to no objection: I adopt them in their entirety. Nothing can excuse the Porte if it does not proceed to that evacuation in good faith, without tergiversation and without delay. I admit all you say, my Lord, as to the numerous embarrassments which, in the critical situation of the Turkish Government, may impede the execution of this measure; but everything should give way to the necessity of fulfilling a formal engagement such as the Porte has made to the ministers of the allied Courts in the clearest and most positive terms. This engagement, more than once renewed and confirmed in consequence of your different representations, has placed you, my Lord, in so strong a position, it gives you so much right and latitude of action, that you will be perfectly justified in constantly pressing forward the accomplishment of a measure which must precede all our other operations.

The direct communications from St. Petersburg will have informed you that it is not to the immediate and complete execution of the four points of the Russian ultimatum—points admitted in principle by the Grand Seigneur—but to the simple fact of the evacuation of the Principalities, that his Imperial Majesty has connected the offer of sending a plenipotentiary. It seems to me that the grandest proof of moderation which the Emperor Alexander could give to the Porte and to his allies was his insisting only on that clause with the view of smoothing over the difficulties to which the events of the last year have given rise between the two Powers. The Porte is consequently more than ever bound to agree to a

measure which moreover imposes no real sacrifice upon it, but, on the contrary, if it were not required by the Powers in conformity with the stipulations of treaties, would be dictated by its own interest and that of its subjects.

I also agree with your Excellency as to the inconvenience of insisting on the Porte sending plenipotentiaries before having positive assurances on the article of evacuation. The nomination even of Hospodars, supposing it definitely decreed, would not compensate for the non-execution or imperfect execution of that article. You will have seen, my Lord, by many of the recent explanations of the Russian Cabinet, that his Imperial Majesty, while admitting that there may be difficulties in the choice of men for the government of a country, does not recognize in these difficulties a valid excuse, either for continuing to inflict on that country the sufferings and ravages which weigh on the Principalities, or for postponing the execution of the treaties.

I flatter myself, however, my Lord, that thanks to your cares and perseverance, supported by the activity of your colleagues, the evacuation will have made real progress in the interval which has elapsed since the departure of your letter, and that it will soon be concluded. If in this case you have thought fit to approach the question to which I have alluded, your next communications will probably inform us of the first results of your labors.

Following the memorandum of April 19 you have, my Lord, in your letter separated the subject of the amnesty from that of sending plenipotentiaries.

It is true that these two subjects were placed thus in the above-mentioned work, where they simply served to indicate the bases of agreement between the Powers. But in fact they cannot be treated separately, and this I will endeavor to show.

The great affair which occupies us offers two points of view, distinct in themselves, but both tending towards the same end. One regards the execution of the treaties between Russia and the Porte, and in the Memorandum of April 19 bears the designation of "questions of right."

The other is what in the same paper we have placed under the head of "subjects of general interest."

The allied Courts have up to this time in their communications with the Porte insisted only on the articles comprehended under the first of these heads; but what is at present the direct object of our efforts? It is to re-establish as soon as possible the former

relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire till late events disturbed and suspended them. We all know and recognize that it is impossible to put an end to the state of uncertainty in which the Porte is, and the troubles of every kind which desolate almost all parts of the Empire, unless it arrives at a full and entire reconciliation with its powerful neighbor. Now, to bring about that reconciliation it is not enough that what we call questions of right should be properly regulated. The Emperor of Russia will not re-establish his ordinary diplomatic relations with the Porte on the one ground of the return of that Power to the strict observation of treaties.

His Imperial Majesty did not recall his embassy to Constantinople simply for the violation of these treaties. He did not wish his representative to be the spectator of scenes such as those which daily took place under his eyes in May, 1821. His Imperial Majesty does not wish to appoint another representative to be the spectator of similar scenes and to be recalled in his turn. And what in truth would the Emperor gain, what would the Porte and Europe gain, by seeing a Russian embassy present itself at Constantinople, establish itself there, only to be removed again? Would this second recall be accompanied by the same arrangements as the first? And, independently of that great obstacle, could the Emperor Alexander after all proceed to the re-establishment of a permanent embassy at Constantinople without having shown by patent acts that, while condemning the revolt, he has neglected no legitimate and pacific means to put an end to these cruel reactions and to re-establish tranquillity in a neighboring State, now a prey to the most frightful revolutions?

Such is, my Lord, the position in which the question is now placed. The Emperor of Russia has decided not to re-establish the embassy at Constantinople until he has satisfied himself on what he regards as a sacred duty, and assured himself at the same time that its continuance will be probably secure from any fresh interruption. The negotiation which his Imperial Majesty proposes to the Porte must first of all furnish him with this guarantee.

I well know that this determination will at first open up a vast field for the Turkish government to take umbrage, and that it will object strongly to the prospect of a transaction in which it sees only danger to its power and humiliation to its pride. But your Excellency, in consulting the second part of the Memorandum of April 19, will have perceived that the concessions to be obtained from the Porte will be circumscribed within precise and moderate

limits; and if at the time of the first explanations on this subject, we could make the Porte comprehend that there is to be no attack on its sovereignty; that we only demand from it, for the re-establishment and consolidation of the internal peace of its empire, things just, practicable, compatible with its dignity, agreeable to its true interests, and manifestly required by circumstances and the local situations of the moment, I should be far from renouncing the hope of conquering a repugnance which is perhaps in a great measure owing to the false and exaggerated ideas which that Government has formed on the intentions and projects of the Powers. I believe, my Lord, that without engaging you in a discussion on these delicate points more than is necessary to reply to the questions which the Porte will address to you on these subjects, you will find in the general situation and in the urgent needs of the Ottoman Empire irresistible reasons to place before the Divan to induce it not to reject this negotiation.

If the Sultan wishes to re-establish his authority over the insurgent provinces otherwise than by force of arms—and it is doubtful if he could still reckon on the efficacy of that force—he must make an amnesty and conditions acceptable to the Greeks. The observations of your Excellency on the uselessness of a mere act of amnesty, such as the Porte has several times tried, are perfectly just; it is therefore necessary that the act which must lead to a real pacification should be of an essentially different character. We have seen more than once that a measure which in one form would have been without effect may under another form bring about satisfactory results.

It seems clear to us that the Ottoman Government, in the state of exasperation and unbounded distrust which at present reigns among the Greeks, cannot obtain by its proclamations, however they are drawn up, the faintest resemblance to a submission, as long as the allied monarchs, and especially the Emperor of Russia, do not raise their voices in support of the Sultan. But they can only make these voices heard when they have fixed and well understood bases to offer as conditions of the submission. It is then only that they can address themselves to the insurgents with the dignity suited to their high station or with any reasonable hope of success. If their voices are heard the end is gained: if not, those who refuse to hear will have to depend upon themselves; they will be abandoned by the Powers, and left to be treated as the Turks always treat rebellious subjects.

By following out this idea, you will be convinced, my Lord, that

if in the Memorandum of April 19 the amnesty and the negotiation are found separately mentioned, these two points are not the less inseparable. You will also see that this negotiation, on which Russia and her allies insist, is neither a gratuitous pretension nor a project conceived with any other views or interests whatever than those of the pacification of the Ottoman Empire. This is the first and indispensable condition of the termination of these unfortunate complications. Everything is included in the propositions which the Powers address to the Porte. The re-establishment of direct relations with Russia is impossible until an end is put to those horrors which are ravaging the Ottoman provinces. There is no way of arriving at this end except a complete and solid amnesty. This amnesty, in order to be something more than a mere string of words, absolutely requires the concurrence of the European Powers. On the other hand, such a concurrence can only take place when there is a complete understanding on the fundamental bases of the amnesty and on the necessary clauses in order to make it acceptable to the insurgents. In short, that these clauses may be determined, they must be discussed and considered in a previous negotiation. This reasoning seems to me so unanswerable that the Porte itself, in spite of all its objections against the intervention of Christian Powers in questions of which it believes they are ignorant, must in the end see the force of it, unless it declares frankly that it attaches no value to the re-establishment of its relations with Russia, nor to the pacification of its provinces, nor to the future fate of its own subjects.

You observe, my Lord, that the Porte would perhaps lend itself more willingly to a general negotiation, if it could hope to obtain by it some real and positive advantages. You quote the wish of several members of the Divan, that the Powers allied to Russia would undertake a mediation between her and the Porte, in order to smooth the difficulties relative to the Asiatic frontiers, adding, however, that you are decidedly averse to such an idea. In this I see the extreme wisdom of your Excellency, and all who may be informed of the fact will no doubt applaud with me. I need no great consideration to rate such a project at its just value. It would alter the character of the negotiation to which we invite the Porte, and mix subjects together which have nothing in common with the object at which we aim. The present case is not one for the calculation of gain and loss, or an arrangement of claims and concessions. It is a grand plan of pacification conceived by the allied Powers with the

most disinterested and enlightened views, and in which the Porte (however indifferent it may be as to the maintenance of peace in Europe) is called more directly than any other Power to join for the preservation of its people, its power, and its future existence. Any advantage which the allied Powers may derive from this negotiation to consolidate the general tranquillity, however great it may appear to us, will nevertheless be far less than what must result to the Porte. How could it pretend to compensations in an affair where it is as much a question of working out its own salvation as of avoiding the most terrible catastrophes? Nothing could be imagined worse for the success of the negotiation, than gratuitously to add one difficulty more to those it already has. If such a proposition could have issued from the Russian Cabinet, would not the Porte have accused Russia of complicating questions to render them interminable, or of serving her own private interests? For the rest, I leave this point, my Lord, to the ascendancy which you have acquired over the minds of the Turkish ministers, and of which you have given more than once a striking proof. You will, I have no doubt, be able to make them comprehend what a mistake it would be to bring forward a claim which would certainly be rejected by the Powers.

I come at last to the different plans suggested by your Excellency to induce the Porte to make some conciliatory and honorable advance towards Russia, in consequence of the evacuation of the Principalities and the nomination of Hospodars. I accept as perfectly sound, wise, and useful, all that your Excellency proposes on this head. A notification, drawn up in terms chosen or at least fully approved by your Excellency and your colleagues, and addressed directly to his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, or to his Cabinet, could not but produce a favorable effect; and, indeed, any act of the Porte which stated its sincere desire to resume its former relations with Russia, and proclaimed a just and reasonable confidence in the intentions of the Emperor Alexander and his august allies, would be a great step towards the accomplishment of our wishes. Nevertheless, my Lord, I am far from admitting that the success of such a step would dispense with the necessity of insisting on the sending of the plenipotentiaries; and after all that I have had the honor to explain to you in this letter on the object and aim of a negotiation which we consider the only means of arriving at the pacification of the Ottoman Empire, you cannot have any doubt on the subject.

I will end with a short *résumé* of the observations contained in the present letter. &

1. The evacuation of the Principalities, a measure to which the nomination of the Hospodars is only regarded as an accessory, must be effectually accomplished.

2. To enable us to make a definite arrangement, the Porte must acknowledge to the Ministers of the allied Courts, as a fact no longer to be hidden, the necessity of offering the insurgents an amnesty drawn up in terms likely to bring them to submit to its authority.

3. As soon as the Porte has acknowledged this fact, it must be convinced that under present circumstances any amnesty which is not strengthened by the concurrence and support of the allied Powers, and particularly of Russia, would be ineffectual and useless.

4. As this concurrence and support can only be obtained by means of a preliminary negotiation, the Porte cannot refuse to appoint plenipotentiaries for this negotiation, which is moreover the condition *sine quâ non* of the re-establishment of its relations with Russia.

5. Any step, any act of the Porte tending to facilitate its reconciliation with Russia will be highly approved by the allied Powers, provided it is not a pretext for eluding the negotiation proposed by the Powers with the wisest and most salutary intentions.

Your Excellency now knows my whole mind on those points which in the present state of the question I regard as most essential. Being approved and shared by the ministers with whom I have the honor to confer on this important affair, and in every way according to the intentions of your Government as far as they are known to me, I believe, my Lord, that my sketch may serve you as a guide in any steps you may take with the ministers of the Porte. As to the time for making use of it; as to the choice of modes of conquering the difficulties, of which no one can judge better than yourself; as to the modifications which may be caused by chances and incidents impossible to foresee; we leave all that to your prudence, your zeal, and your talents. These qualities will enable you to fulfil the difficult task with which you are charged. I have only to add, &c.

RESULTS OF THE CONGRESS OF VERONA.

Protocol signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, at Verona, November 19, 1822.

629. The plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, thinking it necessary to determine the cases in which the engagements made with the Court of France by the Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia—in the supposition of a war declared or provoked by the present Government of Spain—would be binding for the powers who have taken part in them, have agreed to determine precisely the said engagements in the following terms:

ARTICLE I.

The three cases in which the eventual engagements between the four Powers who have signed the present *procès-verbal* would become immediately obligatory are:

1. That of an armed attack on the part of Spain against the French territory, or of an official act of the Spanish Government provoking directly to rebellion the subjects of one or other of the Powers.

2. That of his Majesty the King of Spain being declared to have forfeited his throne; or an action being brought against his august person, or an attempt of the same kind being made against the members of his family.

3. That of a formal act of the Spanish Government infringing the rights of the legitimate succession of the Royal family.

ARTICLE II.

Considering that independently of the cases above specified and defined, there may arise at one or other of the Courts what might be regarded as of the same value and producing the same effects as those designated in Article I., it is decided that should such non-specified case or any other analogous case be realized, the ministers of the

allied Courts accredited to his Most Christian Majesty should unite with the Cabinet of France to examine and determine if the case in question should be considered as belonging to the class of the *casus fœderis* foreseen and defined, and as such demanding the direct application of the engagements taken by the Powers.

METTERNICH, LEBZELTERN, MONTMORENCY, CARAMAN, COUNT DE LA FERRONNAYS, CHATEAUBRIAND, BERNSTORFF, HATZFELD, NESSELRODE, LIEVEN, TATISTSCHIEFF, POZZO DI BORGO.

Conference Protocol

630. The ministers of the Cabinets of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia are met to-day with the Duke of Wellington to confer with his Excellency on the *procès-verbal* signed yesterday (No. 629), and on the instructions that each of these Courts proposes to address to its minister at Madrid.

The Duke of Wellington has explained the different points of view from which, as plenipotentiary of the British Government, he regards both these steps; and in consequence of the discussion produced by these explanations, the Duke has undertaken to communicate to the ministers of the four Cabinets the substance of his observations in writing, in the form of a confidential note.

The question of the Protocol was treated afterwards; and after many forms having been examined, each of which presented difficulties or inconveniences, it was arranged:

That there shall be no general Protocol on the negotiations and conferences relative to the Spanish affair.

That the despatches exchanged between the ministers or presented to the Conferences shall be regarded as simple communications from Cabinet to Cabinet.

That it shall be the same with the confidential note announced by the Duke of Wellington.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Verona, December 11, 1822.

631. Sire,—I have the honor to send without delay to your Imperial Majesty the enclosed Reports, which I have received from Paris by a courier sent by the Government to the French Ambassadors. Your Imperial Majesty will also find enclosed a letter from the Viscount de Montmorency. My mind is made up after perusing a private letter which the Marquis de Caraman received

from M. de Montmorency, and which he gave me to read. From all these things put together it appears to me—

1. That the French minister reckons on connecting himself directly with the three Continental Courts.

2. That he wishes the sending of instructions from the Cabinets met at Verona to the representatives at Madrid to be considered as a question of prudence.

Now, in this there is some confusion of ideas.

We foresaw the possibility that the French Government would not be able to decide on connecting its diplomatic course with our own. It was determined that in this case the instructions to the embassies of the three Courts should be sent without delay.

The French minister, by deciding to place himself on the same moral ground with the allies, seems to desire that the course arranged should undergo some modification. He shows this by his proposal to declare that the time of sending the instructions to Madrid must depend on questions of prudence to be considered by the Conference at Paris. In that the French minister deceives himself. There exists, relative to the sending of these instructions, a stronger power, and one which must decide it quite independently of every other calculation—the end of the Congress. Our despatches should consequently be expedited; the discretionary question exists for France alone, and is confined to the simple fact of deciding if that Power wishes to recall its own embassy at the same time as the allies; it cannot be extended to the consideration whether the recall of the ministers, either of the allies or the representative of France, can be suspended even momentarily. I do not doubt that your Majesty will regard the alternative from the same point of view in which it appears to me.

I pray your Majesty not to notice the remark made by M. de Montmorency relative to the despatch from the Austrian Cabinet to Count Brunetti. This remark arises from a mistake on M. de Montmorency's part.

Deign to accept, Sire, the testimony of my profoundest respect.

*Circular Despatch sent by the three Allied Courts—Austria, Russia, and Prussia—to their Ambassadors at the other Courts. Verona, December, 1822.**

632. The Monarchs of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, at the conclusion of the Conference at Verona, sent the following circular despatch to their ambassadors at the other Courts. The original documents were signed by the three Cabinet ministers—Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and Count Bernstorff.

Verona, December 14, 1822.

You were informed on the conclusion of the Laybach Conferences in May, 1821, that the allied Monarchs and their Cabinets would meet in the course of 1822 on the proposal of the Courts of Naples and Turin, and with the concurrence of the other Italian Courts, to arrange as to the continuance of the measures which had been adopted for the maintenance of peace in the Peninsula after the sad events of 1820 and 1821.

This meeting has now taken place, and it is our present purpose to make known to you its results.

By the Convention, signed July 24, 1821, at Novara, the provisional formation of a military line in Piedmont by a corps of auxiliaries for one year was arranged, with the reservation to decide at the meeting in the year 1822 whether the condition of the country required the longer continuance of this measure, or whether it might be repealed.

The plenipotentiaries of those Courts which had signed the Convention of Novara, together with the plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of Sardinia, entered upon this investigation, and

* This circular despatch was sent by Prince Metternich to the Munich political paper for publication, as is shown by a letter from Metternich dated Munich, January 3, 1823:

" . . . I had a long conference this morning with Messieurs de Rechberg, Wrede, and Zentner, where I obtained as good terms as I possibly could for my great affair. My presence here will do much good, but it naturally excites the attention of the Liberals. This attention has been brought to a height by the insertion which I have managed to-day of the circular despatch of the three Courts, and of the despatch of M. de Villeta to M. de La Garde in the *Munich Gazette*. I shall hear this evening the kind of sensation which these two pieces will have produced on the public."

In the *Frankfort Journal* of January 5, 1823, this despatch is translated into French.—Ed.

it was decided that the presence of an auxiliary force was no longer necessary to preserve peace in Piedmont. The King of Sardinia himself pointed out the mode in which the gradual retreat of the auxiliaries should be effected; and it determined by a new convention that the departure of the troops from Piedmont should begin on December 31 and conclude on September 30, 1823, with the evacuation of the fortress of Alessandria.

His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, who had taken part in the Convention at Naples on October 18, also declared to the three Courts that the present condition of his country permitted him to propose a reduction in the number of the auxiliaries stationed at different places. The allied sovereigns have had no hesitation in acting on this proposal, and the auxiliary forces stationed in the Two Sicilies will be as quickly as possible reduced to seventeen thousand men.

Everything, therefore, goes on according to the wishes of the monarchs as expressed by them at the conclusion of the Congress of Laybach, when they declared "that, far from desiring to extend their intervention in the affairs of Italy beyond the limits of stern necessity, they cherished the desire that the state of things which imposed this painful duty upon them would soon pass away never to return." Thus disappeared the false alarms, hostile constructions, and gloomy prophecies which have been disseminated over Europe by ignorance or perfidy, to mislead the people as to the pure and noble intentions of the monarchs. No secret scheme, no ambition, no calculation of their own advantage united them in the determination which an imperious necessity alone had dictated to them in 1821. To make a stand against revolution, to overcome the disorders, troubles, and crimes which had overspread Italy, and restore this country to peace and order; to afford to legitimate Governments the protection to which they had a right—these were the objects to which the thoughts and the efforts of the monarchs were solely directed. In proportion as those objects are attained they have withdrawn and will continue to withdraw the assistance which necessity alone called for and justifies. They think themselves happy to be able to leave the security and peace of the people to the care of the Princes whom Providence has entrusted with it, thus taking away the last pretext for the calumny which cast a doubt on the independence of the Italian sovereigns.

The object of the Congress of Verona, assigned to it by a definite Convention, was fulfilled by the resolutions passed for the relief of

Italy. But the allied sovereigns and their Cabinets cannot but glance at two great difficulties with the progress of which they have been much occupied since the Congress at Laybach.

An event of great importance took place before the conclusion of the Congress. What the spirit of revolution began in the Western Peninsula, what was attempted in Italy, has succeeded in the East of Europe. At the very moment when the rebels in Naples and Turin were retiring at the approach of legitimate power, a rebellious firebrand was cast into the Ottoman Empire. The coincidence of the events leaves no doubt as to the similarity of their origin. The outbreak of the evil at so many different points, everywhere conducted in the same manner and using the same language, unmistakably betrays the common focus from whence they all issue. The instigators of this movement flattered themselves that the counsels of the Powers would be embarrassed by dissensions and their forces neutralized by the cry of new dangers in different parts of Europe. The hope was vain. The monarchs, determined to refute the maxims of rebellion in whatever place and under whatever form they might appear, at once declared their unanimous decision. They will pursue the objects of their common care with unremitting attention, withstanding every consideration which might turn them from their path; they will follow the voice of conscience and duty, and uphold the cause of humanity in behalf of the victims of an enterprise as rash as it is criminal.

During this period—one of the most remarkable in the history of their alliance—numerous confidential communications took place between the five Courts, which had established such a satisfactory understanding in regard to the Eastern question that when they met at Verona the results only of that understanding had to be set forth, and the Powers friendly with Russia hope by common effort to put aside every obstacle to the entire fulfilment of her wishes.

Other events have called the attention of the monarchs to the pitiable condition of the Western Peninsula.

Spain is now undergoing the fate which awaits all States unfortunate enough to seek what is good in a way in which it can never be found. It is passing through the fateful circle of its revolution, a revolution which deluded or evil-disposed men represent as a benefit, or indeed a triumph, of the enlightened century. All Governments are witnesses of the zeal with which these men seek to persuade their comrades that this revolution is the necessary and wholesome fruit of advanced civilization, and the means by which

it acts and is supported the noblest flight of enthusiastic love for the fatherland. If civilization can have for its aim the destruction of human society, and if it were possible to admit that the armed force which is only meant for the preservation of peace in the kingdom can seize the Government of that kingdom unpunished, certainly the Spanish revolution may claim the admiration of the age, and the military rising of the island of Leon may serve as a pattern for reformers. But truth has soon asserted her rights, and Spain only presents another sad example (at the cost of her happiness and her fame) of the inevitable consequences of such transgressions of the eternal laws of the moral order of the world.

Legitimate power fettered and turned into an instrument for the overthrow of all rights and all lawful liberty; all classes of the people drawn into the stream of revolutionary agitation; caprice and oppression exercised under the guise of laws; a whole kingdom given up to disorders and convulsions of every kind; rich colonies preparing to set themselves free by the same maxims with which the mother country has built up its public rights, and which it vainly condemns in another hemisphere; the last resources of the country destroyed by civil war—this is the picture which Spain now presents, these are the vexations with which a noble people worthy of a better fate is afflicted; lastly, these are the grounds of the just anxiety which such a concurrence of the elements of discontent and confusion must awake in the countries contiguous to the Peninsula. If ever a Power was raised in the very heart of civilization hostile to the principles of conservation, to the principles on which the European confederation rests, that Power is Spain in its present state of decomposition.

Can the monarchs look with equanimity on the evils heaped on one country which are accompanied with so many dangers for others? Dependent only on their own judgment and their own conscience in this grave juncture of affairs, they must ask themselves whether it can be longer permitted to remain quiet spectators of calamities which daily threaten to become more dangerous and more horrible, or even by the presence of their representatives give the false appearance of a silent consent to the measures of a faction ready to do anything to maintain and support their pernicious power. The decision of the monarchs cannot be doubtful. Their ambassadors have received orders to leave the Peninsula.

Whatever may be the result of this step, the monarchs declare before Europe that nothing can move them to waver in a resolution

approved by their most heartfelt convictions. The greater the friendship they entertain for the King of Spain, the livelier their interest in the well-being of a nation which has ever been distinguished for its virtues and its grandeur, the more strongly do they feel the necessity of taking the measure on which they have decided, and which they will know how to maintain.

The above statements will convince you that the monarchs in their last negotiations have remained unalterably true to those principles which have given them so great an influence in all the chief questions of our day relating to order and conservation. Their alliance, essentially supported and maintained on those principles, far from losing its earlier character, from time to time gains in strength and solidity. It would be superfluous further to vindicate their just and benignant sentiments from the unworthy calumnies which are every day refuted by notorious facts. All Europe must at last acknowledge that the system followed in the most perfect harmony by the monarchs equally conduces to the strength and independence of Governments and the true interests of the people. They know no enemies but those who, conspiring against the rightful power of the one and the good feeling of the other, draw both into one abyss. The wishes of the monarchs are directed towards peace alone, but this peace, although thoroughly established between the Powers, cannot spread the fulness of its beneficence over the whole of society so long as the fermentation at work in some countries is fostered by the false persuasions and criminal efforts of a faction which conceives nothing but revolution and rebellion—so long as the heads and instruments of this faction, whether by taking the field openly against thrones and Governments, or brooding in secrecy, prepare their hostile plots or poison the public mind, terrifying the people with subversive and lying representations of the present and gloomy anxieties for the future. The wisest measures of the Governments cannot succeed, the best-intentioned plans of reform have no result, confidence cannot return to men, till this fosterer of the most hateful machinations is reduced to complete impotence; and the monarchs will not feel that they have concluded their great work till they have torn from this faction the weapons with which it threatens the peace of the world.

While imparting to the Court to which you are accredited the facts and explanations set forth in this document, you will at the same time call to remembrance what the monarchs consider to be

the inevitable condition of the fulfilment of their benevolent desires. In order to guarantee to Europe, not merely the peace which it enjoys by the protection of treaties, but that feeling of internal repose and lasting security without which in nations no true happiness can exist, they must be able to rely on the loyal and persistent co-operation of all the Governments. In the name of their own best interests, in the name of the public order whose preservation is concerned, in the name of the future races of mankind, we invite you to this co-operation. May the Governments all be imbued with the great truth that power is given into their hands as a sacred deposit of which they must give an account to their people and their successors, and that they expose themselves to the gravest responsibility if they fall into errors or listen to counsels which sooner or later will deprive them of the possibility of defending their subjects from the ruin which they themselves have prepared. The monarchs are confident that they will find in those who are in supreme authority (in whatever form it may be) true friends and allies—allies who adhere, not merely to the letter and to the positive declarations of the negotiations, but also to the spirit and the principles on which the present European system is founded, and they flatter themselves that this declaration will be taken as a fresh proof of their unalterable intention to devote all the resources entrusted to them by Providence to the welfare of Europe.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Venice, December 21, 1822.

633. It would be difficult to add anything in the way of instructions to the preceding despatch. The Protocols of our Conferences at Verona tell everything, and the final conditions of any possible arrangement are there given. The results of these conditions are as follows:

1. That the Porte should as an act of courtesy to Russia announce the determinations already taken and carried out with regard to the Principalities.

2. That the Porte shall arrange amicably with the Courts who demand the navigation of the Black Sea, unless she prefers to continue the abuses to which the Russian flag, granted to so many foreign vessels, has offered facilities. Of the two the Porte must prefer the first of these alternatives, which is by far the most advantageous.

3. Finally, that the Porte shall herself pacify Greece.

Everything is included in these three points, for the resumption of the ordinary diplomatic relations do not deserve to occupy our attention seriously; the advantage of this resumption is so much on the side of Russia that interest, and interest only, will here do all that the Powers may be excused from attempting.

I advise the most entire agreement with Lord Strangford. This ambassador must have learned to know the truth of the situation, for he has seen it on the spot. He arrived at Vienna under the most unfavorable auspices for himself; he quitted Verona in possession of the undoubted confidence of the Emperor of Russia. I, for my part, have contributed to this fact as much as possible. Lord Strangford knows it, and ought to be pleased. He ought to be convinced of two great truths, which he can never keep too much before him—namely, that the Emperor Alexander sincerely desires to see the end of the trouble in the East, although he has a very just feeling of the numberless difficulties which any grave error committed by the Divan may throw in the way of the realization of his peaceful intentions.

As to the point of view of our Cabinet, Lord Strangford must be satisfied that nothing can be clearer or more disinterested than our fears and our desires. The course you personally take will be extremely helpful to us. Unite openly in pursuing the same aims as the British ambassador, and take care to give me every possible proof of zeal in supporting the conditions which Russia has presented as decisive.

*The Emperor Francis to King Max Josef of Bavaria, Innsbruck,
December 30, 1822.*

634. *Monsieur mon Frère et Beau-Père!*—I think it may be agreeable to your Majesty to be informed of the particulars of the business which has just been concluded at Verona. I have therefore ordered Prince Metternich to pass through Munich in returning to Vienna. He will give your Majesty an account of the results at which the Congress has arrived, and of my view as to the good which will result for the federation from the application of the same principles in Germany. The views and sentiments of your Majesty agreeing with mine, I do not doubt your satisfaction with all that you learn from my Chancellor.

I myself sincerely regret that it was not possible to see your Majesty on my return to Austria. The severity of the season and the

necessity for my return to my capital prevent a pleasure which I only put off to the first convenient opportunity.

Receive, etc., etc.

FRANCIS.

King Max Josef of Bavaria to the Emperor Francis, Munich, January 3, 1823.

635. *Monsieur mon Frère et Beau-Fils!*—Prince Metternich has brought me your Majesty's letter from Innsbruck, and has lost no time in informing me of all the important affairs which were discussed under your Majesty's happy auspices at Verona.

I have had great pleasure in conversing with your Majesty's Chancellor, who has so materially assisted in bringing about the grand results of the Congress, and to whose care Europe owes the tranquillity she has enjoyed during the last few years. He will inform your Majesty of my sentiments, and of the agreement of my views concerning Germany with the principles professed by the allied Powers.

Your Imperial Majesty will believe how much I regretted the impossibility of seeing your Majesty when passing through my country: the extreme severity of the season alone prevented me from coming to meet your Majesty.

Received, etc., etc.

MAX JOSEPH.

Metternich to the Emperor Alexander, a private Memorandum on the Formation of a Central Commission of the Northern Powers in Vienna. Verona (no date).

636. Of all the evils that now afflict the social body, that which ought especially to arrest the attention of the Governments is the criminal part played by the different sects.

One of the weakest sides of the human mind is the inclination which in all ages has attracted it towards the vague domain of mysticism. There are a number of uneasy spirits who are tormented by the necessity of creating some occupation for themselves, whose activity, unable to fix on objects of definite utility, urges them towards the most sterile abstractions. Dupes of their disordered imagination, dupes of whoever will serve their mania for irregular schemes, these men have constantly been like plants in a nursery for the secret societies.

The societies have always been influenced by the varying char-

acter of the age. If there are among them some who have remained faithful to certain principles of their primitive institution, the greater number are always ready to depart from them and yield to the powerful impulses of the moment. Thus it is that in a time of religious exaltation secret associations are armed for the maintenance of this or that dogma. Now that the spirit of the age is directed towards reforms in the modes of government, these same associations exercise all their troublesome activity in the field of politics.

Where the secret societies do not go to meet factions, these factions, knowing the advantage to be gained from the sects, are not slow to find them out.

It is necessary to point out three principal epochs from which may be dated the extraordinary extension acquired by the sects of late.

The French Revolution, at its commencement, caused the suspension of the work of the sects. The arena was open to all the aberrations of the human mind as to all its ambitions; what would the *adepts* have gained by secret conventicles? They had plunged themselves into a career which, while flattering the dreams of their imagination, offered the prospect of a brilliant fortune. Thus the revolutionary administrations in France were recruited from the sects, and the Masonic lodges found themselves empty; in the same way we have seen the revolutionary army of Naples fill up its ranks with *malcontenti*. It was under the Empire, and as a consequence of the expurgations made by Bonaparte in the administrations, that the secret societies began to be reconstituted. Strong of will, Bonaparte calculated that, instead of employing useless efforts to hinder their reorganization, it would be easier to him to restrain them by subjecting them to a severe control, and even making them subserve his designs. Hence, while covering them with ridicule, he managed to establish an active police in the associations which seemed to him susceptible of being guided; towards all the others, on the contrary, he displayed an inflexible severity.

The fall of Bonaparte delivered the world from an immense weight, but this weight having pressed on both good and bad, good and bad both alike felt released from the shackles which had bound them. Unhappily the elements of the good were distorted or paralyzed, while those of the evil did not remain inactive, and the revolutionary spirit was soon seen to take a new flight.

But the factions themselves were not long in discovering that the

people, wearied by so many violent shocks, were no longer disposed to serve their designs actively or *en masse*. It was reserved to the country the most withdrawn from civilization, and unhappily the most internally excited, to create a new mode of bringing about disorders.

A general uneasiness reigned in Spain; no people, however, were further from rising than the Spanish people. Thus the revolution of 1820 was the direct work of a conspiracy hatched in secret, prepared and arranged by means of a secret association. If there could be a doubt of the truth of this fact it would be removed by the indiscreet avowals made public by one of the most active and shameless of the instruments of military rebellion in the Isle de Léon.

A Government which was a perfect cipher was unable to destroy what crime had brought forth. The success of the conspiracy of the Isle de Léon marked the second epoch in the progress made by the secret societies.

The revolutions in Italy in 1820, and above all in 1821, seem to show the third.

If the military revolt in Naples may be regarded as merely a servile imitation of that of the Isle de Léon this cannot be the case with the Piedmontese revolution. This was evidently directed by the dissidents of France, and if enlightened observers had long suspected the existence of a vast revolutionary association in Paris connected with those in foreign countries, the open revolution at Turin tore away the veil that had up to that time concealed its character.

There seems to us a real interest in studying the characteristic differences which exist in the two Italian revolutions. One was more local than the other. The genius of the Neapolitans and that of the Piedmontese, even the geographical position of the two States, was bound to make, and actually did make, a notable difference in the two revolutions. We believe we do not go too far in considering the Neapolitan revolution as the work of pure Carbonarism, owing its origin to no other but national sources, although it may have been fomented and supported by Spanish influence. The revolution in the Sardinian States on the contrary was placed under the combined direction of the Piedmontese revolutionists and the French dissidents. If this assertion were not otherwise supported we should find undoubted proof in the moral situation of the two kingdoms.

That of Naples seems to us much further from a revolution such as that of 1820 than Piedmont is or will be for a long time.

The organization of secret societies in France, such as exist now, does not seem to go further back than 1820. The proceedings commenced in Germany in 1819-1820, and the labors of the Central Commission of Inquiry at Mayence furnish more than one proof that the German revolutionists at that time entertained but very indirect relations with the revolutionary centre in Paris. It was only after the measures taken at Carlsbad had forced the principal heads of the secret associations in Germany to seek a refuge in France, that many of them betook themselves to Paris, where they found little opportunity of coming to an understanding with the French Liberals. Hatred against Bonaparte gave the first impulse to the secret associations in Germany, and this fact caused a difficulty in approaching the French leaders. The philanthropic nonsense of Teutonic professors and students made them despised by those of the factions who were too practical to be caught by such follies. It was only after the year 1831 that direct relations could be established between the German and French revolutionists, and at the head of the former were the German Bonapartists. The places in Germany most remarkable as showing the combination of French and German revolutionary material are the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, the town of Frankfurt, and some Swiss towns. Those who in these places played the first parts were the brothers Murhard, some other literary men at Frankfort, and the editors of the *Gazette du Neckar*. This paper is under the immediate influence of the director of the committee in Paris, and his chief editor, Dr. Lindner, has acted for several years as agent for Bonaparte in Germany. The second editor was a commissary of police under Bonaparte.

Up to this time the French Radicals have followed in the tracks of their own revolution. Many attempts made in France to excite the masses to rise must have proved to these men that there was not now the same chance of such efforts succeeding as in 1789; on the other hand, their attention could not but be fixed on the new means by which success was obtained by the military revolt in Spain, and as the same means afterwards was able to overturn the legitimate Government at Naples in three days, the French revolutionists must adopt it as the most efficacious and expeditious. We feel the less hesitation in placing the introduction of Carbonarism into France no further back than the year 1820—or perhaps even the commencement of the following year—because we see in the

revolutionary outbreak in Piedmont traces of two distinct influences, which doubtless had the same object, but proceeded in a different manner. The revolt in Turin was evidently directed and prepared by the joint efforts of the Piedmontese and French revolutionists, whilst that in Alessandria, of which all the machinery was put in motion by pure Carbonarism, seemed to be quite separate from that in the capital.

The very secrecy of associations of this kind assists their rapid progress. Thus, in all the attempts that have been made during the last ten months to organize military revolts in France, we see the tools of French Carbonarism playing a part everywhere.

Having shown in this rapid sketch the pernicious influence exercised by the sects on the great political convulsions of late years, we do not hesitate to assert that these societies are a malady which consumes the noblest parts of the social body and that the roots of this evil are already deep and widespread. If the Governments do not take vigorous measures not only to prevent its ultimate progress, but to restrain it within manageable limits, Europe runs the risk of falling under the ever-renewed attacks of these associations. But that the remedy may be efficacious the danger must be faced, and since the evil conceals itself in darkness, it must be sought for and attacked with a force equal to its own.

The factions at present employ two means. One is the formation of secret societies and all kinds of sects; of these the most practical is that of Carbonarism. This institution, which arose among a people little civilized but excitable and enthusiastic, bears the impress of their character. Quick in conceiving objects, the Southern Italian executes them with equal facility. One end in view, and that clearly set forth in the higher grades of the association; simple means and plans, free from the metaphysical rubbish of Masonry, a government really reserved for its leaders, a certain number of grades to classify individuals; disobedience and indiscretion punished by the poniard as well as enemies—such is Carbonarism, which of all the political sects seems to have approached the most nearly to perfection in its practical organization.

The factions have found a second means in the fusion of their interests and the establishment of a central point of direction. Nationality, political limits, everything disappears with the sect. The committee which leads the Radicals throughout Europe is, no doubt, at Paris, and every day will show this more and more.

What means have the Governments to oppose to this evil?

We know but two:

In the first place they must make common cause and unite in one the interest of each in his own preservation; in the second place they must establish a central focus for information and direction.

The faction aims equally at all the States; pure monarchies, constitutional monarchies, republics, all are threatened by the levellers.

Never has the world shown examples of union and solidity in great political bodies like those given by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the course of the last few years. By separating carefully the concerns of self-preservation from ordinary politics, and by subordinating all individual interests to the common and general interest, the monarchs have found the true means of maintaining their holy union and accomplishing the enormous good which they have accomplished. France is now paying dearly for the illusions to which her last administrations were given up. The present ministry seems to take a course tending towards the principle of alliance. England must always be placed in a class by herself with regard to the present question. However enlightened and honest may be the intentions of her Government, her policy on any of the points touched on in this memoir can never be identified entirely with that of the Continental Powers.

As this *solidarité* exists between the three Northern Courts, it is necessary to bring the French Government to join in it as much as possible. This will be done more easily by one step actually taken than by explanations and reasonings on the necessity of this *solidarité*. The step to be taken should, we think, be the creation of a centre of information to be obtained from every direction.

To this end we propose the following measure. The Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia shall depute an individual worthy of all confidence at Vienna. The Emperor of Austria on his part will select an *employé* of his Government. These three persons shall form a secret committee. This committee is intended to form a central point of information. To this end each Government will take measures to bring to the knowledge of the committee all the traces of conspiracy which they may discover.

The Central Commission of Inquiry, established at Mayence, will continue its functions agreeably to the almost unanimous desire of the Confederation. The labors of this commission will come under the inspection of the committee.

The resources that the Government will have at their disposal

will be very different from those of the association which is to be abolished. The Governments, strong in all the forces of a vigilant administration, will have less to fear from the machinations of the sect; every discovered plot loses its dangerous character, and furnishes an offensive weapon to legal power. By watching over the lives and the peace of their people the Governments will maintain their power on the ground of justice and right, which can never be the case with sects, whatever may be the mask with which they are covered.

BOOK VI.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

1823-1829.

1823.

EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from January 6 to August 29, 1823.

637. *Vienna, January 6, 1823.*—I have spent two free days in Munich, which I devoted entirely to work; I set out at four this morning, and here I am once more with my Penates. It was indeed a terrible journey in the ever-increasing cold!

In Munich things fell out as I had foreseen. It was singular to see how my mere appearance there caused the greatest expectation * among all the different parties. This again shows what a miserable thing faction is. It is only needed to place four energetic men, who know what they want and are agreed in the manner of carrying out their wishes, in the four corners of Europe, let them raise their voices and their arms at the same moment, and the whole concern vanishes like so much smoke. People are really very foolish. I can find no more power of judgment among them than among children, who if they see a great cloud they want to climb up and walk upon it, as if it were firm ground. When I speak of "judgment" I take the word in its most positive signification and separate it

* Metternich's stay in Munich just after the Congress at Verona gave rise to all sorts of conjectures. Count Trauttmansdorff, the Austrian Ambassador there, wrote to Vienna on January 6: "New adjustments of territory, the removal of the King of Wurtemberg to Poland and the extension of Bavaria on the west, contingents against the Turks, the marriage of the Princess Sophie of Bavaria with an Austrian Archduke, the alteration of the Bavarian Constitution—all these are talked of as being the objects of your Excellency's wishes. Among the cultivated classes, however, the preference is given to the constitutional questions between the Austrian and Bavarian Courts, and the diplomatic corps are of the opinion that your Excellency's demands are limited to a new press law and the abolition or the publicity of the proceedings at the Diets." For the reason of the Chancellor's visit to Munich see No. 635, vol. iii. p. 471.—Ed.

entirely from mind or intellect, for this is generally possessed by the very men who suffer from want of judgment. I much fear that this is the case with Canning also.

638. *January 30.*—We have sustained an irreparable loss. Count Wrba (Lord Chamberlain) is dead. All the necessary qualifications which were peculiar to him will not easily be found united in one man. He died after a severe illness contracted in Verona.

This morning I had an interview with the Emperor. He is in great perplexity, and so am I. He asked me whether I was inclined to take the place; a question which I answered very promptly in the negative, for, if I know myself at all, it is not possible for me to take on myself another burden, and most certainly not that of service at Court. Better die naturally than be killed by needle-pricks.

I am just reading Madame Campan's *Memoirs of Marie Antoinette*. I have hardly got to the middle of the first volume, but it is quite clear to me that the work will do more harm than good. It represents many things in a ludicrous light which now really appear so. The book will do no good, for the conclusion to which it leads is not much more than that Marie Antoinette was a very good, young, and beautiful woman; but what is called "respect" suffers much thereby. No analysis ought to be attempted, especially of so high a personage, whose traditional claims and position are so important, because the analysis itself destroys that kind of feeling. The spirit of the age is satiated with works like these *Memoirs*; if as with a sponge on a water-color drawing you wash away the colors you come to nothing but the bare ground.

This is indeed known well enough, and is no new discovery. The only question is whether the painting is worth the price, and above all whether it is of greater value than the materials out of which it is made.

639. *February 2.*—To-day I have news from Paris to the 28th ult. Some perplexities are preparing in London. I, for my part, am not sorry, for amid the positive evils of the affair I prefer an undecided attitude. What will come out of it all? Heaven alone knows!

The King of Wurtemberg has allowed himself to be carried away by a folly which he will find very serious.* From blind rage against me he now takes counsel only of his passions, which are of all counsellors the worst. If I had prescribed his course to him he could not have carried out more exactly what I have for a long

* See Nos. 671, 672.—Ed.

time thought of him. Still it is extraordinary how the anger of senseless people in itself leads to mischief. This truth finds its application in public as well as private life. People of this stamp knock down the whole erection, and that too when it seems to be on the point of completion. The Emperor Alexander will not take the matter lightly; that I think I can answer for.

The news of the 28th will make a great sensation in London; but not much on me, for it is what I expected.*

640. *March 1.*—I have read Las Cases through. It interested me, because I was mixed up in the whole affair. It is the work of a fanatical adherent, who quite forgets that there is no more useless labor than to point out that Bonaparte was an excellent man. I have already often declared that, according to my opinion, Bonaparte was in no wise wicked as this word is understood in common life. He had too much practical understanding for that. He was a very strong man, and in the different settings of another age he would have become a very great man. Las Cases, moreover, experienced from Bonaparte the usual treatment. He made use of his pen to have the romance of his life written. But history is not to be made romantic thus, and the Napoleon of Las Cases bears the same resemblance to the true Napoleon that the Achilles of the opera does to the immortal Achilles himself. I have, moreover, stumbled upon more than one positive lie.

641. *March 5.*—I am busy about a very anxious work. Paris now presents a most peculiar spectacle. I know the ground in Paris very well, and my knowledge of the city in the time of strength enables me to judge of its position in its present time of weakness. In this country everything is unexpected; even what seems reasonable is only so outwardly, not really: commotion is here the consequence of excited passions, and of all these not one springs from true feeling. Never since there was such a thing as business in the world was an affair handled as it is at this moment in France. It really looks as if people in this country were trying to refine upon suicide. They drive forward, but at the same time bring the car so close to the precipice that it must inevitably turn over.

642. *April 4.*—I send Brunetti to Paris, and if possible to Spain, where he will fill the office of ambassador to the King, who is once more free. This is the design of Heaven, and if the French do nothing stupid the King will shortly rule once more.

* Refers to the warlike speech of the King at the opening of the French Chambers.—Ed.

Affairs are now of a very delicate nature, not because they are extremely difficult in themselves, but because it is to the French Government that the conduct of them naturally falls, and that is weak and is itself breaking up. Happily the other great Powers will act with decision. It borders on the miraculous that I have succeeded in bringing about such a harmony of procedure between the Emperor Alexander and ourselves. When it is considered from what opposite points the two Empires have started to arrive at this harmony, it seems like a dream.

The old Fürstenbergs celebrated their golden wedding yesterday. It was a touching occasion on account of the number of the present descendants; the third and fourth generations had to be omitted, as no place could be found for them at table. Prince John Liechtenstein gave the banquet.

For the rest there is nothing new, no one dying and no one dead. Melanie is better, but she must (according to my opinion, which is shared by her physician) still take the greatest care. She is the same young girl who some years ago so much resembled my Clementine; she has, however, much altered. She is now tall and very pretty, but in quite another style from Clementine. Lawrence has immortalized my Clementine; he painted her just as she took her flight from this world.

The Opera is excellent. They are playing "Othello," the "Barber," and "Zelmira." The Italian company at the Vienna Opera is the best I know. It contains no mediocrities, and the first singers are the best Italians. The Opera affords me great delight, for my life is so monotonous that the sound of something quite different from what I am daily condemned to hear thrills through my whole being.

643. *April 30.*—Here every one is occupied only with Spain and the Italian Opera. If the war goes on as well as the Opera, Europe is saved. I do not know whether Victor heard Lablache sing in Milan. He seems to me like the "Stephansthurm" that tried to sing with its great bell, but he also brings out tones that would do honor to a nightingale.

All Vienna is in spirit on the Ebro. The progress of the French war operations makes the same impression here as if it were a victorious Austrian army.

644. *May 1.*—This day's date has a pleasant sound, but the weather does not correspond with the time of year. This day is generally an epoch in Vienna life. All walk to the public prome-

nade and surrender themselves to the pleasure of the first signs of spring. Unhappily it has hardly begun to grow green, and the first shoots are still in bud. My poor garden is much more like the age of infirmity than that of youthful freshness. If it goes on in this way I shall lose the trees which I saved in 1822. It is literally true that it has not rained since April in last year.

What must touch most painfully the feelings of great speakers like the British Ministers is, that while reading the Parliamentary debates Europe shrugs its shoulders! In all the dreary wastes of the daily journals I have not found a word, not one single word, in their praise. It is just the Radical papers that have the sharpest and most vigorous criticisms. What, then, does Canning want? Whose part will he take? What is he about? For, after all, a man must have some object or end in view.* I really begin to lose the very small portion of respect I had (not without difficulty, God forgive me) attained for the man. Canning keeping step with the Minister President of His Most Christian Majesty! A fine century for this sort of men—for fools who pass for intellectual but are empty; for moral weaklings, who are always ready to threaten with their fists from a distance when the opportunity is good. When obliged to contemplate all this, as I am, to hear everything and read everything that I must hear and read—this really requires a kind of endurance which almost amounts to virtue. But how fruitless is this virtue and how toilsome its exercise! What a pity it is that Wellington is so timid; a man with so upright a heart and so noble a countenance!

645. *May 15.*—The anniversary of my birth is dear to me, for but for that event I could neither have loved nor hated. I am busy preparing for the reception of my family; my sad, solitary life comes to an end, and my heart once more awakes. I am not made for loneliness and I need life about me. The absolute stillness around is to me a symbol of death. I like too to see the delight in social life in other men. I do not trust anchorites: they are mostly tiresome or tired out, and, what is worse, they are often wicked men.

646. *May 17.*—My family arrived this day, I having gone some miles to meet them. They are all in good health; my wife and children look extremely well, and the latter—whom I have not seen for three years—are much grown. I should have known

* This refers to Canning's great speech, April 14, 1823.—Ed.

Leontine, but the little one (Princess Hermine) has entirely altered. She is very like my mother, possesses therefore some of my charms. Victor is very well. The children cried with joy to see me again. What comforts me is that long absence has weakened the deep sorrow of my wife on re-entering the house where, as a mother, she suffered so much. I have quite altered the place, and put out of sight everything that would remind her of that sad time. Providence has given to the lapse of time great power over human feeling, and this is not the least of its blessings.

647. *May 22.*—Spanish affairs go on as they must go now that they have been taken in hand. What a miserable Power is that which is founded on error, is only supported by lies, and has no strength but the weakness of its opponents. This is a portrait of Liberalism. No sooner are its pretensions examined than they are seen to be without foundation; and when its resources are investigated nothing is forthcoming. And yet there are people who claim to be intelligent who hold by Liberal theories and glory in their results.

That which hinders so many persons from obeying truth, from giving themselves up to it entirely, is the utter want of all tinsel peculiar to it. It is the destiny of truth to be developed with ever-increasing power; we grasp it in its early immaturity, and when the day comes that it shines forth in all its innate splendor it makes its way without our help, and all merit seems to belong to it alone. Those who have nourished it in its early beginning, and have watched over its progress to perfection, are quickly wiped out of the memory of men. This not a result flattering to vanity, and they are few who devote themselves to that which confers so little on their love of self. This is my confession of faith and my judgment on myself.

648. *May 27.*—I once more live in domestic happiness, as if I had never been without it, and enjoy it with true delight. Victor is much liked here; he is thought extremely well bred, which is a great satisfaction to me. Certainly his good carriage and pleasant manners strike one in comparing him with the other young men here. My wife's health is apparently much improved, and I put aside my fears for the future. Although I only see my family at breakfast and dinner it is the greatest comfort to me. Man is not intended to be alone, and those who assert the contrary are unhealthy either in mind or heart.

649. *July 2.*—I have been in bed for ten days in consequence of

taking cold. Four days ago I thought myself well enough to be up all day, which had the evil result of sending me to bed again for three days. To-day I feel the return of health, but I shall not be quite restored till the twenty-one days are over. I know by experience that so much time is needed when once fever attacks me.

650. *July 18.*—What a pity it is that the Queen of the Sea and the sometime ruler of the world should lose her salutary influence. What has become of the great and noble British Empire? What has become of its men and its orators, its feeling for right and duty, and its ideas of justice? This is not the work of a single individual, of one weak and feeble man; Canning is but the personification of the symptoms of the terrible malady which runs through every vein of the fatherland—a malady which has destroyed its strength and threatens the weakened body with dissolution.

651. *July 20.*—A letter from Palmella * informs me that his King is adored by his faithful people, and that he will reward them with a *charte à la française*. That which Palmella thinks of doing to-morrow, or perhaps even began yesterday, he has already attempted in Brazil. What he desires and is now doing consists simply in making use of the so-called remedies which our clever generation has discovered. His prescription runs thus: You see death before you, take poison, but our fathers said, You are poisoned, take an antidote. This kind of cure seems too simple in our day—that is, to a generation so flooded with light. There are, however, some very practical men, who know very well what our fathers knew—that poison is deadly; but this is the very reason why others recommend it to free from death. And who are these wise men who boldly place themselves on the standpoint of truth? The Radicals! I will do them full justice. I thoroughly understand them, and I much prefer people whom I understand to those who are not to be understood chiefly because they are themselves groping about in darkness.

652. *August 9.*—In the last few days I have sent off despatches in every direction. Everywhere there is confusion of ideas, weakness in carrying them out, and disgust for those who desire only the good, and for that very reason strive for nothing but the triumph of sound common sense.

* Count Palmella-Sousa, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, was expecting with impatience the moment when King John VI., who had returned from Brazil, should bestow the promised constitution on Portugal.—Ed.

The Emperors Francis and Alexander will meet at the beginning of October. The Russian monarch has invited the Austrian, who has accepted the invitation with the greatest pleasure. The Emperor Alexander desired that it should be kept secret for his sake, and for the sake of the cause which both monarchs look upon as their own. Great and extraordinary interests are bound up in this meeting. It will make much noise, like a gunshot, but only as a signal, not as a war cry.

My views regarding Turkey are different from those generally entertained. Turkey does not make me anxious, but France and Spain. Pozzo di Borgo will certainly not rejoice over the meeting. We shall at the most be eight days together, which is time enough for those who understand how to make use of it. It is not yet decided whether the journey to Italy will take place at the beginning or the end of the winter.

653. *August 15.*—Vienna is empty. Six rational people are not to be brought together. I say rational, not pleasant, people; for six pleasant persons is a number difficult to bring together in any country and at any time whatever.

For some years this day was, to me, always signalized by an effusion of Napoleonic temper: the blows of the great exile of St. Helena either fell on me or were dealt to some one in my presence. Years have passed away since those now famous days, but the power of the date is still so fresh that on each return of it past impressions return so forcibly that I feel as if I were placed once more where I was then so much against my will.

The Bonaparte family are having an answer written to Las Cases. Several of its members accuse him of lying and calumny. The fact is that with regard to the family it was not Las Cases, but Napoleon who lied, or at least said what his brothers and sisters did not like to hear.

654. *August 21.*—The meeting of the two monarchs is fixed for October 6. Of course I shall be there. The thing in itself, apart from the importance of what it includes, will have an effect like the firing of a gun of the first calibre. I am far from being a friend of noise, but if it cannot be avoided I endeavor to use it for positive and salutary ends. This is, too, under the given circumstances, part of my plan. My head is at work, and my blood boils. God grant that something may come of it, and that that something may be good.

655. *August 29.*—The mistaken steps taken by Villèle since Ve-

rona are quite explained by what he has done to-day. The measure is now full, and he will only add to the awkwardness of his position without attaining his object. The French, who are gifted with much imagination, think they can understand the Revolution because they have endured it. This is just as if a woman who has had several children should say she perfectly understands confinements. Both forget that there are two entirely different things—the fact of enduring and the art of assisting. There was but one single man in France who understood how to master the Revolution, and that man was Bonaparte. The King's Government inherited from him, not the Revolution, but the counter-Revolution, and they have not known how to make use of this inheritance. I judge of the Revolution more truly than most men who have been in the midst of it. It is with me as with those who watch a battle from very high ground. It is only from thence that everything is seen; in the midst of the fray the eye cannot reach beyond a given circle, and that circle is always small. From the mistakes which the French Government have already made in Spain, no one can say what the end will be: if it turns out well (which is possible), then it will be the good bursting forth and triumphing of itself over everything in spite of both friends and foes. This is my view, and experience will confirm it. France is to-day like a vessel on a stormy sea guided by inexperienced pilots.

I expect to leave Vienna on September 16, stay four or five days at my house in the country, go to Czernowitz on October 3, and return to Vienna about October 25 or 26.

THE JOURNEY TO CZERNOWITZ.

Extracts from Metternich's Letters to his Wife from September 25 to October 30, 1823.

656. From Rzeszow. 657. Arrival at Lemberg—illness. 658. Fertility of Galicia. 659. Detained in Lemberg. 660. Convalescence. 661. Arrival of Dr. Jäger—Nesselrode sent by the Emperor Alexander to Lemberg. 662. The unhappy situation of the invalid. 663. Nesselrode and Tatistscheff in Lemberg. 664. The town of Lemberg. 665. From Tarnow—Emperor Francis's regard for Metternich—a letter from Emperor Alexander. 666. From Neutitschein.

Metternich to his Wife.

656. *Rzeszow, September 25, 1823.*—I have arrived here a few minutes before the post leaves, and I cannot deny myself the pleasure of sending you news of myself and my proceedings. And good news too; I accomplished the journey most happily and quickly. The same day that I started I arrived at Teschen at eleven in the evening. Yesterday at nine I reached Bochnia, and here I am at Rzeszow at five o'clock. I shall leave to-morrow at daybreak, so as to be at Lemberg by eight or nine in the evening.

The country is quite different from what I had imagined. It is very beautiful and highly cultivated. The entrance into Galicia is mountainous, and is like Upper Austria; then comes the plain, enclosed and wooded and very pretty. What spoils the country is that Jews are met at every step; no one is to be seen but Jews: they swarm here. I travel with M. de Tatistscheff; I have taken him into my carriage, which he naturally prefers to his *calèche*. I hope you have all returned happily to Vienna, and that the cause which deprived me of the pleasure of having Victor with me has disappeared.

657. *Lemberg, September 28.*—I arrived here a little after midnight, after a very rapid journey. I stopped an hour at Lançut, which I saw thoroughly; then I took luncheon at Przeworsk. Lançut is a very fine country house in the style of Louis XV. Przeworsk is

simple but very pretty; it is not a *château*, but an English house, neat and pretty. Here I awake with one of those rheumatic feverish attacks which keep me in bed for two or three days without rhyme or reason. The doctor does not think my pulse bad, but I am in a continual perspiration. To-day I am better—that is to say, I perspire less. I shall, however, remain in bed for three days, to prevent a return of the malady. I can tell you nothing of Lemberg, for I have seen nothing. My house is very fine and well arranged.

658. *September 29.*—Yesterday I wrote to you from my bed; my indisposition (it has never been anything more) is passing away. The doctor has not once found me with fever, but merely a slight irritation which disappeared in the evening of the first day. I remain in bed, however, for two days; first to make sure of my recovery, and then to avoid being overdone with audiences, presentations, and *fêtes* of every kind. Potocka made a point of my passing the Rubicon. I only just escaped having to get up from my bed to be present at the ball, by means of the most vigorous protestations. For the rest, say nothing about it, for the poor people here are excellently disposed, but they are so thoroughly miserable that it would be difficult to know how to preserve them from ruin. This country is exceedingly productive, but it lacks all means of exportation, so that proprietors are literally almost dying of misery although up to the neck in superfluities. There are many parts of Galicia where a pound of beef costs one kreutzer; here it costs three. Two measures of oats cost a florin, Vienna value. One must not laugh at people so unhappy.

659. *October 2.*—I have not written to you for the last two days, for I have nothing to say but to complain of annoyances here. My health is a little deranged in the same way that has given me so much trouble sometimes in Vienna. Since the departure of the Emperor's physician I have seen the best doctor here. As my illness is more catarrhal than rheumatic, and as my eyes are also much inflamed, I have sent for a physician, a pupil of Beer and a friend of Jäger, who has done all that was necessary for me. My maladies, too, are all decreasing; you know I must always go through the *neuvaine*. My doctors declare that, so far as doctors are infallible, there ought to be nothing to prevent me starting on my travels again next Monday. You can understand how this accident annoys me. My illness is nothing, and I must take it patiently, for it seems to be part of my nature periodically to pass through

these crises. I only suffer from annoyance, for I have not even any fever; but business weighs upon me, body and mind. No one else can do what has to be done. and this thought is in itself enough to cause fever.

660. *October 10.*—I am now quite well, my dear, after having passed thirteen days in all kinds of illness. I now feel convalescent, and indeed I feel it so strongly that I must have been really ill. I was fortunate enough to fall into the hands of a straightforward, practical physician. I feel that he at once seized on the peculiarities of my nature, and especially on the singularities and anomalies caused by so trying a life. My illness was partly from cold and partly the consequence of the anxieties of the Congress. Now, to cure the first of these maladies is very possible, but I defy any physician in the world to cure the second; so that my nervous system fell into a state of febrile agitation. God has preserved me and raised me from my bed of suffering, and the interview at Czernowitz has terminated, or will terminate, just as I desired. The Emperor will return here on the 12th. Nesselrode will come to conclude the work with me here. It will be the work of twenty-four hours.

661. *October 13.*—Jäger arrived here this evening; he will give you an account of the state in which he found me. My health begins to recover from the shock it has sustained, and my recovery will be confirmed by the excellent state of affairs. I shall have some months without severe labor. Nesselrode arrived here last night; he was with me this morning for two hours. The Emperor Alexander sent him to me to obtain my "placet" to all the despatches. Far from refusing it, I was able to approve with all my heart. All this business, which I may date from my bed at Lemberg, will do honor to the two Emperors.*

All that Jäger told me of the family pleased me exceedingly; I assure you that good news will improve my health more than medicine. My malady was complicated by moral anxieties; consequently, moral remedies are the most efficacious, and none are so much so as news of your health.

662. *October 17.* I am most thankful for the oranges you had the happy inspiration to send me; I had tried every possible way to procure them here, but in vain. *Hier blühen die Citronen nicht!* Jäger found me already getting better. I was delighted to see him,

because he knows me so thoroughly, and his approbation of all that had been done by the doctor here reassured me. I am quite myself again now. My illness was one of those tiresome affections, catarrhal or rheumatic, which always send me to bed for ten days or a fortnight. In the usual state of things the inconvenience (for it is not a real illness) would have passed off as on former occasions. But just imagine my situation. Alone—the only man knowing anything of the business in bed at Lemberg, and the two Emperors *tête-à-tête* at Czernowitz. Two results only possible, immediate war between Russia and the Porte, or immediate peace; and I, holding peace in my hands, and alone knowing the means of securing peace, ill in bed! I swear to you that no common strength of mind and will was needed to keep me from giving way. I did not succumb morally, but my *physique* received a terrible shock. I was fifteen nights without sleeping, and I was on the brink of a nervous fever. Now I have told you everything. I am still weak, but as my appetite is returning I shall soon regain my strength. Heaven has protected me in the midst of these troubles and anxieties. I had so far advanced matters before the meeting took place that the force of things of itself brought them to a termination without me. Peace is secured; everything is arranged in a marvellous manner, and the triumph is complete. This is a blessing for all Europe, and particularly for me; it gives me some chance of the repose after which I sigh like a bird after the open air, and which has fled from me during twenty years of uninterrupted labor.

663. *October 19.*—The Emperor left yesterday. I am here with Nesselrode and Tatitscheff, busy with the numerous despatches that we have to send off to all parts of the world, and also with the nomination of a Russian agent at Constantinople. I hope, however, to be able to leave either this week or next. We learned yesterday the deliverance of the King of Spain; I await the particulars with curiosity. If this deliverance is complete—that is to say, if there is no defect in the armor—peace is given to Europe for some time; and the coincidence of peace in the East and in the West is not the least singular of these facts. I beg you, my dear, to arrange everything so that on arriving at Vienna I can at once go to my rooms. If God grant me six months of quiet, and I can pass them in a good climate, away from business, or at any rate not in its very midst, I think I should recover ten years of life and health.

664. *October 21.*—I seize a few moments before the departure of

a courier I am sending to Vienna to tell you, my dear, that I am going on well. My strength begins to return, my appetite is good, and I try to accustom myself to the air by taking a short drive every morning. This is the least I can do when I remember the nice little journey of 200 leagues which I must take as soon as possible. To-morrow I shall fix the day for my departure: it will probably be Saturday. I have finished my business with Nesselrode, who has gone this morning to rejoin his master. Tatistscheff leaves to-morrow for St. Petersburg, and I should like to rest two or three days longer. I was greatly tempted to leave on Friday, but I have relinquished the idea from respect to human nature. They want me to see the neighborhood of Lemberg. I have never seen people so in love with their native town as they are here. The road to the right is said to give a view like that of Naples; that to the left is like the Brühl near Vienna. A nearer view shows a town in a hole, and this hole wants both water and trees. The town is half fine and half ugly. There are many houses in it better constructed than those in Vienna, for there is some architectural style about them; then intervals either empty or crowded with barracks. The eastern aspect begins to make its appearance.

P.S.—I cannot tell you, my dear, how happy I am to leave this place; I am dreadfully weary of it. All my life I shall remember the month of October, 1823.

665. *Tarnow, October 27.*—I left Lemberg the day before yesterday. I slept the first night at Przemyśl, the same place where a month ago to day I had the ill luck to fall ill. Yesterday I slept at Rzeszów. To-morrow I shall make a very short stay. I shall sleep at Bochnia, the day after at Bielitz, a place on the frontier of Galicia. In all this I follow the Emperor's directions, for he wishes me everywhere to lodge where he has been. Consequently I am everywhere excellently well accommodated. I have the houses of the captains of the Circles. The courier who precedes me regulates the temperature of the rooms, so that I am everywhere as if at home. In Poland politeness requires that a room should be made excessively hot when prepared for a guest. The temperature was, however, moderated for me, to the great astonishment of the proprietors of the houses, who had been preparing to receive me, as an invalid, with a temperature two or three degrees in excess of what mere politeness required.

For the rest I cannot sufficiently praise the anxious kindness of the Emperor. He did not pass a single day without coming to see

me at Lemberg; he sat for hours by the side of my bed, or, after his return to Czernowitz, in my sitting-room, not to talk business, but to amuse me and chat about trifles. It was he who chose my physician at Lemberg, telling me he would have left me his own, but that he was convinced Dr. Massow was the better man. All along the road I found it was the Emperor who had arranged for my accommodation and given the most exact orders that I should be treated exactly as himself. Well as I had long known the true friendship of the Emperor, I confess that I should not have believed him capable of such delicate attentions. In the midst of all this some very odd things necessarily occurred, which I will tell you, and they will make you laugh.

When it was decided that I could not accompany his Majesty to Czernowitz, and I had chosen Mercy to take my place, I sent the latter to inform the Emperor. The Emperor, with his usual *bonhomie*, then said to Mercy, "We should make a fine embassy of that. I know but little of the affair; you knew nothing till yesterday. Between us we should make a miserable figure. If we cannot get on I will send the Emperor Alexander to Prince Metternich. He will do more with him in half an hour than you and I in eight days." Mercy could not help laughing, and the Emperor joined in the chorus. However, everything was arranged, and well arranged too. The Emperor of Russia, when he sent Nesselrode (who remained with me eight days to manage everything), wrote me a letter which was not that of a monarch, but of a friend disappointed of the meeting to which he had looked forward. I beg you to ask an audience of the Emperor, in order to thank him for yourself and for me for all the kindness and attention I have told you he has shown me. You will not mention the story of Mercy. According to my reckoning I shall be at Vienna on November 2 by dinner-time.

666. *Neutitschein, October 30.*—Here I am in Moravia, my dear—that is to say, in a civilized country, and so near to Vienna that the courier will be there in thirty hours. I have never seen anything more striking than the change from Galicia to Moravia. The country is the same, and is as fine on one side as the other; but the first village on this side is the first which gives the idea of being inhabited by men. No rags; the houses neat and the inhabitants well clothed; no Jews; no squalor, misery, and death. Two days ago, in a very low temperature, I saw peasants working in the fields with no garments but a shirt, and their children from two to four

years old sitting naked in the field their parents were tilling. I was inclined to cry out like the French soldier: "*Ah! les malheureux appellent cela une patrie!*" The first little Silesian I saw had a nice cap and frock, and was carried by his mother, dressed in a good pelisse with thick red worsted stockings and good shoes. I could have wept over the one and embraced the others.

RETURN FROM LEMBERG.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from November 8 to December 20, 1823.

667. *Vienna, November 8.*—I was very ill; certain external conditions so increased my malady that I should soon have arrived at that bourne from whence no one returns. A merciful God and the Emperor Alexander saved me, and everything went so well that my presence in Czernowitz, anxious as I was to be there, was not necessary. Everything is concluded and peace maintained; for which honor is due to the Russian Emperor, who kept his word to the Austrian minister. He was, moreover, endlessly good to me; he gave me proofs of his sympathy, not of the commonplace kind customary to monarchs, but as from one man bound to another by the same noble aims. For eight days Nesselrode was with me at Lemberg; he could not in everything take the place of his Imperial master, but he strove to carry out his intentions with that hearty loyalty we know in him. I am still weak and thin. My own physician, who has watched me since my return, tells me that the severe attack I have had is a proof that my nature is stronger than I supposed, but advises me to avoid all great efforts of the brain. The counsel is more easily given than followed. Happily the situation in general is such as to assist me.

668. *November 18.*—I have reassumed my usual habits, but I must still be somewhat careful. It is a real piece of good fortune for me that my convalescence and that of Europe advance with equal steps. I have not had so little work to do for a long time, the whole social body is inclined to improve. Many parts are already healthy; others are becoming so: those that are unhealthy share the fate of withered branches—they break off. The French Radical papers take the greatest pains to avoid the confession that they have been entirely mistaken: they are now trying lies and calumnies and prophecies.

669. *November 25.*—My lungs are still very much affected, and if they were not sound it might go badly with me. I still need five

or six weeks to make a thorough recovery. I should not require as many days if I could but fly over the Alps. My numerous ties, however, will not allow this, and it is a part of my torture to see the snowy mountain-tops and not to be able to get over them. The only news that reaches me is from London, and it is always the same. English diplomacy at present is careful to spoil whatever lies within its reach. People in London see so wrongly that they will go wrong there again as they have so often gone wrong before. But Canning's nature is still a very remarkable one. In spite of all his lack of discernment the genius which he undoubtedly has, and which I have never questioned, is never clouded. He is certainly a very awkward opponent; but I have had opponents more dangerous, and it is not he who chiefly compels me to think of him. This says everything. On July 18 Canning thought that the French expedition would miscarry. It has, however, succeeded; and then forthwith he represented the question, which had become a European one, as purely English, and, indeed, as an English triumph. At any rate he should not have allowed his despatch of July 18 to go forth.

670. *December 20.*—I daily ask myself wherefore Providence has sent me into the world too soon or too late. It is a sad lot for a statesman to have to fight his way among perpetual storms. The world enjoys a few moments of peace all the more from being exposed to continual storms, and I should have been happy in a time when I could have had an equal amount of both. Had destiny willed it, I could have fulfilled my part as a statesman, and with little trouble made for myself a name; but the course of my life has been amid gales and storms, and such adverse influences bend the body more than the soul. If I had been fifty years old fifty years ago I should have been a more imposing figure than I am now.

THE WURTEMBERG CABINET AND THE RESULTS
OF THE CONFERENCES AT VERONA.

Metternich to Baron Oechsner, January 29, 1823.

671. You are not, perhaps, sir, aware of the existence of a circular despatch which the Cabinet of Wurtemberg has addressed to its diplomatic agents *à propos* of that which the ambassadors of the three monarchs have received after the conferences at Verona. This document has only come to our knowledge through a copy sent to us from Frankfurt, since which its existence has been confirmed by the envoy of Wurtemberg at Berlin. Every courier brings us from different directions extracts from this despatch, and it will very likely appear immediately in some French or English journal, while the Imperial Court itself has never been officially informed of a matter in which it has so direct an interest. The despatch in question (No. 672) contains a serious attack against the three monarchs who signed the despatch of December 14 (No. 632), with a criticism of their transactions and their words; lastly, it contains a formal protest against the consequences which the political procedure of the three allied Courts might have on the independence of those of the second order. It seems to the Emperor that a manifesto so unexpected and so unprovoked cannot be approached except in the system and forms of that solidarity which, happily for the interests of Europe, is established between his Imperial Majesty and his august friends and allies. We shall, then, reserve our reply till we are able to act in concert with the Emperor of all the Russias and his Prussian Majesty.

Meanwhile the Emperor our master cannot hesitate a moment, for his part, to deny any portion "of the heritage of influence in Europe arrogated to himself by Napoleon." Nothing is further from the Emperor's thoughts than the claim to exercise any interference whatever with the independent States. Neither the conduct of his Cabinet at Verona nor the terms of the declaration furnish

the slightest pretext for such an accusation. All Europe has been a witness of the cares and efforts with which his Imperial Majesty has constantly met the torrent of general disorganization advancing so rapidly over peoples and empires. The Emperor's voice has not always been listened to, his advice has not always been followed; but his Majesty never expected that any Cabinet could find in his noble and pure intentions a project for interfering with public rights by disquieting innovations. Firm in principle and conscience, the Emperor is not accessible to injustice. A very different sentiment fills his mind; it is that of the most sincere and profound regret at seeing the finest of causes misunderstood by those whose lasting interest it ought to be to defend it.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Wintzingerode.

CIRCULAR DESPATCH OF THE WURTEMBERG
CABINET.

(Extract.)

672. *Stuttgart, January 2, 1823.*—You are aware no doubt that the Courts which did not take part in the Congress of Verona have just received official information of its existence, its objects, and its results.

It is important that your Excellency should be acquainted with the point of view from which your Court regards this interesting document.

Whatever may be the confidence claimed by the enlightenment and disinterestedness of the Powers who have inherited the influence Napoleon had arrogated to himself in Europe, it is difficult not to fear for the independence of the lesser States if this protection (*tutelle*) should be exercised by sovereignty less enlightened or less generous.

Certainly nothing could be more foreign to our thoughts than to dispute with the sovereigns who make so many and painful sacrifices to the maintenance of the monarchical principle (that palladium of civilized people) the right of watching over the welfare of Europe; but the means by which this *surveillance* acts seems to us to introduce principles more or less disquieting. Treaties concluded, congresses assembled in the interest of the whole European family, without the States of the second order being permitted to assert their views and make known their particular interests, the forms even with which they are admitted to the treaties and made acquainted with the decisions of the preponderating Courts, and the expectation of meeting with no difference of opinion in any of their allies—these different innovations in diplomacy certainly justify an express reserve of the inalienable rights of each independent State.

The causes of independence and the monarchical principle are both blended with the causes of Italy and Spain; the causes of humanity and religion with the cause of the Greeks; while the

cause of general peace, common to all, does not allow us to consider the objects of the last Congresses, especially that of Verona, as foreign to Powers of the second class: and all these justify our regret that we were excluded, and that the German Confederation was not summoned there, although two of its members were at Verona and the whole can hardly be subordinate to the parts. . . .

Comments on the Circular by Metternich.

1. No act, no word, of the three monarchs has authorized the Wurtemberg Cabinet to ascribe to them any intention of treating independent States as minors. Far from claiming to exercise any kind of guardianship whatever, these monarchs, even on occasions when their help was implored, have always respected, to the point of scrupulosity, the authority, independence, and rights of the legitimate sovereigns to whom they have granted their aid.

2. The monarchs have most certainly the right of watching over their own States, and inviting other States to follow their example; but this is a very different thing from a claim to the right of general *surveillance*—a chimera gratuitously imagined by men who make it their business to calumniate the monarchs.

As little have the monarchs introduced disquieting principles. They have introduced nothing, made no innovations; the only object of their efforts is to maintain public rights and individual rights as they at present exist.

3. The allied monarchs are reproached with "concluding treaties, assembling congresses, without States of the second class being permitted to make known their views and particular interests," &c.

If we go back to 1814, 1815, and 1818, there have doubtless been treaties concluded, accepted, and signed, sometimes directly, sometimes by adhesion, by all the European States. At these epochs the sovereigns, the founders of the Great Alliance, were considered by the unanimous desire of the Governments as the interpreters of their common interests, and consequently fully authorized to deliberate and treat in the name of the Governments. It would then be very extraordinary if after their having so many times testified the liveliest gratitude for the manner in which they acquitted themselves of this honorable task, they should be five years afterwards taxed with having done wrong in the services they rendered to Europe. Since the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle no general treaty has been either concluded or proposed. . . .

4. By what title, under what pretext, can the Wurtemberg Court claim to be admitted to the conferences at Verona? The affairs of Italy only concern the Powers which have treated with the Courts of Naples and Piedmont concerning the military occupation of part of their territory. France and England, though having plenipotentiaries at Verona, have themselves acknowledged that it was the part of those Cabinets who signed the conventions of 1821 to arrange with the Courts of Naples and Turin the measures which their own safety and the general state of Italy would allow them to adopt for the relief of the country occupied by the auxiliary troops. The questions relating to Spain which were discussed at Verona were entirely within the province of the Powers, who believed it to be for their own dignity and interest, as well as that of social order, to occupy themselves with it. Russia, Austria, and

Prussia were obliged to consult other Governments to know whether they ought to break off their diplomatic relations with a country convulsed by factions, or to determine what sort of engagements they were under towards France when France was menaced with war with that same country. What the Cabinet of Stuttgart calls *la cause des Grecs* was in the eyes of the monarchs who met at Verona reduced to an examination of the most suitable means for preserving peace in the East, a question which requires an exact knowledge, not only of the state of things in those countries, but also of the antecedent negotiations, and in which the ministers of the German States would have probably found considerable difficulty in giving their advice.

The Cabinet of Stuttgart expresses its regret that the Germanic Confederation had not been summoned to the Congress of Verona, "two of its members being there, and the whole can hardly be subordinate to the parts." It is evident that there was no more reason for the intervention of the *Corps Germanique* in deliberations on the affairs of Italy, Spain, and the East, than the States of which it is composed. If the monarchs assembled had intended to occupy themselves with the affairs of Germany, they would not have excluded from their councils the princes called by their position to vote in such questions. But this was not the case, and the circular of December 14 makes no allusion to the affairs of Germany.

5. The Cabinet of Stuttgart seems to have entirely forgotten the bases of the Federal pact of Germany; it seems to have forgotten that Austria and Prussia only entered the Confederation under the express clause of the preservation of their character of European Powers. The duties and dangers attaching to this last quality may dictate a course for which they alone are responsible, and in which, according to the Federal laws, they could claim neither the assistance nor the support of the *Corps Germanique*. In the case of a war with the Turks a great part of the Austrian territory might be invaded, without Austria having the right to regard the expense and the chances of war as common to the Federation. If Austria and Prussia had attempted to fetter the *Corps Germanique* by any stipulations, or to compromise the safety of its members by transactions to which they remained strangers, the Cabinet of Stuttgart would have the right to say that "the whole could not be subordinate to the parts." No such thing has taken place at Laybach or at Verona, and the spirit in which the allied monarchs have discussed European questions ought to ensure for them the suffrages of Germany, as it will sooner or later those of all Europe.

Metternich to Vincent in Paris

673. *Vienna, April 19, 1823.*—You know of the manifesto which the Wurtemberg Government has addressed to several of its embassies against the declaration of the sovereigns at Verona. This manifesto would doubtless have authorized the most rigorous steps, and if the principles of moderation from which we never depart, and our relations with the King of Wurtemberg as a member of the Germanic Confederation, had not deterred us, we should perhaps have at once followed the course prescribed by the general

situation and by the sacredness of our cause. But whilst we were deliberating with our allies on the common measures most convenient to be taken in a case so unexpected, the King of Wurtemberg, less struck, as I believe, with our displeasure than with the indiscreet applause of the "Constitutionnel" and other French journals of the same stamp, and dreading to be confounded with the avowed partisans of the revolutionary system, caused to be inserted in the "Stuttgart Gazette" a sort of retraction of his manifesto, declaring his entire adhesion to the principles proclaimed in the circular of Verona. This retrograde movement suggested to us the idea of a last attempt to recall, if it were possible, that sovereign from his unhappy errors. His Cabinet was told in the most conciliatory terms that the Emperor gladly accepted the declaration contained in the article of Stuttgart, but that, as a pledge of the sincerity of that profession, he demanded of the Court of Wurtemberg some slight but useful modifications of the course it had taken in Federal affairs, to the great detriment of the common interests of Germany. Not one of our propositions was admitted. After this last fruitless effort we have, conjointly with the Court of Berlin, decided on confining our future relations with the Wurtemberg Government to those subjects which we are to treat of at the Diet of Frankfurt, suspending all political correspondence, recalling our embassies from Stuttgart, and leaving there only subordinate officers for the expedition of current affairs. Knowing that his Majesty the Emperor of Russia sees and judges as we do of the reasons which have led us to this resolution, we are persuaded that this monarch will not be long in placing himself in a similar position to ours with the King of Wurtemberg.

ON THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN SPAIN.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, March 20, 1823.

674. Sir Robert Gordon has, within the last few days, received a courier, by whom he has been charged to make me acquainted with a despatch from the principal Secretary of State, containing questions on which the British Cabinet desires to obtain some light. Anxious to give this communication all the attention which the gravity of the subject demands, I have begged the English Minister to entrust me with Mr. Canning's despatch. In my reply I shall follow the order of that Minister's questions, and our explanations shall be frank and precise; they will thus be worthy of two Courts long intimately connected in relations as happy as they are fruitful in beneficial results to the whole of Europe.

The first question which the British Cabinet addresses to us touches on a declaration of neutrality on our part, which that Cabinet deduces from an article inserted in the Austrian "Observer" of February 5. Mr. Canning has, in consequence of this version, confidentially communicated to us many portions of his diplomatic correspondence relating to the great interest of the moment. He has taken occasion to express the hope "that the King's Government may be able to find in Austria a support for the efforts he is making to prevent an event (war between France and Spain) the consequences of which seem to strike the Imperial Government most forcibly."

The article in the "Observer" is clear and precise, and its object was only to destroy the game of a faction who, to bring about a fall in the funds, and especially in our own, had been endeavoring to make the public look upon a general war as the necessary consequence of any enterprise directed by France against the Spanish revolution. The emperor's political sentiments are too notorious for him to enter into explanations in a newspaper article intended for our public. He has considered it sufficient to give the lie to

the faction without entering into the dispute between the principles of preservation and destruction.

The idea of neutrality in this struggle is incompatible with our political system. Fighting for the same cause for more than thirty years, forced sometimes, by events too powerful for him, to suspend his action, but resuming it as often as more favorable circumstances allowed him, the Emperor could not declare himself neutral if a principle were in question on which the existence of his empire and the well-being of his people depended, a principle which we have never ceased to regard as the fundamental basis of the Alliance, and which, after a quarter of a century of storms and revolutions, has at last given peace to Europe, a peace which the Powers have maintained with a constancy and scrupulosity unexampled in history, and which has been troubled only by the odious attempts of the habitual disturbers of the peace of nations.

The documents which the British Cabinet have much wished to communicate to us were, according to the confession of the writer, conceived "with the object of producing a friendly arrangement between France and Spain." By taking this object into mature consideration we shall easily arrive at the point which it must be most important to the British Government to see determined between us.

Every action of France on Spain can only flow from two sources. It may be founded on the principle which we profess, opposed, as it will always be, to those of revolution; or it may spring from an exclusively French policy. France, in the first of these cases, would act in conformity with the principle of the Alliance; in the second she would deviate from it. In the first of these hypotheses, she would have every right to the support of the allies; in the second, Austria and the other Courts professing the same principles as ourselves would regard France as isolating herself, and by that very fact without a right to their support. The application of this reasoning appears to us simple, just, and agreeable to the honor and good faith of the monarchs.

In bringing forward the truths we have referred to, we by no means pretend to announce anything new to the British Government. We are too just and, I must allow myself to add, too enlightened not to have felt and appreciated on every occasion the force of local influences, and we must recognize the power which such influences may exercise on a Government: the history of Austria in the Alliance has furnished many proofs of our feelings in

this respect. It was after careful calculations of all these influences that we acted in 1821. It was by respecting these necessities, without, however, arresting their action, that the three monarchs have saved Europe from the irretrievable ruin which the Neapolitan revolution, the immediate and natural result of the Spanish revolution, had prepared for it.

As we were in 1821 so we are in 1823. We admit that the Spanish revolution may present itself in a different light to Great Britain and the Continental Powers. England may long remain in the enjoyment of peace and prosperity when the Continental Powers are given up to most real dangers. There are internal commotions, which act differently on States near the centre of revolution and those at a distance. Such is the case with the deplorable event which now occupies us. England sees in the Spanish revolution nothing but an ordinary revolution, the instrument which has produced this revolution cannot alarm a Government which, like that of Great Britain, is essentially more civil than military. The Continental Powers, on the contrary, see, and must see, in the Spanish revolution the means used to bring it about. As an army—unless they renounced the first conditions of their existence—was absolutely necessary to them, the disorder which has overthrown Spain is of the kind which poisons the sources and attacks the principle of life. The Spanish revolution makes much the same impression on the Powers as an event of the same nature might on England if it were headed by a few sailors attempting to give the armed forces at sea the right of imposing laws on the metropolis.

If, from this point of view, the two positions differ essentially, the question of 1823 presents another and not less sensible difference from that of the year 1821. We find traces of it in one of the English despatches. "Spain presents an aspect of peculiar interest to England." Setting aside the political point of view, we are as far from recognizing this reality as we should be disposed to deny that, in the natural order of things, the interests and the fate of Italy and Germany touch the interests of Austria more nearly than those of the Western Peninsula. Neither should we have interfered in Spain if Spain herself had not forced us to do so for our own self-preservation. We are not ignorant that the ill-disposed in that kingdom pretend that they have nothing to do with the affairs of any other nation. But if the most startling testimony had not risen in all parts to contradict this assertion, it only proves that the evil which devours Spain is of a character so contagious

as to cause of itself, and without any positive action, the unhappy effects it has undoubtedly produced in more than one country of Europe.

Acting as this does with such a positive force upon us, can we mistake its action on the most direct interests of France—a country immediately contiguous with the evil itself?

Does England consider the action of France as an isolated case of intermeddling on the part of that Power in the national affairs of Spain? Mr. Canning, in his despatch to Sir Robert Gordon, says, “The causes which now induce France to make war are of a nature altogether different to those which had been anticipated and provided for in the defensive stipulations of the proceedings at Verona.” It appears to us that it is necessary first of all to determine the meaning to be given to this observation. If it only refers to the distinction between a defensive and an aggressive war, which is always vague, and sometimes difficult to determine, it may be easily answered by France. But there is more than one direction in which France may depart from the ground of the Alliance, and from the moment she did so Austria would no longer place any value on a principle of moral solidarity which ceases to find its application.

The question is thus reduced to one point. Is France to act according to the Alliance, and consequently according to the arrangements at Verona, or is she to take an entirely different line?

In the first case, the allies are bound to come to her assistance; in the second, they would not feel themselves called upon to do so. In the first case, the Powers should certainly arrange that those of the allies who, in a given position, cannot act with a liberty equal to the others, should have the power of taking the course they may have already followed on a former occasion, without being exposed to any real inconvenience. In the second hypothesis, all the allies of France would be called upon not to allow her to reckon on a support which she would have no right whatever to claim.

The greatest of all dangers which could threaten the social body is undoubtedly any political war in Europe. Happily, we see no chance of such a thing unless from insufficiently explained positions. We are far from fearing that Great Britain will leave these questions in uncertainty; but if they are not yet distinctly stated, the effort should be at once made to determine them with the care which their extreme importance requires.

Austria flatters herself that she has contributed to this end by the

present despatch. While she believes it unnecessary to enter into new explanations as to her principles, she will never fail to express herself with sincerity and frankness on the application of those principles to objects directly connected with the common welfare of Europe.

Metternich to Vincent, in Paris, Vienna, March 23, 1823.

675. . . . Above all I must beg M. de Chateaubriand to believe, when seeking to know the opinion of our Cabinet in the grave affair of the moment, that the opinion which he heard me announce at Verona, the words and wishes which he heard me utter there, are those which we feel and profess to-day. Nothing is altered in our judgment on the Spanish revolution and the consequences, direct or indirect, which ensue from it both for the whole of Europe and France in particular. What we saw and said last November we see and we say to-day. If the Cabinet of the Tuileries has supposed the contrary for a single instant, or if it should still suppose it, it is, or has been, very much mistaken. The position of affairs is so grave that I should exceedingly regret such an error.

In expressing my feelings with so much frankness, I must at the same time beg M. de Chateaubriand to believe that we know the position of men and things, particularly in France, too well to wish or expect results incompatible with realities. This observation may be applied to the numberless embarrassments to which the French Government is exposed in the conduct of this most important and difficult affair. We understand these difficulties; we judge of them truly, and we deplore them greatly. The cause of France is that of Europe, even as the cause of Europe is that of France. This principle, which is our own, should be that of the French Government. M. de Chateaubriand is too enlightened not to recognize the force of this, and has declared it to the public and to us. The same principle does not seem to have been always equally apparent to his colleagues—a divergence which has been already the cause of much evil, and may lead to still further ill results. If I have expressed some uneasiness to you, and if I have not concealed that feeling from the French Ambassador at Vienna, it is because I am so thoroughly convinced that the welfare of all is connected with the carrying out of the undertaking against the Spanish revolution. It is not in my nature to keep silence when the first interests of the social body are in jeopardy.

I will not return to any of the subjects which I treated in my two last despatches. Great mistakes have been made; they have shared the fate of all mistakes. Some have been made since; they reached their height in the events of Madrid at the end of February and the beginning of March. It is not a question of recriminations; these never yet led to any good end, and I believe that M. de Chateaubriand is quite above them. The point is to come to some understanding on the necessities of the moment, and especially to provide for the future. It is to this end that the Cabinets should unite their efforts. I suppose the Cabinet of the Tuileries has been informed that the British Government has made an advance towards the Courts of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Berlin, in order to assure itself of the feeling of the three monarchs. . . .

You will find enclosed our reply to England (No. 674). Mr. Canning has grounded his action at Vienna on a newspaper article, and the choice is not happy. I am still ignorant of the bases on which he may have founded his proceedings at Berlin and St. Petersburg.

I flatter myself that M. de Chateaubriand will believe that our reply is both precise and correct. The affair has reached its third stage, that of execution. The passions are excited, for the attack has reached the evil, and its defenders are numerous. On the other hand, the more indecision there is in the policy, the more uncertainty about the parts to be taken and efforts for or against such and such definite results, the more the embarrassments will increase. In such a situation safety can only be found in the most open maintenance of perfectly correct principles. It seems to me superfluous to assure you that, whatever happens, we shall not deviate from our course.

Metternich to Vincent, Vienna, March 23, 1823.

676. The preceding despatch is for the eye of M. de Chateaubriand. You will therefore allow him to read it, together with the enclosures.

It seems to me difficult for M. de Chateaubriand to find any objection to our explanation to the British Cabinet. What we say is what we think, and agrees with what we mean to do. Always ready to maintain the principles of the Alliance by all the means in our power, we shall never support what is diametrically opposed to it, or what by an erroneous tendency could in any way lead to its invalidation. . . .

The whole of your despatch of March 11 proves to me that the new attempt to make a compromise, not only with the principles of the Spanish revolution, but with a faction which encourages that disorder, is entirely unknown to your Excellency. After having begged M. de Chateaubriand to judge of the conduct of his Government simply according to the discourse from the Throne and that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and desiring to throw no doubt on the loyalty of that Minister, I go so far as to admit that the attempt of which I speak must have been the work of M. de Vilèle, and that M. de Chateaubriand is ignorant of it. But what dependence can be placed on a Government whose actions can only be judged of leniently when they are to be attributed to the Prime Minister? . . .

The course of the French Ministry is difficult; we allow that, and have never doubted it. The difficulties with which it has to contend arise from two sources—one being in the unfortunate form of government, which favors evil impulses as much as it repels and makes difficult the employment of the remedies of this *régime* implanted in France, but foreign to the manners and spirit of the people of that great State; the second source of the evil can only be sought in the daily faults committed by the Ministers, and the mistakes into which they are led by personal considerations, by the activity of parties, and by their own inexperience. If the first of these influences is insurmountable, it should not be so with the second. What is to be done in the midst of such confusion? The three Courts must stand firm by their principles, and never lose sight of them for a single instant. It is clear to me that if they make the least mistake Europe may be lost. It is necessary to speak clearly to France, and this is what we have done, in terms of friendship and truth, in the despatch which you are charged to read to M. de Chateaubriand.

The fate of the plan arranged at Verona will be decided immediately. In the interest of the cause it should be so already, and by a resolute advance many embarrassments would be spared the French Government. . . .

The line which I have taken care to draw in my despatch to Prince Esterhazy between the two principles of action possible to France should serve us constantly for a guide. This is what justice and the most ordinary prudence require. To change the character of the plan made at Verona, by turning it into a means of consolidating and extending the influence of the Spanish revolution,

instead of attacking it, would be too great an error to be encouraged by those Cabinets which are free from the intrigues and embarrassments in which the French Ministry are placed.

I send you the answer which M. de Chateaubriand has addressed to Prince de Ruffo. You will see that it does not at all agree with what that Minister said to you. This explanation does not even in the least correspond with the spirit of the proposition of his Sicilian Majesty.* The French Cabinet is not happy in its interpretations.

It is not a mediation between France and Spain which the King of Naples proposes; yet it is as a proposal of mediation that the generous offer made by his Sicilian Majesty is treated in a despatch from M. de Chateaubriand to M. de Caraman. The intention of this Sovereign is simply to throw in the weight of his undoubted legitimate power with the legitimacy which we defend, and which France certainly has a positive interest in defending. The King can wish nothing else; the offer, then, ought to be unreservedly accepted by France, for it is in every way beneficial.

M. de Chateaubriand, in speaking to you, appeared to see the question in this the only true light. In his official reply he makes an affair of what does not contain the first elements of one. This does not surprise me; it is quite in accordance with the course followed by the French Government. It dreads control, and consequently sees it in every proposal, however right in principle and however favorable for the success of an enterprise which has already too many difficulties. Into errors of this kind feeble administrations constantly fall.

The fear of the Ministry at the idea of the Ministerial conference is derived from the same source. No progress can ever be made, however, in affairs without this means. I do not doubt that the Russian Ambassador will receive orders from his Court to insist on a measure so necessary and so salutary. The means of arriving at the end in view can only be found in the most scrupulous care to remove from what we call a "centre of information and decision" all that might make it a mere useless formality. Let the French Cabinet inform the representatives of the Powers of its belief, its

* The King of Naples had written to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and to the Kings of France and Prussia, an autograph letter, "by which, without yielding any of his rights, he offered to throw his weight into the balance in aid of the cause which his august allies were defending with as much frankness as firmness."—Ed.

desires, and its wishes. This can be effected by other means than that of an ostentatious assembly.

The Ambassadors can consult and agree upon the language they are to hold without the help of the round table. M. de Chateaubriand knows this, but as he does not wish for the thing, he rejects it under pretext of its form.

I beg you, sir, to be most careful in supporting the great interests with which you are entrusted. You will find the most perfect harmony with your colleagues to be the best means of doing so.

THE REGENCY IN SPAIN.

Memoir on the legitimate right of the King of Naples to the Regency in Spain.

(Supplement to No. 678.)

677. The most recent overtures from the French Cabinet bear on the following subjects:

It has announced to the three allied Courts its intention of proceeding, after the entrance of the French army into the capital of Spain, to the formation of an authority charged with the provisional government of the kingdom.

It has declared its intention of accrediting to this authority a diplomatic representative of his Most Christian Majesty, invested with the character of Ambassador.

It has expressed to them its desire that the three Courts will, on their side, accredit diplomatic agents to this same authority. It proposes that they shall also be invested with the character of Ambassadors.

M. de Chateaubriand has taken the initiative in the regulation of this service. He is of opinion that the representatives of the Courts to the Spanish Provisional Government at Madrid should be placed under the immediate direction of the ministerial conference at Paris.

The same overtures have been made to the embassy of his Sicilian Majesty at Paris.

The enterprise against the Spanish revolution, like all enterprises of this nature, has its three periods—of departure, of action, and of conclusion. In each of these it may either be promoted by the faithful and constant application of the principle which should direct it, or compromised and finally lost by the abandonment of that principle.

The first of these periods is passed; the second is now going on under the most favorable auspices: it is therefore the third with which it is the duty of the Powers to occupy themselves.

The monarchs, who in the whole course of their glorious alliance

have never approached any great affair whatever without being able to state clearly the final result at which they aimed, and have never supported any measure which was not directed towards an object clearly and positively determined beforehand, can only regret that questions of such importance as those which the French Government have just raised should be first proposed at a moment when they ought to have been already decided on and arranged.

In taking these questions into consideration one soon feels the necessity of reducing them to their first elements. Spain, or at least those parts of the kingdom freed from the yoke of the revolutionists, must be governed. It ought to be governed by national authorities, and a central Government should be charged with this function. These principles are simple and just. The French proclamations have sanctioned them; the overtures of the Cabinet seem to confirm them. Nothing, however, having been yet settled in carrying out these principles, it is necessary to ascertain the views of France on the following points: Whether the central authority to be established at Madrid should take the character and bear the title of a regency of the kingdom, or whether its functions should be limited to those of a simple administrative authority. In the first as in the second of these cases the powers of the Provisional Government could never leave the administrative and extend to the constituent line. According to the different accounts which have reached us lately from Paris, it appears that the French Cabinet are not agreed among themselves either as to the composition of the Spanish provisional authority or the forms in which it should be established. We have a right to be surprised at this state of things. Should not the French Cabinet have made arrangements concerning subjects of the greatest importance and most directly connected with the work it has undertaken? Can the success of the expedition have surpassed its expectations? We must be allowed to think so, considering the indecision which continues to reign in its councils.

Some indications seem to prove that if France has the formation of a regency in view, she aims at drawing it from the provisional administrative authority itself. How can such a plan be executed without a loss of principle, and, in fact, of the indefeasible rights of legitimacy? The monarch being captive, the nearest successor to the throne contains in his person, without any doubt, every right to the regency. In the present case the two princes, brothers of the King, share the fate of the monarch. The eventual successor

at liberty and the nearest to the throne is the present King of Naples. Could any arrangement concerning a regency be made without the direct concurrence of the regent by birth?

Our principles, and all sound theories of legitimacy, refuse to admit this.

The same principle seems to us to apply to the creation of a central provisional administrative Government, however it is composed. We cannot conceive that any authority for governing Spain during the captivity of his Catholic Majesty could be legally constituted without the authorization and direct concurrence of his Sicilian Majesty. According to our opinion, even the simple recognition of that authority by his Sicilian Majesty would not be sufficient to give it all legal rights. We know, too, that the King of Naples would not be disposed to agree to such a measure. This fact decides the question. The principles we have laid down are those of all the monarchies; they are especially those of the reigning House in France.

After the death of Louis XVI. the present King, then Monsieur, was declared Regent of the kingdom of France. In 1814 Louis XVIII. refused to recognize the validity of the constitutive acts of the only authority having an appearance of legality in France. What the King of France declared in 1793, and did in 1814, he must necessarily admit as right and just under similar circumstances. How is it that his Cabinet does not decide at once on those questions for which there are precedents, both French and Bourbon? How is it that he leaves to the Powers to whom he addresses these questions the trouble of deciding them?

There is a very simple explanation of this fact, an explanation which, perhaps, we should not give if particular circumstances had not authorized us, and, so to speak, forced us to recur to it. May not the French Government have tried up to this time to avoid placing itself on an entirely correct line, or may it not yet have renounced all possibility of making a compromise with the Spanish revolution, and terminating the difference, by means of an arrangement with those who have dragged the King of Spain from his capital? A fatal project, and subversive of the principles of the Alliance, but one that a Government which has been but too often in the position of making such sacrifices may consider to be merely what it is convenient to call the amalgamation of new interests with the old.

If the French Government could give itself up to such a plan, or

if it simply aims at conducting itself according to the circumstances of the moment, it should be the duty of the allies to avoid errors equally dangerous for the maintenance of the principles of legitimacy in Europe and for that of the sacred rights of the reigning House in France itself; for the conclusion which the French revolutionists and those of other countries would arrive at from such a grave error would certainly be of a nature to shake to its very foundations the legitimacy of the royal authority in France. These observations, both political and moral, are now concerned with a question of fact. The King of Naples has just declared himself; it is not, therefore, a question merely of reasoning, but of regulating that which, in the interest of the general cause and of all private interests, should be regulated and arranged. The King of Naples, in declaring that, by the imprescriptible rights of his birth, he regards himself as called upon to interfere in a direct manner in the measures to be taken in Spain, declares at the same time that in taking this part he believes himself to be acting in the interests of all legitimacy; that his ideas are directed simply to a salutary end; that, in short, far from wishing to raise difficulties in an affair so delicate, his wishes are confined to seeking means for turning the generous undertaking with which his Most Christian Majesty has charged himself solely to the advantage of both thrones and peoples. In consequence of this wish, the King requires that his incontestable rights should be thrown into the balance with the acts of France and his other august allies, and in no wise aims at dictating the course to be followed, but simply at consulting the Courts with regard to it. On these premises, therefore, all calculations should be founded, and it is to their application that we must look for the success of an enterprise which will ensure the definite triumph of the good cause against the subversive plans of the enemies of order in Europe. We have taken these data into most serious consideration, and we have arrived at the following conclusions:

1st. The decrees of Verona testify to the line which the Cabinets have drawn between the positions of the Powers. Thus a just and large part has been reserved to the decisions of France, to the entire liberty of her military action, and to the considerations of every kind connected with the peculiar—internal and political—position of her Government. The three allies, in declaring their moral solidarity with that Power, and in making engagements to unite in action, have one only condition to their engagements—an indispen-

sable condition, and one which they could not renounce without abandoning the fundamental principle of the alliance.

To reduce this to the most simple terms, France takes the burden of material action for the support of a cause common to the Alliance; the choice of means proper to carry out this action has rightly been left to her own discretion. But, that the cause may not be essentially altered, it was necessary that France should found every one of her steps on principles which the allies can acknowledge as their own. The French Government agreed to this; it could not do otherwise without ruin both to itself and the cause. That which was right at the starting-point must be equally right at the point of arrival. We are convinced, in fact, that the latter period requires as much or more care than the former.

2nd. The French Cabinet now demands that her three allies and his Sicilian Majesty shall appoint representatives to the Government to be installed at Madrid on the arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême in that city. This demand is made without either the ground of the formation of this Provisional Government, its legality, the mode of its composition, or the extent of its functions being arranged or defined.

M. de Chateaubriand, in the last demand he made concerning the immediate sending of a representative from the Emperor, expresses himself in the following terms:

“We expect that the Duke d'Angoulême will be at Madrid from the 20th to the 25th of May. It is very desirable that the diplomatic agents from the allied courts should arrive immediately afterwards, to recognize the Provisional Government and to treat in concert the grave questions which must be discussed there.”

Now, to recognize a Government one must know first of all what it is; and to enter into negotiations with it one must have recognized it. It is, therefore, necessary that we should know first of all what the Government will be.

Whatever it may be, the immediate arrival of the representatives from the Courts is no longer possible. This is not the fault of the allies; it is entirely owing to the French Government.

3rd. The authority created by the general-in-chief of the French army at the time of his entrance into Madrid must consequently be regarded even by himself as a temporary authority, whose functions will be subordinate to the installation of a regularly constituted Government for the government of Spain during the captivity of the King.

The Conference at Paris ought, without loss of time, to take into consideration the formation of this second Government.

This Conference, which should take place without the slightest delay, should bring together in a legal act all the measures to be arranged and concerted for the formation of the Provisional Government in Spain. The Powers not being able to recognize this Government until they know on what bases it is to be established, and if those which France proposes are compatible with the principles from which they never deviate, they ought, with as little delay as possible, to be instructed as to the proposed measures.

Metternich to Vincent, in Paris, Vienna, May 28, 1823.

678. . . . I herewith enclose a paper (No. 677) which contains, sir, in the most concise terms the principles you will have to bring forward and maintain in the deliberations which must precede the despatch of representatives from the Courts to the administrative authority to be established at Madrid.

The wise and generous work of France will be found to be established on the principles which the Alliance has ever since its origin considered as its fundamental basis—principles which were victorious at the time of the restoration of the reigning House in France, which have triumphed over the Italian revolutions and have for ten years maintained the political peace of Europe. It is the application of these same principles which alone can in 1823 effectually combat the revolution in the Western Peninsula. This truth once recognized—and it is with real satisfaction that we feel that it is so in France as with us—it only remains to consider the best means of bringing the matter to a happy conclusion; and it will be quite easy to come to an understanding as to the means.

His Sicilian Majesty raises his voice; his right to do so is incontestable, but to be profitable to the common cause it should be guided by prudence and kept within the limits of sound policy. That of the King of Naples will be so if it preserves the character of an intervention with the definite object of strengthening the action of France against the Spanish revolution.

Such is, we are convinced, the sole idea of his Sicilian Majesty, and it is on this basis that the Emperor feels it necessary to rest.

The King of Naples does not aim at creating difficulties; he wishes to lend strength to what would never otherwise acquire it. His Majesty puts himself second and the interest of the common

cause first. He desires nothing for himself, but everything for the cause. His conduct, therefore, is of the same character as all the decisions taken by the monarchs in the course of their alliance. . . .

I need not dwell here on the undoubted advantage that the concurrence of his Sicilian Majesty assures to France and to her allies in her efforts against the Spanish revolution. This advantage is as clear as the support of right and justice will always be, whatever the cause. But there is more than one political advantage that we do not hesitate to regard as directly connected with this position of things.

1st. The attitude of France, in her quality of an active Power, places her above the attacks to which she has hitherto been exposed. Unjust and—according to our conviction—criminal as these attacks have been, the French Government will only be able to withstand them by actions founded on universally admitted principles of public right. France can no longer be accused of acting merely in her own individual interest in recognizing the rights of a sovereign undoubtedly called to exercise functions temporarily withdrawn by unhappy circumstances from the King and princes of Spain. She will prove to everyone that the re-establishment of legal order in that unhappy country is the sole object of her efforts. The responsibility of the acts which the present state of things may require will not weigh on France exclusively; it will be shared by the Power whose intervention consecrates all that can be legally done in Spain during the captivity of the King. The Provisional Government will be then established on clear and correct principles, and the proceedings of France, which might have been taxed with ambition, will have all the value of generosity.

2nd. The immediate consequences of such a situation would not fail immediately to react directly both on Spain and on the Power which at one of the gravest epochs of modern times seems to abandon itself to the recollections of an ancient rivalry and a selfish policy as narrow-minded as it is false. Whatever may be the rage of the factions and whatever the outrages they commit, Spain will have her King. If in other circumstances than those in which Spain finds herself such a demonstration might appear superfluous, it cannot be so when a faction has even overthrown the order of succession in the reigning House. This is the case in Spain. According to the illegal constitution of 1812, the princesses succeed in preference to the more distant male relations; the succession to the throne passed, according to that constitution, to the Queen of Por-

tugal, and the advantage gained by the factions in such a case as that no doubt guided their calculations at the time they imagined this alteration in the order of succession to the throne. It is, however, not in this aspect alone that they regard it. Two other causes have contributed to their determination: one was the desire of proving that the limits of the present royal power, as well as the right of succession to that power, must depend on the good-will of the people; the other motive for the new order of succession was to prevent the nation amalgamating her dearest interests with those of the reigning House. To attain this end, what means more sure, in truth, than limiting the rights of this House to the chances of each generation, and, by calling to the throne a new family, bringing the faction to what must appear to be the very height of success? In a word, they thus make the future subject to mere chance!

I do not know how far these considerations have influenced the personal feelings of the King of Naples; they are of such importance in our eyes that we place them first in our calculations when seeking for the most decisive blows to deal against the spirit of revolution which threatens to engulf Europe.

3rd. There is no doubt as to the reaction on the British Government. As long as Mr. Canning guides the political affairs of that Power we cannot expect it to take a steady course; it is not in his nature. It is by placing herself in the most correct attitude that France will find the surest means of baffling England and furnishing to her allies the best means of repelling the sophisms and false pretensions of the rival Power.

The Emperor wishes, sir, that you should explain with the most perfect frankness the arguments contained in the present despatch both to the French Cabinet and to the representatives of the Powers. I send M. de Brunetti his instructions and letters of credence for the Provisional Government of Madrid. He is authorized to make use of the latter as soon as the decisions taken by the Conference at Paris unite the Courts in one principle of action.

Metternich to Vincent, in Paris, Vienna, May 28, 1823.

679. . . . I think it useless to repeat to your Excellency in a secret despatch the arguments contained in the various despatches, the use of which I leave to your judgment. At present the question is less of arguments than of a fact. The King of Naples has taken a part. It is dictated to him by a right which no one will

contest, and founded on an example set by Louis XVIII. himself. What the King declares cannot be invalidated; the point is, therefore, to make the best use of it. . . .

The fact itself is partly good, for—

It places the rights of legitimacy in a grand and new light.

It overturns with one blow the revolutionary constitutional edifice, for it saps one of its foundations and makes any surrender to that system impossible. . . .

Be good enough to treat this subject with extreme nicety and particular care in arranging the parts to be taken by the Neapolitan Ambassador and yourself. It is he who should maintain the rights of his master; it is he, again, who will assist you in bringing the French Cabinet to see that what the King of Naples wishes the King of France ought to wish, not only in the abstract, but because of the incalculable advantages which will result from it for his own position. . . . It is very important to show to Chateaubriand and Pozzo that the King of Naples has declared what he wishes, and that from that moment we have only to make the most of the favorable opportunities offered by his declaration.*

* The declaration of the King of Naples in regard to the Spanish Regency was not well taken in Paris; the Duke d'Angoulême appointed a Regency under the presidentship of the Duke d'Infantado on the entry of the French army into Spain on May 25.—ED.

THE ELECTION OF THE SUCCESSOR TO PIUS VII.

Metternich to Count Apponyi, in Rome, Vienna, June 20, 1823.

680. Your Excellency will have been for some time in possession of your letters of credence as Ambassador of Austria to the Conclave which is opened for the election of the successor to Pius VII.; and Cardinal Albani having accepted the offer which has been made to him in the name of the Emperor of intrusting him on this occasion with the secret of our Court, it only remains for me to furnish you with the instructions necessary to guide you in this important commission. This is the object of my present despatch, which I beg Cardinal Albani to regard as meant for him as well as your Excellency, and of which I beg you to send a copy to him immediately after the decease of the present Pope.*

The instruction which I am charged to transmit to you may be divided into two parts—that which treats of the forms and ceremonies, and that which embraces the principal thing. The first requires little explanation, because it concerns subjects which for the most part are regulated by custom, and on which the acts of the Embassy relative to preceding Conclaves will furnish you with the necessary knowledge. Two of these subjects, however, require particular mention. One is the harangue which you must address to the Sacred College on presenting your letters of credence. The nature of the place and the circumstances not allowing of a very long address, you must confine yourself to a short and precise statement of the object of your embassy and of the manner in which your Court regards the future election of the new Pope. When the Ambassador is charged (as is generally the case) to present at the same time as his letters of credence the reply of his Court to the letter of notification of the decease of the last Pope, the statement above mentioned is naturally accompanied by some

* Pius VII. died August 20, 1823.

words of condolence on the event, and of praise of the Pontificate which has just ended. That of the present Pope having been such that the Courts in general and ours in particular must sincerely regret his loss, not only is there no reason for your Excellency not conforming to this custom, but it would be advisable to strengthen that part of your discourse. The personal qualities of Pius VII., the strong faith and unflinching courage which he has shown in the midst of adversity and persecutions, will furnish you with a text, all the more happily chosen as in recalling these sorrowful recollections you can take occasion to render public homage to the conservative principle which alone can prevent the return of those epochs of grief and calamity and preserve Europe from new convulsions.

As for the part of your harangue making known the object of your embassy and the manner in which our Court regards the election of a new Head of the Church, it will be sufficient for you to assure the cardinals in a few words that his Majesty, in using the prerogative that belongs to him of being represented at the Conclave by an Ambassador Extraordinary, has no other end in view than of giving public and striking witness of his filial respect to the Church and the Holy See, of protecting the liberty of the suffrages of the cardinal electors, and contributing by the counsel and exhortations which he has charged you to address to them on his behalf to fix their choice on the individual most worthy of the tiara; that this is the one desire that animates our Court on the occasion; and that whoever may be the cardinal called upon to govern the Church, we shall sincerely applaud his elevation, and we shall rejoice with the whole of Catholic Europe if he possesses the qualities necessary for worthily sustaining so heavy a burden in the grave and difficult times in which we live.

The second of the subjects which I have said deserves particular mention is the nomination of the ecclesiastic who must accompany Cardinal Albani to the Conclave.

Canon Emiliani, who has sometimes been mentioned in the reports from the Embassy, and who was usefully employed in the last Conclave, might perhaps do; but as this is a choice concerning which I must depend principally on your opinion and Cardinal Albani's, I beg you, Count, to consult with his Eminence, so as to allow me to propose as soon as possible either Canon Emiliani or any other individual whom you may judge proper to fulfil these important functions. I am anxious to submit this proposition for

the Emperor's approval, and to make known to you the determination of his Majesty. . . .

I now pass to that part of your instruction which treats of the essential part of the matter.

I would observe to your Excellency, in the first place; that the joining of our Court in the affairs of the Conclave, without any afterthought and entirely in the spirit of the European alliance, can have but one object, that of influencing the election of the new Pope in a way useful to religion and the general interest of Europe. Free from private predilection for any one cardinal in particular, the Emperor simply desires to see a virtuous man ascend the Pontifical throne—one who joins to an enlightened piety a conciliatory spirit and moderate principles; who will, in short, be in every way equal to the grave and difficult circumstances in which he will find himself called to take the reins of the spiritual government of the Church and its States. Instead of the different parties which but too often have divided the Conclaves, his Imperial Majesty desires to see but one, whose views and conduct will simply tend to place the tiara on the head most worthy to wear it.

You see, Count, that the instruction which I am charged to give you is reduced to requiring you with all your power and by all honest and worthy means to bring about the exclusion from the Papacy of every cardinal not possessing the qualities above mentioned, and the nomination of the one who appears to you to unite those qualities in the most eminent degree.

But although a mission so honorable must strengthen the position of those who are charged with it, you cannot hide from yourself, Count, that, notwithstanding the advantages to yourself and Cardinal Albani, you will both need all your prudence and skill to enable you to attain the proposed end.

It would be judging very badly of the position of a negotiator instructed to influence the conduct and deliberations of a Conclave if one did not acknowledge that in the course of these deliberations, or rather of these manœuvres, where so many ambitions are roused, so much vanity has to be overcome, a thousand incidents may arise, a thousand aspects present themselves, which such a negotiator could not foresee. Now, if he has not the art of judging every day, every hour, of the true position of things, if he does not possess the talent of seizing opportunities and of penetrating the thoughts of those with whom he treats, he fulfils his mission but imperfectly.

If, however, there are for such a negotiator difficult situations, in which it is only of himself and the present moment that he can and should take counsel, there are also certain general rules of conduct, and some fixed landmarks, in the history of Conclaves, regarding which it may not be useless for me to say a few words.

Constant experience has proved that the formal and open exclusion which the Courts that have the privilege of sending ambassadors to the Conclave have the right to give to a cardinal decided upon is really inconvenient, and that almost always the above-named Courts, when they have made use of this right, have been injured by it. This consideration has determined his Majesty not to allow the employment of this means except as a last resource, and only then if in the course of the Conclave appearances of an election which it would be important for us to prevent at all risks should become so evident as to leave us no other expedient. In such a case your Excellency must not lose an instant in making us aware of it, and you must wait the further directions which it will be necessary for me to send you.

But I am persuaded that we need not fear things taking such an unfavorable turn, especially if the Crowns charge their respective plenipotentiaries to prevent, by indirect exclusion, the election of every candidate who, according to their common judgment, does not possess the qualities necessary for a Pope. . . .

A truth equally confirmed by experience is that the Sacred College does not see with indifference, or without a sort of umbrage, the intervention of foreign Courts in the election of the Pope; hence it follows that the surest means for the plenipotentiaries of the above-named Courts to exercise some influence in the election is to avoid making their intentions too apparent. . . .

You will consequently have to assure the cardinals on every occasion, as your Excellency will have already done in your harangue to the Sacred College, that his Majesty has accredited both of you to the Conclave simply with the view of protecting the liberty of voting, and, by the counsels and exhortations which you are charged to address in his name to the cardinals, assisting to place the tiara on the head of a Pope such as the honor of the Holy See, the interests of religion, and the tranquillity of Italy and Europe demand. This is the most ardent wish of the Emperor, a wish which will be amply fulfilled if the choice of the future Pope falls on a cardinal whose moderate principles and conciliatory and impartial character secure the confidence of all the sovereigns, and give them the cer-

tainty that they will find in him a father and a common friend, having an equal affection for all, and induced as much by feeling as by a policy worthy of the Head of the Church to establish concord and peace among themselves, and to support and second them in the noble design of consolidating concord and peace in the whole of Europe.

THE DISPUTED POINTS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE PORTE.

Metternich's Remarks on Nesselrode's Letter to Lord Strangford in Constantinople, St. Petersburg, May 7, 1823.

681. The letter from Count Nesselrode to Lord Strangford* states the reasons which have determined his Majesty the Emperor Alexander, notwithstanding his sincere desire of re-establishing as soon as possible his diplomatic relations with the Porte, to delay sending a Minister, or even a Chargé d'Affaires, to Constantinople. The grievances specified in the above letter give an opportunity for the following observations:

1st. "The arrangement by means of which the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia recently nominated by the Porte have been chosen from the nobility of these provinces is a change in the system of administration, a change which, as such, should, to make it legal, have been notified to Russia and received her formal assent."

The Porte will not admit without much difficulty that the rights conferred on Russia relating to the administration of the Principalities could extend to a question on which nothing had been decided in the treaties. It will answer to the objection of the Russian Cabinet that it has never been bound in the choice of Hospodars by any stipulations or rules whatever. But his Imperial Majesty having generously declared that he does not wish to insist on that objection, it would be useless to dwell longer upon it.

2nd. "The pretension of the Porte to establish a relation between the questions of the moment and one of the matters of negotiation anterior to the events of 1821 is considered inadmissible by the Emperor, and will never be recognized."

This pretension, in the present state of things, no doubt looks too

* Lord Strangford, the English Ambassador at Constantinople, represented Russia at Constantinople, as the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte were broken off. We omit this letter, as its contents are given in other documents.—Ed.

much like an attempt to pick a quarrel, and it is much to be regretted that the efforts which the ministers of the allied Courts have made to prevent this have not been quite successful. Nevertheless, thanks to their perseverance, they have managed that the article concerning the places on the Black Sea, with which this pretension of the Turks is connected, was not inserted in the official letter from the Reis Effendi to Count Nesselrode. As, besides, there has hitherto been no announcement that the ministers of the Porte regard the definite conclusion of this article as a condition which must precede the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, but that, on the contrary, they seem only to have brought it forward lest their silence on this point should have the appearance of abandoning their rights, it is to be hoped that they will be induced to put off this discussion to a more opportune moment, although it will always be difficult and painful whenever it is brought forward.

3rd. "The arrest of the Russian nobleman Villara at Bucharest."

In reply to the steps that we caused to be taken at Constantinople against an act of authority which, as at first announced to us, undoubtedly justified our intervention, the Reis Effendi has declared to the Internuncio "that this arrest did not take place on an arbitrary order from the Pacha of Silistria; that it was commanded by the Porte and justified by official reports from Bucharest; that Villara was not arrested for political offences, but for purely administrative offences, he having before the troubles in Wallachia filled the post of Grand Treasurer of the province and been guilty of fraud and embezzlement."

We do not yet possess sufficient data to enable us to judge correctly of such contradictory versions, except that many circumstances induce us to think that the Reis Effendi's version is not entirely without foundation. Be that as it may, we do not believe that this isolated fact, which appears to have nothing in common with the political amnesty, can be sufficiently important to influence the ulterior resolutions of his Imperial Majesty of Russia, and we flatter ourselves that this monarch, always guided by the highest considerations, will share our opinion on this subject.

4th. "The evacuation of the Principalities by the Turkish troops is not complete. They still remain in the provinces, although no extraordinary event or urgent need justifies the prolongation of their sojourn."

We are persuaded that if the Russian Court now had agents in the Principalities, it would see as we see the necessity of the pres-

ence of the very small number of Turkish troops who are left in these provinces. Public tranquillity is not yet firmly re-established, and some time must elapse before it can be, after such violent storms. The countries are, moreover, infested by bands of brigands and thieves, the usual inheritance of revolutions in uncivilized countries. Without the assistance of an armed force, however small, people could not with any safety leave the cities, and the principal roads would be impracticable. The Hospodars are not in a state to replace the Turkish soldiers by a national troop; their pecuniary means, very much weakened by late events, will not allow it. Also, far from complaining of the stay of the Ottoman troops, whose conduct, according to the unanimous reports which reach us, has been irreproachable up to this time, these princes themselves desire and claim the preservation of the last means which remains to them for the maintenance of order and peace. We shall communicate these observations to the Russian Cabinet, and we are sure that this enlightened Cabinet will feel their force.

5th. "The firman of the Porte for the establishment of a Turkish mercantile marine is of a nature to cause the most complete stagnation in the commerce of the Black Sea, and very sensibly to affect the prosperity of the Russian provinces situated on that sea."

The complaints of the Russian Cabinet against this unjust and absurd regulation are quite justified, and we thoroughly agree with them. Not that so chimerical a project—one for the execution of which the Porte lacks all means—can inspire us with serious alarm for the navigation and commerce of other nations, but it prepares the way for innumerable vexations, and many parts of the new regulation are incompatible with common rights and with the treaties and arrangements which secure the commerce of the Christian Powers in the Levant, and notably with the treaty of commerce between Russia and the Porte.

However, the very instructive and well-reasoned paper added to Count Nesselrode's letter has pointed out but two paragraphs of this firman which are absolutely inadmissible for Russia, and in truth equally inadmissible for the other European Powers interested in the commerce of the Levant. These paragraphs are: the fourth, which grants to Turkish ships in all the ports of the Ottoman Empire the privilege of unloading and reloading before all other vessels, which must not begin to load until the former have completed their cargo; and the ninth, which allows in future only the transferring of merchandise from a Turkish vessel to a Frank vessel, or

from a Frank vessel to a Turkish vessel, strictly prohibiting Frank vessels from transferring merchandise to another Frank vessel.

These two articles, establishing an odious monopoly in favor of Turkish vessels, vexatious and absolutely contrary to all the treaties, cannot be passed over in silence by any of the Powers taking part in the commerce of the Levant, and his Majesty the Emperor of Russia will never consent to them.

But as we are speaking of a regulation which has scarcely seen the light, which has not even been officially communicated to the foreign embassies, and which rather bears the impress of an improvised measure than of a well-considered ordinance, it appears to us that it would neither be impossible nor even excessively difficult to persuade the Ottoman ministers to sacrifice the two paragraphs in question, or to modify them in such a way as to satisfy the just dissatisfaction of Russia. These ministers, whatever may be the usual height of their pretensions, must do justice to the extreme carefulness with which the Russian memoir expresses itself on an act the object of which cannot escape the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and against which, nevertheless, it has only raised objections which were dictated by justice and the evident interest of the internal prosperity of Russia. They can no longer deny that in all these questions of navigation his Majesty the Emperor Alexander has given proof of a moderation and magnanimity very uncommon. Instead of insisting on the re-establishment of the advantages which Russia had enjoyed uninterruptedly for forty years, the Emperor contents himself with demanding that, by the admission of the ships of other nations trading in the Black Sea, or by some other arrangement leading to the same end, the commerce of his provinces on that sea and all the great interests connected with it shall be replaced in a position analogous to that in which they were before the commencement of the troubles. This demand is eminently just. The allies of Russia feel bound to give him all their support; and if the Porte sincerely desires a complete reconciliation with Russia, it must be made to comprehend the absolute necessity of yielding on an article which Russia will always regard as an indispensable condition of that reconciliation.

6th. "Russia cannot give up the alternative established in the *procès-verbal* of Verona concerning the affairs of Greece; she continues to regard it as an indisputable preliminary to her reconciliation with the Porte."

We have duly weighed and considered the difficulties belonging

to this question. Russia has declared that, in order that she should be quite satisfied concerning the fate of the Greeks, it is necessary "that the Porte should prove by a series of facts that it respects their religion, and that it seeks to re-establish the internal tranquillity of Greece on solid and durable bases." The Porte maintains, on its side, that this series of facts is established; that in the whole course of the recent campaigns not an act injurious to the Greek religion was committed, either by its agents or by its troops; and that it has never ceased to proclaim pardon and amnesty to those of the insurgents who submit to its laws. It is certain that, even admitting this apology, one cannot discover in it a promise of a final settlement of that deplorable struggle which has for so long desolated such an interesting part of Europe, and which, as long as it lasts, will threaten the neighboring Powers with complications, vexations, and dangers of every kind. Our numerous communications with the Russian Cabinet and our actions at the Porte have sufficiently proved that we second with our wishes, our suffrage, our earnest co-operation, any arrangement likely to put an end to this unhappy insurrection. We know that the other Governments agree with us, and that Lord Strangford would be particularly glad to be able to bring about such a desirable result. But how is it to be done?

The jealousy of the Porte in all that relates to the internal administration of its empire is extreme. In times even when it was most in dread of an approaching war with Russia, it has constantly declared that it would not allow any intervention of foreign Powers in the future regulation of its insurgent provinces, and it is clear that the most threatening demonstration will not induce it to renounce this language. But the ground of the difficulty is not only in these arrangements of the Porte. The insurgents, on their side, present insurmountable obstacles to all pacification. They absolutely disdain the amnesty which the Government offers them; their actions as well as their words every day show that they are far from wishing to lay down their arms until they have attained their liberty; they have not taken a single step showing any intention of submitting; they have replied to the amicable advances which have been made to them that they could not agree to speak of peace unless their absolute independence was previously recognized.

In such a situation nothing remains to the Porte, even supposing its intentions to be most conciliatory, most favorable to the insur-

gents, but the sad resource of war. It is not without the most sinister presentiments that we see the opening of a new campaign, the issue of which (unless by a happy accident an unexpected reconciliation takes place), must necessarily bring new complications and new disasters; for if the insurgents are victorious the war will be prolonged, as the Porte will never consent to their independence without being driven to the last extremities. And if the successes of the Turks were decisive enough to subdue the insurgents, they would be (from the very nature of a war between peoples almost equally ferocious) accompanied by horrors and catastrophes which would make humanity shudder. The Greek insurrection is, so to speak, entirely beyond the domain of diplomacy; it has become a question of fact, a problem which Providence alone in the depth of its wisdom can resolve. We do not see how, in the present state of the question, the Powers can, even by using all their means and efforts, change the aspect of it; and we maintain that Lord Strangford cannot be held responsible for not having obtained what is beyond all political power. His Majesty the Emperor Alexander, from his intelligence, penetration, and greatness of mind, will see this as we do.

In summing up what has been said in the preceding observations, we find that of all the grievances mentioned in Count Nesselrode's letter there are only two which admit and require the active intervention of the ministers of the allied Courts, the redress of which must necessarily precede the re-establishment of political relations between Russia and the Porte.

One is the pretension of the Divan to amalgamate with the affairs of to-day the subjects of an anterior negotiation—a pretension which the Porte must entirely abandon, contenting itself with the reply of the Secretary of State to the Reis Effendi.

The other is the new firman concerning navigation, which contains regulations inadmissible by Russia—regulations which the Porte must renounce unless it resigns itself to an indefinite prolongation of the absence of a Russian embassy.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Vienna, June 21, 1823.

682. I herewith enclose a despatch which the Russian Cabinet has begged me to pass on to Lord Strangford. Count Nesselrode having been good enough to send me copies of his letter to that ambassador, together with his communication to the Reis Effendi, I am

able to add to the Russian despatch some reflections suggested by desire for the success of an affair so important for the first interests of Europe, and the Austrian monarchy in particular, as is the state of tension existing between Russia and the Porte (No. 681).

It would be difficult for me not to deplore that particular circumstances have thrown doubt on the conduct of the Ottoman Government at a time when the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is called upon to make some response to the first attempt at a conciliatory step on the part of Turkey. The apprehension of Villara was not in reality accompanied by all the aggravating circumstances with which it was announced at Bucharest. But the fact is none the less to be regretted; and if it were necessary for the Divan to give proofs of the harm it does to its own cause by the daily errors it commits, it would find them in the unfortunate coincidence of this particular affair with the very moment when the Cabinets are eagerly seeking for means of reconciliation between the two neighboring Courts. Add to this the constant intrigues of the ministers of the Porte to impede commerce—of all things that which affects most directly the interests of Russia—and we may congratulate ourselves on the immovable principles of the Emperor Alexander, which have again resisted circumstances all the more deplorable because the evil they do to the cause supported by the Powers falls in the end on the Government which is blind enough to create them.

Count Nesselrode replies to the Reis Effendi in terms which, if they are properly understood, must satisfy the Divan. The Porte will no doubt complain that the arrival of the representative of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias at Constantinople does not take place. But can it infer from this fact any change whatever in the benevolent and generous intentions of his Imperial Majesty? This is a mistake, and it belongs to the representatives of the Courts friendly to both Russia and the Porte to prevent its too probable fatal consequences.

Lord Strangford, whom the flattering confidence of his Imperial Majesty of Russia has invested once more with the task of pleading a cause which we do not hesitate to regard as common to the whole of Europe—for this cause is the preservation of peace—is accustomed to hear the opinions of our Cabinet without reserve. He may well have some confidence in views which we have for more than two years brought forward with equal frankness both at St. Petersburg and at Constantinople. I therefore feel able to speak to him with perfect freedom, and I hope that this time too he will understand

me. It is not views peculiar to Russia that I undertake to develop and maintain; it is our own which I dwell upon in the present despatch. If he finds these views in harmony with those of the Emperor Alexander, this only confirms the fact that his Imperial Majesty, in his projects for an arrangement with the Porte, follows only the course most likely to lead to the pacification of two neighboring empires, and consequently to the general good.

We place the matter thus:

1st. That the difference which at first may have appeared at Constantinople to have been the result of some occult plan of the Russian monarch must now, even in a city so full of errors and false calculations, have lost the color in which it at first, perhaps naturally, appeared.

2nd. It may consequently be supposed that many of these prejudices no longer exist at Constantinople.

The whole truth is contained in the following facts:

An insurrection of the Greek subjects of the Porte has broken out. There are twenty reasons, either permanent or temporary, for this insurrection. Russia could have taken advantage of this deplorable event if the policy of her monarch had been directed towards that end. But on the contrary, this same monarch has, since the first day of the insurrection of the Greeks, given proofs to the least penetrating of his entire disapprobation of the whole thing. The Porte, whose interests are all concentrated in the re-establishment of its authority in the insurgent countries, has not succeeded in attaining this end during the last two years. The whole of Greece is still in a state of insurrection; she would doubtless already have consolidated her internal condition if her tribes had known how to govern themselves. The astuteness of the Greeks and the stupidity of the Turks have caused the failure of two maritime expeditions; and the want of provisions, the result of a total absence of order and foresight, has twice shut out the Ottoman armies from completing the conquests which they accomplished by the simple movement which carried them forward. New Ottoman expeditions by land and by sea are being organized. Will they succeed? It is for the future to decide. I cannot myself reckon on any decisive successes on their part.

What the Emperor of Russia desired at first he still desires. He offered to the Porte for himself and his allies to assume an attitude likely to influence the Greeks; the Porte not seeing in this offer what there really was, and seeking to find everything there was not,

the Emperor has not carried out his proposals. What might have been attained by vigorous and united action he has left to be solved by the future. This future (and almost a year has elapsed since his Imperial Majesty was called upon to assist the Porte) has not even begun to produce any real effects on the insurrection.

Who has done more justice than we have to the Sultan's moderation towards his Greek subjects beyond the insurgent countries? Who has been employed more than we have in trying to calm Russia's natural irritation, and in combating a faction too often increased by the excesses committed or tolerated by the Ottoman Government? We therefore consider that we more than any other Power have the right to speak the whole truth to the Ottoman Government, and not to flatter its errors. The more ready we are to take into account the moderation of this Government, the more right we have to oppose its errors.

3rd. Notwithstanding the imminent dangers with which the Porte was threatened, and in spite of the advice of friends, it would not hear reason, and the Empire of Russia having admitted the principle of waiting, a very simple policy should have made the Divan take the most active and prompt measures towards the submission of Greece. Nothing in its conduct (and I should not even except its recent maritime armaments) proves to me that the Ottoman Government does not take much more into its calculations the examples of the past than the needs of the present. Events will soon show us whether the military operations against the Morea, just announced, are of a serious character, or whether the Divan does not rather hope to see the insurgents yield from weariness of war. My opinion on the plans of the Divan leans rather towards the last of these suppositions.

What does the Turkish Government do in the meantime?

It injures Russia in its most direct permanent interests—those of its commerce.

It enacts measures which also impede and injure the commerce of other Powers.

It confines its policy to the mere desire that Russia should re-establish her ordinary diplomatic relations, without at the same time proving by its measures any sincere disposition to contribute towards the accomplishment of this wish. This is an accurate account of the present position.

I see, Baron, that you and all your colleagues at Constantinople are agreed with Lord Strangford as to the good which must result

from the immediate re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two Powers. I feel that I run the risk of being thought wrong by authorities which have great weight with me; my conscience, however, is easy. I defend the cause of truth, and the truth is that, whatever may be said for or against it, the sending an ambassador from Russia to Constantinople is impossible. The Emperor of Russia will not do it.

The Cabinet of Russia refuses the ambassador because it sees more in the affair than the submission of the insurrection. It attaches to the re-establishment of its ordinary diplomatic relations the idea of duration; it dreads seeing them compromised by the arbitrary measures of the Ottoman Government. It is therefore the friend and not the enemy of the existence of that Empire.

The point of view of the two Governments is essentially different. The Divan, accustomed to see in the Greek insurrection nothing but an intrigue of Russia, desires to defeat it. This calculation might have been reasonable some years ago; it is so no longer when his Imperial Majesty regards the revolt of the Greeks as a deplorable event and a cause of anxiety for the peace of Europe. The Emperor desires nothing but peace throughout the Ottoman possessions, and he should not be regarded as the rival of an empire whose existence has no more active support than the wise conservative policy of this monarch.

In such a state of things what can be done by the Cabinets friendly to the two Powers at difference? They should not waste their powers in trying to attain the impossible, but direct them towards possible means of conciliation.

In examining the chances of the latter I am inclined for my part, to place the Greek insurrection in the second rank of my calculations, and all my thoughts are concentrated on the most important interest of the moment, and that interest appears to me to be that of the commerce of Russia. And it is just this interest which Ottoman stupidity most directly attacks, and injures by measures not only unjust, but without real profit for the Porte.

The Ottoman Government appears to me to be following the line of conduct too often followed by private individuals in a state of bankruptcy. Knowing no longer how to retain possession of their fortune, they take to speculations which even if they succeeded could not save them from ruin. It is a calculation of this kind which makes the Divan fix its hopes on the merchant navigation of the Turks, a navigation which in the days of the empire's prosperity

did not exist, and which certainly cannot be created in a time of disaster.

Lord Strangford justly observes that the interests of Russian commerce can only be properly supported by Russian agents; the fact is indisputable, but cannot be realized while the Divan daily takes measures to prevent the arrival of these agents. They tell us all this will cease: that the ideas of the Divan will be modified by the presence of a representative of Russia; that affairs will regulate themselves as soon as he arrives and assumes his duties: but are these certain facts? That they may be so the Divan must prove that it is not deceiving itself as to its powers; that it ceases to raise obstacles to the reconciliation; that it is not losing time in useless regulations; that it will be just and humane towards its erring subjects, firm and just towards incorrigible rebels; that it seeks for reconciliation where it is really to be found. The Divan will reply that there is bad feeling at St. Petersburg; I retort the accusation, and with more justice. I do not assert that at Constantinople there is bad feeling, but so many mistakes are made there as to break in their very hands the weapons which the friends of the Porte were ready to use in its service. The Reis Effendi will say, "Let the representative of Russia come;"—he will come as soon as it is clear that he will not merely have the task of saving the administrative interests of his own country; he will come as soon as his duties can be regarded as the ordinary cares between two Powers at peace.

"Affairs will regulate themselves if the thing is tried!" I reply to this assertion, without even examining it, that the Emperor of Russia does not judge of things as they are judged at Constantinople, nor of the chances attached to the immediate appearance of his representative at the Porte, a thing he does not mean to begin as a mere experiment—an experiment which might so easily involve the risk that the recall of the Russian agent would very soon follow his appearance at Constantinople.

Count Nesselrode suggests to Lord Strangford the sending an Ottoman ambassador to Vienna. Lord Strangford and yourself declare that this idea is impossible to be realized; you are on the spot, and can judge of the Turks better than I can. What I say on this subject, therefore, is solely to destroy any false ideas concerning the object of this proposition. The truth is that the Cabinet of Russia desires nothing better than to enter into direct contact with the Porte. I have just shown you that the Emperor Alexander does not believe that this contact can take place yet at Con-

stantinople without grave risks. The Divan will be prevented from consenting to the mode proposed by puerile fears of combinations which only exist in the innate suspicion of the Turks. This idea occurred to his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias from his desire to come to an understanding as soon as possible with the Porte; it is thus that we constantly encounter difficulties where the interests of the Porte, properly understood, ought to aid us.

It does not become me to tell Lord Strangford what he should do to enlighten the Divan. I have the most perfect confidence in that ambassador, as he must have known for a long time. All that I can do I do. I tell him all I know, and thus furnish him with the only useful weapons for the good of the cause, and at the same time establish a fixed basis on which he can found his calculations concerning the intentions of St. Petersburg, and on this head I fear no contradiction.

RESULTS OF THE MEETING OF THE TWO EMPERORS IN CZERNOWITZ.

STATE OF THE NEGOTIATION IN CZERNOWITZ.

A Sketch for the use of the Emperor Francis.

683. The Court of Russia requires, as preliminary conditions to the re-establishment of her direct diplomatic relations with the Porte—

1st. A compensation equal to the injury caused to the Russian provinces situated on the Black Sea by the loss of the power which Russia has enjoyed for more than forty years of covering with her flag the ships of other nations.

2nd. The suppression or the modification of certain articles of the last firman on the navigation of Turkish vessels provided with a patent from the Government.

3rd. The cessation of the impediments and vexations lately exercised on Russian vessels in the port of Constantinople.

Besides these three points the Court of Russia particularly insists on the immediate and complete evacuation of the Principalities as a condition *sine qua non* of the re-establishment of her diplomatic relations. According to the last reports from Constantinople, these three points had been conceded by the Divan, and were being definitely arranged, in consequence of what had been settled in the conference which Lord Strangford held on August 30.

As for the evacuation of the Principalities, on which point Lord Strangford met with a stout resistance, it is to be hoped that the orders sent on September 13 to the Intermunio of Austria, insisting in the strongest terms on immediate evacuation, will have enabled that minister and the English Ambassador to force the Divan to make this last concession: and that the latter, informed by this time of the interview between the two Emperors at Czernowitz, will have had the sense to listen to our advice. The courier whom we expect

in a few days from Constantinople will inform us on this point; but even supposing that the Turkish Government still wished to offer any resistance, the way to prevent it would be a decided declaration, which could be made in the name of Russia by the English Ambassador and the Internuncio to the Ottoman Government, that if within eight days the evacuation was not concluded, diplomatic relations between the two Governments would not be re-established. This declaration, dated from Czernowitz, would not fail to have effect.

We are therefore authorized to regard the conditions on which Russia makes her diplomatic relations with the Porte depend either as fulfilled or on the point of being so. While this favorable result is being obtained at Constantinople the Emperor Alexander agrees in principle at St. Petersburg to the proposition which we have made to him to divide the negotiations opened with the Ottoman Porte into two periods; to re-establish his diplomatic relations with it as soon as it shall have satisfied the just demands of Russia concerning the commerce and evacuation of the Principalities; and to wait a more favorable time for the discussion of the arrangements relating to the intervention of the allied Powers in the re-establishment of the tranquillity of Greece. The Emperor reserved this proposition for more mature consideration after he had been informed of the result of the last steps taken by Lord Strangford. Now, this result being favorable, as we have just seen, it seems that nothing should now oppose the immediate re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, since Russia has obtained the concessions on which she had made it depend, and if she does not now show herself satisfied the suspicion will arise that she wishes for war; while, on the other hand, she will place us in a disadvantageous position at the Porte, since we shall not be able to claim any concessions beyond those which we have obtained, and which Russia herself had stipulated as the condition of the re-establishment of her diplomatic relations.

As for ourselves, we have in fact arrived at the end of the negotiation, and we have faithfully fulfilled all our engagements with Russia, offering her the means of terminating her differences with the Porte in a way suitable to her interests, her dignity, and the conditions which she herself stipulated. If, while pleading loyally the interests of Russia, we had failed in our efforts, we should have found ourselves in a very inconvenient position with regard to the Porte; but from the moment they are crowned with success our

intervention must cease, and if it does not entirely satisfy Russia we cannot go further without injuring ourselves and departing from the strict line of duty.

Count Mercy to the Emperor Francis, Czernowitz, October 7, 1823.*

684. According to what Count Nesselrode has told me, to whom, by your Majesty's orders, I have communicated the course recommended to him by Prince Metternich, your Majesty will be able to say to-morrow to the Emperor Alexander "that from the moment he is satisfied with the result of the negotiation confided to Lord Strangford and the Internuncio, who have obtained from the Ottoman Government all the concessions which the Court of Russia demanded as conditions previous to the re-establishment of her diplomatic relations with that Government, it will be as honorable as glorious for the Emperor Alexander to terminate this important affair with your Majesty personally by authorizing Count Nesselrode, his Minister, to write officially to Lord Strangford 'that his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias is satisfied with the result of his negotiations with the Ottoman Porte, a result all the more desirable as it affords a possibility of an early re-establishment of his diplomatic relations with that Government.'"

This spontaneous declaration of the Emperor Alexander would place that sovereign in the eyes of Europe in a position all the more honorable inasmuch as, considering the unfortunate illness of Prince Metternich, it would be attributed exclusively to the profound wisdom of his policy and the beneficent influence of your Majesty.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Lemberg, October 16, 1823.

685. The wise determination which the Porte has at length taken, after Lord Strangford's urgent appeals in the name of the loyal friendship and earnest desire for the preservation of peace of all the allied Courts, has met from the Emperor of Russia that reception which we expected from the high sentiments of that monarch. . . .

Strong in the hopes which we have never ceased to place in the equitable resolutions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and in the determinations of a sovereign always superior to secondary considerations, we now have the satisfaction of seeing that the more clear

* Count Mercy acted for Prince Metternich in the negotiations at Czernowitz when he was detained by illness at Lemberg.—Ed.

and precise explanations on the part of the Divan have been quickly acknowledged and kindly reciprocated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. At this moment we feel that we are fully recompensed. The triumph of the Emperor of Russia's moderation is complete; and this triumph is at the same time ours.

The determinations at which the Emperor Alexander has just arrived being all contained in the official letter which, by order of his august master, Count Nesselrode addressed under date of Czernowitz, October 10 (September 28), to his Excellency Viscount Strangford, I am anxious, after having consulted with the Russian minister, to furnish you with the enclosed copy * of this reply, as taking the form of a common instruction and as being eventually destined to serve as a guide for the co-operation of the representatives of the Courts of France and Berlin, after they have received the official communication from their Governments.

The official letter from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg includes all the points of litigation which had caused the interruption of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte. This important document must therefore henceforth become the basis of your action and form the only groundwork for every step you take. It will suffice for all that your position requires, and your task, like ours, will thus be much simplified.

In it you will observe, sir, that the article on the commercial relations, on which his Imperial Majesty has declared himself fully

* In reference to the important result of the negotiations at Constantinople, in which Lord Strangford represented Russia, information of which reached the monarchs at Czernowitz, Nesselrode wrote to Strangford as follows: "My august master charges me to inform you of his gratitude. He sees, with infinite pleasure, that in consequence of your efforts the essential matter of the commercial relations has been settled according to his wishes—that the Porte renounces the claim to deny the passage of the Bosphorus to the foreign ships which frequent the ports of our southern provinces; that all European flags will be admitted to the enjoyment of this indispensable privilege; that the transference of cargoes may be carried on in a way which ensures liberty and good order—that, in short, in consequence of your representations, visits of suppression, useless disputes, and mistimed and unjust rights being abolished, the passage of the Straits of Constantinople will no longer be an object of anxiety and the cause of constant commercial losses. The Emperor is firmly convinced, my Lord, that these fruits of your negotiations will be as durable as they are useful, and that having been able to induce the Porte to give a proof of conciliatory intentions, you will be able to exercise the same talent in preventing its return to a policy which must have isolated from it all the Governments of Europe and brought upon it the scourge of a general war."—*Ed.*

satisfied, is so definite and fixed in principle on the part of the Porte that, being accepted on the part of Russia, the cares of the representatives of the Courts may henceforth be confined to observing that the declarations of the Divan are exactly carried out, securing their uniform and regular observance, guarding the rights acquired by European flags, and preventing the rise of new grievances between Russia and the Porte on this score. You will observe, on the other hand, that if, in spite of our urgent remonstrances, the Divan still fails completely to satisfy the Cabinet of St. Petersburg by concluding the evacuation of the Principalities of the Danube, the smoothing over of this last complication in the direct relations of the two Empires seems to us the less doubtful as the solution is not only in the hands of the Sultan, but is for his own interest. The great value which the Porte must attach to the formal re-establishment of its diplomatic relations with its powerful neighbor will not allow us to believe that after such striking proofs of good-will and regard as those which it is receiving at this moment from the Emperor Alexander, it can doubt as to the complete return to the *status quo* before these differences with Russia occurred, or hesitate to give up the last traces of distrust and doubt and become thoroughly reconciled with all the European States.

This acceleration of the measures for the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia is the subject to which, sir, you will have to devote your chief care, duty as well as justice calling upon you to do so more particularly than the representatives of other Courts since, the possessions of Austria being contiguous with the two Principalities, we more than any other Power feel the inconveniences and the danger of the prolongation of temporary measures, now as entirely without object as without utility. . . .

As to the question concerning the re-establishment of tranquillity in Greece, this discussion must be entrusted to the collective intervention of the allied Powers, and I reserve to myself, sir, the power of sending you a special instruction on this subject, after I have consulted with the Cabinet of Russia. In the meantime I may beg you, sir, with us, to place full confidence in all the reasons for hope to be drawn from the generous determination of the Emperor Alexander to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Court, from the moment he is satisfied of the evacuation of the Principalities in conformity with the treaties. Count Nesselrode has been authorized, as you will see, to make known to the Divan "that his Imperial Majesty has resolved to make choice of a minister to Con-

stantinople as soon as he has finished his journey." The Emperor, wishing just now to give the Porte a public example of the moderation of his sentiments, has decided to send to Constantinople the present Councillor of State, M. de Minciaky, whose loyal and enlightened views we have frequently had occasion to praise, as you know; and by the present courier the ambassador of Great Britain receives from the Russian Cabinet a request to take the necessary steps at Constantinople to obtain the firman to M. de Minciaky, so as to secure to his mission the reception and the success which the Porte, more than any other Power, has urgent reasons to desire. Under such happy auspices, sir, you will hardly know how to support with sufficient eagerness and zeal the steps taken by M. de Minciaky, and you will also constantly unite with the ambassador of Great Britain in your intentions and conduct, as well as with the representatives of the Courts of France and Berlin, so as to cause the Sublime Porte to put a right value on a position so much in favor of its present interests and future hopes. We are desirous to forward to Constantinople the despatches from the Russian Cabinet, which I herewith send by the present courier. You will carefully forward them without the least delay, and be good enough to acknowledge their receipt.

CONFERENCES IN ST. PETERSBURG ON THE
PACIFICATION OF GREECE.

Metternich to Count Zichy, in Berlin, Vienna, November 13, 1823.

686. I have just learnt by a letter from Count Nesselrode, dated from Odessa the 3rd of this month, that the whole of the despatches sent from Lemberg on October 16 to Constantinople have been placed before the Emperor Alexander; that his Imperial Majesty quite approved of the arrangements which I made with his ministers, and that he has again consented that the affair of the pacification of Greece shall be previously examined and discussed between the allied Courts. In consequence of this determination, the Russian minister invites the Cabinets to furnish their representatives at the Court of St. Petersburg with instructions necessary to take part in the deliberations to be opened on this subject. I do not doubt that Count Bernstorff will have received the same instructions and the same overtures. It will also be necessary to address to the Prussian minister at St. Petersburg instructions with regard to the conferences which are to be held on this grave question, and it seems to me not only useful but indispensable that your Excellency should arrange confidentially beforehand with Count Bernstorff on the line we are to take when our turn comes in these conferences.

In the first place, I consider it very convenient in more than one respect that the first general deliberations on the affair of the Greeks should take place at St. Petersburg. I have every reason to believe that the Emperor Alexander will consider that a mark of attention in the singularly delicate position in which he finds himself concerning that affair. You know, Count, how men's minds are excited in Russia on this question, and how much firmness it has required to enable the Emperor to triumph over the agitation to which it has given rise. The more noble and elevated his conduct has been on this occasion, the more we ought to facilitate as far as possible the reconciliation of the public opinion of his country with his generous determinations. Now, it is certain that the choice of St.

Petersburg for the seat of the conferences will have a very favorable effect in Russia. This arrangement, moreover, has undoubted advantages. The pacification of Greece is a subject so beset with difficulties that it would be wrong for us to wish to take the initiative in the discussions to be held. It appears to me equally just and desirable that the Cabinet of Russia should take the initiative. When this Cabinet makes its first propositions to us, we shall be able to examine and criticise them; and when we see that what they contain is useful and practicable, we shall be able to form our opinion with much more maturity and weight than by forming it independently beforehand. This will be the object of our minister at St. Petersburg. He will be authorized to make, in the conferences to be held, observations which he may draw either from his own convictions or his general knowledge of the principles and intentions of his Court. But he cannot decide on the whole affair, or give any positive opinion, till he has informed us of the overtures made by the Russian Cabinet.

I presume, Count, that the other allied Courts will follow the same course; but I am particularly anxious that it should be approved and adopted by the Berlin Cabinet. Count Bernstorff is too enlightened not to understand the serious inconvenience which any other method of treating the pacification of the Greeks would involve. The personal dispositions of the Emperor Alexander are such that we need not fear being thrown by this question into new embarrassments and complications. But the least proposition on our side, if untimely, would have disastrous consequences, embroiling the matter instead of clearing it, and preventing the results so necessary to be obtained from these conferences. Count Bernstorff will not, I am sure, consider exaggerated the precaution and reserve with which I think it right to proceed in this business. Austria undoubtedly has more direct interest in it than any other Power. The numerous points of contact which we have with both Turks and Greeks, the geographical situation of our States of Hungary, Italy, Dalmatia, &c., the prosperity of our commerce and navigation, necessarily make us regard the pacification of the Ottoman provinces, as well as the future fate of all parts of Greece, as subjects of the highest importance.

I therefore dare to flatter myself that the considerations which guide me in this affair will be duly appreciated by Count Bernstorff, and that he will be ready to second a step which I really believe is the only one practicable to clear up the confusion of the

discussions which we expect, and to prevent new difficulties being added to those which are inseparable from it. I beg your Excellency to say to this minister that I request him, as a real proof of friendship and confidence, at first only to furnish his minister at St. Petersburg with general instructions, reserving to himself to approach the essential part of the question when we know the opinions of the Russian Cabinet. For my part, I shall not fail to render him a faithful account of mine, and to concert with the Court of Berlin on all the steps we shall have to take in order to bring to a happy end one of the most difficult problems which could occupy the attention of the allied Courts.

1824.

EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from January 8 to August 24, 1824.

687. Nesselrode's promotion. 688. Contrasts. 689. The Paris Conference not summoned. 690. Conversation with Wellesley. 691. The Emperor Alexander withdraws from politics. 692. Death of Consalvi. 693. Intended meeting of German ministers. 694. Alexander's fall from his horse. 695. English and Russian travellers in Italy. 696. Feeling in St. Petersburg. 697. Harmonious views. 698. Postponement of the journey to Italy. 699. Journey to Johannesburg.

687. *Vienna, January 8, 1824.*—I have plenty of news from all sides. In St. Petersburg everything goes well, very well. Many honors have been conferred on the occasion of the Emperor's name-day; among others, Peter Wolkonsky received the Grand Cross of St. Andrew, and Nesselrode has been promoted to the dignity of Privy Councillor. I was therefore quite right, that the ill favor into which the former seemed to have fallen was only apparent. I am very much pleased with Nesselrode's advancement, for I think it quite right that those should be promoted who do not put themselves forward. Nesselrode will now have more influence.

In London the Americans have gradually become very uncomfortable. Since Canning has seen that the Presidents of the transatlantic Republics can, with impunity, go much further in their liberal expressions than a member of the Cabinet of George IV. can venture to do, he is somewhat more reserved in his invectives. It sometimes happens, and that, indeed, in a very awkward way, that he allows expressions to escape him which wonderfully resemble the monarchical principle. This is an important step on which we may now reckon. Perhaps in no very long time we may hear from England more rigid principles about monarchy than from the Courts of the Continent. England, alas! will then only appear the weaker with all its severity of principles. It is to this that Lib-

eral ministers lead the countries which trust in them. The most sincere among the revolutionists are the Radicals, and if I became to-day a follower of the Revolution, I would to-morrow hold forth in Spitalfields.

688. *January 11.*—Never were there greater contrasts among individuals than in London. In London we find a movement and friction in intellectual life such as is found in few other great cities. In Paris one side chiefly is prominent, the more or less frivolous; there they take everything lightly as if nothing were of importance; the wind blows everything away. In England things and people are under another moral law, and matters which have no value and no importance in Paris, have it in London.

Italy possesses few men; there are, indeed, some literary men who are dull and heavy there, as everywhere else, in spite of the innate frivolity of their national character. In Germany everything tends to ideology, and a deep sleep lies on everything else.

What vexes me with the English is, that they are all slightly mad; this is an evil which must be patiently endured without noticing too much the ludicrous side of it.

What you tell me from Rome about Apponyi does great credit to your faculty of observation. He has certainly not the appearance of an intellectual, but rather of a good man; but he has more power than is supposed. Apponyi is an excellent envoy, who will never make a mistake, and who will fulfil the task committed to him with tact and discretion.

689. *January 18.*—A great error has been committed, in which I feel myself as white as snow, while all my colleagues are more or less besmirched. The mistake is this, that in spite of all my prayers, of all my entreaties, of all my exclamations, the whole time of the French operations in Spain has been suffered to pass away without summoning the Paris Conference. In Verona the Conference was resolved on, but there is a great gulf between a resolution and its execution. The French did not wish to be restrained, and Pozzo di Borgo, who is always consistent when it is a question of withdrawing from control, has from the first hindered the meeting of the Conference, probably with the idea that his words alone would suffice. From this has resulted a delay of eight or ten months, and at the present time all the Cabinets are occupied only with what should long ago have been settled and concluded, in order to be laid before the King after his recovered liberty.

I have the latest news from London. The most recent is that

Canning means one thing and his colleagues another, and that altogether neither the one nor the other properly know what they mean. In Paris things are much as they were, and it appears to me as if the two Cabinets were playing a game with dice. My position in the midst of this game may be imagined. I, who hate the unexpected and the false, have to contend with these two hostile powers, and have come to this, to desire for myself an out-and-out bad antagonist.

690. *January 23.*—I have had to-day a conversation of three hours with Wellesley; a straightforward man, to whom it now becomes difficult to defend his chief on all sides. Canning defends himself so badly that what custom still permits itself to call English policy no longer represents anything; uncertainty and vacuity do not constitute a policy, and a policy is one of those things least of all influenced by the self-will of an individual.

691. *January 30.*—I hear that the Emperor Alexander has entirely withdrawn from politics; it is well known how much he formerly interested himself in politics, and that if his influence was not always of a decided character it yet made itself felt. Wellesley regards him as an admirer of Canning. I do not believe this, and I find in the preceding fact a proof that I am not wrong.

692. *February 2.*—I deeply feel the death of poor Cardinal Consalvi; I esteemed him very much, and he felt himself much drawn towards me. He had an uncommon understanding and a fine temper, such as we seldom meet with; like an Italian, hot-blooded and vehement, he was yet full of deliberation, like a German.

693. *February 5.*—The journey to Milan is settled, although the Emperor will not give it out as quite certain. He sets out on March 20, and hence I shall not be in Milan before the first days of April. Up to that time I have to meet the German ministers somewhere in the neighborhood of their Courts; they expect me as a Messiah, and they have really extremely important questions to negotiate with me. There is such a concatenation of business in my life that it accompanies my every movement as chains do galley-slaves.

694. *February 10.*—According to my last news from St. Petersburg the Emperor Alexander is ill. By a fall from his horse he has seriously injured his leg. From time to time erysipelas shows itself on the wound, to which now fever is superadded. God preserve him!

695. *February 12.*—The English are everywhere losing their

credit, especially in Italy. Liberals there consider themselves deceived by the English, and travelling Englishmen are no longer regarded as men with Parliamentary influence. The other travellers who once did much mischief were the Russians. Three or four years ago Italy swarmed with them, and every individual of them openly preached revolt, though he gave it to be understood that he was no agent of his Government. Is it credible at the present moment that during the journey of the Grand Duke Michael, La Harpe, who accompanied him, was received in every city by a club of the Carbonari, to whom he promised the Emperor's support? When we consider the weakness and inexperience of Italian Governments, it is unintelligible how one stone has remained upon another in that unhappy country. If I may impute to myself any merit, it is that of having opened the eyes of the Emperor Alexander to the things and persons who surrounded him. I must now prevent him going too far in an opposite direction.

696. *February 21.*—We are now enduring an excess of kindness from some and self-appreciation from others. I have all my life had to preach to deaf ears; now people begin to listen because their eyes are opened. This is especially the case in St. Petersburg. Nesselrode rubs his eyes, pricks his ears, and shakes off a sleep which is not unlike tetanus. The Emperor Alexander now sees clearly—of that I have daily proof; unhappily, it is somewhat late. Couriers fly in every direction; it is a difficult piece of work, with the help of the pen only, to induce people to join in with equal steps when it would be so easy to remain behind. I am stuck up like a preacher in the pulpit of a church where two-thirds of the audience come in at the end of the discourse, and then want to hear all, which would have been so easy if they had arrived earlier. They want, namely, to hear again what I have neither the strength nor the desire to repeat; and this it is which makes my task so difficult and tiresome. I wear myself out, but do not complain if my efforts gain some advantage for the cause; but if this conviction is wanting, then indeed it is otherwise.

697. *February 29.*—More perfect agreement can hardly be imagined than that which now exists between us and St. Petersburg. And the cause of this agreement not being more perceptible is simply the obstinacy of one man.

698. *March 11.*—The Italian journey is put off till the beginning of September. Important reasons have led to this decision. One of them is, that we are now on such a good understanding with St.

Petersburg that it would be awkward to increase our correspondence by going to a distance.

699. *April 23.*—I shall go to Johannisberg about June 5 or 8, and intend to spend a month there. Under the pretence of paying a visit to my vineyards, I shall advance the great affairs (Nos. 721-725) which will come off at Frankfurt.

FROM JOHANNISBERG.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to Gentz, Johannisberg, from June 7 to June 30, 1824.

700. You will have heard from Baron Stürmer that I left Tegernsee on the 2nd instant. On the 3rd I started on my journey from Munich to this place, and on the 5th I arrived in good time on the spot. . . .

In Tegernsee I found Wrede, Rechberg, and Zentner all together. You know that I came to Bavaria with very little hope. I found the feeling here better than I expected. The age goes on so rapidly towards improvement that I found Tegernsee also much advanced. With Zentner, the man to whom I betook myself, it happened as it has done once or twice before. After an hour's conversation he was quite of my opinion. I was not to be satisfied with words, and manœuvred so as to obtain a paper written by Zentner, which, in the form of a proposal from Bavaria, contained more than ever I proposed to carry out in Frankfurt. Now my appetite has increased, and my journey will, I trust, have some results which will annoy your friend De Pradt still more than the pleasant results of the conferences at Carlsbad. Truth is a peculiar thing. You remember that after Carlsbad Rechberg was nearly accused of heresy. Now Zentner says that without Carlsbad Germany would have been lost, and that the greatest masterpiece was the Presidential proposal of September 20, 1819. The discoveries in the political trials which are now going on, discoveries which daily grow in number and importance, have a very favorable effect upon the Bavarian minister. The Government there are now in the same anxiety that I was in, but am no longer. The following is a fine story. The day that I went to Munich Wrede came running up to me, quite out of breath, to tell me that he had just got news from Anspach that give an entirely new character to the incendiary acts in Erlangen, which by this time have passed out of your recollection. "Just imagine," said Wrede to me, "the Ger-

man Republic is history. The individuals of the 25th Regiment complicated in the business have just made their confession. The youths of Erlangen proposed to republicanize Germany with the help of the students in the regiment, and incendiarism was the beginning of the business." The Constitution was prepared for Germany as a republic under an elective Emperor. The King and all the Bavarian ministers were to be deposed, Lerchenfeld alone and by name excepted. It may easily be conceived what a pleasant reputation this favor must give the German Republican minister! The young philanthropic incendiarists of Erlangen do us to-day a service for which we cannot sufficiently thank them.

I will now go to work with Münch and his party. What I settle here I will bring on my return to Ellingen, where the Bavarian ministers will again meet me, and where with their assistance I shall, it is to be hoped, conclude the league, so that we may be able to appear at the Diet in August. I will not to-day enlighten you with details; let so much suffice for you that the wonderful notion exists that I shall ground the present conferences on some of Zentner's ideas. The King commissions me to send his greetings to you. If he could have ventured to do so, he would have asked you not to be too liberal. The world is still in its infancy.

I have arrived here simultaneously with the rejection of Villèle's scheme of reduction. Simultaneously, too, Dorothea Dino* crossed the Rhine, and I have kept her by me for a leisure day. She knows Paris thoroughly, and was therefore very welcome. Her opinion is, that we cannot possibly determine beforehand what influence the rejection of the proposed motion will have upon Villèle's position. She judges the man exactly as I do, but knows much more of him than I do. That which will distress him most is that, in order to gain votes, he has spent millions. Dorothea says that we can form no notion of the profligate character of men in Paris in all questions concerning money. Everything prepares the way for a breach between Chateaubriand and Villèle. Chateaubriand has declared against the law, and the whole ministry reproach Villèle with knowing nothing about it till he introduced the draft of it into the Chamber. This is a pretty instance of joint responsibility. Between them it will be the end of Chateaubriand. From the account of Baron Vincent I see that Chateaubriand is

* Wife of Talleyrand Périgord, Duc de Dino, nephew of the famous Talleyrand. —Tr.

falling into bad health, and then he begins to caress me. Such caresses do not go for much in this world.

My news from England is of late date. Things there are not quite so bad. Canning is, in fact, in open conflict with his colleagues. Wellington's answer to my last letter I have received, and its tone is quite different from the first. Canning calls the Spanish note an excellent piece of work. He asked Neumann whether he knew the man who drew it up. Neumann answered that he believes it was Ofalia. "No," said Canning. "he is a foreigner." "Do you believe it to be Pozzo?" asked Neumann. "No," answered Canning; "Pozzo does not think and write so." When Neumann then declared that he could give no opinion about that, Canning said to him, "Prince Metternich must have drawn up the note;* it is too good to have been done by any one else; the King, too, at once recognized the style of the Prince!" You see that the infallibility of his Majesty is now quite demonstrated. You know that at Paris they have agreed to Canning's demand that the note should be simultaneously supported by the ambassadors of the four Courts. Just the opposite has been done in London. Polignac, without concert with his colleagues, has taken a quite isolated step, and received his isolated, almost coarse rebuff, and swallowed it. When the courier whom Pozzo had sent to Lieven arrived, the whole business was over. I am very curious to learn what impression this *coup de Jarnac* will have had upon Pozzo.

Canning meantime declared himself not only satisfied with the Spanish piece, but professed his readiness to agree to its good ideas. I shall now appear in London with confidence on a new basis, and I will enter into a discussion on these matters, utterly disregarding all forms.

In the Lisbon business England has behaved very well. The

* The Spanish note which is here mentioned is probably identical with that which the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs of that day, Count Ofalia, addressed to the Minister of Great Britain in Madrid. By this note the representative of England was said to have been persuaded to join a conference of the great Powers in Paris, for the regulation of the affairs of the Spanish colonies in America—Austria, Russia, France, and Prussia having already given their consent. The grounds which Ofalia developed were based upon principles which Prince Metternich had often enough defended against the policy of Canning; but the emphatic assertion of Conservative interests for Spain, for America, and for all Europe, in the mouth of a Spanish minister, may have led to the conjecture that the note in question was dictated by a foreign hand.—Ed.

last accounts from Constantinople and Bucharest are not very consoling to me. The rascals are really too stupid. By the next post I will send a despatch to Ottenfels. In this matter the Government at London is blameless. And now, having given you my account, and drawn it with a fresco-pencil, I take my leave.

701. *June 12.*—My business prospers well. The result will exceed my hopes and calculations. On the prospects in Bavaria I have written to you, and will to-day add nothing further, because I put this Court at once out of question. Münch will probably write to you that the works which I brought with me have both surprised and satisfied him. The King of Wurtemberg has just made an advance towards me. He sends me Herr von Maucier. I have taken a very strong position beforehand, and also in consequence of the proposal of the King to come to terms with me. If Maucier comes in consequence of my answer, the King must be very anxious about the settling of the matter. Dr. Linden is to be banished from Wurtemberg. People are now coming to me from all sides. Some are good, and ask for help; others are weak, and leave me strengthened; the third are bad, and wish to find out what is really at stake. The latter leave me as ignorant as they came.

I expect Berstett on the 14th instant. Hatzfeld has made a terrible clearance in Berlin. Münch calls him the moral Hercules. There the party has been violently handled. They have taken advantage of a temporary illness of Herr von Altenstein to alter his whole department. Bernstorff feels himself profoundly mortified, and Wittgenstein trembles whether it can come to good. The King appears to me to have acted like a man who only waited for an opportunity to lay about him on all sides. I expect Hatzfeld in the course of to-day. He has brought his family to Düsseldorf. Tatistscheff is in Frankfurt, and will be here to-morrow. Meantime Chateaubriand is breaking up, and this will make a great sensation at St. Petersburg, but only there. Who is to succeed him we do not yet know. Here I get news from Paris in sixty hours. The cause of his fall is on the one hand his complete nonentity, and on the other the stand he has made against the *rente* business. For the present I remain quite passive in Paris. In England the note has given much satisfaction, although they have answered to the conference "*honnî*." What Canning has said about it I have recently communicated to you (No. 700); now I am going to attack Canning for this, and I send to-day a courier to him, by whom I ask him to explain how he can reject as evil what he thought so good. I have

received from Wellington a very good answer to my last letter. I thank him for it, but say that nowadays words are so many nothings.

I cannot as yet judge of the impression which this change of ministry at Paris will make in England. At any rate, it may be rather good than bad. The *correspondance amicale* between these two enlightened chiefs of the Cabinet has come to an end, and so far this is good. Here you have my budget of news for the day. The weather at Johannesburg is gloriously beautiful. It was broken for two days by severe storms; the temperature, however, was constantly warm and steady. And the news are all so fresh and pleasant, that it is a true delight to the diplomatic soul.

702. *Johannisberg, June 21.*—I authorized Stürmer to let you read a despatch to Constantinople *sub volanti*, which I send to him. Ottenfels has on this occasion not shown good tact. How can he separate himself in the general impression from Strangford and Minciaky? The more he might wish that Russia might escape any lesion from such a relation, the more should he have associated himself with Strangford* in such a form, as that rights should be maintained. As soon as any one is placed in the position of having to choose between apparent generosity or unsatisfied rights the choice becomes very easy; and this so few men understand! I am convinced that the Emperor Alexander will never begin war for the sake of fifty or a hundred more or less Turks in the Principalities. I am also just as certain that he will never allow the Turks the right to have even one Turk more in the country than before.

P. S.—I have just received your letter of the 15th instant. You remark justly about Strangford's not understanding.† You see in this a new example how hard it is to guide the things of this world. Strangford is, moreover, so able a diplomatist that he should understand more easily than others.

“*Si vis pacem para bellum*” every one understands. Why? Because the saying is old, and has a classical value. This saying, and nothing else, have I applied throughout the whole history of the

* Strangford seemed as if he found the proposal of the Porte to reduce the troops in Wallachia to 1,000 men unsatisfactory, and that he must, in the name of Russia, insist upon the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. It is probable that this difficulty was also removed.—GENTZ.

† This refers to Strangford's exceedingly harsh judgment on the answer given by us to the Russian Memoir for the pacification of the Greeks.—GENTZ.

Greek affair, but only in the way of negotiation. These men do not understand.

I have filled my diplomatic arsenal, completed and trained my troops, not in order to come to war, but to prevent it.

The Emperor Alexander has said not a word to me of the march to Spain since I said to him, "We are agreed; the idea is glorious; but—how?" There are many things in this world in which the great difficulty lies in the *quomodo*.

I do not quite take your view of the reduction of *rentes*. I find the proposal neither unjust nor hard. That it has not been carried through is a purely party matter, and many consequences will result from this for France and the money markets in foreign countries, on which the opposition have not calculated, and on which they have laid no stress. For in France everything is a *question de personnes*.

The immense majority of the small *rentiers*, even those to whom the law appeared hard, convinced that it will be carried through, have sold their *rente* at par, or even above it; that is, they have gained about 40 or 41 per cent. on their capital. All these *rentes* have been bought by speculators, and amount to more than 30,000,000 francs. It will be a long time before they are sold again, and meanwhile they occasion much fluctuation in the funds. Villèle will scarcely bring on the question of reduction for discussion in this session.

703. *June 30*.—I had fixed the 15th proximo for my departure from this place, but I have made it a few days later, in order to wait for the answers from Berlin to my negotiations here and at Tegernsee.

On the 20th or 21st I shall go to Ischl, where I shall remain till August 14 or 15. I shall now send Prince Esterhazy to England, and will see whether I cannot deal a blow which, at any rate, will clear the ground. The thing is not altogether so bad. The Cabinet begins to rise against Canning tolerably well, and the South American affair is rather waning. The fashion has changed. I shall soon be able to tell you something very curious about this.

In Paris things are as I have just written to you.

Beyond the *salons* and the public journals there is no further question of Chateaubriand. In a fortnight, with the exception of the *Journal des Débats*, the journals will be silent.

In Spain and Portugal matters are in confusion. The convocation of the Cortes in Portugal is a very hazardous undertaking, and

is, moreover, entirely the work of the Ministers, who wished to shut out the Queen from the Regency, because they are certain not to escape the gallows if ever she become Regent. Whole volumes of the richest anecdotes about this Queen, as well as of the whole *incartado*, might be told to any one who cared for such stuff.

Say many pretty things to Wellesley from me, and that my hopes rise. That will please him. As the Parliament is now at an end, the affair will soon show itself. Have you ever seen such a masterpiece of many-worded nothings as Canning's answer to Macintosh's speech?

There is such a crowd of men about me that, if I do not soon go, I shall not know what to do with them. My table is generally laid for five-and-twenty, and I often have forty and fifty. In the evening there are a great many whist-parties. The weather is extremely warm when it is cloudy, and very hot when the sun shines. With the wine, however, it is all over. Good-by.

704. *June 30.*—To-day I will give you an account of the position of my negotiation in the German affairs, and at the same time claim your official assistance.

Enclosed you will find the paper which I took with me to Tegernsee, respecting the renewal of the decrees of Sept. 20, 1819.

It will be sufficient, instead of going into that negotiation here, to send you Zentner's paper (No. 722). You will see that I made use of the time, and brought out the good side of the Bavarian statesman. In my opinion Zentner's paper is far beyond what I expected. Impartially read and judged, we find in it admissions and words which are of a kind that we scarcely understand how the father of the Bavarian Constitution (the first defender in Germany of the representative system)—in a word, how Zentner could write as he has done. The key to this lies in the reciprocal action of the distress of the financial system of the Bavarian Government, and of the moral bankruptcy which the representative system has suffered in popular opinion. The ministry finds itself in the sad condition of confessing to the Assembly of the States which is to meet at the beginning of 1825, that it has exceeded the budget which it received with approbation six years ago by many millions, and besides has to deal with a yearly deficit of three millions. It needs but this fact alone to explain the pliability of the Ministers. The demand for a *présidial-proposition*, bound to maintain the principles laid down in the Bavarian paper, is quite Zentner's idea. At first I was recalcitrant, and then yielded. After this beneficent act received at my

hands I have taken it upon me to appear as a negotiator against Prussia and Baden, and to assert the superiority of Bavaria. Here it was an easy thing for me to come to terms with Berstett and Nagler. Now I come to your business.

I have through Münch caused a *präsidial-proposition* to be drawn up, and have specially bound him to retain, as far as possible, Zentner's words.

I pray you to revise this paper by Münch, and especially to make it pure in point of style.

This revised *präsidial-proposition* I require as soon as possible. If I could get it here it would be very advantageous. I have with this in view put off my departure from these parts till July 15; should you not be able to get it ready, the courier must be despatched to me on the Regensburg road, by Anspach, Ellingen, and Würzburg. At Ellingen, where I shall meet the Bavarian minister on the 17th or 18th, I must have it without fail.

I have now got Darmstadt in hand. About Wurtemberg I do not at present concern myself. In all probability (and the opinions of Rechberg and Berstett on this matter are still more positive than my own), Stuttgart will say yes to everything.

My apostleship, then, will not have been without use. But I will not wear myself out in this, but let myself be carried on by the stream which brought me here.

EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from July 2 to December 30, 1824.

705. Chaos. 706. From Ischl. 707. Visit to the salt-mines with Tatistscheff. 708. Plan for departure. 709. Visit of the Emperor Francis to Persenberg. 710. Returns to Vienna. 711. Loneliness in Vienna. 712. Wellesley. 713. Death of Louis XVIII. 714. The Eastern question. 715. False report of Metternich's going to Paris. 716. Metternich's health. 717. Court ceremonies. 718. Fain's memoirs. 719. Anecdote. 720. The Eastern question—conduct of Stratford Canning.

705. *Vienna, July 2.*—In the midst of this chaos, I am like a man who, standing on an island with the tide rising around him, is excused from remaining. I remain firm in my place. I do not throw myself into the flood, but wait, to see if it comes nearer or retreats. I call out to some persons to keep close to me, others I urgently entreat not to throw themselves uselessly into the water. All hear me, but no one will understand me; sometimes they urge me to leave my position. I do not stir from it, but rather labor to put stone upon stone, if possible to make my footing higher and higher.

I shall remain here till the 15th, then I shall go to the baths in the Alps in Upper Austria. I shall stay there three weeks, and get back again to Vienna in the middle of August. The journey to Italy will probably take place in the beginning of October, and we shall pass the winter in Milan. If this plan is carried out, I shall send my wife back to Paris for the winter, and in any case I shall send my son there to work at the Embassy. He has excellent manners, which is a great consolation to me in a life which has not many such joys.

706. *Ischl, July 31.*—I have been here since the 28th. The public journals, which do not generally pass me over, follow me step by step. If it were agreeable to the newspapers to know and say the truth, I would inform them that I have taken no step without a definite object or without a successful result. That any one of my

successful movements would give the editors satisfaction or pleasure, I take leave strongly to doubt. My life has become a kind of apostolate. I have not sought it where so many who have no call practise their evil doings. Probably this is the reason why so many opinions are opposed to mine. Everywhere there is a flock of true disciples, who await their pastor, and I can no longer stifle my conscience and leave them without having offered them spiritual consolation. This sounds almost like a kind of exaggeration, but objectors should accompany me only once on my journey. Then they would see that in every place where I halt, at every spot which I hurry by, a crowd presses towards me, surrounds me, gazes on me, smiles on me, and offers to shake hands. It is not to be believed that this concourse of men is only a consequence of curiosity like that with which a mob runs after a dromedary or an ape. Against this actual facts protest, for the groups remain not dumb spectators, but make themselves heard.

707. *August 13.*—Yesterday I made a long and very picturesque excursion in a region of the rarest beauty. I went both above and below ground; they took me down a deep shaft to a vast underground hall capable of holding 5,000 or 6,000 persons. There I found my name and arms brilliantly illuminated; this reminded me of the transitoriness of human things.

Tatistscheff was with me; he has little feeling for the beauties of nature, and prefers a political or professional complication to any sight to be seen. There are more people of this kind than might be supposed.

My health is excellent. The baths suit me very well, and I foresee that I shall come back here. The weather unhappily is variable and rainy, but the country is equally beautiful with or without clouds. The mountains rise like spectres, their tops illuminated by the sun's most brilliant beams, while the valleys lie in the deepest shadow.

708. *August 19.*—I start on the 23rd, but I shall not reach Vienna till the 27th, because I am going to spend two days with the Emperor on one of his estates. In two days I shall have been nearly four months without any intercourse with my Imperial master, which has not happened to me before in all the fifteen years in which I have had the misfortune to fill this place. Fifteen years of work is much in this life, and I am *senior* among my fellows. Prince Kaunitz's was the longest ministry. He filled his place for forty years, and attained the age of eighty-four. At seventy-four I

should leave as long a career behind me, but I shall not live to see it.

709. *Persenberg. August 24.*—I am with the Emperor in a real castle, which stands on high rocks in the Danube.

Nothing is more remarkable than the country residence of our Court. I am certain no one would believe that the Emperor can be satisfied with such homely arrangements, which are far beneath those of a wealthy landowner, not, indeed, sufficient for a well-to-do private person. The household and living are those of a quite poor gentleman. Everything in the slightest degree bordering on luxury is banished, and one has hardly the feeling of the enjoyments of homely comfort; indeed, it is this very self-denial which pleases the Emperor, and he thoroughly enjoys the little he has. He calls himself master of an insignificant *schloss*, with a few fields round it, and that satisfies him. This might disconcert the most Radical of Radicals.

710. *Vienna, Sept. 1.*—Summer seems to have come back again, and here I am in town. The most glorious sunshine lights up all the beautiful country I have left, and is so kind as to shed its splendors on this place. It seems that to pour out its stream of light costs it nothing. Happily my garden is open to its full power. As we have had so rainy a year the trees and grass are most beautifully green. The autumn flowers are in full bloom, but I do not care for them; they are like my age, and everything is uncongenial that reminds me of myself.

Yesterday an amusing incident occurred, which I must not forget to mention. Tatitscheff got a picture from Italy, which he thinks a Domenichino; whether it is so or not is immaterial. The picture represents a young John the Baptist; the saint is slightly draped with a strip of red cloth, and much more resembles an Amor than the Preacher in the Wilderness. Yesterday evening Tatitscheff received company. A tolerably well-known Polish man of letters went up to the picture, and looking at it very attentively, asked his neighbor, "What is that?" "*C'est un Dominiquin*" (French for Domenichino). "What!" cried he, "a Dominican never looked like that."

711. *Sept. 6.*—In a few days I shall go back to the Emperor in the country. The fate of my winter will there be decided. I shall advise him to put off the journey to Milan till next March, and I have important reasons for doing so.

Vienna is lonely and deserted. There is no one in the city except

the diplomatic corps. My only amusement is the Opera, which is all one can desire. Performances take place there which really charm the true connoisseur. I, at least, am often enraptured. The intellect and the heart, as well as the senses, are fully satisfied, and in that satisfaction lies the highest enjoyment. I fear that few people are able to enjoy it so much. It is more than mere pleasure, and would amount to blessedness if it concerned purely moral affairs.

712. *Sept. 20.*—I am very much pleased with Wellesley: he is an excellent man. He has a true eye for affairs, and puts full trust and confidence in one; but he is anxious, which seems to me very excusable. He would not be so if he were satisfied that all was right at home, which is not the case.

713. *Sept. 23.*—Louis XVIII. is dead, and there is nothing more to be said in the matter. What some years ago would have been a great event has now no significance. The world is nowadays so far better, that Kings can die undisturbed. The old King was a feeble ruler; if he had been a private gentleman he would probably have shared many of the errors of the age. Charles X. is different. He has heart and feeling, and if he had more firmness of character he would be a more than ordinary monarch—for without being a regicide I may be permitted to assert that there are *ordinary* monarchs. At any rate it is a happiness for Charles X. that he was not in the position of Louis XVIII.; he would have been ruined by the reaction of his return to France.

A certain Frenchman has made the remarkable assertion that one of Louis XVIII.'s services consisted in twice saving France from foreign invasion. So ridiculous a phrase shows extraordinary audacity. I expect that in some laudation of Ferdinand of Naples it will be said that he was a great ruler, because he twice saved the kingdom from Austrian invasion. Something of this sort might easily be said by conceited people, and long experience has convinced me that self-conceit is ever the cloak of insignificance.

714. *October 14.*—That miserable Eastern Question is again coming to the front. I am now engaged, as I have been for some time, in endeavoring to throw light upon the cause of the new complications, so as to bring them from the first into the right way. I talk to Wellesley with the greatest openness, and to Canning also, so far as it can help forward the cause.

The archducal marriage* was to have taken place on the 18th,

* The Archduke Franz Carl with the Princess Sophie of Bavaria.—Ed.

the anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, but is delayed on account of the illness of the Queen of Bavaria. As this ceremony cannot take place on the 18th, we shall replace it by another; we shall open the new Gate in honor of the day.

715. *October 20.*—The report of my impending journey to Paris is untrue; I am certainly one of the most nimble of the diplomatists in the affair, but still I should find it rather beyond my powers to go to congratulate Charles X. on his accession to the throne. Yet I will not say that I may not make an excursion to Paris at the time of the Coronation. But I speak of possibilities merely, which depend on so many circumstances that I cannot reckon on them beforehand. Beside this, the positions of the respective parties must be perfectly clear; in France there must be a great show of loyalty; I must not be entangled with the miserable Oriental complications, and England must renounce certain bad habits into which for some time she has fallen. I would come in an amiable mood to praise, and, if necessary, to encourage, but not to create anything new, or to reform everything. If matters prosper, if reason should again get the upper hand, I shall find means to make an excursion of a fortnight from Milan to Paris, in order to bring my wife thence to the Rhine. But will this come about?

716. *October 23.*—I feel wonderfully well. We have here an excellent physician, an Italian by birth, who met me the other day and said, “You look extremely well—that is, less like a scholar.” This is really a very proper expression. In this year I have consumed much pure air, my nerves are quieted, and I look less like a scholar—a very good description, in which I find but one fault: namely, that it represents me as still looking heavy and dull, if not quite so much so as before.

717. *November 3.*—I am in the midst of the Court festivities and ceremonies. The little, or rather the big bride (for she is taller than I am) is beautiful, and, more than that, she is engaging. I shall be still some days in this commotion. The King of Bavaria is a very odd man, very pleasant, but talks of everything and says everything. He was like a father to me, and watched over a great part of my education. I was much with him, and he still treats me as a guardian does his ward, calls me by my Christian name, and awakens in me memories to which he looks back more sorrowfully than I do.

718. *November 12.*—Fain’s “Memoirs of the Year 1813” are worth reading. They contain my history as well as Napoleon’s. Fain,

Bonaparte's secretary, has done his duty, inasmuch as he has reproduced his master's views in the best light. I have added to the work a few notes, which contain only corrections of importance.

I was obliged to win back political independence for my country. To this end two ways were open to me—either to desert from a now hostile camp, or to go on honorably. In the first case, we must have followed the example of General Yorke; in the second, we must exchange the part of an ally for that of a mediator. This I have done, and the results show that I was right. In this sense one must read the “Memoirs,” and specially the records quoted in them. Napoleon would gladly have seen us supporting his plans as allies; but what we refused to do at the time of his greatest strength, it would have been madness to grant in the time of his weakness.

The circumstances in which I found myself in the year 1813 were very difficult. The northern democrats, and, later, Alexander's liberal proclamations, did not make them easier. It was not necessary to appeal to popular excitement; calm and considerate statesmen would have completely succeeded in uniting patriotic feeling against a foreign tyranny which had become insupportable, without reference to the appeal of 1793 and 1796.

719. *December 14.*—On the occasion of the morganatic marriage in Berlin, which was celebrated with great secrecy, several very comical incidents occurred. Amongst others, General Knesbeck was invited to dinner the day after the marriage. He met there the father of the new wife, and asked one of his comrades, “Who is this new member of the order?” “Why, Count Harrach.” “And who is the Count Harrach?” “The father of the Princess Liegnitz.” “Who is the Princess Liegnitz?” “The wife of the King.” This roused the indignation of Knesbeck, who thought they were making fun of him, and this indignation was not allayed when, a little later, he learnt the truth.

720. *December 30.*—The way on which we are now going is very direct, and the only possible one. This privilege is owing to very uncomfortable circumstances. I make no pretension except to know what we wish. In St. Petersburg they would gladly do what they cannot do; in London they would gladly have that for which the will is not sufficient; and in Paris they do not rightly know what they wish. This is the true picture of the situation. For contemporaries this is not flattering, and for me not fortunate, considering the completeness of the *rôle* I had planned for myself.

Stratford Canning has behaved very well here; I have brought

him at every interview to see that I was right. Under all circumstances one must suppose that his cousin (Canning) must either unite himself with me or modify his views so that I may act with him, for I can never do what he does now, nor speak as he speaks now. He or I, one of us, must be in the wrong. Stratford is now on the point of starting for St. Petersburg. The question is, Is it wise to send him by Vienna? Do they want to convert us all on a sudden? We are too slow for that, and too well protected. The situation appears to me almost like that of a general to whom a command has been given, and who allows himself to be beaten before he has reached his head-quarters.

RENEWAL OF THE CARLSBAD DECREES.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Ischl, July 18, 1824.

721. As I have concluded the affairs which have brought me to Johannisberg, I take the liberty of laying the following report of my proceedings before your Majesty.

In the year 1819 the revolutionary tendency of a faction in Germany (supported in an incomprehensible manner, even encouraged by many German Governments) brought upon itself by one act the universal attention of the world. The Russian councillor Von Kotzebue fell as the first sacrifice. Your Majesty will be pleased to remember that even before the journey to Italy the political horizon was so clouded that it became a serious question whether the absence of your Majesty from Germany would be prudent. My opinion was that by this journey more was to be gained than lost, and I grounded this opinion chiefly on the feeling that the absence of your Majesty would deprive the German Government of its first and strongest support, and the danger of the position in which error and an inexcusable lukewarmness had placed them would have the effect of arousing their attention. My view was soon justified. Scarcely had we been six weeks on the other side of the Alps when the first communication was made from the Court which had thrown itself in the most decided manner upon the revolutionary path. Convinced that a first step must be followed by other and more decided ones, I answered the Bavarian Minister with great calmness, and with the expression of your Majesty's readiness to come to the help of your allies with advice and action on every occasion. The Kotzebue affair occurred in the meantime, and the votes gained in strength and number. Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse, all turned to us, and I proposed to your Majesty in the month of July my journey to Carlsbad and your Highness's return to Vienna, instead of the projected stay at Milan.

The Carlsbad Congress had the most happy results, far surpassing all expectations. It led to the confirmed conviction that the strength

and value of the Government measures depended far more on the correctness of their choice than on their number. Four decrees were passed at Carlsbad, a number which, taken in the abstract, could scarcely, from any point of view, be looked on as considerable.

The Diet was the supreme authority, but no arrangement was made for carrying out its resolutions. We accordingly planned at Carlsbad a provisional executive administration.

The German Universities, hitherto entirely left to themselves, had Government commissioners set over them as presidents.

All the journals and periodicals were placed under censorship.

A central court of inquiry into the intrigues of the demagogues was established at Mayence.

These measures, concerted at Carlsbad among some of the German Courts, obtained the sanction of the Diet on September 20. I then felt convinced that the moment was come to give to the legislation of the Diet the perfection and firmness which it still so much needed. It naturally appeared to me that this moment, on account of the widespread terror in all the German Government, was most favorable for extending the great work. I saw plainly that this work could not be accomplished by the legal jurisdiction of the assembly of the Diet. I felt myself sufficiently courageous for the undertaking, and I therefore arranged the German ministerial conferences at Vienna. The result fulfilled my hopes, and even some scarcely formed wishes. At the end of a few months the Diet received seventy freshly organized laws, which were agreed to unanimously. I then unfolded to the assembled German ministers my opinion that the organized legislation of the Diet could now be considered as perfected. The experience of the four years just passed has confirmed my view. The advantage which has arisen from the confirmation of this truth, and which becomes more apparent every day, is the general tranquillity of the German princes about their separate relations to the Diet, and the different effect of the Diet on each German State, a tranquillity which the free development of this salutary system could alone make possible.

The resolutions of the Diet of the year 1819 have not failed in their effect on Germany, and have acted more or less beneficially on the whole of Europe. If the alliance of the European Powers has shown how beneficially the principle of strength gained by the union of many for the general welfare acts in relation to politics, the example of Carlsbad shows the world that the union of

Governments for salutary legislative ends is not less possible, and is equally productive of results. The party whose aim is to disunite States as well as individuals has evidently received its death-blow. The truth of this assertion must be apparent to every impartial observer, for the great impression which the Carlsbad decrees made on this party, as well as the happy results which they practically had, cannot really be ascribed to the mere excellence of the laws of September 20, 1819—an excellence which they cannot possibly have in the eyes of impartial judges. Since the year 1819 the governing powers, especially in South Germany, have had to endure many hard trials from the representative government which they had introduced with such inconceivable thoughtlessness. Each one of the State assemblies has given proof of the melancholy truth that all governments introduced by themselves have been shaken to their centres, and that the evil ensuing has been incalculable. On the other hand, to the people the truth was clear that the promised good was an empty dream, a vain design, or an inconsiderate scheme projected by some few individuals in their midst. In the same proportion as light and self-respect spread amongst the rulers, loyal feeling awoke in the people.

Your Majesty may be pleased to remember that, soon after the fortunate termination of the expedition to Spain (the third revolution which in the course of two years has been crushed to dust and ashes), the Baden Court turned to us, and expressed the wish to go further into the matter, and by the united strength of the Government to find means to carry out some necessary reforms in the interior of the States. I still continued to tread with measured steps the path pointed out to me by my already fulfilled wishes. Constant to the principle that with men and States alike dependence is to be placed on the exertion of their own strength rather than on borrowed help, I believed I ought not to press further than absolutely necessary. In time and what it brings forth lay much good, which I endeavored to help forward, but by no means to anticipate.

I followed the advice which your Majesty had been pleased to give me of employing my attendance on his Highness the Grand Duke of Bavaria to obtain fresh information about the disposition of that Court. Your Highness knows that my hopes were not great of the Bavarian officials, but they far exceeded the reality. Without wearying your Majesty with the details of my negotiations in every place, I will hasten on to the results.

Your Majesty will find enclosed a work (No. 722) which I induced

Freiherr von Zentner to give me at the Tegernsee as his proposal. This work being pure in design and powerful in expression, I took it as the basis of my future transactions. I wished to compromise Bavaria so deeply in the matter that it would be impossible for her to turn back.

Your Majesty will find in the larger paper Baden's feeling on the Bavarian question. . . .

On the day of my departure from Johannisberg the Grand Duke of Weimar came to visit me. I immediately secured him.

Your Majesty will also find enclosed the Presidential proposition which had been already prepared, and which needs no commentary. I have grounded it on the work of the Bavarian Court, and only developed it more thoroughly. It needs now only the Imperial sanction of your Majesty. The German princes will take it without opposition, and agree to it thankfully.

With reference to its effect on the separate German States, I can only add that in the beginning of the year 1825 the next State assemblies will take place in Bavaria and Baden. At these meetings the Governments will begin the reforms originated by the late decrees of the Diet. In the reformed regulations, publicity of the transactions will be forbidden; the daily disregard of this has been the cause of great evil latterly. By this means the possibility of the necessary reforms is increased, and they will be made either voluntarily or by compulsion.

I beg your Majesty to examine the Presidential proposition, and to return it to me either with or without your Highness's remarks. After having your Majesty's sanction, I shall immediately have it copied and sent to Freiherr von Münch. I should wish to accomplish this not later than August 9 or 10.

METTERNICH.

I send back the papers enclosed, and you can now despatch the sketch of the Presidential proposition. Your exertions to maintain peace and order in the world have not been in vain. May God crown them with success!

FRANCIS.

Persenberg, August 5, 1824.

722 [The paper by Freiherr von Zentner on the extension of the Carlsbad Decrees is omitted as being uninteresting and almost unintelligible to English readers.—Tr.]

Metternich to Baron Münch, Ischl, August 8, 1824.

723. His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to return the sketch of the Presidential proposition, not only without objection, but with expressions of the greatest satisfaction with the whole work. Your Excellency can now proceed to carry out the business, choosing the day which seems to you most suitable.

With regard to the publication of the Presidential report, I am more and more convinced of its necessity. However much I agree with the principle of reducing as much as possible the number of publications at the Diet, it does not appear to me that this applies to a document of such great importance as the present. In this statement truths are set forth which cannot be sufficiently spread abroad, and the clear and direct language in which they are expressed will certainly not fail to make an impression both on the well-disposed and on the ill-disposed. Moreover, it is next to impossible to keep such a document long secret, the communication of which to all the German Governments, great and small, makes many copies of it unavoidable, and which is of such general interest that we run the risk of seeing it sooner or later appear in some mutilated or unintelligible translation in the French or English journals. For all these reasons I consider the publication of the Presidential statement not only useful but unavoidable, and I beg your Excellency immediately to take the necessary steps.

Metternich to Münch, Ischl, August 20, 1824.

724. From your Excellency's Report of the 16th instant I see with no small satisfaction that the Presidential proposition has had the success desired, and that its proposed measures have been accepted without opposition or alteration by the Diet.

Congratulating your Excellency and ourselves on this result, in which your prudent guidance has again been actively experienced, I hasten to place you in a condition to express the gratitude of our monarch before the conclusion of its session in reference to the expression of thanks to his Imperial Majesty which stands in the protocol of the Bundestag.

At the end your Excellency will be pleased to lay before the Diet, in the form you think most suitable, that—

From the resolutions passed at the sitting of the . . . his Majesty

has derived once more the happy conviction that among the enlightened German Governments the most perfect and happy agreement prevails upon those principles by the maintenance of which not only the security, the inner peace, and true well-being of the several States of the Diet are incontestably conditioned, but also the continued existence of the body which embraces all the power and interest of Germany. This conviction alone, long cherished and now confirmed, could alone have inspired his Majesty with the courage and confidence with which he has hitherto invariably advanced in all the negotiations of the Diet. His Majesty would also, further, ever continue in the same disposition, and esteem himself fortunate to be able on every occasion to respond to the confidence of his august brethren in the Diet.

What I have further to remark in this business, so happily terminated, I put off till I receive your further accounts, and till I return to Vienna.

Metternich to Gentz, Persenberg, August 26, 1824.

725. The reception vouchsafed to me by the Emperor was of a nature to delight me, and that particularly because it showed me the great value which he attaches to the Johannisberg business. To value anything so highly its essence must be perceived, and that the Emperor does most thoroughly. He said a few words to me on the general position of things in Europe which hit like a sledge-hammer; the nail is driven in right up to its head, and that is why it is so firm. Unhappily, I had brought to me a few hours ago the printed Report of the sitting of the Diet, and a French translation of the Presidential proposition from Frankfurt. I send you both without loss of time, in order that the German version may appear in the "Observer" as soon as possible.

PRUSSIA'S AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRIA IN GERMAN POLICY.

Letter of King William III. of Prussia to Prince Metternich, Berlin, September 29, 1824.

726. The results of the labors which have occupied you at Johannisberg* have given me the greatest pleasure. I thank you above all for having succeeded so well in assuring and confirming the most perfect union in the views and interests of Prussia and Austria. The more value I attach to this union the more I appreciate the trouble that you have bestowed on the matter, and I find the great esteem I have so long entertained for you only the more justified. Assuring you again of my sentiments, I am, &c., &c.,

FREDERICK WILLIAM.

Answer of Prince Metternich (without date).

727. The letter which your Majesty has graciously condescended to send me overwhelms me with gratitude for the justice which you render to the principles which direct my labors.

My life, Sire, for some time, has had but one aim—that of assuring, by my feeble efforts, the noble cause which the monarchs, for the welfare of the world, have sought to maintain. Your Majesty knows that at the very moment when I was called to the helm of affairs I based my policy on the most complete union between two States whose ever to be regretted errors had placed them in a rivalry which it seemed hardly possible for time to soften. My labors have been most happily crowned with the success which might be expected under the reigns of the Emperor and of your Majesty.

Allow me, Sire, whilst making this avowal, to entreat the continuance of that personal confidence without which I could do nothing.

Whilst asking this favor, your Majesty may rely on my remaining steadfast to the same line of action as that marked out by your Majesty and his Imperial Highness. As long as Prussia and Austria are united, and this union is clearly shown, every good thing will be possible to Europe. I am, &c.

* See Nos. 721-25.—Ed.

ON THE PACIFICATION OF GREECE.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, October 17, 1824.

728. The return of the Emperor Alexander to his capital will doubtless be marked by the consideration of the Greek affair between the Cabinet of Russia and the representatives of the four other Courts. I believe I should fail in a duty which the gravity and interest of the question imposes on me, if I did not employ the last moment which remains to us to establish a completely frank exchange of sentiments with the British Cabinet.

You know so well, Prince, our views and calculations during the unhappy complication in the Levant that it is unnecessary for me to enter into them at length. In your explanations with the English Ministers, however, you require to know our opinion relative to the position of affairs at the present moment, and I do not think I can explain these better than by the following sketch: The foundation of our intervention in this question has been from the first that of entire confidence in the just and elevated views of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia as well on his own position as on the question itself. Our confidence has been found to be justified by the progress of affairs.

Having arrived at a point where it appears necessary to state the matter in clear and precise terms, we have proposed the separation of subjects which have hitherto been confused. Evidently these subjects were, on one side, the injury to the treaties between the Porte and Russia resulting from the enterprise of Prince Alexander Ypsilanti; and, on the other, the insurrection itself. The Emperor of Russia, guided by his enlightened judgment, acknowledged our distinction to be correct. The other Cabinets accepted our point of view, and the renewal of diplomatic relations on the part of Russia was regarded as a pledge for the removal of the first of these difficulties.

The indefatigable labors of Lord Strangford, his character and talents, have enabled him to bring the affair to the first stage which

we and our allies with us had regarded as most necessary. It would be superfluous to recount here the endless obstacles which the blindness, distrust, and jealousy of the Divan had thrown in the way of a work so beneficial for the Porte. Even now the complete evacuation of Moldavia is not accomplished.

I am anxious that the British Cabinet should be convinced, as we are, of the urgent necessity that the Cabinets should all agree on the following principles:

1. With the resumption of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, the political part of the affair is concluded.

I will speak afterwards of the contested points in Asia. They do not interfere with my calculations in the least. The form in which this first and principal part of the affair was treated placed Russia on one side and the Porte on the other. The allied Courts found themselves between the two Powers.

2. The part of the affair which remains to be arranged is the pacification of the insurgent countries.

Diplomatic relations being re-established, the former attitude of the Powers is necessarily altered. Russia finds herself face to face with the Porte on the same line as her allies, and the allied Powers do not find themselves placed between the Sultan and his insurgent subjects, but rather they face them both.

3. What do the Powers desire, and what ought they to desire? They desire the return of internal peace to the Ottoman Empire. This wish is not grounded on an abstract idea of interference in the internal affairs of a third Power, but in their own interest, and for the maintenance of general tranquillity in Europe. The Powers do not here place themselves in opposition to the interests and rights of the Ottoman Sovereign. They are, on the contrary, convinced that they serve his interests and their own by a peaceful policy.

By establishing these positions, by regulating according to them the starting-point in an affair of extreme delicacy and difficulty, the Cabinets are strong with the strength of reason, and the weight of such a strength cannot be calculated beforehand. It is, in fact, on it that we rest our only hope.

There are still two very important questions to be examined.

The first is whether the Cabinets may not regard their intervention in the affairs of the Levant as terminated by the re-establishment of the ordinary diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte.

We do not hesitate to pronounce a most decided negative. The

insurrection of the Greeks in 1821 received its immediate impulse from the men of the hour. Crushed in its first principles, it would have shared the fate of the insurrections of Naples and Piedmont.

The whole of Europe, the public opinion of all countries, takes part in an affair which has acquired a general popularity. This popularity, we have no doubt, is the fruit of profound ignorance; but it has been nourished and increased by parties to whom men are nothing, and whose sole aim is confusion. It is still increasing by the concurrence of benevolent minds, always ready to yield to generous sentiments without having duly examined either the facts or the inevitable consequences of the illusions which carry them away.

If this disposition is more or less evident in the different States of Europe, it should have been quite otherwise in the Empire of Russia.

The merits of a sovereign who, placed in a position like that of the Emperor Alexander, has constantly maintained principles as prudent as they are noble, are all the more striking. To support the Emperor is a task imposed on his allies by justice and sound policy. His Imperial Majesty has given them pledges of his intentions worthy of all gratitude. Honor and duty compel them to serve the cause of the peace of Europe; this cause is that of the Emperor Alexander.

Austria, I need not say, does not run after business. If that of which I treat were free to be left alone or to be taken up, we should decide without hesitation to leave it alone.

The second question to be examined is that of the points in Asia which have been contested between Russia and the Porte since 1812. This question is, from its very nature, quite unconnected with the present affair. The labors of the Powers never have affected, and never could be expected to affect, the carrying out of all the treaties existing between the two neighboring Powers. By what right could the Courts have given such an extension to the intervention which they have exercised since 1821? Besides, far from raising any objection to the reservations made by the Russian Cabinet on this question in its diplomatic despatches, we have for our part constantly admitted and recognized them as just and useful. Affairs difficult in themselves gain nothing by being complicated by incidental questions. The Courts have never alluded to the stipulations of any treaties but those violated in consequence of the events of March, 1821. They have not generalized the princi-

ple; they have, on the contrary, contracted it within well-known and easily defined limits. What they have not done hitherto they ought not to do in future. The idea of mixing up Asiatic questions with those which are foreign to them is Turkish. It is wrong in every way—

Because it tends to amalgamate matters of a different nature;

Because it is merely a weapon seized from panic;

Because, in short, the claim on which it rests is inadmissible. The Divan claims that the efforts of the Courts of Europe since 1821 in the interest of Russia shall now be turned in favor of the Porte. But if we are conscious that we have done much for the maintenance of political peace in Europe, we are no less certain that we have done no more for Russia than for ourselves, and much less than we have done for the Porte. The advantages of peace are not for the strong Power; it is the weak Power which particularly enjoys them; and if the Porte acknowledges that the maintenance of peace with its powerful neighbor may be partly due to the influence of the European Powers, it must also feel that without that salutary influence it would have found itself between the guns of Russia and those of the Greek insurgents. In the face of this, to call the maintenance of peace a service rendered to Russia would be both erroneous and ridiculous.

The conferences will be resumed after the return of the Emperor to St. Petersburg. Our most sincere wish is that the Cabinets may agree with us in regard to intervention. I have marked it out with precision and clearness. If we are deceiving ourselves as to principles, we shall be truly thankful to be enlightened. What is beyond doubt is the necessity for determining the course to be followed in this affair, and that can only be done by means of clear and precise instructions to the representatives of the Cabinets called upon to contribute them.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, October 17, 1824.

729. I have in my preceding despatch, in an abridged form and official style, laid down the principles which we consider should serve as the basis of the next negotiation concerning the pacification of Greece. I have still to add some considerations which it would not be possible for me to do except in the most confidential form.

The British Cabinet will share our conviction that in the affair which awaits us there are two evident and incontestable truths.

One is that good faith and the most perfect candor should preside over all the steps taken by the Powers; the other that, seeing the position of things and the character of the men who have to be gained over by reasonable and pacific words, this attempt, however well prepared and executed it may be, offers but slight chance of success.

The affair must, nevertheless, be attempted, because, if it is not, the Emperor of Russia cannot be delivered from the powerful and dangerous influences which, notwithstanding the wisdom and purity of his intentions, would cause a breach between Russia and the Porte. I much desire that the British Cabinet should attach the same value as we do to the classification of subjects made by us in our explanations with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg: namely, that whenever the first part of the long and complicated negotiation which has occupied us for three years—that part which we call political—is terminated by the fact of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two neighboring empires, Russia should regard herself as re-enrolled in the ranks of the allies, and placed on the same line with them. This formality—and it is much more than a purely logical distinction—connects Russia with the party; it serves and strengthens the moral attitude of its monarch; it offers and secures to him the power of moderating the natural impulse of the different classes of the Russian nation in favor of a rupture with the Porte.

We do not conceal from ourselves that it is more than doubtful whether the pacification of Greece will ever be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by means of a negotiation to the success of which the very elements are wanting.

The Porte, like the Greeks, will not yield to the proposals, however just and wise they may be. The Divan will refuse from habit, from indomitable pride, from its natural spirit of jealousy, which constantly prevents the very services the Powers wish to render it from being regarded otherwise than as a pretension on their part to dictate as to its internal affairs, or a mask to cover some secret and ambitious views. The Turks, in short, always see in an affair what is not there, and never see what is there in reality. The Greeks, on the other hand, will not listen to a proposal which does not rest on the principle of political independence, or—what comes to the same thing—which does not show that the Powers have determined to regard the Ottoman Empire as extinct in Europe. But even if a definite arrangement of the affairs of the East is pre-

vented by insurmountable difficulties, it is still of the greatest importance to prevent new and unhappy complications in the future—complications which the united action of the allied Powers can alone prevent.

By a right and vigorous management of the negotiation the Emperor of Russia—who, as we firmly believe, aims neither at conquests nor at the thorough emancipation of the Greeks and the establishment of a new and revolutionary Power—will find means of justifying himself, by arguments founded on a sound policy, from what the popular voice in Russia will not fail to call indifference to Russian interests and desertion of his co-religionists. If the Emperor were not strongly supported by the counsels and language of his allies, this voice would end by defeating the firmest intentions of his Imperial Majesty. Any false attitude which the Courts might take, any appearance of indecision in the choice of that attitude, would offer dangerous facilities for the plans of the too numerous partisans of a war between Russia and the Porte.

I confess, Prince, that, with the feeling which I have of the extreme difficulty of the affair, it is only the conviction that the political peace of Europe would be at an end if it were not approached seriously that has decided me to direct to it the attention of our Cabinet and that of our allies. Will war between Russia and the Porte be avoided by any diplomatic steps we may take? I cannot take upon myself to say; but what is clear to me is that, by a clear agreement between the Powers, the dangers will be diminished, the chances of the maintenance of peace augmented, those of war will become much less formidable, and in short, by a well-concerted plan, the Courts will preserve a liberty of decision and action which would be greatly curtailed if the only Power prepared to break with the Porte were obliged to consult merely her own interests and her own difficulties.

We have seen with satisfaction that the Cabinet of London is ready to enter into conference with that of Russia and with the three other Cabinets; we regret, on the other hand, that its first declarations on this subject have been accompanied by the assurance that, if the results should not justify the attempt, Russia will be regarded by England as mistress of her own movements, and that Great Britain will not interfere. An assurance of this kind does not serve the cause which the Emperor Alexander happily still regards as his own—that of the maintenance of political peace. Let us not deprive this monarch beforehand of the support which

he may one day seek in the solidarity of a pacific policy between him and his allies. When that day comes, when war breaks out in the Levant, when the Ottoman Power is in danger of being driven back into Asia, and when a long series of convulsions will be the inevitable consequence of a change which will alter the present territorial boundaries and many political relations, both maritime and commercial—in that day will England be contented with the *role* of a benevolent spectator, quite uninterested in these vast changes? We not only believe that she does not wish this, but we are quite convinced that she could not do it. This is the crisis which we would prevent; against this our cares and efforts have been for years and still continue to be directed, and this is the object in which we ask our allies to second us with all their might.

As to questions of detail and execution, we have given our ambassador at St. Petersburg directions which appeared necessary and sufficient for the opening and the earlier part of the conferences. We cannot, however, hide from ourselves that another work not less important and perhaps more difficult awaits us. It may be foreseen that as soon as the conferences are resumed the Russian Cabinet will ask for the opinion of the allied Courts on the plan of pacification which it communicated to them last February. The British Government, having announced the despatch of Mr. Stratford Canning with the express object of his assisting at the conferences, we must suppose that it has furnished him with instructions concerning this essential part of the deliberations; and if such is the case, which we do not doubt, it would be of great interest for us to be previously informed, so as to judge how far these instructions agree with those which we ourselves addressed to that Minister, under the form of observations on the Memoir put forth by the Russian Cabinet.

I authorize you, sir, to allow Mr. Canning to read the present despatch, and to request secrecy as to its contents. You can understand the great value we must attach to a reply from him which would enable us accurately to judge of the feelings of the British Cabinet on a number of questions important for both Governments. We have explained ourselves to the Courts of Russia, France, and Prussia on the terms of the preceding despatch. If I require from the Principal Secretary of State secrecy as to the confidential overtures contained in the present despatch, it would be superfluous to say that we bind ourselves to equal discretion on our part; that is understood, and is customary with us.

METTERNICH'S AGREEMENT WITH PRUSSIA IN
ORIENTAL POLITICS.

Metternich to Baron Werner in Berlin, Vienna, October 23, 1824.

730. I take advantage of the return of a Prussian courier to send you the present despatches. This is a moment of the gravest importance; a glance at the position in different parts of Europe makes it impossible to doubt this.

In France a new reign has just commenced. This event, which a few years ago would, no doubt, have borne a totally different character, now demands the consideration of the Powers.

England, which since the ministry of Mr. Canning has wandered in the paths of a false and dangerous Liberalism, gives us some hope of a return to sounder principles.

Spain is lost in the depths of moral and material disorder which, as it cannot be explained even by persons on the spot, can still less be judged of at a distance with justice.

The Eastern Question has reached its first stage. Conferences relating to its second stage are already opened at St. Petersburg. The preservation of political peace will depend on the solution of the questions to be submitted to the Courts. Happily, Europe presents a concord between these same Courts which nothing has hitherto disturbed, and under the shadow of which the political and social reconstruction of the Continent will be attained. This concord has resisted the attacks which error, party spirit, and sometimes the views of a false policy have directed against it. The peace of Europe and the health of the social body will not be permanently disturbed as long as this concord exists. Convinced of this truth, our efforts should be to cement it; and, with this end in view, I beg of the Prussian Cabinet to take into mature consideration the confidential communications which you have to-day received orders to make. You will find enclosed a despatch which I have addressed to Prince Esterhazy and to Baron Vincent on the affairs of the Levant (No. 728). I beg the Prussian Cabinet to study this despatch

carefully, for it shows our views with regard to the second stage of the affair, and is of such a nature that it can respond to it conscientiously. You can testify that this is the result of the extensive knowledge we possess of the position in Russia and elsewhere.

We may deceive ourselves; but it is at least in good faith, and we are not conscious of error. Every Cabinet, like every man similarly placed, must expect, must even desire, that those whom it wishes to share its opinions will point out to it how it is deceived, if it is so, when it believes it is keeping to the strict line of truth and right. If the Prussian Cabinet shares our views wholly or in part, it will direct its representative at St. Petersburg to express himself in accordance with this despatch, which will serve as a guide to our ambassador in Russia, whenever the conferences concerning the pacification of Greece are resumed.

You will find in the enclosure II. (No. 729) a secret despatch intended to be read only to Mr. Canning. It has been drawn up with the sole object of enlightening the British Cabinet, and of guarding it against any false interpretation of our policy. England is called upon to play so decisive a part in the affair that our efforts must be particularly directed to her. I beg from the Prussian Cabinet the most perfect secrecy as to the confidential communication I have made of this despatch. It is not always possible to speak the truth aloud; it is sometimes and in some places indispensable not to hide it.

It is not needful for me to inform the Berlin Cabinet of the position of things in Turkey. The reports of Baron de Miltitz keep it perfectly acquainted with all that is going on there.

The reports which I have received from Paris since the arrival of Count Zichy present a number of ideas which I have been able (No. 731) to compress into the short statement enclosed. I have no doubt it is perfectly correct. I beg you to show it to M. Ancillon. No action is called for on our part at a moment when prudence and confidence allow the Courts to take an expectant attitude only.

The protocol of the Conference of October 12 on the position of things in Spain will have been sent from Paris to Berlin as it reached us. We entirely approve the judgment and the decisions of the Conference.

Will you be good enough, sir, to ask the Prussian Cabinet to inform us, with as little delay as possible, of its opinion on the different affairs mentioned in the present despatch? It will be of great value to us by confirming the opinion we have formed already.

FRANCE UNDER CHARLES X.

A Memoir by Metternich, October 23, 1824 (enclosed with No. 730).

731. Never has an accession to the throne of France been accompanied with more perfect calmness than that of Charles X., and yet at the death of Louis XVIII. many people were afraid that this crisis would produce a shock which would shake the foundations so new as those of the restored French monarchy. At the time of the King's decease some timorous Royalists talked of a proclamation, of the necessity of having out the troops, and receiving their oath. M. de Villèle opposed all these measures; and was wisely of opinion that the principle of the continuity of possession ought to be consecrated, and that the simplicity of a venerable custom would give to the new Power more real strength, than precautions which betrayed a want of confidence. The result has proved in favor of this calculation. Charles X. is peacefully seated on his brother's throne. This quiet change, which makes an historical episode of the revolution, undoubtedly proves that moral regeneration has made some progress in France. The firmness which Louis XVIII. displayed in his last moments has flattered the French self-love. The first appearance of the new King has been brilliant; it has satisfied everybody; it has produced a universal enthusiasm, which has been contagious even to the opposite party. And we may believe that the temporary suspension of the liberty of the press has not injured this success.

The fact is that Charles X., from the first moments of his reign, has evidently aimed at obtaining a popularity which he has really acquired, and which, in his position, is undoubtedly beneficial. It remains to be seen if he has not made too many concessions, and gone perhaps a little too far in his attitude—one might say his advances—towards the left.

M. de Villèle felt this so strongly that, without waiting for a remark on this subject, he hastened to assure Count Zichy that this condescension of the King towards notorious Liberals was simply

to facilitate their return, but that they must not suppose that his Majesty had any tendency towards their doctrines.

If this marked affability towards individuals who are only known by their perverse or erroneous opinions is merely to open a door for their repentance, conduct so moderate can only be praised, and the fruits of it are already felt, for the same men who so recently prophesied that the reign of Charles X. would be a reign of priests with a counter-revolution are suddenly metamorphosed into panegyrists of the new King. But many reflecting persons cannot see without fear as to the consequences so flattering a reception given to the *corpyphæi* of Liberalism. Charles X. is frank, loyal, amiable, chivalrous, and religious; but at the same time he is weak, accessible to insinuations, self-willed and even violent in his prejudices. All this makes one dread a mobility in the conduct of the Government which is dangerous to authority, and a want of power to resist the Liberal influence which the Dauphin seems to exercise over his father.

The Liberalism of the Dauphin is a fact. It remains to be proved whether the ideas of this prince have been radically corrupted by the men who surrounded him during his campaign in Spain, or whether it is a part which he has adopted in the vain hope of forming an intermediate party, in which he can unite and amalgamate all the Liberal and Royalist interests, both ancient and modern. It appears, however, more likely that this prince, loyal and brave, but commonplace, acts from conviction. With a little sagacity he would soon be convinced that his system of amalgamation is built on the sand, and that a fusion of heterogeneous elements of that nature is impossible. It is, however, on the opinions of the Dauphin that the Liberal party speculates; and this blindness partly explains the eulogiums which the Opposition showers on the King, and the attentions bestowed by the King on the Liberals.

The knot will be disentangled in a few weeks, for the ministry will be obliged to act. Then the elements which have been mixed, but possess no affinity, will separate of themselves.

In the meantime all parties, both foolish and wise, unite to overthrow the ministry—that is to say, M. de Villèle. This minister, after many mistakes, appeared to have adopted the only line of conduct suited to a statesman, and in spite of his awkwardness he is at this moment the only man whom those who wish rightly can desire to see in power. He seems to be tottering, however, and it

is generally believed that he will lose his post, either immediately before, or immediately after the opening of the Chambers. In truth, the party opposed to him is too strong. The Dauphin does not like him, and has shown his repugnance on more than one occasion. Although the King sees in M. de Villèle the principal author of the good understanding which has existed during the last few years between him and Louis XVIII., and knows that he owes to him the evident amelioration of public feeling, this minister's loss of credit with his Majesty is nevertheless perceptible; and it is to be feared that the influence of the Dauphine, who takes his seat in the Council, will be able to overthrow him. The title of Royal Highness accorded to the Orleans branch and the abolition of the censorship of the press are two measures, of which the first has been adopted without the knowledge, and the second against the advice, of the ministers.

In the event—which is very probable—of the dismissal of the present ministry, the new ministry will be formed either by the Dauphin or by the King. If by the first, we may expect to see a semi-Liberal semi-Royalist concoction; if the King forms the ministry without his son, we can hardly foresee what choice he will make, but no great things can be expected from many of his old Royalist friends. In the meantime intrigue is in full force, and the party of discontented Royalists includes M. de Bruges, Marshal Soult, the Duke de Fitzjames, and M. de Vitrolles in the ministry. That party which in France will most need a thorough reform is the department of Foreign Affairs. According to people who may be supposed to know, the composition of this department is more than mediocre; and, unfortunately, there seems to be no one capable of bringing it out of this state and following a firm and substantial system. M. de Chateaubriand is certainly not the proper person for this work—who sometimes runs to Mr. Canning, and sometimes imagines he is acting according to the views of the Emperor of Russia because he happens to agree with the opinions of a Russian diplomatist. M. de Damas must have felt very much out of place as Minister for Foreign Affairs—a post for which the career of arms gives no preparation. In truth, his vague, reserved, and uncertain language denotes the embarrassment of his position, and already public opinion destines him to the command of the army of occupation in exchange for the portfolio.

Spain is at present the subject which occupies the meditations of the French Government most painfully. In a conversation which

Count Zichy has had on this subject with M. de Villèle, that minister deplored the conduct of the King of Spain, open as he is to all counsel, the bad as well as the good. Being at length convinced of the enormous expense which the occupation is to France, the President of the Council hinted to M. Zichy the necessity of diminishing the army of occupation, limiting it to the holding of certain strong places, and massing the troops so as to be able to retreat. M. de Villèle proposed immediately to send M. de Talaru to Madrid, without, however, hoping much from the efforts of that ambassador.

For the rest Count Zichy found M. de Villèle very correct in his ideas concerning harmony in the political proceedings of the Courts.

THE ST. PETERSBURG CONFERENCES.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople (confidential letter), Vienna, December 18, 1824.

732. I have nothing particular to add to my despatch of this day, except that the early arrival of Mr. Stratford Canning seems probable. After many tergiversations and all sorts of evasions. Mr. Canning seems to have at last decided to send this diplomatist; or, rather, the Cabinet has forced the inclinations of the Principal Secretary of State.

The most recent news from St. Petersburg proves to me that the delay in the evacuation of the Principalities and the affair falsely represented by M. Pisani have not produced on the Emperor of Russia the effect which no doubt the Hetairists desired. The desire to end the thing predominates with his Imperial Majesty, and the day that by the renewal of her diplomatic relations Russia is replaced in the ranks of the allies will be a happy day for him. This is the true state of the case; do not be misled by any appearance to the contrary. If you have an opportunity of explaining this to M. de Minciaky, it will do no harm. It is not for me to point out to him what he should do in circumstances which must be difficult for any one in his position. But he should know that I understand the Emperor Alexander, and that we are determined to maintain his cause with justice and vigor. My words, therefore, cannot be misunderstood. You must, however, use a certain reserve in a thing of such a delicate nature. I leave all this to your good sense and knowledge of the world.

The affair at present is the division of subjects. It is important that the conferences at St. Petersburg should be opened promptly. Constantinople will sleep until a new impulse arrives from St. Petersburg. That this may be salutary it must be regulated and arranged as a whole and in detail, and to this end we must meet and debate. Here you have our policy complete; every other is false in principle and wrong in calculation.

1825.

ILLNESS AND DEATH OF PRINCESS ELEONORE METTERNICH IN PARIS.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from January 12 to April 20, 1825.

733. Anxiety regarding Princess Eleonore. 734. Impending journey to Paris. 735. The Greek question. 736. Journey to Paris. 737. Melancholy feeling. 738. Death of Princess Eleonore. 739. Travelling plans. 740. Russian projects for coercive measures against Turkey. 741. Sad position in Paris. 742. Journey to Milan. 743. Departure of Metternich's daughters. 744. Despatches to St. Petersburg. 745. Villèle. 746. Departure for Milan.

733. *Vienna, January 12, 1825.*—I begin to have serious fears on account of my wife's health. I have known for some time that she had fallen very much out of health; but her present state seems to me exceedingly critical, which touches me more deeply than all the events in the world. I can bear much without bemoaning myself, but I bear my cross more easily when I can impart my cares to a sympathetic heart. If the lungs are really attacked, nothing more can be done; if the cause of the suffering lies elsewhere, she may be preserved to me. In so painful an uncertainty I know not where to turn my thoughts, and this anxiety is most painful. It requires the greatest devotion to my official duties, to the business which requires me here, not to leave everything and go immediately to Paris; but I will not come to a decision till I can see more clearly.

Stratford Canning approaches his destination, and will not be well received in St. Petersburg. His cousin has taken a most hazardous step in sending him. Here I expect De la Ferronays. Things go better in Paris; worse in London. With the Englishman I have had my tussle; with the Frenchman I will fraternize. When Stratford Canning heard that De la Ferronays had come to Vienna, he said it must be supposed that the French Government had been induced to take this step in consequence of the resolutions come to in London. I answered that he might be quite easy on the subject, for I had myself invited the Count.

734. *January 30.*—My anxiety respecting the condition of my

wife grows greater and greater. In consequence of the tender care practised in my family I have no direct information. The physician, Bourdois, was going to write to me, but he was prevented, lest it should make me anxious. I am sending a courier to him, with strict orders that he should tell me the truth. If I have to go to Paris, my journey will excite Canning's attention immensely; he will think the one sad cause of my journey only a pretext. That he is quite mistaken is immaterial to me, and on the whole will be no bad thing. Anxiety is often only a just punishment. According to Canning, Pozzo will rejoice the least at this. His reign is over in Paris, and will not return for a long time in St. Petersburg. As to the first circumstance, I have remarkable evidence. He will believe that I go to Paris to give him his deathblow, and God knows I have no such intention.

735. *February 3.*—The Greek question is clear and simple, if one is not afraid to look it in the face. I do not understand the part that Wellington plays; when not on the battle-field does he lose the energy he there displayed? There is a military genius of a certain kind which depends on its artillery, and is nothing without it. Wellesley, who thinks as I do, wishes to retire at once; but I hold him back, because it is a bad plan to give pleasure to your opponents, and certainly in London they would not feel hurt by Wellesley's retirement.

736. *February 8.*—The news I have of my poor wife from the physicians determines me to go to Paris now, and then meet the Emperor at the end of March at Milan. I do not know quite certainly—I do not know, that is, whether the invalid's danger is immediate or remote.

737. *Paris, February 14.*—I am troubled to the very depths of my heart, and at the present moment good for nothing. Face to face with a catastrophe the prospect of which filled me with sorrow, I find myself, after thirty years of undisturbed married life, reduced to a frightful isolation. What shall I do with my daughters? To give them over to a governess is a very insufficient remedy, although I will never separate myself from my children. What sad blows has not my heart already endured from fate—everything has happened to me—to me, whom the world calls a fortunate man! What must it be to one who is called unfortunate!

The French journals busy themselves with my arrival, and put their own construction upon it. In London still more importance will be attributed to my sudden appearance in the rival capital.

People are always uneasy when they are in the wrong; and if Parliament had not assembled, Canning would find an excuse to make his appearance here also. I am sorry that circumstances prevent his coming to meet me. Seldom have two ministers taken more different standpoints in the same city than we should have done.

738. *March 29.*—I have sustained an irreparable loss; Providence has so ordained.* It is not for the survivors to give way to expressions of just lamentation when the best of mothers has parted from her children without a word of complaint. This mother died as she lived—her heart and her temper remained the same to the last moment. Her last days were occupied in giving pious counsels to her children for their guidance through life, in thanking me for what I have done or not done for her, in blessing and comforting all those for whom alone she had lived, as if the separation from her were not the cause of our most bitter sorrow. From her childhood deeply religious, she felt towards God as a child to a father. She went home to Him, not as before a judge, but in the calmest confidence in His fatherly goodness. It was the departure of a fair saint (*einer schönen Seele*)!

I shall send my daughters back to Vienna; my son will accompany me to Italy, and, as the Emperor's journey to Milan is postponed to May 4, I shall not leave Paris till April 16 or 18. My residence here will not be without good results.

I am writing to the King of England and to Wellington, who have invited me to London, to express my regret that it is impossible for me to go there.

739. *March 30.*—I shall probably remain in Italy till the middle of July, and then return to Vienna. From the middle of August to the beginning of September I will go through the course of waters at Ischl, and then establish myself again at the Chancellery.

For some time past I have been trying to think of some plan for restraining the English policy within certain limits. Whether the means I have thought of are feasible remains to be seen; it will require great harmony among the Courts, for, if it is easy to agree on principles, it is often much more difficult to come to an understanding on details of a subordinate character.

I prepare many embarrassments for Lord Granville, telling him some truths to his face with the most good-humored air, some

* Princess Eleonore Metternich died in Paris, March 19, 1825. See No. 748.—ED.

truths which throw him into amazement, because he does not comprehend that certain things can be said which I am not able to be silent about. It was very confusing for him when he heard from me that I cannot comprehend and positively cannot make out certain emanations from the English policy, adding that it was probably my own helplessness and incapability of discovering it that made me feel as if I were thrust to the wall. This, of course, had the result of a change in the parts, and excuses and protestations were heaped upon me. His arguments led him into a hole, out of which he could not get till he had as good as acknowledged that the policy he had been defending was wrong. Having arrived at this point, he left off; but I took no notice, and continued.

I have lived to see most remarkable things in England. The present ministry begins to see more clearly, and will certainly bring about many beneficial things if it is not thrown out first. Of society I see only those who call upon me, and I see them separately. Men of all shades of politics meet in my anteroom, and certainly many of them have not met before for a long time. Thus the Archbishop of Paris and the Napoleonist De Montholon come to me, and the Legitimist De Bonald, and a September man named Jullien. Contrasts can indeed go no further, for only extremes come to see me; the red and white Doctrinaires shun me like the plague. Chateaubriand gives no sign of life.

740. *April 2.*—The postponement of the departure of the French courier who takes this letter to Vienna makes it possible for me to write to you. The courier takes instructions from the Cabinet here to the French ambassador in Constantinople, Guilleminot. I send mine to Ottenfels. They are very short. I did not know how to say more, and I doubt whether I shall find anything more to say when I know what the instructions were which were sent from St. Petersburg. I know everything that has taken place to March 16 inclusive. I imagine that you have already received reports from Lebzeltern. These cannot, however, teach me anything new. One's hair need not turn gray on account of the views, or rather the feebleness, of the Russian Cabinet as to coercive measures, for it is so unpractical that it can hardly take a rational form. When things are in such a position one need not take the trouble to point out that they are impossible; it is better to leave the party that supports them to show that they are possible, and this I will do, according to time and opportunity. I propose to his Majesty to appoint Count du Montel to be commissioner to Greece. I know of no better man; and then he

is here, and can receive the necessary instructions from me. Moreover, if this commission prospers I shall be very greatly astonished. Canning seems to take pleasure in approaching the Eastern Question. My idea would be to leave him alone; the more this is done the more closely will he draw in.

I am extremely satisfied with my present position. The most thorough harmony prevails between the ministers and myself. I experience this in the most important questions, especially the Eastern Question. A reflection of these happy relations is seen in the proceedings of the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, and the same will be seen at Constantinople. My presence has been very beneficial to mark out and limit the standpoints clearly, and my expectations in this matter have not been disappointed.

741. The situation here is still very sad. If the good and evil peculiar to States like England and France can be said to be calculable in England, in France they are incalculable. A drama or a farce: nothing more; and yet the position in which France has been placed is the best that could have been done for the country. The only man whom I have discovered here among the crowd is Villèle. He has a firm will, and therefore all hope need not be given up. The Chambers are only there to make certain matters easy and others difficult: to make easy the laying on the people new taxes; difficult, the regulation of the people's well-understood interests. And here we have, they say, the highest social civilization!

I have dined to-day in the Palais Royal, with the Duke of Orleans. The Duchess* I like very much. She is one of my oldest friends and a thoroughly excellent woman. We spent the evening together; and the Duke showed me his fine collection of modern pictures, among which there are many very pretty ones; the expression "beautiful" is not applicable to the present school.

742. *April 7.*—I shall remain here ten days more, and then fill up the rest of my time with *détours* on my way to Milan. My heavy baggage I shall send over Mount Cenis; but I shall myself drive in my son's *calèche*, by way of Marseilles, Nice, and the Corniche to Italy. My son-in-law will take my daughters to-morrow to Vienna, and thus gives me a proof of his great attachment. He is one of those people who are always in a hurry; and for him to take ten

* Marie Amalie, a Neapolitan princess, married to Louis Philippe in 1809.—Ed.

days to get over a distance which he could have managed in six is certainly quite a hardship.

My life is portioned out as follows: I get up at seven o'clock and write till ten, when the most remarkable people come to me, many of them quite strangers to one another—ministers, place-hunters, ultra-Legitimists, Bonapartists, Jacobins, and Jesuits, a complete valley of Jehoshaphat; at one o'clock I endeavor to get rid of all my visitors, and go for a walk, to see how Paris has altered in ten years. There is plenty of fine material. At six o'clock I go to a not very agreeable dinner. At nine I go home, or join some of the men whose company is pleasant to me, like Bonald, Franchet, Rivière, Mathieu de Montmorency, &c. There we analyze the perfection of social institutions, or discuss the history of the time, and these are my only happy hours.

743. *April 9.*—My daughters left us yesterday; the parting with their brother was sad. For three years he has filled the place of a father to them, and they love and honor their brother as a real father; Victor is a handsome and excellent young fellow. God preserve him!

From morning to night I must unhappily be in the world. People will give *soirées* in my honor, which are worse than *soirées* in general. There are certain persons whom I cannot refuse. Yesterday I was with the Viscountess de Laval. Her house is the one where for forty years Talleyrand held his court. The hostess, mother of the Duke de Montmorency, is infinitely *spirituelle*. We were eight men, Talleyrand being one of them.

(*To Gentz.*)

744. *April 11.*—To-day I send despatches to St. Petersburg, and order Stürmer to let you see them. I think you will agree with all the views therein unfolded. If I were at St. Petersburg, I would conduct the contest quite differently; but, being at a distance, the direction of affairs must be entrusted to third parties, so that I must confine myself to principles. My principal object is to gain the strongest diplomatic position, and that is always the defensive. Besides, Lebzeltern puts all questions so clearly, and is so courageous, that I have no anxiety about the conduct of the affair.

I beg you to notice the English "*Courier*" of the 6th inst. Canning must find that it is far easier, with his principles, to trifle with the Powers and with good men than with a revolutionary Republic.

I am excogitating the working-up of a good article upon this happy state of things for a journal here; but how I come to do this is one of the signs of the times, and of my environment. I could write a volume about this; but, as I shall see you so soon, I will not give myself the trouble. Time for this, too, is wanting. Certainly, if I required more evidence than my inner feelings that I fill a quite peculiar, definite position in the world—a position shared by no one—my residence here would have served to inform me.

My relations with the ministry and with the King are assuredly without example. Things look so differently when one embraces only a period of time, or when one mixes in the common life which comes with a longer residence. People look upon me as a kind of lantern, which they approach to get light on a dark night. I cannot otherwise describe what I daily experience. Villèle and Damas are always running in and out to ask me questions which, God knows, are easy enough to answer. If I give a decision, they think it grand, when I should be ashamed of myself to do otherwise. It seems that the worthy men, instead of answers to their questions, are accustomed to hear the very convenient "I don't understand." I am not guilty of the crime of using such words, and so they discover that the lantern really gives light—of all the duties of a lantern surely the commonest.

So much is plain to me, that an ambassador from any Court whatever who is in the right—that is, who wishes what is good and knows how to speak it out plainly—must here play a great part. This part would have been excellently played by Pozzo if he had condescended to this fundamental condition; but he is always in the wrong, and if an affair is intelligible to the bystanders, it is not from Pozzo's help. And it has now come to that with Pozzo, that if he *par hasard* speaks for once without personal views, nobody believes him. His money speculations have injured him more than anything, although he has become immensely rich. He is largely interested in the loan to the Cortes. Just imagine what must be their thoughts about his support of the Legitimists! The increased intimacy which has grown up between the Purist party and myself has for me the greatest interest. This intimacy will have its results. The men who are at the head of that party force themselves upon me with the greatest confidence, and I now see through their actions, their plans, and their hopes as if I had been here for years. For the present moment let it suffice for them to be certain that here in the centre of all mischief, another disciple of the good

cause has been made, and that his progress is as vigorous as it is practical. Action is characteristic of the French, and with empty words they are never content. I see a great deal of Bonald; he interests me very much, and he is far more practical than I had believed. At the same time he is in many things of a crass ignorance that one only finds in France. He falls into a kind of stupid amazement at all that I know, and yet I may asseverate most solemnly that not a single case has arisen between us which to have been ignorant of would not have been perfect stupidity on my part. The reason why evil makes such rapid strides so easily is simply this, that it is only necessary to be an ignoramus to step out like a hero.

Bonald lately said something very fine, which is universally applicable. He says, *Le particulier des sots—et ils forment la majorité dans la société—c'est leur propension à découvrir les difficultés dans les bonnes choses, et les facilités dans les mauvaises.* (The peculiarity of fools—and they form the majority in society—is their propensity to discover difficulties in what is good, and facilities in what is bad.) This is a true saying; it quite applies, for example, to the course of the English ministry. In the Alliance it finds everything difficult, and in its relations with the Liberals, on the contrary, everything easy.

A very practical man is Franchet. He is quite young, and a very pleasant, even light-hearted, man.

Yesterday I had the honor of dining with the King. Since the monarchy there have been only two examples of a private person dining with the King—the Duke of Wellington in the year 1815, and subsequently Lord Moira as a personal friend of the family during their exile. The occurrence makes a noise here, too. I am certain the report will be renewed that the freedom of the press has fallen a victim to yesterday's dinner!

Peru has now gone the way of all flesh. I encourage them here to a step with respect to the Spanish Government, which is merely to inquire whether they are also ready to give up Cuba in the same way—that is, to do nothing to keep it?

745. *April 12.*—The present ministry is decidedly the best since the Restoration. It consists, however, of merely one man, and has a very difficult position. Amongst the ministers there are always some who, at a very critical moment, do their best to get into his place. The strength of Villèle consists in something he said to me lately. When I asked him, quite openly, “Shall you remain, or

will they turn you out?" he answered, "I am determined to remain, and a determined man is not easily put on one side."

746. *April 20.*—To-morrow I shalt start, take the road I mentioned, and by May 8 meet the Emperor at Milan, the day of the Emperor's arrival at Monza. August I shall spend in Ischl. There is some talk of summoning the Hungarian Landtag in September. If that happens, I shall hardly have the necessary time to visit my estates in Bohemia.

RESIDENCE IN PARIS.

Eight Reports from Prince Metternich to the Emperor Francis from March 19 to May 9, 1825.

747. Arrival in Paris. 748. Death of the Princess Eleonore. 749. Internal position of France. 750. Conferences at St. Petersburg. 751. Happy results of the residence in Paris. 752. Parting with King Louis XVIII. 753. Conversation with Villèle. 754. Arrival in Milan.

747. *Paris, March 17, 1825.*—I arrived here on the 14th inst. The state of my wife's health is, unhappily, what I had only too well foreseen. Her dissolution draws near with rapid strides, and if there be a respite it can but be of hours or days. The sad object of my journey, and the dangerous state of the invalid at the present moment, give me natural ground for declaring that I shall live in the closest retirement.

The good disposition in our favor has, under these circumstances, been very plainly shown. Immediately after my arrival I received the visits of the whole French ministry, and, at a diplomatic audience which took place on the day after my arrival, the King sent Vincent to me to say that he would not fix on any hour for me to visit him, but that he would leave it to me to choose the time according to my private engagements.

Yesterday I paid my respects to his Majesty. The King received me with extreme graciousness, spoke to me of the great confidence he has in your Majesty's firmness, and repeated at different times, as well as at the beginning of our conversation, "his conviction that your Majesty is the grand support of Europe's salvation, and that duty and prudence must lead all the Powers to unite with confidence in Austria's policy, which, amid all the pressure of the times, has always shown itself true and sound.

Hereupon the King took the Order *Saint Esprit* and presented it to me, saying that he had long desired to repay an old debt of recognition; that he had intended to give me this Order at his coronation; but he was too glad of the opportunity of bestowing it earlier and personally. Himself placing the Order around me, the

King said, "Take this as a sign of my gratitude and my friendship: these you have earned from me personally, for I only bestow them where I believe them to be well employed, and I now offer them to you without reserve."

I answered his Majesty as my own feelings prompted me, and added that I received the Order with the conviction that your Majesty would see in the manner of this gift a confirmation of the King's continuance in the right path.

After the audience, which lasted nearly two hours, and which I can best describe by assuring your Majesty that the King in every respect answers to my desires, I went to the Dauphin, the Dauphiness, and the Duchesse de Berry. I found the Dauphin very much embarrassed. His expressions were generally good, but guarded. The Dauphiness talked with me much and with affection of your Majesty, and their feelings of gratitude. The children, the Duke of Bordeaux and Mademoiselle, entered during our conversation. They are both small and delicate.

The Duchesse de Berry received me in the most friendly manner, and spoke heartily of your Majesty and the whole Imperial family.

With Villèle and Damas I have already had several conversations which have given me great satisfaction. Both receive me frequently and in the most confidential manner. I found the ideas confirmed which I had formed regarding them. Villèle is a man of large and penetrating understanding; Damas is simple and straightforward, not much known in his profession.

The whole attention of French policy is fastened on two things: the conclusion of the Greek affairs, and the course of English politics, especially with regard to the American colonies. The fate of the continent seemed to be decided; the defeat of the Royal party in Peru left it no longer doubtful. Only Cuba and Porto Rico still remain under the dominion of Spain, and all information prepares me to expect the insurrection of the latter province. What an unhappy influence these events must have on the fate of civilization is only too easy to calculate; and how culpable is the man who now guides English policy and leads it utterly astray is no less certain. An insurrection in Cuba is, however, feared by Canning as much as anything can be feared, for its inevitable and speedy result would certainly be the same fate for the English colonies in the West Indies.

Grounded on these circumstances I have formed a scheme which I will take into consideration here on the very spot where only it

can be carried out with speed and success. The first and most necessary thing is to provide Spain with money, but at the same time making sure that it is put to the right use. I do not doubt that I shall be able to accomplish something. It is with me just now as it has been at many periods of the greatest importance—that is, many desire the same, but none of them know how to manage it. So, God willing, I will find out what is possible; man cannot do more. In respect to this business my arrival has also happened at a moment as important in itself as it is sad in my private position.

Meanwhile I am still only in the preliminaries, for I must myself feel my way. My quite free position makes many things easy, which would be difficult to others, for people come to me with confidence. Men here seem to be like sponges, which are greedy to suck in ideas. I will not neglect to give them what I can.

Prince Paul Esterhazy came here yesterday to stay a few days. He crossed, on the way, an intimation from me to remain where he was. He was sent directly from the King of England to request me to proceed to London. Enclosed your Majesty will find the letters of the King of England and the Duke of Wellington. Your Majesty will please to remember that I foresaw that this would certainly be done. Prince Paul explains to me the hopes which the King places on my appearance in London: his Majesty believes, that is, that it would be easy for me in two or three days to finish Canning's moral education. If he should not take it in good part, this would give ground and occasion for getting rid of him. How trifling, or, I might almost say, how senseless is this idea, need hardly be insisted on. I shall send back Prince Esterhazy in a day or two to express my regrets to the King and the Duke of Wellington that I cannot respond to their views, but I shall also point out to the former how far the evil must have gone to have made the appearance of an Austrian minister in England an impossibility. The invitation is very fortunate, for it necessitates a refusal; and, from the knowledge of things that I possess, I may say, without going too far, that this is a heavy blow for the English ministry, and it shall be my care to take advantage of it. In a few days I shall have the honor of giving your Majesty a further account of the general state of things.

METTERNICH.

I see with pleasure that you have made yourself acquainted with

the state of things in France, and the manner in which the King has received you. God grant that we may be able to prevent or turn into good the evil arising from Canning's attitude and proceedings !

FRANCIS.

Vienna, March 27, 1825.

748. *Paris, March 19.*—The long foreseen calamity took place early this morning. The poor sufferer departed, as she had lived, peacefully, and with resignation to God's will. I had been for some time convinced that recovery was impossible, and my first glance told me that the hour of dissolution must be near. It was even delayed beyond what the physicians had thought possible. I have taken my children home with me, and shall keep them with me as long as possible; that is, as long as I stay here myself. My daughters I shall then send back to Vienna. My son I shall take with me to Italy. In what a sad position I find myself I certainly need not explain to your Majesty's fatherly feelings.

With great respect I beg that your Majesty will have me informed very exactly of the day of your Majesty's arrival in Milan. I will arrange my plans so as to meet your Majesty there.

METTERNICH.

As you know how great a share I take in all that concerns you, and have myself been placed in a similar position, you must be assured how great is my sympathy. Here religion, and the happy end of those who are dear to us, and whom we can no longer retain with us, are the only comfort. God keep your children in good health for your consolation !

I will let you know in good time before my arrival in Milan, which cannot, however, take place till the month of May.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, March 27, 1825.

749. *Paris, March 28.*—I send off the present courier, more with the intention of meeting your Majesty in Vienna than to make an exhaustive Report. This I shall not do till my arrival in Milan. I now limit myself to laying before your Majesty a general description of my present work.

From my Report of the 17th inst. (No. 747) your Majesty will have already seen that I was received here with great attention.

Since my more intimate and repeated contact with the ministry, I find a strong confirmation of my original suspicions. I will divide my remarks into sections.

I. THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF FRANCE.

My feeling with regard to this your Majesty will see in the short statement in the despatch enclosed, which I sent yesterday to Count Lebzeltern at St. Petersburg.

In the descriptions it contains nothing is overdrawn. My feeling of the dreadful position of things is even stronger than I can express. I have known France under the Empire, and afterwards in the presence of the allied armies. After being ten years left to itself and the development of its constitutional relations, I enter it again, and I find things in a much worse state. . . .

It is only now that the consequences of the revolution can be correctly traced. All that is sacred has been loosened, and the system inaugurated at the Restoration, which unhappily was not suited to France, cannot restore anything of what has been lost. Thus society here loses itself in a conflict of passions, and under the influence of these passions the Government lacks all power, to act beneficially in other ways.

This is a true picture; and when I admit it into a despatch to St. Petersburg, I do so with the intention that it should be a lesson for the Emperor. The will of the present ministers is good, but they have no resources at their command. They endeavor to procure them, but it will be a long time before they have any. It is difficult to form any idea of the demoralization of the people. It will be sufficient to lay before your Majesty the following facts, which I got from the fountain head:

The population of Paris may be roughly stated at 800,000. Of these 80,000 women and 10,000 men have no religion whatever.

More than a third of the population is unbaptized. The proper business for the religious at the present moment is to introduce religion. In the Quartier de St. Geneviève—where the lowest classes of the people live—it may be said that out of twenty households one consists of married people. At least half of them are not even to be found in any civil register. The only thing that can have any effect here is a religious mission like those sent among savages.

The system followed by the Government is decried and restrained by the Liberal faction.

In the course of the last ten years—consequently since the Restoration and since the freedom of the press, introduced at the same time—about 2,700,000 copies of atheistic, irreligious, immoral writings have been sold. That this trade is supported by the faction is shown by the fact that these works are sold at half-price to young people of both sexes, and they are often freely given away. In the higher classes the immorality at least is lessened by better education. But among these the greed of money and titles prevails. From the present Chamber of Deputies the Government has 220 petitions for the dignity of peer.

As a means of carrying out the laws the Government has made use of the coronation. The majority consists of individuals who hope to get their petitions granted on this occasion. The measures in themselves are generally considered bad; but they are carried through, and the voters laugh loudly over the part they have played. That is to say, the whole work of the lower Chamber is a game, a kind of gambling, in which the so-called representatives of the common rights stake their wishes like the gold upon a faro table. The winners rejoice: the losers call names.

Meantime the present ministry is the first since the Restoration which acknowledges the evil to be an evil. The King himself thinks like the ministers. The Dauphin is the complete dupe of the faction.

II. POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

These are clear and good. Not only have I heard nothing wrong, but much that is good and genuine. Villèle gives himself to politics in a way he could not do earlier: his expressed wish is the maintenance of political peace and the avoidance of possible frictions. He knows that we see rightly, and he is therefore quite ready to go with us. . . .

Pozzo's influence is over. . . .

For the moment no one plays a political part except myself. In this respect I am rather embarrassed, for, in spite of my strict seclusion, the French ministry itself puts me forward.

III. MY NEGOTIATIONS.

These are limited to three matters:

1. General principles;
2. The Eastern Question;
3. The English-Spanish Question.

As to the first, I have not much to do but to strengthen the views on these subjects, and explain those principles which are not already known. Where this is really desired it is always an easy business. In the Eastern Question France goes entirely with us. Your Majesty knows that I have always considered this as a matter to be manipulated, and so it will be definitely solved. The third question is the most difficult and the most real, but I shall accomplish some good in it. My intention is to obtain some sort of division of the question of the maintenance of the Spanish islands still under the authority of the King from that of the colonies on the American continent. I have unfolded my plans to the present ministry, and they have entered into them with satisfaction. Pozzo follows me; he knows nothing to substitute for my proposals. Between this time and my departure the attempt will so far have afforded light that I shall be able to see whether anything new can be done with Madrid and London. I have more fear of Spain than England. On the affair itself I shall not be able to give your Majesty satisfactory explanations till my arrival at Milan.

METTERNICH.

750. *Paris, April 1.*—Through the courteous communication of the French ministry, I learn the first resolution of the Conference of St. Petersburg. Your Majesty will have received this information from Lebzeltern's Report, which he will send direct to Vienna.

The representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia have done their duty. In an intricate question the best has been attained, and no more was possible. All ideas turning on coercion are false and, rightly viewed, impossible. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to consider them. If they are brought forward again from the Russian side, there is one very simple rule to follow—the Cabinet which brings them forward must be left to show their possibility.

In the whole affair there is but one means and one end. The first has been adopted; the second is our proposal of January 15. Everything intermediate is mere illusion, and on closer examination will always be proved so. . . .

I have not, so far, discovered any difference between the views of your Majesty on the Eastern Question and those of the Court here, and I am convinced of a thorough agreement of judgment and desire. The choice of a thoroughly suitable person for the mission to Greece is very difficult. I respectfully propose to your Majesty Lieutenant-Colonel du Montel. He possesses the necessary qualifi-

cations; and then he is here, so that I can give him all the necessary instructions. I will, therefore, beg your Majesty graciously to confirm this choice. The whole mission will do nothing more than demonstrate that with the Greeks there is no possibility of negotiating, and this is the true solution of the affair.

The postponement of your Majesty's arrival in Milan places me in a very unusual position of having too much time before me. I cannot remain too long here, and I have no business in Milan before your Majesty arrives. I think, therefore, of leaving Paris on the 16th, and, instead of taking the direct road by Lyon and Chambéry, I intend to go by Marseilles, Nice, and Turin. In this way I can fill up the eighteen days between April 16 and May 4. The only inducement which might keep me here beyond April 16 would be some matter of business which at present I do not foresee. In any case I shall meet your Majesty on your arrival at Milan.

I send this Report to Vienna by a French courier, who is taking the French instructions to General Guilleminot. They are in spirit the same as ours, as well as everything that goes to St. Petersburg.

METTERNICH.

I approve the choice of Du Montel for the mission to Greece.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, April 14, 1825.

751. *Paris, April 11.*—I have every reason, so far, to be satisfied with my stay here. It will certainly have good results, for there is no single object of importance which I have not been able to clear up and set going.

The King is quite devoted to me, and he expresses this openly. Of this proofs are given which are not without importance in a country where courtier manners unite so easily with revolutionary feeling. Thus, for instance, the King invited me to dinner—a distinction which, I believe, has, since the establishment of the monarchy, only been extended to two private persons—the Duke of Wellington after the battle of Waterloo, and Lord Moira, as the personal friend of the late King during his exile. The dinner was quite *en famille*, including only the King, the Dauphin, the Dauphiness, and the Duchesse de Berry. The Royalists exalt the fact to the skies, and the Revolutionists believe that now it is all up with the liberty of the press.

I will not attempt to give an account of my political transactions

till I have the honor of meeting your Majesty in Milan. The ministry is in the best temper. From Vienna your Majesty will receive the copy of a despatch to St. Petersburg which I am sending there. I have fixed on the 18th inst. for my departure. I take the road by Lyons, and instead of going over Mount Cenis I make a *détour* by Nîmes, Marseilles, Toulon, Nice, Savona, and Alessandria. This will fill up the time between April 18 and May 5, on which day I shall meet your Majesty in Milan. The road by Nice to Turin is rather shorter, but at this time of year it is often bad travelling over the Col di Tenda. From Savona to Alessandria there is no delay, and the *chaussee* of the Corniche goes as far as Savona. I am very glad to see this neighborhood, and it is an excellent time of year. For political reasons I must not stay here any longer; people would attribute my long stay to some motive which must remain without result, and I have no reason to be in Milan before your Majesty.

I receive invitation after invitation from the King of England. He has gone so far as to propose to go to Brighton, to allow me to avoid London. But I have been obliged to repeat my refusal.

METTERNICH.

752. *Paris, April 17.*—On the 15th I took my leave of the King and the Royal family. It would be difficult for me to show your Majesty all the good which has been effected by my residence here in every political respect. My position at Paris was no common one. If I wished for material proof on which to ground my conviction that the moral position of your Majesty in Europe is unequalled either in the past or in the present, I might here find it a hundred times over. Only to the minister of a Court equally trusted and honored can people behave as they have done to me here. The King, the ministry, and all the well-disposed have come to me in a way which shows on what a high level Austria now stands. To estimate this high position rightly one must take into consideration the old prejudices, rooted in the feeling of the people here for centuries, against the predominance of the Austrian power. Of this feeling I have in the whole mass of people with whom I have come in contact found no trace, but I have found it everywhere exchanged for the most obliging confidence.

After my arrival in Milan I shall make it my duty to give your Majesty a detailed report of my stay here. I require for this purpose a leisure which I cannot find, and even if it were at my command, I would not commence the work till my residence here is

concluded. In situations like mine the last hours are generally the most fruitful.

This much will suffice temporarily to assure your Majesty that the feelings and views of the Government, and of both parties in it, are plainly visible to me. I know the state of things now as if I had been here for years. In regard to the political standpoint of the Government little more remains for me to wish.

I will arrange my journey so as to arrive at Milan on May 8 or 9, which according to the last accounts from Vienna is the date appointed for your Majesty's arrival at Monza.

METTERNICH.

Noticed and approved. I hope to meet you at Milan after a prosperous journey.

FRANCIS.

Verona, April 29, 1825.

753. *Paris, April 20.*—I have put off my journey till to-morrow, because I could not find time for a conversation with M. de Villèle. There is now not one dark spot in diplomatic matters here.

On taking leave, the king gave me the enclosed letter for your Majesty. I send it on, for I am certain it is written with the best feeling.

Sir Charles Stewart has arrived in Portugal. The reception given to him was good, and his speech is no less so. The result remains to be seen. I have brought about the most thorough concord between the views of your Majesty and those of the Cabinet here on the Brazilian question. After I had settled this with them, I endeavored to draw General Pozzo into it. If one may trust his words, he is gained over, and the progress of the affair will be thereby much improved. In any case the possible happy termination lies between Lisbon and Brazil.

It is a singular thing that one can with difficulty decide whether Bolivar's victory in Peru is true or not. Many things speak for it, many things against it. In a few days we shall see more clearly. I have done all that is possible here to bring about a reasonable course of proceeding in the Spanish affairs. Yesterday a conference about them was held, at which I was not present, because I do not wish to take any part in conferences.

On all these things it will be my duty to give your Majesty the fullest account. Nothing is altered in my travelling plans. I shall

certainly keep to Lyons. At all events, I shall be at Milan either before your Majesty or at the same moment.

METTERNICH.

754. *May 8.*—I beg respectfully to inform your Majesty of my arrival in Milan yesterday. To-morrow I shall have the honor of paying my respects to your Majesty.

METTERNICH.

I expect you with pleasure.

FRANCIS.

Monza, May 9, 1825.

FROM MILAN AND ISCHL.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to Gentz, from June 16 to August 16, 1825.

755. Philhellenes. 756. Villèle's system. 757. Dispersion of the diplomatic corps. 758. From Mals. 759. On the Eastern question. 760. Despatches from Hatzfeld and Ancillon. 761. Ruffo's death. 762. Good news from the Levant. 763. Metternich's memoirs. 764. Good diplomacy.

755. *Milan, June 16, 1825.*—During my stay at Genoa the English frigate "Naiad" came in; her captain (Spencer)—the same who made the last arrangement with Algiers—had just come from Greece. He told me as follows: In the middle of April he was with Ismaël (Ibrahim) Pacha before Navarino, and at the beginning of May with the Pacha who went against Missolonghi. Spencer assured me that the success of the two operations may be relied upon, for they are very well conducted, and, besides, the Greeks have no material of war, although none of them (and especially the garrison of Navarino) are in want for courage. Resources they have none, for everything out of the English loans of current money was divided among Government officials. The regularity of the Turkish operations is alone to be ascribed to the European Liberals, who have all entered the Turkish service, although at home they act the Philhellenes. All the Frenchmen go to Ismaël Pacha. All Frenchmen join Ismaël Pacha; all the Carbonari join the Albanians. He (Spencer) expressed his surprise to many of them, but he always received for answer that they should go where money was to be got. They were well paid by the Pachas, and, besides, they sadly plundered the poor Greeks, so much so, indeed, that the Turks handled them in a far more Christian manner than the Philhellenes.

. . . As *petite pièce* Spencer told me that nothing pleased him more than the numerous bands of music which the Philhellenes had introduced among the Turks. In all the Mussulman camps they played nothing but Italian marches and airs. Captain Spencer had just as bad an idea of the Greek fleet as of the means of defence on land. He has now set sail again, and is to cruise in Greek waters

and protect the trade which the Greek privateers have lessened day by day. In his opinion it is impossible for the Greeks to make a stand if the Turks continue to operate as they have done since the opening of the campaign. Every other word was always, "The people have nothing, just nothing."

The history of the Greek insurrection will be a very curious one. Spencer asserts that before his departure from Greece, in the middle of May, not a fight had taken place, either by sea or on land, except some unsuccessful sorties of the gallant garrison of Navarino.

I beg you to write these facts to the Internuncio; they may be useful to him.

Our residence in Genoa will have good results. It would not be possible to earn a greater success than has the Emperor. The King is excellent, and the Prince de Carignan, who was in some fear of the Emperor—and of me, too, they say—has behaved very well. He said quite openly his *pater, peccavi*, and he seems quite determined to be a dupe no more. If ever the contrary happens I know not to which party his evil star will bring him—his late friends know him through and through. I have passed many hours with him, and he has related to me stories of the *boutique libérale*, such as I had never heard. Among others he told me very important circumstances in the behavior of the Duke d'Angouleme and his fine headquarters. As to experience, he had made use of his residence with the French army and at Paris; and he speaks openly of the things, which gives him quite the appearance of a reformed character. If he is not so, he has at any rate no excuse on the Emperor's part, and still less on mine. "*J'étais la dupe*," he said to me on taking leave, "*et je l'ai été en plein. Aujourd'hui je ne veux plus l'être et je ne le serai plus. J'ai appris à connaître le libéralisme et ses patrons, et j'en suis dégoûté.*"

His behavior is in general quite true to these principles, and the King shares my feeling that he will not be caught again. God grant it! [See No. 789.] I have fixed my departure for the 1st prox.

756. June 30.—According to my last news from Paris, Villèle's system, which is so much attacked by the bankers, and especially by Rothschild, makes much progress. James Rothschild writes to me "he can now assure me Villèle has gained his suit; the *rentes* will do very well, and Villèle will get the better of all his enemies because he is right." In Paris Rothschild said to me, "Villèle is wrong." This is often the way with the world's judgment.

Nesselrode has lately written to Tatistscheff and given him the following account of Stratford Canning's last appearance at Warsaw. Stratford Canning wrote to Nesselrode from Moscow and told him that he had received communications and overtures of the greatest importance, and would therefore betake himself to Warsaw. After his arrival he explained that he had nothing to say, but to learn whether it might not be possible for Russia to come to an understanding with England on the means of making an end of the disorders in the Levant. Whereupon Nesselrode told him that the Emperor Alexander would never separate himself from his allies, and that it was open to England to join the common cause. The day following the Emperor begged Stratford Canning not to remain longer in Warsaw, as he had nothing to do there, and his presence could only give occasion to false impressions. Whereupon Stratford Canning departed.

The affair is doubly remarkable as showing both how mistaken Canning is, and that the Emperor's attitude is correct. But between a correct attitude and knowing what is wanted, and especially how what is wanted is to be carried out, there is a very wide difference!

757. *July 3.*—I write to you still a few words on the evening before my departure. I cannot take the Stilsfer route, for in the last few days the Adda has overflowed, so that several bridges have been destroyed. I shall therefore cross the Splügen. Our whole diplomatic corps is dispersing. Hatzfeld is at Teplitz to preach to the King; from thence he will go to Carlsbad. Caraman goes by the Riviera to a family meeting at Zurich. Tatistscheff visits Carlsbad. The Wellesleys are at Genoa, and go from there through Tyrol to Weinhaus. Bernstorff also makes a sentimental journey along the Riviera. The newspapers will say now that the Congress is sending out its spies.

POSTSCRIPT.—Cardinal Albani, who as Papal legate was sent here to compliment the Emperor, has also departed. I have for many years had the most friendly relations with the Cardinal, and he therefore visited me very often. When Albani, a little while ago, informed me of his approaching return to Rome, he said to me with a certain solemnity that he was commissioned by the Holy Father to ask me a question. He then took out of his pocket an autograph letter from his Holiness, and begged me to make myself acquainted with its contents. In it were the few lines as follows: "I have received with pleasure your confidential communication respecting Prince Metternich's desire to be admitted into the Col-

lege of Cardinals. The Prince [here follows a list of my meritorious actions] has so many claims to this dignity, that I am ready to bestow it upon him. But before I can nominate the Prince, be good enough to ask him whether he really desires the Cardinalship, in which case I will propose him in the next secret consistory."

You may imagine what an impression this overture has made on me. I begged for an explanation from the Cardinal, and he answered that he had inferred my desire from some of my expressions—that is, from my expressions concerning a red color, which in talking to the Cardinal I had mentioned as extremely pleasing to me. The answer which I gave to the friendly interpreter of thoughts I had never had, you may well imagine.

758. *Mals, July 7.*—I left Milan on the 4th, dined at a charming villa of the Duchess Vincenti's on Lake Como, and slept at Villa Trotti, at Bellagio. On the 5th I visited Villas Melzi, Pallavicini, Sommariva, and some others, and went by Colico to Sondrio, where, after a warm reception, with a great opera, illuminations, &c., I passed the night. At Bellagio I heard that the road by Bormio is again passable: I therefore preferred it to the Splügen. At Colico good but distressing Dr. Sacco waited for me and obliged me to go through a part of the swamp with him. Happily, the malaria did not seize me. At Sondrio, where we arrived at ten o'clock, I found the whole town in uproar. All the preparations had been made for the reception of the Emperor, and he had not come, so the inhabitants satisfied themselves with my humble self. Illuminations, fireworks, operas, deputations—everything must I swallow.

After a bad night, we set out at five in the morning, and arrived in the afternoon about four o'clock. I made the journey without the least trouble in my great travelling coach and six, not wanting any extra horses. We breakfasted at your former lodgings.*

Now listen to my opinion.

The Lake of Como is one of the most magnificent works of nature and of art. I do not think you have seen the villas, the most celebrated of which are Villa Sommariva and Villa Melzi: the first is on the left bank of the lake, opposite Bellagio, and has, besides other advantages, a climate just of the kind I like. All southern plants grow here, and the difference between Bellagio and Tremezzina is exactly the same as between Como and Naples. The Veltlin is a poor and even barren valley. I should not like either to live or die

* Gentz had formerly travelled by this road.—Ed.—

there. The smallest valley in Tyrol is a paradise compared with the Veltlin fifty miles long. But, on the other hand, the people are so thoroughly Austrian in their feelings that I cannot help loving them. The new road is an imposing and splendid work; but it has two parts. The Italian side is excellent; the northern I very much fear will not remain as it is now. The nature of the mountains is such as to render an alteration of the present road quite necessary; this can, however, be done so easily that I cannot understand why it has been made as it is at present. By taking a new line twelve turnings would be avoided, and the ground would doubtless be much more firm. At the Cantoniera, where the engineer is living, and still higher up, the two roads would meet again. To-day the weather has been splendid, nevertheless we could not see the top of the Ortler, which was lost in a heavy mist. Some flakes of snow fell, but the road was perfectly dry. On both sides of it the snow forms walls as high as a man, which were pointed out to me by the engineer under the name of Gentz's snow. But you are also remembered in a quite different way. The engineers have been talking to me incessantly of "Signor Consigliere," and *ha fatto* or *ha detto questa o quella cosa* was always on their lips. I am very anxious that one of our papers should mention these great works, which are executed daily, and which are never allowed to be put clearly before the public in our dull atmosphere.* The air of Vienna is in some respects like that of the Alps.

All the pamphleteers of the world are telling us that we only know how to gain a thing, and not how to profit by it. If you look closely at the course of human affairs you will make strange discoveries—for instance, that the Simplon Pass has contributed as surely to Napoleon's immortality as the numerous works done in the reign of the Emperor Francis will fail to add to his. This fact irritates me, and helps to make me unhappy, like the ringing of bells at Milan. On the Stifser I have discovered a rock on which, to take revenge for once, an inscription shall be engraved in letters twelve feet long. This rock shall tell posterity who made this road, and when. As the letters shall be cut out two feet and a half deep, and twelve feet high, nobody will efface this inscription.

759. *Ischl*, July 13.—I received your letter to-day. I can only tell you my first impressions, but experience has taught me that my

* At this time Metternich wrote an essay on the Stifser road, in the "*Beobachter*" of August 4, 1825.—Ed.

first impressions are generally also my last. What has been done in the affair? A refusal has been given which from the first was more probable than an acceptance.* The case in itself remains unaltered, like other things which cannot alter to him who truly and firmly stands up for truth. It is a very unpleasant truth that we stand so alone, although I do not want France.

I am sorry that you do not know the last instructions from Paris for La Ferronays. I have not a copy of them, or I would send it you; but trust my judgment, and believe that never was sounder work sent out. Damas says the same, but enters much more into details, and so energetically that nothing remains to be desired. Particularly "*les mesures coercitives*" are declared by the French Cabinet to be thoroughly unsound. I am not in a hurry to send off anything to Lebzeltern which could be considered an instruction. What sort of one could I give? Everything is included in my two last despatches. What I said in the last of these, "*La Conférence délibérera avec plus de facilité quand elle connaîtra la réponse de Constantinople—celle-ci fût-elle même mauvaise,*" will be proved right. The Conference has too much to do to take notice of empty words; it must turn its attention to facts. What is possible between the lines drawn by Russia herself? Not a war with the Porte, nor emancipation of the Greeks. The Emperor Alexander's idea is intervention on his side and the solidarity of the allies, as with the Austrians and French in Spain. This idea will surely find expression, and if I were a member of the Conference I would start it myself, because it goes against all common-sense.

I predict that our fight will take place on this ground, although a mere chimerical one. My batteries are drawn up, and I am going to put the question in a practical way, as follows:

Russia wishes for an active intervention. The Powers cannot act against their conscience. The question remains whether Russia will operate alone? If this is her intention the allies can only take a position outside, not against, these operations. These Powers will be Austria, France, and England. Prussia can be consulted only as to her moral support, as the Emperor Alexander cannot ask her for auxiliary troops!

The position I have imagined must be grounded on the following basis :

* The Porte had rejected the principle of intervention recommended by the Powers at the Conference of St. Petersburg on April 7.—Ed.

1. A guarantee that Russia does not cherish any idea of conquest;
2. That she asks no indemnification for the expenses of war;
3. That the commerce of the neutral Powers remains undisturbed;
4. That the Porte, whatever the result of the intervention may be, shall be protected against any violation of her prerogatives.

Could you imagine such an agreement? It is beyond my power. However, no other resource is left to the Emperor if he will act, and "*les mesures coercitives*" are doubtless action. Of course I could never propose such a position, but it is a rock against which the waves will break themselves. The rock does not challenge the sea; the sea dashes against the rock. The consequence of this plan is that we cannot give up the affair. No! we have to wade through the mud as long as we can. My last despatches to Lebzeltern will prevent our losing the right direction. The whole affair is in every way bad, mean, and disgraceful. There has never been such a position in the world as that now adopted by the Conference at St. Petersburg. If one of the lesser Powers had raised such claims we could have smiled at it, and taught it to behave better; but this is not the case, and when a Colossus like Russia, not knowing what it wants, only follows the instinct for motion, policy drifts about as if in a whirlwind. It will be difficult to attain our end, but God will support me and give me power to guide the helm of State safely. I can assure you that the present affair is not more perplexing than if I had to write a very intricate melodrama; it will therefore have no bad influence on my use of the mineral waters, and a little salt will not spoil my despatches. These are my first words. In due time the next will follow. The separation from the Emperor will be useful. In St. Petersburg I will not put forward any vile Metternich ideas, but only the most noble and imperial; but in Paris I will take the lead.

Tatistscheff has news from Warsaw. Either he has received no answer to my communications or he has kept the answer back. If anything has been said, it must be idle words, for the Emperor was delighted with the course of affairs in the Landtag. The Diet of Hungary may be very useful to me in order to prove—if, indeed, we wanted such proof—that we cannot undertake any military operation. Here a purely Austrian consideration confronts the so-called Russian considerations; and wherever two equal powers meet, repose must be the result. I shall write to Constantinople, request-

ing as a favor to Austria the dismissal of the Beschli-Agas.* So much can be said in behalf of this measure that I shall find no difficulty in doing so. It is now with the Greeks as I have always told you it would be. There is no power of resistance in the majority of the nation, and the more separate parties a revolution has, the worse it will fare. Never has the Greek insurrection presented to my eyes the idea of a compact body; neither is the so-called Government a compact body any more than the Parliament at Naples, in spite of its big words, has been a Roman Senate. A great difficulty in the scheme of pacification proposed by the Powers is the nomination of Ibrahim Pacha to the Pachalic of the Morea. He is not likely to give up his reward so easily. In St. Petersburg, where ideas are easily confounded, this appointment will be considered as a union between the Morea and Egypt.

Nesselrode's idyllic journey to visit his farms near Odessa is a very good omen. At any rate, he is in no hurry: that is to say, the Emperor is not. September will be the critical month; if we get safely through September and October, we shall have gained the field. Do you remember that about the end of February I talked to you of a crisis we might expect in the autumn? I am not at all taken by surprise.

It is really a misfortune that I cannot return to Vienna by Johannisberg. I should meet on the Rhine the King of Prussia, Count Bernstorff, and the Grand Duke Constantine. This would have enlightened me very much. I ought to be always *en ambulance*, like the hospitals in time of war. The politics of the day belong to such institutions. My journey to Paris has been invaluable in every point, and if it is still regarded in St. Petersburg with jealous eyes, this must be more from instinct than calculation.

760. *July 24.*—I hear from Lebzeiter that on July 5 the last news from Constantinople had not yet arrived, but I foresee that the news, when it does come, will produce but little effect. The Emperor will probably say, "*Je vous l'avais prédit*," and so saying, console himself. The power of events is too great, and can be as little resisted by the autocrats as by the "Philistines." Our merit in the whole affair is and has been the strengthening and perfecting of this power. If Bernstorff had been in Vienna, God knows how affairs would have stood with us to-day!

* The Beschli-Agas were the commanders of the Beschli, a troop of police-military organization.

Senfft takes this letter with him to Vienna. He wrote some very good notes concerning Paris. All his views of the ministry and the political course of affairs are perfectly right. He only talks foolishly with respect to the Jesuits; but everybody has his weak points, and it is far better that these should be connected with important than with foolish things. The King of Sweden has sold two ships of the line and three frigates to the Mexicans. The Spanish ambassador at Stockholm has objected very strongly to their putting to sea. The Swedish ministry has not yet answered them, and will hardly be able to do so. I do not dislike this affair, since it brings Charles Jean to maturity.

761. *August 1.*—Yesterday I received very sad private news and very good political news. The death of Prince Ruffo is a real misfortune for me. I lose in him a true friend of twenty years' standing and a fellow-laborer in the Lord's vineyard, and, although he had been for some time morally enfeebled, he can never be replaced, if only because in his position another man may be hurtful to us instead of useful.

My political news are in the main as follows:

1. My last despatch to Paris has met with entire approval. France is willing to follow in our footsteps, leaving to Russia to come forward with her proposals at the Conference, and to charge the ministry, which certainly knows not what it wants; with the burden of being forced to think.

2. The last instructions of Lebzeltern have been discussed between him and Nesselrode. Nesselrode received them with a bad grace, and Lebzeltern inquired whether he (Nesselrode) flattered himself that, if the question of war were started, Austria would take it up. Upon this Nesselrode was silent, but sighed deeply.

Two days after my instructions from Milan those of the French Cabinet arrived. Nesselrode was quite wild about them, and as submissive about ours. He said to Lebzeltern, "Prince Metternich has never changed his opinions nor his language; it is quite different with the French Cabinet: people there do not know what they want." When Lebzeltern wished to know his opinion of what was going to happen, Nesselrode answered again, with a deep sigh, "*Je regarde l'affaire comme manquée.*"

This judgment is true without being profound! The definition of this "*affaire qui est manquée*" would be far more difficult. Hang me if I think Nesselrode could give half a reasonable one!

La Ferronnays has been with the Emperor Alexander before going

to Carlsbad. The Emperor did not mention the Greek affair at all. Ferronays, who was determined to hear about it, asked at last if he should undertake his journey or whether he should remain in St. Petersburg to be present at the Conference. The Emperor told him to go, for the Conference was not to be thought of before September. (Here is a hint of a September as long ago as February and March.)

762. *August 5.*—The last news from the Levant is most interesting. Putting aside some incomprehensible mistakes the Porte has committed, I considered the affair there quite settled. Ibrahim Pacha is master of the Morea, and if the fleet of Kapudan Pacha had arrived with him before Nauplia all would have been lost. I think we shall very soon hear that Ibrahim has advanced again with a stronger force against this town, and if the fleet arrives at last, that will happen which has been so long brewing. The most probable result will be an agreement between Kolokotronis and the Pacha, and the year 1825 will only see a repetition of the same events as have occurred in all the former insurrections in Greece. This has always been my opinion, based upon the conviction that present events differ only outwardly from former events, and if there is any other difference it is this, that the strength and vigor of former times have given place to bombast. Hence it comes that events very quickly cover a vast space, but, like water, they lose in strength what they gain in extension. This feeling leads me logically to believe that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, the events of to-day can be far more easily overcome than of old. Why, then, are they not overcome? Because of the general weakness and shallowness of men, and because those who ought to lend a helping hand are as miserable in their defence as their adversaries in their attacks. I consider myself, therefore, stronger than most of my contemporaries, because my nature leads me to an unconquerable hatred of empty words, and always prompts me to act. Think this over, and you will find that I am right, and that this is the cause of my moral calmness. This calm is only the continual feeling, which each day strengthens, of the misery of all affairs now in motion. Unhappily, I am too old to see their final solution, which will consist in a universal repose. But this repose will only be fatigue and the kind of disgust which follows upon long and resultless struggles. The only condition under which the course of events could take another turn would be the appearance of a truly great man in an elevated position. If nature can pro-

duce him, he will strangle the bugbear of this day as Napoleon crushed those of his and would have saved the world had he not been a very small man endued with great qualities and still greater faults. This is truly my confession of faith!

The day after to-morrow I will send Prince Esterhazy to London with his statement on taking leave. You will be satisfied with my despatch, and with my treatment of Canning, which is according to his merits. Nesselrode, however, is firmly convinced that I am his accomplice. If men who guide the helm, or at least are close to it, are clear sighted and well informed, their daily action cannot be incomprehensible. Equally luminous with his judgment on me are Nesselrode's views on Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal, America, and in the highest degree those with regard to his friend Pozzo, who perplexes him thoroughly; he perceives that he has entirely lost ground in Paris, but does not know how to explain the phenomenon. Being very sentimental, Nesselrode weeps over the boundless ingratitude of the French to their deliverer. A few days before my departure from here I shall send a courier to Lebzelttern, and I shall doubtless hear from him first. Fortunately, it is his left arm which he has broken; the right he can flourish about in a free and easy way.

763 *August 10.*—You know, my dear Gentz, that I have been occupied for a long time with the collection of material for a history of the year 1809, the period of my entering the ministry, to 1813. The material is rich in itself, and I have the feeling that I alone possess the clue to the greatest events of modern times, and that posterity will be innudated by false views and distorted facts unless I hand down to them that clue. I have, therefore, made a rule to take up my pen whenever I have time and leisure. The sea is made of drops, and this is a truth I begin to realize. I have made so many sketches that if I were to die to-morrow all important truths would be secure. You know how little I think of my talent as a writer, therefore I have chosen the form of fragments, and I will leave it to an abler pen to collect and arrange them as a whole. These fragments are, of course, of a very varied character. Some are particularly interesting to me, and let me confess that I feel how much better you would express what I wish to think and say than I ever can. There I lay claim to your help for my essays. Enclosed you will find the picture of Napoleon as it stands before my eyes. I ask you to read and polish it without changing the features of my Napoleon, who would otherwise cease to be mine. This is

not the work of one day, and I am not going to hurry you. Make use of your leisure time and your gift for writing, but do not meddle with the man himself—he belongs to me. Take him as I give him to you, and apply to him my ideas, which you know so well. . . . Victor has copied this work from my first essay, and then I looked over it again. It is not copied a second time, because I suppose that you are going to do that while correcting, and because it is of moment to me that my undertaking should at first remain a secret. Many other pictures will follow which cannot be published till the originals have disappeared.

On finishing my work I see, as perhaps you will also, that I produce an entirely new picture of Napoleon. I have stripped the man of his garments, and shown him as he really was—without romance, without ornament, but also without the mire so often cast upon him. It might seem difficult to say anything new about the man, but I imagine that all I have said is more or less new, or rather that it has not been said before.

Do not weary of the work, and if we learn in the other world that my picture of Napoleon is the most successful, I will proclaim you as its author (see vol. i, p. 171).

764. 1848. 16. — "Hurrah for good diplomacy!" you exclaimed the other day. I hope there is nothing bad in the diplomatic position I have chosen. Never has anything troubled me less than Nesselrode's ill humor. I know my man, and of all men living I fear him the least. In a private letter from Leibeltern, which I will show you on my return to Vienna, the full truth concerning the Emperor is given, and it is, as I expected, good.

Your opinion of Pozzo was nine years ago. Something in my nature makes me follow a certain kind of man as hounds track game. As soon as I sniff them they double and make all approach impossible. Such men are more or less adventurers, as Pozzo, Capo d'Istria, Arnfeldt, d'Antuignes, &c. Without knowing these people my nature revolts against them. There is still another class of people with whom I cannot get on at all. Chateaubriand, Caning, Haugwitz, Stein, &c., belong to this class. Against them, too, my feelings instinctively rebel. I can almost guess their characters at first sight.

Pozzo will be overthrown in a miserable manner. Unhappily, the Russian Cabinet, not he himself, will have to suffer for it. Pozzo has prepared everything that he may fall safely. How can a great Power like Russia surrender herself chained hand and foot to a

Corsican party-leader? The Powers are like people who have the reputation of great inflexibility and who in treating their friends roughly only give back the affronts they have daily received from their valets and cooks.

The fall of Missolonghi is an important event. Please to send all the particulars by the next courier to Lebzeltern. Do not forget to mention the building of men-of-war for the Greeks at New York. From Vienna I will write to him about the proposals of the President of the United States; but I wish first to talk over the affair with you. I have nothing more to say about St. Petersburg; I look calmly forward to all events which can come from this quarter. Russia can only escape from her critical position by some sudden stroke. The most expensive one would be a war. A quiet explanation, in polite form, putting an end to the whole affair, would be a far less serious matter. I have given up my journey to Salzburg. I start from here on the 18th, sleep that day at Enns, and on the 19th reach Vienna.

FROM THE TIME OF THE DIET AT PRESSBURG.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from August 19 to December 28, 1825.

765. Metternich unwilling to leave Ischl. 766. The Diet in good spirits. 767. St. Petersburg in bad humor. 768. Easy kind of business. 769. False rumors. 770. Canning's neutrality. 771. The Diet. 772. Death of the Emperor Alexander. 773. Two Emperors in Russia.

765. *Ischl, August 17, 1825.*—I am really sorry to leave Ischl. I shall regret this place with its calmness, its charming neighborhood, its pure air, and its privacy. I have been here surrounded by the children nature has given me, but not by the crowd of menials belonging to my position—these have disappeared in all directions, and will turn up again on my return to Vienna. In a few days I shall be at home again.

On September 11 the Diet of Hungary, one of the most tiresome constitutional *divertissements* of the world, will be opened. This Diet not only interferes with my time, my customs, and daily life, but actually forces me to change my language and my dress. I have to speak Latin and dress like a hussar, and the refusal to wear moustaches is the only liberty I take upon this occasion. I shall not stay at Pressburg, but shall have the pleasure of going backwards and forwards between Pressburg and Vienna, which will make six hundred German or twelve hundred French miles—the same distance as between Vienna and St. Petersburg. If I could begin life a second time I would be, as Heaven pleased, a German, a Russian, an Englishman, or a Frenchman—anything, in short, except a Turk—but I would not leave my native place till the end of my days. Where this place should be, I have not yet quite decided, but I am sure I should not choose it on this side of the Alps, at least not above the 52° nor below the 32° of northern latitude. I leave to-morrow, and arrive on the 19th at Vienna.

(To Gentz.)

766. *Pressburg, September 28.*—The Diet has been opened and I cannot leave just at present, for I must attend its sittings when it first begins, but I will profit by the first leisure time to pay a visit to Vienna. By that time the post from Constantinople will have arrived. Meanwhile affairs are going on well. A good spirit prevails, but a great deal of inexperience is evident. The fatherly attitude adopted by the Emperor in his address has taken the States by surprise, and, as is usual in such cases, has inspired them with great enthusiasm. In the sittings, a great deal of empty talk goes on, which never rises to anything higher than mere personal and local interest.

As a new but not uncommon example of how right, as such, is acknowledged by the majority of the people, I may mention the thorough confidence shown in me by all parties. Certainly a democracy does not exist here; the struggle goes on between the pure Royalists and the friends of constitution. Since the Emperor Joseph II.'s accession to the throne the Government opposed the Constitution. I caused the Emperor to take a reserved position within the bounds of the Constitution; this perplexed most people and forces the Opposition to fall in with my wishes while repeating Giroux's great words, "*C'est ice que je vous disais*," or "*J'allais vous le proposer*." The first result of this frame of mind has been the enthusiastic manner in which the States have proclaimed my naturalization. I know of no other instance of such proceeding.

767. *October 1.*—At St. Petersburg they seem to be very much offended with me, which is quite natural. If the waves of the sea were endowed with human feelings their antipathy to the hard substance on which they dash themselves would be easily explained. According to the laws of nature such bodies must resist, they must remain unchanged, or their own turn to be destroyed will soon come. In the midst of the tempest the waves appear to be the strongest, but when the tempest passes away the rock is unhurt and the waves have disappeared. I am in the same position, and I trust that the tempest will soon be calmed. What have I to fear? The noise? What signifies noise in our day, when all kinds of voices may be heard in every direction? God will forgive these agitators, for they know not what they do.

The mischief must be sought where it is—that is, in the mon

strous seething of crude ideas: it is enormous, but leaves no choice to those who guide the helm of State. He who can collect and arrange his thoughts; to whom Heaven has granted a dispassionate nature; who enters without hatred or love into the great questions of this world, with all rational beings on his side, must gain the victory or perish; but dying thus, at least he dies in good company.

Thick mists lie on the Neva, but they will soon be dissipated, for they begin again to see there that the road which they have taken is not the right one, but as this view of things is disagreeable, they will for some time longer seek elsewhere what they can only find at home; and herein is, it appears to me, the true cause of the bad temper.

I am to-day going backwards and forwards between the two capitals, which happily are not farther from each other than two London suburbs; in the one I am a German, in the other a Hungarian. Strange fate!

768. *October 5.*—As time passes on and I with it, I have more and more the feeling that the only difficult businesses which occur are those which we have ill understood. Why should these matters be difficult, especially for great political bodies? Are not the Great Powers in a position to support each other by rendering assistance to each other? If this is not desired, then indeed difficulties begin; and they will not be desired as long as we do not form a distinct notion of what we really intend or should intend. Between the Power which needs advice and the Power which can give it there generally subsist petty jealousies, idle fears and suspicions, and paltry pretensions; and as long as this continues no progress is made. And thus it is with the famous Eastern Question in relation to the North. Since I have been connected with such matters I have had to do with no simpler. The question is so transparent. The Russian interest, the interest of the other Powers, then the Greek and the Turkish interest. Yet in St. Petersburg, instead of of keeping this truth before them, they prefer to take in hand something opposed to their own special interest; in London jealousy of Paris, and in Paris jealousy of London, take the place of policy. In Nauplia, revolution takes the place of organization according to circumstances; in Constantinople, they waste their strength in sophistries and quarrel over questions of etiquette. And then, finally, come the Philhellenic Committees! General Roche and Chateaubriand, Colonel Fabvier and the Duke of Fitz

James, Sir Frederic Adams and M. Hamilton, Mavrocordato and Theodoki, Capo d'Istria, and the Pacha of Egypt—all these folks mingled together, all speaking and acting in confusion, pushing and driving—surely here, in such a mixture as this, sound common-sense is not to be found.

(To Gentz.)

769. *October 9.*—Yesterday's French journals, and especially the "*Courier Français*" of September 30, contain articles which prove that already the Liberal party observes the tension between the Russian Court and the three great Continental Powers. In fact, this is not to be wondered at, for it is a line of demarcation between Russian policy and Liberalism; and the multitude of agents and babblers in foreign countries all stand personally on Liberal soil. If their own wretched tendencies did not draw them to that side, the confusion of ideas which prevails in the Cabinet would be enough to effect a union with Liberalism. All evils carry their own punishment with them. The shrieks of hell will soon reach the ears of the Emperor, and he will shudder. The Liberals are our truest allies. I believe, however, that we should at once give a solemn denial to the rumor of the formation of a *cordon sanitaire* on our frontiers towards Dalmatia and on Siebenberg and Bessarabia towards the two Principalities. . . .

I am reading now the "*Portefeuille de 1813*" of Norvins. The materials for this work have assuredly been furnished by Maret, and it is as shallow, as stupid and idealistic as this prosaic poet himself. The preface is the best of what I have already read, and in it there are some opinions which must seem very strange to you and to me with regard to the portrait of Napoleon which has already reached your hands.

I select only the following:

"If it was his nature [Napoleon's] to dominate the world, if he had taken his own emblem for his flag, he was also the man of monarchy, even of Catholic monarchy, and not the man of republican liberty.

"Napoleon was not deceived, even when he thought himself so necessary that they dare not overthrow him. . . .

"He felt that he was the key-stone of the Continent, and he might believe that if he were violently overthrown, it would be the revolution that while applauding his fall would demand satisfaction from Europe. . . .

“In his early years, the cry ‘*Vive la république!*’ was for him only a cry of pride, as was afterwards for the army the cry ‘*Vive l’Empereur!*’

“It was not given to him to change or transform himself, for he returned from the isle of Elba just as he left Fontainebleau.”

I make notes to the book and therefore read it slowly; for it is worthy of marginal notes, being written with honest enthusiasm. I shall get information about it, and I am certain it will show that Norvins is the editor and Maret the real author.

Here things are going on as usual. Seven or eight miserable babblers have taken up the *Circular-Sitzung*. They have quarrelled to such an extent that people cannot but laugh at them. On Monday will be the first sitting of the States (*Sitzung der Stände*), and then all their fine work will be thrown overboard. This “all” only refers to the recruiting business. If the *Landtag* goes on in this way, it will last eight or nine months; but perhaps means will be found to prevent this.

770. *October 11.*—Wellesley has read to me the despatch which came to him yesterday. It contains the confirmation of the conjecture which I before hazarded, that Canning will maintain his position and will oppose every attempt to make any change in it. And this is what is so peculiar; he says, ‘I am neutral and will remain so,’ and reserves to himself the interpretation of neutrality and its daily application. . . .

I shall hardly get to Vienna before next week. The work in the sittings (*Zirkeln*) has taken very long to mature into Reports. Yesterday was the first sitting of the lower board (*Tafel*); to-day there is a second, and the Reports have gone up to the Upper Chamber. Then a few days must elapse before the Government can be ready with its answer. It is here as it is in all meetings of the kind: seven or eight individuals shriek themselves hoarse, and the assembly thrashes empty straw.

771. *November 7.*—The Emperor is quite restored, and I believe that we shall certainly not have to remain over the 15th. Of the *Landtag* I will speak to you when we meet. Hungary is a real Bœotia, in which wiseacres, students raise themselves up as States of the Realm, and scholastic councillors (*Hofräthe*) represent the Government. Danger there is none, for ideas do not rise to that. As a specimen of an ebullition of the chief orator, the following words were uttered in yesterday’s sitting (*Zirkel*): “How is it that the intrinsic value of the Vienna banknotes is so far below that of

the notes of the English bank? Only because we have no freedom of the press as the English have—that best security of the English bank”!!! The orator was much applauded. When, hereupon, the notorious Nagy Pál got up and moved for the representation of the peasantry, he was almost turned out of doors, and Vay, the chief demagogue in the assembly, declared that he would rather be hanged than take a single burden from the nobles, which was what this fourth class would very soon desire. I was glad indeed to get home as soon as possible.

772. *Vienna, Dec. 22.*—What a shocking event at Taganrog! (Nos. 786, 787.) How little worth are all human calculations. They have less weight than invisible, intangible atoms, which need but a breath of air to carry them to the end of the earth. In spite of my cold-bloodedness, this unexpected catastrophe has touched me most deeply.

At midnight of the 13-14th I received an express from our sub-consular agent at Warsaw. On the cover was written “most urgent” three times repeated. I turned the letter over and over without being able to imagine what could be the cause of such urgency. When I opened it the first lines that met my eye told the news that the Emperor Alexander had died on Dec. 1. Could the truth of this be doubted? The letter had passed through the Warsaw post-office. Four whole days passed without the news being confirmed or corrected—on the fifth day certainty overpowered us.

773. *Dec. 28.*—We are still in the greatest uncertainty here how the conflict between the two Emperors will end. We live in an extraordinary century, that seems to be meant to go through the cycle of all experience. A throne which no one can mount is a *novum* in history, and this experience may be turned to the greatest triumph of philanthropy. But whatever may result from this, the blame lies with the Emperor Alexander. He had a peculiar and deplorable inclination to go wrong as to the means of carrying out the good intentions he had in his mind. This defect in his nature was also the ground of all the misunderstandings between him and me. He often allowed me the honor of looking into his inner thoughts. I approved of them, and we understood one another quickly enough as to the starting-point and the end to be arrived at. Then we both started on our way. I went straight to the end proposed: the Emperor went round about. I called to him “Stop!” He cried in return, “Do but come with me.” Now I cry at the top of my voice, “Indeed you have taken the wrong road,” but he goes on further

astray, full of vexation at being left alone. And this was especially the case in the Eastern Question.

The contest which is now taking place between the two brothers is a most serious event. If it were wished to try whether Russia could do without an Emperor or Europe without a Russia, the two experiments certainly could not have been better introduced. However this dead-lock may end, evil must arise from it, and an evil which makes itself felt so widely may easily become a calamity. Constantine can no longer refuse to accept the throne; he must abdicate. Will he do so? Or will two Emperors reign side by side in Russia, to help or weaken one another?

THE CONFERENCES AT ST. PETERSBURG WITHOUT ENGLAND.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Vienna, January 6, 1825.

774. Mr. Stratford Canning arrived here on Dec. 21. The object of his mission was solely to make us understand the difficulties experienced by the British Cabinet, or, to speak more correctly, the difficulties which Mr. Canning finds in taking part in the Conferences at St. Petersburg. Mr. Canning, who manages the Liberal faction, is afraid of committing himself by entering into a measure which, in the eyes of that faction, would undoubtedly partake of the nature of the Alliance. He wishes on this occasion, as on every other, to be free in his actions, and to be able to guide himself according to circumstances. This is the secret of his political course.

It seems to me unnecessary, Baron, to enter more into details. It is sufficient that you should be warned of a fact which doubtless will delay the overtures which the Courts will make to the Divan. Our opinion is that the conferences ought not to be delayed; the first point they will naturally take into consideration will be the difference with England. I will take care to keep you informed of the progress of an affair of which you will be supposed to be entirely ignorant till I am at liberty to give you instructions *ad hoc*.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, January 15, 1825.

775. . . . Greece is in insurrection against the Porte. The principal object of this movement is national and political independence.

Can the Powers support the cause of the independence of the Greeks on any principles of public right? This question is easily answered: the whole of Europe is at peace with the Sultan.

By what right, then, do the Powers interfere in an affair appar-

ently only affecting the rights and interests of a third State? In that of their own interest, inseparable from the maintenance of the public repose and political peace of Europe.

Insurrection and anarchy in European Turkey cannot be indifferent to the Powers—to those which are contiguous, for reasons which it would be superfluous to mention; to the generality, on account of the hindrance to their navigation and commerce; on account of the dangers arising from the dismembering of any State by civil wars; on account of the efforts made by enemies of all rule and order to encourage a sanguinary struggle which would everywhere increase the spirit of insubordination and disorder; on account, in short, of the criminal hopes founded on the issue of the insurrection. The peculiar character of the struggle as between Christians and Mussulmans increases the embarrassment of the Governments; and if this fact acts on the public mind everywhere, how much more does it increase the embarrassment of the sovereign of Russia!

Nevertheless, the desire to do away with the source of the evil is too sound a policy not to animate the monarchs who for so many years have acted as bulwarks against these evils, although the application of their principles seems in this case to encounter peculiar difficulties.

The wish is legitimate; it should therefore be supported by action, and this, to be just and useful, should be founded on reason.

Has the Porte the means necessary to bring the insurgent countries under its domination? We believe it has; but the attempt can only lead to new complications, the effects of which it is difficult to estimate. The submission of the insurgent countries, brought about by the force of Ottoman arms, would be equivalent to the more or less complete destruction of the Greeks. The consequence of a partial defeat would only be to smother the insurrection, which would break out again upon the slightest cause. The difference, both moral and political, between our time and former times is so noticeable that an interval of repose such as that between the events of Greece from 1769 to 1779 and the insurrection of 1821, seems to us scarcely probable.

In all this we do not believe there is anything which has not been said or felt in the course of the last few years. What has not been expressed has yet served as a basis for what the Courts have done so far. They have at all times regarded as the common basis of their determinations:

1st. Respect for the sovereignty of the Sultan;

2nd. A capitulation which secures to the insurgents forgiveness for what is past and pledges of civil well-being compatible with the rights of sovereignty of the Porte.

What is the question to-day? To put in action what has been, and always will be, recognized by the Powers in spite of the unhappy division produced in their councils by the defection of England; for truth and justice remain eternally the same.

You, Count, are about to give the vote of Austria in the council of Continental Courts. You will draw from what I have now stated the basis which we recognize as that of our participation in these conferences and in their subsequent determinations.

This basis once fixed and established, the means and mode of proceeding must be determined. We do not hesitate to decide on that which gives us as many conditions of success as possible.

The Courts in making their united voices heard by the contending parties should be careful not to forget the difference of qualification in the two parties. Whatever may be the moral condition of the Porte, it has for the Courts the value of a regular Power. The revolution is of an entirely different character; the language and the tone of the Cabinets should mark this difference. The first overtures should therefore be directed towards the Porte. The Powers will have means of addressing declarations to the Greeks on the subjects which they think proper to make known to them; but there should be no negotiation with them, before they are connected with the Ottoman Government. Clear and precise language will greatly contribute to the success of the affair.

I do not believe that the Porte will absolutely reject the overtures which will be addressed to it by the Powers relative to the pacification of its provinces. And even if it should forget the respect which it owes to the first sovereigns of Europe, this would be no reason for renouncing further explanations, for the Courts desire nothing but what is reasonable. They are entirely guided by an interest which they may justly consider to be shared by the Porte itself. The proposal of a cessation of hostilities between the parties at variance seems to us a very convenient opportunity for sounding the inclinations of the insurgents. I confess that I have no hope that this proposal will be accepted by either party, and still less by the Greeks than by the Divan. The attempt, nevertheless, appears to us so justifiable that you must declare in its favor.

And now I come to the point when the Powers, after having surmounted the first difficulties, will be able to enter on the subject

with the Porte, and to discuss the means of pacifying Greece. Foreseeing that this will be one of the subjects which will particularly occupy the Conference, we flatter ourselves that the following observations will be favorably received.

Any project for pacification grounded on a basis between the ancient order of things and the real independence of the Greeks will have necessarily to struggle against two equally formidable obstacles—the objections of the Porte, and the refusal of the Greeks to return under its sway on any condition whatever. The objections of the Porte do not all arise from mere pride, tenacity, or blind repugnance. Some of them are founded on more solid arguments. The Porte will have great difficulty in removing the religious scruples which are opposed to any arrangement tending to submit to the Christian authorities Mussulman subjects inhabiting the countries administered by the Greeks. To remove this great obstacle—unknown in the provinces where, as in Wallachia and in Moldavia, the Turks have never been domiciled—it would be necessary either to expel entirely the Mussulmans from the parts placed under the new *régime*, or to create two heterogeneous administrations on the same territory, which would cause grave complications. The Porte would be very unwilling to subscribe to concessions which would be of no avail in the other provinces of its Empire, where a great number, if not the majority, of the population is composed of Christians. It would moreover be afraid that these concessions would be but a feeble barrier and an insecure guarantee against a renewal of attempts on the part of its Greek subjects in favor of their political independence.

On the other hand, the Greeks, although enfeebled by divisions, and little capable of long maintaining a struggle disproportioned to their means, perhaps still less capable of forming an independent State, are nevertheless too much excited against the Turks by four years' successful resistance, and by a natural enthusiasm supported and nourished by the feeling, real or fictitious, that Europe is in favor of their cause, to submit to any plan of pacification which has not their absolute independence for its basis.

To oppose to the objections of the Turks, and especially to those connected with religion, the threat of imminent war, would be to place that Government between two kinds of death, of which the fanaticism of despair would perhaps choose the longest and the least dishonorable. On the other hand, the conclusion which the Powers propose to themselves; which has been the basis of their

concert for more than four years; which has been connected with their political and moral conduct since the foundation of their glorious alliance—this conclusion which they have so often proclaimed, and never lost sight of in the most critical times, will it allow them to drift into war, when they seek only for the preservation and security of peace? Assuredly not.

Is it to be supposed that, in the present state of things, any Cabinet would feel disposed to take up arms against the Greeks? We think not.

What, then, remains to the Cabinets, if the blindness or obstinacy of the Porte puts it out of their power to labor seriously for the pacification of Greece, and paralyzes the only means of action adapted to the success of the enterprise?

Here is our opinion on this subject. In considering every possible means of negotiation that could be used under this painful supposition, we can only find one which seems to us to unite chances of success with the security which the Emperor, our august master, regards as compatible with the character of his policy. This means would be the eventual admission of the independence of the Greeks, not as the recognition of a right, but as a measure of fact and necessity, directed as a threat against an opposition otherwise insurmountable. To establish this distinction it is sufficient for us to show the allied Cabinets that in our thoughts we separate the means and the end, and that, while admitting that even in the event of a defeat in the way of persuasion and conciliation we should not be deprived of all resources, we at the same time point out the limits of that to which we should have recourse. . . .

In fact, the thing to be done is to announce to the Porte that, in case of a peremptory refusal of concessions considered indispensable, the Powers, decided at all costs to end the present troubles, see the necessity of admitting the independence of the Morea and the islands, if the Porte itself does not make this resolution unnecessary by wise and efficacious measures, fitted to put an end to a state of things incompatible with the peace and well-being of Europe.

The Cabinets will perhaps be surprised, Sir, at the idea which I have just imparted to you. But we sincerely desire the pacification of European Turkey; we wish it above everything, and therefore will reject no means which will bring it about, however little it corresponds with our wishes and general feelings. You know enough of the mind of the Emperor our august master to know that when it is necessary to take up and advance an affair, his Majesty yields

to no difficulty, at the same time circumscribing his action within the exact limits which he will neither conceal nor exceed.

To resume, it will suffice to reduce the instructions to the smallest possible compass.

1st. You are authorized, Sir, to take part in the conferences to be opened by the Russian Cabinet, conjointly with the representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia. You will join in the conferences with all the freedom inspired by the confidence placed in you by the Emperor our august master, and under the restriction solely of your instructions.

2nd. We recognize as the aim of the Conferences of St. Petersburg—

In the first place, to take into consideration the means of putting an end to the insurrection in the Morea and the isles of the Archipelago; to re-establish peace in those parts of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the sovereignty of the Porte, and the maintenance of public tranquillity;

In the second place, to consider the most useful advances for this object, as well towards the Ottoman Porte as towards the insurgents—advances the execution of which shall be committed to the representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople;

In the third place, to agree on a moral guarantee providing that, whatever may be the issue of these steps, the political peace of Europe shall not be disturbed.

3rd. The demand of an armistice between the two contending parties being regarded by us as having the character of a pacific intervention, you will admit this demand, while considering the best means of carrying it out.

4th. As to the forms to be observed and the means to be employed in the explanations with the Porte, the present despatch contains all necessary instructions for the time being.

A grave and, from every point of view, deplorable circumstance has just complicated this affair afresh. You will understand that I speak of the unexpected resolution which the British Government has just taken. . . .

It seems to us indispensable that the Powers should immediately enter into an explanation with the British Cabinet on its evident change of position.

It ought not to be difficult for the Cabinets, united and with one object clearly defined and loudly declared, to announce to the British Government, by a simple and frank declaration, that they

persist in the benevolent intentions which the Cabinet of London itself until lately had recognized as just and salutary for the re-establishment of peace in the East; and that, considering it for their common interest to be enlightened on the step England intends to take in the isolated position it has chosen in this affair, they believe they have a right to demand from the British Government whether its retreat from the council of the Powers is not to be followed by some step prejudicial to their design for the pacification of Greece, or whether it will not lead to demonstrations and measures opposed to the object of their efforts.

Such is the line, Sir, which we have marked out for your action. I beg you to keep it before you, and to follow this most important and most difficult of affairs with the zeal which belongs to your character and the uprightness characteristic of your Court.

Receive, &c.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, January 15, 1825.

776. . . . You remark that in my despatch (No. 775) I restrict the subject of the negotiation to the pacification of the Peloponnesus and the islands of the Archipelago. It is, in truth, to these countries that we ought to limit the efforts of the Powers.

The Russian Memoir of January 9, 1824, embraces in its provisions all the provinces of the continent, such as Thessaly, Acarnania, &c. How could it be reasonably supposed that an arrangement could be arrived at with the Porte on such a vast scale, and which would bear, with the exception of some parts of Roumelia, on almost all the provinces of European Turkey where Christians are mixed up with Turks! The truth of this observation is so evident that it was M. de Tatitscheff himself who first made the remark to me. I know for certain that he has written to his Court stating the plain truth.

I should have insisted on the distinction in my despatch, but I preferred to leave to the Russian Cabinet the opportunity of taking the initiative in this amendment: I therefore beg you to make it understood at the conference, that in speaking of the pacification in the Levant we mean the deciding of the fate of the inhabitants of the Morea and the Archipelago, and of those provinces alone which can be rightly called Greek. If the proposals of Russian Cabinet should extend further, you will not refuse to take them into consideration, but you will make no attempt to conceal that we fully realize the

enormous difficulties which prevent any real hope of success. The most superficial knowledge of the real state of things in the countries which we exclude from our calculations, the mixture of Mussulmans and Christians forming the population, while the Morea has been evacuated by the first, and the isles have never contained Turkish inhabitants—these considerations alone are enough to justify our reasoning. The establishment of a Southern, Western, and Eastern Greece, cost but the stroke of a pen to the editor of the Russian Memoir: it would be quite otherwise with the execution of a measure which would be nothing less than a transformation of the pachaliks of Janina, Arta, Prevesa, and others into so many Christian magistracies. . . .

In my instructions to you I mention a step to be taken towards the Court of London. I think this should be done on the day following that when the Cabinets arrange their points of view, and fix their plans for the negotiation at Constantinople and the declarations to be addressed subsequently to the Greeks. The overtures to be addressed to the British Cabinet should declare frankly what the Powers wish, and demand formally an equally frank declaration on the part of the British Cabinet, especially inquiring if it intends to oppose, directly or indirectly, the measure of pacification projected by the allies, or means to adhere to the line of strict neutrality.

I do not consider it prudent or useful to go further, for any invitation to the English Government to stand by the cause and support it would be regarded as a triumph, whether it rejected the offer of the Powers or accepted it. The interest of the day being moreover the sole guide which one can rightly attribute to the policy of Mr. Canning, no human foresight could determine beforehand which of the two sides he would take.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Vienna, January 29, 1825.

777. I have informed you, by one of my despatches of the 6th of this month (No. 774), of the arrival of Mr. Stratford Canning at Vienna. You know that the project of engaging our Court in a different course from that which we have hitherto followed in concert with our allies—a project which appears to have been the principal object of Mr. Canning's mission—has entirely failed, and that we have expressed ourselves to the Cabinet of Russia in a way which has left no doubt as to the firmness of our intentions.

Before the effect produced by these communications at St. Petersburg could have been known to us, M. de Tatistscheff informed us of some despatches which had been addressed to him, dated December 26. We learnt from them that his Majesty the Emperor Alexander, having been informed by direct reports from London of the difficulties which the British Government made to the conferences on the pacification of the Greeks, and of the line taken by Mr. Canning of not associating England with these conferences, has decided to break off all discussion with the Cabinet of London on this subject.

We had foreseen that the refusal of the British Government to take part in the conferences would be no reason for the Emperor of Russia to renounce them; and as we shared his views on the subject, we were able to reply without delay to the proposal of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to proceed with the conferences in spite of the declarations of England.

The affair having arrived at this point, we thought it indispensable to send Count Lebzeltern instructions to guide him in the deliberations about to be opened. With this you will receive a copy of the despatch (No. 775) addressed to him, which I send for your own private information.

A few days after this despatch was sent off, Count de La Ferronays arrived at Vienna, from whence he goes to St. Petersburg. We have heard from him that the French Cabinet, persuaded that we regard the affair in its true aspect, is quite disposed to join with us, and follow the line we have indicated as the most useful and prudent.

By the time the present despatch reaches you, the Porte, I have no doubt, will be aware of the attitude taken by the British Government. I know that Mr. Turner has been authorized to communicate the correspondence of Mr. Canning with the Greeks to the Reis-Effendi, in case the Divan should evince a desire to take cognizance of it. If this communication has not taken place, you would do well to induce the Reis-Effendi to demand it. It will not escape you, sir, what advantages we may gain in our relations with the Porte from the imprudent and irregular conduct of the English Cabinet. The Ottoman ministers will not fail to inquire the motives which have determined England to withdraw from a friendly attempt at pacification which occupies the other Cabinets, and to which the English minister had more than once announced his intention of contributing. If Mr. Canning had covered his

refusal with the pretext of not wishing to join in steps which could displease or give umbrage to the Porte, they might, at Constantinople, have been somewhat grateful for his reserve, and have perhaps passed a less favorable judgment on the conduct of the Continental Powers. But since it has been shown, by Mr. Canning's own confession, that his withdrawal was only caused by the declaration of the Greeks against any pacification not grounded on the basis of their independence, there can no longer be any doubt of the spirit which directs the British Government in a question so essential for the interests of the Porte. You will take care, when the occasion offers, to make the most of these observations; and the part which England has just taken concerning the Spanish colonies in America will furnish you with a sufficiently striking commentary. . . .

I have already informed you that we shall use the proper means to strengthen our squadron in the Archipelago and in the Ionian Sea, and that his Majesty the Emperor has authorized me to concert, conjointly with the Aulic Council of War, on the measures which can guarantee as far as possible our navigation and our commerce in these seas from the additional dangers to which the attempts of the Greek cruisers, tolerated and protected up to a certain point by the British authorities, may expose them.

METTERNICH'S OPINIONS ON CANNING'S POLICY.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London Ischl, August 7, 1825.

778. I do not wish you to leave London without enabling you to express yourself clearly on many subjects of great importance, if you think it would be useful to do so.

You, sir, who have been so long the enlightened and zealous interpreter of the thoughts and wishes of our Court to a monarch whom the strongest ties attach to Austria, need not be reminded of the immutability of principle and political system of our august master the Emperor. Nothing is variable in these principles and intentions, for our principles are just, and our proceedings free from all secondary views.

The policy of his Imperial Majesty has all the value of a religion; it is neither influenced by passion (from which the Emperor is exempt), nor restrained by the attitude of the Government. Our calculations are never confined to the passing day or to the needs of the moment. Placed face to face with the future, and giving to temporary embarrassments no other value than that of transient and variable symptoms, our point of view is extended but unchangeable, and our line of action never varies in its direction. You are acquainted with all the questions which, for the last fifteen years, have agitated society; also with those which have furnished matter for more special explanations between us and England. You have been a witness on the very spot of a change of tactics on the part of the British Cabinet which we shall ever regard as deplorable. I am certain that your personal opinion does not differ from our own, either on the causes or on the effects of this change. It should therefore now be easy for me to express myself freely to you, with the absolute certainty that you will understand every one of my words in its true sense, and that you will know how to make the best use of them.

Two truths have for me all the value of positive axioms.

The first is that there should be no clashing of interests between

England and Austria; that, on the contrary, their great political interests are common to both.

The second is that everything in the conduct of the present English administration that differs from that of the preceding administration rests on grave error. This may appear too hard and too plain-spoken. I should, however, belie my conscience if I did not plainly express my thoughts.

On the other hand, I admit that there is a fundamental difference between the situation of the British Government and that of the Governments of the Continent, and that to require from the first all that can and should be expected from the second is a vain enterprise which will prove nothing but the ignorance of those who undertake it. The stress I place on this difference and the needs connected with it, for the direction of affairs, is not slight; it is on the contrary large and justified by strong conviction. In admitting this truth, I feel that I have less cause to dread being accused of cherishing impracticable views.

In England a man has sprung to the head of affairs. He has aimed at founding his power on an appeal to the prejudices popular in his country. Up to this time he has succeeded in his enterprise; but has he served his country and the general cause, which is undoubtedly also that of England? I have no doubt as to the reply, and events will show that my opinion cannot be contradicted. I do not even require to seek its justification in a remote future; the facts of every-day life come already to support it.

Its insular position separates England from the other parts of the civilized world. It has drawn and will draw very decided advantages from this position when its Government does not extend this separation to the moral interests common to all States. The science of the English ministers consists in distinguishing to which of the two classes the subject which for the time claim their attention belongs; and here it has latterly fallen into error, the consequences of which will be very grave, both for the kingdom itself and for the whole world.

The first source of this error—allowing for the influence of personal considerations on the English political administration of recent years—consists in the way in which it has regarded the Alliance.

In touching on this subject, I feel myself called upon to make certain concessions to the British Cabinet. I make allowance for the embarrassments and difficulties which more than one false in-

terpretation, and more than one attempt at direct application, both forced and erroneous, of a spirit which might be allowable to the Cabinets of the Continent, but which has caused the English Cabinet much uneasiness and perplexity. There is not one of the occurrences to which the reproach would be applicable which I could not easily point out, for there is none which our active solicitude for the preservation of the real benefits of the Alliance and the most intimate and regular relations between England and the Powers has not foreseen, has not combated, and sometimes considerably modified.

In making this concession I feel more especially called upon to distinguish between what is reality in the Alliance and what is only illusion—in fact, to distinguish between the real thing and the abuse of it.

The moral essence of the Alliance rests alone upon the principle of preserving everything that has a legal existence, and of a happy union between the great Powers on this principle. If such is the spirit of the Alliance, in its active application to special cases it should submit to the common law. It is for prudence (and the consideration of possibilities is certainly one of the conditions of prudence) to weigh, as each case occurs, the nature of the object to which an action should be applied that otherwise might turn against the very object of the Alliance itself. Examined closely, the principle is that of the life of all States: it supports one of the first needs of society, the security of property; it exists everywhere, and loses nothing of its correctness, or of the necessity of its application, under whatever form a Government may be placed. If the principle has been pronounced too strongly, the fact is due to the attacks which mad fanatics have made on the social body, and which they still continue to make. To attack the principle of the Alliance is to attack society. To protect oneself against the Alliance, or to abandon it, is not to understand the Alliance, or not to understand oneself.

Such is the reproach I cast on Mr. Canning, a reproach which history, alwas impartial, will also cast on him.

By placing the question as I have just done, one can understand the recent proceedings. The Secretary of State has too much experience in business to think seriously of a system of isolation and concentration in favor of what is more easily called the direct interest of Great Britain than proved to be so; besides, his thoughts have never extended beyond the separation of the conduct of Eng-

land from that of the Alliance. But it is just here that the error lies. In such an undertaking one would have to separate oneself from the vital principles of society, and in more than one special case it would be found that the action of the Powers on the affairs in point would not have been claimed but for the existence of the Alliance.

I do not hesitate to declare that, according to my firm belief, in the Eastern Question one sees the allies, but not, strictly speaking, the Alliance. Its fundamental principle—that of respect for existing rights and for the value of treaties—assuredly acts as a guide to the Continental Powers in this complication; but could it have been otherwise, or would it have been otherwise, if the Alliance had never existed? It is not from London that I expect a negative reply. And, nevertheless, where do we find the English Power in this grave conflict? The course which its Cabinet has recently followed has tended to make more difficult the solution of a complication which its own interests should have hastened. Has it not been the same with the affairs of the New World? . . .

I admit that Mr. Canning belongs to those men who seek to open up new ways, or what are called so; that he may attach to certain clamors and to certain suffrages more value than they deserve in reality; in short, that he believes he will obtain more facility and success in what he regards as the support of a national policy! If such is the case, Mr. Canning is but deceiving himself, and this the event will prove.

Europe at present has but one real need, which is political repose; this would sustain the prodigious bound which industry and commerce have taken. England wishes for repose as much as we do. She should therefore not favor that which tends to disturb it, and which but for our firmness would have already produced much evil.

Count Münster addresses to me the question, "If, in the present state of things [he is speaking of the Eastern Question], it would not be better to strengthen the union of Austria and England rather than to weaken it?"

My reply to this question will be short and precise.

Austria, considering the first conditions of its existence, should never depart from the principles which actually form the true and only basis of that which custom has made us call the Alliance. Anything which, in the present situation of things and the state of public feeling, would tend to cement a special union between us and England, would infallibly ruin us. A political body which

rests on unchanging principles cannot alter its course to adopt one which its very authors can only characterize as concession to English popular opinion—a feeling most precarious in its essence, as everything is which owes its existence to the favor of the people. We are convinced that by the firmness of our conduct and the force of our moral attitude we shall continue to render great services to the world and to England herself. We shall not deviate from our line of conduct, and we have to face two alternatives: either the British Cabinet may return to its former ways—considering the natural mobility of popular opinion and the danger of the extremes to which it leads, it may after a long circuit rejoin us where it left us; or perhaps the steep incline on which it is placed will take it to a distance which it is not given to us to comprehend, much less ever to attain. In this case—which our wishes for the cause which we regard as the good one make us unwilling to admit—we shall still be strong from our antecedents and from the very essence of the principles we have invariably maintained. This calculation presents in our opinion not a single weak side, for we are quite convinced that on the whole the sound policy of England does not desire, and never could desire, anything but what is for the true and permanent interest of society. If I am not mistaken, Mr. Canning belongs to a class of men who sometimes join in affairs without ardently wishing their success; these men speculate on the advantages of the moment, and at the same time try to secure their capital apart from the enterprise. Such speculations rarely succeed, and we could not in any case embark in them. It is doubtless unnecessary for me to warn you against imagining for a moment that in these observations we have alluded to the true and valuable support of noble old England, or to the thoughts of the monarch whom the Emperor regards as the most constant, the most prudent, and the most enlightened of his allies and friends.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Ischl, August 7, 1825.

779. I leave the use of the preceding despatch (No. 778) to your discretion. If you think that its contents should be read to the King, the Duke of Wellington, and Count Münster, you are at liberty to do so.

The sketch which I have given of Mr. Canning's policy is in obedience to my conscience. What I advance as the ground of his calculations and of his daily conduct is, without any doubt, strictly

true. I have no need to search far for the comparison which I have made between him and those speculators who are at the same time in certain enterprises and out of them. The truth of the comparison is shown by the contrast (evident to those who know the progress of affairs) between the support which Mr. Canning has given to the emancipation of the Irish Catholics and the American and Greek insurrections, and the well-known desire of that minister that these same enterprises may be unsuccessful. Mr. Canning has, on the other hand, furnished us with a proof by the direction which he has given to the arrangement between Brazil and Portugal, that he is in no doubt as to what are sound and correct principles, nor of the importance of not abandoning them whenever he considers it is for his own interest and that of England to maintain them. Mr. Canning uses, as it suits him, two weights and two measures. I believe that by this fact alone he injures the real and permanent interests of his country; on the other hand, it is certain that we could not act thus without bringing on ourselves immediate ruin.

The turn which affairs in Greece have taken is well calculated to make the British Cabinet thoughtful. We have arrived at the moment for its solution. The Greeks, whose true interests might have been secured by an agreement between the Powers, will succumb entirely, unless, indeed, Russia goes to war with the Porte—an event in my opinion unlikely even now, but which would have been impossible if England had acted in concert with the Powers. It was possible to avoid the true mean between real evil and the imaginary good, and this Mr. Canning did. The good which has been accomplished they owe to us.

The point which it seems to me we should especially dwell upon to the King is the deep regret of the Emperor at having been abandoned by England in the pacification of the Levant. The thing is so inexcusable, so contrary to the undoubted interests of Great Britain, that it presents more than one side on which it may be approached. It is impossible that the whole affair should not cause great embarrassment to Mr. Canning, and that its issue, whatever it may be, should not give as many reasons for reproach for what he has done as well as what he has omitted. It may be allowable to repose when there are many chances of favorable results, but it is never allowable to hesitate when there is no such chance.

THE AUSTRIAN MARITIME TRADE IN THE LEVANT.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Ischl, August 13, 1825.

780. One of the last Reports from your Excellency touches a subject on which there is evidently some mistake that I ought to remove.

Count Nesselrode appears to suppose that our maritime commerce in the Levant, far from suffering by the insurrection, will, on the contrary, gain by the state of confusion which reigns in the Morea and Archipelago. The thing is absolutely false, and is contradicted by the extreme inconveniences to which our commerce, and consequently our Government, are a constant prey.

To show the true state of the case, it will be sufficient perhaps to adhere to a general rule. It is a fact—and experience has constantly proved it—that all regular commerce must suffer by disorder. Now, the more regular our maritime commerce with the Levant is, the more it owes its wide extent to the confidence which the merchants have in the strictness of our commercial laws and in the loyalty of the owners of our merchant vessels, the more prejudicial is the present state of things to our commercial interest and the prosperity of the empire. Such is, indeed, the case.

Notwithstanding the keeping up of very costly maritime stations, of which the whole charge falls on the State; notwithstanding the absolute necessity of augmenting them, in order not to lose the whole of our commerce, it has suffered a sensible diminution, as the statistics testify. This diminution is owing to two causes.

One is the insurrection—a state of things which favors all kinds of disorder, and which, among other inconveniences, furnishes the Greek populations with the opportunity of transforming themselves into pirates.

The other is the competition at present sustained by flags hitherto strangers to the Black Sea with those which up to this time have alone possessed the right of admission.

The first of these causes is altogether intolerable, and the more

difficult it is to get rid of it, the more the Emperor our august master desires its speedy disappearance.

The second cause is of quite another nature. It rouses in his Imperial Majesty his innate sentiment of justice, and induces him to the application of a policy as sound as it is vigorous—a policy which does not allow him to hesitate when it is necessary to employ useful means to a desirable end.

The Emperor thinks that the exportations from Southern Russia should not be stopped in consequence of the Greek insurrection and the difficulty of navigation, which he feels may be indefinitely prolonged. There is no sort of representation which has not been made by the departments of the interior against the support we have given to the admission of the Sardinian flag—a support which we give and will give also to the other commercial Powers. These representations are natural on the part of these departments, and are justified by experience. If the very important reports from the port of Genoa alone are consulted at St. Petersburg, it will be easily seen that the appearance of the Austrian flag there has diminished more than two-thirds in the course of the year 1825. This fact of the admission of a great number of flags in the Black Sea has caused a positive decline in the industry and revenues of Austria; but the Emperor consoles himself with the thought of having done what is useful and agreeable to his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, and having secured still further the maintenance of political peace in Europe.

This is the whole truth very simply stated. I am too anxious to enlighten the conscience of Count Nesselrode, and I know too well how much he desires to avoid error not to address these few words to you, to which I will merely add the request that you will bring them to the knowledge of the Secretary of State.

THE EVENT AT NAUPLIA.*

Metternich to Gentz, Vienna, September 9, 1825.

781. I candidly admit that I consider the declaration of the Nauplia Government in favor of the English, and all the circumstances accompanying that event, as a true *deus ex machina*—a divinity which is always the faithful companion of those who “are in the right.” What will Canning do? That may be left to him to decide, but this much is certain, that, do what he may, and how he may, he will always stick in the mud.

How easily we can now bear Russia’s reproaches at not having taken up the excellent “*mesures coercitives contre la Porte!*” How well their application would have matched Hamilton’s splendid operations! Do you think that we shall be asked again to force the Porte to subjugate the Greeks? Is not Cochrane’s expedition in the most charming harmony with the present course of affairs? To make it quite perfect it only remained for General Roche to instigate Hamilton to pursue his present line of conduct. The whole is a magnificent structure!

Tatistscheff agrees with me, as to the advantage of this event. He no longer thinks that the Russian troops will march upon Moldavia, because he believes that the English would, in this case, take possession of Hydra. Time will show what is to be done, and the greatest proof of wisdom will be seen in skilfully allowing time to ripen matters.

I have based my remarks in the “*Beobachter*” of the 8th on the article taken from the “*Spectateur Oriental*,” and have worded it most carefully.† I only wait for the right moment to speak out

* This event was the resolution of the Greek Council to place themselves, in the name of the clergy and the people, under the protection of England. An act to this effect passed and signed by 2,000 persons was protested against by General Roche in the name of the French Philhellenic Committee.—Ed.

† The “*Beobachter*” (Observer) of September 8 took from the “*Spectateur Oriental*” notes on the Nauplia event, on which Metternich remarked as follows:

“A new scene of the Greek insurrection has just opened. What has been

more distinctly. There are cases, and this is one of them, where silence is of the greatest moment.

P.S. *September 11, 1825.*—I send you a short summary of a conversation with Tatistscheff on the last despatches he had from St. Petersburg (No. 782). Nesselrode's last letter is full of lamentations. When a Cabinet like the Russian is in such a mood it must be encouraged, and truthful words are the best encouragement. These I believe I have used in speaking to Tatistscheff. He has remarked on them very well in his Report, in so far as what I said needed commentary: according to my judgment it was clear and distinct, and will be everywhere well received.

I thought well to send you this little work, as it contains a summary of my belief. This is exactly how I look upon the present position in Turkey, Greece, and England. If I could myself and alone represent the Continental Powers in Constantinople, as in other places, I should soon bring the whole quarrel to a good and speedy end, for at the present moment every one is wrong except myself.*

long expected has at last taken place: the members of the Philhellenic Committee are in conflict with themselves and the revolutionary Government, and the members of the latter are disputing among themselves and with the various leaders in the Peloponnesus and the islands. Impartiality requires the historian to wait for fuller accounts before entering on a discussion of the elements which produce the present chaotic situation. The question will soon be solved, whether the interference of so many foreign elements, the introduction into Greece of those passions and errors which party spirit has in our agitated times called forth in Christian Europe, has been advantageous to the cause of Greece or tended to its ruin. As soon as we can see sufficiently clearly to obtain trustworthy material for the history of our time, we shall, firmly and without reserve, step forth, as we have from the beginning of these events in the East, without paying any regard to the widespread system of deception." Gentz considers these remarks the best and most forcible ever made on the subject.—ED.

* Gentz in his answer, dated Gastein, September 17, says:

"I should not call your despatches to London 'bad work in a smooth form,' but a very vigorous and decisive step in a very simple and moderate form. It is no easy matter to answer your last two questions. I am delighted with the plain language your Highness used in your conversation with Tatistscheff. The remark '*que ce que nous rencontrons journellement de difficultés et de répugnances à Madrid, nous devons pour le moins aussi le rencontrer à Constantinople*' is invaluable."

SKETCH OF A CONVERSATION WITH TATIST-SCHEFF.

(Enclosed in No. 781.)

782. Will recent events alter the moral and material situation of the four Continental Courts in the Eastern affair?

Let us consider what the Courts have desired up to this time.

They have desired that peace should be universally maintained and treaties respected. The object of their moral action has been the prompt pacification of insurgent provinces; indeed, as a pledge of future tranquillity, they have sought to ameliorate the fate of the people in these same provinces, having at the same time regard to the needs of mankind and the rights of sovereignty.

These views and desires are legitimate and correct, for beyond and apart from them will be found partial or general war; a clashing of great political interests; injury to principles nobly and usefully defended by the Alliance; and trouble of the most serious character—in a word, all that revolutionists desire.

When, three months ago, the intervention of the Powers for the pacification of Greece was offered for the first time to the Divan, the latter refused to allow it. It may be supposed that it was induced to this refusal by a repugnance to foreign interference in what it regards as a domestic affair. Its repugnance may have been strengthened by the conviction that the Ottoman forces would be sufficient to quell the insurrection. There is no need for us to discuss the strength or weakness of the Ottoman Government; it is sufficient that we recognize the Porte as a Power, and we have no right to be astonished that the feeling of independence dominates the Sultan and his council. The difficulties and opposition we have met with at Madrid we must certainly expect to meet with also at Constantinople.

The Greek insurgents, however, have not yet shown by a single step or movement that they are disposed to second the generous views of the four Courts. This is only natural. The leaders of a revolution are never disposed to allow of any capitulation to the

sovereign. Any capitulation appears to them equivalent to death, or at least to the ruin of their cause. "All or nothing" is their device. In this judgment I separate the real leaders of the insurrection, the men of action from the people. The Courts would not have anything to do with the latter in the first instance, but with the authority so-called, if it were only because in the midst of the general disorder it forms a centre of deliberation, and in it all action is concentrated. What I say of insurgent Greece applies to all countries in revolution; but further, the strength which the Greek Government would not have had if left to itself has been to a great degree lent to it by foreign aid and influence.

The state of things in Greece is something like that in Spain when the revolution was stopped at Cadiz. But there are, however, some remarkable differences. It will suffice to mention two: the existence of the Greek islands, and the very different action of England in 1825 from what it was in the affairs of Spain in 1823.

In short, if Europe saw with regret that England showed a decided dislike to the salutary interference of the Continental Powers in the affairs of Spain, the British Government did not then expose itself, as it has since, by the support of the revolution in Greece. I myself believe that, having been led farther than it intended, it will recoil before the consequences of its ill-disguised intervention.

The difference between the position of England and that of the Continental Courts is for this reason very great. The latter have never abandoned the principles of equity and reason; they have nothing to retrace. Can and will they go forward in this same way? The reply is easy.

They can go forward, for nothing in their situation is changed, while that of all other parties is altered, and, in my opinion, altered for the worse.

The Porte ought to consider that its arms alone cannot terminate the affair. One of two things: either England will accept the offer of the Greek Government, or she will reject it. If she accepts it, the Sultan will have nothing more to do with its subjects and insurgent countries, but with the British Power. If the British Government refuses to undertake the conquest, it must be regarded as naturally coming forward and intervening in the pacification. Of these two, the offer of intervention by the Continental Powers must bear, even in the eyes of the Divan, quite a different character, both of freedom and real impartiality, from that of England.

The situation of the Greeks is essentially changed. They have,

in fact, renounced their political independence. Europe now has the right to decide to what Power they should belong. The question is political and very simple, and unless the triumph of Liberalism has already reached such a point that the Powers recognize in the people or in fractions of States the right of putting themselves according to their good pleasure under other masters or protectors, the statement I make is unanswerable.

England, in short, has received a good lesson on the consequences of her system of isolation. If she has no ideas of conquest it must be plain, to the eyes of every impartial judge, that her conduct, her proceedings, her actions, and her refusals to act, have only given trouble to everybody and injured herself. If Mr. Canning's system conquers, the question changes its aspect, and both Turks and Greeks are driven back on political ground. Then, indeed, many other interests than their individual interests will necessarily be touched, and it is neither to Constantinople nor the Greek Senate that the Powers will turn to seek for counsel.

Will the Powers advance on the same principles which have hitherto served as their guide? I can answer for the determinations of the Emperor my master, and my part goes no further.

THE JESUITS.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Pressburg, October 18, 1825.

783. In accordance with your Majesty's gracious commands I have given most serious consideration to the memorial of the College of Jesuits in Galicia,* as well as to the opinions of Abbé Frint and his Royal Highness the Archduke Louis. I consider it my duty to communicate my opinion to your Majesty openly and without reserve, according to my principles on all State affairs, whether great or small.

The matter must be clearly placed in two different points of view, to enable your Majesty to judge rightly and truly.

The one is determined by the general circumstances of our time.

The other is Austrian, and administrative.

With respect to the first I propose the following questions:

Who are the Jesuits?

It seems to me that this is the first point to be examined in the most frank and unprejudiced manner. At the time of the so-called

* The Jesuits, banished from Russia and Poland, were received in the Dominican convent at Tarnopoli, in Galicia. They were urged to moderate the statutes of their order. They were to renounce all communication with Rome, nominating an independent vicar-general for the Austrian province, and not limit their work to missions, but undertake also parish work and education; they should not follow strictly the *ratio studiorum* under the control of the society, and should personally engage, by written promise, never to leave the Austrian monarchy. The negotiations were prolonged without coming to any result, till the Society of Jesus, in the year 1825, received the imperial order to communicate directly with the Emperor as to their wishes and demands. The society, in an address to his Majesty, set forth the incompatibility of the above-mentioned reforms with the spirit and essences of their institutions, summing up all their wishes and requests in the principle *sint ut sunt aut non sint*. The Chancellor had to give his opinion on this address (a masterpiece of dialectic), and it was in itself and in its results favorable to the Jesuits—that is to say, to the “old Jesuits.” An imperial decree, issued November 17, 1827, gave full permission to the Jesuits in Galicia to live according to their statutes and their vows.—Ed.

Reformation—a time when spiritual life had been roused and quickened by many abuses contrary to the spirit of the Church—it happened, as it always does when the idea of reform takes possession of the masses of a nation, that the building which was meant to be restored was almost entirely destroyed!

In the midst of the dangerous contest, so bravely taken up by your Majesty's glorious ancestors, a man arose who stemmed the evil by the most powerful barriers.

This man was St. Ignatius. His mind, as truly Christian as it was keen and clear, enabling him to see the weak points of society, he created a body which, with all its various parts, formed one impenetrable whole; and this body he made over to the head of the Church for its defence.

It was inevitable that such a body should become a *status in statu*; that according to its nature it should gather strength by its conflicts. But two other things were also inevitable. The form adopted—namely, that of a secret society—could not but produce abuses in the institution itself, which the reforming party assailed vehemently. It soon came to such a point that even the most clear-sighted could scarcely recognize in Jesuitism the original ideas of the Society. Yet the Jesuits, in spite of their degeneracy, would doubtless have forced Governments to a salutary reform—*i.e.* to bring back the Institute to its true principles—if the so-called philosophical spirit of the eighteenth century had not got the mastery, and exterminated the whole society. The difference between the *Society of Jesus* and Jesuitism is very important—and must be so in the eyes of those who think as I do, because I regard the Institute as a defence against the attacks of error, and condemn Jesuitism in all its forms and tendencies. The clearest proof of the soundness of the principles on which the society is based is seen in the fact that even the abuses, however deplorable they may be, have never caused it to deviate from its great aim—support of the Church and the throne, and victory over the enemies of both! Were it possible to doubt on this point, we must be convinced by a consideration of the furious persecution, the excessive irritation, the rage with which all friends of reform, from religious reformers down to the meanest Radicals, have attacked the Jesuits.

It remains a matter of question whether the Holy See has acted wisely in calling the Jesuits into life again; but there can be no doubt whether their existence, according to their original statutes, would prove useful or injurious. I, for my part, can easily decide

the question. The means by which victory was gained in a comparatively less evil age cannot be bad when the age has become more evil. Here we may once more appeal to the feelings of all the adversaries of law, belief, and legal right. If these sectaries did believe one of all the stories laid at the Jesuits' door, they could not do better than recall them to life as a means to gain their end. I can therefore say nothing against the old Jesuits. But are the new like the old Jesuits?

The answer to this question depends on the management shown by the Holy See and the Governments which admit Jesuits, and not a little on the rage of their antagonists. A body, dissolved, as to its legal forms, for forty years, can scarcely be expected to be ever the same institution again. It is, however, certain that the same evils beget the same necessities, and that the form which the founder of the society availed himself of may be again adapted to the present time. But it can never be as useful, because, although the battle of to-day may have the same motives as the battle fought by the reformers, affairs in the thirteenth century differ widely from those of the sixteenth.

These reflections, in connection with the proved usefulness of the society in the first period of its existence, are certainly consoling. We cannot expect that the society, if re-established in the pure sense of its statutes, can spread so quickly or so widely as it did at its first foundation, but neither is it probable that its abuses will develop with the same rapidity or reach the same extent. When the last remaining Jesuits were forced to emigrate from Russia, it would have been my humble advice only to permit them to pass through your Majesty's realm. It would not have been more difficult to introduce the newly established society into the kingdom than it would now be to banish it.

I am placed by my position on a very high point in the centre of agitated Europe, from whence I overlook the crowd, and can therefore judge of the effect of great measures. I use the words "great measures" deliberately, because no event would be more likely to excite general wonder than the closing of the Jesuit college now existing in Galicia. However this might be done, it could only add to the triumph of hell upon earth, and act injuriously upon other Governments, particularly upon the French. And if in peaceful times individual States are justified in considering their private interests before all others, the same cannot be said of more agitated periods.

Referring more directly to the monarchy, the following remarks may be made:

"The Society of Jesus," says Abbé Frint, "is in contradiction with the opinions of modern politicians and the Imperial control of ecclesiastical matters" in Austria. Contemning, as I do unconditionally, the authority of the so-called modern politicians, the first of these contradictions is of no value to me. The second deserves more consideration because it is a very important matter for Government to be placed in contradiction with itself. This is not the place to enter into the details, nor to follow out the leading idea, which ought to be grounded on an examination of the Emperor Joseph's ecclesiastical reforms, showing whether they truly promoted the welfare of religion and morality (and therefore also the welfare of the State), or whether these institutions were only the result of a theoretic system refuted by practice. This question may be regarded as decided by Abbé Frint in the picture, only too faithful, which he has given of the position of convents. All that can be said of members of ecclesiastical orders in general may, in my opinion, be applied to the Society of Jesuits. It is generally true that the whole is better than the half, and this may be particularly applied to a body like that of the Jesuits, which so easily gives the opportunity for abuses.

Jesuits are no Jesuits without the fundamental statutes of their society. Where these are stultified or abolished, there can be no true Jesuits. Now, it is a well-known fact that new forms under old names will soon destroy what was once good and useful, while bad and hurtful things will live on under the protection of the old name. I say, therefore, without hesitation, "No Jesuits, or the old Jesuits"—that is, the strict rules and principles in their first pure conception; and even then I would say as unhesitatingly, "No Jesuits at all," if I thought that their institutions were not suited for times of danger, or if I believed them to be in themselves bad.

Moreover, what guarantees would be offered by a mere aggregate of persons who, to form a body, began by violating its laws, and, while refusing obedience, promised obedience anew?

I do not consider myself called upon to investigate the question, whether the teaching of the Jesuits and their system of education are the best. Their doctrine is entirely and essentially opposite to ours. I confine myself to condemning our doctrine. Whether the Jesuits' doctrine is the best possible, I do not know, but it is certainly better than ours, for it is monarchical in form.

Further, I would respectfully propose as follows:

That it may please your Majesty to grant a certain time to the Jesuit college in Galicia, to test its efficiency for the work it has undertaken. The precise length of this period it is neither necessary nor desirable to fix; and the permission should only allude to the request of the members of the college not to be disturbed in obeying the rules of their order.

To enter upon the practical part of the affair and attain the desired end (a period of probation) certain points, decided favorably for the college, must be communicated to the *ordinariate* at Lemberg, and the Jesuits must be informed that your Majesty has granted their request, with the intention of showing by deeds the sincerity of your Majesty's feelings.

In this way a certain hold would be attained to induce the Jesuits to act fairly and honestly. If they will not or cannot do so, it always remains to us to take such measures as would be most unsuitable at the present time. If this experiment should answer its purpose, your Majesty could well grant an extension of time.

It appears to me necessary for your Majesty to take the college, as an institution on trial, under your Majesty's personal protection, deciding upon the form which will secure the superintendence of the college, and render harmless the collisions which must be a natural consequence of the jealousy of the Government.

THE OPPOSITION IN THE DIET OF PRESSBURG.

1825.

Metternich to the President of the Lower House: Vienna, December 11, 1825.

784. I have given to your letter of the 10th inst. the full attention demanded by the interesting nature of its contents, and increased by the great weight which I attach to your personal opinions in so critical and important a period as the present. My mind endeavors always to grasp the essential substance of things, to get at the root of the evil; symptoms are only useful in my eyes so far as they are instructive, and I allow them to pass quickly before me, merely following their traces, because, if quietly studied, they may guide us to fundamental truths. Seldom in my public life have I come upon these latter so quickly as with respect to the concerns of the present Diet: for this reason, that in Hungary I encounter all those things on which during my whole public life, especially during the last ten years, I have made war. The Diet has entirely taken my ground. I did not move from my position for so long that I came to know every spot of ground in its whole extent. As I am always anxious to communicate with you, and as your last letter and our last conversation assured me that we understand each other, I ask you to consider the following remarks:

In Hungary the Government has to struggle with two Oppositions: one, the natural result of circumstances, is the old Hungarian Opposition; the other represents the spirit of the age. When the Diet was opened these two Oppositions were mingled together; time alone will be able to separate them, and this will and must be done if Government keeps invariably to the right, in a really constitutional sense. The Hungarian Opposition, which sincerely desires to sustain the Constitution, will be paralyzed by this line of conduct, and unconsciously take the same position as that on which the King

himself has taken his stand. The notions of the Opposition about the Constitution are indeed strange and in many points entirely wrong, but are always based on loyalty and patriotism; and such an Opposition could only be dangerous for a Government whose wishes were the reverse to those honestly entertained by the King. The second Opposition desires disorder, for this is its natural element; and by feigning to support the Constitution it only makes use of it as a kind of weapon to attack Government—that is, authority. Monarchy is the great object of its hatred, and consequently also the Hungarian Monarchical Constitution. With regard to this matter I will send you some not unimportant notes. The firmness shown by yourself and the Archduke in the last session must have separated these two Oppositions.

. . . I will now in the strictest confidence give you some particulars of what occurred between young Count Stephan Széchenyi and myself. I know this young man from the beginning of his career, and I have done a great deal for him. He has quick parts, but, like most of our young people, no solid knowledge—a want which he makes up for by a kind of cultivated instinct. His ambition is boundless; he is not frivolous, but a sort of political spitfire, although he can be deep enough sometimes.

During my stay in Pressburg I observed (without showing it) that he wished to open his heart to me. I gave him the opportunity of doing so without directly touching the point. At last, a week after the Court's departure, he called on me, expressing his desire for a confidential conference. I made him understand that I could both speak and listen.

He now went into the subject, talking a great deal against absolutism, against the supposed opinions of Government, on the ignorance the Court had shown with respect to Hungarian affairs, on his anxiety that the Diet would come to a bad end, &c. It was the day on which the Royal answer upon the first address of the Diet had been published. I told him that I was quite ready to discuss the Royal resolution. Point for point I brought forward, silencing him so thoroughly that he left me with the remark that I was entirely right. Then he went back to his club, to change his opinions again.

The day of my departure from Pressburg I received the letter (No. 785) I now enclose, and I informed him that I should be very pleased to enter into real discussions about its contents. Expecting him every day—as he had said to my commissioner that he would

call on me immediately—I marked his letter with marginal notes, and you will find them on the copy.

Meanwhile time passed away; the last royal rescript had been issued, and the face of affairs was entirely changed. Some days ago Count Széchényi presented himself to me. His friends here had observed a strange disturbance in his deportment. The first look I gave him confirmed this. I received him kindly, telling him I was still quite willing to make my observations on his last letter, although affairs had been changed in their most essential points. He expressed his readiness to hear them, and had nothing to object after my reading his own letters and my notes. This done, I told him I was about to speak of his personal position as my conscience and my heart prompted. I acknowledged that I considered him as a man lost through vanity and ambition—one of those who bring unhappiness upon themselves.

The Count, much affected, interrupted me here, entering into an exposition of his opinions, which are in the main as follows: He is, he says, a man of active and ambitious mind, who desires to leave to posterity an honored name. He has undertaken a part which, although difficult to maintain, promises a rich reward. The shallowness and apathy of the Hungarian magnates grieved him deeply, and he had therefore determined to endeavor at least to animate the Hungarian youth. As it was their fate to go astray, they much needed a guide, who ought to be a good and faithful subject and patriot to fill properly a position demanding so much tact and consideration. This position he had attained, and would try to use it to support his Majesty's good designs, &c.

I replied that no doubt he gave a true account of his feelings, but that they only confirmed me in my conviction that he was a "lost man." To prove to him that I was not wrong, I would only ask peremptorily whether he would dare to make the same confessions to his friends as he had made to me. He answered unhesitatingly that this would be impossible.

"Then you must be a traitor either to me or to your friends—that is to say, a traitor to yourself: that which never has prospered, never will prosper, and you will pass through the same dismal experience as all who have taken the same line have gone through before you—you will sink into the mire; or if you turn round you will be branded by the very party that led you astray."

The conversation that ensued showed me that Count Széchényi, when quite calm, would think as I do; he complained of the ex-

travagance of his young friends' ideas, and described some of them as mere madmen, who made the American Republic the model after which they strove. These he opposes, and hopes to convert some of them to his views.

After a discussion of three hours, he left me, much moved and dejected; and as this took place at the time when I usually receive visitors, I should not be much astonished if the fact of so long a conversation between Széchényi and myself would soon be generally known.

I give you all these details, because they throw light on the situation in Pressburg. It appears to be evident that the Széchényi-Károly Club belongs to the new Opposition, and that one of its leading men is not at all satisfied with it. And thus it will be, if the Government remains firm, and proclaims the truth honestly. This has conquered other things than the excitement in Pressburg.

I have shown you more than once that the party in Opposition looks upon the Circular-Sessions (*Circular-Sitzungen*) as the best means of furthering its bad and foolish plans. As long as this heaven is not removed, order cannot be thought of. The question only remains how and when this beneficial work can be undertaken—a question which no one can answer better than yourself.

The object of the moment will be to point out to the old Opposition that the new Opposition runs counter to all its constitutional labors. If once the two parties are divided, it would be best to spare the latter of the two; but to eradicate the other entirely, for it spreads like a horrible disease.

If your Excellency had yielded at the session of the 8th inst., the affair would have been lost in principle for the Government and the old Opposition. You have therefore by your firm conduct rendered a very important service. I am, with respect, &c. &c.,

METTERNICH.

Letters of Colonel Count Stephan Széchényi to Prince Metternich.

(With marginal notes by Metternich.)

785. *Pressburg, November 16, 1825.*—Most Serene Highness! Some days ago, you were so good as to permit the discussion of a subject which, as it concerns my country, of course interests me deeply.

It cannot be denied that the chief cause of many of the evils of the world is merely misunderstanding, and that sometimes the smallest trifle, even one little word, might turn to advantage an

affair lost for want of thorough explanation. Your Highness has not asked my opinions on the affairs of the Diet; and, as I do not possess the deep and intimate knowledge which would enable me to make new disclosures to your Highness, I feel somewhat embarrassed in writing to you. But these considerations must not hinder me from fulfilling my duty, by drawing your attention to some circumstances and some objects which you, in your elevated position, can see less clearly than I who have them close before my eyes.

(a) The idea that matters belonging to the administration are less clearly seen from an elevated position than from a lower one, is not always correct. He sees who has good eyes, and the larger the space extended before him may be, the surer he is to see rightly. The first advantage of a high position is that it enables us to rise above the prejudices of the masses; and, since it is not given to man to be free from error, higher positions present at least the possibility of an extended influence not to be attained in narrower spheres.

Your Highness told me, the other day, that most people judge of objects wrongly because they do not examine from all points their own position, the general circumstances, and their power of influencing it. We ought, you said, to be provided with everything likely to throw light on the object to be judged of.

With regard to the Diet, I venture to state my humble opinion that, although your acquaintance with the Hungarian Constitution excited my greatest astonishment, your information on some points was not absolutely correct, and your opinions sometimes erroneous. I am therefore convinced that I do you a service by drawing your attention to some matters which have escaped your notice, telling you quite honestly what others dare not or will not tell you.

Your Highness must permit me to remind you that we agreed to consider the distrust of the States of the Government as the chief cause of all the disagreeables (if I may so call them) which have occurred. Distrust is want of confidence; and how is it possible, without changing human nature, that confidence can reign where promises are seldom kept; where the law is always explained in favor of the King, and to the disadvantage of the people; and where, to speak plainly, affairs just now have the appearance as if the Constitution were on the point of being overturned?

(b) Trust and distrust are doubtless fruits of experience. But under certain conditions and in certain times they may be mere delusions. I know only one period of Hungarian history in which Government threatened the Constitution. This was in the reign of the Emperor Joseph, much praised by the Liberals. In the year 1790-1, the Constitution became nominally and actually

stronger than it had been before Joseph II.'s accession to the throne. In the next reign, that of the Emperor Francis I., there were twenty-six years of war. The six Diets, held in the general agitation, show not the smallest trace of want of respect to the Constitution on the part of the King. Now, in a time of peace and security, his Majesty has convoked the "Reichstag," and has given expression to those feelings which have been the firm and noble basis of his reign for thirty years.

What reason is there for distrust? It cannot be the principles of the monarch; for why should he exclude Hungary alone from the principle he has so often and so openly proclaimed in Hungary as elsewhere—"the maintenance of all existing rights"? Why should he give the lie to himself before his people and before the whole of Europe? If it was only want of experience which was the cause of the phenomena at the Diet, the Royal speech should have overcome them; for he does not speak as the Emperor spoke who intends to do the reverse of his words.

Is the distrust based upon facts? Why not expose them; why not be ready to have them explained?

Is there not a good deal of calculation in the manifestation of distrust? Is it not possible that Hungary has caught the malady of the time? Is there not in Hungary, as everywhere, a party to whom authority is disgusting, which uses law to cover private interests, and a systematic opposition as a means of gaining popularity? The further course of proceedings will prove if this be true.

I could prove all this by examples, and if you will judge impartially you will find I am right. But I will not detain you except on the essential matter of the Diet. His Majesty has gratified the States by a fatherly address, asking them to discuss the consolidation of the Constitution. The States, keeping firmly to their laws and customs, have been working and discussing for four weeks. At last they present most respectfully their memorial, the merit of which I will neither discuss for or against, being beside the question and not belonging to my subject. But there can be no doubt that the States consider the points mentioned in the above-named memorial as the most important means of supporting their Constitution, and are convinced that in presenting it to his Majesty they fulfilled their duty to their King and their country. Some weeks afterwards his Majesty's decision was made known to the States, the contents of which plainly express the principles of a quite absolute monarchy.

(c) This representation of facts might be disputed as to its most essential points. It is true that his Majesty has expressed the sincere desire to fortify the Constitution by filling up the deficiencies of legislation, by reforming the administration of law, by establishing certain institutions which secure to a country, richly endowed by nature, the advantage of well-regulated industry, as health and well-regulated strength alone enable our bodies to enjoy life.

Again, it is true that the States, after the loss of four weeks as far as public matters are concerned, have expressed their complaint against some facts and asked for some measures, the cause and rights of which I will not discuss here. It cannot be denied that the answer was delayed, but this was the will of Heaven, for the King fell ill.

What value the explanations in regard to the principles of absolutism supposed to be expressed in the Royal resolution really possess, the next answer of his Majesty will bring to light. . . . Opposition counselled by passion will rarely hit the mark.

I am not going to examine how far it may be right or wrong to look for the principle of absolutism in the above-named Royal resolution. I will only ask if it is possible that the States, which cannot see any other meaning in it, can have after all much confidence, or if the anxiety be not pardonable which urges them to gain security on certain points of the Constitution.

(d) Where no other sense can be found, further examination is certainly superfluous. The question whether the Prince's words do contain the sense of absolutism appears to me more to the purpose.

Can we ask a man who fears that his house is falling, to discuss the improvement and comfort of the interior ?

(e) No! but he would do wisely not to be alarmed till he has quietly examined whether his anxiety is justified, or if it be only a chimera.

Your Highness respects and honors all institutions which custom has sanctioned; the fundamental idea of your principles is legitimacy. You are so logical in your political and private life, that I am convinced of your wish to maintain the Constitution of Hungary in all its cardinal points as pure and sound as it was before the accession of the present dynasty.

(f) The maintenance of the Hungarian Constitution must in every respect be considered so sacred a duty of the ministry, and so plain a command of right and prudence, that I should destroy my whole former political life by lending a willing ear to the contrary. But the more firmly and steadfastly I have taken my stand, the more freely I have a right to pronounce my confession of faith, which is as follows:

The Constitution will never be threatened by a wise and just King. That which has defied the storms of time for eight centuries has proved its strength.

The dangers which threatened the Constitution come from a very different source. In times of violence, of bold experiments, in times when experience is insulted and displaced by theory, long-tried customs have always to go through hard struggles. Nowhere can such rich material for combat be found as in the whole affairs of Hungary. What in other States would simply

be regarded as a change of form, would in Hungary endanger property, existence, and legal rights, and end in destruction. The changes wrought by time therefore bring danger, and what judgment can the calm observer, the true friend of Constitution, form of men who charge the King—and what is more, the present King—with the attacks with which his enemies threaten the general welfare?

I must be very much mistaken if I interpret the leading idea of the conversation with which your Highness honored me the other day, in any other sense—when you compared our Hungarian Constitution with a precious jewel which ought to be kept like a relic.

(g) This remark contains all that I have said above.

When I reflect on this, as I hope, false conception of our situation, and the groundless anxiety of the States as a source of much evil, I cannot but lament that mutual enlightenments and explanations are not insisted on, the more as it would be easy to satisfy the States without violating the least right of his Majesty.

(h) I believe that I may guarantee the fulfilment of this excellent desire, which is also mine.

To attain this purpose his Majesty should in his next resolution express the sincere constitutional feeling which he affirmed by oath on his accession to the throne. All the remarks which seemed to lean to absolutism would, if not repeated, be forgotten of themselves.

(i) His Majesty must go further and proclaim, as error, what is error.

His Majesty should permit, without any condition, the legal convocation of the Diet, and this permission ought to be entirely independent of other political events and circumstances, as it touches upon the fundamental element of the Constitution clearly expressed in our laws and binding on the King.

Your Highness must confess that my countrymen, even if they have appeared to disadvantage, are worthy of the confidence of a just monarch. Can a man be a loyal subject of his King who does not cleave vigorously to the laws of his country? I do not believe it, and I shall always doubt the true worth of him who is unable manfully to defend his rights. I am convinced that I shall not offend your Highness by this letter, written with the greatest respect, for truth never offends one who is true himself. I am, &c.,

STEPHEN COUNT SZÉCHÉNYI.

DEATH OF THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER.

Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, December 18, 1825.

786. The shocking event which I mentioned in my preceding despatch is both more unexpected and more serious than can well be conceived.

In such an event reason requires that a statesman should face the truth, and to attain this end he must be careful to relinquish every feeling which could make him deviate from the simple search for probable and possible facts which may assist in regulating the approaching future. This search should be founded on his knowledge of individuals.

I abstain here from anything like a panegyric on the Emperor Alexander. His qualities, his virtues, his actions, both public and private, his faults and his weaknesses, have been clearly seen in the course of a reign of more than five-and-twenty years. They belong to the domain of history. I may be allowed to add that the materials for the history of the period in which the Emperor Alexander reigned, are in my opinion nowhere better known than at Vienna. I have no doubt either that this my conviction will be generally shared by all the enlightened men in Europe.

Moreover, we know his successor equally well, and it is on this double knowledge that I found, without fear of mistake, the following opinion on the first actions of his reign.

The Grand Duke Constantine has great parts, his heart is noble and in the right place, his political principles most correct; often little agreeing with the sentimental and romantic ideas of his august brother, he nevertheless most faithfully carried out all his wishes. No one knew how to obey better than the Grand Duke.

His youth was darkened by such impetuosity of character that his reputation has suffered considerably. Age has done much to calm this heat, and his wife exercises upon his irascible nature a great and salutary influence.

His policy will be entirely pacific. The bent of his mind has two

objects: in politics, the support of the monarchical principle; and in an administrative point of view, the internal amelioration of the empire. I deceive myself, if the *History* of Russia does not begin where the *Romance* of Russia ends.

I have every reason to believe that he will not interest himself in any way with the fate of the Greeks. He has always declared with contempt against them as a nation and with animadversion as subjects in revolt. He is devoted to Austria and to the union between the two Empires. He detests the English and despises the French. He looks upon Prussia as given up to revolution.

Such is substantially the view presented to our minds by the change of reigns. The future alone can prove if the presage will be confirmed by the actions of a reign which, according to all reports, will have many difficulties to surmount. The first of these will be, that the bonds of discipline have been much relaxed under the mild reign of Alexander, and consequently the acts of the new Emperor, interpreted by the fear he inspires, will gain for him a character for hardness and create a feeling of constraint which the nation has not experienced for more than five-and-twenty years—that is to say, for the lapse of a whole generation.

Is there a chance that the natural heir to the throne will not accept the crown? Many persons think so. A very short time ought to tell us what part the Grand Duke has already taken. If the Grand Duke Nicholas were to succeed (which he could only do after a formal act of renunciation on the part of his eldest brother) it would be impossible to cast any horoscope whatever of the new reign.

However this may be, this unlooked-for event, which the correspondence from Odessa will no doubt have made known at Constantinople before the arrival of the present post, must produce great excitement at the Ottoman Court.

You will find M. de Minciaky very much embarrassed; you must pay him the greatest attention, and you cannot express too strongly the profound grief experienced by the Emperor's august master at the loss of an ally who was at the same time his life-long friend.

I can say nothing further at present. It is singular and deplorable that I should have to give you instructions on an event which, though apparently authentic, is not absolutely certain, and which, as you will observe, is not yet announced in our public journals.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, December 22, 1825.

787. In writing to your Excellency, it would be superfluous to revert to the probable or possible consequences of an event as unexpected as enormous in its inevitable consequences.

I send you some portions of correspondence which will show you that up to this time we are still ignorant which of the two brothers will occupy the throne of Russia. M. de Tatistscheff has no doubt that the Emperor Constantine's first step is grounded on calculations on the opinion which he thinks predominates in his favor in Russia. M. de Tatistscheff believes that he wishes to be urged to retain the crown. I suspend my judgment on a fact which a few days will bring to light.

A new era is commencing. My spirit is transported by it and it sees. . . .

The choice which the Emperor our august master has made of the Archduke Ferdinand is undoubtedly most suitable, and will be at the same time very useful in a business point of view. This Prince has right and deep feelings, he is placed morally on the same line that we take ourselves; neither his mind nor his principles need give us the least anxiety. He will bring to your Excellency instructions which will be the more easily arranged as His Royal Highness will not leave Vienna until we know which of the two brothers is to occupy the throne of Russia.

PRINCE METTERNICH'S LECTURES TO THE ARCH- DUKES FERDINAND AND FRANZ CARL IN 1825.

Sketch in Metternich's handwriting.

Monday, January 17, 1825. First hour.

1. General idea of politics and diplomacy.
2. The advance of science in consequence of the ever increasing spread of civilization. Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu.
3. Institution of secret State service. Its functions and objects. Its action on the administration.

Friday, January 21, 1825.

1. The idea of true policy and diplomacy. These are limited to the permanent and real interests of the States. Disadvantages of a policy grounded on mere passions.
2. Comparison between the policy of Louis XIV., Napoleon, and Frederick II.
3. Reflections on Austria's views of aggrandizement.
4. What is Austria's true policy ?

Monday, January 24, 1825.

1. The spirit of the age.
2. The French Revolution.
3. *Principes de droit et de fait.*

Monday, January 31, 1825.

1. Effects of the French Revolution in the whole of Europe.
2. Secret Societies.
3. Their general tendency.
4. Their formation.
5. They are but means to an end.

Friday, February 4, 1825.

1. Secret Societies, continued.
2. Freemasons: their first aims not culpable. But they have been divided into so many sects that Freemasonry proper no longer exists. It serves as the ready prepared instrument to spread and increase the intrigues of secret conspiracies against religion and the State.
3. Carbonarism Adelpism. The Carbonarist institution is remarkable, because by its simplicity of form it makes the sect suit the ideas of the lower classes.

CHARLES ALBERT PRINCE DE CARIGNAN, AFTER- WARDS KING OF SARDINIA.*

A contribution towards the understanding of his character. By Prince Metternich.

789. After the beginning of the revolution in Piedmont in 1820-21, King Charles Felix was firmly resolved to exclude the Prince de Carignan, who had come forward as one of the leaders of the Revolution, from the succession, and to name his son heir to the throne. In departing from a pragmatic hereditary succession the King wished to secure the sanction of the Emperor Francis, but the Emperor opposed those measures. He was of opinion, and I fully agreed with him, that exclusions of such a peculiar nature cannot but be destructive of peace (see No. 557). When the Emperor in 1825 visited Lombardy and Venetia, this question was the subject of an animated correspondence. King Charles Felix himself proposed to meet the Emperor at Milan. The Emperor profited by the opportunity to influence the King's decision. He declared that he could not receive the King till the question of the non-interruption of the hereditary succession had been settled, in which case the Emperor would prefer an interview at Genoa to an interview at Milan. "The Piedmontese," wrote the Emperor, "will be much gratified if I visit them, and Genoa will be grateful if she is chosen to be the place of rendezvous."

The King agreed, and engaged to abandon his intentions with regard to Prince de Carignan, on the understanding that the Prince de Carignan should be introduced to the King by the Emperor after the interview of the two sovereigns at Genoa. This plan was strictly followed. On the arrival of the Emperor at Genoa, where the King had arrived some days before, a courier was sent to Turin requesting the Prince to present himself to the Emperor at Genoa. The King, very much displeased with the whole affair, said to me,

* This sketch was written many years later, but is inserted here as the events to which it refers occurred in 1825.—Ed.

“J’ai cédé à la volonté de l’Empereur, autant par suite du respect que je lui porte que par suite de l’hommage que je rends au sentiment qui l’anime, et qui est celui de l’ordre appuyé sur des principes et sur l’expérience. Ce dont par contre je ne puis me défendre, c’est de la conviction que ce sera l’Autriche qui en particulier aura à se plaindre d’un homme dont les idées sont entièrement perverses !”

I answered that the Emperor’s line of conduct had not been dictated by any feelings of confidence in the Prince; that during the discussion of hereditary succession he had kept strictly to the question itself, without regard to the personality of the heir apparent; and that of two evils he had chosen the least.

Two days later the Prince de Carignan and his wife arrived at Genoa. A private house had been prepared for his reception by the King’s order, and he went immediately to see the Emperor. After an interview of an hour with his Majesty, he stayed three hours with me, and as it was late in the evening, I could not see the Emperor till the next morning. He received me with the words, “Well, what impression has the Prince de Carignan made upon you?” Being anxious to know what impression his Majesty had received during the long conversation, I asked the Emperor not to alter the chronological order of events. “The Prince has not made a very favorable impression upon me,” answered the Emperor; “he is a ‘talker,’ and these people I distrust!” “I see in your Majesty’s words,” said I, “the very same impression that I received in our three hours conversation.” “For all that,” said the Emperor, “nothing else can be done in the matter but what we have done.” The same morning the Emperor presented the Prince to the King. Charles Albert knelt before the King and begged forgiveness with tears. “It is to the Emperor,” exclaimed the King, “and not to your birth or to me that you are indebted. Never forget that, and never give your protector reason to regret his generosity.”

The Prince declared he was firmly determined, and the rest of the monarchs’ visit to Genoa passed off quietly.

The political and personal course taken by King Charles Albert after his accession to the throne need not be touched on here. Up to the year of the coronation of the Emperor Ferdinand at Milan (1838), he gave no cause for complaints on the part of Austria. The Emperor and the King met at Pavia, where I also met the King for the first time since 1825.

The King of Sardinia had his quarters in the same house as the

Emperor, who received him on his arrival. The King passed half-an-hour with the Emperor, and when returning through the Emperor's anteroom he called me, and taking my arm led me to his apartment, when the following remarkable and characteristic conversation ensued. Sitting by my side on a sofa, the King began:

"I have waited with much impatience for the happy moment when, after the years which have passed between our first meeting at Genoa and that of to-day, I am able to ask you this question: "Are you content with me, and do you consider that I have fulfilled, or not, the engagements which in 1825 I contracted with the Emperor and his minister?" You will perhaps be surprised at my addressing this question to you, so to speak, point blank. I do so for this reason: I read at Genoa, both in the face of the Emperor Francis and on your own, that you did not place entire confidence in my explanations of an unhappy past, nor in my engagements with regard to the future. I confess to you that I was not surprised; I should have even been astonished if your impressions had been otherwise.

Myself: "The Emperor and I did not doubt the intentions which you expressed to us, but the possibility of your ever being able, even in the very interest of your future, after the evils of 1820 and 1821, to repair the faults which an unfortunate enthusiasm had caused you to commit. You have kept your word to the Emperor, and if he were placed before you, Sire, he would confirm this judgment."

The King: "I am delighted to see you accept what I regard as a full justification of my conduct as a ruler. But this is not all. The circumstance of our meeting is too precious for me not to take advantage of it in the interest of a cause which is common to us, and at the same time is that of the whole social body.

"Do me the favor to listen, and accept what I say as the greatest proof of confidence. There is a vast conspiracy in the world; it seems to be only directed against thrones, but is really directed against the peace of the whole social body. I need not tell you this; what I wish to prove is that I am not, as many others are, the dupe of a faction; on the other hand there is no doubt that the position of the King of Sardinia is the most difficult of all positions. This is owing to the faults of the Piedmontese nature, a timid sort of nature, at once daring and fearful, disputatious and cunning; the position of the head of a country animated by such an unhappy spirit is rendered eminently difficult, for it is always hampered, and must therefore be ever open to suspicion on the part of the other

Cabinets. The Piedmontese mind is before everything anti-Austrian; the very air that blows from France nourishes this tendency. You know what I think of the policy *du juste milieu*, and you know that you can reckon on me. But there may be occasions when my conduct will not appear clear to you. On these occasions address me directly. Write to me and do not trust your letters to the post, but send them by a safe hand to your ambassador at Turin. He would give them to me himself without speaking of the matter to any one, and you will receive my explanations in the same way."

Myself: "I shall very rarely permit myself to use the privilege which your Majesty gives me, and for this reason. I know the Piedmontese mind; I know how very difficult it is to lead. The only way to deal with it is by perfect openness on the part of those who have nothing to conceal, either of what they wish, or the course they mean to take."

The King with difficulty agreed to my opinion. But I held to it firmly, and the documents of the secret State-office prove that I remained faithful to it.

1826.

EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's Private Letters to his son Victor, to his Mother, and to Baron Neumann, from January 1 to December 25, 1826.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, January 1, 1826.

790. Nothing new yet in the affair of the Emperors. On the 29th, Constantine made several ladies at Warsaw put off the mourning they were wearing for Alexander; he will have it that the Emperor lives. They say the Grand Duke Michael returned to St. Petersburg in consequence of an order from Constantine which he found at Kowno. Meantime all the troops—except those of the Kingdom of Poland—have taken the oath to the Emperor Constantine I.

Tatistscheff has not had mass said in the Chapel attached to the embassy, because he does not know for which Emperor to pray. He has orders to receive the oaths of Russian subjects; he delays his decision, for he believes that Constantine will end by accepting the crown. Russia in the mean time has no master, and Poland finds herself under another *régime*.

The liberal newspapers make the most of this strange situation; they always bracket me with the Emperor Alexander, and they are not far wrong, but they do themselves no good by it. The liberals thus warn his successor against separating from a man who knows how to resist them, for I doubt very much the Emperor of Russia ever becoming a good republican. If poor Alexander had not committed faults in his youth, and if in mature age he had not "*manqué de quelque chose*," as Napoleon said, where would the Liberalism of to-day be? If from the heights of Paradise things below can occupy one, Alexander comprehends me now better than he ever did on earth, and his soul ought to come to meet and support mine.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, January 3.

791. The suit between the world and Mr. Canning will not be judged before the tribunal of our embassy in London.

The suit may be gained or lost, but it will be pleaded. Judgment will be pronounced in the first six months of this year. In June I will remind you of what I now tell you.

. . . The affairs of the Diet of Hungary will soon be terminated. We have gained every case, and those who formerly fought against the Court are now fighting among themselves. This is just an example of the fact that when Kings know when to say "No," they gain their cause. The Emperor has thanked me in the most touching way for all my trouble, for it was quite by chance that the Hungarian affairs fell latterly on my already overlaiden shoulders.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, January 7.

792. . . . The courier with the news of December 26 has arrived from St. Petersburg. The deplorable struggle is over, and we have an Emperor. I congratulate Russia and Europe. (Nos. 829-831.)

The accession has been marked by a military revolt. I hope that the Emperor, who has behaved well on the occasion, will thoroughly investigate the matter, and not be content with superficial inquiries. Setting aside many private misfortunes, the event has two favorable sides: one is that of preventing the young monarch from believing the honeyed language which will be used towards him by his most determined enemies; the other, that of showing him that material distance is not sufficient to place one beyond moral influences and odious attempts. Russia has *la maladie du temps*, like all other countries. The accession of Nicholas will probably lead to fewer changes than there would have been under Constantine. Nothing remains of the ephemeral and fantastic reign of the latter except several miserable diplomatic despatches on his renunciation. There is nothing to find fault with in the proclamation of the new Emperor, which is very correct; it rests principally on the declaration of the Emperor Alexander in 1823. There is not a single paragraph in it which does not show right principles.

The sea rises, it is very rough, and the wind—of affairs—begins to blow. He is the most skilful who knows how to find its direction, and not always he who goes the fastest.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, January 27.

793. I have received, my dear Victor, your Reports and letters from London. The former are very well done, and the Emperor has read them with interest.

. . . I beg you to fix your attention somewhat more particularly on what the Russians (especially the Princess Bagration) say on the situation of things in Russia. You will see from what I told Vincent in my last despatch what the affair really is. It is neither more nor less than an exact copy of those of Madrid, Naples, and Turin. The conspiracy has immense ramifications, and the number of individuals already arrested is between twelve and thirteen hundred. Among this number are persons of the highest classes of Russian society. If the Emperor Alexander had lived, the same thing would have happened, and he and the Imperial family would have been massacred. . . . Lebzeltern cannot remain at St. Petersburg. He is too much compromised by his brother-in-law Trubetzkoi.* The public already regard him as a Carbonaro. Ah well! Lebzeltern with all his good qualities, is one of those who never believe in the existence of sticks until they have been beaten to powder. He believes in conspiracies now his brother-in-law has been arrested as a conspirator. Whenever I expressed my opinion to the Emperor Alexander, Lebzeltern, and oftener still Nesselrode, have taxed me with being a visionary, and with behaving badly to the Emperor of Russia. See what the Russian Carbonari are saying at Paris: every word is an indication to me. It is impossible yet to foresee where the affair will stop, Meantime it somewhat disconcerts our young noblemen.

Another who is almost equally compromised is Felix Schwarzenberg. He has lived on terms of the greatest intimacy with all these young scatterbrains, certainly without knowing anything of the conspiracy which was hatching; but his choice of company is returning on his own head. . . .

Leontine will tell you about our balls. I am in no humor for dancing. I refer you therefore to her accounts.

I yesterday sent to my agents to purchase Plass for me. It is to be sold by auction on the 30th of this month.

794. *February 14.*—I have bought Plass, and it is a great acqui-

* Prince Trubetzkoi, who was at the head of the conspiracy against the Emperor Nicholas, concealed himself at the house of Lebzeltern, his brother-in-law.—Ed.

sition. I send you a description of the place. These are inferior little engravings, but they show you the Château de Plass, and I shall be much surprised if you have ever seen anything grander. Besides the *château*—that is, the old abbey—there are three others of less importance. We must decide on the spot which of them can be made habitable without a ruinous expenditure.

795. *February 18.*—The news from Russia are very disquieting for the safety and internal peace of that country. I am writing more at length to Apponyi.

Take a kindly leave of M. de Vincent. He deserves it, for his conduct lately has been admirable. If he had not so many eccentricities he would be perfect in his place, but they spoil everything. Eccentricities are incompatible with business, and as soon as they seize upon a business man he is ruined.

796. *February 20.*—I have not been better in health for many years than I am at present. Ischl has done me a great deal of good. *A propos* of health, you may announce everywhere that the Emperor has been marvellously well since his illness at Pressburg. This will enrage the journalists, who would like to see us both very far from this lower world.

797. *March 2.*—I have suffered for the last fortnight with a cold in the head; it has passed away now, and I am perfectly well. Everybody in the town has either measles or cold. Your sisters as yet have escaped the first of these maladies, and, as the weather has changed suddenly, I suppose the epidemic is over.

Continue to observe the Russians, and tell me all you know. You have no idea how we are abused by the Russian knaves. They are only singing in their natural voice, and this voice they have in common with all the Radical newspapers in the world. It is a storm which must be allowed to pass over, and which will not even wet us; but those who go out in it will be drenched—that is, the bawlers themselves.

798. *March 16.*—The Emperor's serious illness has passed away; he has been for six days between life and death; to-day he is convalescent, but he will need the greatest care during his return to health. There is, however, every probability of his living a long time, for he has no organic disease, and his lungs are in a normal state. I need not tell you that these last six days have been full of terrible anxieties for me. Besides the uneasiness which I had felt from the beginning of his Majesty's illness, I had to think of the future—or rather to arrange it.

I have never left the Palace or my desk, and God has sustained me, as in so many other trials which I have been called upon to bear in my long and painful career. God has placed me in this world to labor, and with this thought I yield to His will. The different effects produced by the events we have escaped will be curious to observe. I almost allow myself to hope that the *Journal des Débats* will give us lessons on what we should have to do after the Emperor's death. But *petit bonhomme* lives still, and that is what friends and relations did not expect.

Tell me all you hear about this affair. Your *résumé* of the last despatches from London is perfectly correct, and I am quite satisfied with your work.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, March 18.

799. We have just passed through a very painful crisis. The Emperor has been at death's door; he is saved, and nothing remains of his malady but the certainty that his constitution is, contrary to all appearances, really strong. Good comes out of evil. The probability of his death will have brought many feelings to light. With us there is but one, that of the love which children bear to their father.

It is known by this time that difficult circumstances act upon me only in the sense of an appeal to means of opposing them. On the second day I admitted the possibility of the Emperor's death, and I then passed, so to speak, three entire days under the new reign. Except myself no one knew it, and I believe I may say no one suspected it. But I have obtained much and useful experience; I have learnt what I am, and what the mass of the public believes me to be. I had no need to seek for any one; all came pressing round me: friends, enemies, and the indifferent—everybody. A great empire, whose movements are regulated by immemorial custom, is a grand and beautiful thing. Its resources never having been disturbed, everything is ready to hand when required.

The trouble is over, let us talk no more of it. God has not taken to Himself in the short space of three months two men so different in their nature and yet united by the strongest and most indissoluble bonds.

800. *March 20.*—I do not know a more difficult post to occupy than that of the Emperor Nicholas. I will give you a sketch of Russia.

Peter the Great changed her frontiers. In Asia he moved them westward—in a word, he said to Russia, “Thou shalt henceforth be part of Europe.” He was right in this, but he was wrong to destroy so many of the ancient institutions of the State and not replace them.

Catherine II., entirely European, thought only of glory. She was a thorough woman, and she had the misfortune to live in the era of encyclopædists.

Paul I., if he had not been insane, would have rendered great services to his country. His sentiments were thoroughly monarchic. His characteristics are sufficiently shown in the act by which he regulated the succession to the throne.

Alexander, who was fortunate in taking the crown after his father, was unhappily the child of the age. Always going from one religion to another, from one taste to another, he moved everything and built nothing. Everything in him was superficial and exaggerated, and he ever inclined to prefer bad means to good: at the end of five-and-twenty years he left his empire at the point to which the Emperor Joseph II. had conducted his in nine years. Joseph II., however, was an administrator, and the Russian monarch was not.

The population of Russia is divided into two classes; in this respect it resembles the States of the middle ages; the difference, however, is in the quality of the classes. The aristocracy forms everywhere else the superior class, but in Russia it is only the principal persons—or, we may say, the Court and its suite—who form the superior class.

In an empire thus organized, full of peculiar positions, of necessities which exist nowhere else, the Emperor Alexander wished to introduce the refinements and the abuses of what in my opinion is very improperly described by the epithet of modern civilization—a monster without a body and all ideas!

His successor will have to search for the body, and he will have much trouble in finding it. Russia is not unlike a banqueting-hall the day after the feast. What in the evening before produced all the effect of solid and brilliant substances is seen on the morrow to be not more valuable than the cloth, false diamonds, embroidery and trimmings of which it is composed.

Old Russia exists no longer. Nicholas has been called upon to create a new one, and my heartiest wishes accompany him in this grand and noble enterprise.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, March 22.

801. We seem to have entered on a time of peace and calm. The Emperor is quite well; not only do we no longer feel any anxiety about him, but we see daily how excellent is his constitution, and how free he is from any bad tendencies. Yesterday, the twelfth day after the beginning of the illness, I passed more than an hour working with him, and his only annoyance was his having still to take care of himself.

. . . Gentz is enchanted with you. If you wish to make him foolishly fond, send him some bonbon or new perfume.

802. *March 27.*—I am surprised that on March 17 you had received no news of the trouble which, since the 10th, had fallen upon Vienna. You would have been much moved, and the arrival of the news of two monarchs dead (for they would not fail to regard the Emperor as such) must have caused great consternation to the good people. I expect the *Journal des Débats* will have given me some very sage counsel in my difficult position. Be that as it may, the dead Emperor is remarkably well. He got up yesterday for the first time, and it would be impossible for his convalescence to be more complete, more speedy, and more thorough than it is.

I return thanks to God, who has brought me individually out of great tribulation. The idea of being chained more than I already am to my desk; of not being able to stir from Vienna; of seeing my business increase tenfold—all these thoughts made me very unhappy, setting aside the fact of my tender affection for the Emperor, a man who has overwhelmed me with kindnesses, who regards me as his greatest friend, and who loves me as I love him.

The popular feeling has been shown in these grave circumstances throughout all Germany. All the accounts show what immense moral power has been acquired, far beyond the frontiers of his Empire, by the simple and modest man who bears the name of Francis I.

The King of Portugal has given me great pleasure by continuing to live.

Thank Pierre d'Arenberg for his care of my flowers; I will write to him when I have time.

The children are charmingly well. You would not know Leon-tine. She is very tall and very pretty. She will soon be the belle of society, into which, however, I am far from wishing to thrust her yet. She is, besides, the best little maid in the world. All her

masters, among others, adore her. Mademoiselle Tardivau, her governess, has already become quite a Viennese.

803. *April 4.*—We are just in the crisis of the change from winter to spring, and the labor is a difficult one. I hope for your satisfaction that you are more advanced than we are here. Among other things, we have had a hurricane for the last three days, which has knocked down everything. Yesterday, for instance, the balustrade of the "Bellaria" fell in the square, and it would have struck me if I had come out two or three minutes sooner to go to the Emperor. To-day, three grenadiers have been killed by the fall of a chimney. You see that our upper regions are not very secure.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, April 8.

804. . . . The real position of the poor Emperor Alexander was difficult to understand. He himself did not understand it, for those who lead things to the verge of ruin do not see clearly. I was the confidant of more than one secret thought of the Emperor, and I have guessed more still. I have been witness of his fears, and have often even been called to be the judge of his remorse; but the exact knowledge of Russia was wanting to me, so that I could not foresee everything. I saw that a great evil existed, without being able to fix its limits. I am able to state with perfect confidence that latterly Alexander was occupied with but one thing, and that was the desire of saving himself and his country from the ruin which he felt to be certain.

In the lives of men and in the course of great affairs opportunities sometimes occur which if they can be seized decide the whole future. One of these moments was in the spring of the year 1825. If in the month of March I had been near the Emperor, many things would have turned out differently for him and consequently for his empire.

805. *April 14.*—The Emperor Nicholas has just taken a grand step in the burning question of the moment.

If Alexander had done five years ago what his successor had just done, the detestable Eastern Question would have ceased to exist, and we might have helped the Greeks with some reason.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna April 20.

806. I find that M. d'Arlincourt is a type of the period. It is only in times of folly and bad taste that men of his stamp find any

one to applaud them. Your quotations from his tragedy are charming, and they have not failed to produce on all who have heard them the same effect as on the boxes of the *Théâtre Français*.

My plans for the summer can be arranged after the first, or at any rate after the second, news from Constantinople. I say after the second, for I admit the chance that the Divan may resist until the very eve of the peremptory term of six weeks which the Emperor Nicholas has given it. If the negotiation goes on then, I shall gain six or eight weeks, which is what I hope for.

. . . . Your sisters and your grandmamma will be very happy to see you. The former seem to grow as one looks at them, and are very pretty. Leontine danced at my party yesterday. It is the fashion now to dance in the evenings, and I pleased the child by conforming to the fashion. These small dances, which last two or three hours, do no harm to any one.

Tell Pelissier to make me a subscriber to *L'histoire générale des voyages*, by Walckenaër.

I also wish him to send me Geoffroy's *feuilletons*, six numbers, and the works of Rabaut Saint-Etienne, two volumes.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, April 21.

807. If I can (the mud will decide it), I should like to spend the months of July and August away from my desk. I shall go and see a great acquisition I have made in Bohemia, for it is foolish to spend nearly four million francs on a place I do not know. I have contracted a marriage by proxy; they say my wife is very beautiful, but I wish at least to know it for myself.

808. *April 28.*—They have done, in my opinion, very miserable work at St. Petersburg; everything is changed as if by the stroke of a wand. The Emperor from being strong has become weak; his correct political attitude has changed. I shall be able to boast of having co-operated in the March business: I should not like to be responsible for that of April.* If Russia were a country *à la mode*, I should say that the ministers had spoilt the Prince's ideas.

What will happen in Europe? I know not. My most sincere wishes are for the success of an enterprise which unfortunately, everything tells me will not succeed, or rather that evil will be so bound up in it that it will not be possible to recognize the good.

* In March Russia confined her action to her own affairs with the Porte; in April she extended it to Greece.—ED.

809. *May 12.*— . . . I am perfectly satisfied with the first conception of the Emperor Nicholas and the way he has put it into execution. It is what his predecessor ought to have done, and what if he had done he would have spared the world from six years of torments, and the Cabinets from being seriously compromised. The Porte would have done then what it will do now: it would have yielded; the Greeks would have been saved, which they will not be now; a civilized existence could have been procured for them with ease: which is what the Emperor Alexander desired, and what we desired with him.

We wished for nothing better than to see a free and independent Greek Empire! We proposed it; we were exclaimed against, and I understand why.

Nous ne marchons pas, et nous ne marcherons jamais, dans les eaux troubles ni vers les demibuts.

We wish for the preservation of political peace; but not because we have taken up the utopias of the Abbé de St.-Pierre. In a word, we wish always, and once for all, the contrary of what our enemies wish. The day when they wish for peace, we shall be asking ourselves if the time has not arrived for war.

We wish that these skirmishings between two neighboring Powers would cease, or at least be suspended, were it only that skirmishings never do any good.

Never, no never, should we advise others to do what we are determined not to do ourselves. Thus we shall never protect a system of conquest. Is it desired to chase the Turks from Europe? Well, let them be chased, and let a great empire be established in their place. But where are the elements of this empire—where is even its population? Where are its institutions, its prince, its people? We do not wish for a republic of bandits, or a monarchy composed and organized by the scum of the revolutionists of Europe. I will answer for it that the Emperor of Russia will never wish in this respect what the Emperor of Austria will not allow. I believe even that in Russia they are still more interested than in Austria that the revolution should not triumph.

We have approved frankly and unreservedly the first determination of the Emperor Nicholas, because it is right, clear, precise, and vigorous, and consequently will attain its end.

We deplore the second affair, seeing that it is of an entirely opposite character. It will lead to no good; the work of April 4 is an

abortion which in a few weeks will be disowned by the very people who formed it.*

810. *May 21.*—I am making my preparations to leave on July 1. The world thinks it a great movement; I am sure of profound peace, and I shall be a nobody for two months away from here. I have no urgent need for my health, which is very good, and really much better than it has been for years; but I need repose from the usual burdens of existence. I hope that my stay at Plass will make less noise than that at Paris. The latter, however, had the same political value, in spite of all that more than one simpleton tried to discover of importance in it!

811. *May 24.*—The Porte will yield to the demands of Russia, while it falls with all its weight on Mr. Stratford Canning. One of these facts is as natural as the other.

As Canning always does the contrary of what I should do, it is just to allow that he also thinks exactly opposite to what I think. Perhaps he will find that the part which England plays in these affairs is convenient and useful. All I know is that Mr. Stratford Canning does not know what to do, and that, instead of saving the Greeks, the English policy will cause them to be massacred by degrees, and, in fact, ruin them. Is that what it wished?

Fine weather at last. We have made our leap from winter to summer. I pass several hours every day among my flowers, and am quite happy. They are worth more than politics.

812. *May 30.*—The peace of Europe will be preserved; this is the principal thing, and the wishes of all good men will be fulfilled.

The alliance, which has been regarded as dead for the last year, lives and will live. It is I who say so: not the alliance such as its enemies have tried to misrepresent it, but such as it really is, simple, pure, and strong, as everything is which is true—such as, for my own part, I have always conceived and applied it.

They are altogether deceived in London, but that is endemic with them. Wellington has received orders to prevent a war which it is

* According to the transaction signed in the name of the English Government by Wellington, and in the name of the Russian Government by Nesselrode and Lieven, Greece was to remain dependent on Turkey, paying the Turks a yearly fixed tribute, but governed by authorities of its own choice and enjoying a perfect freedom of conscience and commerce. The Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin were invited to join in the convention. Austria and Prussia, however, declined any direct interference in the affairs of Greece. (No. 832.)—ED.

believed he was longing for, but did not wish to take the initiative if it could be avoided! They would have sworn at London that the Porte would never agree to such an arrangement; it has agreed. I may deceive myself, but I think I know better how to estimate men, their needs, and consequently their desires, than Canning.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, May 31.

813. I shall only wait for the arrival of the first courier from Russia—who will bring us news of the effects of the benign decision of the Porte—to fix the date of my journey. Nothing shall prevent it; I shall go straight from here to Plass, where I shall arrive on the 3rd or 4th of August. I shall be there twelve or fifteen days, then eight or ten at Königswart, then, if the skies favor me, about the same time at Johannisberg. I shall end my travels by going in the latter part of August to join the children at Ischl.

You will have heard of the deplorable end of young Lord Ingestre. He was drowned at the Prater, in a pond of water about as large as a medium-sized ball-room. He was mounted on a restive horse; the pond is to the right of the bridge on the road to the *Lusthaus*; the horse not liking to go over the bridge, he took the path by the side of the pond, and there he was thrown backwards into the water. His body was found after much dragging, which proved that the pond was twenty feet deep. To-day they have very properly surrounded it with a fence. In the course of twenty years seven or eight people have been drowned there, and once a wagon and horses. . . .

We have newspapers from Paris up to the 23rd. I expect tomorrow to hear of the effect produced by the news of the Porte's submission. The Liberals have a peculiar talent for deceiving themselves; the reason is that their cause rests on error, and knows not how to produce anything else! To defeat these men one has only to wait. To reach them one has but to stand still. But herein lies the difficulty of the work, and if God has given me one quality, it is that of being able to support the State firm and upright in the midst of tumult. This is what I have known how to do ever since I have been at the head of affairs, and certainly I shall not discontinue what I have found so valuable a specific. When I look round me and find only myself standing on a field strewn with dead and wounded, I must say decidedly that I have chosen a good place! They shall never make me move, and the Liberals, with their whole

following of fools and doctrinaires, shall not win the day as long as God gives me strength.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, June 5.

814. We are now plunged into a new grief. What a touching fate is that of the Empress Elizabeth! The history of the latter period of the life of the Imperial couple is moral feeling exemplified. How small are the grandeurs of this world! Taganrog and Beleff, two places abandoned by nature and man, and whose very existence was unknown till lately, find themselves surrounded with glory and homage!

We shall not send an Ambassador Extraordinary to the coronation. France and England have sent such a reinforcement that the Emperor does not wish to enter into rivalry with them. The Prince of Hesse will take a simple letter of congratulation to Moscow.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, June 7.

815. I am charmed, my dear Victor, that you have gained your pacific wager, and you know now why the Sultan has yielded, and why the Emperor Nicholas has declared himself satisfied. The greatest events often have the most trifling causes. Your 500 francs have saved the social body and defeated the sanguinary projects of the Liberals. It is fortunate they knew nothing of the fact, or they would have counterbalanced your bet by some national subscription.

Read my despatches for London (No. 832), they will enable you to see into affairs, and the opinion I have of them.

Herminie is forming herself after the model of M. Giroux. I give you two of her speeches this week.

During her arithmetic lesson she was asked what was produced by the division of a unit? She answered: "Two." To prove it, she tore a sheet of paper in half.

In her geography lesson Mademoiselle Tardivau asked her who discovered America?

She replied: "A Mr. Pigeon!" Mademoiselle Tardivau, startled, and not comprehending her, asked her if she were dreaming! "Not at all," replied Herminie; "you told me he was called Colombe. Now, *colombe* and *pigeon* are the same thing!" Odry* would make something of these sayings.

* A comic actor in Paris at the Théâtre des Variétés.

Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, June 12.

816. I am now leading a very idle life. I do nothing of any consequence, except some stupid home affairs, some tiresome protocols of the Hungarian Parliament. I might as well be at Madrid or at Madras as Vienna. For a long time there has been no diplomatic affair in Europe; that which occupies men's minds never had any real value; nothing is worse than to dabble in business without understanding it. The Emperor Nicholas has had the good sense to make himself master of his affairs, and from that moment he knew how to regulate them.

How much time and how many words have been wasted in these unhappy dissensions! The late Emperor made the mistake of wishing for seven-eighths, and of not wishing for the last eighth. Hence all his affairs were guesswork, and nothing is worse or leads one farther astray.

My feeling about the difference of the two affairs—the decision of March 17 and the protocol of April 4—it is not beginning to be, or rather is it not already, amply justified? The idea of Nicholas was good; that of Wellington was miserable. The first will lead to everything; the second will lead to nothing. The difference is great.

The world, in the meantime, is delivered up to a great and deplorable phantasmagoria. I mean the Philhellenic affair.

If I use this word plainly, it will be said that I have become a Mohammedan. Now, this is what I protest against, and I will justify my protestation.

I commence by asserting that I am a better Christian than Benjamin Constant, Hobhouse, Chateaubriand, the Abbé de Pradt, and all the rest of the set. Then, I am convinced that I am more human than Lord Cochrane and Colonel Fabvier, and further, that I have a hundred times more mind, understanding and sense than M. Eynard—who, by the by, is a man who has annoyed me more than any one in the world.

Besides all this, I confess that I very much prefer the Greeks to the Turks; for, both being barbarians, there is more hope of Christians than of Mussulmans.

This said, I inveigh against the villany of making religion and humanity a pretext to overthrow the regular course of things; against the folly of Governments which cannot escape from one or

other of these charges—either of tolerating what they do not wish to support, or of proving that what they cannot do, these wretched committees can quite well do for them. In the latter case, I should prefer to abdicate, descend from the height of an illusory power, and give up the reins of government to the Philhellenic committees.

This folly, like all others, will pass away, and the poor Greeks alone will have been the victims. If, instead of fighting with phantoms for the last five years, they had done what I was most anxious for them to do, the Greeks—as far as it was possible—would have been saved.

Many things will become clear very shortly.

817. *June 19.*—*A propos* of fashion, here is a new one I find coming in. Mr. Canning is beginning to be called in the French newspapers the accomplice of that abominable Head of the Holy Alliance. I had not expected this, but we always get what we least expect. I shall soon be accused of having drawn up Mr. Stratford Canning's instructions; of having cooked the protocol of April 4; of having commanded Lord Hamilton's expeditions. We live in an age when intellect goes begging. Really it is not worthy the trouble of having; it is much too common. Therefore it gives me great pleasure when they describe me as a species of wild beast. Not long ago I saw this in print, and the author of the article was certainly not aware how much he gratified my vanity. Nowadays it is with mind very much as it is with decorations—the way to be distinguished is not to have any.

818. *June 22.*—There are in this world two kinds of minds: one skims over everything and gets to the bottom of nothing; the other grasps things and gets to know them. Canning possesses a great deal of mind of the first species; I have certainly less mind than he, and the little I have is in the second category. Canning flies, I walk; he rises to a region where men dwell not, while I remain on the level of all things human. Hence he will have the Romanticists on his side, while I shall be reduced to simple prosaic souls. His career is as brilliant as a flash of lightning, but as transient; mine does not dazzle, but it preserves what the other consumes!

This is the simple but undoubted truth. It is always discovered by the historian, but it often escapes contemporaries. Men like Canning fall twenty times and rise twenty times: men like myself have not the trouble of getting up, for they are not so subject to fall. The first always amuse and occupy the public; the second

often bore it. I must be a very tiresome object to watch to the immense majority of those who regard me; but they must put up with that, for I shall not change.

819. *July 2.*—The West has taken a new flight in its revolutionary career. Don Pedro is praised as the most liberal of princes, and consequently as the model of monarchs, by those who not eight days ago abused him as a tiger thirsting for Republican blood. Extremes meet in the Liberal faction; they know no happy medium.

Those who like disturbances will have them. They believe at Paris that England is an accomplice: they are mistaken, or at least are only half right. The present British Cabinet is the natural accomplice of all the extravagances of the time; it is not, however, the author of them on this occasion, but, the things being done, it supports them and their consequences.

I am so accustomed to see kings look upon themselves as an abuse, that I should not be surprised if I saw one of them begging to be made the churchwarden of a parish. Far from being surprised, I quite expect it. Moreover, I am not put out in any of my calculations, and the Head of the Holy Alliance is without any doubt less surprised than any other statesman at this moment.

A few days ago I was present at a very painful scene. I was in Hungary on business connected with our tiresome Diet. The Chancellor of Hungary (Count Kohary), with whom I had been working and walking all day, and with whom I had dined, was struck with apoplexy while talking to me and old Zichy. He died in the middle of a sentence; I did all I could to help him, but one cannot help the dead.

820. *July 3.*—I have come to the end of my stay. I intend to leave on the 16th for Bohemia; I shall be by August 10 or 12 on the banks of the Rhine. Politicians are speaking of a Congress at Johannisberg. I know nothing about it, and yet I ought to know. But the world loves fairy-tales, and the human mind has returned to the golden age—that is to say, the age which preceded history. The world is peopled again with demigods; nectar and ambrosia flow everywhere, and Lethe seems to wash the thresholds of the clubs and of more than one Cabinet. It is said to possess so little poetic spirit that what gives general satisfaction does not affect one. This is the piteous case in which I find myself; I see things as they are, and so many flowers seem to me briars that I feel quite sorry for myself.

A time perhaps may come when things will mend; people will then have to come down from their stilts to my level, for I am determined never to raise myself to the region in which they are moving.

Metternich to his Mother.

821. *Königswart, August 2.*—I write to you, my dear mother, from a place we all love, and which still bears traces of your beneficence and good taste.

I have found many changes at Königswart, and I think they would all meet with your approbation. There is still much to be done, however.

The court of the *château* is removed entirely. It was necessary to lower the earth about two feet, and to make a slope on the open side. In front of the *château*—that is to say, on the site of the horrible public-house—there will be a beautiful building next year, comprising a coach-house, stables, and a lodge for one of the servants. Beyond this building in prospective, there is a beautiful little farm. I do not think one could find anywhere a place so charming and at the same time so well arranged. It is much improved by the picturesque Swiss cattle. The brewery side has quite a new aspect. The lake near the *château* will be drained this autumn and converted into meadow-land.

Three farms—the Haselhof, the Kisselhof, and the Lehnhof—are either reconstructed or restored, and stocked with fine merino sheep.

The park is lovely, and a great avenue crosses it in the direction of Marienbad. The visitors at the baths love this place, and the part nearest to Marienbad resembles the valley of St. Hélène,* it is so crowded with people and carriages.

. . . I have already had here M. de Tatistscheff, the Princes of Arenberg, Louis de Rohan, Windischgrätz, and twenty other guests. Happily, the right wing of the *château* is quite finished inside, so I have been able to entertain everybody.

Yesterday we all made an excursion to Marienbad: to-day they left me. I expect, however, to-day M. de Pralormo and Count Gaspard de Sternberg. Marienbad is not troublesome, for its inhabitants are contented with a dinner. It has destroyed the solitude of Königswart, which has thus perhaps lost one of its charms in the good old times.

* Helenenthal, near Baden.

. . . I intend, before leaving, to spend with Victor one sad morning in the parish church of Königswart, as I shall not be here till next year, when the sacred remains it contains will have been removed. The new vault at Plass will be finished by next year.

822. *Johannisberg, August 21.*—We arrived at Johannisberg on the 12th. I was obliged to go and see the King of Bavaria at Aschaffenburg; so I slept at Frankfurt on the 11th.

I find this place very much improved. A great deal has been done in the course of the last two years, and the aspect is altogether changed. Really I do not believe that there is any place to surpass this. With all that has been taken down and removed, the view is not only enlarged, but it has gained a look of culture and perfection which nothing can approach. It will take me four years yet to finish everything; then neither the castle nor its surroundings will leave anything to be desired.

The perfection of the climate and especially of the site is shown triumphantly. I have under my windows a bed in which there is not a single plant which would live out of a hot-house during the winter at Vienna or in any part of Germany.

Here all kinds of magnolias, azaleas, rhododendrons, laurels, &c., grow in the open air. I have even attempted camellias: all grow and flourish. My plantations have weathered two winters, one of which was that of 1825-1826; they have therefore stood the strongest of proofs, and, far from having succumbed in that rigorous winter, the magnolias have shot up four feet and a half. All the neighborhood comes to see my garden, which is the wonder of travellers. I am going to-morrow to Coblenz with a party, by water. The Marquis of Hertford, an old friend of mine, and the most decided Tory in England, has come here to see me.* I enjoy his society for more reasons than one: his society is congenial and our politics are the same. I shall return here the day after to-morrow. Victor and several gentlemen who are staying here will be of the party. The only drawback to my visit is the number of people who overwhelm me. Every day I have from thirty to forty people to dinner. All Frankfurt and the neighboring towns inflict themselves upon me. One thing is certain, and that is that if Austria and, I may be allowed to add, her Minister are not loved and respected in Germany, according to the *Débats* and the *Constitutionnel*, the Germans know very well how to hide their feelings.

* See "Lord Hertford on Canning," No. 833.

I am distressed at not having Chateaubriand and Benjamin Constant near me.

What a summer, my dear mother! I hope it will do you a great deal of good, and that I shall find you in a most flourishing state on my return, which will not be till after September 15. I must wait for some replies, which cannot arrive before September 7 or 8. My journey will not have been without some good fruit.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, October 21.

823. The Paris newspapers are very badly advised. They wish to kill me, and they cherish me as if they wished to preserve me. The hatred of antagonists such as those good editors would make the fortune of an unknown ambitious man. I, who am neither one nor the other, am surprised at the trouble taken by the scribes who are not feared by him whom they would like to draw into their arena: I have but one regret—not to be able to translate and insert in our own newspapers the absurdities daily published about me by my good friends in Paris and other places. I shall gain, in fact, all that they wish me to lose. For some time I have derived great amusement from the pain which no doubt they intend to give me. Poor men!

824. *October 24.*—Marshal Marmont, who has returned from Russia, has arrived at Vienna. I had a very long conversation with him to-day on what has passed at St. Petersburg and Moscow. He has the same opinion of the Emperor Nicholas that I have. I have no doubt that Nicholas will be a prince such as I think sovereigns ought to be.

825. Your last letter, December 11, interested me very much. Your judgment on the change of rôle between Pozzo and Granville quite agrees with mine, and I do not give up the idea that at Paris they are mistaken with regard to the Emperor of Russia.

It requires great force of character and much coolness to know how to separate what is reality from what is mere tinsel. I have maintained for four years against the whole world, that the Emperor Alexandria did not wish for war. I was right and the secret of my obstinacy arose from this consideration, that if he had wished it, he would have had no trouble in making it. When I hear a capitalist talking of a speculation while he does not go into it himself, I know he is speaking of something he does not wish to do.

. . . I am overwhelmed with business. My situation is like that

of one crucified: one arm is nailed to Constantinople, and the other to Lisbon; home affairs occupy the trunk; Mr. Canning is my crucifier, and the Hungarian Diet the sponge steeped in vinegar. I hope to see the latter come to a good conclusion.

Be civil to the Woronzows, to whom I entrust my letter. They deserve it; I like them very much, and have known them for a long time. He is a very right-minded Russian. If the Emperor of Russia thought of making war, General Woronzow would not go to London to spend eighteen months with his old father.

826. *December 25.*— . . . You will read my despatches of to-day, and you will see that I have had more courage than M. de Damas. The two ambassadors declare themselves quite contented. I am, therefore, fifty per cent. more advanced than the French Cabinet.

I am curious to know what Pozzo will find to say about what I have done. Unless he requires a blind obedience on the part of Austria to all the whims which, according to the humor of the moment, seem to suit his taste, he will have some difficulty in discovering why we have not made use of our independence to threaten that of others. Read carefully my secret despatch to Bombelles; you will find there a rather sharp analysis, which is, however, quite justified by the pitiable London affair. (See No. 839.)

. . . I hope you will soon send me the hangings for the drawing-room; it will be finished in about a fortnight, and it is extremely beautiful. I shall open it with a ball; I have ordered benches and white draperies for the occasion; the hangings will be reserved for grand reception days. The decorations of the drawing-room are of a very peculiar kind, and will make a great sensation. Four openings in the ceiling, of which two are for the introduction of fresh air, and two act as siphons to expel the heated air, are quite a new invention, of which I am very proud. When these hatches, if we may call them so, are closed, they are imperceptible, and when they are open, they add to the appearance of the ceiling. This is uniting the useful with the agreeable.

. . . As I am writing to you after all my packets are closed, I beg you to tell Count Apponyi that I have this moment received a report from Alexandria, dated November 25, which informs me that the Pacha of Egypt's fleet—eighty-seven vessels, men of war and transports laden with provisions and ammunition for Ibrahim Pacha—has set sail. Another report from Zante tells me that the fleet has arrived safe and sound at Navarino and Modon. So Ibrahim is re-provisioned.

STATE OF THE EASTERN QUESTION UP TO THE
TIME OF THE DEATH OF THE EMPEROR ALEX-
ANDER.

Metternich to Vincent, in Paris, Vienna, January 5, 1826.

827. I have the honor to send herewith to your Excellency a despatch on the Eastern Question. It has no other object but to serve as an instruction to the Archduke Ferdinand in the very probable event of the new sovereign of Russia speaking to him on this important subject.

As the Memoir traces succinctly and correctly the attitude of our Court and the opinion we have always pronounced on the dispute, I have thought it advisable to deposit a copy of it in the archives of our principal embassies.

The Eastern Question historically considered.

828. The insurrection of the Greeks has been condemned from its origin by the principal Christian Powers—explicitly and publicly by some, tacitly and virtually by others—as a revolutionary attempt which the most determined oppression (even if the authors of the revolt had proved the fact) could never justify, and as an event tending to add new embarrassments and dangers to the already critical position of Europe. In any other circumstances the sovereigns, to be faithful to the principles which they have solemnly proclaimed and applied to more than one of the revolutions of our time would, in the cause of peace, good order, and justice, have given their assistance to the outraged Government, and helped it to stifle as soon as possible a conflagration which threatened the repose of three parts of the world. What prevented them from fulfilling a duty which at the very beginning of the insurrection they would have done in any other country, was not at first, as is now believed, the ascendancy of public opinion; for at the time of that outbreak this opinion was not nearly so general, so pronounced and so pow-

erful as unhappily it has since become, in consequence of the indefatigable labor of factions and the ignorance and credulity of the public.

One consideration only arrested the sovereigns at the very beginning: it was repugnant to them to furnish arms to a Power professing dogmas contrary to Christianity, against subjects guilty, but Christians and unfortunate. It was this which threw them into the painful dilemma of being able neither to aid the Greeks without violating the principles of public right, nor of fighting against them without wounding religious feelings. A passive attitude (very different from a neutrality properly so called) was the only means of conciliating these two great interests. From that time the rôle of the Powers was limited to employing all that an enlightened, kind and skilful diplomacy could suggest, and all the means which their united influence gave them, to put an end to a struggle in which they were prevented from interposing with their material forces. In departing from this rôle they would have run the risk of rendering useless the only resources which remained to them, or of precipitating themselves into one of those extremities which it was equally important they should avoid.

It must be confessed, since it is the truth and history cannot ignore it—it was Russia who, in the first place, deprived herself and her allies of the advantages of a position in itself very difficult and delicate.

Led, not by views of ambition or cupidity, always foreign to the soul of the monarch who directed her destinies, but by feeble or equivocal counsels, she fell into two faults, the consequences of which could not fail to extend far and wide. The first was that of allowing herself to be led to believe that it was an urgent necessity for Russia to interfere, and to interfere at any price, in the affair of the insurrection, and consequently, as she neither could nor would act on the Greeks, to act strongly on the Porte in any way and by any means she could.

Imbued with this opinion, the Russian Cabinet soon gave to its proceedings at Constantinople a character all the more alarming and the less adapted to the circumstances, since the Porte—amazed at a catastrophe so terrible and unexpected—was absolutely not in a state to judge of its own position, to consult its own interests, or to maintain any political discussions. Russia, believing herself repulsed and offended, and listening only to the irritation of the moment, then committed a second fault, more grave in its conse-

quences than the first—that of recalling her embassy, thus depriving herself of the only means of accomplishing what she desired so ardently—that of acting directly on the Porte.

By this unfortunate resolution, Russia necessarily placed herself in the alternative, either of losing little by little her influence and even a part of her consideration at Constantinople, or of making war on the Porte: a part abhorrent to the Emperor for many weighty reasons both generous and worthy. His Cabinet, having gratuitously closed all direct avenues, saw itself obliged to confide to the ministers of its allies the grievances and protests which it had against the Porte, and which, indeed, it could not renounce without isolating itself in a question in which it must have such a lively interest.

The allied Cabinets undertook this commission, one of the most painful which could fall to the lot of diplomacy. Their cares and their efforts were paralyzed by the retreat of Russia, a retreat which, in the eyes of the Porte, rendered ineffectual or suspected the best combined steps they could attempt. These steps, moreover, formed part of two different negotiations, each of which especially claimed their attention.

The departure of the Russian embassy produced a state of exasperation and fear at Constantinople, which the declarations of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg were little calculated to allay, but were indeed much more likely to strengthen. Each day saw new grievances, new claims, new recriminations, arise on one side or the other; and the efforts of the ministers of the allies were soon restricted to calming the storm ever ready to break out.

In the midst of these inquietudes, they could not lose sight of the great object of the pacification of Greece. The absence of Russia made itself felt in everything relating to that question, and reduced the allies to representations easily repulsed by the Porte. They nevertheless continued to advise moderation and clemency, and tried to familiarize the Ottoman ministers with the best means of arriving at a pacification, which the results of the military operations were beginning to render problematical, and to prepare the way for more effectual negotiations, which the gradual exhaustion of the insurgents seemed to make possible, but which the return of a Russian mission could alone crown with success.

The time will come when justice will be done to the manner in which the allied Cabinets, especially that of Vienna—the central point of impulsion—have acquitted themselves of this double task;

to the inexhaustible patience with which they have braved the difficulties; to the often-renewed activity with which they have approached so many complications; to the merit, in short, of having supported for four years the structure of peace and the Alliance against the numerous dangers with which it was assailed, and of having averted from Europe the new troubles with which it was threatened.

The Congress of Verona and the meeting of the two Emperors at Czernowitz in the month of October, 1823, had quite reassured the Cabinets as to the personal disposition of the Emperor Alexander. His constant attachment to the Alliance, his moderate and pacific sentiments were again manifested in such a way as to silence all apprehensions. The Cabinet of Vienna worked with redoubled zeal and diligence towards so desirable an end. It had long since recognized the inconveniences and delays to which they were exposed by treating simultaneously, by confounding in one negotiation, two kinds of questions absolutely distinct: those which regarded the demand of Russia as to her principal treaties with the Porte, and those which had for their object the re-establishment of peace in the Ottoman Empire. The first were the most urgent, and at the same time the easier to arrange; the latter, although of far greater importance, had not yet acquired that degree of maturity which could render their solution near or even probable.

The Court of Vienna formally renewed a proposition which it had many times advised, that of separating the questions—of settling first the direct interests of Russia sanctioned by the treaties, and of reserving the affair of the pacification to the time when the Powers should have arranged the means of approaching it with most hope of success. This proposition, accepted by Russia, had all the effect which was expected. While simplifying the discussions, it accelerated the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two empires. The sending M. de Minciaky to Constantinople showed the sincere wish of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias to terminate amicably his discussions with the Porte.

The evacuation of the Principalities, commenced in the year 1823, was concluded; regulations were made, remedying the annoyances and checks to Russian navigation and commerce exercised in former years; the Porte consented—with some modifications dictated in the interest of her finances—to the principle of granting to all the Powers which desired it the freedom of the passage of the Black Sea. And, lastly, the departure of Lord Strangford from

Constantinople, and the delivery of M. de Minciaky's credentials (in October, 1824), terminated, we may be allowed to hope, the first act of these long and painful discussions. Thanks to the activity and perseverance of the ministers of the allied Courts, the Porte had met all the grievances and satisfied all the demands of Russia, with the exception of one article, which was not even mentioned in the treaties—the restitution of the former connection between the Hospodars and the heads of militia in the Principalities, an article which has been recently settled by the special intervention of Austria.

The Court of Russia evinced its satisfaction by several measures which seemed to put a seal to these transactions. The Emperor thanked Lord Strangford in the most honorable terms, and begged the King of England to confer some favor upon him. He nominated M. de Ribeaupierre minister to Constantinople, and published the ukase of his nomination. For a short time we were full of hope.

But that most thorny of problems, the pacification of Greece, remained to be solved. In proportion as the difficulties of that affair increased, and the means of action became weaker, the interest of Russia in it seemed to increase. From the beginning of 1824, she proposed to the allied Courts to hold ministerial conferences at St. Petersburg for the purpose of taking into consideration a plan of pacification drawn up by her Cabinet, and to arrange measures likely to be agreeable to the Porte. These conferences, the first of which took place in the presence of the English ambassador, were suspended by the departure of the Emperor Alexander for his eastern provinces; they were to have been resumed on his return, when a fatal and unforeseen incident suddenly changed the whole aspect of things. The English Government, which during the first years of the Greek revolution had constantly acted in concert with the Continental Courts; which even after the change of ministry in 1822 had neither withdrawn nor essentially modified the instructions to its ambassador at Constantinople; which, in short, had actually promised its countenance to the conferences at St. Petersburg—declared to the allied Cabinets that considerations founded partly on its own connection with the countries in the Levant, partly on the difficulty of effecting under the circumstances a reconciliation between the Porte and the insurgents, prevented it from taking part in these conferences. The consequences of this resolution were easy to foresee. The absence of England would in the

conferences themselves make itself felt by uncertainties and embarrassments of every kind; and, whatever might be the result, any attempt at intervention would lose a great part of its weight at Constantinople, by confirming the Porte in its long-cherished suspicion that the principal powers of Europe were no longer united in their views and system.

The Cabinet of Vienna was quite aware of these new obstacles; but, always ready to second anything in the least tending to the re-establishment of peace, convinced of the necessity and animated with the sincere desire of finding a remedy for the calamities and disorders of the Levant, it was none the less willing to contribute by its good will and knowledge to the deliberations at St. Petersburg. The result of the conferences answered our expectations. The aim of the four Courts continued to be the same, but the divergence of opinions was manifested in more ways than one, not only in the choice of means, but in the possibility of employing these means. It was soon seen that the most indispensable elements for forming an effective and feasible plan of operation were lacking, and that problematical questions were not ripe enough to admit a positive decision. That the fruit of their labor might not be entirely lost, and to prepare the way for better considered and better arranged measures, the Conference adopted the plan of charging the ministers of the four Courts at Constantinople with a verbal and confidential message, for the purpose of representing to the Porte the necessity of a pacific intervention of the Powers in the affairs of Greece. This step, executed in haste and at the most inopportune moment, had the fate which might have been foreseen.

The Russian Cabinet, having itself no doubt of the uselessness of this feeble attempt, determined to push the question in other directions. Even before it was informed of the refusal of the Porte, it addressed directly to the three allied Courts an urgent appeal on the necessity of arranging without delay the course they would follow in the event of the Turkish Government persisting in not accepting their intervention. Unhappily, this communication from the Russian Cabinet contained a proposal which the Austrian monarch had always regarded as incompatible, not only with political interests, but with respect for the rights of others and the validity of treaties, and, consequently, opposed by his own conscience—the proposal for a recourse to coercive measures against the Porte, if persuasion proved ineffectual. The Cabinet of Vienna believed itself obliged, even at the risk of displeasing Russia, to

express its opinion on this subject with the sincerity and frankness which had always characterized its correspondence. In announcing the grave reasons which prevented it from acceding to the proposal of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, it added considerations which appeared of sufficient weight to convince that Cabinet that the path it pointed out was directly opposed to the end it wished to attain, and that by following it the Powers would simply provoke fresh and more extended complications than those they wished to overcome.

The Emperor Alexander, dissatisfied with this reply, dissatisfied perhaps with the position in which, with the purest and most loyal intentions, he found himself placed, maintained a strict silence, disquieting no doubt for the Cabinets, but which did not shake the confidence of the Cabinet of Vienna in the greatness of his character. The result, however, was an absolute stagnation between the Russian and Continental Cabinets as to the Eastern Question—a stagnation which continued until the deplorable event which has plunged Russia and Europe into mourning.

As this state of things could not be indefinitely prolonged, it would have probably ceased with the return of the Emperor to his capital, and in whatever part he had then taken he would have found we agreed with him. For nothing has changed, either in our principles or in our views or in the judgment we pronounced on the Eastern Question from the very beginning; but of course the stability of our principles could not prevent us from following the march of events and adapting our ideas to their progressive development.

Lord Strangford's project brought us back to the ground we never wished to leave. We have always regarded as feeble and barren any plan of pacification which did not include the suffrage and active co-operation of England. But if that Power will agree with the Powers on one of the greatest questions which the progress of the century has submitted to the solicitude of the Governments—if the five Powers, in short, will and can agree on measures practicable and well arranged, Austria will not fail them; and without indulging in chimerical hopes, without answering for a success which human wisdom cannot guarantee, we will take our task upon us and loyally fulfil it.

We are ignorant how far Lord Strangford has been authorized to draw up and communicate his project. If he has acted according to the instructions of his Court, or if the British Government re-

ceives favorably the ideas with which the gravity of the circumstances and the prospect of imminent danger for Europe have inspired this minister, we must congratulate ourselves on such a happy augury for the consolidation of the general peace and for the re-establishment of a perfect harmony in the system of the great Powers.

We have but little to say on the motives which we think should determine Russia to fix her attention on the proposed plan. Unless that Power—which nothing will allow us to suppose—prefers to abandon to the chances of war an affair in which the employment of that force would be without a definite object, without known end, impossible to justify, and, as things are, almost impossible to conceive, it is certain that the step proposed by Lord Strangford offers to her an honorable means, either of obtaining what she desires or of withdrawing from a complication which can only lead to the most disastrous results. The public voice in Russia complains especially that the Government has lost its influence, not only in Greece (which would be the fault of events and not its own), but also at the Porte. The arrival of a Russian minister at Constantinople, which is one of the fundamental conditions of the project in question, would soon contradict these complaints. It is impossible that this minister should not be treated with all the respect and listened to with all the deference dictated, if not by the good sense of the ministers of the Sultan, at least by the fear of a second rupture. Even if he should not succeed in all the steps he might take in common with the ministers of the allied Courts to hasten the pacification of Greece, the honor of Russia would be in nowise compromised; it would only be false friends and perfidious counsellors who would maintain the contrary. Russia, after all, would preserve her present attitude. If she wished, if she could wish for war, war she could have. She would lose nothing and gain much by an attempt in which the risk would be divided with her allies.

We are persuaded, and those who knew the Emperor Alexander well will agree with us, that that monarch would not have refused to entertain a project fulfilling at least what he himself regarded as the first conditions of success in a negotiation with the Porte. This persuasion makes us hope that his august successor will not disdain to entertain it.

ON THE ACCESSION OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, January 8, 1826.

829. . . . The prolonged uncertainty regarding the accession of the new sovereign of Russia obliged us to delay our explanations on the great political interests in question until we knew which of the two Grand Dukes, Constantine or Nicholas, would bear the burden of the Crown. It was only the day before yesterday, January 6, that we were informed of the accession of the Emperor Nicholas I., and of his proclamation at St. Petersburg and Warsaw.

History contains no episode so singular in its causes as that which has kept a great empire without a head for nearly a month; one is glad to arrive at the end of such a strange situation. I need not enter into any particulars to your Highness on the circumstances which have accompanied the accession of Nicholas I. The correspondence between St. Petersburg and London is so direct that it would be impossible to tell you anything that was not known in England long before the arrival of our news.

The revolt of a part of the troops, the nature and the tendency of that event, seem to contain a warning to the new monarch not to deceive himself as to the work of innovators—a salutary warning for a young prince surrounded by men given up to the false spirit of the age.

The Circular which M. de Nesselrode addressed to the diplomatic body at St. Petersburg on the day of the accession is set forth in terms which are amply confirmed, in a sense most favorable to us and to our wishes, by the direct overtures which the new Emperor has made to the Emperor our august master. . . .

We have no doubt that the Emperor Nicholas will follow in the steps of the late Emperor in the affair of the pacification of the Levant. The last measure of the representatives of England and France will be regarded by his Imperial Majesty as the first addressed to him by the two Courts. It is therefore very important

to draw up correctly, and on fixed and unimpeachable principles, the first advances made by the Powers to the new monarch.

I beg that you will express yourself to Mr. Canning in similar terms to this despatch, and inform us as soon as possible, of any directions which may be received by Lord Strangford.

One painful circumstance, however, will for the present, at least, render any military operation of Russia against the Porte physically impossible. The plague has just invaded the two Danubian Principalities with awful intensity. . . .

The Emperor has given the necessary orders for forming a cordon of the greatest severity. Five or six thousand men must be employed in this service, and I am persuaded that the Liberal newspapers of Europe will tax us with arming in favor of the Turks and against Russia, while they will give to the measures taken by the Court of St. Petersburg an entirely different complexion.

Metternich to Lebzeltern, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, January 10, 1826.

830. The Emperor has heard with great satisfaction that the generous struggle between the two successors to the throne of Russia is concluded.

The Manifesto published on December 26 by the Emperor Nicholas I. is a monument of wisdom and moderation. It proves to us that the new Sovereign would not have been able, without very evident inconveniences, to act otherwise than he has done. The Manifesto explains the reasons of this conduct most satisfactorily, and his Imperial Majesty in taking his position firmly on the Pragmatic Sanction so happily established by the Emperor Paul has rendered an eminent service to his country and to the whole of Europe. The first need in every country being the clear and precise determination of the line of succession to the throne, it would be impossible to deny that his Imperial Majesty has conferred a great benefit on Russia. It is pleasant to see a powerful monarch begin with such calmness and rectitude of principles the painful career assigned to him by Providence.

The same may be said of the manner in which the Emperor conducted himself on the occasion of the deplorable bungle which was made on December 26. Such conduct in such an event is equivalent to many years' reign.

Nothing, on the other hand, could have been more satisfactory to

the Emperor our august master than the terms of the first Circular Note which Count Nesselrode addressed on that same December 26 to the diplomatic body at St. Petersburg.

You would do well, Count, to address to Count Nesselrode a Note, replying to that of December 26, in the terms we have mentioned, which are those dictated to the Emperor by his own conscience.

Your Excellency will receive herewith your new credentials, both original and copies.

Monsignor the Archduke Ferdinand will start on the 11th of this month.

Metternich to Lebzelter, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, January 10, 1826.

831. The commendation in the preceding despatch (No. 830) of the first Manifesto of the reign of the Emperor Nicholas is not at all exaggerated. . . .

The more correct this act of the new monarch is, the more one is inclined to blame the various documents exchanged between the Emperor Alexander and the Grand Duke Constantine. Those who did not know the mind of the former must find it very difficult to conceive the existence of such an act as that of August 28, 1823.* The event, moreover, proves, also, that one cannot treat lightly or indifferently acts which require the greatest consideration and the most careful arrangement—those, namely, destined to serve as the foundation of the monarchy—without perilling the repose of empires. If Russia pays for a month's interregnum by the loss only of several hundred men, she will have bought her experience cheaply.

You will readily understand that in the present case the spectators placed out of the fray must have very different impressions from those who occupy the very arena of the conflict. We are also able to judge of the extraordinary effect which the events of the month of December have produced on minds beyond the frontiers of Russia. The two brothers, if they did not know how to advise themselves, would have done well to seek counsel from men capable of regulating a great and important affair in the way indicated by the most simple reasons of State.

* A manifesto of the Emperor Alexander in favor of the Grand Duke Nicholas in consequence of the voluntary renunciation by the Grand Duke Constantine of the succession to the throne; in four sealed copies left in the care of trustworthy persons and not opened till after Alexander's death.—Ed.

The revolt of December 26 will have had the advantage of allowing the character of the young monarch to be seen by the public, and of showing him that Russia is, unhappily, as easy to agitate as all other countries are in our time. I hope a thorough inquiry will be made as to those who seduced the soldiery, for they were certainly in this case only tools in wicked hands. It is just possible that *les hommes en frac*, of whom Count Nesselrode made mention in his Circular to the Russian ministers abroad, will be able to put the Government in the way of discovering how far revolutionary influences have been at work. Russia has, so to speak, been breathing for years the Liberalism of Europe; hundreds of travellers from that nation are steeped in its atmosphere, and have been for a long time waiting for an opportunity to return to their country and the Imperial Court. Facts like these must necessarily leave some traces.

M. de Tatistscheff speaks of having received from Count Nesselrode an order—more explicit even than the text of the Circular from that minister to the diplomatic body at St. Petersburg—to give us the strongest assurances that the new Emperor desires nothing so much as to strengthen the happy and intimate connection between the two Courts. I use the same expressions which M. de Tatistscheff uses, because he has not actually shown me the order; and if, on the one hand, I am a little surprised at his reticence on so satisfactory a subject, on the other hand it is very natural that Count Nesselrode should not enter into details in the very first days of an accession to the throne which has been marked by so much embarrassment. M. de Tatistscheff added, however, that the new Emperor would take up the Eastern Question immediately, seeking its solution on the ground of the alliance. . . .

I am waiting for your news, Count, with eagerness; you will have much to tell, and I impatiently expect many details with which your zeal and your knowledge of the places and the men will enable you to furnish us.

THE AUSTRIAN POLICY IN THE EAST AFTER THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA, APRIL 4, 1826.

(See No. 809.)

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, June 8, 1826.

832. The terms used by the Chief Secretary to you confirm what I have long observed, that the British Cabinet starts, concerning the most important points of the misunderstanding between Russia and the Porte, from two suppositions absolutely different from those which have guided our calculations. He has admitted, on the one hand, the positive desire of the Emperor Nicholas for a rupture with the Porte, and, on the other, the invincible repugnance of the Porte to yield to any demand addressed to it by Russia. But facts have now placed the truth in the light in which sooner or later it is always seen. The Porte has conceded all the demands of Russia, and this concession has been received with undoubted satisfaction by the Emperor Nicholas.

For a long time, and perhaps always, there has been a total difference of opinion between our Cabinet and that of London on the possibility of a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte. The case has been tried, and the event has proved that we were not deceived in our presentiments.

We have never had any doubt on the following fundamental points—namely:

That the Russian monarchs (the last like the present), far from desiring the rupture with the Porte, have ever since the beginning of the revolution regarded the war as a very disastrous event.

That the arrangement of the differences between Russia and the Porte, and an interpretation of the Treaty of Bucharest which would tend to remove the awkwardness concerning the retrocession (desired by this Treaty) of some point in Asia, have constantly occupied the first place in their thoughts.

That the arrangements concerning the fate of the Morea and the isles have had but a secondary value for them, and that,

1st. Seeing the absolute impossibility that Russia can ever wish for the political independence of the Greeks;

2nd. Seeing the impossibility of that Power ever regaining her former influence over them;

3rd. Seeing, in short, that some sort of dependence on the Porte must necessarily be imposed on the Greeks, instead of that political independence for which they have made so many sacrifices; the active part which Russia will take in this return to dependence, far from satisfying public opinion, and thus corresponding to the strong considerations which attach that Power to the cause of the Greeks, will be laid to the charge of the Russian monarch.

That any other conclusion of the pacification of Greece than that brought about by the natural course of things can only be attained by the united moral efforts of the principal Powers of Europe, and especially by those of Russia, Austria, and England.

These are undoubted truths and I leave them wholly to your discretion. Do what you think best to enlighten the conscience of the British Cabinet with respect to us; I am not afraid of committing myself, for what I have just written is a matter of history.

The separate negotiation between Great Britain and Russia, and the assent of the Sultan to the first proposals of the Emperor Nicholas, have drawn a definite line between the past and the future; the claims of the historian begin with the separation between the periods.

The Eastern Question has arrived at the end of one of these periods. It is clear to me that the Porte and Russia will come to an understanding.

What will become of the other part of the affair?

To reply to this question I must recall to you the points of view from which we have always regarded the Greek affair.

It is difficult to say exactly what is to be understood by Greece. Is one understood to speak of the Peloponnesus and the isles, or of all the parts of European Turkey which contain a majority of Christian population? If the Peloponnesus, either alone or with the isles, offers—which we do not admit—the indispensable elements for forming a politically independent State, the existence of such a State would suffice to render that of an Ottoman Power in Europe problematical; the union of all the countries principally inhabited by Greeks would render it impossible. Thus, in either of

these hypotheses, the establishment of an independent Greece would be synonymous with the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

If—setting aside all considerations of right and justice—the means necessary for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the conditions for the re-establishment in their place of a great Christian State, could be regarded as existing, of all the Powers Austria would lose the least by such a change.

The proved fidelity with which the Porte has regularly fulfilled its engagements, and the scrupulous respect with which it has observed its treaties, make, it is true, its vicinity useful and even commodious to us. European Turkey really affords to Austria all the negative advantages of a sea frontier.

Nevertheless, whenever a great independent Christian State shall replace the Ottoman, that State will become our natural and active ally. Placed between two great and powerful neighbors, it will not be the encroachments of one that aims at no extension, and which in consequence of the physical and moral conditions of her existence never will aim at any—in a word, it will not be Austria that will be feared by the new Greek Empire; her tendency must necessarily be to seek and cultivate its friendship.

To represent us as the irreconcilable enemies of Greece, and to seek motives for our hatred in the fears for our political interests which their independence would inspire, would be as erroneous as to re-echo the many contemptible libels which we consider it beneath our dignity to contradict.

But does the question ever arise among the Cabinets of the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the establishment of a free and independent Greece? Certainly not. Nevertheless, the general excitement in Europe is founded on this supposition; the most atrocious calumnies are in this sense directed against the Governments; Austria especially is the daily mark of the factious, who aim at objects exactly opposite to those which could ever be pursued by a sound policy or even the simple calculation of possibilities. Up to this time, instead of seeing the Government oppose this torrent, we have unfortunately been the witnesses of a system of toleration and even of action in a contrary direction.

What has our Court desired, and what ought it to desire? Its desire has been, and always will be, that the first causes of so much excitement, of so detestable and dangerous a game, should cease with as little delay as possible. It sees no remedy for the evil except in the pacification of the insurgent countries.

This pacification can only be accomplished in one or other of the three following ways: the voluntary submission of the Greeks to the Ottoman Power; the reconquest of all the insurgent countries by the force of Turkish arms; or an amicable arrangement, under the influence of the Powers, between the Sultan and his rebellious subjects.

It is this last plan which for five years has occupied the attention of our Court. . . .

Now that, in consequence of the transaction of April 4, we have acquired the feeling of perfect liberty of action, we think proper, for the interest of the general cause, and perhaps even for our honor, to draw a line between the past and the future. No one runs less after affairs than the Emperor our august master; no one is less jealous than he of seeing them arranged without his concurrence. Let good be done and let evil be avoided, is the sum total of his Majesty's desires.

How can this end be attained in the present position of things? Happily it is not our business either to arrange or propose the means. We have only to wait and hear, with all the interest this question has for us, what will be proposed by the two Courts who are engaged in its solution. . . .

I hope, Prince, that you will thoroughly enter into the spirit of this despatch; it expresses in a few words all our thoughts on the Eastern Question; it is agreeable to historical truth, and to the positions in which the Powers and the two contending parties are placed. You will express yourself in this same spirit, and, as far as possible, in our very words, to the Secretary of State. We leave you to make the necessary explanations so that the British Cabinet may comprehend—

1st. What we have always seen and desired in the Eastern Question;

2nd. What we see in it at the present moment;

3rd. That we are troubled by no views of ambition or of uneasy activity; and that far from desiring to put ourselves forward, either by giving advice, or by taking direct steps, we are in a state of tranquil expectation, prepared to learn what England believes, thinks, and wishes, in an affair which she has suddenly taken in hand, and concerning which it is reasonable to suppose she has some fixed and clearly arranged plan: a plan that should not be difficult to communicate to the Power which ought naturally to be made acquainted with it.

LORD HERTFORD ON MR. CANNING.

Rough copy of a letter written by Metternich, dated August 23, 1826, without address (probably to Gentz).

833. In my present position I am sure to fall in with people unexpectedly who are able to enlighten me on some point or other. Thus, the Marquis of Hertford (formerly Lord Yarmouth) has fallen into my hands. You have, I am sure, heard of this man. As Lord Yarmouth he for some years took part in politics. He was cousin to the late Lord Castlereagh, and son of the King's old friend. I made his acquaintance in Paris, where he was much with Talleyrand. Since his father's death he has thrown himself into Parliamentary work. He is one of the most distinguished and wealthiest Tories, controls ten votes in the House of Commons, and in general plays the part which the high nobility of England grants to those who know how to profit by their own position and general circumstances. Neumann met him at Spa, and, as he intended to visit the Rhine, he encouraged him to pay me a visit at Johannisberg. Hearing this from Neumann, I formally invited him. I passed some days with him which opened a new world before my eyes. I had not for many years met with so independent, thoughtful, and clever an Englishman. His words were like echoes of the past. We talked together quite frankly and unreservedly, and I feel sure that he was as pleased with me as I with him. The difference between our final impressions could only be that whereas he could teach me much, it was not in my power to tell him anything new.

He is of my opinion with regard to Canning; the picture I had made of this scourge of the world corresponds with his; and if in our conversation I pronounced judgment upon Canning's individuality with diplomatic moderation, the truth of it was always confirmed by his own plain words. He calls him and his actions by the right names, strengthening my own feelings with regard to both. Sometimes, too, he overstepped the limits of mere polemics, and the following is the substantial point of view from which he judges of Canning.

Hertford maintains that things have attained their height, and that the next session of Parliament will show this. He and all Tories, he says, have exhausted their patience, and are firmly resolved to begin the fight. This feeling was one motive for their resolution; the other was the death of the Duke of York, the brother of King George IV. The Duke, said Lord Hertford, had for years been regarded as the firm support of the Tories, a fact which had done much to bring about the present miserable state of affairs, first, because in his future the victory of the party seemed secured; secondly, because with the Duke two feelings had equal weight, the cause of the throne and the respect due to the King. Whenever the leading men of the party came forward he endeavored to hold them back and prevent them from making an attack. This proceeding alone would account for Canning's majority, composed of all the Whigs and a certain number of Tories. This amalgamation would now come to an end, for nothing was left to Canning but to form a ministry with Lord Lansdowne and Lord Holland in the House of Lords. His ambition, however, which was boundless, led him to desire himself to be at the head of the administration.

You will remember that I had heard privately of this arrangement with Lord Lansdowne. On my asking him what would happen to Lord Liverpool if such changes took place, Hertford answered "that he would descend from the stage without leaving a trace behind him. He had displeased the Tories without doing enough for the Whigs, and this arose from his indolence, which prevented him from looking into anything whatever beyond the next sitting of Parliament." (How true a description this is I need not tell you.)

"Observe what I say," continued Lord Hertford; "you will soon see the battle begin; at the head of the combatants will be the Duke of Wellington, the Lord Chancellor, and Robert Peel."

On my remark that the Duke of Wellington appeared to me to be too weak to ensure the success of such an affair, he replied: "Your remark is just; but Wellington's name is necessary, and with the support of the whole aristocracy and the country gentlemen, who all think their property is endangered, it may be successful. Canning stands quite alone, and although by granting favors he has contrived to get some clients, they are nothing against the majority of the squires and the rich commercial and manufacturing classes, the two latter being already ruined by the measures of Canning and his friend Huskisson, and the very existence of the coun-

try gentlemen endangered. The only reason why Canning had been spared till now (namely, the certainty that the Whigs would be strengthened by his withdrawal) had entirely lost its weight from the day when he, as a member of the ministry, made advances to the Whigs."

On my asking him what view the King would take of the struggle, Hertford replied that he was in a state of apathy. The calm which reigned around the throne was, in his eyes, Canning's greatest merit. This calm once troubled, the King would wish for, certainly not hinder, the victory of the right party.

En résumé, I received the impression that Lord Hertford considers a change of affairs inevitable, and the calmness with which he spoke seems to me particularly remarkable. He used expressly the word *Umschwung* (change), and pointed out "Reform" as the reverse of a success of those plans which he announced as quite decided. His last words on this subject were: "A middle course is no longer to be thought of, and with Reform the throne disappears."

To illustrate Canning's line of conduct he told me several anecdotes, some of them very amusing.

He thinks of the history of the Portuguese Constitution as I do. He supposes that Don Pedro's resolutions are unknown to Canning, and that only two reasons could have induced Charles Stewart to take part in them, either to play Canning a trick, being his sworn enemy, or that he had turned out to be himself a fool—a supposition proved, so it seemed to me, by Lord Hertford, on almost indisputable grounds. Some months ago, the ship in which Charles Stewart sailed to Brazil was wanted for a more important service and exchanged for another. Hearing this, Stewart wrote to Lord Melville that he refused to sail in the new ship, which had been sent on purpose to drown him. Lord Melville showed the letter to Lord Hertford, asking him if such a fancy and such a letter, addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty, was not a proof of madness. It would be the strangest fate which could be imagined if the English Ambassador became a madman in order to present the world with the Portuguese Constitution!

ON THE MOST IMPORTANT AFFAIRS OF THE DAY.

*Metternich to Count Bombelles, in St. Petersburg, Johannisberg,
September 7, 1826.*

834. I do not wish to leave my present abode without addressing a despatch to you, giving you my impressions on the most important affairs of the moment.

Your despatches of the 22d to the 26th of July, and of the 15th of August, as well as the first letter which the Prince of Hesse has addressed to me from Moscow, permit me to hope that the confidence I allowed myself to found on the moral position of the Emperor Nicholas will not be deceived.

If that monarch knows what is for his own welfare, he must necessarily attach great value to being on good terms with Austria.

The attempts made by men who wished to disturb the good understanding between the two Empires have failed at Vienna; they will also fail at St. Petersburg, and I do not for an instant doubt that the best means at our disposal for attaining this end is what we have already made use of—namely, the reserve we have imposed upon ourselves.

M. de Tatistscheff, whose personal conduct continues to deserve our commendation, remained a fortnight here. He has now returned to Vienna, where I expect to arrive about the 20th of this month.

The result of the negotiations at Ackermann will be known to you as soon and probably sooner than to us. When the dice are thrown, it is of no use calculating what the number will be. The questions seem to me to have been long since placed on a very simple basis. Russia and the Porte have an interest in common, which is the preservation of peace; it is therefore reasonable that the contending parties should come to an amicable understanding; if they do not they are wrong; and voluntary wrongs, like follies, baffle the foresight of observers.

If the affair is arranged between Russia and the Porte, English mediation would find it very difficult to make room for itself.

According to the most recent news from the East, neither Mr. Stratford Canning nor the numerous English agents employed in the affair have to this day arrived at making themselves heard, even by the Greeks. Disunited among themselves, much more excited against each other than disposed to contribute to one common end, the different chiefs of the insurrection agree on one point, and that is exactly the one which neither England nor Russia aim at: political independence! The people, on the other hand, are sighing for the end of these troubles, and there is no doubt they are ready to submit, if the chance presented itself of capitulating to the Turks.

One great moral struggle, which still continues to make itself felt in the Levant as in many other places, is the intense jealousy and rivalry between England and France. The two parties exhaust themselves in opposing and baffling each other, and it is certainly not the Greeks who will gain by this singular struggle.

The ambassadors of Russia and England at Paris have received orders to communicate the protocol of April 4 conjointly to the French Government. I have just received from M. de Tatistscheff and from Sir Henry Wellesley two letters, dated September 1, in which they tell me that they are charged with the same commission, but that they thought well to await my return to the capital to discharge it. My reply to the communication will be in every way in agreement with that of the French Cabinet. Portugal every day approaches nearer to an open revolution. It is in truth not a Constitution, but a system of anarchy which the Emperor Don Pedro has introduced into that country, and the common ground to be taken by the Courts seems to me to be found in the following points: 1. Uniformity of opinion on the nature of things. 2. Efforts to keep the revolution within its own frontiers. 3. Wise counsels to be given to Spain. I will only add a few remarks demanded by the peculiar situation of the Emperor our august master, in respect of his natural relations with the Emperor of Brazil, and the presence of the Infant Don Miguel at Vienna.

You thought, sir, that Count Nesselrode's first replies to our communications of July 4 last* were unsatisfactory and feeble.

* Metternich's despatch of the 4th of July concerned a decree issued by Don Pedro on the occasion of his renunciation of the throne of Portugal, with regard to the succession of Maria da Gloria, the regency of Isabella, the marriage of the first with Don Miguel, and the bestowal of a Constitution for that kingdom. In his despatches to St. Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, the Chancellor expressed his doubts and hesitations with regard to the charter and the

My opinion is the same, but I do not hesitate to say that this was partly owing to the Russian Cabinet's want of more complete information, and to certain special considerations with regard to the Court of London, towards which Court this Cabinet has always had a leaning, even at a time when we were falsely accused of managing England, the only Power with which Russia never wishes to compromise herself.

Since your despatches at the end of July, affairs have progressed, and Mr. Canning himself has furnished us with more than one proof of the difficulties of his situation. This situation is easy to describe. He denies all participation in the drawing up of the Portuguese Charter, while declaring himself in favor of it. But what is easy to describe often presents many difficulties in its development, and this is the case with the affairs of Portugal. Nothing is more problematical than the application of the deplorable work of Don Pedro. It would be difficult to tell how Portugal is governed now, for each day presents singular anomalies. Mr. Canning has evinced a desire to come to an understanding with us on the conduct to be observed by our two Courts in the affairs of Portugal; I thought it right, first of all, to address some questions to him which seem to me fundamental, and which the British minister will have some difficulty in answering satisfactorily.

It is clear to us that there is a happy identity of opinion between us and the French Cabinet, and it seems to be shared by General Pozzo. I have no doubt that the Emperor of Russia, when he is rightly informed, will agree with us; but the more convinced I feel on this point, the less advisable I think it to display any great activity in the matter. Russia should be left to herself at present, and especially by us. The less eagerness, or anything that resembles insisting, we use with the object of influencing the political conduct of the young Emperor, the more chance we shall have, in my opinion, of seeing him take the same road as ourselves. I wish you, therefore, Count, to make your present despatches entirely passive in character. I am away from the Emperor, and do not therefore give you orders, but communications for your own information. If you feel yourself obliged to make some more particular

alteration of the laws. In writing to London (September 2) Metternich confined himself to asking Canning (through Esterhazy) the following question—Who is now sovereign in Portugal, where all the acts of the Regent (Isabella) are issued in the name of Don Pedro, King of Portugal? Is not the Regency of Isabella in direct contradiction to the fundamental laws?

explanation to Count Nesselrode, do it on your own account, as a proof of your personal confidence, and from a feeling that you must trust him as you see he trusts you.

In any case, do not present the questions we have just addressed to London too decidedly, but simply bring them forward as doubts which we have conceived of the regularity of the conduct of the Portuguese Government.

If the Infant continues to show himself well disposed (the Emperor of Brazil has himself begged his august brother-in-law not to spare his counsels to his brother, and made it a duty for his Royal Highness to listen to them), we shall feel ourselves as much at ease in our relations with that Prince as it is possible to be in a position surrounded with difficulties, and involving risk to ourselves and the Prince, in whom the Emperor takes well-merited interest.

I shall leave Johannisberg to-morrow, and take the route by Darmstadt, Carlsruhe, and consequently Upper Suabia and Tyrol, to return to Austria. I have fixed, as I told you above, the time of my arrival in the capital about the 20th September. The Emperor will not return till that time.

THE ATTITUDE TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF ANY FRESH RUSSO-ENGLISH STEP IN GREEK AFFAIRS.

Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, November 8, 1826.

835. . . . I foresee the probability of Russia and England taking a simultaneous step with regard to the allies.

. . . Our best-founded hopes depend for the moment on the fact that the French Cabinet, in its answer, avoids going too far. I beg you, my dear Count, to express yourself in this sense, but in the most confidential manner, to M. de Villèle. That enlightened minister must admit how important it is for us not to be accused of wishing to prevent, what a false interpretation would perhaps not be slow to represent, as a project in harmony with the spirit of the Alliance. We shall always be ready to participate in what is really agreeable to the principles and rules of right, but we shall never support what is wrong. Because we wish the former, we cannot be too decided against the latter.

It is clear to me, however, that the fate of Europe will be decided in about six weeks. The present political life or death of Europe will depend on the triumph of England over the religion of the young Russian monarch, or the defeat of her enterprises. The balance is still in the hands of the Continental Powers; with calmness, wisdom, and enlightened benevolence, they may be able to correct the evil; if they are precipitate in their explanations, they may sanction the very evil they wish to avoid, and the first error sanctioned by them will be equivalent to ruin.

Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, November 8, 1826.

836. The Greek question approaches its conclusion. According to the text of the Russian despatch, two possibilities only present themselves: one is, that Mr. Canning accepts the amendments which

Russia has made to the first propositions of England; the other is that Mr. Canning will reject them.

In the first of these cases, no doubt we shall immediately have a new Russo-English communication to the three Courts.

In the second case, there will be more *pourparlers* between London and St. Petersburg, and according to all appearances, the protocol of April 4 will be abandoned.

It is only with the first of these chances that we need trouble ourselves at present, and to that my letter applies (No. 835).

If there is to be a new Russo-English communication, I am anxious the French Cabinet should not reply before consulting Prussia and ourselves, or rather that in replying it should not prejudice its attitude, principles, or future.

Mr. Canning's remark, in which he seems to make no difficulty in admitting the Quintuple Alliance, is remarkable for two reasons.

First, because the thing is presented by the Emperor Nicholas as a definite clause of his own agreement with England; next, because the crafty and unscrupulous mind of Mr. Canning may lead him to accede to the wishes of the Emperor of Russia with the certainty of being able to arrange the interpretations and applications of what he would regard as a concession made to a mere word.

Indeed, one has only to refer to his letter to Mr. Temple to see that if Mr. Canning crushes the Alliance as he is pleased to define it, he would re-establish it with equal facility on bases suited to his own ends.

Now, if the French Cabinet allows itself to be misled by a phrase, without considering the nature and value attached to it by the Secretary of State, it may bring the greatest evil on itself. I should regard as such the fact, that from that time France would find herself placed in a different position from that which we have maintained in the Greek question. Never shall we violate a principle, and never shall we refuse to accede to a pacification in agreement with these principles. The proposal addressed to the Sultan to renounce his sovereignty and modify it to a suzerainty is a manifest violation of principle.

Mr. Canning's game is to throw dust in the eyes of the Emperor of Russia.

Has that Prince any suspicion of this?

Possibly not; it is probable, however, that he will soon perceive it; and the question is, will he wake up to it in time, or will his delusion last till it is too late?

If the Continental Courts fall into the snare in their turn, the cause will be lost. . . .

I commit to you the matter treated of in my two letters. I have only to beg you to be very cautious, to avoid as far as possible being accused of wishing to stir up the world against so desirable a unity of thought and action.

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS AND METTERNICH.

Confidential letter of Metternich to the Prince of Hesse-Homburg at St. Petersburg.

837. *Vienna, November 13, 1826.*—To judge from the combinations we were able to make with regard to the Russian affairs, it appears to be obvious: 1. That the Emperor Nicholas has much character, pure principles, clear insight, and great personal confidence in our Emperor. 2. That he feels a certain dislike for myself. 3. And that till now he stands alone, not having yet found the man whom he could regard as a powerful instrument to perform his will, or the useful support as necessary to the monarch as to the man of business. In this description the good far outweighs the evil, and I will frankly confess that I think so little of the evil compared with the good, that I look forward to the future with courage. What is most to be regretted is the hopelessness that, in the surroundings of the Emperor, even one man could be found fit to fulfil the high mission of a trustworthy counsellor. The dislike the Emperor has for me is, I think, of secondary importance, being the natural consequence of long efforts, and it would be surprising if the young monarch, a stranger in the world of politics, had resisted endeavors of so very active a nature. It is evident that the Emperor could not turn in any direction whatever without being more or less actively instigated against me. The whole crew of weak-minded and wicked people, all the fanatics, the doctrinaires and schemers of our days, are against me. What struggles I have daily to encounter, and how thick the clouds in which I see the good people walking about me—these and many other experiences I have enough of. The more firmly I keep to my standpoint the greater the number of my enemies, who are also enemies of all common right and its representative, sound manly common sense.

One unfortunate circumstance has done much to spoil the relations between the young Emperor and myself. When he came into the inheritance of the Eastern affair, which had for five years been so miserably conducted by the Russian Cabinet, the principal

statesmen could only excuse themselves by laying the blame on a foreign and hostile power. This has been done, and in similar positions this power will continue to be hostile, having been in the right from the commencement of the affair. I was this power, and the proof is plainly evident. As soon as the Emperor followed the line of conduct I had pointed out as necessary, results were gained which none of the former advisers of the Emperor Alexander desired. But when the firm determination of the new Emperor was seen, the wretched party were obliged to seek some new means for their assistance, and this was presently offered by England. This is the true history of the time.

As a sure means of influencing the late monarch (who died of grief and remorse) against me, the Pozzos and their friends invented the miserable fable that I had proposed to France an alliance against Russia. This story is as true as the other, that in 1791 and 1792 the French Royalists burned their own houses. The more senseless such tales are the more credible they appear—a fact well known to novel-writers and scandalmongers. My desire must therefore be to prove to the Emperor Nicholas that all these tales are nothing more than lies—a desire not easy to fulfil, because I have no reason to believe that the Emperor or his Cabinet will give up the sources from whence these inventions have been taken. I venture to believe, too, that the only denunciations against me are those of General Pozzo, which are entirely imaginary; and that the whole accusation is only a pretext to save the monarch from falling under my influence. If this is the case, all efforts to prove the lie would be in vain, for it is impossible to teach those who will not be taught.

However, I have seriously taken into consideration whether it would be useful to force the Emperor Nicholas to speak out plainly what he has in his mind. On mature reflection I do not feel inclined to make the attempt, and for these reasons:

The evil in question is so deeply rooted in the general situation and the peculiar position of the Emperor that, as in most cases of this kind, time and experience will prove to be the best remedies. The Liberals honor me by their sneers. This is not their intention: they wish to make the world believe that the good cause of legal right is only to the prejudice of one man. If this were true, my power ought to surpass that of all monarchs in the world, and what is more, I must be stronger than my age, or this age very weak. As things now stand, the truth of the situation, the strength

of the different positions, can only be proved by the victory one affair, one party, one man (call it as you like), gains over the other. All between these extremes must be weak and useless. I am therefore firmly resolved to try nothing of this kind, but to keep all my strength for action.

At this moment a decision of the greatest possible importance has to be made: namely, whether Russia will unite with England to lay their weight in the balance against revolution or not. According to the decision of this question my relations with the Russian Cabinet will be regulated. I await the decision with calmness. If your Highness can find, quite naturally, an opportunity to tell the Emperor plain truth about the liberty people take with my name, please to do so; but take care, I beg you, to avoid all controversy on the matter.

AUSTRIA'S ANSWER TO THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH INVITATION TO COMMON ACTION AGAINST THE PORTE.

Metternich to Tatistscheff and Wellesley, Vienna, December 22, 1826.

838. The undersigned Chancellor of State, &c., &c., immediately on receiving the communications from his Excellency M. de Tatistscheff and the Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty, concerning the steps to be taken towards the Ottoman Empire for the pacification of the insurgent provinces, hastened to lay them before the Emperor, and he has just received his Majesty's commands to reply as follows:

His Imperial Majesty observes with satisfaction the interest of these two august Courts in the object to which the Emperor has for two years devoted all his care; and knows how to appreciate the confidence placed in him by these Courts.

With the same satisfaction his Majesty observes the happy agreement with his wishes expressed by his august allies: and that the measures and plans they propose agree with the proposals made by his Cabinet at the time of the Conferences at St. Petersburg in 1825.

But his Majesty, accustomed as he is to reply to such confidential overtures with absolute sincerity, cannot abstain from drawing attention to some points which do not agree with his feelings, and on which he will proceed to explain himself with the good faith and candor inseparable from his policy.

These points concern the employment of coercive measures intended to force the *Grand-Seigneur*—

To renounce his sovereignty over the Greek subjects of his Empire and to substitute a state of suzerainty;

To admit the mediation of the Powers between him and his subjects in revolt.

The Emperor, in fact, does not know how he can claim the right

in either of these cases to employ such measures, or even to threaten the Porte.

In this position his Majesty, animated by the most sincere desire to concur with his august allies by all the means in his power, and considering the pursuit of these means as the fitting object of his constant and serious meditations, does not hesitate to declare—

1st. That he considers it one of his first duties, and one of his first interests, to smooth over as quickly and satisfactorily as possible the hostile relations between the Porte and its insurgent subjects.

2nd. That his Majesty, feeling most deeply the innumerable embarrassments, vexations and dangers of an indefinite prolongation of this state of things in such troublous times as ours, considers himself fully justified in using the most efficacious means both towards the Porte and the insurgents, to put an end as quickly as possible to this deplorable conflict.

3rd. That according to his Majesty's firm conviction the true means to this end is to be found in the similarity of views in the allied Courts, and their perfect agreement in the measures concerted by them.

Influenced by these considerations, his Imperial Majesty commands the undersigned to reply—

1. That his Majesty is ready to join the four allied Courts in the manner and within the limits that are considered most suitable, and desires that they may be made known to him more fully, provided that the objections concerning the questions of right before mentioned can be removed;

2. That in case the concert so earnestly desired cannot be established on this basis, his Majesty, while taking an independent line, will none the less concur to the utmost of his power in the aims of his august allies, and will consider it a sacred obligation to co-operate zealously and indefatigably for the success of the proposals they will address to the Porte.

The undersigned desires, &c., &c.

Metternich to Bombelles, in St. Petersburg, Vienna, December 24, 1826.

839. When the last communication was simultaneously made by M. de Tatistscheff and Mr. Henry Wellesley, I thought it well to present to the Emperor in a compressed form the reflections excited by these remarkable diplomatic performances; and this paper you will find enclosed herewith. You will remark that it only relates

to the text of the Anglo-Russian acts, and, although I have abstained from there mentioning the communication, it will be impossible for me not to speak of it to you.

I do not believe that so undigested a work could ever be the subject of serious consideration by respectable Cabinets. Here we have the long-expected result of a political combination which shows to three Courts that a discovery to which long deliberation had not been able to lead them had only been the amusement of a few hours for two Courts which till now had been divided by the (apparently) most bitter feelings.

The correspondence between Mr. Canning and M. de Lieven—for the communication is nothing more than that—is confined to proposing two coercive measures, of which one had been formerly considered quite inefficacious, and the other had caused so much irritation to the late Emperor Alexander that, if the rupture of the Conferences of St. Petersburg was not to be explained by more general causes, we might attribute this rupture to the proposal of the second of these measures.

These proposals are:

1st. The interruption of the diplomatic relations of the five Courts with the Porte;

2nd. The recognition of the independence of the Greeks.

These proposals, made by Mr. Canning on the 4th of September last, and accepted by M. de Lieven on November 19, are withdrawn, or at least so contracted by the reply of Mr. Canning on November 20 that they are really annulled; for how can the first condition be admitted when England reserves to herself

(a) The unanimous agreement of the Courts;

(b) The adjournment of the departure of the English and French embassies till the arrival of new orders from these two Courts to their representatives at Constantinople.

What are the arrangements, with respect to this, mentioned in the Secretary of State's letter? They cannot be regarded as legislation, for the recall of the diplomatic agents does not come from the Chambers. It is the same with the diplomatic considerations, for they ought to have preceded the proposal made to the Courts. Then there remain the considerations connected with commerce. What guarantee does Mr. Canning offer to the Courts to which he proposes the simultaneous recall of their embassies that English commerce, first terrified and then consulted, will not demand the withdrawal of this measure?

If Count Nesselrode seems surprised that we have not touched on the question of the interruption of the diplomatic relations, please to deduce the causes of our silence from these considerations, as well as the evident inutility of the measure and the probable effect on the Divan. The second measure is treated by Mr. Canning like the first.

Indeed, what are the limits of the territories to which the recognition of independence extends? Russia, so far as we know, has never described them.

The English Cabinet talks sometimes of the Morea and the isles, and sometimes of the territories already set free. At the present moment these territories are reduced to the town of Nauplia and its suburbs; to some roads occupied by the wretched remains of the insurgent bodies; to the Acropolis of besieged Athens; to the castles at Corinth and Argos; perhaps to a strong castle or one or two fortified houses. But Mr. Canning, by the end of his communication of November 25, limited the recognition to territories under regular authority, and capable of maintaining their independence.

To add to the confusion, Mr. Canning's letter dated November 20—to judge by the instructions to the ambassadors accredited to the allied Courts—seems not to be taken into account. It is the first letter, of September 4, which ought to form the instructions for the negotiators at Constantinople. I feel instinctively that it is impossible that the last communication from London to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin can satisfy the enlightened and beneficent views of the Emperor Nicholas. In such a strange state of things, we have done what we could; we have explained our views frankly, and certainly with good will, as to the pacification, which is the Emperor's only object in view in the midst of this deplorable complication!

You will find enclosed a short statement concerning the letter of the Greeks to Mr. Stratford Canning. We have not thought fit to touch on this point in our official despatches, for the two following reasons—because all the caution which we thought necessary to preserve the fundamental principles of the alliance (that is to say, our own principles) is contained in our declaration against the right of intervention in the internal affairs of a third State. By refusing to join in mediation, by not recognizing the right, we destroy the basis on which it ought to rest.

Considering the caution on which we insisted with regard to the text of the protocol of April 4, which rests directly on the invitation

of the Greeks addressed to England, an invitation which, when closely analyzed, presents some points of resemblance with a certain address presented—at a time that surely no one would wish to recall—at the bar of the Convention, in the name *du genre humain*.

If, however, M. de Nesselrode should speak to you of this, you will have recourse to the statement referred to above.

I believe, Sir, that I have now exhausted the subject. Nothing is more painful than to have to reply to questions which in reality are not worthy of a reply. If the two Courts were placed in an upright, open attitude towards the allies who have given so many proofs of their disinterestedness to the world, the affairs would be quickly and easily arranged. Every effect has a cause, and we find the cause of the present perturbation in the character (*faux esprit*) of Mr. Canning, and in the secret views by which he is actuated, and which continually urge him towards inextricable complications. Russian errors form a period of trouble and confusion; our most sincere desire is to repair them, and we doubt not that in the end we shall do so.

1827.

EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his son Victor, from January 26 to June 14.

840. On business. 841. Despatches to Paris. 842. Prince Victor's views on the question of titles. 843. The question of titles renewed. 844. Johannisberg undergoing repairs. 845. Neumann's arrival at Vienna. 846. The Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

840. *Vienna, January 26, 1827.*—Things in this lower world are in very great confusion. They will come to a solution, for all things have an end; but it is difficult to foresee with any certainty what is the end reserved for us. The worst kind of affairs are those which are difficult to understand; long observation has led me to discover that when this is the case the mischief is in taking for business what is not so. It is with affairs as with writings: obscure passages may always be erased, for in reality they say nothing of any value.

In twice twenty-four hours I shall send you one courier and then a second, in order that the ambassador may have one at his disposal. I begin to run short of couriers—not that I have sent off more than were necessary, but because they have not returned. They are monopolized by some of the embassies.

We have had eighteen days of excessive cold, and the country is covered with more snow than I ever remember to have seen. It has snowed in great flakes for four whole days. The snow is nearly four feet deep, and five hundred carts are at work night and day to clear the city.

Prince de Hatzfeld was last night attacked by severe inflammation of the lungs. I trust he will recover, for his loss would be a great misfortune. He is rather better this evening, after having been bled three times. He was to give a ball next Sunday, which must now be put off, and this will grieve our young ladies as much as the cause does me. I shall open the new room by a grand ball on February 12. It is really a very fine room.

841. *January 29.*—I recommend to you my despatch sent this day. I have disclosed my sentiments a little, and lifted the veil which covers many of the positions. (No. 853.)

842. *February 27.*—Your last despatch, my dear Victor, was very interesting. Your opinions on the affair of the titles agree with mine, as you may see by my despatch of the 11th inst.

The affair cannot stop here; it is repugnant to the nature of things and to human nature. I frankly confess that I have already experienced moments of extreme uneasiness when thinking of you in Paris in the midst of the squabble. I should be sorry that you were mixed up in some bad sort of affairs, which easily happen and are difficult to avoid for one who unites your qualifications as man of the world, an Austrian, and your father's son. I am glad that the young men have taken the thing properly: they rightly attach little value to the *souvenirs de l'Empire*, for the whole matter is, in fact, only a question of these *souvenirs*: the rest is only a pretence.

The Carnival is just over, and glad I am! My balls were very fine, and the concert that I gave on Friday was still better, and was, in fact, more perfect than can be imagined.

843. *March 18.*—Since I was mixed up in affairs—and that is, alas! a very long time—I have never seen such a silly affair as this of the titles! It will come to an end, as all affairs must; but it will not die a natural death, as they flatter themselves in Paris. At any rate, you take the thing too hotly: there is nothing in it so extremely pressing.

I hope Count Apponyi will see what I mean by the instruction that I send to-day. We must have an answer to the questions we address to the French Cabinet. Apponyi must not negotiate, but he must exact a clear and distinct answer for or against. . . .

I have been so much occupied and I am still so busy with the new turn that we are trying to give to the Eastern Question that I have no head for anything else. I shall send everything to Paris in three or four days, but only for the information of the ambassador; for, as to the Government, it is not worth even the trouble of talking to. It will meet us again in London. (Nos. 855-857.)

844. *May 21.*—I shall not go to Johannisberg, for I cannot do so, on account of the business, and on account of the changes being made there. The first of necessities in a *château* is the roof, and they are just about to alter that at Johannisberg. My plan is to settle myself for July and August at Königswart. I shall take the children there, and from this point make excursions to Plass and

probably some other places. When I can decide the day of my arrival at Königswart I will let you know and fix the time for you to come and meet me.

For the rest, I foresee nothing to hinder me from passing six weeks or two months in the country. I can attend to my business as well there as here, and my health, though good enough, will still be the better for the fine air. The season promises to be fine, and therefore we may hope to enjoy the pastoral life that I propose to lead

As to affairs, everything is going wrong, as it always will as long as weak men try to be very clever, without finding out that they only serve as the bad sport of some factions and the chief of factious people (Canning), whom I consider in a very uncomfortable position, although he has become Prime Minister. At Paris, they are quite silly, and we shall soon see in what class of character the young *autocrate du Nord* is to be placed.

Neumann has only made "*des bêtises*" at Rio. Do not tell him so: that must be left to me. There is a sort of independence about his character which does not go well with affairs. Every one who undertakes a mission should begin by submitting himself to the yoke of the thought that serves as the ground of his instruction. Neumann, instead of imbuing himself in our decision never to allow the Infant to go to Brazil, has acted as if the contrary were the object of our wishes. He has dreamed and perspired; it was hardly worth while to go eight thousand leagues to do nothing more than that. Felix Schwarzenberg has returned fine and fresh from his trip.

845. *May 31.*—Neumann arrived here yesterday, looking like a sinner; I scolded him, and then comforted him. He has acted like a child where he ought to have acted in a manner more worthy of his usual weight and influence. Neumann's great fault was a want of obedience in circumstances where no latitude had been left to the negotiator. He was ordered to take *ad referendum* the expression of Don Pedro's wish that his brother should come to Brazil. Instead of confining himself to this, he said "Yes," when we said nothing; which brought about that the speaker found himself contradicted, which is neither desirable for a Court, nor agreeable for the person who undergoes the contradiction. Neumann feels this, and I think his indiscreet "Yes" will long weigh upon him.

846. *June 11.*—Read my remarks, my dear Victor, on the plan of the treaty (No. 861). This is a work which will as little escape the

remarks of Pufendorf as those of Colnet, and if I have only filled eight or ten pages with my benevolent sayings, it is because I was obliged to restrain my imagination for want of time, but not for want of material. "*Das Salz der Welt ist dumm geworden*," said the Apostle Paul; he spoke of his own times and most certainly also of ours. I do not think it will please at St. Petersburg.

Vienna is now absolutely empty, and the only thing alive is the opera, which has just become perfect when there is no longer any one to criticise it. It is a resource for me, and beside that I have only the garden, which has been in a great state of perfection ever since it was put into the care of the new gardener, who seems to be a sort of genius. He has already gained a great reputation among the botanical big-wigs, and I cannot get over my astonishment whenever I trace back his immense store of knowledge to its source. Who would ever have thought that the little *Hausmeister* would become the father of a great man! But you, on the other hand, serve me very badly: since the first batch of camellias you have sent nothing, and if there were no one but you as a purveyor of plants, the garden would be a desert. If ever Mr. Canning plants a garden, I shall recommend you to take care of it. That will be the most crushing defeat that I could possibly prepare for him.

METTERNICH'S MARRIAGE WITH ANTONIA LEYKAM, COUNTESS VON BEILSTEIN.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his son Victor and to Countess Molly Zichy-Ferraris, from October 7 to December 9.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, October 7, 1827.

847. I told you shortly the other day that here the affair is settled. To-morrow the Emperor will sign the decree which will make Mademoiselle de Leykam a Countess of Beilstein, and after to-morrow I shall announce my approaching marriage.

I do not like to hear that you have not been well for a fortnight and that you do not yet know what is the matter. Your constitution requires care, and I entreat you not to spare it. Ask Gall what he recommends, and follow exactly what he prescribes. Winter is now beginning, and if by chance he recommends your passing some months in a warmer climate than that of Paris, do not hesitate to go—let nothing stop you. You like Maurice Dietrichstein: I will ask him to accompany you. Hyères, Nice, or some place near Genoa—perhaps Genoa itself—would no doubt suit you better than Paris. I hope I shall soon learn that my provisions are needless; but Gall, not you, must decide. Think of me and the anxieties you will cause me if you do not follow the advice of your physician. Nothing is ever risked by being obedient; what you will not do for yourself, do for me.

I beg you, my dear Victor, to let me know how you are, and, above all, let Gall write to me. I am waiting anxiously to hear one of two things—either that Gall has no directions to give you, or that you are careful to do what he tells you. Either of these pieces of intelligence will do me good, and I am sure you wish to gratify me.

I have fixed the day for my marriage—on the 29th of this month. It will take place at Hetzendorf, and the Duke of Wurtemberg will

remain there expressly for it. Neumann, who is leaving this, will be able to tell you that everything is arranged satisfactorily.

Metternich to the Countess Molly Zichy-Ferraris, Vienna, October 20.*

848. Instead of troubling you with a long history of my affairs, I enclose an extract of a letter which I recently addressed to the only person to whom I have written on the subject. These are my words:

“I have no need to tell you what you have heard from a hundred people. What I do, I decide with the reason and calmness which are in my heart. In great decisions I ask counsel from no one. All that my friends tell me I know, for I have already said it to myself; what those tell me who are not my friends has no value at all in my eyes. I consult my conscience on these occasions and try to obey it. At the age of twenty-five I should have doubted my ability to judge of the situation of others clearly, or of my own with impartiality. At my age, I am less modest, and have not the same doubts. I know what I ought to do, and I do it. The conduct of men may be influenced by the circumstances which form the setting in which they are placed. That in which I find myself is in an elevated sphere. I am the object of much attention, and the public occupies itself by preference with those who are daily before its eyes. Tittle-tattle is the peculiar characteristic of Vienna society, and this society does not always dream to what independent men may be driven. It is happy for my future life that these unworthy tales should have shown me the path I had to follow; it opposes neither the affections of my heart, nor the first necessity of my private life—a home. That home I am about to find, and it will be a special guarantee of repose, from the fact that it is restricted to one person: I am not going to marry the relations.

“This is my story. It is very simple, for it is very straightforward.

“I complete, moreover, two great and very happy experiences. The truest friends of my life are my family and my master. The Emperor has been my only confidant on this occasion, and he has proved—as he always has—the surest guide and the most tender of fathers. My own relations—all who are first in my affection and regards—have shown themselves as they always have been, my

* The mother of Melanie, afterwards wife of the State Chancellor.—ED.

truest friends. What is laid at my door may remain there. I shall know how to defend it."

849. *October 25.*—My life, my dear friends—for I speak to you all—is a very singular thing, and very unlike that of most people. This life is composed of two parts, which my nature enables me to lead in two parallel lines which never become entangled. One of these parts belongs to the world, and God knows it cannot, without great injustice, accuse me of sparing myself in its service. The other is my own especial domain, and great sufferings have fallen to my lot. I have lost all which constitutes the happiness of man; I have lived through it all, for trouble does not kill. I need perfect rest; this is the secret of my heart, and is known only to my friends. My heart is not blind; it is not under the influence of passion; it is calm and warm, serene and severe, and—unless I deceive myself—in the right proportion. What I desire is that those who love me should understand me, and I feel that among you I am better understood than anywhere else.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, November 3.

850. My marriage will take place the day after to-morrow. The ceremony has been delayed eight days as your aunt had a cold; and, as the marriage is to be at Hetzendorf, it would not have done for my sister to be absent.

851. *November 13.*—It was with very great satisfaction that I saw by your letter, and by a line which Neumann wrote to me, that your health is restored. I love you too much not to be uneasy when I know you are ill; and I have spent many anxious days. I do not like undecided maladies, and when the fifteenth day arrived and no solution, I had sad fears, which Heaven has seen fit to contradict. I wish Heaven had treated the triple Alliance as it has you—that is to say, that it had cured it.

. . . . As for you, follow Gall's advice. His Philhellenism and his craniology do not frighten me; he is a very good doctor, and he understands the German constitution. If he advises a journey to the South, I should be either for Nice or Genoa. If he advises nothing, do nothing. I shall not recommend you to be careful; I flatter myself you are so. A little care will often prevent a severe illness; and health is not an affair of fancy.

I have made my home as I always desired it should be, simple and without fuss. I have found what I sought, and the poor

children are happy, which is so necessary to my happiness. You have written a perfect letter to Leontine, just what my heart would have dictated.

852. *December 9.*— . . . I beg you to tell Count Apponyi that the only news I have had from Constantinople since the 11th are in a despatch brought by the courier; it is dated the 24th, and contains two facts. One is, that at the urgent demand of the Internuncio the Porte has raised the embargo on merchant vessels. The second, that the representatives of the three Courts had a conference with the Reis-Effendi on the 24th.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE AT THE
BEGINNING OF 1827.

Metternich to Apponyi, in Paris, Vienna, January 29, 1827.

853. We regard the present moment as the most critical that has occurred for several years. This critical moment is the natural consequence and, to a certain extent, a necessary condition of the general position of things in Europe, of the various faults committed by the Governments: in short, of two fortuitous circumstances—namely, the appointment of Mr. Canning to the department of Foreign Affairs in England, and the change of reign in Russia.

The revolution, after brooding in men's minds, burst forth in France in 1789. Its violence limited its outward existence to a very short period; a man endowed with extraordinary faculties was raised up in the midst of the French people; strong from the cast of his mind and character, and not less strong from the weakness of his rivals and adversaries, he needed but a short time and good fortune to change the anarchy into a military despotism unexampled in modern times. But the same qualities and the same defects which brought about his ascension, produced his fall as soon as he had attained his apogee. Desiring to mount still higher, he fell, and the restoration of the principle of legitimacy, having only been acted on in an abstract sense, has turned in consequence of enormous errors into a new era of the revolution. The latter is, so to speak, ennobled, and Radicalism has hoisted the banner of Liberalism.

The conduct of public affairs between the years 1814 and 1820 has enabled the factions to measure the moral forces of the different Governments. New revolutions have broken out. Mr. Canning has been called to the helm of affairs in his own country, and the bent of his mind, his strong and his weak sides, his incapacity in so many essential points, and his great adroitness in others, lastly his exalted ambition, have allowed him to choose his part; he chose one which was open to him: he put himself at the head of Monarchical Liberalism. From that time the world had to take a new color.

The moral death of the Emperor Alexander had preceded his physical death. Deceived in everything, weighed down with regret, wanting that force of mind which if he had but possessed would have prevented him from preparing so many troubles for himself, that unfortunate Prince has left the throne to a young successor, who seems to possess many of the qualities which his predecessor lacked. But, unhappily for Europe and for himself, his first steps on the field of politics have been stultified by the grave errors committed by some weak-minded men.

The fate of a whole future depends on the struggle between the qualities which we are glad to regard as belonging personally to the monarch, and the need which must be felt by his feeble counsellors of justifying what cannot be justified either before the tribunal of reason or even before that of a certain wretched diplomacy which ought to be banished from the Cabinet of every great Power.

Mr. Canning has made use of the Emperor Nicholas as we often see adroit speculators make use of heirs who inherit a great fortune while still young and inexperienced.

The question of the day, as of the future, depends entirely on the part that will be taken by the Emperor Nicholas, or, to express myself more correctly, on that which he must have already taken, and which we shall hear of immediately.

But whatever steps Russia may take, the time of ease for Mr. Canning is past. Difficulties of every kind have commenced. Whatever determinations the Court of Russia may take, nothing can alter this fact. If these determinations are according to our wishes, what the English Cabinet has made and undertaken and encouraged since the accession of its chief will be restrained in its development. If they should not bear this character, Mr. Canning will be smothered under the weight of his deplorable success. The master of a vessel carrying a regular flag may enter into speculations and hazardous enterprises disapproved by the laws of prudence and even by those of justice; but he cannot, without the consent and agreement of the whole crew, take up the line of a freebooter. . . .

Unhappily, two Governments directly contribute to aggravate the dangers. One is that of France, the other that of Spain; and both lack wisdom, strength, and foresight. Of the two the latter is the stronger, for it is the attacking party.

I do not know if many judges of public affairs will judge as I

do; but this opinion agrees so thoroughly with my inner feelings that I have no hesitation in pronouncing it.

The two Governments are under the influence of fear; but there are many shades of this feeling: there is a fear which leads to capitulations without end; there is another which hardens men. The French ministers have the first; the second belongs to Spain.

In this position of things, our attitude is expectant without being impassive. Whenever we can see clearly we shall know how to act.

THE APPROACHES MADE BY RUSSIA TO AUSTRIA.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, February 14, 1827.

854. The Court of Russia is inclined to make approaches to us. You will have proof of this in the instructions which M. de Lieven must have received. Alliance, uniformity of views and conduct in the affairs of Portugal, Spain, Italy, &c., is the order of the day. They wish us to join in the treaty which, according to the proposal of France, must replace the protocol of April 4; if this wish of the Emperor Nicholas cannot be attained, he desires at least that we should support it. Our decision will not differ from the spirit of our reply of December 22 to the last Anglo-Russian communication (No. 838). We will never violate what we feel to be principles. It is thought at St. Petersburg that England did not wish for the form of a treaty. Consequently, they would regard her as released from the protocol. We see risks in this move, and we will not sacrifice our position, which is strong because it is correct. . . .

The last word of the relations between Russia and England is found in the fear with which the two parties inspire each other.

Continue to maintain an amicable footing with Mr. Canning, and cultivate also your relations with M. de Lieven.

I shall take care to furnish you with all the support necessary in the negotiation on the Greek question. You shall immediately have proof of this. In the mean time seem to be ignorant of everything, and make good use of your time by finding out what effect the communications from St. Petersburg have on Mr. Canning.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCES.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, March 26, 1827.

855. The Court of Russia has invited us to send you the necessary instructions and faculties, so that your Highness may contribute to the establishment of an agreement between the five Courts on the subject of the pacification of the still insurgent countries of European Turkey. The Emperor, far from objecting to this desire, finds it agree so well with his own intentions and wishes, that his Imperial Majesty thinks he can hardly show enough eagerness in granting it.

In consequence of this determination you will find enclosed (No. 856) the instructions which by the Emperor's orders I have the honor to address to you.

Their contents are clear, and embrace all aspects of the affair. . . .

You will take care to inform Mr. Canning and the representatives of Russia, France, and Prussia of the directions we have addressed to you. Your Highness is moreover authorized to make them confidentially cognizant of the very text of your instructions. . . .

From the moment that the agreement we desire is established between the representatives of the Courts, your Highness may consider yourself authorized to take part in the deliberations to be arranged in common, in order by your signature to show the agreement of your Court in the act which is the object of all our efforts.

Your Highness is aware that we have always been persuaded that it could only be by a clearly-stated uniformity of views and action in the five Courts that there would be any chance of success for this plan. You will therefore not be surprised at the eagerness of his Imperial Majesty to agree to means likely to bring about the desired result.*

* Gentz writes (March 11, 1827) to Metternich: "The Russian Cabinet has produced a project for a convention; the French, a second; England (as representing the Greeks), a third. Perhaps it would be a clever thing for Austria to come forward with a fourth. Have we not as much right to do so

Instructions to Esterhazy, Vienna, March 25, 1827.

856. The Court of Russia having invited us to contribute to the establishment of a centre of agreement between the five Powers, and to send instructions to London to this effect, the Emperor our august master, always disposed to associate himself with his august allies in the search of means to put an end to the troubles and calamities which still weigh heavily on European Turkey, has ordered us to furnish you, without loss of time, with the instructions necessary to enable you to take part in the deliberations about to take place in the capital of the country in which you are residing.

Our directions are similar to those which you have received at different times during the last six years. You are acquainted with the negotiations and *pourparlers* which have taken place between the Cabinets on the subject of the pacification of the Levant. You know especially the replies which we addressed to the last simultaneous communications from England and Russia, and the instructions to the Internuncio last December. Our task is thus limited to informing you of the determinations of our august master, incited by the new demand which the Cabinet of Russia has addressed to us.

The affair in its new phase must be considered with two points in view:

1. An agreement between the five Courts.
2. The most natural and therefore the most likely means of arriving, not only at an agreement between the five Courts, but also at rendering this agreement useful and effectual in the interest of the pacification.

We readily admit, with regard to the first point, that the wishes and fundamental views of the five Courts present no essential difference.

As to the Emperor's feelings relative to the object of the agreement, I have nothing fresh to tell you. You know that the real pacification of the Levant has at all times been one of the chief objects of his solicitude. I need not, therefore, enter into the reasons which influence the wishes and calculations of our august master. Independently of considerations relative to the administrative or

as the others? It is true that this would only increase the perplexity; but it is really not our interest to make so very bad a thing clear. The thicker the darkness, the sooner will the meddlers in it break their heads."—ED.

commercial interests of his own Empire, nothing of what concerns the general interest, nothing which tends to the good of humanity, can be indifferent to his Imperial Majesty. On the other hand, how can he conceal from himself the numerous grave inconveniences and positive dangers attached to the continuance of troubles which form a stumbling-block between the Great Powers?

As a proof of the desire of our august master that an end should be put to this complication, it will be sufficient for us to send you the text of our above-mentioned instructions to the Internuncio, and of the explanations on the same subject which that minister has been charged to make, in case of necessity, to the Divan itself. We may therefore regard this subject as exhausted both towards the allied Courts and our own agents.

In approaching the second point, it seems to us most important to consider the difficulties which up to this time have been raised against the establishment of an agreement between the five Courts.

If during the first period of the affair England did not entirely remove herself from all participation in the *pourparlers* which took place between the allied Cabinets, she retired at the very moment of the opening of the Conferences at St. Petersburg, and from that time refused her concurrence as much to the Conferences as to the steps agreed upon at them.

At the beginning of last year, the relative positions of the Powers experienced a complete change. The Courts of Russia and England entered into a separate negotiation. The protocol of March 23 (April 4) was the result.

In the deliberations between the years 1822 and 1825, the four intervening Courts at the Conferences were maintained on one common basis of principles.

The protocol of April 4 established different bases.

At the conclusion of the communication which the two signatory Courts of the protocol made of this act to the three other Continental Courts, France declared herself in accord with the terms of the Anglo-Russian transaction.

Prussia declared herself ready to subscribe to these same terms, provided the five Courts were unanimous.

Austria declared she could not for her part admit any departure from the protocol. But we engaged to support by all means in our power the necessity of the pacification.

Quite recently, the French Cabinet proposed the transformation

of the protocol into a treaty between the five Courts. The Russian Cabinet accepted this proposition.

Without knowing officially, we have every reason to believe that a similar declaration has emanated from the British Cabinet.

The Cabinet of Berlin remains true to its former declaration.

Our declaration concerning the first Anglo-Russian act has of course been a sufficient reply to the new proposal.

According to rumors which have reached us from St. Petersburg, the French Cabinet has communicated to that of Russia a project about the treaty in question which the latter has declared it cannot admit.

Your Reports of March 1, however, inform us that the Court of London would have not only accepted the proposal of converting the protocol of April 4 into a treaty, but that it would be equally ready with France and Russia to sign the project proposed at Paris.

We do not know what the French project is; it is thus placed beyond the sphere of our judgment, and, as far as we know, the Court of Prussia is not better informed than we are.

In the meantime, the English ambassador at Constantinople sent to the Reis Effendi a few days before the arrival of M. de Ribeaupierre, and seconded by M. de Minciaky, a formal note expressly founded on the basis of the protocol. . . .

This is the history of the affair, and at this moment it is not an easy task to furnish you with instructions.

To give them a basis founded on antecedents, we have but to take for guide the invariable principles of the Emperor and the facts of the case.

The former have been explained with so much precision in the despatches which have emanated from our Cabinet for the last six years, and especially in those which since the beginning of the present year have been brought to your knowledge, that we can only repeat ourselves while insisting on the divergence between the terms of the protocol of April 4 and our points of departure.

Reduced to the most simple terms, this divergence may be stated as follows:

To prove to the Sultan the necessity that he should pacify his insurgent provinces; or

To prove to the Sultan the necessity of allowing these same provinces to be pacified, and of contributing what means he can towards that pacification.

According to the first formula, the weight of the Powers would

be brought to bear on one object—namely, the admission on the part of the Sultan of the necessity of the pacification.

According to the second, their action would bear equally on two objects: in the first place, on the admission of this necessity by the Sultan; and, in the second place, on the recognition by him of the right and necessity of foreign mediation.

A very simple question arises in our minds. Would the weight which would suffice for the first of these concessions suffice equally for the second? We do not think so; and for these reasons:

The Courts will be powerful so long as they rest on the evident necessity of a pacification aided also by calculations of their own interests, and those of the Ottoman Power; so long as they do not attack in any way the sovereign authority of the Sultan, and, far from injuring him, make the most of those acts of condescension which, though in fact imposed upon him, have the appearance of benefits conferred by the sovereign authority on an unhappy people—pledges of the repose and stability of the empire. Driven to his last retrenchments, how could the Sultan withstand an urgency grounded on such bases? Would it be a blind repugnance? But the firm determination on the part of the five Courts not to retrace their steps after a first demand—a demand justified by powerful considerations and by the undoubted necessity—should certainly suffice to overcome this repugnance; as in the case (which we do not admit) of a refusal, it would be evident to the monarchs, and to all right-minded men in Europe, on which side reason and wisdom lay. On the other hand, the Courts will be weak as often as their weight, instead of bearing by preference on the main question, is used in favor of particular forms. The Emperor has a firm conviction that this would uselessly endanger the success which might be hoped for under the latter system, and consequently his Imperial Majesty, while desiring the same object as the allies, has reserved to himself, by his last replies to the signatory Courts of the protocol of April 4, the liberty of using the means he considers most efficacious.

We will now inform you of our point of view on some questions which we think must have a decided influence on the success of the double enterprise of establishing an agreement between the allied Powers, and of using it in favor of the common cause.

Supposing that it were possible to remove the essential difficulty of our acceding to such an agreement, you would have to bring forward the following observations:

The general idea of the pacification comprises the past, the present, and the future.

The remedy applicable to the past is oblivion. The recognized form is that of an amnesty pronounced by the sovereign authority.

The measure applicable to the present is a truce, in the technical or military acceptation of the term—that is to say, a suspension of warlike operations properly so called. This measure, indispensable in itself, would nevertheless only be proposed to the Porte in consequence of its previous assent to the principle and fact of the pacification.

Lastly, the future can only be secured by the establishment of such a state of things as will secure to the contending parties the hope of a lasting peace, and the preservation of the reciprocal advantages derived from the present pacification.

The means of arriving at such a state of things will be found, we think, in the two following articles:—

I. Separation of the Christian and Mussulman population;

II. Guarantee of the Powers in favor of the two contending parties, which guarantee must be confined to the execution and maintenance of the agreement which has been made use of to establish the pacification.

Ad I. This basis seems to us the only one which need occupy the attention of the Conference at London, being that which, in reality, embraces the whole question.

Its application necessitates so many important ideas, and the taking into consideration so many local circumstances, that the arrangement of the means of execution and of the limits within which they should be confined cannot come under the domain of a Conference in London. Meantime we feel convinced that the basis can only be practically applicable to some of the isles and to the Peloponnesus.

In the former, the two populations have never been mixed;

In the latter, the Turkish population has been destroyed or expelled, and the troops of Ibrahim Pacha must not be mistaken for a permanent population. The fortresses must remain in the power of the Porte for the maintenance of its sovereignty, and in the interest of the Greek race, as well as in that of a real pacification. The system on which this pacification will rest, as we understand it, not having for its object a political emancipation of the Greeks, one of the first pledges of the solidity of this system, and of the security which it will give to the Greek tribes of enjoying a durable tranquillity under a *régime* of political dependence, can never be

found except in a measure which would prevent the latter from becoming daily the sport of guilty ambitions within and intrigues without.

The civil liberty of the countries under the new *régime* cannot be better established and guaranteed than by a stipulation giving up to them the power of administering their own laws, and retaining their own usages and customs. What are these laws and usages? It is not for the Powers to define them. The Porte, contending itself with an annual tribute, which would be brought to Constantinople or deposited in some place of security, would have no motive for interfering in what could not interest it directly.

Ad II. A definite guarantee of the kind alluded to would be of great utility; we should consider it advantageous for both parties.

The sovereign authority would find in it a pledge of the future tranquillity of the pacified countries, and consequently the guarantee of its own peace, both internal and political.

The people of the Morea and of the isles would, on their side, find in this guarantee the inestimable advantage of the peaceable enjoyment of those good things which nature has lavished upon them, and be able to develop the elements of prosperity offered to them by their soil, their industry, and their commerce.

We have now to approach a subject of the highest importance: which is that of the comminatory and coercive measures to be employed against the Porte in case it should persist in its refusal to entertain the overtures made by the allies concerning the pacification and the measures proper to bring it about.

We will explain this with the frankness and straightforwardness characteristic of our august master.

Two comminatory measures have been arranged between the two signatory Powers of the protocol of April 4: the interruption of the diplomatic relations with the Porte, and the threat of establishing direct relations with the insurgents.

A third measure having been brought forward—namely, that of employing the fleets to intercept communication between the army of Ibrahim and Egypt, together with an amicable attitude of these same maritime forces towards the Greeks—seems to have since formed the subject of an understanding between the Courts of London, St. Petersburg, and France. In its last communications the Court of Russia made some allusion to a fourth measure. It was merely hinted at, but not with sufficient clearness to enable us to describe it as rupture with the Porte.

As to the three measures distinctly announced by Russia and England and accepted by France, we find but one gradation. Moreover, it is clear to us from the last communications that neither the Cabinet of London nor that of St. Petersburg attributes any sensible effect to the recall of the embassy from Constantinople, and we share that feeling.

On the other hand, open contact with the Greeks might, naturally enough, be regarded by the Porte as an act of positive hostility; if such should not be the case (and we are inclined to think that the Sultan will not be anxious to regard it in this sense) this measure certainly would not lead to the political emancipation of the Greeks—a result which the Powers seem to lose sight of.

As for the employment of the fleets, how could the Powers have recourse to that step without putting themselves into an openly hostile attitude?

There still remains the fourth measure indicated by Russia. This measure, employed as a comminatory means by the five Courts, and directed towards a clear and precise end—the only one which could effectually answer the expectation of the Courts—seems to us the most certain to bring about the consent of the Sultan to the pacification; and, consequently, it is the only one which appears to us of a nature to be seriously discussed between the five Courts.

The Emperor is, from conviction and feeling, unwilling to admit the chances of a war with the Porte. He would regard it, not only as the greatest misfortune which could happen to Europe, but as leading the Powers to results in every way opposed to those which they propose. But his Imperial Majesty is invited to give his opinion and pronounce a judgment on the most effectual means for attaining the pacification without endangering the general peace; far from refusing this request, he expresses his views with perfect candor.

You have here, Prince, all the thoughts and feelings of our august master, and by them you will be able to regulate your language and conduct.

Your instructions may be summed up as follows:

1st. You will announce to the Secretary of State and to your colleagues that, in consequence of the expression of a wish of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias, you are authorized to take part in any common deliberation of the five Courts on the means of bringing peace to the Levant; the deliberations taking place either

in the form of regular conferences or in that of confidential *pour-parlers*.

In either case, you will take care to bring forward the different points of view above mentioned—namely, those relating to the clear and precise definition—

(a) Of the end or aim of the agreement to be established;

(b) Of the moral attitude of the Powers in the establishment of so desirable an agreement among themselves;

(c) Of the choice and employment of the best means for attaining a real pacification.

Two things, however, may occur, for either of which we ought to be prepared.

One would be an agreement between the five Courts on the basis of our principles, and especially of those which were set forth in our reply of December 22 (No. 838). On that, your Highness must declare yourself ready to corroborate the act by your signature recording the result of the common agreement. We have, however, one remark to make concerning the form to be given to such an act.

The denomination “treaty” seems to us little adapted to the circumstances, and we much prefer the not less binding but more suitable form of a “convention” or a “protocol.” Your Highness will take care to make this distinction.

In the other case, the signatory Courts of the protocol of April 4 may strictly maintain the terms and points of departure from that act, and the other Courts may agree. You would then, Prince, have to declare that your Court will maintain the terms of its Note in reply to the last simultaneous communications from England and Russia, continuing, however, to regulate its action at Constantinople on the line and within the limits of the instruction to the Internuncio on December 30, 1826.*

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.

While the Emperor authorizes you to express yourself frankly on the only feasible comminatory measure which he thinks calculated

* This instruction culminated in the notification that the Internuncio was to take no step till he was informed of the commencement of the negotiation by the representatives of England and Russia; but in that case he should counsel the Porte to compliance; that is, that he should say that the Porte might decline mediation and do of its own accord what the mediating Powers desired.—Ed.

to make the Sultan decide on the pacification of Greece—namely, the threat of a rupture with the five Powers simultaneously—our august master would not satisfy his conscience if he did not beforehand draw a precise limit between the threat of a rupture to induce the Sultan to grant peace to his insurgent countries and the realization of that threat by an actual European war against the Porte.

Consequently, the Emperor now declares that whenever he consents to join the four other Courts and proceed conjointly with them to the comminatory measure, his Imperial Majesty, trusting in the wisdom and moderation of his allies, has no doubt that, in case of a peremptory refusal on the part of the Sultan, they will consider it indispensable that a deliberation on future contingencies should take place; and he reserves to himself to take part in it, each of the intervening Powers possessing the most entire moral independence.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, March 26, 1827.

857. The present despatch arises from a combination of circumstances so peculiar that your Highness must absolutely be informed of our moral attitude to enable you to render to his Majesty and the general cause the services which we expect from your well-known zeal. I will therefore give you a rapid sketch of our observations and intentions, and I beg you to give your best attention to this *résumé*.

You have followed for so many years the progress of affairs, both as an observer and an actor, that you must certainly share our conviction that the politics of Europe have undergone a radical change, in consequence of the change of ministry in England after the death of the Marquis of Londonderry, and also in consequence of the death of the Emperor Alexander and the accession of the present monarch in Russia. I should undertake a useless task if I made a profound examination of the causes which have most influenced the changes we mention. It is sufficient to say that the order of things established between the years 1813 and 1815 has succumbed because it was worn out and inapplicable to the new conditions under which the Powers are placed—conditions partly owing to faults committed by themselves, and partly produced by a number of causes which in the course of time arise and develop of themselves. We cannot conceal from ourselves that the union known under the name of the Alliance has for some time been little

more than a pretence, a sort of formula, recently conjured up and employed according to individual needs, and sometimes distorted or inverted in its application in consequence of other sentiments or other needs, real or supposed.

Indeed, how would it be possible to find in the conduct of England, since Mr. Canning's accession to power, one single trace of the Alliance?

Who would not admit that the act passed between England and Russia on April 4, 1826, has done manifest injury to the principles of this same Alliance?

France has never comprehended the Alliance, and in reality has never taken part in it.

Austria and Prussia alone have remained faithful to the principles of the Alliance, and we in particular have never deviated at any time, or under any circumstances, from its salutary rules. We have acted thus because the principles of the Alliance are those of public right, and consequently ours, and because of the importance which we attach to preserving a name even when the thing itself has ceased to exist. While admitting in theory that the Alliance long has been nothing more than a mere abstraction, we are nevertheless not surprised to see the Emperor of Russia make an appeal to the Alliance—or at any rate to its forms. It seems to us perfectly natural. A work so undigested as the protocol of April 4—a protocol from the first stultified by the interpretations, explanations, and reserves which the Court of London applied to it in November last—not being able to bear any other fruits for the two contracting parties than those of disorder, the time has come for the scales to fall from the eyes of the least clear-sighted. This moment had long ago been foreseen by us when the work engendered by the distrust of two contracting parties, and by the jealousy which these same parties entertain for each other, is put in practice.

The Russian ambassador arrived at Constantinople, and from that moment the protocol of April 4 was doomed.

Experience seems to have convinced the Russian Cabinet that without our concurrence the re-establishment of order in the Levant would be impossible. It therefore reconsidered its conduct towards us; but it was anxious to obtain the concurrence of England as well as ours. This is doubtless the origin of the Emperor Nicholas' idea of trying to establish in London a centre of agreement between the five Courts. . . .

You have, on the other hand, remarked for some time signs of

approach made by the British Cabinet. The last explanations of Mr. Stratford Canning with the Internuncio have given a new complexion to symptoms which I am very much inclined to describe rather as those of great embarrassment than as those of confidence in us.

But let us keep to matters of fact. Of these one of the most curious is the last despatch from Constantinople. . . .

Has Mr. Stratford Canning, in throwing himself, so to speak, into the arms of our minister, acted in virtue of positive orders from his Government? I can hardly go so far as that. But it is a certain fact that the protocol of April 4 no longer exists in any possible application.

We are thus working on new ground; we are called upon to explain ourselves, and although the formal instructions which you will receive to-day had been drawn up previous to the arrival of the last news from Constantinople, far from having thought it necessary to change them, we have been confirmed in the pursuit of the plan which we had traced for ourselves.

How do Russia and England really wish the Greek affair to end? It would be very difficult to say, and I do not trouble myself to find out, as I have a feeling, which I may admit without much fear of being contradicted, that the two Courts themselves are not very clear on the subject. Were I compelled to occupy myself with the solution of occult questions, it would seem to me less difficult to decide what these same Courts do not wish, and what they do not know how to wish. . . .

We admit as certain that the Emperor of Russia wishes to have done with the Greek question. The public is ready to believe that his aim is war. You see by the Reports from the Internuncio, that the diplomatic body at Constantinople may be considered as having adopted that belief. Our opinion is that they are mistaken. We believe that the Emperor Nicholas would not refuse to make war, but we do not believe that he desires it. I will go further. I do not believe in the possibility of the Emperor of Russia making war on the Turks without its leading to consequences diametrically opposed to what he desires to attain. He desires the end of the present troubles, and war would be the beginning of new troubles likely to be even more grave in their consequences.

I have read to Tatistscheff and De Severin the instructions to your Highness and the reservations concerning the comminatory measures. They declared themselves perfectly satisfied.

What will Mr. Canning think of our work? I cannot say.

You will make it your business to place this *résumé* before him and to explain our thoughts with perfect candor.

We, too, desire the conclusion of an odious complication; it is, indeed, the object of all our wishes. In fact, we regard the continuance of such a position as the one in which we have for many years been placed, as one of the greatest inconveniences we can imagine.

If England wishes what we do, and wishes nothing that we do not, we ought to come to an understanding.

We desire the return of the insurgent populations under the sovereign authority of the Sultan, but we do not desire to lead them back to be massacred.

We see the gain to the Porte, and at the same time to the people, in certain concessions which the sovereign authority might make, and in certain precautions which would secure to the Sultan for the present and for the future the submission of his rebellious subjects; and to the latter the pledge of present and future tranquillity.

We desire such an agreement between the allies as will attain this double object, for we believe it can only be attained by this means.

We do not desire any encroachment of Russia on the rights of the Sultan, but we desire the re-establishment of the public peace, so urgently demanded in the interests of commerce.

Why should England not desire the same? Does she wish to sacrifice the main question for a vain shadow? Does she wish to maintain the plan of mediation at the expense of the possibility of pacification? Will she, in short, object to everything that can be done and obtained by the agreement of the Powers, because this agreement may recall to Mr. Canning what, on the faith of a few factious journals, he is accustomed to designate by the name of the Holy Alliance? If this is the case, we will not depart from the attitude we assumed at the end of the year 1826.

Place these questions before the English minister, and endeavor to prove to him that, if truth loves simplicity, we ought certainly to find ourselves on the line we have adopted.

For the rest, in your explanations with Mr. Canning and your colleagues preserve the calmest attitude. You will be there as judge. . . .

Accustomed to be understood by you, Prince, we are confident that we shall be so now, on an occasion so eminently important.

We consider it so, not because we attach any real hope of success to the attempt to establish an active agreement between the five Courts, but because it is impossible that this singular state of things should not lead to the truth being made known in many peculiar situations. The disorder which has reigned for six years in the Eastern Question will not yield easily to a preconceived idea of the Emperor Nicholas, which, moreover, is not perfectly clear to any one; but we run no risk in supporting it, and we obtain a knowledge of the different positions, and are able to prove to our allies that the disorder which has seized on so many minds has left ours intact.

THE DECLARATION OF RUSSIA REPUDIATING
ESTERHAZY'S INSTRUCTION.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, May 26, 1827.

858. A courier who arrived here from St. Petersburg on May 21, brought to M. de Tatistscheff the first reply to the communication which we made to the Court of Russia of the instructions addressed to your Highness on March 25 (No. 856).

This reply agrees with the Reports which Count de Bombelles transmitted to us of the reception which had been given to the communication of our despatch. Your Highness will find enclosed (No. 859) the textual copy of a declaration made by the Russian ambassador to me. I laid it before the Emperor, and his Imperial Majesty has commanded me to reply to the ambassador in the terms of the enclosed (No. 860).

He considers it necessary that you should be furnished, without loss of time, with orders which your position in London requires in consequence of our directions of March 25, and I acquit myself of this duty.

We replied on December 22, 1826, to the simultaneous communications of England and Russia (No. 838). Since then, the Court of Russia has invited us to transmit to you instructions and full powers, with the object of establishing in London an agreement between the five allied Courts. This task has been fulfilled by my despatch of March 26 (Nos. 855-857). His Imperial Majesty of All the Russias has declared that he would be understood to maintain, without any deviation, the basis and the terms of the protocol of April 4. Your attitude must therefore be also founded on our first directions of December 26, and remain within the limits therein marked out.*

You will, therefore, not take any further steps in consequence of our instructions of March 25, our action being no longer directed towards London.

* The limitation consisted in this, that the Austrian Cabinet declared itself ready to meet any agreement of the five Powers, provided the language to be addressed in common to the Porte did not overstep the limits of friendly advice.—ED.

Declaration of the Russian Ambassador.

859. . . . The undersigned declares—

That the Emperor sees with the most lively regret the Court of Austria bringing forward proposals on the Eastern Question which differ from those of his Imperial Majesty, and not adhering to the project of a treaty and to the measures which he had communicated to that Court;

That his Imperial Majesty cannot adopt the course which the Court of Austria invites him to follow;

• That his present situation obliges him to carry out the enterprise which has for its object the pacification of Greece on the basis of the protocol of March 23 (April 4);

But that if there exists some difference between the opinions of the two Cabinets as to the ways which should lead to this end, it appears to the Emperor that there can exist no difference as to the end itself; and his Majesty hopes that, faithful to her declaration, Austria will second Russia in this grave juncture, by not departing from the forms which His Majesty considers most essential.

Metternich's Reply to the Russian Ambassador.

860. The undersigned declares—

1st. That his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty is much grieved that the views he has brought forward in the instructions to his ambassador at London have not met with the approval of his Imperial Majesty of All the Russias;

The more the Emperor is convinced of the perfect identity of his wishes concerning the pacification of Greece with those of his august friend and ally, the more he regrets that the Courts cannot agree on a step which, in his opinion, brings the strongest force to bear against the weakest part of the resistance opposed to them by the Porte;

2nd. That as the reply of the Court of Russia to the last simultaneous communication of England and Russia replaces his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty on the position which he took on December 22, 1826 (No. 838), and as his Imperial Majesty never departs from an engagement he has once made, he will return to the course indicated in the reply of December 22, 1826, of which the official Note which the Internuncio addressed on March 12 last to the Porte has already furnished the most precise application.

METTERNICH'S SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE CONDUCT OF THE PORTE WITH RESPECT TO THE TRIPLE TREATY.

Metternich to Apponyi, in Paris, Vienna, June 11, 1827.

861. I have had the honor to inform you, in the despatch which we have entrusted to the French courier on the 6th of this month, that I would not lose an instant in laying before the Emperor the communication of which the Marquis of Caraman was the bearer.

His Imperial Majesty is deeply sensible of the new proof of confidence which his Most Christian Majesty has given by informing him of the project of the Triple Treaty. The Marquis of Caraman, in making this communication according to orders he had received from his Government, expressed a wish that Austria would be able to join in the transaction.

The French Cabinet grounds this wish on the motive which would doubtless have the greatest value in the eyes of our august master if he could be sure that by his agreement to the act in question the Alliance would once more appear in its true light, and if the Power which has unhappily separated itself from its protective bases would return to its guardianship.

The few words which I had the honor to address to you by the courier of June 6, joined to the numerous explanations on which our Court has entered with her allies since the end of last year, must have convinced you how very far we are from believing that the Alliance—a moral power of so pure and so grand a nature—could be served by a transaction founded on the bases of the protocol of April 4, 1826. The more we understand the value which his Most Christian Majesty and his Cabinet attach to the Alliance, to its existence and its preservation, the more frankly can the Emperor express himself to the French Court his thoughts, his fears, and his hopes. That Court was the first to whom we communicated the results of our labors of March 25 (No. 856), and they should have sufficed to prove the eagerness with which we seized the first

occasion when we could explain the grave considerations which prevented the agreement of Austria to the bases and to some terms of the Anglo-Russian protocol, and the changes which would have permitted his Imperial Majesty to unite himself formally to his august allies in the pursuit of an affair which, besides its great general interest, is so intimately connected with the peculiar interests of his Empire. The last declaration of the Court of Russia, which I had the honor to transmit to you by my courier of May 31 (No. 859), has shown you that our hope has unhappily not been realized.

The objections we made to the stipulations of April 4, 1826, apply equally to the project of the treaty; it is sufficient to study the text to be convinced that these objections have lost none of their weight. The project contains the same dispositions and phrases which seem to have been placed there only to increase the anomalies which struck us in the protocol.

Mediation is extended to three Powers.

The change of the sovereignty of the Sultan into a simple suzerainty is expressly stated.

The interposition of the maritime forces of the Powers between Egypt and Greece—consequently between two parts of the same empire—is not only maintained as to the forces of the Viceroy of Egypt, but is extended to the direct forces of the Sultan.

To these hindrances to our agreement are joined others of much greater consideration.

We see in no part of the projected treaty any clearly defined aim, but on the contrary we see, and particularly in paragraph V of the additional and secret article, certain anticipations which, far from producing the pacification which is so desirable, open a vast field for new and indefinite complications.

The reservations so often repeated in this project, particularly in paragraphs III. and IV. of the secret article, relating to the maintenance of peace with the Porte, seem to us so impracticable that, setting aside the nature of the measures themselves, their existence is by no means reassuring.

Lastly, there is one thing which seems to us to stand out with so much clearness and force in the project that we feel obliged to mention it: which is, that the whole of the stipulations point to no other definite result than the political emancipation of the Greeks—a result which will consummate a new revolution in Europe—a triumph the reaction of which on the whole of Europe is far beyond

our calculations; which would give birth to a new era of war and disorder in European Turkey, and an enormous extension of the English preponderance in all parts of the Levant, and consequently in Italy and other States washed by the Mediterranean.

Penetrated with this idea, his Imperial Majesty considers that it is impossible for him to accede to the terms of a treaty which, in his eyes, contains the first elements of a future so injurious to the general repose, and which, moreover, seems to him unfeasible. His Majesty will never fail to assist the cause of peace, with all the means in his power—an aim which inspires every action of his Imperial and Apostolic Majesty, and is also shared by his Most Christian Majesty.

These considerations and the frank and confiding manner in which they are laid before a Court which cherishes the same desires with ourselves, should suffice to justify to that Court a moral resistance resting on considerations so serious.

But even if his Imperial Majesty were not prevented by these important considerations, he would still be inclined to ask himself whether in the painful and dangerous position of the affair he is not stronger, and therefore more useful to the cause of peace, by maintaining himself firmly on his principles than by sacrificing them with the desire of saving by his agreement the appearances of an Alliance which one of its principal members constantly disowns. There is indeed no doubt that, faithful to a course which has acquired all the consistence of a political system, he would not fail to disown this Alliance either formally or by his silence if ever he were supposed to co-operate in its work. Indeed, we do not believe that the British Ministry, as it is composed at present, will ever allow itself to be accused of the least tolerance for a union it holds in horror; and the terms in which, even before the last change, the Cabinet of London expressed itself on the Eastern Question leave us in no doubt that, since the concurrence of the five Powers would recall this union, it would assert the independence of its principles, and separate its cause from that of the allies.

I beg you to lay the present despatch before the French Cabinet. In it will be found the feelings of the Emperor our august master frankly expressed, as well as thanks for the recent loyal and kindly action of his Most Christian Majesty towards his august friend and ally.*

* The Triple Treaty in question was signed in London, July 6, 1827, between England, France, and Russia.—Ed.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, July 7, 1827.

862. To day's Berlin post has brought me Reports which I respectfully enclose. The desire expressed at St. Petersburg seems to be this—to go on fearlessly. Russia is in a position to do this herself, but to wish to drag England into this Northern complication is an undertaking which, once for all, cannot succeed. This matter needs no profound calculation, no great knowledge of affairs, but only sound common-sense, to which even the autocratic will must finally yield. We, on our side, need nothing more than to go forward in the path we have so prudently chosen. Your Majesty may here see a very singular spectacle which may lead to great evils, but will never answer the purpose of the very badly advised Russian Emperor.

THE FRENCH MEASURES CONCERNING THE PRESS.

Metternich to Apponyi, in Paris, Vienna, July 2, 1827.

863. I desire, more than I hope, that the measures which the French Government propose to take with regard to the press will answer the purpose. All legislation concerning the press, having in view the repression of its excesses, will fail in its object: and if a preventive censorship, in the true sense of the word, can alone attain it, the durability of the measure is an essential condition of its success. A temporary censorship is nonsense.

I am not in a position to form an opinion as to the chances of a majority for the Government in the newly elected Chamber; but it is clear to me, on the other hand, that the preservation of the Chamber of Deputies in its present form will lead to the fall of the monarchy. It is, unhappily, but too true that experience never teaches those who do not know by instinct how to find the paths of safety. It was faults committed by the supreme authority which caused the downfall of the throne in France. The anarchy which was the inevitable consequence of this downfall ended in military despotism—in that heroic remedy which, after having re-established public order, is always liable to exhaust itself by its excesses or to sink under its own weight. The Restoration—due to Napoleon's spirit of conquest—instead of deriving its strength from historical elements and the institutions of the Empire favorable to authority, entangled itself with a stupid *doctrinairism*. In this short sketch I truly describe the present situation. I have been called to play a part in the great changes of our miserable times; the Liberal Princes did not understand me, and their Radical counsellors detested me. The first were wrong; the others were right.

Napoleon, who could not have been wanting in the feeling of power, said to me. "You see me master of France: well, I would not undertake to govern her for three months with liberty of the press." Louis XVIII., apparently thinking himself stronger than Napoleon, is not contented with allowing the press its freedom, but has embodied its liberty in the Charter.

CANNING'S DEATH.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Königswart, August 19, 1827.

864. I am sending a courier to Paris, and I wish him to go on to London, although it is impossible for me to give him anything of the nature of instructions for your Highness in the extremely critical position in which England is placed in consequence of the decease of Mr. Canning. I will not even enter on a consideration of the consequences of this unexpected event; I shall trust to you for information on the probable consequences which such a change will entail on England and consequently on politics generally.

I do not think it necessary to repeat to you the opinion we have from the first entertained of the merits of the man whom Providence hurled upon England and Europe like a malevolent meteor. As for me, you have heard me long ago pronounce the judgment which his contemporaries have already formed of him. The task which the impartial historian will have to fulfil concerning the public life of this man will be easy. He has shaken everything and destroyed a great deal, but he has built up nothing—a sad but common thing with men of his stamp. England is delivered from a great scourge. Will the world seek for compensation for the evil which has been done to it by him to an extent which cannot be estimated? This important question can only be answered in ways and by means so far beyond our powers that all we can do is to wait and hope.

We have great confidence in the Duke of Wellington. His social position and character give him a position and impose duties upon him peculiar to himself. Our sincerest good wishes will attend his steps; and if the Duke seeks for some place as *point d'appui*, where the support of the good cause is free from individual views, prejudices, and errors, he will go, I flatter myself, to seek it at Vienna.

I beg you, Prince, to express yourself in this sense to his Grace, and receive yourself, &c.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Königswart, August 19, 1827.

865. It would be difficult for me, without falling into numerous repetitions, to enter into details with respect to the great event which, with astonishing celerity, has come to my knowledge.

Mr. Canning's career has been that of a meteor; he rose rapidly to be extinguished in an instant, and your last Reports contain proofs that, as always happens with meteors of this nature, profound darkness succeeds his disappearance. His public life belongs henceforth to history; the immediate and indirect consequences of his actions are what we have to do with, and the field is so vast that it can only be explored in a corresponding manner. Neither shall I stop to tell you my suppositions on the composition of the new Ministry. In consequence of the inheritance of disorder which Mr. Canning has left to his colleagues and to his country, calculations at this distance are impossible. I do not hesitate to say, however, that the next Administration will have great difficulty in assuming a definite form. Order succeeds disorder only by degrees, and I do not know a man in England strong enough to rule the numerous parties who are continually struggling openly against each other. What seems to me certain is, that the Parliamentary set of whom the deceased was a member will not be the party to form the new Administration.

METTERNICH'S INTERVIEW WITH KING FREDERICK WILLIAM III. AT TEPLITZ.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Teplitz, August 28, 1827.

866. I arrived here on the 21st, and yesterday and to-day I prepared matters for my discussions with the King. I cannot give your Majesty a better account of the results of our interview than by assuring you that the King's opinions on the really important questions of the day do not differ from those of your Majesty. He desires what your Majesty desires, and his knowledge is great and extensive. He is particularly well informed on the circumstances of the Russian Emperor; he has no prejudices on this point, and I could tell him nothing he did not already know. He is very anxious that the disagreement between ourselves and Russia should be forgotten; and he goes so far in this wish that I was obliged to ask him not to trouble himself so much about an affair in which the course of events is beyond all anticipation. When right and truth are plain, time and experience are the best allies. But it is not the less pleasant to see a Prince who forms his judgment impartially before God and the world, in such a state of mind, and the influence which the Prussian Court naturally exercises on the Russian cannot be without advantages for us.

I drew the King's attention to the impression Canning's death must produce in Russia, and I made it clear to him that, where one Power is ready to act for the good cause, its influence can only be weakened by the appearance of a second Power. The King's opinion on Canning's merits or demerits agrees entirely with that of your Majesty. He looks upon his fate as upon one of those revelations of Providence which are quite unaccountable. The affair of Hesse Cassel I have brought to a happy conclusion. Prussia is quite willing to arrange matters amicably.*

The message which the King gave me bears the impress of his

* This refers to a disagreement between the Courts of Berlin and Hesse-Cassel on some domestic matters.—Ed.

heart and of the deep feeling he entertains for your Majesty. The King is, as your Majesty knows, extremely laconic, and his words, therefore, have the greater weight. The King said that the importance of his present position in the world had been clearly felt by him only from the moment that he had become convinced that his views and opinions are in perfect agreement with those of your Majesty. Never before, certainly, has the King used such expressions to a foreign Power. . . .

To-morrow I shall go to Dresden, stay there two days, and then return to Königswart. I think I shall arrive there about the 28th.

METTERNICH.

I received your news with pleasure, and I hope you will express my gratitude to the King of Prussia in an appropriate manner. I wish you good health and fair weather; here it is cold and wet.

FRANCIS.

Persenberg, August 28, 1827.

METTERNICH'S CONVERSATION WITH COUNT DE LA FERRONAYS ON ORIENTAL POLITICS.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Teplitz, August 23, 1827.

867. I perfectly agreed with Count de la Ferronays* as to the language he is to use in Paris and St. Petersburg. He goes for some days to Paris, returning very soon to St. Petersburg. His opinions on the monarch's moral point of view, and upon his whole Court, are ours. It is a great pity that the Count, who in both places is highly esteemed, had not always held his present opinions. He is a convert, and therefore has much to reproach himself with. To give an example, he told me that it is only now that he has recognized the superiority of the definitions which we proposed from the first, above all the other means of treating the Oriental question. His opinion is that the present difficulty between St. Petersburg and Vienna has been created by the Russian Cabinet as a kind of game to endeavor to force us to submit—a game which will soon come to an end if we remain firm. Having the same impression myself, I persuaded the Count, as the first result of our interview, to defend firmly and vigorously to the Emperor and Count Nesselrode, the opinion that we shall never cede one point of our right. The Count de la Ferronays is convinced that Canning's death has produced an impression in St. Petersburg the consequences of which are incalculable, because the Emperor (who always understood Canning better than Nesselrode did), after having founded the whole of his Oriental structure on the English minister's existence, sees it suddenly without any firm basis. The Count de la Ferronays is convinced that the Emperor will only make war in case of extreme necessity.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Königsward, September 2, 1827.

868. Yesterday Count de la Ferronays left Teplitz for Paris, passing through Königsward. We arrived at such a good understanding

* French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, for the time staying at Teplitz.—ED.

that his sojourn in France must be advantageous. The Count is one of those men who (although of clear intellect) out of mere ignorance easily take the wrong course, which they honestly abandon on more serious consideration. He now knows Russia's ground as it really is, and he ascribes all the unpleasant complications in the Eastern affair to a kind of game in which the young Emperor has been, against his will, entangled. He also attributes some of the evils to the French Court, which took far more notice of Count Pozzo's opinion than of the despatches and accounts of its own ambassador in St. Petersburg. The Emperor Nicholas has now committed himself so far that he greatly fears that he will be forced into war against his will. This agrees with my account of the Emperor's former and present position. In this unpleasant situation, Count de la Ferronays expressed his wish to be charged with a message from me to the Cabinet. I seized on the idea, and carried it out as follows. "My advice," said I, "is that of common sense. Three Powers have joined together for very vague purposes with very confused words; one of the three Powers has just been paralyzed, and I doubt if the feeble English Government will be able to move as boldly on its dangerous path as Canning would have done. Here, therefore, nothing need be done hastily. The absurd Triple Alliance is only in its first stage: try to prevent the French Government from helping on its further progress; take in your sails and make sure of your position in a sea so full of rocks.

"What I desire to know is how the following questions are to be answered: Supposing that the Porte rejects all the proposals of the three Powers; supposing that the coercive measures of the Powers prove to be ridiculously insufficient; supposing, too, that the Russian Emperor finds himself so committed that he cannot avoid war: what would be the attitude and the line of conduct adopted by the French Court?"

Count de la Ferronays could not, of course, give me an answer; but he is of opinion that France, in such an extreme case, would turn to Austria, begging her to place her weight and power in the scale of peace.

I answered that this was a quite natural idea, and that I could reply with the greatest candor, "Tell your Cabinet that France will find us prepared to do our best for the maintenance of peace on the following principles:

"1. That the Powers acknowledge the re-establishment of peace in Greece to be the basis of the treaty in place of the former basis.

“2. That the Sultan himself must carry out the pacification.

“3. That the Powers show themselves as friends of the Porte and enemies of the revolution.

“4. That there is to be no question of the abdication of the Sultan, or of a Greek Government, a Greek flag, Greek fortresses, &c.”

“Under these conditions, and these only, can our assistance be given.”

Count de la Ferronays shares these views, and will endeavor to support them. Events alone can show what the result will be, and in looking forward allowance must be made for the frivolity of the French Ministers.

METTERNICH.

Received and noticed. God grant that your interview with Count de la Ferronays may have the desired effect upon his Court.

FRANCIS.

Weinzierl, September 6, 1827.

METTERNICH'S PROPOSALS TO THE PORTE WITH
RESPECT TO THE TRIPLE TREATY.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Vienna, October 3, 1827.

869. I find myself in a position to entrust you with an important and delicate mission, the value of which you will understand when you have read the present despatch.

In order to arrive at a possible solution of the immense problem before us, it is necessary that we should plainly state the real position of things. To this end I must divide the subjects as follows:

I. The situation of the Eastern Question at the present moment, and the respective position of the three Powers in coalition with regard to the Porte, and of the latter with regard to the Powers; the relative position of the three Courts in the Triple Treaty; lastly, the position of our Court in the whole affair;

II. Probabilities relative to future contingencies;

III. Opportunities of arrangement which the different situations of the Courts and the probabilities in the march of events may give us.

Ad I. The examination of the situation of the three Courts with regard to the Porte, and of the latter with regard to the Powers, not being here a question of rights, must be made a question of facts.

The affair at present in contestation has arrived at one of those decisive periods when neither one party nor the other can draw back without compromising a strict point of honor. This affair in its present phase is no longer the Greek question; the Turks have scarcely pronounced this name in their recent discussions; it is a question of mediation peremptorily demanded by three foreign Powers, and peremptorily rejected by the Porte. The difference between the two questions is great; it is precisely that difference which has determined us to separate our course from that of the Courts that signed the Treaty of London. The debates of the day turn much less on the pacification of Greece than on the means

adopted by the Courts to force the Ottoman Government to bring it about.

The reality is thus effaced by the form; and experience of all times teaches us that, in politics as between individuals, quarrels of this nature are the most difficult to arrange.

To judge of the situation of the three contracting Courts between themselves, it is sufficient to know their respective interests. If these interests coincide on one principal point, the maintenance of political peace, they clash on a number of secondary questions, and on more than one they are entirely opposed. This divergence of interests has necessarily enfeebled their action. The ministers of the Porte have not failed to discover this; they see in the union of the three Courts merely a fictitious and fragile bond, and flatter themselves with the prospect of profiting by a division which they consider inevitable between political bodies so little homogeneous.

Lastly, as to the position of Austria in the whole affair, I need not explain it to you—you know as well as I do how we have invariably regarded this question. That the pacification should take place; that it should be brought about by the wisdom and consolidated by the moderation and clemency of the Sultan—such were, such are still our wishes, and any means we have thought would contribute to realize them have always been seized upon with eagerness by us. Our isolation in the affair arises solely from the invincible repugnance of our august master to violate what he regards as a principle of incontestable right, and from his conviction that any enterprise which departs from this rule cannot prosper. Certainly the beginning of this enterprise, so much and so long debated, is not likely to alter the opinion of his Imperial Majesty.

In short, the three Powers and the Porte are placed in a position which exercises the most disastrous effect on the liberty of their movements, and which renders it as difficult, if not impossible, to advance as to retreat. That of Austria, on the other hand, is perfectly free, and our mobility is complete.

Ad II. The examination of the probability of future contingencies is founded more or less on the questions I have just treated.

We should be quite contented, for our part, if the Porte decided to abate its resistance, and if, instead of meeting the allies with an absolute refusal, it would prove to them that it is the method and not the ground of their proposals to which it objects; if it declares, in a word, that it wishes for pacification, and that, provided they do not pretend to extort it by orders and threats, it will find means

of coming to an understanding with them. But may we yet reckon on this chance? Unhappily, everything makes us think that we must renounce it.

Ad III. The really most important object of all is that of seeking means by which we can hope to bring the affair to a more happy *dénouement* than it promises at present.

I frankly confess that we should not have had courage to enter into such an examination but for the invitation which has recently been addressed to us by the British Cabinet. For of what avail would have been the best wishes on our part if there had been no basis on which we could found a hope? We have had six years' experience of the Eastern Question, and the sad results of this experience were not likely to induce us to renew the fruitless efforts we made during that long time with all the frankness, impartiality, and solicitude of which the Emperor has given so many proofs to his allies and the world in general throughout the numerous crises of the last five-and-thirty years. But an appeal having been made to us, we should have failed in our duty if we had not replied to it. . . .

The real difficulty of the moment is found, in our opinion, in two apparently irreconcilable facts, of which the reality must also be recognized if we are not to fall into grave mistakes. One, that there is a revolutionary movement, threatening directly or indirectly the tranquillity and the existence of a great part of the Ottoman Empire, and which must be stopped at any price; the other that the Porte has no longer the moral power (supposing even it has the material power) to combat the movement by its single efforts. I know what the ministers of the Sultan will reply to this observation. They will say what they have so often said: "Let them leave us alone, and we will soon settle our own affairs." I admit—and how can any one dispute it?—that if the first Courts of Europe had not been for so many years occupied with an event which no doubt the Porte would have been very glad if they had left alone, and if the agitation produced by this event on the public mind of all countries had not made them feel obliged to occupy themselves with it, the insurrection of the Ottoman provinces would sooner or later have come to nothing. But can we efface the past? By yielding to useless regrets, can we change the results? The Triple Treaty exists; the ultimatum of the three Courts has gone forth,* and the

* An ultimatum was sent to the Porte on August 16, 1827, by the Ambassadors of England, France, and Russia, to which no answer was given.—Ed.

Porte cries out in vain against these transactions—it must submit to the consequences, unless it can find means of disarming them.

It is first of all necessary to put a stop to the evils which must inevitably arise from the conflict between the demands of the intervening Courts and the peremptory refusals of the Porte. We are not called upon at present to give our advice on the means or terms of the pacification of the Greeks. It is a question apart, the importance of which we do not forget. But what claims our attention in the first place is the political struggle between the Powers who propose and the Government that rejects a forced mediation, which the former regard as necessary to bring about the pacification, and the latter believes absolutely derogatory to its rights. To this question all the embarrassments and dangers which we wish to remove are attached. The separation of the subjects in litigation appears to us once for all the first condition of success. We thus return to a distinction analogous to that on which we previously insisted so strongly when, unhappily without being attended to, we never ceased to protest against the system of confounding the affair of the insurrection with that of the Russo-Turkish differences.

That we may be able to find a way of salvation, the Porte must be made to comprehend that it cannot escape from these dilemmas by mere refusals and a passive attitude; that, even when it has decided not to shrink from any danger, the three Courts will none the less be placed under the necessity of a positive decision; that the honor of the party who, in such a violent crisis, runs the most risk, is not compromised if it is the first to attempt to bring about a solution of the complication; that, in short, statements addressed to a Power which is both its friend and that of the Courts which the Porte must necessarily at present regard as enemies can never humiliate those who have the good sense to make them. You see what I wish to arrive at. The Porte should address us confidentially; it should express to us its desire to put an end to the embarrassments which even its vanity must regard as more or less shared with the three Courts; it should choose, for its first step, the form of asking our advice, or any other form it may consider convenient; in a word, it should address us with the object of enabling us to address our allies. This step can have no inconveniences; it is applicable to the state of things such as it was at the time of your last Reports, as well as to that when the conflicting parties are already engaged in material action. The effect of an attempt to which the Emperor might agree in consequence of an initiative taken by the

Sultan towards his Imperial Majesty is without doubt placed beyond the sphere of our foresight. But if this consideration does not stop the Emperor, why should it stop the Sultan, who would lose nothing, even if it did not succeed?

I authorize you then to make, under the seal of secrecy, the following overtures to the Reis-Effendi. You will say to him from me:

“That we see with great vexation the embarrassing and eminently dangerous situation in which our friend the Porte is placed;

“That the very fact of this situation must convince the Porte that, not being deceived as to the march of events, we have constantly acted towards it with that loyal frankness which characterizes the well-known policy of the Emperor our august master, and belongs to an enlightened friendship which does not allow him to conceal from his friends the evils with which he believes they are threatened;

“That, in our opinion, the Porte is not only running the deplorable risk of an open rupture with three Powers, but it is also exposed to the danger of a direct war with Russia; a war which under present circumstances that Power would undertake without any views of conquest (of which we are far from suspecting the Emperor Nicholas) but solely with a view to overcoming the opposition his proposals have met with at Constantinople;

“That, according to our firm conviction, the safety of the Ottoman Empire requires its Government to do everything in its power to put an end to a crisis which can only lead to the most disastrous extremities;

“That to this end we consider we are giving the Porte a new proof of our interest in its preservation and prosperity, by suggesting that it should express to us confidentially the regrets it feels for the state of tension (or of open war) produced by a fatal discussion with the Powers friendly to Austria, and claiming our good offices to assist it out of this complication and replace it in a position corresponding with its desire of maintaining political peace and re-establishing tranquillity in its own States.”

If the Porte should agree to this step, you can assure it in return that we shall regard it as a sacred duty to devote all our efforts to the attainment of so desirable an object, and that we shall neglect no opportunity of making known to our allies its conciliatory disposition.

However, as it is easy to foresee that the steps which our Court

may take in consequence of such an overture would be received by the allied Powers with much more confidence and favor if they were accompanied by some tangible evidence of the moderate and pacific intentions of the Ottoman Government, we do not wish to conceal from the Porte that our means of action would be greatly strengthened by its consent to a temporary suspension of hostilities. We are quite convinced that this measure, which would much facilitate the employment of our good offices, and essentially contribute to render them efficacious, would impose no real sacrifice on the Porte, while this suspension of hostilities, carried out in a way compatible with the dignity of the Sultan, would neither prejudice his rights nor his interests. If nevertheless, seeing the extreme repugnance with which the proposal of an armistice seems to have inspired the Porte, it should be impossible for you to induce him to take this last step, you must not regard his refusal as a reason for discontinuing your efforts, and you must persist in doing everything that is possible to give weight to your representations.

In any case you will take care to make the Reis-Effendi comprehend that the overtures you make to him are dictated solely by our solicitude, the knowledge we have recently acquired of the position at Constantinople, and the serious apprehensions we entertain on the matter. You must not allow the slightest suspicion that we have founded hopes of a better future on secret communications from another Cabinet. The knowledge of this fact would not fail to influence the resolutions of the Divan in a sense contrary to our benevolent intentions, and to confirm its expectation of an approaching disunion between the three Courts—an expectation which has already not a little contributed to its determinations.

You must yourself feel how important it is to lose no time in an affair which may any day be irreparably embroiled. Knowing your zeal and devotion to the service, I need not beg you to use all the promptitude of which the forms of Ottoman diplomacy admit. As soon as you can announce the result you must send me a courier extraordinary.*

* In consequence of this despatch, which arrived at Constantinople on October 20, all the members of the Divan met at the house of the Grand Vizier, when the sketch of a letter addressed to Prince Metternich, requesting the interposition of Austria, was drawn up. The Sultan himself wrote on it these words: "The Emperor of Austria is our old friend, and is worthy of all our confidence, for he has given us constant proofs of his good feeling. I have also long been aware of the remarkable qualities of Prince Metternich

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, October 17, 1827

870. In the peculiar and dangerous position of affairs between the friendly Powers and the Porte in consequence of the Triple Treaty, I am not able to-day to send you a regular despatch. Events move on, and we are, no doubt, the only Cabinet which is not experiencing one surprise after another. At St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, it was not doubted that the Porte would yield to a strong collective step of the three Powers; Count Nesselrode made bets on this illusion, up to the very day when the last negative reply from the Divan arrived. Placed in closer correspondence with us the French ministers, disappointed in the hope they had so long cherished, and convinced by facts of their error, assured us that the interposition of the squadrons—if only as a matter of time—would surely prevent the disembarkation of the Turco-Egyptian fleet in the Morea. Both calculations are shown to have been mistaken, and there has happened also what always quickly happens after moral defeats. The Cabinets are all in a great state of irritation, and the Tuileries in a perfect fury, and inclined to attribute to us the ill-success of a cleverly-conceived plan. They refer to your refusal to join your colleagues at the time of the last triple arrangement, and the five Austrian merchant ships which were employed as transports in the Egyptian fleet complete our misdeeds. I informed you of my opinion on the negative attitude you have recently assumed. I am convinced that you were bound to follow the particular line of conduct I pointed out—the thing is past, and is no longer a question of the moment. Recriminations run high. At Berlin, they dread the moral effect; at London, they are full of regrets; at St. Petersburg, they have said so little that we are in need of explanations: while at Paris they are venting their rage against us, and our perfidy has become a sort of proverb.

Through it all you see I am very tranquil on our account. I do not fear words, and those dictated by a consciousness of wrong are always poor words. What I do fear are the extremes in the posi-

With the confidential communications and assurances of the Internuncio before me, I consider the Grand Vizier's letter thoroughly good." The letter here alluded to (No. 875) was sent to Prince Metternich, but it was too late, for an unexpected event had entirely changed the political situation, and frustrated the hopes attached by the Porte to this step. Five days before the letter was despatched, unknown to those at Constantinople, the battle of Navarino had been fought.—Ed.

tions of the opposite parties; the vanity of two sensitive Powers such as Russia and France, and the embarrassments in which the new British Government will find itself; I fear on the other hand the extreme rashness of the Turks in an affair where their feelings are wounded, and where the weakness of their opponents' attitude may contribute to blind the Divan to the reality and undoubted imminence of the greatest dangers. We pointed out in our last despatch the way in which alone the situation of affairs can be altered.

Has the Porte comprehended us? Has it seized our meaning and does it understand the risks to which it will certainly be exposed if it shows itself incapable of comprehending us? Experience alone will prove, and reasoning is useless, for all I can say I have said, and what the Divan can comprehend it will have comprehended already, or it will be too late, both for itself and for the success of our good intentions.

If the Porte is disposed to accept our suggestion, you will have only to maintain it in its good disposition. If it has only admitted the first part of our proposal, you must insist on an armistice also: if it has refused, you must warn it that we foresee war, with all its possible consequences.

Do not fail to let us know the results of our overtures of the 3rd inst.

CODRINGTON'S LETTER.

Metternich to Werner, in Berlin, Vienna, October 29, 1827.

871. . . . The false rumor that Austrian men-of-war had formed part of the last Turco-Egyptian expedition induced Admiral Codrington to take a step towards the unknown head of this supposed expedition so contrary to the common rules of war and sound policy that the Emperor would think it derogatory to his dignity to let the question drop. His Imperial Majesty has therefore commanded me to write to London on the matter, and you will find enclosed (No. 872) the despatch which I have addressed on this subject to Prince Esterhazy.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, October 29, 1827.

872. We have received from Constantinople the enclosed despatch (No. 873) sent, without being addressed to him, to Rear-Admiral Dandolo, chief of our squadron in the Archipelago. It contains the complaints of Vice-Admiral Sir E. Codrington with regard to the pretended services rendered by our vessels to the Turco-Egyptian fleet surrounded by the English and French Admirals in the port of Navarino, and warnings, in very strong language, of the dangers to which our ships would be exposed if they interfered with the operations of the squadrons of the three Powers, who, by the treaty of London had united to aid the Greeks.

Rear-Admiral Dandolo has himself replied to the declaration of Sir E. Codrington, and the British Government will soon be informed of his reply. The affair is, however, of a nature to claim the attention of the Courts which it concerns; and, persuaded as we are that the British ministry sincerely desires to maintain the most amicable relations with us, we do not hesitate to give our opinion on the English Vice-Admiral's letter with all the frankness inspired by the rectitude of our own cause and our knowledge of the just and benevolent feelings of England.

With this object we communicate to your Highness the following observations, suggested by the perusal of the above-mentioned document:

1. The instructions given to the commandant of our squadron in the Levant expressly forbid any Austrian vessel—either of war or commerce—to enter a port regularly and effectively blockaded by either of the parties engaged in the actual struggle; but,

2. The blockade of the port of Navarino has not been regularly announced, and it was not likely to be suspected, inasmuch as not one of the Powers which could proceed thither had declared the fact of a state of war between itself and the Ottoman Empire;

3. Notwithstanding the absence of the indispensable formality of this declaration, it is certain that no Imperial vessel of war has entered or attempted to enter that port since the English fleet appeared before Navarino on September 19, the date of Vice-Admiral Codrington's letter; that the Austrian schooner "*La Vigilante*" was at Navarino previous to the arrival of the Egyptian fleet, for the purpose of demanding the restitution of the property of an Austrian vessel which was wrecked on the coast and pillaged and the crew inhumanely treated by a band of thieves; that this schooner had left the above-mentioned port before September 12, the day of the arrival of the British squadron at Navarino; and that, moreover, no Imperial vessel of war "has made part of the Egyptian fleet" either before or after its arrival;

4. Therefore, the complaint of Vice-Admiral Codrington has no real foundation, while the form of his declaration is contrary to the usages observed between friendly and allied Powers; for this document—even admitting that the English Vice-Admiral believed himself authorized to take such a step—instead of being addressed to an officer anonymously, should have been addressed to the head of the Imperial squadron, who was alone in a position to judge what reply to make to the demands of the English Vice-Admiral;

5. With entering here into delicate and intricate discussions, it appears to us incontestable that the question of knowing whether the squadrons of the Powers allied by the Treaty of London have the right to exclude from all communication with the places and coasts of Greece the ships of every other European Power, making "no distinction between their ships and those of the Turks," and to prevent them with threats "from acting in opposition to the signatory Powers of the treaty," cannot be decided between naval officers. This question should have been discussed and arranged

by the Courts: in short, in order to regulate the relations between the different squadrons, in so new and undefined a position as that which has arisen from the recent proceedings of the three Powers, a previous arrangement should have been made, agreed to, and recognized by all the Powers whose vessels frequent the seas of Turkey and Greece.

I wish you to repeat these observations to Lord Dudley, begging that minister to give them the attention they seem to me to deserve, and to arrange things between yourselves in such a way as to prevent disagreements and misunderstandings, unjust accusations and embarrassing claims, between the naval officers of the two States. The Secretary of State is too wise not to see the justice and importance of our desire, and to appreciate its motives.

The grievances proclaimed by Vice-Admiral Codrington, to which we have replied, seem to bear principally on the material assistance which our vessels may have furnished to the Ottoman fleet. But, judging from some of his expressions, he complains of the mere presence of some Imperial vessels of war in the neighborhood of Navarino. Now, although we have every reason to believe that on September 19 no vessel of war was to be found in the port of Navarino, it is nevertheless possible and even probable that one of these vessels may have arrived afterwards, not in the port, but in the neighborhood of that place. But under what pretext could a neutral vessel be prevented from being—either as a spectator or in consequence of orders it may have received from its chiefs—near a place where events are taking place with which it has nothing to do? The officers of the Imperial vessels could certainly not be accused of having fanned the flame of discord at any period of this deplorable struggle; wherever they have appeared they have spoken words of conciliation and peace. . . .

As for the new circumstances to which the proceedings of the three intervening Courts may have given rise, we invariably keep to the line prescribed by loyalty and friendship. It is not for us to judge of the measures these Courts have determined upon, and we scrupulously abstain from obstructing the operations which may ensue from them, as we sincerely desire that they may lead to the pacification of the Levant. But at the same time we flatter ourselves that the Government of his Britannic Majesty would desire us to be rightly informed of its ulterior views in the present state of things so that we may give clear and positive orders to those charged with our interests in those countries and seas which, some

day or other, may become the theatre of the most important events.

Vice-Admiral Codrington's Letter of the 19th September, 1827.

873. Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, Commander-in-Chief of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Archipelago, learning that some vessels belonging to the Emperor of Austria form part of the Turkish fleet, and are actually in the Port of Navarino for the purpose of carrying on hostilities against the Greeks, has the honor to inform the officer commanding the above-mentioned vessels that, by a treaty signed between Great Britain, France, and Russia, he is charged to prevent the arrival of assistance in the way of men, arms, vessels and naval munitions to Greece and the islands of the Archipelago, and that, consequently, it will not be in his power to make any distinction between Austrian and Turkish vessels. Respect for the Imperial flag and for the nation with which England is in alliance induces the Vice-Admiral to choose this means of preventing a collision which it will be very easy to avoid; and if the Austrian commander does not show the same desire to preserve the vessels of his Imperial Majesty from the inconveniences they will experience by continuing to act in opposition to the allied Powers, that officer will be responsible for the consequences.

His Britannic Majesty's ship "Asia,"
September 19, 1827.

NAVARINO.

Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, November 13, 1827.

874. A few days after the departure of the last courier from Paris news arrived there of the terrible catastrophe of Navarino.

It did not surprise us in the least. We always said that the Triple Alliance could have but two possible results—either complete inaction or war.

The event of October 20 begins a new era for Europe. What are the consequences to be expected? We are quite unable to determine, much less to foresee them. One thing is certain—namely, that the total destruction of the Ottoman navy must be most fruitful in consequences. In this respect everything is changed.

The Ottoman empire has ceased, for the moment, to belong to itself. Constantinople is defenceless against a combined invasion of land forces, supported by reinforcements echeloned along the Black Sea, and provisioned by a fleet. The chain of the Balkan is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, and an army crossing the Pruth could now calculate its success, and fix the moment when Constantinople should be blockaded by land and sea. . . .

What effect will be produced in the capital of the Ottoman empire and in the provinces by the event of Navarino? What we know of these countries enables us to foresee many sad possibilities and not one happy one.

We may infer that the Sultan will decide, in consequence of the sanguinary affront he has just received, to resist everything.

We may also suppose that in an extremity so disastrous the will of the Sultan may yield to the impetuosity of an entire population driven to exasperation. The Ottoman fleet is, so to speak, the patrimony of the capital; immense efforts have been made quite recently for its equipment, and now not a single remnant of so many sacrifices will reappear in the port of Constantinople. Thousands of Turkish sailors have fallen victims of an event, which the immense population of Constantinople will have some difficulty in understanding, seeing that the representatives of the Courts to whom the victorious squadrons belong stay on quietly. How far will the fury

of the population extend, and to what sacrifices of reason and prudence will the Porte find itself reduced, so as not to succumb under the reproach of having been either the accomplice or the dupe of circumstances?

Lastly, we consider it possible that the popular movement may result in a state of complete anarchy; that the reigning family may become the immediate victims; that the reforms which the Sultan has lately undertaken may be turned against him as attempts contrary to law; and that the destruction of the fleet may be regarded by a superstitious people as a punishment from Heaven. Constantinople will, indeed, then be like a hell in which the wildest passions are at war.

If Providence should turn the feeling of public misfortune among the Turks into apathy we might have some hope; but with the Turks this does not seem at all probable.

The considerations I have just laid before you have lately formed the subject of the gravest and most sombre meditations of the Emperor. You know the activity of his mind, the rectitude of his thoughts, and the warmth of his feelings. The event of Navarino, its causes, and its more than probable consequences, all place his Imperial Majesty in the most painful moral situation. I confess to you that, in the long course of more than eighteen years in which I have occupied a position bringing me daily in contact with his person, I have never seen our august master more painfully affected or uneasy.

At the very time when such grave cares were occupying his Majesty, the post from Constantinople of the 25th of this month arrived. It brought me the letter from the Grand Vizier, a copy of which is enclosed (No. 875). I made it my duty to lay it before the Emperor without delay.

His first impulse was to dictate a reply in which I was to inform the Porte that, as all the thoughts and anticipations of his Imperial Majesty had been mistaken, he knew not how to venture on new ground, having no basis whatever for his calculations. Feeling, however, that this would show a want of confidence, he afterwards decided to order me to communicate the Turkish official note to the representatives of the three Courts. I have myself carried out this order to-day.* . . .

* In this letter to the representatives of the three allied Courts, of November 12, Prince Metternich says: "In laying this despatch before you, I must inform you, by the express order of his Imperial Majesty, that in charging

I have no orders to give you concerning this step. The Emperor regards it as a relief to his conscience, without attaching to it any practical value. However, I feel the necessity of urging you to assure Baron de Damas that, although the Emperor felt bound to undertake to make the words known, he strongly protests against acting in any way as a mediator in a situation which defies calculations. The Emperor desires that you will not allow the least doubt to spring up in the minds of the Cabinet of his Most Christian Majesty; the representatives of his Majesty at London and St. Petersburg have received the same command. If the three Courts desire to make us the medium of a reply to the Porte, his Imperial Majesty will forward it to Constantinople, whatever may be its tenor. If they desire no reply to be made, the Porte must also be informed of that fact.

. . . I beg you to communicate the present despatch to Baron de Damas. It accurately describes the Emperor's feelings concerning an event new in the records of history, and in a position of affairs which, since it baffles all calculation, should prevent statesmen from undertaking the useless and thankless task of attempting it.

Mehemet Selim Pacha, Grand Vizier, to Prince Metternich, Constantinople, October 24, 1827.

875. It cannot have escaped the wisdom and experience of your Highness that, agreeably to the decrees of Divine Providence, the maintenance of order and peace in the world can have no solid foundation save in the recognition of the rights of sovereigns over their subjects, without which, indeed, the social state cannot subsist. This is an undoubted truth. Nevertheless, your Highness cannot be ignorant of the nature of the extraordinary circumstances that have recently arisen between the Sublimé Porte and certain friendly Powers, and have led to a state of things which is neither peace nor war. The proposals made by the Powers and the measures resulting from them, while they seem to aim only at promoting the general tranquillity, in reality tend to disturb the peace of the whole

his Cabinet with this communication, the Emperor fulfils a duty which neither his relations towards the Porte, nor those towards the allied Powers, allow him to avoid; nevertheless his Imperial Majesty limits himself to this step, wishing it to be understood that he does not, and never will, act as mediator in the differences which are raised between the three Powers and the Ottoman Porte."—ED.

world. This state of things has assumed a character which must strike with astonishment every wise and just statesman. Notwithstanding this, the Sovereign Porte takes now, as in the past, the straight path of justice, and, maintaining the principles of moderation and peace, has up to this time omitted nothing to preserve the bonds of friendship, and displayed both generosity and humanity in its sentiments. Nevertheless, neither the calm and moderate conduct of the Ottoman Government, nor their reasonable and just replies, have been able to overcome the tenacity still manifested by these Powers, who seem to have forgotten all respect due to the Sovereign Porte and the Mussulman people in general. This state of things naturally afflicts the Ottoman minister, and profoundly grieves the heart of the Sultan. Although it is beyond doubt that the Almighty will lend His divine assistance to those who depart not from the straight path and the cause of justice, and that, notwithstanding his troubles, the confidence of the Sovereign Porte in this Divine protection is not shaken, yet he would prefer before everything the preservation of peace and the re-establishment of public tranquillity. This end, however, can only be attained when all that concerns his internal affairs is left to his will and pleasure, and when the re-establishment of the repose and tranquillity of his States is intrusted to his own means—which he does not cease and never will cease to use with the moderation necessary to sound legislation. Then the peace and tranquillity which form the principal object of the wishes and cares of the Powers will be re-established in the most perfect manner; then the discussions which have been raised, without any provocation on our part, between the Sovereign Porte and the Powers in question, will cease; all cause for misunderstanding will disappear, and the Sovereign Porte is ready to place himself again on the best relations of friendship and sincerity towards these Powers.

The sentiments of the Sovereign Porte in all that regards this excellent object thoroughly agree with those of the Imperial Court of Austria, his friend and most valued neighbor, and in consideration of the bonds of intimacy and special confidence which exist between his Majesty the Emperor and his Highness the Sultan, and the sincere and friendly relations which have long reigned between the two Governments, without even a shadow of dissatisfaction, his Excellency the Reis Effendi has already had several conversations on this subject with Baron d'Ottensfels, the Internuncio of Austria residing at Constantinople. Nevertheless, the Ottoman ministry

have judged it convenient to address the present amicable and confidential letter to your Highness, with the object of showing you for the first and last time their manner of seeing and judging events, flattering themselves with the hope that, as Austria is a great Power, the sincere and true friend of all the other Courts, she will employ her good offices and beneficent endeavors to overcome a crisis that has arisen, without provocation on the part of the Sovereign Porte, between it and its friends, from their unjust interference in its internal affairs; to the end that all unsuitable proceedings and measures may be avoided, all that has taken place forgotten, and the ties of friendship between the Porte and the Courts re-established. This is what we have pleasure in hoping from the friendly and beneficent sentiments of your Serene Highness.

Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, November 13, 1827.

876. I must remind you that you cannot too much insist on the fact that the Emperor, by not refusing to forward the Grand Vizier's letter to its destination, has no intention by doing so of placing himself as mediator between the three Powers and the Porte, and still less between the Porte and the Greeks. It is certain that if either of the parties had requested the mediation of his Imperial Majesty, a decided refusal would have been immediately given to the request. And the Grand Vizier's letter does not contain a word that even in a forced sense could give the supposition that the Porte would go so far as to ask for the mediation of Austria. The Sultan must dislike all idea of mediation, just as we recoil at a word which has acquired a terrible celebrity from the cruel abuse which has been made of it. . . .

What effect will the arbitrary exploit of the English admiral produce on the English public? I shall be very much surprised, if the feeling be of a kind to please those who have to clear themselves from very great faults. One of the greatest a Government can be guilty of is to have failed in foresight. Now, if history does not pass over such faults in silence, the authors of the transactions between the three Courts in the years 1826 and 1827 will have to encounter the bitterest reproaches.

No one can foresee what will be the consequences of the affair of October 20. One of the most probable will be horrible massacres in those places where the Christian population is mixed with the Mussulman. Another which must be expected is the enormous

loss likely to be sustained by commerce. The description which in my last despatch (No. 874) I gave of the state to which the Ottoman Empire is reduced in a military point of view, is, most unhappily, a true one. Admitting that the Emperor of Russia may take a part which, I cannot but acknowledge, is a natural consequence of the advantageous position which the two other Courts have made for him, what means have the two Powers themselves of preventing the total ruin of an empire with whose existence they have so many direct interests? The fleet at Sebastopol is ready to set sail. An army of a hundred thousand men is echeloned from the Ukraine to the banks of the Pruth. The Turks have neither army nor fleet to oppose to these forces, and the maritime resources of the allies, which have destroyed the last defence of the Turks, are themselves disabled. . . .

I send you the copy of an official Report addressed by Admiral Codrington to his Government. Never before has a Report of this kind come from the pen of an English admiral. All that Machiavellism put in action, and injustice applied to politics and war, can invent in the way of rashness is to be found crammed into this remarkable performance.

Please to take the greatest care to keep us informed of the impressions produced by the development of events both on the Government and on the different parties in France. The time approaches when we shall have to make great decisions, and hence we ought not to be left in any doubt as to facts. Therefore, do not spare the couriers. For the rest, assume an attitude of perfect impassibility. Our watchword now is, that we no longer understand at all what the three Courts have wished or do wish; and therefore that we have no longer to answer to them for anything that we wish or may wish.

Your duty is to make yourself acquainted with everything in order to inform us; nothing more. I beg you to read the preceding despatch to M. de Damas and M. de Villèle, as a proof of our personal confidence. Whenever there is any question as to the Emperor's impression, you cannot be too decided in your expressions. I cannot well use the word "indignation" in diplomatic correspondence; it is, however, the only word which really represents the feeling of his Imperial Majesty.

*Metternich to the Emperor Francis, with His Majesty's remark,
Vienna, November 26, 1827.*

877. . . . From Constantinople we are without news beyond the 10th. It must, however, arrive almost immediately. From Jassy we hear that the war may be considered as begun. The details your Majesty will find in the Reports. On the 13th inst. people in St. Petersburg were still in good hopes of the compliance of the Porte, and full of delight at the taking of Eriwan, which event will certainly make a contrary impression in London.

At Paris everything is in commotion. The elections in twelve departments were known, and were entirely Liberal, and in consequence they seem in the capital to have come to blows. Everywhere it is like a real earthquake; and all this is the result of Liberal politics. To judge from the English newspapers of the 14th inst., it appears that the public voice is lifted more and more against the Navarino affair. I have had an article from the "Times" (the ministerial journal) inserted in the *Beobachter*, which, by the shallowness of its arguments and the number of its reservations, shows how gently the Government is feeling its way. The Opposition journals are so strong that we cannot give one extract from them.

METTERNICH.

The enclosures are herewith returned. According to them it really seems that war is impending. God grant that this is not a contrivance of the Liberals to occupy the Powers while they use the opportunity (as, for instance, in France) to break out and advance their own views. I await with great impatience the news from London and Constantinople.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, Nov. 27, 1827.

Metternich to Werner, in Berlin, Vienna, November 29, 1827.

878. I have this morning received a despatch from London, dated November 20, which is hardly intelligible, because the Reports of the embassy are full of references to a despatch of two days before, which, having been directed to Paris, has not yet arrived here. However, from the despatch of November 20 it is clear—

That the public voice is less and less in favor of the Navarino affair;

That the British Government is not well satisfied with the Grand Vizier's letter.

Far from being surprised at these two facts, I think them quite natural. The loyal feeling which is one of the happy features of the English national character must be shocked by an act which all the sophistries in the world can never represent as lawful. Commerce must be alarmed; the City merchants can hardly take in good part what disturbs it. Liberalism has not yet succeeded in introducing itself into the figures of the counting-houses.

The Grand Vizier's step is an ineffectual step, and if we consider it so, others besides ourselves will, for the best reasons, think so too. I am not, however, sorry that they are annoyed about it in London, for it may be inferred that they were there in favor of the right course; therefore, they do not desire a rupture, and this fact is nothing new to me.

The contest is now taking place where enterprises dictated by Liberalism always end. The things disappear, and the formulas remain; the English Cabinet will certainly be ready to bargain for the pacification, provided it can escape the mediation. Thus we have seen the hottest French republicans, not only not perish for the Republic, but not make so easy a bargain for the interests of the revolution; just as we have seen latterly Imperialists contented with everything except Legitimacy. But it is precisely in this undoubted rule that lies the great difficulty of bringing the affair to a peaceful conclusion. The Sultan will be, in fact, as disposed for peace as he will be immovable in his determination never to recognize the right of foreign mediation. The genius of revolution is disorder; and to attain a state of disorder it creates difficulties in every affair which are not in the affairs themselves. How is the course of two far-seeing Powers like Austria and Prussia embarrassed by the considerations I have here indicated!

I send you the first proof of an article which will appear in the *Beobachter* of to-morrow. We have felt the absolute necessity of giving a short account of what has passed at Constantinople since the arrival of the news of Navarino. Our public takes the most natural interest in what occurs in a State with which we have every kind of contact; therefore we must speak, and this is certainly not easy at a moment when it is often as impossible to say all as to say nothing. I hope M. de Bernstorff will not think that what we have said lays us open to blame.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, November 30, 1827.

879. Your Majesty will find enclosed Reports from London of the 19th and 20th inst., and from Paris of the 20th inst.

The Reports from Paris show only the greatest confusion in both ideas and things. I beg your Majesty to cast your eye over my son's letter,* for, in my opinion, it contains very just views of the circumstances of the moment. I very much doubt myself whether the ministry can hold together: and if it falls, it has only deserved its fall too well. On the other hand it can, however, only be replaced by a worse.

Prince Esterhazy's news of the 19th inst. is in the highest degree interesting. It is plainly to be seen that the public voice is more and more against the position of things in the East; and our credit increases in proportion. The Report of the 20th inst. contains the opinion of the English Cabinet on the letter of the Grand Vizier to me. This opinion could only be what it is, and is therefore not in the least surprising. Mine on these Reports your Majesty will please to find in the despatch which I yesterday sent to Berlin (No. 878).

At the same time your Majesty will see from Werner's Report from Berlin how clear and even strong are the views of the Cabinet there.

METTERNICH.

The enclosures are herewith returned. Their contents are not very consolatory, except for the satisfaction which my maxims receive on the part of England, and the hope that England will put a stop to the pirates. We must endeavor to make use of the present situation and, so far as we safely can, manage that England and France put a stop to Russia, if there is still time; moreover, we must endeavor that the Turks go on quietly, and thereby gain time to bring them nearer to the other Powers as much as possible without offending their principles.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, December 1, 1827.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, December 9, 1827.

880. A despatch received to-day from Constantinople brought me the enclosed Report of the Internuncio. It consists of two parts,

* Prince Victor was then an attaché at the embassy in Paris. The letter is not forthcoming.—ED.

the practical and the moral. The first is confined to two facts. On the 25th the embargo on merchantmen at Constantinople was taken off; and at the conference between the representatives of the three allied Courts and the Reis-Effendi on the 24th the word Mediation was not uttered by the first; words of pacification seem to have fallen from the latter. From the Report of the Internuncio of November 24 we have hopes of further approaches. The same hope, however, cannot be derived from the despatches of General Guilleminot just received, which the French agent read to me. Concerning the moral part of the despatch, I can only lament that an importance is attached to the Grand Vizier's letter which its contents in no way justify. From my last despatch to Baron Ottenfels, which I had yesterday the honor of laying before your Majesty, you will have seen what I think of the matter.* The Internuncio was also under another delusion—namely, that we were anxious for mediation. On this point he is already corrected. Since there is a possibility of a truce at Constantinople, I thought it necessary to send an extraordinary despatch to the Internuncio, in which my definite overtures were stated. If by the touch of a magic wand I could get to Constantinople, I would take a wager that I would soon put an end to the business; but where the distance is so great, the simplest things are difficult to attain.

The whole affair turns on the words Mediation and Pacification: it did so at its very beginning, and now it is plainer still. The first word represents the revolutionary principle; the second, everlasting right. But the fight is angry, for, unhappily, Canning has placed the three Courts on the basis of the first. I yesterday experienced an unhappy proof of this truth. It seems from the official despatches, which Herr von Tatistscheff received to-day, that there is great rejoicing and triumph at St. Petersburg over the "grand and noble" victory of Navarino. Of this I think nothing, for this is the only language suited to the Emperor's position. But it is otherwise with a private letter of Count Nesselrode to Herr von Tatistscheff, which the latter allowed me to read. In this letter Count Nesselrode raves and rants. In it was the following sentence. "What will our friend Metternich say of this grand triumph? he will repeat

* On Dec. 6, Metternich wrote to the Internuncio that he might set before the Reis-Effendi the insufficiency of the step, and tell him that the Grand Vizier's letter had made in Paris and in London the same impression as it had made on people in Vienna—namely, that they lamented its inadequacy, since it did not contain a word as to the suspension of hostilities.—ED.

his old tiresome principles; he will talk of right—*vive la force!* It is might which rules the world nowadays, and I am very glad to find that I and my comrades can leave the regulating of affairs to the admirals. These are the men to cut the matter short! Never has there been glory comparable to that of this moment!”

This is how Carnot and Danton, and afterwards their imitators, thought and spoke. They were signally overthrown, however, by the same old and tiresome principles, and that will be the end of the ranting Count Nesselrode. The only question is what will go to the bottom before him and his feeble comrades.

METTERNICH.

The despatches of the Internuncio are enclosed herewith. You are quite right in saying that everything turns on the words Mediation and Pacification; and if you were on the spot, and the distances were not so great, you would, with the help of God, make an end of these unhappy affairs in the East, without setting aside sacred principles and rights, as Count Nesselrode is weak enough to desire, and which might have the most frightful consequences.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, December 10, 1827.

1828.

THE EVENTS OF THE DAY.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to his son Victor, from January 1 to May 15, 1828.

881. *Vienna, January 1, 1828.*—I shall begin this year, my dear Victor, by telling you of my desire for your happiness. Mine is much bound up in this desire, for you know how great a part you occupy in my existence! How earnestly do I hope that we may soon be together again!

As to the other aspects of my life, they look very sombre for the year 1828. On no side does anything smile on me, and, alone in the midst of a crazy world, I should at least have the right to grow tired of my solitude, if the feeling of *ennui* was compatible with that of anger and contempt. If ever the want of all right feeling in what is styled Liberalism was shown in all its nakedness, it is in the proceedings of the year which has just passed. Incapable of constructing anything, even of making a mere screen for themselves, the Courts, under the influence of that sect, are now in a position like that of the savage in the midst of civilization. Everything is in disorder in Paris and in London, and all would be in disorder in St. Petersburg if the victorious autocracy was not there to swallow the scraps thrown to them by the Liberal Alliance for that purpose.

"I cannot properly make any travelling plans for the year 1828. Shall I be able to leave my office, which will probably soon be changed into headquarters again? I cannot tell; what I do know is that I shall have you come to me somewhere or other.

. . . . The works at Königswart go on very well. The last account that I have received leaves me no doubt that if we have the happiness of going there this summer we shall hardly know the place. But God knows, however, if I shall find means of leaving my desk! I should like to be able to go to Johannisberg, and to pass through Königswart either in going or returning. I should stay all June at

Johannisberg, and it would be a very great pleasure to me to see it again.

882. *January 24.*—I believe all you tell me in your letter of the 15th on the sudden ministerial change in France (No. 891). That country is lost, and my calculations with respect to it are no longer of an active character; they are simply defensive. I have observed affairs too closely, and Heaven has given me too sure an instinct, that I should not have some foresight. This is what M. de Villèle lacked. He was a man of business, not a statesman. Nations do not vanish, they are transformed; and this is what most certainly awaits France. The institutions she possesses do not suit her, and they will fall to pieces. But many things, even the throne, may yet fall before they do. For France there is nothing but the Republic or the Empire; that is to say, confusion or the excess of power. The Republic is a dream; the Empire is a reality. It is possible that France may have yet once again to pass through confusion to arrive at order. Neither this confusion nor this order will be in all respects like that which has existed. Never does the same malady invade the same body and show the same symptoms: but that does not prevent a new malady from resembling the old. Since the world began, never has a country shown such an utter want of men fit to conduct public affairs as France at this day. Bonaparte was right when he said—and he said it to me twenty times—“They talk of my generals and my ministers; I have neither, I have only myself!—you have not me, but you have generals and ministers better than I have!” Without boasting, I may say that we have better men than any that France has, or has had since the Restoration; and France has not the Emperor of the French with his good sense.

My attention and my efforts are directed towards England and Turkey. Canning wished to kill me; it is I who have killed him and his feeble acolytes. There are resources in England, for there is a public spirit; and it is this very spirit that is wanting in France. That country is rotten to the core.

I expect M. de Caraman very soon. You can tell me nothing of him that I do not know. He has latterly written letter after letter to all his correspondents to announce that he has escaped wonderfully well! I shall not push the farce so far as to congratulate him.

The months of March, April, and May of this year will decide the future. If the Sultan has as much common sense as he ought

to have, he will end the business. In this case I shall be free in the summer months; if not, not.

883. *February 11.*—I should much like you, my dear Victor, to read in passing my despatch to London. Sit by Count Apponyi and read it together. You will see that it is interesting.*

The crisis has arrived, and as I am an old practitioner in the maladies of the social body, I am not more alarmed than is necessary. What I cannot do is to know or predict how things will go: certain it is that the crisis may turn against the folly of the age which has caused it; and the country that is most seriously ill is France, and France is also the country whose future is the least promising. A country where all the moral elements are extinct cannot help itself, and Providence alone knows what will become of this Babylon.

Ours is really the only vigorous attitude; and if it does not seem to be so in every case, it is because the spot on which to rest our lever is not yet marked out. I have survived Napoleon and Canning; I hope I shall survive even evils still more flagrant. It will be for you young men to fight its residues. The idea that you in your turn will be called to do this will sustain me in the midst of the troubles of life.

Gentz has given the lamp to Antoinette; do not tell Count Apponyi. Gentz was distressed at the shape of the lamp: he does not like anything Gothic, because the Goths are dead. I have promised to indemnify him with chocolate. Send me some boxes of *bonbons* of this material wrought in the most artistic fashion. He would give the Cathedral of Strasburg for a good piece of chocolate.

884. *March 26* —You will read my despatches of this day,† my dear Victor. I will not use the little time I have to spare in speaking of anything but your own future. I have already told you that I reckon on seeing you this summer, and then we will consult about our doings. Meanwhile, consider two things settled: you will break up your camp and leave your post of attaché at Paris when you leave that city, and the following winter you will enter on the position of minister. I placed your name on the list I pre-

* This referred to the reconstruction of the English ministry under Wellington.—ED.

† This referred to the despatch of March 24 concerning the Russian circular despatch by which Russia gave the great Powers to know that her Guards had received orders to march. See No. 894.—ED.

sented to his Majesty, and he has agreed to it. I have an idea of going into Bohemia and to the Rhine, but both these things depend on circumstances. The great men of our time have given up guiding events.

In what a state of confusion do things appear! Disorder seems the ruling spirit of the day, and this spirit will not fail to change daylight into the darkest night. A new divinity is wanted to say once more, *Fiat lux*; but I know no country where this divinity reigns.

885. *May 15.*—A long time has elapsed without my being able to write to you except by the ordinary post, which I never think of doing. I leave that to Leontine and the others. The departure of M. de Caraman was so hurried that I could not take advantage of it, and the courier who ought then to have been sent was delayed by the frightful amount of news that followed, requiring us to direct our efforts to other places than Paris.

I write to you to-day, which is the fifty-fifth anniversary of my birth. I have prayed for you more than for myself, for you are in the spring-time of your life, while my season is the autumn. I desire to live to guide your career, to put our domestic affairs on a footing that will give you the least possible difficulty; I wish to live, too, for public matters, since the world yet has need of me, were it only that I hold a place which no one else could fill. To be what I am my antecedents are necessary, and one can as little replace an old minister as an old tree.

I think your grandmother is failing very much. She now keeps to her bed and sofa, and the physicians consider that she is in a state of atrophy. Her head and her heart are young and full of sense; it is only the machine that goes no longer. She will be seventy-four next December. One of her greatest wishes is to see you once more. She said something the other day which describes her state exactly: "*Il y a longtemps que je me sens vieillir, mais depuis quelque temps je me sens défaillir.*" She looks as usual, but is excessively thin. She takes strengthening baths.

The die is thrown, and the situation is simplified; it is, in fact, easier to understand the reason of the enemies' guns than the reason of guns placed with a show of pretended friendship. God knows to what France is coming! If it were only a question of the direct interests of that country, the foreigner would have nothing to look for there; it is otherwise when it is a question of the influence which the events in that kingdom exercise on the whole social body.

FROM WATTERSDORF.*

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters to Gentz, from June 28 to September 13, 1828.

886. *Waltersdorf, June 28, 1828.*—Prince Esterhazy, as easily happens with people at a distance, is asking too much; he demands more from the ministry than I do. As to the Eastern Question, but one way is left for England to show her power—namely, the tearing up of the Treaty of London. This the Duke of Wellington, who took office with the treaty, cannot do; and if he could, the decision would be useless if not sustained by the peremptory declaration, addressed to Russia—so far, and no further! No one in England is prepared for this step; and if it were otherwise the whole power of England would be used up, not against Russia, but against France. How would this injure Russia? Hardly at all; for while the two Powers are watching each other, Russia would be master of the situation, go its own ways, and reach the goal quite independently. The whole Triple Alliance may be compared to a poison, paralyzing the vitality of its members.

In all points the opinions of the English ministry are ours, particularly with regard to Portuguese affairs. The existence of the Junta in Oporto and the conduct of Palmello has called forth an opinion similar to ours, and the ministry has pronounced its disapproval of Palmella's last steps. In Paris the state of things is most miserable.

887. *September 11.*—I received your despatches almost at the

* At the time of the encampment at Traiskirchen, near Vienna, Prince Metternich resided at Schloss Waltersdorf, and Gentz was released from his official duties while the encampment lasted. It appears that this encampment was regarded with some suspicion on account of the Russo-Turkish war, and moreover that it was really used to hide the design of arming part of the Austrian army. That Russia looked upon the affair in this light may be seen from Nesselrode's letter to Tatistscheff, saying that the Emperor Nicholas would send some troops to the frontier if Austria did not desist from arming.—ED.

same time as the communications from the Prince of Hesse. As he gives all the military news to the military authorities, I know merely the few facts he writes to me, and from which I draw the following conclusions:

1. That the operations are badly conducted.
2. That the Prince knows nothing at all of politics; he mentions neither Heytesbury nor any of his colleagues, and even Nesselrode only in connection with Portuguese affairs. The last conferences with Lord Heytesbury are therefore entirely unknown to him.
3. That the Emperor Nicholas must receive news from Constantinople which are the reverse of a true statement of facts: for instance, that the Sultan has lost all presence of mind; that he is without troops and resources; that the Grand Vizier marched out with an army of sixty thousand men, taken from the lowest rabble, who disappeared at the first action, &c., &c.
4. That up to this time only 1200 men of the reinforcements could reach Varna.
5. That Varna has not been besieged yet, but is on the point of being so.

From Lord Heytesbury's despatches I see that the culminating point of the Triple Alliance has been reached sooner than I expected. In consequence of the English ministry's senseless consent to the French expedition (see No. 899) France and Russia have taken up a hostile position against the Porte. meanwhile England still continues her war of words in a state of peace.

But the hour of decision is near. England cannot say Yes; and if she says No, the Triple Alliance has come to an end. At the first moment she will say neither Yes nor No, but will be forced to act in a negative sense. This is my presentiment, and you may tell this to Lord Cowley. With or without the taking of Varna the campaign of the year 1828 will end in the middle of October. Then the winter begins. If this time is not used for serious negotiations, if the Governments pursue the same miserable course, the year 1829 will bring complications which may lead to the overthrow of all present political relations. We may then expect several years of war, and experience will affirm it *aut aut*.

Tatitscheff's audience was only to introduce to his Majesty four Polish spies, sent by the Grand Duke to the camp here.

I am sorry that your antipathy for these spies prevents your coming here. It is a most important moment—to-morrow Tatitscheff sleeps in your room, because the day after is the great review,

which was put off by his Majesty till the arrival of the Prussian princes.

888. *September 13.*—The letters from Odessa are like those from the Prince of Hesse. The latter really say no more, and less they cannot contain, since there is nothing in the world less than nothing. From Semlin we have the confirmation of the news that the Russian batteries before Schumla have been taken. Perhaps more will happen before the Emperor returns to the army, and many a disaster may take place after his arrival. War is a power which cannot be played with unpunished.

I had yesterday a two hours' conference with Prince William of Prussia.* The result of our interview was:

That I saw plainly that the whole complication is the result of the puerile opinions of the monarch and the absurd sophistry of those about him.

That it had been undertaken without consideration of the possible resistance of the Turks.

That ways and means had been offered by the English.

That the Emperor thinks it only natural to ask untold millions from the Turks as compensation, and the destruction of all the fortresses on the Danube and Bosphorus as a kind of guarantee.

That it has never been supposed that England would raise the least objection to such demands.

That the war has taken a quite unexpected turn, and that the Emperor is very anxious to make an end of it.

This *status questionis* does great honor to the Russian Cabinet.

The best picture of the present position was unwittingly given by the Prince of Hesse: "The Emperor picks lint at the Empress's table" shows sufficiently the state of affairs. Meanwhile Nesselrode picks political lint; but he has wounded the English Cabinet so deeply that it will be difficult to find the right plaster. I talk quite openly with the English.

Everything goes on here so quietly that I scarcely am aware of the existence of the camp. Sometimes I take a drive to the camp instead of walking in the park.

* His Majesty the reigning Emperor. See No. 901.—Ed.

DEATH OF METTERNICH'S MOTHER.

Extract from a Letter to Countess Molly Zichy, December 15, 1828.

889. I have once more experienced a most grievous loss—one for which there is indeed no consolation. If my mother had not been my mother, she would have been my life-long friend, so many points of contact were there between our minds. There is no need for me to tell you of the fine qualities for which she was so eminently distinguished. All the rarest excellences of heart and intellect were united in her. Our intimacy has been a long one, and in its whole course I have never seen a moment which has not been devoted by her to the best feelings. For the last two years I have seen her death approaching, but it has taken place much sooner than was expected by her physicians. She has ceased to be—this is the description of her end, for malady, properly speaking, she had none.

Read the newspapers, observe what has passed and is passing, and you will see that the affairs of the world pay no regard to my faculties, moral or physical; public concerns go on without pause, and my mind has to endure while my heart is full of sorrow. As for the affair and what has come of it, we are not to blame, but that does not prevent the burden which weighs upon one who is in the right from being very heavy to bear. Rich people have the advantage over me in that they can repose by the side of their treasures: if they had always to carry them on their backs they would very soon throw them away. It is not possible for me to repose by the side of my business, nor can I get rid of it day or night. To be rich as I am is poverty indeed.

AUSTRIA'S POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 1828 IN RESPECT TO THE EASTERN DIFFICULTY.

Metternich to Ottenfels, at Constantinople, Vienna, January 6, 1828.

890. Your Excellency's Reports of December 11 reached me on the 25th.

Meantime despatches from London and Paris, as well as news from St. Petersburg, arrived, which enable us to judge of the situation at these different centres. However difficult or even impossible it may be to give you an exact representation of a state of things unexampled in history, I will nevertheless endeavor to sketch in boldly and truly its main features.

France and England may be considered as having no Government. The ministers in these two countries only exist from day to day, and I share the opinion of all calm observers when I assert that neither of these administrations can maintain themselves. Their last and great support is the difficulty found by both monarchs in choosing men in the least degree likely to be able to bear the burden of affairs successfully, and the jealousy of each other felt by the extreme parties, who, although both in England and France they may unite to turn out the present ministers, would each be most unwilling to cede the battlefield to their rivals.

The French Chambers will open on the 22nd of January next; the sitting of Parliament in England will begin on the same day. What is not altered or arranged by that date will be so by the contest in the Chambers.

A calm study of the public journals will have sufficed to show you the causes of the deplorable situation of the two Governments. I need not, therefore, enter into matters lying outside your own sphere of action, but I will confine myself to those connected with the affairs of the Levant.

The situation of the French ministry is in this respect essentially different from that of the English ministry. The two Governments, after having entangled themselves in the most frivolous manner in

a dilemma impossible of happy solution, have done all they could to dull the natural consequences of the dangerous attempt ushered in by the protocol of April 4, 1826, and completed by the treaty of July 6, 1827, which only served to bring the moral and physical confusion to its height. The varnish of philanthropy covering these transactions has seduced many weak minds; the *coryphæi* of the Liberal system supported them because they suited their subversive views. As long as the mere *pourparlers*, conducted in the usual diplomatic modes, concealed the true state of the question from the general public, the two Governments had an easy game to play. The battle of Navarino inaugurated a new era. Facts speak quite otherwise than words.

The effect produced by this unjustifiable event is different in England from what it is in France. In the first of these countries the national feeling has been quickly aroused, and the feeling is that of justice. The ministry will be attacked by an immense majority, and it must defend what does not admit of serious defence, nor even of an interpretation in the least degree favorable. The ministry, too, is no less injured by the strange party divisions among its members, than it is by the more or less direct part they have taken in the diplomatic transactions which have brought on the present crisis between England and the Ottoman Porte.

In France, on the contrary, the battle of Navarino was received with almost general favor. The prism of glory very quickly transforms objects in France, and the present generation is hardly accustomed to take feats of arms at their true value. That of Navarino has found admirers among men of different parties—the Revolutionists, for the sake of past memories; the Bourbon party, from delight at having a royal military trophy to vie with those of the Republic and the Empire. Lastly, the ministers hoped to draw from the event the double profit of a distraction to the public mind, and the final success of their political plans. The articles in the Governmental journals—that is, the *Moniteur* and *Gazette de France*—prove with what inconceivable frivolity the ministry proclaims the chimerical advantages to result from the events at Navarino. It is only quite latterly that voices have been heard in France against the progress of affairs in the East. These protests emanate from the Royalist party as well as from that of the Revolution. None are based on principle; they form part of the attacks made against all the acts of the Government, and they only furnish to the next session some arguments to add to those that the

united oppositions use against the continuance of the present ministry.

The only Court that is beyond the embarrassments under the weight of which the two allies are likely to be crushed, is that of Russia. Everything up to this time has turned in favor of the views of this Power, although the system it follows is false, and rejected as much by sound reasoning as by right and justice. Mr. Canning's dangerous idea of taking a prominent part in the affairs of the Levant, and at the same time barring from Russia the way to new conquests, has brought its own punishment. The end proposed by the unlucky minister has not been attained; on the contrary, the young Emperor of Russia now finds himself not only launched in a career from which the best policy should have kept him aloof, but an extraordinary coincidence of difficulties at home and abroad places the two Governments that are allied with Russia in a situation where, not knowing how to guide themselves, they are still less capable of guiding the decisions of their formidable ally. Events, therefore, move on according to their natural bent and the good pleasure of the Emperor Nicholas.

The last news from London and Paris do not allow us to doubt that the two Courts have given their consent to the occupation of the two Principalities on the Danube by Russian troops, with the double clause that the entrance and the occupation of these territories should have no other character than that of a coercive measure to force the Sultan to submit to the terms of the Triple Treaty, and that it should be performed in the name of the three Courts, who would continue to regard themselves as bound together by that treaty.

This is the historical position of affairs at the present moment; its aspect is as dark and undefined as the two transactions whence it is derived. No one but the Sultan can cut this inextricable knot, and I must confess that nothing he has done up to the present time enables us to calculate with any certainty as to what he will or will not concede in the last extremity. In proof of this assertion some facts will suffice.

War against the Porte was signed morally on April 4, 1826. It was corroborated and extended on July 6, 1827. Actual war began with the first shot fired at Lepanto by the English Admiral. The battle of Navarino was only the second act. You see that I put aside all the performances of Hamilton and his party during the years preceding the explosion. The course of the Porte for the last six years has been incomprehensible.

During the first four years it did nothing to repress the revolution.

In the course of the fifth year it confided the task of bringing the Morea to submission to the Viceroy of Egypt.

In the sixth year that submission was no nearer.

In the seventh the Porte's fleet was burned, and she hardly raised her voice, except to assure the Powers who made this frightful attack upon her of her sincere desire to maintain the most friendly relations with them. On the other hand she did not vigorously prosecute the war against the insurgents; the revolution, instead of being restrained, was left perfectly free.

The Porte neither negotiated with the Greeks nor with the Powers. At last she addressed herself to us, and what did she say? That she prefers peace to war!

The *pourparlers* are broken off, and she addresses a circular to the Cabinet which again says nothing more.

The three Courts are as ill-informed as we are; if there is a difference between us, it is confined to feelings. We still think that the Sultan at the last will accept war. In Paris and London they do not believe this. At St. Petersburg they do not take the trouble to examine the question; they have decided to run the risks of war if the Sultan accepts it, though they are inclined to avoid it if he will concede all that they demand of him. The difference in the measures required by the two cases has no doubt been foreseen; if war is accepted they will demand from the Porte what war will procure; if peaceful councils prevail, they will confine themselves to the stipulations of the Triple Treaty. What are the limits of these stipulations—especially, what is the limit of the chief ground on which it rests—namely, how is the Greece of which it speaks to be defined? No one knows. What are they driving at? For the position of two of the allied Governments approaches madness, and the third risks nothing, whatever may be the results of the triple efforts.

In such a dilemma what ought we to do, what can we do? I will tell you, and I authorize you to conceal nothing from the Porte. You will say to Reis Effendi: "That we see the loss of the Ottoman Empire made, so to speak, certain by the course taken by its Government, and that we are too much interested in its fate to keep silence during a frightful crisis, the approach and continuance of which is to a great extent the result of its own conduct."

We will permit ourselves no recrimination; the principal re-

proach we might make would be that in the gravest circumstances the Divan has not followed our counsels. It will suffice to mention that during the lifetime of the Emperor Alexander, we advised that the Porte should arrange those matters which directly concerned Russia. By granting half of what a few months later she granted at Ackerman there would have been neither the protocol of St. Petersburg, nor the Treaty of London, nor the Triple Alliance, nor Navarino ! The second piece of advice which the Porte did not follow was to enforce with vigor the submission of the Morea.

I know what a man of the stamp of Pertew Effendi will have to reply to what is on our part merely a sincere expression of regret, but on the part of the Porte ought to cause the severest self-reproach. Pertew Effendi will say that everything shown by events to be good or evil is not always feasible or avoidable in an empire organized like the Ottoman Empire. I admit the truth of the remark, but Reis Effendi must then admit that chance alone can in future regulate the destinies of a State so situated.

My desire is to make this fact plain, and I know no duty more pressing than that of bringing the truth before the Divan.

THE CHANGE OF MINISTRY IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND, AND METTERNICH'S ADVICE TO THE PORTE.

Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, January, 21, 1828.

891. The short time which has elapsed between my last despatch and the present has been filled by two events which, if they could have been foreseen, would still have been of the greatest importance. There has been a change of ministry in France and in England.*

The two Administrations succumbed in a great measure by their own faults. I have not the time, and indeed I know that it is not necessary for me to enter into details as to the causes which have brought about these changes. Similar as the situation in these two kingdoms may appear, their differences are no less striking to those who are acquainted with their internal condition and the exigencies of their external policy. However that may be, it is certain that if the cause of right and justice gains by these changes (a more direct consequence of the fall of the English than of the French ministry), it is no less certain that the Porte would yield to the most dangerous of delusions if it should think that by the disappearance of certain individuals it would be protected from the consequences of the Triple Treaty. This conclusion would be absolutely false. The Treaty of London exists; and its existence will acquire greater importance for the Court of Russia by the fact that it has for the Russian Cabinet the merit of a positive bond with its two allies in the Eastern Question, just where so many other connecting links have been broken. I have given you, in my despatch of the 6th of this month (No. 890), an exact sketch of the dispositions of France and England with regard to this same treaty. In France, public

* On January 4 Charles X. dismissed the Villèle ministry, which had become unpopular from the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, and the creation of a number of peers. In London, Wellington became Prime Minister January 10.—Ed.

opinion is decidedly in favor of the Greeks, and in England the carrying out of a treaty is always regarded as a sacred duty. The Porte will, therefore, remain under the weight of the Triple Treaty after the fall of the two ministries, just as it was before that event; and if anything is changed in the situation, it can only be that a well-considered step taken by the Porte may have more chance of being well received by ministers who can scarcely desire to have their first steps encumbered by so essentially bad a business; whilst, on the other hand, the Porte finds itself more exposed to the sword of Russia since the changes which have taken place in France and England than it was before those events, for the simple reason that the very doubt which the Emperor of Russia might entertain of the ability of new men to walk in the ways of their predecessors would make him all the more determined himself to take vigorous measures. Thus, any hope at Constantinople that might be founded on the disappearance of the dangers with the fall of their authors, would infallibly be injurious to the Sultan.

The Ottoman Government, I repeat, can alone give itself the help which no one else is in a position to offer it.

This assistance, the means by which it can and should be employed, we pointed out on January 6 (No. 890). We have received abundant data since then, and, far from making us change our opinion, everything leads us to hope that the Divan, if it is not a prey to the worst and most deplorable of errors—if, in a word, it has not taken a suicidal decision—will be able to bring its affairs to a better state.

The present time is, however, so important, it bears so strongly the character of one of those passing moments when the good that men fail to do turns into so much evil, which they have no longer the power to overcome, that the Emperor makes it a point of conscience to charge you to employ all the representations reason dictates to us, and will equally suggest to you.

You have received orders by the courier of January 6 to enter into explanations with the Reis Effendi; you will no doubt have done so before the arrival of the present directions, and you will, therefore, resume the questions at the point to which you had conducted them.

You will say to the Reis Effendi

“That the object of the present despatch is to bring to the knowledge of the Divan the changes which have taken place in the Administrations in France and England.”

(You will here enter upon the explanations and arguments which form the first part of the present despatch.)

You will add, after having given a sketch of our opinions:

"That we consider things and positions have arrived at the last stage in which good can still be done; but that we do not assume to ourselves any moral power beyond the counsels which we believe we have a right to address to our friend the Porte, and those which, in case we should be listened to by the Divan, we would gladly, conscientiously, and with perfect frankness give to the three Powers united by the Treaty of London.

"That if, in our despatch of January 6, we laid down some general points of view, the present moment seems to require that we should bring forward these points; and we should fail in our duty of friendship towards the Porte, and at the same time in our duty towards ourselves and the whole of Europe, if we did not attempt to give a more precise explanation of our views."

You will add further:

"That in following this determination we have no fear of encroaching on the rights of an independent Power; that to give advice to a friend is not to aim at governing him, nor even to pretend to govern for him; it is simply wishing to serve him.

"That in advising the Porte to do of its own accord what in the end it will be obliged to grant to adversaries so powerful that it is impossible to doubt the issue of a struggle between them, we are only recommending what under the circumstances must be eminently useful, and what alone can secure it a more tranquil future."

We are recommending what is useful to it in the present; for by seizing the interval between the refusal of the Divan to the demands which have been made to it by the Courts, and the return of new demands which will soon arrive, the Porte is able to give a proof of its independence; we recommend what will be useful to it in the future; for the object at which the Porte must aim before everything is the real pacification of the Morea and the islands; and a pacification which did not carry with it pledges of stability would in reality be only a truce which would have no practical effect except to strengthen the enemy's measures—measures which doubtless they would take care to combine in such a way as to make them quite irresistible when their plans of destruction against the Ottoman Power seem to them more easy of accomplishment than at present.

We, therefore, being a Power friendly to the Ottoman Empire, and directly interested in its preservation and well-being, ask that

the Sultan will decide without loss of time on the measures contained in our despatch of January 6; and we add the express desire that he will establish and proclaim the future *régime* of the Peloponnesus on the following grand administrative lines:

1. The Peloponnesus shall be governed by a prince *raya*, or the different territorial subdivisions which are included in the peninsula shall be severally governed by a prince *raya*;

2. This prince, or these princes, according to ancient custom, shall be hereditary, or nominated and confirmed by his Highness as sovereign of the country;

3. Morea shall pay an annual tribute, which will be placed in the Imperial coffers;

4. The strongholds in the Peloponnesus must be garrisoned by Turks;

5. The islands shall enjoy their ancient liberties, and their annual tribute shall be sent direct to Constantinople;

6. No tributes in arrear shall be claimed—a privilege which has already been offered by the Sultan.

Such stipulations, emanating from the sovereign power, with the clause of the previous submission of the insurgents, and accompanied by any act of amnesty and a declaration of suspension of arms by land and sea, can be supported by us at the three Courts. If, on the contrary, the Porte does not enter into our views, there remains to us no other means of pleading its cause, since the concessions which it has hitherto brought forward, however honorable as proofs of the clemency and generosity of the Sultan, infer the re-establishment (with some modifications) of the *régime* subsisting before the insurrection; a re-establishment which we believe irreconcilable with the proposals made by the Courts in coalition, and on which they continue to insist, and which, consequently, can never serve as the basis of an agreement, nor put an end to all the immense risks to which the Empire is exposed at the present moment and in the approaching future.

An objection has been made by the Divan to any arrangement by which concessions would be made to the insurgent Greeks, which could not be extended to those of its subjects which have remained faithful. This objection is no doubt plausible, but we cannot regard it as applicable to all cases, and especially to the present circumstances.

Powers, as individuals, are often forced to bend beneath the weight of grave necessities, but this does not make it their duty to

generalize benefits granted in consequence of these very necessities. Another consideration not less worthy of respect arises from the examination of this question. The topographical situation of the Peloponnesus and the islands is entirely different from that of other countries also containing Greek populations. We have never seen that the peculiar *régime* of the Danubian Principalities, of Servia, of Bosnia, even of Egypt, has been or could be claimed by provinces otherwise situated or differently inhabited.

The Ottoman Empire, in which a nation professing Islamism is uniformly governed by religious law, is very different from others. To avoid all false interpretations, it would perhaps suffice that the Porte, in speaking of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus and the islands, should never make use of the generic denomination Greeks. It is true that the rebels and their partisans affect for this denomination a predilection easy to explain; but in our explanations we need not sanction it; and we are moreover persuaded that not one of the Powers engaged in this dispute can seriously entertain a project so chimerical as that of the fusion of all the Greeks into one national body.

You are charged to make these overtures to the Divan, as a sequel to those which we addressed to it on January 6 last, and consequent on the latest events in the different States of Europe.

These explanations to the Porte are not instigated by any other Cabinet; what we say proceeds from our own heart, and is the fruit of the perfect independence of our political attitude. We desire your Excellency to make the Reis Effendi thoroughly understand this fact; we would not mislead any one, and to allow the Porte to believe that we would be mandatories for the Powers in coalition, or for one or other of them, would be both to mislead it and to put ourselves forward as guarantees that three Courts would unhesitatingly accept the spontaneous determinations of the Grand Signior.

The Emperor ardently desires the preservation of political peace and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He would have no hesitation in stating anywhere—at Constantinople as at London, at Paris, and at St. Petersburg—what he considers necessary to attain this double object. His Imperial Majesty does not yield to illusions of any kind; on the contrary, he combats them wherever they are to be seen. He carefully guards himself from confounding the age and the necessities which it creates; he seeks nothing for himself in the affair known for years as the Eastern or Greek Question; he

wishes for a lasting peace, and believes this can only be obtained by the means he has pointed out.

He does not present them to the Porte as likely to be agreeable, or as concessions easy to make; on the contrary, he regards them as necessities and sacrifices, which prudence sometimes compels Powers to make in order to avoid still greater sacrifices and misfortunes.

The Porte will in reality lose nothing by the sacrifices which we advise, either in intrinsic strength or in resources; we feel by no means certain that it will not gain. If the object should be attained by the adoption of our plan, the Porte, on the other hand, would have given proof of a force of resistance and vital energy of which perhaps we alone have not regarded it as entirely destitute. If the embarrassments in which the Powers in coalition find themselves make them adhere to our plan; if, in short, a durable peace and the establishment of new bonds between the Ottoman Empire and Powers which, from the errors of some men, are hostile, should crown the enterprise, would not the concessions made by the Sultan seem small in comparison with the advantages resulting from them? In crises when the life of a State is at stake, its Government cannot study its own antipathies, and at the present moment the Porte is passing through such a crisis.

If I make yet another appeal to the Divan, I will found it on the passage at the end of your despatch (No. 204 B) of December 31.

You tell us "that the Porte, placing all its trust in the friendship of the Imperial Court of Austria, is disposed to listen to and accept all the proposals which the Cabinet of Vienna may make to it with the object of the pacification of its revolted provinces and of its reconciliation with the Powers in coalition, being persuaded that these proposals can never be contrary to its honor, its dignity, or its interests; it promises to wait for the overtures of the Imperial Court, and to confine itself in the mean time to simple measures of foresight and precaution without doing anything that could be regarded by the Powers as a provocation on its part."

We ask that this engagement may be carried out.

THE FORMATION OF STATES IN THE EAST ACCORDING TO METTERNICH'S PROPOSAL.

Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, March 15, 1828.

892. I had the honor to inform you that I would soon send you a despatch containing a statement of our opinions on the needs of the present moment. I now acquit myself of this task.

If my last despatch has left no doubt in the minds of the British Cabinet as to our agreement with it in regard to the gravity of the Eastern Question, it remains for me to place before the English ministers what are, in our opinion, the only measures which can turn away from Europe the dangers with which she is threatened.

Before entering on the subject I should fail in my duty if I did not take account of the moral position of our Court with regard to the problem now occupying it. In not doing so I should run the risk of favoring the supposition—however false and gratuitous it might be—that the Emperor and his Cabinet had yielded their principles. It is not so; our principles are immutable, and we never shall recognize rights with which, according to our decided opinion, they are not compatible. Sound practice, on the other hand, forces us to admit that there are cases in which circumstances beyond our power may create situations so imperious, that the search for means of ameliorating them with the least possible disadvantage should alone occupy the attention of men called upon by their position to act in the affairs of this world. In the presence of such a necessity we find ourselves placed.

The choice no longer exists between what we qualify as good and evil. The good having been rendered impossible, we have only to deal with the evil, and to do all in our power to lessen its consequences.

The Eastern Question in its present state may be described as follows:

It is enclosed within two limits, from which it seems to have no

power to free itself; one is the Treaty of London and the obligations it contains for the three contracting parties; the other is the persistence shown by the Sultan not to yield to any of the demands made by the allies. Threatening measures were indicated by the treaty of July 6. They have been tried and have failed. If the resistance of the Sultan had not been caused by the nature of the conditions which the triple transaction imposed on the Ottoman Power, it would be easily explained by the publicity which even the most secret transactions between the three Courts have acquired almost from the very time of their conclusion. To pursue the course of measures which have received an absolute check, would be to expose one's self to new and certain misfortunes; to extend measures of the kind already employed, would be simply passing to declared hostilities; in a word, to blockade the Dardanelles and Hellespont, to occupy the Principalities, even without passing to a state of war otherwise declared, would be to do less than has already been done at Navarino, whilst the passage of the Danube and the attack of the strongholds which defend the two straits would be war, with all its inevitable consequences. We are aware that there are no intentions but those absolutely foreign to projects of conquest, or the destruction of the Ottoman power in Europe, and that the Courts animated with these intentions are ready to corroborate them by the most solemn engagements. But do the consequences of war depend entirely on the will of Courts? The fall of the Turkish power, the annihilation of the feeble remains of the reigning dynasty, the immediate establishment of a state of complete anarchy in Constantinople and the European provinces of the empire, the massacre of entire Turkish populations on this side of the Bosphorus, and, *per contra*, of thousands of Christians in Asia and Africa: these more or less certain consequences of a war of which the Sultan has already determined the character, can they remain under the direction of those who, while wishing for some only of these effects, only too easily provoke the others? These united considerations speak too openly against the pursuit of a plan which has already proved to be a mistake, and presents terrible prospects for the future!

From this picture—which, however, is not exaggerated—we now turn to a more cheerful prospect. You will find in the enclosed sketch (No. 893) some ideas which we wish to be considered by the Cabinet to whom they are addressed.

You will recognize in this brief despatch opinions which, about

the beginning of the year 1825, we expressed at the Conferences of St. Petersburg, at the time of the discussion on the choice of threatening measures, to induce the Sultan to make certain concessions in favor of his rebellious subjects. They were not received then, the Emperor Alexander expressed great surprise at our taking a line that would have led to the emancipation of the Greeks; a step which that sovereign, dreading the consequences of a revolutionary enterprise being crowned with such brilliant success, declared inadmissible. Shortly afterwards the Conferences of St. Petersburg were broken off.

Although we return to the same idea, the circumstances under which we submit it to the deliberations of the British Cabinet are very different from those in which the affair was then placed.

Little inclined to yield to illusions, and far from giving to words an importance not warranted by facts, we see in the coercive measures hitherto proposed by the three Cabinets nothing but disappointment or open war. The plan which we propose may doubtless also lead to a state of open war; but that war will be at least limited to a clearly defined object, and as I believe to the only object definable. When the day comes that the Sultan has to choose between the limited emancipation of a certain portion of his Greek subjects, and the absolute independence of the whole countries inhabited by them, he will find the choice possible, however painful it may be to him to be reduced to make it by Powers with whom he has not actually broken, notwithstanding many undoubted provocations on their part.

If the allied Courts will take the path we have pointed out, they must feel the necessity of determining beforehand how far they mean to go, both as to territorial extension, and the concessions to be obtained in favor of the countries which these concessions concern. Unless the Courts have previously made arrangements on these points, how can they make them the subject of a formal proposal to be addressed to the Porte? And after the catastrophe of Navarino has proved the result of the coercive measures already at work, can we still remain in doubt whether the one question of territorial limits—the first of all—will be determined in the trilateral council.

After having stated our opinion on the means of terminating the most difficult question which has occupied the Cabinets for a long period, I consider it due to the Emperor's character not to allow the British Cabinet to remain in ignorance of the course which, if

the allied Courts share this opinion, his Imperial Majesty intends to take towards the Porte.

There would be two periods: the first would be marked by the peremptory proposal addressed to the Sultan, of the administrative and limited emancipation of certain countries inhabited by the Greeks; the second, which would follow the definite refusal of the Sultan, would be the recognition of the complete political independence of these same countries by the three Powers.

In the first of these periods, we shall not hesitate to second the demand of the allies by our best offices with the Sultan, pointing out in the most energetic manner the necessity of acceding to the demand addressed to him. We shall also support the threatening measure by declaring to the Porte the determination of our Court to enter without further delay into relations with the new State created in consequence of the refusal of the Sultan to yield to an evident necessity.

I beg you to lay the present despatch before the British Cabinet, as a proof of the confidence we have in the sincerity of its desire to spare its own country and Europe from the evils which would be the inevitable consequence of a political war begun on such insecure foundations as those which would in the first instance serve as a pretext for it.

Metternich's Memorandum.

893. The hope of preventing the bursting of the storm by a pacific *dénouement* in the East diminishes day by day. The steps taken at Constantinople in consequence of the Treaty of London have failed in their effect; the operations of the admirals, although more brilliant than those of the negotiators, have not been more efficacious. Neither the united entreaties of the Courts who signed the treaty, nor the threats which accompanied them, nor the first fulfilment of these threats at Navarino, nor the explanations which preceded the departure of the ministers, nor the cares and efforts of the embassies of Austria and Prussia—nothing has been able to make the Sultan yield. Whether afraid of the dangerous abyss that might open before him if he yielded to the proposals of the Powers, or from excess of religious scruples, or incurable blindness, the fact remains that his resistance has become stronger rather than weaker, and that, in spite of the most menacing circumstances, the language of his ministers has not changed.

Nothing is more easy than to accuse of barbarous and stupid obstinacy an unhappy Government in which remembrances of former grandeur and glory unite with a profound feeling of embarrassment, humiliation, and defeat, brought upon it by a concurrence of unfortunate circumstances.

The errors of the Porte, its false calculations, its mistaken pride, its terrified despair, are known to all the world; the most vulgar can see them; and it is natural that many of its contemporaries should load it with invectives. But very different and very serious considerations are presented to the tribunal of a more elevated policy. Must the Ottoman Empire succumb beneath the weight of the errors of its Government? Must Europe punish herself in order to avenge on the Porte the crimes of its rebellious subjects? Would it be worthy of the wisdom, would it be worthy of the magnanimity of the allied Sovereigns to cut the knot of this unhappy complication by a war to the death? Would the advantages they might finally obtain for the insurgents compensate them for the calamities, the horrors, inseparable from a crusade the results of which would threaten not only the existence of Turkey, but also that of the Greeks themselves, as well as the interests of Christianity, the fate of Europeans in three parts of the world, and the foundations of that peace so gloriously established, so happily maintained for fifteen years? The reply to these questions cannot be doubtful. The Cabinets have spoken with one voice. They desire a pacification. If extraordinary measures are necessary, if sacrifices must be made, let there be at least a just proportion between the end and the means. Every victory is bought at a price. And what would pay for the bloodshed, the catastrophes and ruin which would have to be gone through before conquering an enemy whose very destruction would be but the prelude to a new era of trouble and distress of every kind?

Before an irrevocable decree has closed the last avenues of peace, an examination should be made to see if there are not some more persuasive means of negotiation than those which have hitherto been employed, and at the same time nearer to the object which the authors of the Triple Treaty undoubtedly had in view. Measures which might have been considered more than rigorous six months ago may now be salvation for the Porte and expedient for Europe.

First, let us consider the present state of the question:

1. A return to the *régime* which preceded the insurrection of the Greeks has become impossible in those of the insurgent countries

which from their geographical position and their maritime resources have successfully resisted, and continue to resist, the re-establishment of that *régime*. That is a certain fact, on which all the Powers must be agreed.

2. A change of *régime*, a new political organization, is therefore necessary for the pacification of these countries. The Courts connected by the Treaty of London have agreed on the bases of it in their transactions, and have required the Porte to accept them under their mediation. Austria and Prussia, who have not taken part in the treaty, have nevertheless recognized the necessity of this change, and have urged the Porte to accept it as the only means of averting the ruin with which it is threatened.

3. The Porte has been equally deaf to the peremptory assertions, the active demonstrations of the three Courts, and to the urgent representations of Austria and Prussia. the means of pacification proposed by its ministers have been in their turn declared insufficient and inadmissible, because while having an appearance of moderation and clemency, they tended only to the re-establishment of the former *régime*.

4. In looking impartially at these proceedings, one is soon convinced that the real question at issue between the Powers and the Porte concerns the principle of this new organization, demanded on one side, refused on the other; the Porte believing itself ruined by treating on the bases proposed to it by the Powers, and the Powers not being able, without renouncing their prior engagements, to recognize those which the Porte wishes to substitute for them.

It is evidently impossible to find a clue in the labyrinth of these contradictory claims, without recourse to other combinations than those which have hitherto been vainly attempted.

To justify what we are now about to propose, let us glance rapidly at the situation, past and present.

The object of the Greek insurrection—that which the heads of that insurrection have pursued and proclaimed at all periods of the struggle—was not a change of *régime*, but the achievement of absolute independence. The Sovereigns of Europe saw in this enterprise, and the means used to support it, only a direct attempt against the imprescriptible principles of the social order to which they rendered a solemn homage; and all of them more or less expressly condemned it. Not one European Government has up to this day recognized the legality of the insurrection. Whilst working without intermission for a pacification becoming year by year more difficult,

whilst demanding for the insurgents that which humanity and religion, seconded by the voice of the people, have claimed for them, the Cabinets did not wish to go beyond that line; and notwithstanding all that some among them have done or allowed to be done for the independence of the Greeks, it has not been sanctioned by any public act.

There are, however, in the course of human affairs, moments in which the strongest wills, the most legitimate opposition, cannot resist an imperious necessity, to which all must submit. The public man must take things as he finds them, leaving to history to reveal the first mistakes, the fundamental errors which produced these sad necessities. It is a fact that revolutions the most culpable in their origin have sometimes ended triumphantly, and that when this has come to pass the enlightened and correct governments have been obliged to come to terms with the most undoubted usurpation. If, then, the peace of Europe is attached to the pacification of the Levant, and if the independence of part of Greece, with all the inconveniences and dangers it will entail, is the unavoidable condition of this pacification, it is no longer possible to hesitate.

This general observation acquires under the circumstances of the moment a very peculiar force. Three of the first Powers of Europe have decided to prescribe to the Porte the terms of pacification, at the same time announcing in an unequivocal manner the consequences of its refusal. Why do these same Powers hesitate to take a part which, while modifying the object, would make no change in the principle of their action? Placed as they are at present between the difficulty of retracting declarations perhaps too decided, and the prospect of only being able to realize them by violent measures, why do they hesitate to admit the mere fact of emancipation, either as a means of negotiation or as a definite result?

The project we are going to propose unites two immense advantages: that of acting on the Porte more directly and powerfully than even the imminence of danger against which a Government excited by despair will always flatter itself that some resource will yet be found; and that of preventing a murderous war, or at least of restraining it within clearly defined limits.

To render this project feasible, the Courts must agree beforehand on an exact definition of the parts of insurgent Greece to which they mean to extend their intervention with the Porte. The mysterious uncertainty with which this question has been constantly surrounded—an uncertainty prolonged and even augmented by the

inconceivable silence of the Treaty of London—has not a little contributed to baffle all the proceedings of the Powers. To put an end to this, the nature of things, the localities and antecedents, must be considered. In our opinion, any plan of emancipation, either limited or absolute, which is not confined to the Morea and to a certain number of the islands of the Archipelago, must infallibly end in new refusals, new disasters, interminable wars—in short, to an immediate or speedy dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. This is a truth which we need not attempt to prove; it must be admitted by all who have the least notion of the geographical, military, and statistical relations between the provinces of European Turkey. This first point settled, the intervening Courts should make a declaration to the Turkish Government in substance as follows:

“That the old order of things having been totally overthrown in the Morea and in a part of the Archipelago by the insurrections which broke out in 1821, and the re-establishment of that order of things having become impossible on account of the events which followed these insurrections, the Courts consider that the only way of putting an end to the disorders and convulsions which desolate that part of the Ottoman Empire is to establish in the above-named countries a system of administration in agreement with the bases communicated to the Porte by the official note of August 16:

“That if the Porte consents to the principle of administrative independence as stipulated in the treaty of July 6, which does not admit the political independence of the Greeks in the countries comprised in this new arrangement, a treaty should be drawn up without delay, securing to the Porte the enjoyment of its rights over the above-named countries, and to the inhabitants of these countries the form of government formerly proposed by the Powers. As soon as the Porte announces its formal acceptance of these bases, hostilities should be suspended by land and sea; and the Powers would undertake that these arrangements should be accepted and carried out, both in the Morea and the islands to which these stipulations would apply;

“That if the Porte refuses to accept the present proposals, the Powers would recognize the separation and real independence of the above-named countries, and act accordingly.”

Respecting the insurgent provinces not comprised in this arrangement, they would continue to treat with the Porte on the best means of re-establishing order and tranquillity on a just and stable footing. it being understood that the arrangements concerning these

countries would be the subject of amicable negotiation, and arranged according to the wishes of the Porte.

If this step taken by the Powers should only lead to a new refusal from the Porte, the measures concerning the establishment of a separate government in the Morea and the islands should be carried out without further delay; the object of the Treaty of London, the avowed aim of the Powers which signed it, would be effectually obtained in ways the least injurious to the tranquillity and the interests of Europe; and the military operations, if it were necessary to have recourse to them, being confined to the defence and preservation of the newly-created State, the war would be prevented from extending beyond its true limits. It would even be possible to maintain—notwithstanding the execution of these measures—peaceful relations with all the other parts of Turkey till the Porte itself provoked war, either by acts of aggression against one or other of the allied Powers, or by new hostilities against the countries placed under the special protection of the Powers.

This project, less dangerous, and in reality much more practicable than those which depend either on the spontaneous concurrence of the Porte or a desperate war, is doubtless not free from objection; this is the fate of all plans made in times of dire extremity; but it offers several chances of safety which are not to be despised, for:

1. If the Porte, reduced to choose between two sacrifices, accepts the least painful, and prefers the restriction of its power to the loss of a part of its possessions, the Powers would have the double satisfaction of accomplishing the wishes and engagements they have formed in favor of Greece, and of furthering the interests of a government which is free from reproach as towards Europe.

2. If the Porte, as is much to be feared, listening only to its own exasperation and resentment, rejects a capitulation which would secure to it an honorable retreat, there would be nothing to prevent the Powers from establishing the independence of the Morea and the Islands. The forces they could employ to carry out this measure are more than sufficient.

Whatever part the Pacha of Egypt and his son may finally take, they can no longer defend the Morea against the united operations of the Powers; and the Islands, virtually emancipated, would offer no resistance. It would be, indeed, much less difficult to withdraw these countries from the authority of the Porte, than to organize in them a government calculated to enable them to enjoy a liberty which hitherto they have most cruelly abused, and which, if it were

not regulated, would soon become the scourge of their neighbors. But this question, more important and more problematical than that of emancipation, does not concern us just now.

3. In detaching from the Ottoman Empire possessions like the Morea and the Isles the Powers would have reached the utmost limit to which the most determined advocate of the right of intervention could proceed, except by stating frankly that might is right. To go beyond this limit, to attack the other possessions of the Porte, to destroy its last means of defence, to burn its ports or to surround its capital in order to force from it a consent which it looks upon as suicide or sacrilege, would be acts of gratuitous injustice; since, after all, its consent can be dispensed with, and the object gained, without buying it by useless cruelties.

4. What would be repugnant to every sentiment of humanity and justice would be still more to be regretted in the interests of Europe. If the military operations are confined to the countries which they are intended to free, it is possible, it is even probable, that the Porte, seeing its absolute powerlessness to re-establish its authority in these countries, will submit to an inevitable loss (as the King of Spain submitted to the loss of his colonies), rather than rush into a war with the half of Europe, and stake its existence against a dream of power. It is quite characteristic of the Turks, and in keeping with their religious and political principles, to yield to necessity, and to make up their minds to resign a province irrevocably lost, whilst they will defend to the last a place still occupied by their arms. It would be the height of skilful policy to avoid, in spite of the enfranchisement of the Morea, a complete suspension of relations between Turkey and Europe, to save the appearances of peace, and to labor diligently for its return, by drawing within the narrowest compass the points of hostile contact with the Porte—of bringing, in short, little by little, this Power not to consider its allies as implacable enemies sworn to its destruction. On the other hand, what a picture is presented to us by the prospect of a general war; of a war which, whatever be its issue, would overthrow a great empire and shake the foundations of Europe and Asia!

5. But if the Porte pronounces its own sentence of death, if it replies by a declaration of war to the ultimatum of the Powers, or if it opposes the emancipation of the Morea; in short, if by acts of frenzy and barbarous reprisals, it forces the Powers to attack it in its last retrenchments, what becomes of the plan we have just advanced? It may yet be believed that the words and demonstrations

of the Porte which have given rise to this apprehension have been inspired by excess of terror; one thing is certain—they have betrayed only a desire to conceal its weakness, and to cause its defensive attitude to be respected. But if, sooner or later, it changes its attitude, the wishes we have expressed will be but barren speculations, and then blind guesswork will take the place of political reasoning. Let those who may one day be accused of not having removed these evils never lose sight of two considerations, one of which addresses itself to their generosity and their conscience, the other to their reason and interest. Let them remember that the first signal which we expect does not proceed from the Divan, and that each blow now given to the Ottoman Empire is one danger more for Europe, a germ of incalculable complications, and the presage of a disastrous future.*

* These proposals of the Austrian Cabinet were rejected by England on the following grounds. The Austrian Ambassador, Prince Esterhazy, wrote to Prince Metternich from London as follows:

"The principal objection, hitherto the only objection which the Duke of Wellington has made to the plans brought forward by your Highness, would have astonished any one except a man who, like your Highness, has from the beginning of this deplorable complication until the present crisis, which begins a new period, remained firm on the same ground.

"The Austrian Cabinet proposed at the Conferences of St. Petersburg in 1825 the same measures as it proposed in the spring of 1828. At first it was the Emperor Alexander himself who positively rejected them, and now it is the head of the British Cabinet who declares that he does not see his way to support absolute political independence of the territory to which they intended to apply the stipulations of the trilateral treaty. 'In the first place,' said he, 'it would be overturning one of the essential bases of that agreement, and if I believed it,' added the Duke, 'not in agreement with the precepts of justice or good policy to lay down the principle of an absolute independence at the time of the protocol, how many more reasons are there now to make us remain faithful to our first idea! How can the British Government, without opposing the principles it has professed with regard to the New American States, and recommencing at their expense experiences it has already acquired, see in that part of Greece even a shadow of the elements indispensable for maintaining its independence? It is besides essential not to forget that one grand object which we have in view is excluded in the too probable supposition of the continuance of the refusal of the Porte. This object is to establish relations of amity and good neighborhood with this new State, and thus to heal the wound which otherwise would always remain open. If,' continued the Duke, 'we do not obtain the Porte's consent, its relations with Russia will always remain precarious, and we shall be always exposed to the same danger which will constantly be suspended over our heads.'"

Russia too declined, see No. 896.—Ed.

THE RUSSIAN GUARDS ORDERED TO MARCH.

Metternich to Esterhazy in London, Vienna, March 24, 1828.

894. Yesterday evening, just as the present courier was leaving, a despatch arrived here from St. Petersburg for M. de Tatistscheff, and I thought it right to delay the departure of the courier until I heard what the Russian Ambassador might have to communicate.

He came to my room soon after the arrival of his courier, and simply handed to me the Circular which his Court has addressed to its foreign embassies, on the subject of the order given to the Guards to hold themselves in readiness to march on the 13th (April 1). To this despatch, which is endorsed *duplicata*, and dated February 29, was added a Gazette Extraordinary from St. Petersburg, dated February 27 (O.S.).* I do not send these despatches, for the Prince de Lieven will have received them long before the present courier can reach London.

The motives alleged by the Russian Circular confirm our appre-

* The Supplement Extraordinary of the *Petersburger Zeitung* of February 27 contained the Sultan's *Hattischerif* of December 20, 1827. In this Imperial Decree (which was not intended as a manifesto to the Powers, but as necessary information to the governors of the Turkish provinces), Russia was designated the irreconcilable enemy of the Ottoman kingdom and faith; the insurrection of the Greeks and the defection of two friendly Powers, England and France, was imputed to Russia; and finally all Mussulmans were called to arms for the defence of the faith, the throne, and kingdom. To this publication by the official journal, the Russian Government subjoined an explanation which left no doubt as to its purpose. Contemporaneously with this declaration to its own people, Russia gave similar declarations to all the European courts in the Circular Despatch of February 29. In these Russia enumerated all its notorious grievances and complaints against the Porte, especially the *Hattischerif* itself. It did not declare war, but prepared for war, and set its troops in motion. To the allies it left the choice of material or moral help, even proposed to them to suspend their obligations arising from the Treaty of London, in which case it would continue the conflict alone which the three had begun. It took a purely Russian point of view of the war, and declared itself ready to hasten, by this war, the solution of the other questions emanating from the London Treaty.—Ed.

hensions. If I had not already discovered a parallel with Bonapart's system, I should be forced to do so now, in consequence of the new Russian manifestoes. They are modelled on the manifestoes of the French Empire; it is not only the fundamental idea which is identical, but the manner of putting it, of disguising it, of making it fluent—all recalls their style.

May it not be said that the Emperor of the North has been aroused by a sudden attack of the Sultan, that the Emperor Nicholas has been awakened from the sleep of the just, from a sleep which nothing has hitherto disturbed, not even the noise of the cannon at Navarino!

An inoffensive and confiding Power is attacked unawares by an imperious neighbor, ungrateful and forgetful of the numerous proofs of a faithful friendship. It is the Sultan apparently, who, taking the tone of a Turk to please his people, has declared war against the Russian Empire; it is he also who, by his manifesto, appeals to the allies of Russia; it is he who disturbs the commerce of a peaceable neighbor; it is he, in short, who has already begun the war. . . . But the Porte has declared war upon us also: read the enclosed report from our consul at Scutari, and you will see that our grievances are not less than those of Russia. Our army, however, will not prepare to avenge this affront just yet.

M. de Tatistscheff came to see me this morning. He showed me the despatch of February 14 (O.S.) addressed by the Russian Cabinet to Prince Lieven. The mere reading of it gave me the key to the recent communication made to us by the French Cabinet.

I have no doubt your Highness knows of the above despatch of February 14. It fulfils all that for two years we have dreaded and foreseen. Full of animus against the English Government, it is a condemnation of the Triple Alliance. The only thing which appears to us less detestable than the rest of this despatch, is the word *Peloponnesus*, which is there employed to designate the aim of the allies.

Into what a labyrinth of evils is Europe now thrown! On the one hand is the gratuitous war which Russia is now about to begin, but the end of which no one can foresee. Of what avail are simple phrases of moderation contradicted by all the acts of the invading Power, in comparison with the flagrant dangers which all the more surpass human foresight, since the Porte is at the same time assailed from without and harassed at home? Who will dare for a single instant to contemplate the scenes of anarchy to which European

Turkey may, and I will even say to which she must, become a prey? If the Sultan bends under the weight of the misfortunes which overwhelm him, what will not be the consequences? If he resists, what will become of himself and his Empire?

On the other hand there is the terrible Greek complication. The allies of Russia are invited to take part in it; the principal Power wishes to admit them to finish the work recently begun; but do they not wish for more? In this case she saves them the trouble; for she alone can manage the Russian affair and the task common to the allies.

If in so critical a moment we can find any one reason for satisfaction, it is, without doubt, the feeling of our entire independence!

It is not our province to set forth anything which could be considered as a plan, or of a nature corresponding with the gravity of the danger. Before collecting our own thoughts, we shall wait to hear what they have to say to us from London. Tell the Duke of Wellington he can speak to us with perfect frankness; he knows well he risks nothing in being open with us. I cannot, by this courier, enter into any details whatever on the new position of affairs, inasmuch as I have not yet been able to submit to His Imperial Majesty the communications just made to us by the Russian Cabinet.

DOM MIGUEL'S FIRST APPEARANCE AT LISBON.

Metternich to Bombelles, in Lisbon, Vienna, April 7, 1828.

895. It would be superfluous to tell you that the account you give of the weak and reprehensible conduct of the Infant, ever since his arrival at Lisbon, has profoundly affected His Majesty the Emperor, and unhappily leaves us in no doubt that this young Prince, who had every opportunity of founding the restoration of the Portuguese monarchy on a solid and durable basis, and who had moreover the certainty of being supported in that noble enterprise by all the great Powers of Europe, will ruin himself by yielding to perfidious counsels, which, if he blindly follows, will infallibly lead him to perjure himself, and place him in the attitude of a usurper.

Nothing can, in truth, justify the hesitation and delay of the Infant to take the oath prescribed by the Charter; the ambiguous manner in which he proceeded to this solemn act; the way in which it has been brought to the knowledge of the public; the culpable weakness which has from the first tolerated the seditious cries of a vile populace till, emboldened by impunity, they have even taken possession of the avenues to the palace, and there dictated the law; lastly, the obstinacy with which the Infant has refused to make a proclamation that, while calming anxiety, would have made known to the public the line of conduct he intended to follow, and his resolution to restrain all, and treat the ill-disposed with severity.

Such are, however, the irreparable faults which the young Prince has committed at his first appearance, and the consequences of which he will find it very difficult to remove. It would even seem, according to the news from Lisbon up to March 16, that these first faults have been followed by faults graver still, and that an imminent crisis threatens the existence of the Portuguese Government: the dissolution of the Chambers, pronounced as it appears by the Infant, must hasten the moment: and if the Count of Villa-Real has actually sent in his resignation as Minister of Foreign Affairs,

I see no other person in the ministry who could or would put any limits to the reactions with which Portugal is threatened.

In so deplorable a situation, for which we see no remedy, you can imagine that I have no instructions to give you, except that you must not in any case or under any circumstances whatever depart from the principles consecrated by the Protocols of Vienna;* they have received the sanction of all the Powers of Europe; and if it pleases the Infant—who solemnly engaged to take them for the basis of his conduct in Portugal—to violate his engagements, the Emperor our august master will never consent to be an accomplice in so culpable a proceeding. His Majesty will never depart from the duties imposed upon him by his sovereignty, his personal relations with the Emperor Dom Pedro, and his latest transactions, in short, with the Prince, the British Government, and his august allies; and the Emperor will never favor the usurpation of the Infant Dom Miguel. You have therefore anticipated the intentions of his Majesty in neglecting no means, direct or indirect, of enlightening the young prince as to the dangers of the evil course into which he is allowing himself to be led; and I quite approve of your not hesitating to unite your efforts to those of the English ambassador for this end. If they have been foiled by a more powerful influence and by the culpable weakness of the Infant, the fault is not yours, and the Emperor does you justice in this respect; but his Majesty, being quite decided in this painful complication to follow the same line of conduct adopted by the Court of London,

* The most important document in the Protocols of Vienna is Dom Miguel's letter to Dom Pedro, because in it expression is given to Dom Pedro's rights and Dom Miguel's duties with regard to the Charter which had been given to Portugal. This letter, dated Vienna, October 19, 1827, was as follows: "Sire! I have received the decree which your Royal and Imperial Majesty deigned to address to me on July 3, in which your Majesty nominated me Lieutenant and Regent of the kingdoms of Portugal, the Algarves, and their dependencies; and in accordance with the sovereign determinations of your Majesty, I immediately made the necessary arrangements for enabling me to repair to Lisbon, in order to fulfil the wise and paternal views of your Majesty, in governing and ruling the above-named kingdoms, in agreement with the constitutional Charter which your Majesty has granted to the Portuguese nation. All my efforts tend to the maintenance of existing institutions in Portugal, and to contribute as far as is in my power to the preservation of public tranquillity in these countries, by opposing myself to factions which shall never have my support, whatever be their origin."

The three Protocols may be found in De Castro, *Collecção, etc.*, vol. vi. p. 20 (Lisbon, 1857).—ED.

I beg you to adhere to the rules laid down in your instructions; to take part, consequently, in any steps in which the English ambassador desires to associate himself with you, in order to prevent the Infant from departing from the engagements he has contracted; and, lastly, to be guided by the directions which Prince Esterhazy may be in a position to send you, after having consulted with the Duke of Wellington. I have given authority to that ambassador by the present courier, and I do not hesitate to authorize you personally, in case Mr. Lamb receives orders from his Government to leave Lisbon, to depart at the same time and to follow him to London, where you will await further orders from your Court.*

* This did in fact take place. The Cortes convoked by Dom Miguel declared Dom Pedro to have forfeited his right to the throne of Portugal, and on June 26 they proclaimed Dom Miguel King of Portugal, and the Austrian ambassador, like the representatives of the other Powers, broke off all diplomatic intercourse with the Portuguese Government, on account of the illegal summoning of the Cortes, and left Lisbon as soon as it became evident that Dom Miguel would accept the offered crown. On July 30 a decree appeared, signed "*El Rey*," in which Dom Miguel accepted the resolutions of the Cortes, appointing him successor to the late King John VI. See 903.—Ed.

CONVERSATION OF ZICHY WITH THE EMPEROR
NICHOLAS ON THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS.

Zichy to Metternich, St. Petersburg, April 24, 1828.

896. I had the honor to deliver to his Majesty the Emperor, at a private audience, on Monday, April 21 (9), the autograph letter of our august master, which I had been charged to present to that sovereign. I will now give your Highness a faithful and detailed account of the conversation which I had with his Imperial Majesty on the important affairs of the moment.

The interview lasted about two hours. His Majesty deigned to listen to me with perfect calmness and great attention. After I had given him the substance of the voluminous communications which your Highness addressed to me by the courier of the 5th—the mere reading of which was a work of several consecutive days for me—the Emperor replied, and explained to me without a moment's hesitation his whole position, and the point of view from which he regarded the duties which the present circumstances imposed upon him, and from which he declared he could not exempt himself in any way without compromising his honor, as well as the dignity and interests of the Russian Empire.

"It is necessary," said the Emperor, "to go to the root of the matter, and, to give you a clear and precise idea of my position and my political transactions, I will narrate the events which have taken place since I found myself at the head of affairs. After the death of the Emperor, my brother, I was called upon to settle and conclude an affair which had occupied him unsuccessfully for years, and which he had always vainly hoped to arrange in concert with his allies—namely, the removal of the existing differences with the Porte, and the redressing of the just grievances of Russia against the Ottoman Government. The Emperor, my brother, being convinced that the course which he had followed never would effect the object, had decided to make war in order to obtain it, and war would positively have taken place if death had not removed him,

and plunged us into grief by a new catastrophe which threatened the existence of the whole family. The Almighty has blessed my efforts: we have not been the victims of that treason; I have triumphed over the abominable conspiracy against the Emperor my brother and all my family; I have succeeded in restoring order and obedience; I have set myself to follow in the footsteps of my late brother, and I have laid down clearly what justice and the treaties—which the Porte had never observed towards us—authorize me to demand from it. After innumerable difficulties and tergiversations, employed by the Turks to elude our demands, they at last consented (seeing that my resolution was immovable) to send to me, at Ackerman, negotiators to terminate our differences amicably. Whilst we were occupied with this affair, the Duke of Wellington arrived at St. Petersburg. He spoke to me of the insurrection of the Greeks; of the powerlessness of the Porte to put down the rebels and to restore order; of the horrible sufferings and objectless bloodshed; lastly, of the losses which the commerce of all the nations had sustained for years, and to which it would still be exposed unless an end was put to this sad state of things. I replied to the Duke that I was quite disposed to agree to any measure which he thought likely to lead to that end; but that, in truth, I was such a novice in business and diplomacy that I had not entertained the possibility of attaining it by negotiations; that if he would give me his ideas I would willingly accept any means that would lead to it. The articles of the protocol signed at St. Petersburg on April 4 were the result of our interview. I should here observe that it was by my express request that Article V. of the said protocol was drawn up and inserted, namely: ‘That neither of the two contracting Powers should seek any augmentation of territory, exclusive influence, or commercial advantage for its subjects, other than those which every other nation could equally obtain.’ After some days of reflection on the part of the Duke of Wellington, he accepted my proposition, and this article was inserted in the protocol. I believe,” added his Majesty, “that it is the first time England has been induced to take part in an enterprise offering expense and risk without prospect of acquisition or advantage to her commerce. As it is far from my thoughts to dream of any increase of territory, this clause was quite acceptable to me, and I made the proposal to assure myself that England had not in view the commercial advantages or predominant influence at which she so often aims. I recollect,” continued the Emperor, “saying to the Duke of Wellington: ‘But

tell me, marshal, how do you think the Turks will take what we are doing to prevent them from putting down their rebellious subjects? Will they patiently endure what we wish to dictate to them?' The Duke of Wellington replied: 'Oh, the Turks, when they see our serious determination, will never proceed to extremities; all that will be necessary on our part will be a few frigates to prevent them from commencing hostilities, to intimidate them, and to make them listen to reason; besides, there will be no war.'"

The Emperor assured me he then replied: "But yet, if our frigates were compelled to fire, would the Turks consider these guns as messengers of peace?" The Duke maintained that they would never come to that extremity, nor to a war which no one desired. "The only condition," said the Emperor, "which the Duke of Wellington expressly imposed upon me at the time of the signature of the protocol was that Lord Strangford, who was then ambassador at St. Petersburg, was not to be informed of it. I could not at all comprehend the reason why he wished to observe a mysterious silence towards the representative of the King his master, but I promised him that I would only mention it to my allies, to whom I was obliged to give confidential cognizance of the protocol, in order to induce them to take part in it at their convenience. In the meantime our conferences at Ackerman went on firmly, and we succeeded in overcoming all obstacles and signing the treaty which was to put an end to our just causes of complaint against the Porte. Russia was satisfied, and nothing remained but to see the fulfilment of the conditions which had been stipulated for." Here the Emperor passed rapidly over the succeeding events. "The treaty called by you 'The Triple Treaty' was signed at London in consequence of the protocol; you and Prussia did not think fit to accede to it, which I shall always sincerely deplore, for I am convinced that if all the five Cabinets had held the same threatening language at Constantinople, and that if we had been able to agree on the form to be employed in order to obtain the pacification of the insurgent provinces, what has since happened never could have taken place. The Divan would have submitted to our demands; the countries in insurrection would have been pacified; the action of the Holy Alliance would have once more been grandly manifested, and its irresistible strength would have been displayed. I hold religiously to its conservative principles," said the Emperor, "and I shall always be the warmest partisan of the Holy Alliance, which will find in me one of its staunchest

supporters. I repeat that I detest, I abhor the Greeks, although they are my co-religionists; they have behaved in a shocking, blamable, even criminal manner; I look upon them as subjects in open revolt against their legitimate sovereign; I do not desire their enfranchisement; they do not deserve it, and it would be a very bad example for all other countries if they succeeded in establishing it. I have not recognized the independence of the Spanish colonies in America, and I think the proposal you have just made at London concerning Greece is in contradiction with the principles you profess, and a departure from your true character. I remain, for my part, pure and faithful to my monarchical principles. I beg you to tell the Emperor that he will always find in me a faithful and powerful ally, ready to give him my hand on every occasion, and to recognize only legitimate rights. If he should need my assistance in any complication, he will find me always ready to help him. I give you my word, he has but to command me. I have no views of aggrandizement, ambition, or conquest. I know all the world thinks otherwise; but events will prove that I wish only for peace, the internal happiness, the prosperity, and the commerce of my people. The immense loss sustained by commerce in consequence of the measures of the Porte, the continual provocations Russia has to endure, the non-execution of the Treaty of Ackerman, oblige me to draw the sword to support my just claims. From the moment my adversaries do me justice, I shall be ready to listen to any words of peace and reconciliation they may bring forward. I do not hide from myself the inconveniences and even the grave dangers of the enterprise which I am on the eve of commencing, but that shall not make me shrink from my duty. If circumstances beyond all human calculations should lead the Porte to accomplish its own destruction, I should deplore it very sincerely. I prefer to believe that this deplorable catastrophe will not take place. I am going to place myself at the head of my army, holding myself in readiness to receive at any instant the overtures which the Sultan may still wish to make when he sees that my part is irrevocably taken, and with the power of stopping my troops when I think it convenient. I shall not make war in the Turkish manner. If the Porte really intends to admit my claims, I will receive its proposals whenever they are made to me. For the rest, no difficulty shall make me abandon my enterprise, even should it result in the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That would indeed be a new misfortune, a disastrous complication, for I see no means of reconstructing that edifice

if it fell to pieces. But even this consideration, grave though it be, shall not stop me. I owe it to the Empire of Russia to procure for it what the treaties promise: I owe to it to establish in a clear and positive manner the rights which it cannot renounce. My course is marked out; I shall follow it with constancy and firmness, and if God helps me and blesses my arms, I will prove to Europe that I have no intention of making conquests, and that I know how to be satisfied with my position, such as it is."

Having listened with profound attention to the words of the Emperor, I respectfully asked permission to make some observations in reply. His Majesty graciously assented, and I answered him as follows: "You have deigned, Sire, to express yourself with a frankness and condescension which the Emperor my master will rightly appreciate. But suffer me to speak to your Majesty with the loyalty and straightforwardness which characterize my sovereign, and of which it is my duty to be the faithful interpreter. I beseech you, Sire, to read with attention the letter which I have just had the honor to give you from the Emperor. The heart of the Emperor answers to your Majesty's with all the confidence which the purity of your principles, Sire, and your elevated sentiments inspire my sovereign. The grave complication which threatens the peace of Europe imposes upon him the duty of exhorting you, Sire, at a time when great resolutions may decide the destinies of an empire, and perhaps of social order altogether, not to be precipitate, but calmly to consider the remedy proposed to your Majesty by the Emperor for the frightful evils which he feels convinced we may expect unless we can restore to the councils of the allied sovereigns the harmony and system which has been hitherto followed with so much success. Your Majesty will permit me to retrace the steps you have taken in this affair. Your Cabinet, with that of London, signed the protocol of April 4, which has been since converted into a treaty, signed at London, to which France has acceded. Austria and Prussia had reasons which prevented them from taking part in it. Nevertheless we have not ceased to use every effort at Constantinople to remove the differences between the three Courts and the Ottoman Porte. The Sultan has resisted them all. The battle of Navarino took place contrary to the wishes of your Majesty and your allies. This event has done nothing to alter the determinations of the Porte. The representatives of the Courts at length thought it necessary to retire from Constantinople, declaring that they could only continue their residence in that capital on condition

that the Porte accepted the Treaty of London. The Porte did not yield, and the representatives left Constantinople. Your Majesty was thus deprived of the advantages of the Treaty of Ackerman, the Porte having declared, after the departure of the representatives, that all that had passed rendered void the treatise signed between it and Russia; and the Divan, in its blind despair, has been led into a course which the Emperor my master highly disapproves. Your Majesty does not wish for the enfranchisement of the Greeks: you have deigned to express your feelings and your way of looking at that question. And yet the Greeks will be made free, in spite of your Majesty's wishes and declarations. The Treaty of Ackerman infringed, you are now obliged to make war, of which you would not otherwise have dreamed, having obtained all that you desired from the Ottoman Porte for the real interests of Russia. The war will still be made against your will, but as an imperious necessity which circumstances have required. You desire the preservation of the Porte, and yet you decide on a measure which will perhaps ruin it, or give rise to combinations and events far beyond all the calculations of human foresight. See, Sire, the picture which I have dared to place before you, with the earnest prayer that you will weigh what I have had the honor to represent to you. The future will some day justify all our apprehensions. There may be still time, Sire, to give a more beneficial direction to our united efforts; but it is for your Majesty to use moderation towards a feeble, irritated, and suspicious Government, no longer conscious what part it ought to take. If that Government could be inspired with confidence in a better future, perhaps it might consent to the required concessions."

The Emperor replied: "I cannot persuade myself that we shall succeed in making the Porte yield by mere threats or by negotiations; cannon and the bayonet are necessary to frighten them, and to conquer the resistance which the Sultan opposes to everything we have hitherto done to prove our desire reasonable. All my measures are taken to this effect, and I will not draw back. The injury which this state of things has done to the commerce of Odessa amounts already to about thirty millions of rubles. The reports which I have recently received from Servia inform me that the Turks exercise every imaginable vexation and cruelty in that province, notwithstanding the stipulations of the Treaty of Ackerman. All my ports are closed; the produce of our soil cannot be sold, because everything must pass through that narrow channel of Constantinople, which is closed

to my vessels. This is my present position. I have in my hand proofs that the Turks wished to prevent the peace I was about to conclude with the Persians. These documents will be published, that the public may judge of the conduct of the Porte with regard to me. I have, however, succeeded in making an honorable peace with Persia, and if God helps me in the present enterprise, I shall also make peace with the Porte, and they will be convinced that I wish for nothing but what is necessary for Russian commerce, and what was, in fact, mine by treaty. I ask you," said the Emperor, "what will Austria do, if by any unforeseen chance the Turkish Government should fall?"

"That is precisely, Sire," replied I, "what the Emperor, in his anxiety, represents to you, with the object of avoiding the commotion and general confusion, which would arise in Europe if that event were brought about by the war which you are on the point of undertaking."

The Emperor then said: "I have read attentively the memorandum (No. 893) which your cabinet presented at the Conference of London, on the means which it proposes to the Porte to escape from its embarrassing position with regard to the three Courts. It was long before I could understand it, for I could not persuade myself that your real meaning was that the Porte should entirely give up its insurgent provinces. Such a proposal to the Porte is ridiculous. Besides, it would, I think, be a very bad example to give to the rebels. The Greeks must remain—I repeat it—under the suzerainty of the Porte if they are permitted to exist at all. But how can your Court propose such a thing while it disapproves of what we desire to do?"

"It is precisely, Sire," replied I, "because we believe that the Porte would sooner resign itself to the total loss of a province than admit the principle of an interference and intervention by foreigners in its internal affairs. The religious principles of the Turks reject this interference, and their consent will never be obtained by that means."

"If," said the Emperor, "my allies at London agree to bring this proposal forward, I will not oppose it; but, I repeat, the Porte will not accept it, and I expect no success from this step. As for the suspension of arms, we learn from Paris that the Greeks do not wish to accept it, unless the three Courts, under whose protection they have placed themselves, approve. Admiral de Rigny, moreover, declares that he can see no possibility of this armistice taking

place, for the Turks would take the opportunity to provision and strengthen their weak points, and then after three months their position would be as much better as ours would be worse."

The Emperor terminated this long and important conversation by saying: "I have expressed my thoughts freely to you; give an account of them to the Emperor. I shall keep my word; I employ no *finesse* and have no reservations. I am but a general of brigade, who understands nothing of policy nor of diplomacy; but I am attached to the Emperor; I respect him, and he will always find me in the path of honor and principle. If he and I join hands and understand each other, since we are still masters at home, we have nothing to fear from disorders on any side. We suffice for all the needs of Europe, because our resources, if we know how to employ and unite them, are powerful, and we know how to make ourselves obeyed. What say you to all that is taking place in Portugal? Is the Infant behaving wisely? Do they write to you about this?" I told the Emperor what your Highness wrote to me in your private letter (see No. 895) on the same subject. His Majesty immediately replied, "Well, without consulting you, I have sent the same instructions to my ambassador. If the Infant can so far forget himself as to neglect his duty towards his brother and sovereign, my embassy has orders to retire from Lisbon, and to declare to the Infant that we will never give our approbation to any act which cannot be justified before the tribunal of the King his sovereign, of whom he is but the lieutenant. You see," continued his Majesty, "that we agree when monarchical principles are in question. The Emperor will always find it so with me, for I have been brought up in these principles, and events have confirmed me in them."

His Imperial Majesty pressed my hand, as if he were relieved at having said all that was in his heart, and dismissed me with assurances of his hearty good will.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

Metternich to Apponyi, in Paris, Vienna, May 9, 1828.

897. The Russo-Turkish War—that war which we have foreseen as the only probable, or perhaps even possible, result of the course which has been taken for years—is about to begin, and everything shows that it will be carried on with great vigor by Russia. All agree that it must be so. The necessity of striking decisive blows to attain the double advantage of a prompt pacification in those countries where disorder is making many more ravages than the enemy's sabre, and of making a strong impression on Europe at the commencement of the war, dictate this course. We do not say that the plans of Russia arise from the desire of conquest, properly so called. That Power does not need to extend her frontiers to be mistress of the Ottoman domains which border them; she has conquests of another kind to make in this same Empire, and they will not fail her. The explanations on the matter of indemnities, of which M. de Fontenay was the interpreter, do not seem to us as yet to prejudice the future. They talk of the loss of thirty millions which the commerce of Odessa alone has sustained. That allegation is false; Odessa has not yet lost anything, unless one reckons the loss which the prospect of the war has caused to speculators. But no matter; it is not a question of the commerce of one town nor of millions that we have to consider. Nothing inclines us to think that the result of the war will be what they expect; everything, on the contrary, tells us that the result will be different. I state this conviction simply as an acquittal of my political conscience, and not as a recrimination on a situation determined by a Power higher than the wishes of Cabinets.

Our desire is that Count de la Ferronays will not alter his course of vigorous action in order to maintain the Triple Alliance and he may be assured of our frank co-operation in this respect in all places and on all occasions where our voice can exercise a salutary influence.

The knowledge that we, more than any other Court, are able to obtain as to the internal condition of the Ottoman Empire does not allow us to doubt that the success of the Russian armies will be easily accomplished. There is no security for the existence of the Ottoman Empire; and a question which we think should be regarded as indefinable—seeing that the three allies themselves have not yet been able to define it between them—is not of a nature to be resolved by a Government which has no pretensions to wisdom.

The world is thus in the presence of a very great evil, and I should be concealing the truth as to my feelings if I did not assure you that I regard as still more frightful the chances presented by the moral situation of France. My mind is here arrested, and all our wishes are concentrated in the hope that the evil will finally cause the awakening of good men who have allowed themselves to be led to the brink of a declivity bordering on a fathomless abyss. The question seems to me to be reduced to the alternative, whether this awakening will take place before the loss is consummated or not till after the catastrophe; and assuredly tears shed over ruins are at the best but useless tears.

ATTEMPT TO GAIN OVER THE ENGLISH CABINET
TO AUSTRIA.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, May 31, 1828.

898. The report you have given us of the verbal communications of the Duke of Wellington is appreciated by us as everything is which comes from him. I think I could not better respond to his Grace's confidence than by enabling you to explain with perfect candor our views with regard to the grave circumstances of the moment.

In addressing myself to the Duke of Wellington I am not hindered by any of those considerations which are so often an obstacle to complete openness between Courts.

No one is more convinced than myself of the great qualities which distinguish this Minister—elevation of thought and energy of character; neither have I any doubt of the value which he attaches to the closeness of the relations between our two Courts.

The analysis made by the Duke of Wellington of the recent declarations from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg entirely agrees with the opinion which we had from the first formed of these documents. (See note to 894.)

The substance of the different Russian despatches may be given in a few words:

Russia, while affecting the greatest moderation, opens the door to tremendous exactions. She wishes by this means to secure a double benefit, moral and material, in advance. Whatever may be the course of events, she wishes to obtain, by the position she has taken, one or other of these benefits, and it will not be difficult to obtain both.

She charges the allies, and more directly England, with the pretended necessity in which she finds herself placed to act as she has done.

Whatever happens, nothing will prevent her from being the Power to liberate the Greeks.

Russia speaks of moderation, and renews her protestation that she aims neither at conquests of territory nor at the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

We have long ago declared to the Court of London our conviction as to the real plans of the Emperor Nicholas concerning the future existence of that Empire. He does not desire its death, but its ruin; he does not care to add small portions to his territory in Europe—he would require the whole, or the greater part of the whole, to make the enterprise worth the trouble. We are not, therefore, disposed to believe that, at the present moment, the Emperor can aim at material conquests, which would only be made to the detriment of the Principalities. He takes another direction, which must seem more advantageous. He will impose on the Porte pecuniary charges which will tax its resources to the utmost. It remains to be seen if the Sultan can satisfy these exactions. If he cannot, Russia will keep guarantees, and declare she has made no conquests.

The next peace will increase the demands already agreed to by the stipulations of former treaties, and completed by that of Ackerman, to such a point that, in fact, they will leave nothing to the Sultan but the exercise of a useless and dangerous suzerainty over the two Principalities of the Danube and Servia.

The Emperor Nicholas declares that it is absolutely necessary he should have guarantees to protect his commerce. He declares even that he desires the superiority of his influence to be established forever at Constantinople. By what material means does his Imperial Majesty expect to arrive at these two ends? He does not say so, but there is no doubt that it is only by a positive and recognized preponderance that his end can be secured, for purely moral means cannot attain such an object.

The operations of the Russian army in Asia have commenced. They will be assisted by the operations of the fleet. The Russian forces are about to take possession of Anapa, Sukum-Kalé, and other places on the coast of Mingrelia and Armenia. These conquests appear so simple, and men's minds are so familiarized with them, that it is hardly to be supposed that any Power will consider this an open violation of the declared engagement not to do it. But, if our information is correct, we shall see the Persians in their turn take the offensive against the Turks, and Prince Abbas-Mirza will seek to indemnify the Shah for the loss of Persian Armenia by conquests in the Pachalik of Bagdad.

What will become of the Ottoman Power, attacked on all sides?

Two alternatives present themselves—its dissolution in consequence of a defence out of proportion with the force of the attack, or its submission to demands the necessary effect of which will be equivalent to speedy ruin. In a word, the Porte has the choice between death and a prolonged agony.

Of what importance, on the other hand, are the chances which Russia has managed with such undoubted skill? In either of the cases I have mentioned she can gain the object she has in view. If she contents herself with the second of the alternatives indicated, the Emperor will have found means to indemnify himself for the expenses he will have so gratuitously incurred, and to surround with an aureole of military glory the opening of a reign which had commenced under very sad auspices; moreover, he will know how to make the most of a moderation to which the whole of Europe will be eager to render homage.

These are the real facts, and the Duke of Wellington has too much candor and rectitude of judgment to contradict them.

In such a state of things, and in face of a future so fraught with evil omens, the head of the Austrian Cabinet would fail in his duty if he did not express himself with perfect candor to the head of the British Government.

We have lately passed through an epoch all the more difficult for us, as the greatest evil has come from England herself, which long tradition had accustomed us to regard as the surest guardian of the many interests common to the two Powers. The same force of circumstances which would certainly have overthrown—if he had not been removed by death—the public man whose audacious conceptions had no other object but that of turning the world round in a circle of which his personal ambition occupied the centre—that same force of circumstances, let us say it boldly, has placed the Duke of Wellington at the head of affairs in Great Britain. The good which has succeeded the evil has not raised our hopes to a degree that seems impossible of attainment. . . .

The Eastern Question is so confused that even the prompt termination of the war now appears in many respects a morally frightful result. England may still exercise some influence on the *dénouement* of the drama; but we do not see that her Cabinet has taken any decided part, although we do justice to the perfect agreement of the Duke of Wellington's opinion with that which we ourselves have

formed on the attitude of the Court of Russia and the value of her manifestoes.

You know that we should have considered it as a great mistake if the two Courts of the Triple Alliance had retired immediately from their engagements to Russia, or, what is much the same thing, if by such a decision they had released the Emperor Nicholas from certain of his engagements to them. But we sincerely regret that, when the Emperor of Russia had already made himself master of the occasion, the two Courts had not, instead of deliberating on points of mere form, taken advantage of the existence of their common treaty to arrest, or at any rate to hinder, what may lead to results which cannot be softened when once they are attained.

The despatch from Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, dated April 29 last, struck us more with the confusion of its proposals than for any other reason.*

The allies were right to regard themselves as bound by the Treaty of London, but they have committed a great error in separating the Russo-Turkish war from the same treaty. The truth is that the origin of this war is found in the treaty of July 6; the Emperor Nicholas should have consequently been stopped then. But the mistake is made, and there is nothing to do but to palliate it by a firm and decided step in future.

The Duke of Wellington will see in my candid explanation a new proof of the great importance we attach to the prompt conclusion of the dangerous course which Russia is now taking, so to speak, under the shield of her allies. A new era must follow the next arrangements between the Powers at war, and if I regard the present as lost, I must with all the more zeal fix my thoughts on the future; and, in the anticipation of a better state of things between Austria and England, I believe I cannot avoid entering into some details.

I will begin by explaining to the Duke of Wellington what our position really is.

* On Lord Aberdeen's answer to the Russian despatch of April 19, Gentz writes to Metternich, July 18, as follows: "The note is written in a florid style, full of tiresome repetitions and punctilious verbosity; the work of a diplomatist who, between the necessity of telling the truth and the fear of displeasing, is driven hither and thither, neither able to defend his own cause (a bad enough one) nor venturing to attack the weakness of his adversaries with vigor; who trembles before the slightest criticism and covers over his well-founded fears with trivial compliments. It is evident that this document is written more for show than for any practical purpose."—ED.

It is customary nowadays to regulate one's views by those of the journalists and pamphleteers. In representing Austria as crushed beneath the weight of inextricable financial and administrative embarrassments, the faction knew what it was about; it wished to turn away the attention of Europe from a Power which time and events have not been able to make deviate from its political course, and the number of credulous people is immense. The spirit of sound criticism is extinct, and the fact that calumny attacks a living adversary does not enter into the calculations of these credulous men.

Austria is not dying; we are full of life and vigor; our troubles are not internal; our people do not need to be excited—their just indignation rather needs to be calmed by the wisdom of the Government; our army is what it has always been; and if the gravest considerations have forced us to stand quietly aloof, we shall never be prevented by material difficulties from using the necessary strength to secure our own safety and to give assistance to those who need our support. It is not at a time—unexampled in the records of history—when three great Powers are united by one common bond, in spite of the views which divide them on the object of their union, that we should find it useful to increase alarm and distrust by putting ourselves in motion.

Austria is a central Power; she needs, consequently, to cover one or other of her flanks; and when Russia, France, and Great Britain are united, Austria cannot move without imminent risk to herself and to the whole social body.

But this state of things must come to an end, and it is to prepare and consolidate a better future that we should devote all our care. The Duke of Wellington may, therefore, be easy as to our internal state, and particularly as to the condition of our army. Our military system is not inclined to parade and play, for which reason it is all the stronger.

But the more we feel our strength, the great moderation which characterizes the Emperor our august master, and the importance of a return to perfect confidence between our Court and that of London, the more we regret the daily hindrances to the establishment of that confidence from the organization still existing in the department for Foreign Affairs in England. With regard to this, I appeal to the conscience of your Highness. In what relation does the ambassador of the Emperor stand with the Secretary of State? And, on the other hand, to what absolute nonentity does it not condemn the ambassador of his Britannic Majesty at our Court! Cer-

tainly the present is a most anxious moment, and under the beneficent administration of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Cowley finds himself without directions, just as he was under the administration of his predecessors, which was hostile towards us.

I beg you to impress upon his Grace how necessary and urgent it is that things should be changed on this important point. I have no secrets from the Prime Minister, and no confidence in him who ought to act as his intermediary with Europe. My mind is too practical not to see that Lord Dudley is connected with a whole order of things which will consequently disappear or triumph with him. But it is just because of this that I may expect with impatience that department which exercises such a direct influence over the relations of Great Britain with Europe will, with as little delay as possible, represent worthily the noble and useful thoughts of the head of the present Administration.

I shall soon have the honor of returning to all these subjects, and I beg your Highness to use the most perfect frankness with the Duke of Wellington.*

* See Nos. 887 and 904.

THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO THE MOREA.

Metternich to Trauttmansdorff, in Berlin, Vienna, August 13, 1828.

899. The opinion which M. Ancillon has expressed on the French expedition to the Morea entirely coincides with my own. This enterprise injures the Court which attempts it, those who have authorized it, and, in short, the whole social order. To justify the latter statement, it is sufficient to draw your attention to the use the French newspapers already make of an event which is only in preparation, and to the advantage the disorganizing factions seek to obtain from it. I should be inclined to treat the follies of these pamphleteers with a certain amount of contempt, but sad experience forbids us to pass lightly over the lucubrations of the French journalists. The expedition to the Morea will be the complement to the violation of principles of every kind which has distinguished the triple affair from the very beginning; it will perhaps serve as the point of departure for a new political movement.

The Greek Question is not, and never has been, anything in France but a mantle to cover a very different game; Philhellenism in that kingdom has had all the importance of an avowed political club. The Government speaks to us of a strong force pushing it forward; and that force, which it can no longer resist, was created by itself. Will it be better able to resist when, by compliance, it will have given to the factions new pledges of its passive obedience? The thing appears to me as little doubtful as is the tendency of parties in France. All are agreed more or less on one subject: that subject is the extension of frontiers. The aim of France is conquest, and the *Mobiles* who have launched both the Republic and the Empire in so dangerous a career now adopt the prevailing opinions. These *Mobiles* were the desire of the leaders at the time of the Revolution in order to occupy the attention of the masses with outward events, and, under the Empire, with the thirst for glory. They now act with equal force on the opposite parties, and each one thinks itself the most favored. Our prediction, made long ago,

of the evils which would necessarily occur and crush the social body at the sound of the first discharge of the political artillery which will burst over Europe—how has it been verified, and will it not be verified still more?

The attack seems to be directed against Italy. The parties in France—and I do not except a great number of Royalists—desire to replace in the peninsula what they call the influence of Austria by French influence. Certain that, without conquests consolidated by time—and the first ought to be that of a neighboring kingdom—the material preponderance of France could make no way against our deliberate calmness, and our political conduct (so conservative, and frankly acknowledged to be so by the Princes of Italy), it is to the people that the ambition of the faction is addressed. They are promised a *régime* to which the great majority in the peninsula object. The game is evident, and it is pushed to indecency. It will not make us alter our line of conduct. If it should ever go beyond its present limits, if it should be followed by facts, we shall know how to resist them, and I hope that we shall succeed in the future as we have succeeded in the past.

What the French have long been accustomed to consider their natural frontiers the masses now aim at attaining, although the more prudent even among the imprudent try to conceal this.

The great and decisive question, therefore, is still, Will the Russian campaign of 1828 put an end to the war? If such should be the case, and it is assuredly the object of all our wishes, things, at least for a certain time, would be restored to something like order. Many plans would be overthrown, and it would take time to create new ones, to prepare them and to execute them, and to collect again the materials necessary for their execution. If, on the contrary, the war is renewed in the spring of next year, Europe will then see what good she gets from the Russo-Turkish War, and from the example of a French army which is to carry liberty and emancipation to a foreign nation.

In the midst of this political confusion, Austria does not take up arms; what we are doing is to count our disposable forces, and also those which are not so. Besides, the French Government is as indifferent to what we are doing as to what we are not doing. It knows both, and it knows especially that our looks are not turned towards the East. Neither are the factions uneasy, but they make a noise and abuse the Power which annoys them. All this is in the natural order of things, and I confess that I should be more

anxious if the parties were silent about us than I am when they affect to treat us with contempt. It is the future of Europe which makes me uneasy; and I am quite overcome by the consideration of the causes which have produced so awful a state of things, and which, while the evil is still so great, prevent an agreement between those Powers whose efforts for the maintenance of peace Providence had so long crowned with success.

I have been led to enter into these explanations by the uniformity of ideas which every day proves to exist so happily between the two great intermediary Courts, and of which the few words spoken recently by you to M. Ancillon furnish us with a new proof.

THE THEATRE OF WAR.

Metternich to Ottenfels, in Constantinople, Vienna, September 4, 1828.

900. The situation, as indicated by the news from all quarters, is as follows: The Russian army, which did not exceed forty thousand when the Emperor left it for Odessa, is now before Schumla. It has taken several positions, and has advanced as far as the fortifications on the Ottoman frontier. It has covered its position by redoubts; some corps have been pushed forwards into the defiles of the Balkans, in the direction of the communications of the Turkish camp with Adrianople. In the Russian camp they estimate the force of Hussein Pacha at forty thousand men, of whom the half are cavalry.

The Pacha remains quiet; with the exception of some detachments which he has sent forward, no fighting has taken place. One of these detachments, consisting of two thousand horse, attacked the communications of the Russian army and inflicted some damage.

The Russian Guards have crossed the Danube. They are advancing in the direction of Varna. The third *corps d'armée*, under General Scherbatow, is advancing towards Moldavia. It is said to be destined to relieve that of General Roth, who is going to strengthen the army before Schumla. The public voice estimates the reinforcements now marching to join the army at sixty thousand men.

The *corps d'armée* placed near Widdin must have received a reinforcement of twelve thousand Albanians. They have taken a position in Little Wallachia, where the Russians had only a few troops. Count Langeron, having become the commander-in-chief of the two Principalities, has left Bucharest in haste, gathering round him as many as he could to meet the enemy. On August 22 (the date of our last reports from Bucharest) it was said that the enemy had been surprised at Kalafat.

General Menzikoff, whom the Emperor has entrusted with the siege of Varna, has driven the Turks, who were advancing from all sides, back into that place. Some gunboats have been taken before Varna by the fleet commanded by Admiral Greigh. . . .

The enemy has sustained great loss before Silistria, which is making a vigorous defence. Giurgewo, not being carefully observed, had pushed forward detachments in all directions.

Provisions in Roumelia are scarce; the army consequently is suffering. There is a great scarcity of water. The hospitals are crowded.

The corps scattered throughout the Principalities are also afflicted with sickness. The plague has ceased at Bucharest.

The whole situation may be summed up thus:

The Russian army which commenced the war has been found too weak to obtain a decided success. It is clear that the war was undertaken on the supposition that the Porte would yield to fear. This supposition not being realized, great operations had necessarily to be suspended until the arrival of reinforcements.

The plan of the Russian campaign shows deficiencies which might have already led to the most disastrous results if the attitude of the Turks had not been purely negative. I use this word, for "defensive" would not be the proper term. The defensive does not exclude the offensive under given circumstances.

The position of the invading army is in contradiction to all military rules. To secure but one passage across a river like the Danube, to choose that point on the most distant part of the line, to take Braïla with great loss of men instead of making sure of Rustchuk and Silistria, to fail to provide Wallachia with imposing forces, and allow the enemy to remain master of all the left bank of the river, to rush with a light heart into a long and dangerous defile—this is not to make war, properly so-called, but to reckon on the enemy's faults, and to seek for no success but what results from these same faults.

There is nothing, however, to prove that the Turks have not already committed all the mistakes which the Russians hoped they would; it remains to be seen if they will continue those mistakes to the end of the campaign. It is certain that a combined operation between the army of Widdin, the numerous garrisons of the places on the Danube, and Hussein Pacha, would already have driven the Russians beyond the Lower Danube and cleared the Principalities. The propitious moment for such an operation would have been that when the Emperor prudently left the army, when it was in so hazardous a position as that before Schumla. When the reinforcements have arrived, the opportunity will be gone.

This is the state of affairs on one side of the picture.

The landing of the French expedition in the Morea, which may be effected at this very moment, completes the other side.

What does or does not the Porte desire? That is what no one can say. If it is time that it desires to gain, it is calculating falsely.

Two great Powers are engaged in a struggle with the Porte. They must either be defeated and their armies pursued, or unpleasant conditions must be submitted to. The Porte would have some reason for desiring to gain time if it could reckon on subsequent assistance in these painful conflicts; but as that aid is not to be found in Europe, she is wrong, a hundred times wrong, in not fighting the enemy when it is in a difficult position, or in not yielding the less, where it will infallibly in the end have to yield the more.

If a great and brilliant action were to change the position of things, the first part of the opinion I have pronounced would be weakened, but the second would remain as strong as ever. Beaten, the Russians will not yield, for they could not yield; thrown back for a time, they would recover themselves more easily than the Divan imagines.

I am thus brought back to what I have constantly pointed out. To this I can add nothing, nor will I take anything away. . . .

INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, September 14, 1828.

901. Among the foreigners who have come to the camp of Baden (Traiskirchen) are the Princes William and Augustus of Prussia.

The former (see note to 888) is a prince distinguished in every way. You know that he is a close adherent of the Emperor Nicholas, and that he only left St. Petersburg, after a sojourn of several months, when his Imperial Majesty repaired to the army. Prince William had made great efforts to obtain from the King his father permission to join the Russian army. The King refused it.

Knowing the privileges and opportunities of his Royal Highness, I was naturally anxious to hear his opinion with regard to the position of affairs at the theatre of war.

Here are the results at which I have arrived:

I assume in the first place that Prince William is well informed as to the mind of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia. He was with him for months before the commencement of hostilities, and I know for certain that not only has the Emperor great personal confidence in him, but that there is an active correspondence between them. Therefore I consider that the words of the Prince have all the importance of words from the Emperor Nicholas himself.

The following facts, which are certainly not in contradiction with the ideas I have already formed, are thus demonstrated.

The frightful complication of the moment owes its source to a spirit of levity—I may even say of actual puerility on the part of the young Monarch and the young courtiers who are about him—excited and fomented by the extreme weakness of the Cabinet, and the culpable folly of some blunderers.

Serious war was considered impossible. How could these miserable Turks, who at each step betrayed their weakness and their fear by submitting to all sorts of outrages—how could they dare to enter upon a war with Russia! Turkish plenipotentiaries would be

sure to present themselves as soon as the first steps were taken by the Russian army.

The Emperor was quite sincere in his objection to making any conquests of territory. He simply wished to commence his reign by a brilliant stroke, and at the same time to secure perfect liberty to the commerce of his Empire.

Sounded by me as to the substantial difficulties which might prevent this end from being attained, Prince William assured me he could not say exactly the means proposed by the Emperor, but he thought they might be found in the two following conditions: Demolition of all the Turkish strongholds on the Danube, as well as the forts of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

On my observation that the Ottoman Empire might well feel its very existence threatened by the execution of a plan which, for that reason, would meet with a strong opposition on the part of the Porte, and to the success of which the Powers trading in the Levant would also find great difficulty in co-operating, the Prince replied, without hesitation, "that he did not agree with me; that the Porte deserved to be punished, and must not be listened to; that, as for the maritime Powers, they could not with reason oppose the plan, seeing that it had never entered into the Emperor's thoughts to hinder commerce, but that, on the contrary, he desired to make it as free as possible."

The Prince confessed that the facts had not, up to the present time, answered their expectations, but that they would no doubt be fulfilled in the next campaign. He admitted, on the other hand, that this state of things endangered the peace of Europe, and that therefore the Powers should try to prevent the necessity for renewing the war.

Our reports from St. Petersburg convince us that the war is unpopular among all classes of society. It is the same in the provinces, and, what is more, in the army. You will remember that this was our opinion at a time when all Europe thought that the national and military movement in Russia seriously threatened the maintenance of peace. The war is a work of a few individuals, among whom the Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris have played the principal part. We may be allowed to express our regret that nowhere has the knowledge that we must have of the public feeling and resources of the States adjacent to our own been taken into account.

The Emperor Nicholas left Odessa on the first of this month, by

ship. The diplomatists are all to follow his Majesty. It appears that Lord Heytesbury alone has decided to prolong his stay. The Empress also intends to leave that city in a short time, and, after having made a tour of the Crimea, she reckons on returning to St. Petersburg towards the end of the present month.

There is no doubt that some decisive step is to be taken soon after the Emperor returns to the army. . . .

COMBINED EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, September 14, 1828.

902. . . . The news from the theatre of war continues to prove the insufficiency of the means the Russians had at their disposal at the beginning of the campaign. The reinforcements, which I can hardly estimate at more than fifty thousand men, should by this time have joined the *corps d'armée* which they are destined to support. These reinforcements are composed of twenty thousand of the Guards and about thirty thousand troops of the line under General Scherbatow. The former are to repair to Varna; the latter to the Principalities and to the blockade of the strongholds on the Danube, as well as for the siege of Silistria. This is a very small number for so many purposes. . . .

Every day also increases the embarrassments of the Powers, both those bound by the Treaty of London and those which are not. A course of affairs so directly opposed to the expectation of everybody must necessarily lead to the most extraordinary complications. I do not believe that history offers another example of such a disappointment as the Court and the public of Russia have met with from the serious resistance of the Turks. The Cabinet must change their plan, and it must be vigorously conceived, for the gravest interests are at stake.

Many of the recent arrangements have been altered. The Russian fleet in the Mediterranean will throw off the mask and commence hostilities; it will be the same with everything.

What will France do amid all this tacking about? I have no difficulty in predicting. She will continue to press forward in the direction of an alliance with the three Courts, as long as she has the Egyptians in front of her. She will be very much inclined to become the auxiliary of Russia when the French Cabinet is asked to lend a more active support to those Powers. My prophecy, that at the Russian headquarters the French expedition would be hailed as a favorable diversion to the operations of the war, was not long

in being fulfilled. I earnestly desire that my presentiments with regard to the political attitude of France in the Russo-Turkish War may not have the same fate.

There are truths so evident, that they cannot be concealed. I regard as such truths the following dangers—namely:

1. That the calculations of Russia having been false, she will be obliged, in case peace is not signed between her and the Porte at the end of the present campaign, to put forth all the resources of the Empire for the opening of a new campaign. From that time she will also change the principle of action she has hitherto declared;

2. That the same causes which may drive his Imperial Majesty of Russia to such dire extremities will incline the Sultan not to enter into any arrangements the result of which would be his granting to the open enemy what that enemy has not been able to acquire by the sword, and conceding to enemies under the guise of friends what, even at the peril of his existence, he has hitherto refused;

That France, actually engaged in the struggle, will not retire, even when the avowed object of her efforts is obtained. Having once taken up a position in the Morea, the French Government will yield to the temptation of dictating to the Porte the double duty of the liberation of the Greeks and peace with Russia.

As I feel sure that these possible results have also presented themselves to the foresight of the British Cabinet, it seems to me that I am fulfilling a duty to ourselves and the whole of Europe, in begging you to enter into candid explanations with Lord Aberdeen concerning the necessities created by a position of affairs singularly dangerous for the general repose.

Our most anxious care must be directed toward the only point where our moral action may yet replace the many other influences that have been dispelled. We must neglect no opportunity of urging the Porte to return to a state of peace, which it did not break, but which it alone can re-establish. Our efforts have hitherto been unsuccessful, which is not surprising; the Divan opposes us with the arguments we have employed to induce it to yield to dangers which experience has not yet justified. It does not even reply directly to our exhortations; but it is impossible for us to conceal that when it does, it will address to us two questions—namely:

“By what right does Russia require the Sultan to make sacrifices to free himself from a war which he has not provoked?”

And “What security has he that he would have the support of

the Powers, supposing he responds to their wishes concerning the affairs of Greece?" . . .

Our influence on the Porte may therefore be regarded as void, so long as the general situation is not essentially changed. What will be the ultimate decisions of the Court of London? It is very important for us to know.

I repeat that, until events contradict it, we allow that the present campaign will not put an end to the war. The winter, then, should be employed in arriving at an agreement between the principal Courts. If the spring of 1829 sees the renewal of the war, and if the same lack of agreement between the principal Courts should be prolonged until that time, Europe will then have to face an awful prospect of troubles and revolutions.

These questions are of extreme gravity. We do not pretend to solve them, but we wish to discover what the Court of London thinks of them. Seven years of real moral warfare have now run their course; but our views have undergone no change, the line we have taken remains the same. We still take the same standpoint as that from which we started, and what we desired then we desire now. Our fears are realized—war is the inevitable consequence of proceedings which, as we felt sure, contained its germs. This war, which no one really desired, has altered the position: will a means of making peace be found between the end of this campaign and the beginning of the next? That is the question, and its answer will decide neither more nor less than the maintenance of the old political order in Europe or its fall.

The difficulties are great, for of all affairs the worst are those which proceed in a manner contrary to the desires of those who take part in them; and the necessity that these parties should be very careful and correct in what they desire in the future is an undoubted result of this position.

DON PEDRO'S CLAIM TO THE PORTUGUESE THRONE.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, September 22, 1828.

903. Sire ! Your Majesty has requested me in your despatches from Weinzierl, dated August 29, to give you an exact and exhaustive statement of the disputed claims of the Emperor Don Pedro and the Infant Don Miguel to the Crown of Portugal, based on the Portuguese national and family laws.

It will be the easier for me to fulfil your Majesty's request as I had not waited for your Majesty's commands to give this important question the most serious attention. As soon as I saw that the Cabinets of the great Powers, especially those of Vienna and Berlin, disagreed in their views on the question whether the Infant Don Miguel had no claims at all to the Crown of Portugal, I began a memoir, in which I examined this question from different political points of view, and with due regard to the fundamental laws of the country and the hereditary succession established for the reigning dynasty. The purpose of this memoir was to point out, on the clearest evidence, that not the Infant Don Miguel but the Emperor Don Pedro would be the legal successor of his father King John VI. on the throne of Portugal; that therefore Don Pedro had the undoubted right to abdicate in favor of his daughter, the Infanta Donna Maria da Gloria, and that this young Princess must be regarded as the lawful Queen of Portugal. I have the honor to send your Majesty a copy of this memoir, with the respectful intimation that I have communicated its contents to the different Cabinets of Europe, partly to enlighten them on this intricate question, partly to warn them of the efforts and intrigues of Don Miguel's party and the widowed Queen, his mother, which are intended to exclude your Majesty's granddaughter from the succession to the throne of Portugal.

The memoir had, besides, the effect of suspending the decisions of the Powers, so that we gained time to prepare a favorable reception for the proposals I had to make, and which were intended to

put an end to all these dangerous complications, without violating Queen Mary's rights.

Before I give an account to your Majesty of the negotiations I entered upon with the Cabinets of the Powers, particularly with England, I believe it necessary to enter first upon a strict examination of the statutes of the Cortes of Lamego, the Pragmatic rights of John VI., because the rights of Don Miguel have been founded upon these acts, to the disadvantage of the Emperor Don Pedro and Queen Mary. I flatter myself I have proved the groundlessness of these claims; but if, after reading the memoir, your Majesty still retains any doubt on the subject, I hope to convince your Majesty by further explanation, that your Majesty's granddaughter alone is lawful Queen of Portugal.

1. Till the House of Braganza was raised to power, the constitution of Portugal was nominally and in some of its chief features monarchical, although it was in reality limited by the participation of the three estates which, under the name of the "Cortes," claimed to represent the sovereignty of the people. This was especially the case with respect to all laws made from time to time to settle the hereditary succession in the different branches of the royal family; and, as frequent changes of government and throne-revolutions very often brought questions forward which affected these laws, the Cortes exercised more than once the right to settle those questions, sometimes with the King's sanction, sometimes without it, usually according to the will or the interest of the party in power.

2. Of these decisions two are particularly remembered by the Portuguese nation and in the works of the historians and legal writers, and are considered by the modern advocates of the old Portuguese political law as the basis of all others. The constitution of Lamego, given under King Alphonso I. (according to some in 1143, according to others in 1181), and the declaration of the Cortes of January 28, 1642, which, after the revolution excluding Spain from the throne of Portugal, acknowledged John IV. Duke of Braganza, King of Portugal. Very serious doubts have always been raised as to the validity of these documents. The constitutions of Lamego are, as is proved by their style, the work of a barbarous age, only curious, even if their genuineness were fully proved, as an historical monument, but certainly not as a source of law, under entirely different circumstances. The declaration of 1642, never sanctioned by the monarch raised to the throne, bears on each line the stamp of its origin, the purpose to which it was consecrated, and the circum-

stances out of which it originated. The principle, common to both documents, was the exclusion of a foreign prince from the throne. On the separate articles of these so-called fundamental statutes whole volumes of polemics could be written, although, as has been proved in the enclosed memoir, there is no connection between them and the present discussion: a fact also mentioned in the protest of the Brazilian ambassador, published in London, which I likewise enclose.

3. No assembly of the Cortes took place after the revolution of 1642, and during all the following reigns there is no mention of the Cortes and their principles. During these periods the kings exercised the supreme power, undivided and unlimited, they decided the most important matters without the assistance of the Cortes; they made and repealed laws; they regulated the whole administration of the realm and its colonies as they chose, assisted only by powerful ministers and other state officials; they made war with foreign States and entered into treaties and alliances. The Cortes is not even mentioned in the most decisive epochs of modern history; not during the negotiations before and after the Peace of Utrecht, nor during the powerful and extensive reforms of Pombal, nor in the long reign of King John VI. It never raised its voice at the important moment when the royal family emigrated to Brazil, nor took the slightest notice of anything happening there, from the elevation of Brazil to the rank of a kingdom till the breaking out of the Brazilian revolution. When, in 1820, the revolution in Portugal broke out, the name of the Cortes was abused to gain the semblance of a legal sanction for the overthrow of all old constitutions; but the Cortes of the Revolution had nothing in common with the old Cortes but the name; in form, spirit, and system it was a national assembly after the modern fashion, which, like that of 1791, forced upon the monarch a form of government hateful to the majority of the nation. When this assembly was overthrown in the year 1823, different projects to re-establish the old Cortes were conceived but not realized. At last in 1825 the important treaty which settled the independence of Brazil was signed through the mediation of foreign Powers, without the assistance of the Cortes, the political existence of which must therefore be regarded as extinguished.

4. This being the position of things, King John VI. had the undoubted right to regulate the hereditary succession according to his own wishes, and if he thought fit, not to exclude his firstborn

son and his descendants from the Portuguese throne, a decision he could have taken after a mutual agreement, according to the treaty of 1825; if he not only silently but expressly named Don Pedro his successor, there could be no legal obstacle to this decision. Not the least objection was therefore raised against these arrangements, either at the time when the treaty was signed, or when John VI., a short time before his death, appointed his daughter Maria Isabella regent, nor during the interval between King John's death and the beginning of his son's reign, and all European Courts acknowledged these arrangements to their fullest extent.

5. If, after the practical extinction of the Cortes, any other tribunal or any other authority could have had the right to attack the decisions of John VI. on the pretext of violation of the Declaration of the year 1642, the first decrees of Don Pedro ought to have sufficed to annihilate these pretexts. The avowed principle (the *ratio legis*) of the statutes of 1642 had been to prevent the crown of Portugal from being given to a foreign prince, or to a Portuguese prince residing in a foreign country, even if he could prove a constitutional claim to the throne. Don Pedro met this objection by renouncing his indisputable birthright, and leaving his rights to his daughter. He dissipated the fears which the minority of this princess might excite for the future; he chose his brother for her husband and co-regent, consequently he had fulfilled all the claims of the statutes of 1624. The future Queen was a Portuguese princess, after her father's abdication the next in succession; separated for ever from Brazil, engaged to reside in Portugal, and the future bride of a Portuguese prince. Donna Maria therefore united in her person all the qualities and titles prescribed not only by the law of succession, but also by the mere local Portuguese law; and blind party spirit alone could refuse to acknowledge her incontestable rights.

6. Don Miguel, in accepting the regency, has acknowledged the rights of his imperial brother as well as those of his future wife. Bad advisers tempted him to aspire to the throne, but even to them it appeared too bold a step to attempt to gain it by mere arbitrary power; they resolved, therefore, to call into being the phantom of the old Cortes. Even if this step had been taken with the purest intentions, the Regent being merely the representative of a higher authority, was not entitled to take it without the sanction of the nation. The power he himself did not possess he could not bestow upon others; and that the Junta, the mere assembling of

which was high treason, should decide who was to be King of Portugal, was even offensive to common-sense. The execution, too, of the whole enterprise was in harmony with the spirit in which it had been proposed and the end to which it tended. The so-called representatives of the nation were only chosen instruments and notorious accomplices of the usurpation. The discussions of these two or three tumultuous assemblies were only the echo of all that fanatical party spirit had prepared and arbitrary power was willing to execute. The decisions of this sham parliament had exactly as much political value as the decrees of the *Trombetta Final* (a Portuguese journal).

7. From the above remarks it is evident:

(a) That according to the laws of hereditary succession established in all the reigning houses of Europe, modified in Portugal only in some peculiar cases, Maria da Gloria has become the only legal heir to the Portuguese throne after her father's renunciation;

(b) That even the statutes of 1612 could not be used as a legal objection against this succession;

(c) That the convocation of the Cortes ordered by Don Miguel without any right or authority must be regarded as an illegal act, powerless to weaken the rights of Queen Mary, and that, consequently, the decisions of this assembly were in every respect null and void.

Further, it follows that the Powers which did not hesitate to withdraw their ambassadors from Lisbon and to break off all communications with the new Court of Portugal, from the moment when Don Miguel usurped the Portuguese throne by accepting the crown offered to him by the Cortes, have at this moment the undoubted right to refuse to acknowledge the Infant Don Miguel as King of Portugal, and to take fitting measures to secure to the young Queen Mary II., the only lawful Queen of Portugal, the crown of that country.

This declaration of the Powers, if it is to answer the end proposed, must necessarily be supported by some measures threatening coercion, which would probably seriously disturb peace; for, in taking such a step, the Powers would give the revolutionary party in Portugal new ardor (a fact which certainly could not answer their interest or their intention), as Queen Mary is too young to reign herself, and a regency would only complicate the difficult position of Portugal. It has, therefore, been necessary to think of means of adjustment, which would prevent further mischief without com-

promising the rights of Queen Mary, or placing the Powers in contradiction with their former declarations and line of conduct. The means devised by me will, I believe, unite the different interests, and consists in blending Queen Mary's rights (rights acknowledged by the Powers in the Treaty of Vienna, as well as by the Infant Don Miguel) with the rights which Portugal grants to this Prince. Indeed, if the rights of the two hostile parties were united by a marriage which had been before planned, if the right be given to Don Miguel to divide with the young Queen the throne of Portugal, with the title of King and the power of co-regent, till she has reached a marriageable age, a legal basis would be prepared for the Powers, whereon to re-establish the peace of Portugal in a solid and lasting manner. To prove the advantages thus offered, I have written some short and concise notes which may serve as a kind of supplement to the memoir, and which I have the honor to send to your Majesty. I have sent both documents to your Majesty's Ambassador in London, asking him to communicate their contents to the English ministry, and authorizing Prince Esterhazy, in case the arrangement therein proposed is approved by this Cabinet, to demand that it be taken as the basis of negotiations with Rio Janeiro to gain over the Emperor Don Pedro to our views of the matter. The English Cabinet not only received my proposals very favorably, but has also resolved that they shall be considered as the basis of the instruction to Lord Strangford, who has just left for Rio Janeiro to settle this affair with the Emperor. Baron Marschall received similar orders, and has been charged to support the endeavors of Lord Strangford as heartily as possible. Lastly, your Majesty will permit me to remind you of your own letter to the Emperor Don Pedro, in which you advised him to place the rights of his daughter Mary under the protection of the European Powers. Nothing has, therefore, been neglected to ensure the success of this important negotiation, and the spirit of toleration and prudence, as well as the conciliatory spirit of which Don Pedro has latterly given numerous proofs, permit us to hope that the success of this negotiation will correspond with our desires. We shall probably encounter the greatest difficulty in Lisbon, not only from the Prince but also from the Queen his mother, who from the first opposed the Prince's marriage with the young Queen Mary.

But, on the other hand, there is reason to believe that the Prince must be anxious to be acknowledged King by the Powers, and that he will seriously consider the matter before he refuses to

accept the offer of conciliation which we proposed in Rio Janeiro, and are about to propose in Lisbon, as soon as we know the Emperor's resolution. Neither can it be without effect if the Prince sees that the Powers are firmly resolved to keep the position they took in opposition to him from the moment of his usurpation. In this sense the last declaration of the English Secretary of State, made to Don Miguel's unacknowledged agent in London, may have the greatest effect. All the different Courts agree so far on this matter. The Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Madrid, to which I communicated my proposal as soon as I was sure of its being favorably accepted by the English ministry, have joined us unanimously.

I therefore hope that this explanation will suffice to allay your Majesty's anxieties with respect to the claims of your granddaughter to the Portuguese throne, and show the care with which I have endeavored to defend them. It only remains for me to add that I enclose copies of the Edicts of August 29, 1825, and November 15, 1825, with the Memoir and Notes, in case your Majesty may like to see them.

A TEMPORARY AGREEMENT OF POLICY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AUSTRIA.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, October 8, 1828.

904. Lord Cowley has allowed me, under promise of secrecy, to see the last despatch from the Cabinet of London to Lord Heytesbury. This despatch does honor to Lord Aberdeen. It is well written and conceived, and expresses frankly the opinion of the Government on the political conduct of Austria. The despatches in question confirm the satisfactory impression you had yourself received from the English ministers. In this important respect we cannot be otherwise than perfectly satisfied.

I wish I could say the same of the general situation of affairs. This is, from whatever point we regard it, the most critical and the most dangerous possible.

The position in which the young Emperor of Russia finds himself is most embarrassing. . . .

Can the Emperor Nicholas allow his own defeats to go unpunished? Will he not be forced to avenge his own mistakes? This much must be admitted, but what is one to expect in the future?

According to its well-known habit, the Porte will not yield, and the successes—as real as unexpected—which the Turks have achieved in the first campaign, are not likely to incline the Sultan to give way.

In this state of things there arises an inevitable necessity: namely, that the English Government must declare which side it means to take; what the choice will be I cannot yet foretell. Between an explosion of ill-temper and the ease with which it has hitherto lent itself to the fantasies of its allies, there is a middle course which alone can serve the general cause without exposing Europe to terrible commotions. Will the Cabinet take this course? It is impossible to say, and yet everything depends upon it.

I told you in my last despatch of Prince William of Prussia.

Since then I have had an opportunity of seeing how the events of the war have astonished him. He has thus furnished me with another proof of the extreme imprudence with which the operations must have been conceived by his Imperial Majesty of Russia. A defeat, or even the possibility of one, was never admitted at St. Petersburg. It was, in a great measure, Count Nesselrode who protested against opening the campaign with more considerable forces, not only from the conviction that the Sultan would yield without hesitation, but principally to avoid the expenses falling too heavily on the Porte, in consequence of the indemnities it would have to pay. The Russian Cabinet thus economized for the Turks, and certainly confusion of ideas could no farther go. I am anxiously awaiting your news, which must necessarily throw light on much that is still dark to us.

PEACEFUL DISPOSITION OF THE PORTE.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 2, 1828.

905. . . . A great change has undoubtedly taken place in the moral attitude of the Porte, the reason of which may be found in the two following circumstances—namely, the character and intelligence of the Sultan being particularly striking, and the removal of the Greeks from all participation in the political affairs of the Empire.

The Ottoman character now presents itself in all its simplicity. It is no longer influenced or travestied by the shadows which belong to the Greek mind; and among that nation the Fanariotes have without any doubt for many years furnished a particular class, demoralized by all kinds of vices. It was only through a prism held by this caste that the Porte saw Europe, and that the Cabinets perceived the Ottoman Government.

If the resistance of the Sultan to the concessions which have been required from him for the last few years can be no longer doubtful; and if it seems quite natural that at the end of a campaign which could not have terminated more happily, the Sultan Mahmoud should be no more disposed to comply than he was at the approach, and in the present time of danger, it seems to us that the point of view—thoroughly European—which the Reis-Effendi has developed to our representative relative to the future peace with Russia furnishes material for many new observations.

A few years ago the Divan would have considered it contrary to good Mussulman policy to entertain any idea of a general arrangement or of a peaceful meeting between the Powers and the Turks, of transactions in fact, whose form would be that of a European Congress. Nothing appeared to us more just or wise than the sketch drawn by the Reis Effendi of the consequences of any pacification between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia, concluded according to the mode hitherto followed between the two Powers. It is therefore clear to me that there are more dreamers at St. Petersburg than at Constantinople.

The rage against the Courts of London and Paris is great at Constantinople. It is not so much the expedition to the Morea itself as the taking the fortresses, which excites this feeling in the Divan. . . . Nevertheless, the latter will be wise enough not to quarrel abruptly with the two Courts. It seems decided on this subject.

While placing these questions in their true light, we cannot conceal from ourselves that there are many other difficulties to hinder the great work of peace.

No warlike enterprise has ever been conducted like that which is to-day costing Russia the most precious of all her blessings, which nothing can either compensate or replace: among these I regard as first that prestige of power, the fruit of a century of efforts and of a finesse and address hitherto possessed by those who guided the political and military affairs of the Empire. The Emperor Nicholas has, most assuredly, spent in one single operation the patrimony of glory and prestige which his predecessors have accumulated since the foundation of the Empire! That blessing is lost, and it is to a certain extent irreparable. Will the Emperor have that force of character, and that calmness of true wisdom, which enables men to say that what is lost exists no longer, and that under given circumstances the risk of attempting to reconquer what exists no longer is much greater than ever the happy result of the enterprise should have been, had it even been crowned with the most marked success? Everything is in this question; for in its solution is found the possibility or the impossibility of preventing, by the conclusion of peace, the opening of a new campaign. The latter once begun, everything will be changed in the position of Russia, as well as in that of Europe. In the event of a second disastrous campaign, the Russian Empire would be in a condition which I do not allow myself to think of; and if it were victorious, the Emperor would no longer be able to make a peace in harmony with the engagements which he contracted with Europe and his allies, at the opening of the campaign of 1828.

The Porte on the other hand seems to have established itself on a basis of purpose and determination unassailable by justice and reason. By declaring itself ready to make peace—real peace—and quite determined not to submit to mere capitulations under the name of peace, it is right before God and man. It is so far in the right that, if the parts could be changed between Russia and Austria, the whole of Europe would be very ready to condemn openly that which on our side would be undoubtedly and universally reprobated.

as an abuse of power. Whence comes the difference which, hitherto at least, has been seen in the judgments of Europe on the proceedings of these two Powers? Evidently from the charm which surrounded the Russian Colossus, before the Emperor dissipated it so imprudently. The charm has disappeared, and it has not only disappeared for the Courts and the people of Europe, but also for the Divan and the Mussulman people. What the Emperor of Russia has lost the Sultan has undoubtedly gained in the eyes of the nation, and to a certain extent in those of the European public. The Porte is ready to make peace; but that peace is not, I am very much afraid, one to which the Emperor of Russia will ever consent.

Your last Reports, as well as those which the same courier brought us from Count Apponyi, were at length of a nature to raise our hopes as to the conduct of the trilateral affair. The decision of the two Courts to put an end as soon as possible to their operations, and to consult the interests of peace, in preference to the natural desire of the third power for the indefinite prolongation of a difference which would continue to weigh down its enemy, seems to us to be the only correct one, and the only one proportioned to the gravity of the circumstances. If I am not much mistaken, the deplorable condition in which the affairs of Russia are at present will tend to rouse a feeling of independence in the French ministry: a feeling which hitherto had scarcely been consulted by the Bourbons since their restoration.

As for ourselves and our political conduct, it cannot afford subject for a doubt in London. We are giving to the world—our friends as well as our rivals—a new proof of the spirit which animates us. Our conscience has not yielded under the weight of a complete isolation; its wishes and its tendency do not change because a catastrophe experienced by a neighboring Empire might seem to be advantageous. What we have wished we wish still; we desire the re-establishment of a state of peace, which our constant efforts have not been able to maintain. The ancient and natural alliance between ourselves and England still exists, it does not need to be strengthened by words; and if such an important condition of the general safety has seemed to be obscured for a time, the fault has not been with us. You must be able to recall the time when I expressed the most lively regret that for us and for the rest of Europe England no longer existed.

We must for the moment content ourselves with the return of our

two Cabinets to looking at things in the same light. To go further seems to me impossible. You have seen us, in times assuredly very difficult, not refuse to take the initiative in many general measures; and even if we could reproach ourselves with having been too ready, we have never yielded to any sentiment but that of strict necessity, or what we considered utility. Now, we can only wait for what will come to us from Powers which, finding themselves in the same difficulties, must feel an equal need of extricating themselves. To go beyond that would be not only to compromise ourselves, but to forget the common interests of Europe.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 2, 1828.

906. All the news which arrive daily from the Principalities and our frontiers but confirm the deplorable state to which the Russian army is reduced. These news being, however, fragmentary, and there being no authority to collect and put them together, a number of essential particulars are wanting, and can only be understood by induction.

We cannot, therefore, yet decide if the raising of the siege of Silistria was caused by the inclemency of the weather, or if an offensive operation of the Turks rendered necessary such a desperate step. It seems, however, probable from the scattered data that both causes combined. . . .

In the present position of things, it would be impossible for Varna to resist a serious attack, or even a blockade. The feeble remnant of the army charged to defend the approaches must succumb to privations, and Varna itself could not be defended in its present state of dismantlement.

Such are the results of a campaign which reason condemned beforehand, and which no wise or vigorous arrangement has assisted in its execution. . . .

If the campaign of 1812 in Russia showed an error of calculation which in a man of Napoleon's understanding was inconceivable, at any rate no material means for the success of his enterprise was neglected by him. In 1828, Russia has made a war which, in proportion, will have cost her as much in men and materials of war, for, indeed, one cannot lose more than he has. But in this campaign the army has never been more than thirty or forty leagues from her frontiers, and it required a special effort to create, by the voluntary and deliberate choice of such a line of action, so many causes of ruin and death.

A new and great difficulty awaits the Russians in 1829—the exhaustion and total ruin of the two Danubian Principalities. An administration without example has there destroyed the greater part of its resources both present and future. The fields lie uncultivated, and beasts of burden and those for food are alike ruined and worn out. It remains to be seen if the winter will pass without the Ottoman armies invading them, were it only to evacuate them at the opening of the campaign, giving them up again to the enemy in a state of still more hopeless devastation.

According to the most moderate calculations, the Turkish army engaged before Constantinople, comprising the garrisons of the forts, must be upwards of a hundred and fifty thousand fighting men. Asiatic troops cross the Bosphorus daily, and their appearance is said to be very satisfactory.

The present epoch is most grave. An immense reputation is compromised, and must try to reinstate itself. On the other hand, an Empire which we regarded as extinct has retrieved itself. The Powers are obliged to look on at the struggle; we have done what we could to prevent the conflict breaking out; we can now only wait the solution of the deliberations which have been opened between the Cabinets engaged in one act of the drama.

The last post from Constantinople has brought many reports of the situation of affairs in Greece. They bear the impress of the soil from which they spring. Disorder reigns in vacuity—many phantasies and no reality. In the midst of it all the Government has least vitality, and the person the most completely ruined is M. Capo d'Istria.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE ALLIED COURTS TO
THE PORTE WITH REGARD TO GREECE.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 12, 1828.

907. In the declaration which the three Courts propose to address to the Divan, the word *provisional* is in truth connected with that of *guarantee*, and in this acceptance it does not present itself to our minds as an insurmountable obstacle; but if the Divan believes that it can be applied to *delimitation*, it will undoubtedly be an *impedimentum in re*. We have already, and too often, dealt with this question of delimitation for me to be able to avoid returning to it once more. If I touch upon it, it is only to mention the extreme difficulty which I foresee in obtaining from the Porte its consent to a proposal which appears to me incompatible with its well-known principles. The Sultan may confine his action to the Morea and the Cyclades; he may even renounce their possession; I will go further: he may, in the event of a disastrous war, be compelled to renounce the possession of countries at a far greater distance, but he will never, now or at any other time, agree to admit in principle a provisional delimitation. . . .

The step now about to be taken by the Ambassador of the Low Countries promises three results—namely:

1. That the Porte will not reply in a satisfactory manner to the triple declaration;
2. That the course arranged in the Conference at London will produce irritation at St. Petersburg, were it only that irritation which, in Russia more than anywhere else, arises from the feeling of the impossibility of preventing what is unpalatable;
3. That the medium through which the step will be taken at Constantinople adds to the difficulty which may, in the eyes of the Porte, be found at the root of the matter.

These considerations must necessarily influence us in the part we have to take. But there are others as well, and which, together

with the preceding, have made us decide to adopt the course sketched out in my directions to the Internuncio.

These considerations arise from our perfect knowledge of men and things.

Should the Internuncio be invited by M. de Zuylen to join with him in any form whatever in the step he is about to take, he would, by responding to that invitation, cause our Court to depart from the position which, up to this hour, it has maintained in the Eastern Question: a position to which we especially owe the confidence which our counsels still inspire at the Divan.

If the Prussian Ambassador should feel some hesitation, which I admit is very probable, in advancing in the same line as our representative, the Court of Austria would certainly lose its position of benevolent neutrality in the eyes of the Porte.

In short, it must be one of two things: M. de Zuylen will succeed in his step, or he will fail.

In the first case, the Court of Russia will not cease to reproach us with not being able to use our influence with the Divan, except on an occasion when the success of the allies would have the appearance of a Russian defeat; in the second case, M. de Zuylen will not fail to throw upon our representative a share of the failure.

My ostensible despatch to the Internuncio will show you that the course which we recommend is perfectly in harmony with the system of reserve enforced by the above considerations. But at the same time you will find in the secret instruction * sent to him the

* In these secret instructions of December 10 Metternich writes to the Internuncio at Constantinople: "The two Courts (England and France) have decided to send agents to Constantinople on the very first opportunity. They have announced this decision at the Russian Court. To soften the effect, and with a diplomacy which we are far from disapproving, they propose to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to leave the representatives of the three united Powers in some port of the Mediterranean, and to send two private agents to treat of the triple affair at Constantinople itself.

"The delimitation of Greece is provisional, but this word has no value in the eyes of the British Cabinet. . . . The idea of the total emancipation of Greece is definitely abandoned by the two Courts. There will thus be no question of those municipal forms which no Government can tolerate less easily than the Porte, and which certainly no people less than those of the Morea know how to enjoy.

"May the Divan rightly estimate the immense advantage of seeing the Triple Alliance broken wherever it is unfavorable to the Porte, and the only clause maintained which is favorable to it—that in which the Emperor of Russia renounces every kind of conquest. . . . The Porte, if it is wise, will

plainest proofs of the support which in other ways we can give to the real object of the measures about to be taken. These instructions should satisfy the English Cabinet, to whom alone we entrust the secret.

I beg you, Prince, to make known this despatch and its enclosures to Lord Aberdeen.

make every possible sacrifice of *amour propre* to facilitate the arrival of the English and French agents at Constantinople, and at the same time desire nothing better than to see the two Courts still keep up their apparent state of alliance with Russia." We know that this step, too, had no success, and the distrust of the Porte in the Cabinets was not less than its confidence in the strength of its own resources.—ED.

PRUSSIA'S POLICY IN THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 12, 1828.

908. . . . I mean now to speak of the present political attitude of the Court of Prussia.

I have once already approached this question, and I cannot conscientiously change anything in the opinion I then formed.

The moral situation of the Court of Prussia has not changed. But the position of the Emperor of Russia has undergone a complete revolution, and this will always exercise, no doubt, a more or less decisive influence on the Berlin Cabinet.

This fact being beyond dispute, it only remains to examine the following questions:

What does Prussia really desire ?

What can she do and what will she do ?

As long as there is no open division between the Courts of Europe, Prussia, I have no doubt, will not remove from the line on which she is placed; but whenever a different order of things is established—a prospect very much opposed to the wishes of his Prussian Majesty and the head of his Cabinet—we shall see Prussia ally herself with Russia.

In naming the King and Count Bernstorff, the wishes of those who at present regulate the politics of the kingdom must not be confounded with those of the great mass of the army and the Prussian *employés* in the different branches of the civil administration. The number of men in the kingdom who think and feel with as much moderation as the Cabinet is restricted. It happily counts among its ranks the successor to the throne, and if there are any political differences they are between the King and the Prince Royal, owing to a leaning (which, however, is only personal affection) that his Majesty has towards the imperial family of Russia. The natural affection which the King feels for his august relative and the imperial family of Russia does not, however, go so far as to make him infatuated with the political system of that Power, of the

nature and value of which he is fully aware, and which is directly contrary to the principles of sound policy to which his Majesty is devoted.

It is, in short, to this monarch, and the force—negative certainly, but not less real—which forms the basis of his character, that Europe owes the attitude adopted by Prussia in a most difficult situation. The amount of confidence and true friendship, I might even say of gratitude, which the King bears to the Emperor our august master, for the multiplied proofs of interest and the material help which our Court furnished to Prussia at the time of her frightful disasters, has had its effect. Mr. Canning, whose conduct on all occasions appeared to us to show the reverse of good sense, has, on his side, contributed to decide the attitude of Prussia in the triple affairs. He managed to embroil himself personally with Count Bernstorff at the very moment when a less domineering spirit than that of Mr. Canning would have considered it more suitable to his views to have conciliated the friendship of Prussia.

Never accustomed to live merely for the passing hour, never satisfied to walk in darkness, but anxious to do everything possible to enlighten the road along which we have to travel, we have never, in the most difficult times, lost any opportunity for making ourselves acquainted with the thoughts of the Prussian Cabinet. To this end we have had recourse to our usual means; we have established and maintained frank explanations between the two Courts. To furnish a clear demonstration of our manner of proceeding, it will be sufficient to make you acquainted with the last explanations between Vienna and Berlin.

There is no need for me to tell your Highness of the system of calumny indulged in by all parties with respect to Austria. In this the parties are right—they know who troubles them. We present a strong front, compact and difficult to overthrow or even to shake—this fact alone is irritating. From the first day of the French Revolution until now, Austria has always been able to thwart the plans of subversion. In twenty campaigns our Power has been found fighting the Revolution on the very field of battle, and, in the midst of political peace, it was always on our frontiers that the incendiary torches came to be extinguished, unless they were extinguished by the weight of our military forces thrown upon the foreign incendiary. Nothing is more natural than that political factions should be unable to console themselves for our action, so contrary is it to their designs. The conduct of the Russian Cabinet with re-

gard to us might appear less so; but when the Liberal policy becomes that of the most despotic Power there must necessarily arise a number of contradictions in the conduct of a Power so singularly placed. The effect has not been slow to follow the cause, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, with the immense crowd of flatterers of its real or imaginary power, has taken its position among Liberal politicians. From that time Austria has been exposed to Russian animadversion and to the extravagances of an irritation which is all the more violent because it can never find anything to justify it.

Prussia—that is to say, the Cabinet—remains faithful to us. The latter has neither succumbed to Liberal seductions nor to Russian policy; the storm has passed by it; it has raged in the kingdom, but neither the King nor his minister has been led away by the more or less general error. I believe that this fact alone is no despicable evidence of the moral strength of the Cabinet of Berlin. For some time this Cabinet has warned us of the intrigues I have just mentioned. Frankness provokes frankness; therefore, on our side, we have felt it our duty not to conceal our impressions concerning the solidity of Prussia's political course. You will find enclosed the copy of a recent despatch which Count Bernstorff has addressed on this subject to the Prussian Minister at the Imperial Court.* You will see in it the most positive assurances of the non-existence of secret engagements with Russia, and I perfectly believe in their sincerity.

I have already told you our opinion of M. de Bulow. That agent belongs to the faction, and is held there by a strong tie—his wife. But his own mind inclines to a restless and ambitious policy. It is annoying that he has been chosen to be the representative of his Court at London; for I am convinced that his Cabinet does not always know how to estimate the impressions which M. de Bulow gives of the conduct of the British Cabinet. We find daily proofs of this in the Reports from Count Trauttmansdorff.

The present moment is rich in errors of every kind. All the ele-

* The extract from this despatch is as follows: "As for the rumors of a double alliance which would be formed on one side between Austria and Sweden, and on the other between Prussia and Russia, we learnt them first in your despatch. The part concerning ourselves gives us no uneasiness. When one has nothing to conceal, one dreads little these false accusations, and I think our movements are too well known for us to be long suspected of being bound by secret engagements. We have not the ambition they ascribe to us, but we have that of maintaining a frank, independent, and open position."—ED.

ments are in motion; things have lost their equilibrium, and are trying to recover themselves. Systems are tottering, and truth is showing itself without disguise.

At such times men's minds cannot easily compose themselves; that takes time, which is precisely what is lacking at a period when everything is done in haste. If anywhere one has the power of employing oneself usefully, it is certainly with us; our country is quiet, and the public feeling is entirely with the Government. In this the difference between our position and that of the Court of Prussia is very great. In that kingdom also public feeling is favorable to the Government; but it follows to a certain extent a different direction from that of the Cabinet. The Russian defeats have materially calmed the exalted hopes of the ultra-Prussian faction; but *per contra* these defeats place the King in a position personally painful. While I acknowledge, moreover, that this is the state of things in Prussia, I must add that the embarrassment is not yet more than embarrassment. The Cabinet is full of uneasiness about the future, and a state of things which may lead to extremes is what it most dreads.

In short, it is afraid of complications increasing to such an extent that it will be forced to choose which side to take; hitherto it has held aloof.

This is our firm conviction, and I have no hesitation in laying it before the Cabinet of his Britannic Majesty.

RUSSIA'S RELATION TO ENGLAND.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 18, 1828.

909. I have received by way of Berlin the Reports from our Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg. It is clear to me that it was in consequence of a concert with the Prince of Hesse that M. de Kaisersfeld has drawn up these Reports.

I authorize you to lay them before Lord Aberdeen.

The description sketched in the despatch of November 16 describes I think exactly the position of things and persons at St. Petersburg.

What M. de Kaisersfeld says of the irritation which exists against Austria must be true, for the causes which he mentions are true.

The contents of this same despatch concerning England is what I think most important.

I desire very much—for I think the good of the cause greatly depends on it—that every opportunity should be seized for making it understood at London that, of all the Powers, it is Great Britain which has most influence with Russia. The cause of this influence is so connected with the nature of things that it must be seen at a glance.

Russia is a Power always coveting, and consequently always uneasy. Its nature being diametrically opposed to our own, the relations between the two neighboring Empires must be affected thereby. On our side there is no irritation, for we are not in the wrong; it is otherwise at St. Petersburg, where they are rarely exactly in the right. Our strong and ponderous mass hinders by its gravitation the approaching march of the Colossus of the North. For want of a better it has lately fallen upon another neighbor, who was regarded at St. Petersburg as weaker than experience has happily proved him to be. Russia does not love us, for no one loves what is a hindrance; but it dares not make war upon us openly—the enterprise appears too serious.

Prussia it does not think of.

As for France, it does not trust her, and, in spite of a great many points of contact and affinity between the two Cabinets, there will never be a real alliance between them, unless it is based on a system of conquest and the destruction of intermediary States.

Then there is England; without contact on *terra firma* that Power alone can influence Russia, for she is in a position to do Russia as much harm as Russia can possibly do to her.

It is sufficient to consider for a moment the conduct of affairs in the course of the last six or seven years to be convinced that it was England alone which could have facilitated, or even rendered it possible for Russia to undertake, an enterprise which, but for the interference of Providence, might have been an immense triumph for Russia. Indeed, during the first and longest period of the Eastern Question, the Court of Russia never dared to take a part. As long as England stood aloof, Russia was contented simply to give an opinion without the concurrence of the English Power. Russia would not have dared to undertake anything serious. When in 1825 the first proceedings of the British Ministry of that period took place, affairs took another direction. Later on Russia did no more than make use of the latitude which from that time was recognized, and which she regarded as sufficiently secured to her by the other Powers singly or together.

What was true three years ago is not less true to-day, and will not be contradicted to-morrow. What England does not wish Russia will not do. It is, therefore, at London and not at St. Petersburg that we must seek for information concerning the future.

Everything inclines me to think that the British Cabinet will not contradict the opinion we have formed of it, and I will go further and say that it cannot but give its assent to that which contains our full and entire conviction.

SUSPENSION OF WARLIKE OPERATIONS.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, December 18, 1828.

910. . . . The operations of war seem to be suspended for the present. The peculiarly rigorous season renders it doubtful whether active operations can be resumed at all. You may be sure that military intelligence from Constantinople is singularly meagre; except two serious affairs, one before Schumla and the other near Bazartschick, in which the Russians sustained great loss, nothing seems to have taken place during the month of November. The Turks, however, continue to speak of a winter campaign.

A new and painful complication has just presented itself to the commercial Powers in consequence of the armed vessels cruising on the part of the Greeks. Several merchant vessels, among which are four Austrians, have already been taken to Egina, and are awaiting judgment. It appears, according to the most recent information, that they will not escape condemnation.

There is in this act an abuse of authority to which we object to submit. But it is more than that. According to the last triple declaration, the Morea and the Islands are under the provisional protection of the Powers. We are not at war with them; by what right can letters of marque be conceded by a country which itself has no real political existence? and what validity is there in the judgments and declarations of brigands? Among the ships captured under our flag and as Austrian property, there is one whose cargo is French property. We hope the Courts of London and Paris will put some restraint on this revival of brigandage and plunder. You are, then, specially desired to claim the support of the British Government in this matter, and we feel sure it will not be refused.

THE YEAR 1829.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, January 1, 1829.

911. I take this opportunity, my dear Victor, to repeat to you what you know already, that if any one has ardent wishes for your welfare it is certainly your father.

I received your last letter two days ago; it shows me that you are rather disappointed with Rome. Léontine, who received the same impression from the letter you wrote to her, says it always takes you some time to feel at home in new places.

I am far from sharing your impressions, for our starting points differ. Rome is the city of recollections, and it offers to the observer a view of three distinct epochs. Full of monuments of ancient times, it retraces the image of what is no more, and yet lives eternally in the records of history. Not less rich in monuments of the middle ages, it again recalls what exists no longer. Lastly, the present has its place there. The present is neither the first nor the second of these epochs—it is now reality, to-morrow it also will be lost in the shades of time.

The two epochs must not be confounded, physically or morally.

Ancient Rome is not Modern Rome—that could not be; nothing in the material world lasts. A little more or a little less stripped of their moss, the monuments remain the same; restored, they are lost. The late Pope always intended to clean the Forum and drive out the cows and other cattle. That is all that should be done, and it certainly will be done some day. Does this suggest moral reflections? There is only one reflection to make, and that is peremptory—the ancient Romans live no more; the inhabitants of modern Rome are not Romans, and never can be. All the visionaries in the world cannot alter this. Besides, one does not go to Rome for its inhabitants, but to see what those who no longer exist have bequeathed for the meditation of those who think themselves so great and wise because they live in this age of mere words.

In short, it is necessary to know what to look for, and not to seek everything, for nowhere is that to be found. Is it a question of seeing the world of 1829? One must go to Paris, Philadelphia, or Bogota. Is it an object to see industrial life? London, the avenues of the Opera, the boulevards of Paris, Birmingham, or Lyons must be visited. Is it snow that is wanted? This must be sought at the sixty-second degree.

I see you have not yet visited the Museum of the Vatican, and I am glad of it, for, all said and done, it is very disagreeable in the month of January. I am surprised that I had not warned you of the temperature of St. Peter's, and you were quite right to find it out. I am of your opinion about this edifice. The interior of it is much more remarkable than the exterior, and the interior is, I think, much more like a secular building than a church. I do not think that this church inspires devotion. It is a real misfortune for the visitors to Rome that they know everything from copies bad or good. Except to find the way about the streets, I think one hardly requires a guide in Rome.

912. *January 8.*—I take the opportunity of letting you know by this day's post that you have a brother. Antoinette was confined yesterday at four o'clock in the afternoon with a fine healthy boy. He was baptized to-day, and named Richard Clement Joseph Lothaire. My brother was god-father, as he has been for you all. . . . Mother and child are perfectly well.

I wished to be the first to announce this event to you, my dear Victor.

I have just heard from Paris that M. de la Ferronnays has had a stroke of apoplexy, on New Year's Day, when in the King's room; he seems to be paralyzed on one side—this is equivalent to his loss. He had some premonitory symptoms a few days previously; the doctor wished to bleed him, but he refused. See what is the consequence of resistance in certain cases of which the faculty can judge better than the patient. I consider this event as a great misfortune.

913. *January 16.*—Your letter of January 3 arrived by the last courier, and gave me pleasure, because it showed that your health is improved by the influence of the Roman climate.

I am delighted at the respect shown to the ambassador. Count de Lützow is an excellent man; his heart is as good as his head and his temper. I was certain that he would succeed at Rome, and that is why he is there. The more you know him, the more good qualities you will find in him. Big and awkward as he may be, he is

one of the best men I know. In 1808, 1809, 1810, and 1811 he was a thorough Spanish Royalist; the services he rendered are innumerable, and they border on the miraculous, if in the doings of good people there were any miracle.

I am delighted that you have so wisely gone into society. The *salons* of Rome are better than the streets; at any rate, you do not meet wild oxen in them. I recommend you to the studios, which are very different from the *salons*. Is it in the new *Maison Torlonia* that the most unhappy of all the Dukes has given you a dinner? What a grand house that is! If it were mine it would console me for many things, except being Torlonia himself. You know that he never sleeps in that house, for fear of dying. A fortune-teller has told him something of this kind. You will only have a real idea of the treasures of Rome when you have seen the Vatican.

Antoinette ought now to be recovering, for this is the tenth day since her confinement, but this is not the case; she has taken cold, God knows how, and consequently is feverish, but I hope it will soon pass off.

914. *January 17.*—The most terrible catastrophe has fallen upon me. Antoinette died this morning at eight o'clock, the tenth day after her confinement. What the Lord gave the Lord can take away, and man must bow the head without question. My confidence is in Him, and I bow to His immutable decrees. My life is over, and nothing remains to me but my children. This idea sustains me and gives me courage to live.

I know you will wish to come to me. I absolutely forbid you to do so. The season is unpropitious, and I shall be much more easy if I know that you are living under the influence of a milder climate than ours; so do not attempt to come on any account.

The cause of my poor Antoinette's death was a fever—probably suppressed—an inexorable malady. I trembled for her since the fifth day, when this fever showed itself. She has not wanted either for care from others or strength in herself, but nothing could conquer the malady. She died as all should die who believe and hope in God.

I have made the greatest possible effort to write these lines. I cannot go on. Good-by; I wish you all the happiness that is denied to me.

915. *January 21.*—To-day, my dear Victor, I can enter more into details than I could when I sent the last courier. The blow which has desolated my life was then too recent; I was quite stunned; but

now my mind, shattered as it is, has regained the necessary strength to tell what has happened.

The poor deceased was safely confined on January 7. Her calculation was wrong; the child was fully developed, so that she had made the mistake of a month. She decided to nurse the child herself if nature permitted, and all seemed to promise well in that respect; but the third day a slight milk-fever appeared. The fourth day passed over, but about ten o'clock at night of that day I found the pulse very much quickened again. In the morning slight traces of miliary fever were visible. After this discovery I knew that danger was imminent. This terrible malady of women in their confinements, of the origin of which I am ignorant, and against which the course of ages has discovered no real remedy, was unhappily too well known to me, and you know that I do not deceive myself readily. But no alarming symptom showed itself after this eruption. Everything went on normally. The ninth day all anxiety seemed to be removed, mother and child seemed doing well, and the eleventh day was talked of for the mother to leave her bed. At ten o'clock in the evening I left Antoinette, who was sleepy. She slept till two o'clock without interruption, when they brought the child to her. She was then quite well, and went to sleep again. At four she awoke suddenly with a shivering fit, which was immediately followed by a burning fever. She sent for me, and I had the doctor summoned. In the course of the day the fever, which resembled those slight fevers which attack women so easily in their confinements after some inadvertence, diminished so much that the physicians thought it would probably be over in the course of twenty-four hours. In the evening there was no increase. The physicians returned at midnight; she was perfectly calm. A little while afterwards she had convulsions; at four o'clock her mind wandered; at eight she was dead, without having regained the use of her senses for a moment. Examination showed that the eruption had invaded all the organs. Such is the deplorable end of a being whom I had thought destined to be, long after I am no more, the friend and mother of my children. No one better than you knows the feeling which led me to contract a second marriage. The necessity not to be alone acted most powerfully upon me. God has decided otherwise, and I submit to His decrees.

In moments of great calamity public feeling is shown. I do not think that for a long time—to my knowledge not since the Emperor's serious illness—any event has caused such a general sensation as

that of this sad and sudden death. It was known that on the ninth day she was doing well. On the tenth, at eight in the morning, the news of her death spread through the town. My servants were everywhere stopped; the crowd rushed to our house, and a guard had to be fetched to keep people from being crushed. At the burial, the short distance from the Chancellery to the Church of St. Michael was so impeded by the crowd that the funeral train could hardly get to its destination. There were several accidents in the church, the altars of which even were invaded. All the crowd wept. This expression of feeling does not console my grief, which will last while I last.

The Emperor, who is certainly my best friend, wishes me to go and stay at the palace. I have refused, however, for the day will come when I must re-enter the house of mourning; therefore it is better not to leave it.

Your sisters have been and are like good angels. At one time I was very anxious about Léontine. She is well now, for grief does not kill. But there have been other catastrophes.

Adam Müller heard of this death from Klinkowström, who only wished to prepare him for the news. He looked up to heaven, and said solemnly, "Now for the first time I know man's fate," and fell, struck with an attack of apoplexy.

The good and beautiful Countess Taaffe, when she heard the news concerning a friend for whom she had so great a regard, fell into convulsions, after which she was confined five weeks before her time. She is very dangerously ill. May God preserve her! One victim is enough!

After this tale of death and mourning, what more can I say! You are my nearest friend, and you must share my too natural sorrow! May God preserve you and my other children, and thus aid me to drag on my miserable existence so long as He sees fit.

Metternich to Countess Molly Zichy, Vienna, January 23.

916. If I have not written to you before since the frightful misfortune which has thrown me back into dreary solitude, it is because I have not had the strength to do so. What can I say to you which the simple fact has not already told you? I know too well how sincerely you and yours share my feelings to feel obliged to repeat them to you.

It has been the same for you, dear Molly, as for the general pub-

lie; you heard of the death before you heard anything of the danger. The terrible fever began on the fifth day. From that day, although there was not one alarming symptom, a deadly fear possessed me. I knew the danger of a malady which is never more destructive than when its aspect is harmless. This disease, this scourge of the human race, which no one yet knows how to treat, and consequently cannot cure, makes, in proportion to the number attacked, more victims than the plague! The physicians and I were alone in the secret of the uncertainty so soon resolved into a terrible reality.

What the Lord gave the Lord can take away; man must not resist His immutable decrees; therefore I submit, and kiss the hand which has dealt me so heavy a blow.

But I feel my misfortune most deeply. There are few individuals who more feel the need of a peaceful home life, free from agitation and from all cares but those which here below always interpose between life and perfect happiness. Nothing was wanting to me; now I have lost everything for the remainder of my days.

If anything consoles me, it is the active part that the public really takes in my sorrow. There is not one class which does not give proof of this. I do not think of myself in this, I feel it a homage rendered to the departed. The other world is daily more and more peopled with beings to whom I am united by the closest ties of affection. I, too, shall take my place there, and I shall disengage myself from this life with all the less regret.

You wrote yesterday to Mercy. He spoke to me of your letter; he did not wish to show it to me; it is, I am sure, worthy of you.

Metternich to his son Victor, Vienna, January 30.

917. It is a fortnight to-day since the blow fell. From my feelings I do not know whether this space of time is fourteen minutes or fourteen years. Heaven has given me a strength of resistance to the things of this world that certainly is all I have to enable me to withstand my grief. You know, too, that the double nature which in me moves side by side—the public man and the private individual—never interfere with each other; misfortune acts only on one or on the other side of my existence. I work in order to occupy myself, and I work day and night. Thus I save myself from myself, and it is the only thing I can do.

If I had not before appreciated Léontine, I should have learned to know her during this terrible occurrence. She poured balm into my heart by her whole manner, and by a refinement of attention beyond her years, of which not a shade escaped my attention. God will reward her!

Little Richard is very well; he is strong, robust, and very ugly, which gives me hope that he will not be so when he grows up; he is like no one but himself. The only striking resemblance that he has with his poor mother is in his hands.

I told you above that I take refuge from myself as much as possible in the troubles of Europe. These are great, for the faults which have led to them are immense. God knows what France will come to, and what will become of France! As to the East, I have good hope that it will be pacified. I shall yet have been right for once.

Here there is nothing new, and if there were I should not know it probably. Not that I do not see plenty of people; I even seek to see them, and I have not to take much trouble about it. I cannot be too grateful for the spirit which society shows towards me. My days pass as they always have done. It is not the days that have changed. What has changed is the inward feeling of peace and happiness. I am now once more alone in the world!

918. *February 4.*—Your good letter, my dear Victor, arrived to-day; it is worthy of you, and speaks from your heart to mine.

I should understand your feeling, even if you were not my son, for the case is too striking not to excite a universal feeling of pity. But you, who are the closest friend of my life, and who know its needs—you know better than any one that I speak truly when I assure you that I have lost half my life. What remains to me is so encumbered with difficulties, troubles, and privations of every kind, that it has little value for me. What value it has still for me arises from my love for my children; the feeling of the great importance of my life for their dear sakes—the feeling, in fact, that I am not a useless piece of furniture in the world!

But it was God's will—therefore complaints must cease and even feeling should keep silence. I have the consciousness of having made happy, so far as it was possible, a being worthy of happiness. Our union, founded on thorough confidence and affection, has never been disturbed for an hour. You have all suffered a serious loss. Antoinette would have continued to be the happiness of my life till my last breath; after I was gone she would have remained

the unchangeable friend of my children. Occupied with them like a real mother, she only thought of their welfare. In her the most upright spirit was joined to the tenderest heart. Calm like myself, reflective, and of tried excellence, I found united in her all that could delight my life. All is over!

To-day I give myself up to a kind of indefinable feeling which always succeeds to great shocks. My health, thanks to my *régime*, has not given way, but I feel physically shattered. My moral powers have always survived the evils of life, and it seems as if my mind would remain firm and uninfluenced by material things till it has the happiness of escaping from their fetters.

I think I have already told you of the many marks of sincere and kind interest which I receive from all sides. You, who know me, will know which among all these have the power of touching me, and which will remain without influence on either mind or heart. To the object of so much attention, of so many cares, trouble of a peculiar kind must ensue. I receive a heap of letters to which I must reply. I receive them from persons who cannot know either me or my misfortunes; they must be replied to with all the more zeal. In fact, my position is dreadful. I have not yet been able to make up my mind to visit the left wing of the house. I remain in the rooms which are not intended for living in. Sooner or later I shall have again to enter the rooms where I have suffered so much.

Little Richard is very well. He grows and gets fat; he was a month old yesterday. For the rest, I regret to find that he is no consolation to me. The poor child little knows his loss; happy age, which does not allow of even a memory!

919. *February 6.*—Our winter continues very severe, and the quantity of snow that covers Austria is remarkable. It is not uncommon for the post to be interrupted for thirty hours and more. I dislike this weather, for it prevents me from taking the air, of which I have great need. I await the spring with impatience. When the winters are severe on this side the Alps, they are generally mild on the other. If it will but be fine at Rome, I will put up willingly with a certain quantity more of snow.

My day is spent in work. I am at my desk by nine o'clock in the morning; I leave it at five, and return at half-past six. Some friends come to see me from ten till midnight. I began by making a list; one visitor has brought another, so that some days I have asked myself whether my library—for it is there we live now—

would hold all these people. After to-morrow I have announced that the door will be closed. My list includes some ladies and a certain number of men. The Ambassadors are among them, of course, and I cannot sufficiently praise their kind attention. For instance, they have all countermanded their balls during the first week; an attention which I was certainly far from claiming, but with which I am no less gratified.

I hope that we shall come to an end in the East, but what shall we see in the West? Poor France is in a very, very bad way!

Good-by, my dear Victor; take care of your health, and keep your mind easy. God bless you!

920. *February 10.*—I quite understand, my dear Victor, your wish that I could be released for a time from the weight of public affairs—a wish in which no one joins more heartily than myself. But how can it be possible? I may die any day, and business will go on all the same. Another man will succeed me, and that other I can without difficulty point out. I have even mentioned him in my political testament, just as one appoints an heir in an ordinary will. But this successor, who will be able to replace me without difficulty, could not supply my place for a time, and, above all, not at the moment of a great crisis. This crisis itself might change its character all at once, so that no one can calculate on it; and the most frightful confusion might be added to a disorder already extraordinary. Therefore, I have only to submit to the heaviest yoke a man can have to bear. My nature, however tenacious it may be, can be shattered—I say more, it must be shattered—but my conscience at least will be easy; I shall have done my duty, as the general dies on the battle-field. This battle is important; it is one of those that decide the future, not of one empire alone, but of the whole social order. When armies are called out and the troops engaged at all points, it is not for me to think of yielding my place for a single instant to any one whatever. The stronger the man who could fill my place, the less he would be able to do my business; for no one can know my arrangements. It is a case when a man must know how to die at the breach, or not present himself there. This is all I can tell you of public affairs. Your wishes are none the less those of a good son and warm friend; I accept them as a good father.

921. *February 13.*—What you say of the detractors of the dear departed one is very true, and is already more than realized. There are none, and I grieve that it is so; for had she lived it would have

been otherwise. As to the past, it is for me as if it had never been. There was something in the poor child's fate so unusual, so striking, both in her elevation and in her loss, that feeling must be excited about her in various ways. Antoinette was not called to her destiny without attracting much attention and disturbing many ideas. Now that all has disappeared, now that there is no present but only the past to study and observe, now history begins, and every one is agreed. They ask what malice itself could find to say against her? The result is that those who were spiteful yesterday are kindly to-day. Every one claims to have been one of her friends. The fact is that Antoinette's character prevented her from being any one's enemy. She was my friend and my children's. Beyond that circle she never sought friends, and her whole life would have been passed in this way. My tears, and those of your sisters—especially those of Léontine, who has lost in her almost as much as I have—are the best eulogy she can have. The woman of whom no one talks is the model of her sex. Napoleon often praised your mother in the same terms, and he was right.

I see that you begin to enjoy Rome as I hoped. There is nothing comparable to that classic soil and the pleasures it provides. They are all of the highest standard and elevate the mind, and that is what many other pleasures cannot do.

922. *February 16.*—The present year is rich in victims. Now it is the unexpected loss of a Pope that comes to disturb my leisure and embarrass me in various ways. The two ideas—death and the Pope—are, however, so much alike, that one's feeling is hardly disturbed. As to the successor, I know many personages who will not be it; but who will be is what I should like to know.

I send you, enclosed, a very curious document for your collection of autographs. It is a letter entirely in the handwriting of Louis XVI. to the late Prince de Lambese, granting him and his brother, Prince de Vaudémont, permission to enter the service of Austria. I found it among my mother's papers—no doubt it had been given to her by the Prince de Lorraine. It is a singular present, for this letter would always have been of great value to the family of him to whom it is addressed. The contents increase the value of the autograph, and the gift is quite historical.

923. *February 21.*—I have finished my despatches for the Conclave, and the courier is setting off.

I received your letter of the 12th inst. by the Florence courier. I am sorry to see that Rome does not escape this terrible winter,

which here seems as if it would never be got rid of. No one remembers such a quantity of snow as we have this year. The cold is equally severe; but for some days the sun has been bright, and there are some fine hours for walking. I take as much advantage of them as I can, for I have very great need of them. My machine is much out of order, and it is especially the nerves that are in so bad a state. In reflecting on my life, it seems that so many blows have fallen upon me that many in my place would have succumbed altogether.

I only see, too, around me those who are sad and suffering. Poor Pilat lost his wife this very day. The unhappy husband is left with seven children. Write to him as soon as you can; he will be gratified.

. . . . I send you another autograph. It is a letter of the Archduchess Beatrix; you will see how pleased she was with a portrait of your grandmother I had given her. This Princess is in every way worthy of a place in a collection of autographs, for, beside her personal qualities, she is the last of the house of D'Este, the oldest family in Europe. You know that the house of D'Este Ascania is divided into those of Brunswick and Anhalt. Estes are found as far back as the eighth century.

I shall certainly not tell you who will be Pope; there is little enough to choose between the names; any Pontiff provided with reason will suit me, and there are often cardinals wanting in that rare and useful ingredient to be found under the tiara. I know much more about those who will not be elected. Indeed, this is always the way. I am very glad you are at Rome at the present moment. It is a piece of good fortune.

924. *February 27.*— . . . Here we are still in snow. The sun, however, begins to have some power; it thaws in the day, but freezes again at night. I have to-day been for the first time for three months in the garden. One cannot walk a single step except along a little path cut through the snow, which is three feet deep. I went through the hothouses, which are in very good order. The little gardener is really an admirable man. If I could transport this establishment to Mont Palatin, I should ask no more.

925. *March 5.*— . . . I see by the last accounts from Count de Lützow that Carbonarism does not disdain to meddle in events. All that will come to an end—so says the “*Courier*”—if Cardinal Fesch is elected Pope, in consequence of the protection granted to him by Prince Metternich and the Jesuits! It seems that the “*Courier*”

has plenty of leisure time to waste for it to occupy itself with such stuff as this; but still there are plenty of idlers in Paris who will believe that Cardinal Fesch is the candidate of our Court!

I see that you are inclined to go to Naples. You will do well if it is a forward spring; if it is not, do not hurry too much, for Naples, like all fine countries, requires verdure. I warn you, also, that Naples will seem to you quite ugly after Rome. I think even it is hideously ugly, and it is made worse by its horrible filth. Of course there is the site, which is admirable. In your drives about Rome do not forget to see the stairs at the Palais Braschi. Very likely you have seen them already, for I think the Cardinal de Milan must live in that palace if he does not live at the Quirinal.

The last days of the Carnival have given place to two *fêtes*, one given by the English Ambassador, the other by the young people. Lord Cowley's fancy ball was, they say, a great success.

I only know these things by hearsay, and am not much interested in them. Neither does Lent add or alter anything in my life. I am not yet able to make any plan for the summer. I think the probabilities that I shall not be able to move are, unhappily, greater than the chances that I may do so.

926. *March 12.*—I write to you at Naples, my dear Victor, and I send this letter by a special courier. I suppose you are enchanted with the work of the Creator under that beautiful sky. Everything there is lovely—the sky, the earth, the sea. If men had but seconded the intentions of the Creator, Naples would be a true paradise, but it is not so. What struck me especially was the extraordinary want of architectural monuments in places so near to ancient and modern Rome. I hope you found a good cicerone. A fortnight is quite sufficient to exhaust Naples and its environs. You will have seen the towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum, as well as Baïæ and Sorrente. If you can get as far as Pæstum, do; in that case you must sleep at Salerno, and see the Abbaye de la Cava in passing; the next morning go to Pæstum, returning to the same town to sleep, for it is not good to travel by night in the neighborhood of Naples. You could even see Amalfi the same day.

Do not attempt to climb Vesuvius; at any rate go no further than the Hermitage; you can get so far quite well *à ciuccio*.^{*} To ascend to the summit is extremely fatiguing, and the cold affects one very quickly on the mountain itself.

^{*} Neapolitan for *ciuco*, donkey.—Ed.

You will see most admirable things in the studios. Then you must go to see the Catacombs. They are, in my opinion, more curious than those at Rome. One sees there wonderfully well the places of refuge of the first Christians. I hope you have been able to reside in the Chiaja. You must be presented at Court. If you see the King, mention me in the most respectful manner, and also to the Queen.

Ender is now finishing Antoinette's portrait. I called my heart's memory to counsel, and the likeness is perfect. A portrait is a small thing when one has lost all that made the happiness of life; but still it is something.

I send you the programme of the quadrilles at the Duchesse de Berry's. You who know the performers will have more interest in it than I have. You will see that Lady Aldborough figures in them. I am surprised that the Duchesse de Berry takes the character of Marie Stuart. It is rather too near the catastrophe of 1793 and 1794.

927. *March 26.*—I see that Naples pleases you, and I am delighted. The site is perfect, but in my opinion that is all. The country will look still better, for verdure is always necessary to a landscape, and and that we shall soon have. I was surprised at what you told me of the backwardness of vegetation in Italy; but I have come to the conclusion that the northern plants remain backward in southern countries, while southern plants follow other laws. The trees and shrubs of temperate climates are not more than a fortnight or three weeks in advance of the countries where they are indigenous; so that the oaks, lime trees, and other trees are still budding at Naples when many southern shrubs have already done flowering.

Madame Pasta has just left us; she takes with her the money and the regrets of the Viennese. She has taken, in four weeks and by means of the most wretched representations, forty thousand francs. The Emperor made her *première cantatrice de la chambre*, so that all prospered—her travels, her purse, and her vanity. I still continue to live like a *cénobite*, and I shall make no change till after Easter. The change will not amount to much, for life is nothing but empty forms. Mine is spoiled for ever, and I devote it to God and to my duties as a father and a citizen.

If I could but have an idea what would become of me next summer! There are many probabilities that I shall not be able to stay long away from Vienna, so that I may count the year lost for my tastes and interests. In any case I shall make a tour in Bohemia,

for I want to see what is being done at Königswart and at Plass. They are stopped by a number of arrangements which can only be decided on the spot. The manufactories recommence work in July. We shall see whether M. Rippel's prophecies will be realized, and I greatly hope they will.

928. *April 16.*—I send this letter to Rome by courier who takes letters to the new Pope. M. de Lützow will send it on to you.

We have jumped all at once into summer; a fortnight ago every thing was covered with snow, and to-day it is so warm that it was almost impossible to walk out in the middle of the day. Vegetation does not know how to keep pace with the temperature, and the year seems to participate in the folly of the age!

I am sorry you did not stay for Holy Week at Rome, and that you were not present at the enthronement of the new Pope. Your loss would have been less if the weather had been fine at Naples; but I see from a letter to Léontine that you have a good deal to complain of in that way. However, by this time you have got over that difficulty.

Here we have nothing new. I work fifteen hours out of the twenty-four, and that is nothing extraordinary. The campaign is about to begin, and if there is not a negotiation, which I think probable, perhaps I may get a few weeks' holiday, after which I sigh from the bottom of my heart. I feel a necessity for getting out of my prison which I cannot describe. To-morrow it will be three months since the happiness of my home was destroyed, and I was again left alone with myself and my responsibilities. During this time I have only seen those I was obliged to see; after Easter I shall reopen my *salon*; but it has not much to offer me. For three months I have not entered the rooms on the other side of the house, and certainly to return to them will be no consolation to me.

Imagine my surprise a few days ago at seeing M. Simon * arrive bag and baggage. He declares that only at Vienna can his dictionary be appreciated. He wants me to have it printed, or, what comes to the same thing, he wants me to provide for its author. I have sent them all to Pilat—father, mother, and daughters.

I envy you the happiness of breathing under a southern sky and close to the sea. You will soon have Mr. Robert Gordon at Naples; he is going to replace Mr. Stratford Canning at Constantinople.

929. *April 24.*—Next Sunday I shall re-open my house. My first

* M. Simon had been Metternich's steward.—Ed.

return to the world was marked by two great political dinners—one at the Nuncio's, to celebrate the accession of Pius VIII., the other was given by the English Ambassador. I have long promised Dietrichstein that his son should have a holiday. He would have taken it now, if Felix Schwarzenberg had not been called here, to be ready in case the Emperor Nicholas goes to the army and has to be followed by the foreign generals.

930. *May 8.*—I have seen with sorrow, my dear Victor, that you are not satisfied about your health. I attribute this to the bad season, and this is always felt more at Naples than in other parts of Italy—at Rome for example. The Italian physicians are, in general, ignorant, and only understand their countrymen, who rarely suffer from the maladies which lead travellers from the North to Italy. . . . I hate to know that you are uncomfortable, and Providence has little compassion for me, to judge from the torments it inflicts upon me. I cannot prescribe for you from this distance: your physician at Rome, whom you liked before, will know how to advise you.

. . . The season begins to improve, though it is still very capricious. At the end of two or three fine days we always go back to the horrors of bad weather. This year is most miserable; nothing is talked of but catastrophes. I do not know which carry off the palm—the earthquakes or the inundations in Prussia. It is not yet known how many millions have been lost by these last.

The backward season has also hindered military operations. The army is still struggling in the mud and water in the two Principalities near the lower Danube. This commencement of the new campaign added to the plague which is spreading in Wallachia, and the disease which has carried off nearly all the cattle, must have an effect on the war. This same disease makes great ravages, too, in our country. With great care, we had managed to preserve Kojetein; but the disease came at last, and in less than a fortnight has carried off fifty-four cows from the farm of Kojetein alone. The malady is now stayed, and the remainder of the cattle seem to be saved.

931. *May 11.*—I hope, my dear, that by this time you are quite well again. Jaeger agrees with me as to the cause of your illness: it is the coming on of spring after a very bad winter, which pursued you even into Italy, where it is much more trying than beyond the Alps. You would prefer the sirocco to fresh breezes, and that is because your constitution requires a soft air. Naples is hard and

dry, and not suitable to irritable nerves. You will always feel best where the vegetation is rich and succulent, the plants living on air and water; a volcanic, dry soil will never suit you.

I write only these few lines, for every other subject is without interest to me.

932. *May 29.*—From what you say, I see that you have been seriously ill. I was not deceived, for I at once felt all a father's anxiety at the first hint you gave me of your indisposition. My uneasiness was increased from the situation in which you had fallen ill. . . . To-day I had a consultation with Staudenheim and Jaeger about your letter of May 19. They both praised the clearness with which you described your symptoms, and they both think that your malady is the same as that which has already twice attacked you.

As to your journey, they advise that you should stay at least a fortnight at Pisa or Lucca; and that you should wait for the end of June or beginning of July to pass the Alps. I think they are right on these points. Lead an idle life, and you will soon be restored.

If you want something to read, both interesting and amusing, get the *Mémoires de Bourrienne*. These are the only authentic memoirs of Napoleon which have yet appeared. The style is not brilliant, but that only makes them all the more trustworthy.

933. *June 5.*—I am very glad to see from your last letters that your health has improved. In spite of the horrible weather, Vienna begins to be empty. The younger ladies have this year had a rage for excursions to the country. Whatever the weather may be, they take to the fields, and *fêtes* of this kind, if *fêtes* they are, succeed each other madly. Only a few days ago, in shocking weather, a large party was dragged to Marchegg, to the Prince de Palffy's; they got into an omnibus at seven in the morning, and returned half-an-hour after midnight. In the morning a third of the party had to keep their beds; another third had lost their voices, and the last third sung the praises of the delightful party. You will understand that Léontine does not enter into extravagances of this kind, therefore she is wonderfully well. The Princess de Ligne is at all these parties; some say it is she who arranges them, others say that they are made in her honor.

I think your second visit to Rome will bring you to my opinion on this city, as compared with Naples. It is with Rome as with all really fine things: they gain by being seen and seen again. God has done all that was possible for Naples, men have spoiled it; and

for it to become what it might have been, the Neapolitans must be sent off to Barbary, and the kingdom be repopled afresh.

In regard to the people, Tuscany has quite another appearance. The people are a fine race and clean. Nothing is so charming as the drive from Florence to Livourne; the villages are numerous, and industry is everywhere highly developed.

Good bye! I hope you will bring your travels to a good termination, and have a pleasant journey over the Alps. It will make me very happy to see you again.

PRINCE VICTOR'S ILLNESS AND DEATH.

Extracts from Metternich's private Letters from July 3 to December 1, 1829.

Metternich to Countess Molly Zichy, Vienna, July 3, 1829.

934. I have been for some days with my son, who is undergoing very severe treatment: but, happily, is doing well. His health is feeble and his chest delicate. The Italian doctors have treated him for a fever; he is now in good hands, and his condition is improved. Instead of giving him quinine, they have bled him; he was weak and he begins to be strong; he coughed a great deal, now he coughs no more. My life, dear Molly, is a very sad life; every calamity falls upon me. Thus I have become a coward with regard to the health of others, while I have plenty of confidence in my own. You ask about my *soirées*; I can describe them in a word—there are no *soirées*, either with me or anywhere else. Here and there a masculine individual or two comes to me between ten and eleven in the evening; as for ladies, there are none, and I might say, like Stackelberg of the Neapolitan ministers—ladies, we are without. You were present at the sentimental scene Gentz got up for me; well, he has not come one single time to keep me company. Léontine goes to bed at ten, so as to be able to get up early; I work till one, and then go to bed. See my *soirées* and their charms.

935. *July 9.*—I have only good news to tell you of Victor. He is as well as he can be after three or four months of illness. He has neither cough nor fever nor irritation. Since he was under the rod of my little tyrant he has not taken a grain of medicine; his *régime* is more severe than that of the homœopaths, for it is of water; in three bleedings they have drawn thirteen or fourteen ounces of blood, and each time he has felt eased from a burden. One may now hope that he will recover from what might have been most serious. Next week I shall settle him at Erlaa, a place unanimously recommended by the eight physicians I consulted, as being the mildest and most tiresome. I shall not stay there myself, but have

a temporary lodging there; at the end of the month I hope to be able to take my tour in Bohemia. I shall leave Herminie with her brother, and take Léontine with me. This is my plan, and you will easily believe that I have much need of getting away from a place of such sad memories—a place that I leave with pleasure, as a prisoner leaves his dungeon. Each day, dear Molly, shows me more plainly that my life is ended, and that if I am not physically numbered with the dead, I morally belong to them. Do not believe in the effect of solitude on me, for my feeling about realities is never influenced by the *salons*. The *salons*, little or big, do not change what seems to me to be the truth.

936. *July 24.*—Gentz brings you “Marino Faliero.” It is all I can send you, for I have not the “Moïse.” I send you the history of Philippe Auguste; it is charming reading, but to be presentable in the *salon* needs some excisions. Among others there are some details about King Philippe’s divorce from Ingelburga of Denmark, which are not made for the ears of those who have nothing to do with matrimonial cases of conscience. Certainly Pope Innocent III. was of all men the least worthy to bear that fine name. One has only to read his letter to the King, to be convinced of that.

I am making preparations for my tour in Bohemia. I hope to start on the first of August, or a day or two later. Victor undergoes a terrible sort of treatment; but it suits him. In really serious cases it does not do to trifle, and the contrary defect is neither to my taste nor the doctor’s. Happily, Victor is the most patient of patients and the most tractable of invalids. If I did not know him so well, I should certainly not stir from his side.

937. *Plass, August 26.*—I wished to write to you before I left Vienna, but my departures do not resemble those of other human beings. I have not found a moment to perform the only task which would have been pleasant to me. I remained a fortnight at Königs-wart. This place is on the way to become beautiful and agreeable. The change made in the last two years is extraordinary, and I see that those who did not know it in its old state can hardly believe it. The country all round, far beyond anything that could be called a garden, is being entirely formed anew. The park will be more than two leagues round, and within that space there is not a point where art is not brought to the assistance of a nature which is here extremely wild. Masses of rock, abundance of water, turf like that in England, and vegetation which I can only compare to that of the Alpine valleys, are, under the hands of M. Riedl and of an excellent gar-

dener, brought to absolute perfection in its way. I think, too, that my own skill does the undertaking no harm; and thus all goes well at a spot which is nowadays one of the most frequented in the civilized world. By means of the creation of Marienbad, and the new roads making communication easy and short between Carlsbad, Franzenbad, and Marienbad, I have only too many people coming to see my works. Every fine afternoon thirty or forty carriages are collected round the little inn (which will next year be metamorphosed into a fine *café*), and the visitors to the baths from all parts of the world visit those parts of the park that are finished or nearly so. Among the visitors of 1829 were the Queen of Hayti and the Princesses Améthyste and Athénaïs, her august and very black daughters. The book in which strangers who visit the Museum write their names (once stolen, but now recovered) already contains more than a thousand names, black and white. I have long seen that there is no such a thing as distance in this sublunary world!

The remains of those to whom I owe my being, and of those who have adorned my life, and whom I have had the misfortune to survive, are deposited at Plass, in the chapel which I have consecrated to our future re-union, and to embellish this locality and make it worthy of my respect for those who are no more is one of my chief cares. The chapel is finished, and the arrangement of the grounds which surround it is now all that I have to do. This new chapel is frequented by all the neighborhood. Three days of plenary indulgence, and the magnificent remains of a Saint Valentine—a martyr of the end of the second century, sent to me by Pope Leo for it—have attracted five-and-twenty to thirty thousand pious pilgrims. The place where stones rise heavenwards in memory of those who are no more, is not an agreeable residence for those who remain behind. The mask of the body of Saint Valentine was made in wax in Canova's studio; it is most beautiful, and by a singular chance it is like Antoinette!

We will dismiss these mournful subjects, and, indeed, I ask your pardon for having touched on them in my letter; but I am too much surrounded by them, and too full of them, not to speak of them. I find that the only letters which have any value to friends are those which depict the moral situation of the writer. It is only thus that they form part of the history of life, and this, and not romance, should count in friendship. Gentz is more innocent in the country than in the town, with an innocence which in a young person would be ingenuousness. He hates Plass, not for

what makes it so gloomy to me, but because of the large rooms, the distances of everything, the want of a flower-garden, and the number of dirty sheep, which he would like to see white. Two things console him: one is that he has not to stay there long, and the other that he can see the casting of iron. My new ironworks are in full work, and though he detests black iron, he likes red iron. The only fault he finds with the works is the noise of the hammers, which he would like to have wrapped in cotton-wool, and the howling of the wind through the bellows. He would like a forge without either the one or the other.

I believe that Gentz, the romantic soul, will be with you immediately. He wants to see Henrietta* again, to whom, however, he has not been altogether faithful during the separation. He has increased his list of fifteen by two new beauties, and he looks for more; in fact, the whole feminine sex will be placed there! Happy Gentz, and poor sex! If he comes to you do not forget to get him on the subject of Plass; he will give you a good description. What vexed him most was that during the long space of eight days he did not see one person worthy of his attention, "not one woman kind, not one cheerful hour; nothing but horrible iron, big rooms, white walls, provincial officials, and miners." He will never go back there!

I am sorry that Henrietta cannot see the work of a Venetian who is here now, and who makes copies of famous pictures very cleverly. She has invented a quite new manner, which is that of a miniature on wood and varnished. It is like oil-painting, but has all the delicacy of a miniature. The pictures are tolerably large. I have at this moment a copy of the fine "Virgin," by Jean Bellin, and the copy is really a *chef-d'œuvre*.

938. Vienna, Sept. 11.—Here I am, my dear Molly, back again in my poor prison. It is only pleasant to me from rejoining my children, and I do not complain. I am quite at peace. I find Victor greatly better than when I left. All the symptoms of his malady are much lessened; we must see if this improvement can be maintained. We have nothing, therefore, to build upon, but still there is positive improvement.

Vienna is as empty as a beggar's pocket, so that I see no one except those who have business with me, and there are some among

* Afterwards Princess Odescalchi, the daughter of Countess Molly Zichy.
—ED.

these with whom I should much prefer not to have any business. I shall soon be rid of one of these persons. The Duc de Laval* leaves us almost immediately for the banks of the Thâmes. I do not know who is to replace him; they talk of M. de la Ferronays, which would delight me. But as your friend Chateaubriand has just resigned his place at Rome, I am rather afraid that M. de la Ferronays, on account of his health, may prefer Rome to Vienna. This will be decided very soon, and, whoever it may be, any ambassador who replaces Laval will be a comfort. Since the last ministerial revolution in his country, the good man has lost the very little head he had on his shoulders. His absence of mind works so with his anxieties that they become real crises. A few days ago M. de Laval went to one of his colleagues. On going into his room he said to him, "Well, well, its all very fine; but why did you not tell me?" The colleague of course replied by the question, "What is it that I have not told you? What do you want to know? Whom do you complain of?" M. de Laval, continuing his complaints, his "Ah well!" and his lamentations, obliged the interpolator to repeat twenty times the same series of questions, when at last M. de Laval, rubbing his forehead, said, "Ah well! really, I don't know myself what I was going to tell you!"—and then to have to do business with a diplomatist of this stamp!

I know that if Chateaubriand is sent to us you will be delighted; but you must remain disconsolate, for we shall not have him!

939. *Dec. 1.*—I am so convinced of the feeling of you and yours, that I do not even thank you. This feeling is natural; it is that of sincere benevolence and friendship, and certainly, if any one has need of friends, it is I.

The loss I have just suffered is irreparable, for it concerns one who united in himself the rarest qualities. His long illness and his death are to him the martyr's palm. I have seen many men die in various ways; I have never seen one depart as my poor son has departed! Ask all those who were about him during the last period of his life; they will all tell you the same thing. I do not know what was most conspicuous, the strength of his faith in God, his thorough detachment from everything but high feeling or duty, his perfect calm, or his filial and fraternal affection!

* French ambassador.—*Ed.*

The actual death was for him and for us all a deliverance. He hardly allowed me at last to leave him, and one of the last words he said to me was: "You, too, will now soon be relieved!" Léontine and her little sister have behaved like angels; they have been always with him, too; they were more courageous than I was, or than his attendants, but certainly not more than he was himself.

MISSION EXTRAORDINARY OF COUNT FICQUELMONT TO ST. PETERSBURG.

Metternich to Ficquelmont (Instruction), Vienna, January 17, 1829.

940. The interest of the service requiring that the diplomatic relations between our Court and that of Russia should not be suspended in consequence of the long absence of Count Zichy from his post; and the Emperor's choice having fallen on you, his Majesty desires that you will immediately repair to St. Petersburg.

You will be the bearer of an autograph letter to this effect to the Emperor of Russia, by which our august master accredits you with that monarch as being charged with a mission extraordinary.

In order to enable you to follow the line of our thoughts after we are separated, it seems to me necessary to inform you of our opinion on the three following questions, namely:

1. The general tendency of the policy of the Emperor Nicholas.
2. The attitude of the Court of Russia in the Triple Alliance.
3. Lastly, the relations of the moment between that Court and ours.

I. General Tendency of the Policy of the Emperor of Russia.

The Emperor, having ascended the throne in the midst of rebellion, seemed conscious of the necessity of devoting his first care to the internal administration of his Empire. The first declarations of his Imperial Majesty showed this feeling, and it was shared by the great majority of the nation and by numerous foreign diplomatists. But some persons, closely acquainted with the mind and temper of the Emperor, were of opinion that he would rather recur to the political errors of the Russian sovereigns of the eighteenth century. To judge by what has happened, these persons are not entirely mistaken. Indeed, how is it possible not to perceive that the events which led affairs to that frightful crisis could have had no other

point of departure but a system thought out by the Emperor Nicholas? What had up to this time lent a certain color of moderation to the proceedings of this Prince may be explained by his efforts to turn the advantages his relative moderation had given him in favor of the real end of his policy. Of two things, one; either the Emperor Nicholas followed the course we attribute to him, or that monarch was a proof of such a facility for being drawn out of the path of sound policy, that an absolute want of calculation and reflection could hardly suffice to explain this phenomenon. But nothing authorizes us to make this admission.

II. The Attitude of the Court of Russia in the Triple Alliance.

Nothing, doubtless, is more difficult than to comprehend the singular course of the Triple Alliance. It is clearly shown that none of the contracting Courts now know (if, indeed, they ever have known) which way they are going, or at what end they may arrive. The approaches between Russia and England, coming after a very decided estrangement on both sides, were the work of Mr. Canning. This move was sketched out in the last months of the life of the Emperor Alexander; it was completed under the reign of his successor. The appearance of the Duke of Wellington at the head of the British Cabinet, and the Russo-Turkish War, should have given a deadly blow to a work which had no other foundation than views of personal interest and the development of an unhappy policy.

The course which France has followed in the whole affair agrees with the extreme frivolity and the weakness of the administrations which have succeeded each other in that kingdom. To make great efforts to discover what lies plainly on the surface, is labor thrown away; we shall therefore not attempt to explain the political course of France.

The only one of the three Cabinets which has not varied in conduct since the origin of the Triple Alliance is that of St. Petersburg. The Emperor of Russia—always gentle and smooth in his way of acting, suave and kindly in his relations towards his allies, but vigorous in the pursuit of his own views and interests—knew how to take advantage to the utmost of the protocol of April and the treaty of July 6. He was able to make use of his allies for his own interests, and to give an extension to those interests which they would never have gained with so little difficulty.

if the policy of England and France had not been chained to the car of the third allied Court.

To analyze the Triple Treaty would be impossible, for it is at once everything and nothing. To define its object and fix its limits is equally impossible; it exists, and it is all that the Russian policy needs from which to take the flight which we have seen. In the interest of the enterprise, said to be a common undertaking, events such as the disaster of Navarino and the expedition to the Morea may have been superfluous; but they have none the less contributed to the advantage of the active party of the alliance; and it was necessarily in this alliance so, for Russia alone knew what she required and what part she could take. Not to have had to fight the Ottoman naval forces, and to have seen, at the critical period of the first campaign, a French army disembark in the Morea, is, on Russia's part, not only to have been fortunate, but to have known how to improve upon fortune.

III. Present Relations between Russia and Austria.

It would be impossible to clear up this question without separating what, in the relations between the two Courts, forms the antecedents of the present crisis, and what proceeds from the crisis itself.

In taking into consideration the first of these, I shall not extend my examination to the causes of the constraint which naturally must exist between two neighboring empires. This constraint is of the very nature of things, and it is inevitable when one great political body, whose well-being rests on the basis of preservation, finds itself in the way of another State which aims only at progressive encroachments. If sometimes we have seen the two empires unite, it has only been with one common aim of aggrandizement, as in the partition of Poland and the war against the Turks; or when a common danger has called them to a common defence—as in the wars of the Revolution and the French Empire. At the close of the last war, provoked by the perpetual invasions of Napoleon, there certainly was established between the two Courts a union resting on different bases; but this union derived its source from the personal character of the Emperor Alexander, and the tension at present existing between the two Courts was, doubtless, produced in great measure by a state of things too little in conformity with the Russian nature not to bring about a thorough reaction.

Your Excellency knows the antecedents of the présent crisis so well that I have no need to describe the different phases through which our relations with St. Petersburg have passed since the accession of the Emperor Nicholas. You therefore know that at the beginning of his reign, that Prince undertook to assure us that there would be no change in the intimate relations between the two Empires; but his practice has in no way corresponded with his protestations. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to mention the single fact of the transactions which immediately afterwards took place between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, the substance of which was so opposed to the immutable principles of our august master that it would have been impossible for us ever to have taken any active part in them.

Any such deviation soon leads those who are guilty of it to recriminations and calumny. They began by reproaching us at St. Petersburg for not having entered on the trilateral affair; later on they accused us of preventing the pacification. The reproach was unjust; the accusation is more than that—it is absurd. Any formal denial, however, would be useless and humiliating; the conduct attributed to us is contradicted as much by the evidence of facts as by that of our political interests.

With reference to the position of affairs at the present moment, a new difficulty between the two Courts has presented itself.

The Triple Alliance has had the fate we invariably predicted; the Russian war, on its side, has not answered the expectations of its authors. Both of these facts show that we were in the right—an unpardonable wrong in the eyes of those whose *amour-propre* we have wounded by not wishing to follow in their footsteps.

Three principal causes may thus be assigned to the state of tension existing between Russia and ourselves:

The permanent constraint which our Power imposes on our neighbor;

The reaction of the present reign against the personal system of the late Emperor;

The check to the triple plans and the Russian arms.

To these causes must be joined one more, which cannot be regarded as secondary.

During the glorious years of the reign of the Emperor Alexander, Count Nesselrode was not only the confidant of the intimate relations between the two Courts, but in many respects he contributed to strengthen them. Wanting in energy, and finding his position

insecure, this minister began to yield when he saw the party opposed to the political system of the late Emperor daily increasing, and preparing for an open attack upon that same system, and consequently upon those who had used it. When his own weakness made him renounce his former principles, he became of necessity the detractor of the antecedents of his own political career. From a zealous friend he then became an adversary, all the more active, since to support his new part, and save himself from the reproach of manifest contradiction, he had to use every effort to make people believe that it was our arrangements, and not those of his Court, which had undergone a total change. This task must have appeared to him very easy of fulfilment as long as such brilliant hopes were attached to the new moral and political direction taken by the Russian Cabinet; it cannot appear so now when facilities are changed into difficulties, and definite successes—even supposing them still possible—can only be obtained at the price of efforts and sacrifices of every kind, which are no more popular in Russia than they would be in any other country. The seeming advantages of a bad policy generally disappear with fortune, and fortune so far has not crowned with success an enterprise with which we did not care to associate ourselves.

Having sketched the moral situation as between our Court and that of Russia, it remains for me to pass to the second part of the present instruction. This will include the practical questions most worthy of the active solicitude of the principal Courts, and more particularly of our own.

An enterprise long prepared, and announced to the world with very uncommon emphasis, has failed. This fact alone is important, for, whatever may be the future contingencies in the war which Russia is now making upon the Porte, the stain of the first campaign is ineffaceable. As a great State it may repair losses, however grave; but it has lost that reputation for invulnerability which the Russian monarchs have been able to maintain since the origin of Empire.

In the present despatch I will content myself with speaking generally; the chances more or less in favor of rehabilitation, or the risk of new losses, can change nothing of the past, and the future is in the hands of Providence. It is the present moment—that of your Excellency's *début* at St. Petersburg—which alone need occupy my thoughts.

Your attention must be fixed upon two objects—namely:

I. To define accurately the position of your Court in the great conflict of the day;

II. To ascertain as far as possible the basis on which the ideas of the Emperor Nicholas rest, the direction of his mind, the extent of his projects, and the means which he can or will employ to carry them out.

Ad I. Of the wishes of the Emperor our august master you are well aware. The Emperor will never give up his principles. It was weakness of that kind which, in the transactions of the last three years, was yielded to by the Courts, and obliged us to separate ourselves from their political course. At the time of the rupture of the *pourparlers* at St. Petersburg we were accused more than once of being too firm in the matter of principles.

The experience of those Courts which were not so particular would certainly not induce us to change our ground, if we needed to take lessons anywhere except from our own convictions.

We have always ardently desired that the general peace of Europe should not be disturbed; though at all times the essence of our policy is pacific, we attach a special value to the preservation of political repose in a combination of circumstances where the consequences of a war cannot possibly be estimated.

What our constant care could not prevent, we fervently hope to see replaced by a state of things more in harmony with the general and common interests of the Powers.

This truth, although verified by the evidence of facts, will not secure you altogether from recrimination on the part of the Russian Cabinet. The position of this same Cabinet is too full of difficulty for it easily to reconcile itself to a Court which, while participating in more than one common danger, is not exposed to any peculiar difficulty.

I do not imagine that either the Emperor or his Vice-Chancellor will dream of reopening the discussion on the subject of the negotiations which preceded the rupture of the Conferences at St. Petersburg, in the course of the summer of the year 1825.

In any case it would be a very easy ground for you to defend; it lends itself to the defence of opinions which we have always held, for events have justified our predictions.

It is more probable that there will be an attempt at recrimination on our decision not to connect ourselves with the Triple Treaty of the year 1827. But here also the event has spoken in favor of the part we took. The consequences of their rash agreement are cer-

tainly not calculated to console those who joined in that treaty for the evil which has resulted for the general cause, and the innumerable difficulties which have arisen for each one of them taken singly.

They will recur, no doubt, to our political conduct at Constantinople. Facts will again reply for us, and these facts are such that no malignant and gratuitous accusations, nor attempts of intriguers, can ever invalidate them.

As often as the Powers aim at open accommodation with the Porte the influence of Austria will be there to support their salutary enterprise, while attempts of a different kind will always be repugnant to the political conscience of the Emperor.

Your Excellency is perfectly informed of our correspondence with the Internuncio. You will, therefore, be able to reply by positive citations to every one of the imputations which may be laid to our charge, or to that of the representative of the Emperor at the Porte.

They will speak to you at St. Petersburg of what they are pleased to call our armaments. No person being better informed than your Excellency is as to our military affairs, I have nothing to tell you on that subject.

Thirteen years of uninterrupted political peace have enabled the Emperor to use for the internal administration of his monarchy a considerable portion of the resources which, according to our former organization, would have been reserved for military use. During that time candid and well-meant exhortations have been many times made to his Imperial Majesty by the monarchs his allies, and especially by the late Emperor Alexander, on what they did not hesitate to qualify as a dangerous neglect of the principal support of the State.

The epochs of Troppau and Laybach were particularly remarkable in this respect.

During that long pacific era, Russia, of all the empires the least exposed to attacks from without, never ceased to maintain her armies on a footing approaching that of war. Well-organized *corps d'armées* are found echeloned in her western provinces; a new army has been created in Poland. We have remained in a state of perfect tranquillity. The war of 1828 approached, it broke out, and our military attitude underwent no change. But the French Government addressed itself to the Chambers, requiring an addition to the army and numerous subsidies, explaining its demands by the con-

tingencies it declared probable; from that time the Emperor our august master ordered that the reduction which had been made in the military administration should be restored.

This is the history of what they are pleased to call the armaments of Austria. In removing the army from its normal peace-footing the Emperor felt he was but fulfilling a duty towards his own empire and the whole of Europe.

If ever you are attacked on this question, reply and explain yourself as to our proceedings on this point as on all others. Nothing in our conduct requires to be covered with a veil. If ever we have any cause of regret, it is when our usual habit must give way to the respect for some considerations, political or administrative, which deprive us of the power of giving entire publicity to all the acts and measures of the Government.

Ad II. To give you, in the present despatch, a sketch sufficient to guide you to the second object mentioned above, seems to us impossible. We are the more willing to admit our powerlessness, inasmuch as we have every confidence in your powers of observation, and have many reasons for thinking that the ideas of the Emperor of Russia, as to the means by which he would prefer to disengage himself from the grave difficulties in which he is entangled, are not yet arranged. But whatever difficulty he may have in making a choice, he must in the end yield to the hard necessity of making some choice.

I do not think it necessary to explain to you how much our views concerning the needs and resources of the Russian monarch differ from those on which many of the Courts are accustomed to found their calculations. We know what an Emperor of Russia can do, and what he cannot do; we have never written any romance on that empire, and while we have always estimated its resources at their just value, we have never concealed the difficulties which they might find in employing them, on account of many local circumstances and defects in the internal administration. When the public opinion of Europe was led away by more than one deceitful appearance, our judgment continued on that same line of severe equity on which it now stands, when so many blind advisers are ready to change their former part for that of detractors no less blind. The question, too, whether the Emperor of Russia will be able, with chances of assured success, to reopen and carry on the campaign of 1829, is not among those which we consider worthy of examination. The only one that must necessarily occupy us is, to find out

the direction which that monarch will give to his policy, for on the solution of that the future will depend.

It is certain that the ground on which Russia finds herself to-day is entirely different from that from which she started in the present war. The Russian and Ottoman armies will no longer be the same at the opening of the next campaign. The Triple Alliance will enter into fresh combinations, which will be the fruit of the present winter. The campaign of 1828 had been calculated at St. Petersburg on the chance of a *coup-de-main*, the success of which had not been regarded as doubtful. An undertaking reputed transient and easy has turned out to be a most serious enterprise. If the hope of being able to bring the war to an end in one single campaign still exists at St. Petersburg, common prudence should nevertheless make the Emperor provide means of war for two campaigns.

In this situation what does that Prince desire? It appears to me that this might easily be found out in a short time.

The rumors which have reached us from different quarters induce us to believe that the Emperor Nicholas is tired of the war, and that his ideas of pacification are limited to the maintenance of the *status quo ante bellum*, or something very like it.

It is said that he has abandoned all pretensions to pecuniary indemnities, and that he will be ready to take as their equivalent the preservation of the fortresses of Anapa, Poti, &c.

It is also said that his pretensions to what in the Russian Manifesto were described as guarantees for the liberty of commerce, are confined to the stipulations already existing between the Porte, Russia, and the other Powers.

Lastly, it is said that the general wishes of the Emperor are restricted to the accomplishment of the stipulations of Ackerman.

According to our view, many difficulties would be removed by arrangements like these. Many, however, would still remain, and those of so grave a nature as to render a peaceful conclusion hard of attainment.

These difficulties are both material and moral.

The Treaty of Ackerman* was the latest result of that preponderance which Russia for so many years maintained at Constantinople.

* By the Treaty of Ackerman, concluded between Russia and Turkey October 7, 1826, the Porte was bound to carry out the Peace of Bucharest (1812), gave up the mouths of the Danube to Russia, and guaranteed to the Russians free trade with Turkey and protection from the pirate ships of the insurgent States.—ED.

It is easy to see, in the present state of things, that the Sultan will endeavor to prove that the Treaty of Ackerman shall be the last act of that character. In stating this theory I have no doubt that thousands of voices will be ready to reply with the simple exclamation, that it is necessary to force the Sultan to renounce a pretension which these same voices do not hesitate to qualify as ridiculous. But this is no reply at all. The question is whether the Emperor of Russia intends to force the Porte to a peace which would be of a nature to satisfy his Imperial Majesty in every respect, and in case of the affirmative there would no longer be any question of peace, but only that of the continuation of the war.

The Treaty of Ackerman contains more than one clause to which, we are certain, the Sultan will never again subscribe.

The wish expressed by the Divan in favor of a peace under guarantees cannot reasonably signify anything else than a desire for a clear and precise treaty, in which certain articles—which were simply a blind to mask new encroachments—should find no place.

Moreover, the real question—the only one which in my eyes has any practical value—is whether the Emperor of Russia intends to make peace with the Porte, or if he aims at the renewal of stipulations which, in reality, have never been anything but capitulations.

In case the intentions of the monarch (for those of his statesmen will never have that tendency) aim at the establishment of a state of real peace, we thankfully admit that the difficulties, even those which at first sight seem the most grave, can be overcome, were it only that the Porte itself is enlightened enough to prefer a state of real peace to the continuation of a war so fertile in disastrous chances for itself.

If, on the contrary, the intentions of the Emperor should agree with those which we regard as likely to influence his councils, the struggle between these two States will only be terminated at the point of the sword.

I believe I have now reduced the real questions to their most simple form.

The work of conciliation would doubtless be greatly served if the same opinion were everywhere pronounced on the nature and value of the different aspects which the great affair of the moment presents. I dare not hope that such will be the case.

The Court of Russia seems to be applying itself at present to give its political conduct a tone of moderation. Of two things, one—either the Emperor is in reality as moderate in his views as he says

he is, or the care which he takes to appear so is a pretence. We cannot form an opinion on what must require so many proofs; we wish we could induce other Cabinets to have the same reserve, and particularly that of France, which espouses with an unhappy facility the one side or the other in questions which at least require a calm examination! You know our opinion of the situation in that kingdom, as far as an opinion can be formed from the most recent data. The situation of France, however, must be grave indeed to be able to distract our attention from the affairs of the East.

For a long time unhappy relations have subsisted between France and Russia. I call these relations unhappy, because they have always depended on fallacious principles, or enterprises menacing the repose of Europe.

What augments the present danger are the grave errors into which a great number of the French Royalists have fallen. Dupes of their own false theories of national glory, and of the stratagems of the Revolutionists, these men embrace the wildest projects, and their decided tendency towards Russian preponderance has no other foundation than the hope of also serving by that preponderance the interests of the French Power. For many years the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has had an extraordinary fancy for Liberal opinions, even when the Emperor Alexander had become the determined adversary of the revolutionary spirit. This was especially the case when the influence of General Pozzo was all-powerful in the very Liberal council of Louis XVIII., and when the ministers Decazes and Dessoles applied themselves to the realization of many crude plans, under the feeble administration of the Duke de Richelieu. Thus we have seen M. de Chateaubriand, under the protection of that same ambassador, hoisting Russian and revolutionary colors at the same time. Count de la Ferronnays, who is certainly as much Russian as French, belongs also to one of the most Liberal ministries France has yet had.

Nothing in the connection which since the Restoration has more or less actively existed between the two States has changed. What has experienced a notable change is the political situation of the Court of Russia; and a question the solution of which will be one of the most important in its consequences is, what influence this change of position will exercise on the political connection between the two Powers.

There is sufficient evidence to leave no doubt as to the political and overmastering tendency which the revolutionary faction in

France displays every day more and more. A minister so feeble as he who now governs France cannot in any way be counted as a counterpoise to the balance. His tendency is decidedly less moderate than revolutionary and Russian. With the Emperor Nicholas support a state of things so dangerous for the repose of Europe: and does he believe he will find by so doing means to diminish the difficulties which weigh heavily on his empire, in consequence of the grievous mistakes which signalized the beginning of his reign? The fact of a whole future is contained in this question.

I can do no more than draw your attention to this subject. To go further, and enter into details, appears to me impossible. Your own observations will be your guide and I shall consider it my duty to make you aware of every circumstance likely to be of assistance.

It is important for us to know the real thoughts of the Emperor, at a moment full of difficulties for this Prince and of danger for the world. Everything depends upon the direction which, in these grave circumstances, he may give to his policy, and our duty is to do all we can to enlighten his mind on our own account. If we can succeed in opening his eyes to our political conduct a great advantage will have been gained, were it only that he will then be able to choose between two clearly defined parties, a happiness which up to this hour has not fallen to his lot.

First Supplementary Note to the Instructions to Comte de Flourens.

Among the causes of the tension between our Court and that of Russia I ought to mention that of the correspondence of the Russian agents, who are all more or less inclined to flatter the wounded amour-propre of their Government rather than to inquire into the truth. National vanity does not allow the Russians to confess that they may have made mistakes: and they will end by themselves believing, from mere repetition, that their defeats are attributable to the inclemency of the season, and the manoeuvres of the Austrians. I only mention these difficulties to complete the sketch I have given you, for time alone can bring the remedy, as time alone can make the truth known.

I must, however, touch upon one more probable cause of the species of animosity against the Austrian Cabinet which seems to characterize opinion in Russia, at least that of the *salons* and of the officers who surround the Emperor Nicholas. You must study your ground, and find out how deep this cause has gone: a study

which is, from the gravity of the subject, worthy of your most earnest attention.

For almost two years before the decease of the Emperor Alexander, the conspiracy, which in the end endangered the existence of the throne, as well as of the monarch himself, had made great strides; and, so to speak, tolerated and encouraged by the timidity and passiveness of the Emperor Alexander, it worked openly. This conspiracy, however, dared not attack the monarch in front, surrounded by prestige as he still was, and it therefore applied itself to discrediting him in the eyes of the nation.

To represent the Emperor as the servile instrument of a Cabinet which held him under its tutelage, to represent him as unceasingly sacrificing the interests of Russia to European interests, detrimental to the Empire, was a clever calculation on the part of the conspirators, for it was founded on absurd national pride, always unreflecting, always ready to draw from the most impure sources, a lever which is most powerful in Russia.

These conspirators belonged to the nobility, they filled the *salons*; there they sowed the seeds which the weakness of the Emperor Alexander had allowed to develop, and the minister, accused and often warned by the public voice, but blinded by an inconceivable security, did not tremble for his position till the day when the explosion took place and he had changed masters. This horrible explosion stripped the throne of its immediate perils, since it exposed a great number of his enemies to the new monarch, but the opinions they had propagated remained. The Government did nothing to rectify them, nothing to vindicate the memory of the late Emperor, nothing to dissipate the accusations which weighed on the ministers whom the Emperor Nicholas had kept; far otherwise. Without examining the source of these opinions, and only stopping to observe its effects, the Emperor affected to give to his conduct and his language a tone exclusively Russian, and independent of all general interests, hoping thus to escape the reproaches which had attended and saddened the last days of his brother. Firm and courageous at the beginning, he soon yielded to a chimera: he punished the conspirators severely, yet he allowed their works to remain; he retained the same ministers, but did nothing to re-establish their credit.

I do not think I am mistaken in saying that the conspiracy was not attacked at its roots, and that it still exists; nor do I think I am mistaken in asserting that the present tension against Austria is in

part its work. Circumstances only have modified its language; then the hatred was against Austria because she influenced the Russian Cabinet and somewhat dimmed its glory; to-day the hatred is against Austria because she impedes the glory and the interests of Russia.

If we consider the blind resistance opposed by the Russian Government to the reiterated warnings of the existence of the conspiracy, even when it was at the very gates of the Palace of the Czars, we cannot reject the possibility of the same Government obstinately deceiving itself as to the cause of this groundless exasperation. But the remarkable coincidence between the opinions promulgated at St. Petersburg and those put forth in the French Liberal newspapers ought to attract its attention.

Not till you have been some time resident in that capital will you be able to pronounce an opinion on the existence and intensity of an evil which, while seriously menacing Russia, is not less formidable to the whole of Europe.

Second Supplementary Note to the Instructions to Count de Ficquelmont.

I feel it my duty to point out to you two more difficulties which will prevent an early peace between the belligerent Powers: one belongs to the domain of politics; the other to that of *amours-propres*; the latter have played too important a part in the events of the last few years for us to be able to leave them out of our calculations.

The first difficulty is connected with the claim of the Divan, instructed by the experience of a century, to conclude henceforth no treaty with Russia except under a sort of general guarantee from Europe: that is to say, a treaty in which the arrangements on both sides shall be consolidated; which is not left to be revised by subsequent negotiations in which Turkey has not to fear disputes or fresh encroachments on the part of Russia.

But will the pressure of necessity exercise sufficient power upon the councils of the Cabinet at St. Petersburg to enable it to deviate from its ancient and unchanging system—a system to which it owes innumerable advantages, and the maintenance of which is possibly the only true aim of the war? Will it consent, in short, to conclude a final peace, to associate the European Governments in interests and transactions with which it has hitherto been too jealous even

to make them acquainted? One must know better than we do at present the extent and urgency of these necessities to be able to judge if their voice would predominate over another course—without doubt a vicious and unjust course, but to which the sanction of nearly a century has given, in the eyes of the great majority of Russians, a certain kind of legality, at variance, however, with every feeling of justice.

The second difficulty, which concerns their feeling of self-esteem, would be the initiative which one of the two Powers must take to approach the other. To expect the first advance on the side of the Porte would be a delusion; to hope for it on the part of Russia would be to look for an impossibility, for this would be a blot that national pride could forgive less easily than the loss of a province, and which it would soon seek to efface. And, besides, up to the present time Russia declares that she wishes for no foreign intervention. If, however, she had seriously decided to repel this intervention, would she discuss, as she has done with France, the conditions of a peace. It follows either that she would not refuse an intervention as a fact provided that it did not bear this name, and even that she wishes for it; or else that these pacific demonstrations have no other end but to appease the uneasiness of England and France about a second campaign, till Russia should have gained the six months which she requires to repair her losses, and to maintain at the same time the reputation for generosity which is eminently useful to her in order to conceal her real views.

LATER NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.

Metternich to Ficquelmont, at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Jan. 23, 1829.

941. M. de Tatistscheff received despatches on the 20th of this month.

The next day he came to see me at a very late hour, which he had evidently chosen to prevent any serious conversation taking place between us.

He began by complaining that at St. Petersburg they continued to attach a singular importance to the false rumor of the famous Memoir of our Cabinet. I begged him to say no more about it. He assured me that, quite contrary to his own wishes, he was obliged to do so; that he had received an express order about it, and that to facilitate the painful task he had furnished himself with an abstract from the despatch relative to this subject. . . .*

On reading this, I told the ambassador that to reply to such evidently false assertions would be absurd; that I felt a necessity of a different kind; that, in fact, I should not be satisfied till I had discovered the source which had originated and continued to reproduce such insulting errors.

After this introduction, the Russian Ambassador informed me that he had some other communications to make. Time pressing, he told me that he could give me only a summary of their tenor.

"I have received," continued he, "the reply that my Government has just sent to the Cabinets of London and Paris. It is so extremely moderate that it much surpasses my expectation. You know that these two Courts desire that Russia should give full powers to their representatives at the Porte. The Emperor con-

* This despatch states that in St. Petersburg they had unquestionable evidence that Austria was endeavoring to bring the Courts of Berlin, London, and Paris into coalition against Russia, with the intention of establishing conditions of peace and imposing them upon Russia.—ED.

sents under two conditions. He desires that the limitation of Greece should not be restrained, as the allies appear to expect; he adopts, on the other hand, your proposal of April 5. He wishes that Greece should attain her entire independence; that she should have a monarchical government, with the exclusion of all revolutionary parties. He formally protests also against the elevation of a Russian prince to the Greek throne."

I replied to M. de Tatitscheff that the only immediate answer I could make was, that these two proposals would lead to war and not to peace; that the Courts of London and Paris would never acquiesce in them, and the same might be said of the Porte.

"Do not let us discuss the affair," replied the ambassador; "we will return to it; only remember that the Emperor believes that with an alliance of three nothing is to be done; he would like to get five to join. You can seize the ball at its rebound, and re-establish the old relations of intimacy; the true peace of Europe will thus be found."

"To move with five," I interrupted, "one must in the present affair first get on with three, and the two other Courts will know how to support decisions on which the three Courts shall agree; but, I repeat, if the agreement of the three cannot be established on your premises, that of five would be equally impossible."

"Very well," said M. de Tatitscheff; "that which neither three nor five can do will have to be accomplished by two. Only Austria and Russia are necessary. At St. Petersburg they are tired of the triple affair. It is clear that it will not work!"

At this moment we were interrupted. M. de Tatitscheff came again to see me in the evening; but as we were not alone, and I avoided giving him any opportunity of speaking to me in private, he yesterday morning addressed the following letter to me (No. 942).

From these facts two things appear to me to be clearly shown—a feeling of great uneasiness in Russia, and a very unfortunate facility on the part of the Russian Cabinet for endeavoring to free itself of all moral restraint. That assuredly is neither good nor sound policy.

I must have some more conversation with M. de Tatitscheff, and above all I must see what he is driving at. It seems clear that the story of the Austrian proposal has been put forward with the hope of intimidating us, a hope as vain as that of seeing us make any sacrifice to rectify a fault which is not ours. Our definite replies are neither doubtful nor difficult to guess. We shall be

always ready to help forward the return of peace by the paths of honor and sound policy; but we shall never be found disposed to serve the contrary cause. The different Russian proposals show plainly the desire to drag out the Eastern affair as much as possible. Those which are addressed to the two allied Courts would require several months at least only to be discussed between the three Cabinets; those which have been addressed to us could have no other aim than to throw disorder into the business, to provoke new political combinations, and to gain by one means or another the time necessary for Russia to terminate as best she can her own differences with the Porte.

M. de Tatistscheff's letter is full of singular *naïvetés*—I should say inconceivable ones if it were not that Cabinets, as well as individuals, are betrayed in times of great embarrassment into very singular schemes.

To present a worthless bribe as a compensation to us—an invention of which no one knows the childishness better than ourselves; to flatter our self-esteem by reproducing our former proposals, without acknowledging that the new situation would give them not only a different application, but even an application diametrically opposed to our fixed idea; to speak in the month of January of the necessity of a previous understanding between the three allied Courts which we counselled last summer, and which was then rejected because it might have led to a conclusion which Russia now desires quite as much to disappoint—to make such proposals as these is to prove that they do not know where they are going, and specially that at St. Petersburg they have lost all power of judging for us. I send you the present courier, who, I have no doubt, will join you before your arrival in St. Petersburg. Whether this be the case or not, it will be expedient to appear ignorant of the facts of which I inform you. Say that the courier has followed you according to your orders, and that he has brought you some documents which could not be finished before you left.

It is important that you should be informed of all that has taken place. Instructed in the facts, you will observe with more ease, and you will be better able to judge of the explanations into which the Emperor and Count Nesselrode will enter with you. If either of them should unfold himself towards you in a sense conformable to the written or unwritten words of M. de Tatistscheff, your own observation and the contents of the present despatch will enable you to regulate your language.

Tatitscheff to Metternich, Vienna, January 22, 1829.

(Supplement to No. 941.)

942. I must, of course, my dear Prince, give an account of the last explanation that we had with respect to your measures in London, Paris, and Berlin, and to the manner in which you have received my friendly representations. It would be well if we could draw up this despatch together; I will therefore draw up the sketch of it and bring it to you. Meantime I will explain the tendency of the proposals which have been made in London, so that you may be able to determine what support you will give them. We ask that the allies should begin by agreeing between themselves, concerning Greece, on the four points which should fix her future—namely, the boundaries, the form of government, the indemnity, and the tribute. Once agreed on these points, the Emperor consents to give his full powers to the negotiators sent by his allies to treat with the Porte without the intervention of a plenipotentiary of the Greek Government. You already know my opinions as to the boundaries and the form of government. From my sincere and constant desire to be able as soon as possible to re-establish an intimate union between the two countries, I should be delighted if you would seize this opportunity of proving that, far from nourishing hostile intentions and malevolent sentiments against us, you hasten to oblige us. Then, too, the demonstration that I am about to propose to you will certainly impose no engagement which will be disagreeable to you to fulfil.

The necessity intimated by Russia of fixing the final basis of the pacification of Greece before entering on the subject of serious negotiations with the Porte, is too evident to be contested; it is, besides, your own opinion "that, before making any demands from the Porte, we should define what we wish to obtain for the Greeks." If, therefore, you will now explain yourself in London and Paris in the sense that "you recognize the necessity which we have intimated, and, if the bases of the pacification resemble those which you proposed yourself in your Memorandum of April 5, and which did not give too much extension to Greece, you should be disposed to accede to them, and to sustain them by all your influence at Constantinople," I am persuaded that this measure would give the greatest pleasure to the Emperor, and, at the same time, assure

him of the falseness of the report that you had formed a coalition against him. There would be no doubt about the result, and our relations would again become as intimate as they were in better times. For my part I have a presentiment with regard to this, and I should be so happy to assist in bringing it about that I ardently desire that you will not reject the method I propose.

I write to you, my dear Prince, because, having to despatch a courier to Italy, I have not been able to go out this morning, and this evening I shall not be able to see you on account of the ball at the Archduke Charles's. You will also be kind enough not to forget the farewell audience of Strogonoff. I am, &c., &c.

TATISTSCHEFF.

POPE PIUS VIII.

Metternich to Tatistscheff Vienna, April 6, 1829.

943. The new Pope, who has taken the name of Pius in order to mark his veneration for the memory of his benefactor, was Vicar-General in the bishopric of Imola, and was made Cardinal by Pius VII., in 1816.

During his residence in Rome he always lived out of the world, and was solely occupied with his ecclesiastical profession. After the death of Pius VII., Consalvi wished to elevate him to the Pontificate, and he was not elected because he declared he would have no other Secretary of State than that same Cardinal. The *Zelanti* carried it against the moderate party.

He was elected at first by a majority of thirty-six; a slight error having appeared in the ballot, Cardinal Castiglione insisted on a fresh one. In this he obtained forty-seven votes—that is to say, almost unanimity. We had placed him at the head of those who would be desirable as Pontiffs. The French Cardinals joined our Cardinals. M. de Chateaubriand, on the contrary, patronized Gregorio.

The new Pope has given Gregorio the post of *Grand Pénitencier* which he has just left; and nominated Albani, State Secretary. Chateaubriand, in consequence, will have absolution.

The election was received with general satisfaction by the Roman public. The choice of the Cardinal is decidedly good; one must see now whether the Pope will resemble the Cardinal. As it is he who made the replies to the ambassadors, it is clear that he is not wanting in sound political views. He is not, at any rate, a Carbonaro Pope.

THE EMANCIPATION OF THE CATHOLICS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

Metternich to Wellington, Vienna, April 18, 1829.

944. Prince Esterhazy received yesterday, on the part of the Emperor, a command to express to his Britannic Majesty and his Prime Minister the very great satisfaction the signal triumph that you have just obtained has caused his Imperial Majesty.* The enemies of England, of her internal peace and of her power, or the enemies of her present Administration, would alone refuse to join in this sentiment. As we are not among the number of such enemies, we rejoice from the bottom of our heart at this great success. Respect and friendship compel me, my dear Duke, to address these lines to you.

Believe always in the profound respect which I shall ever entertain for you, &c., &c.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, April 19, 1829.

945. We were informed, two days ago, of the brilliant success which the Government has just gained in the Catholic affair. No news could have been received here with more sincere satisfaction. We see in this event not only the triumph of a cause, but also the consolidation of an Administration on which rests—I do not hesitate to say it—our last hope for the general safety.

The Emperor desires that your Highness should express on his behalf to his Britannic Majesty his sincere congratulations on the issue of an affair which will add a fresh flower to the glory of his reign. He desires that you should also express the same sentiments to the Duke of Wellington.

By a singular accident the triumph of the British Government coincided with a defeat of the French Ministry. The attitude of the two Governments and that of their Parliaments are very exactly pointed out by a comparison of the two positions.

I beg you to forward to the Duke of Wellington the enclosed letter (No. 944) which I think it right to address to him.

* Catholic Emancipation Bill, April 18, 1829.

OPENING OF THE SECOND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Vienna, April 19, 1829.

946. It would be very difficult for me to give you any information as to what is passing in the theatre of war. Not from want of news; but the rumors are so contradictory, so disconnected, and so strongly in favor of all kinds of disorder, that the impartial observer must resign himself to wait, and seek only in the results that foundation for his calculations which the preparations do not afford.

General Diebitsch has plenty to do. This we never questioned. The two Principalities are in a state of absolute ruin. It appears that Russia wishes to make war with recruits of sixteen to nineteen years old. I allow that it does not require other soldiers to beat the Turks; nevertheless, it is certain that it would not take more than three months of a campaign to place two-thirds of the army in hospital. Where grown men cannot escape the hurtful influences of climate and fatigue, children must succumb.

The military service does not present a more favorable aspect than that evinced in the last campaign. In default of beasts of burden, the people—men, women, and children—have been put in requisition for the transport of provisions. It appears that the first serious operation will take place against Silistria. The Turks have left only combatants in this place; they have caused all the other inhabitants to evacuate. What will the Turks do? We know nothing about this; for any sort of control is impossible when their arrangements are concerned. This, however, is certain, that they have collected a great number of men in the Balkans. Servia and Albania are full of Russian agents, and the money of this power is disbursed with open hands.

The fate of the campaign will be again decided in favor of him who makes the fewest mistakes. This is the only thing to guide us in looking forward to a future which depends so much upon chance.

The Emperor of Russia will be at Warsaw on May 15. He will be crowned there *civilement*, for it has just been discovered that a Greek Prince cannot be consecrated by a Catholic Archbishop; it

appears that the Emperor Alexander had not thought of making the act of coronation a fundamental article of the Polish constitution. After the coronation, the Emperor and Empress will see the King of Prussia somewhere on the frontiers, and then the Empress will pass some weeks in Berlin. This is what has been decided. Will the Emperor return to the army? We believe this will depend greatly on the course of events at first.*

* The following events of the war afford nothing worthy of remark for our object: On June 30 Silistria succumbed; from July 17 to 26 Diebitsch passed over the Balkans, and appeared on August 29 before Adrianople.—Ed.

CANDIDATES FOR THE THRONE OF GREECE.

Metternich to Esterházy, in London, Vienna, April 30, 1829.

947. What I foresaw has not failed to happen. The decision taken by the three allied Powers, that Greece should be constituted an independent State, except for some slight formalities which would reserve to the Sultan certain rights of suzerainty,* has without doubt caused excitement in more than one reigning family; and from this cause various political intrigues may arise. We know that some princes belonging to Germany begin to covet the Greek throne?† We have certain ideas—in truth, still very vague—that the King of Bavaria thinks also of a Prince of his house. The most probable rumor seems to be that which is connected with Naples.

One remark—and it appears to me fundamental—appears up to this time to have escaped the observation of the princes who put themselves in the ranks. This is that the Head of Greece must necessarily belong to the Greek religion. Certainly no Catholic Prince would change his religion, and the King of Naples is greatly deceived if he believes that the Greek people would be contented with a Prince of the United Greek faith. The schismatic Greeks

* The London Conference Protocol of the three Powers concerning this is dated March 22, 1829; it contains, besides the arrangement for the boundaries of Greece and the settlement of the yearly tributes, the determination that the new State under the superintendence of the Porte should obtain a free government, under a Christian hereditary prince, but not chosen from the families of the three allied sovereigns.—ED.

† Prince Leopold of Coburg, afterwards King of the Belgians, was among them. At least, Metternich writes some time later to Apponyi, in Paris, the following: "I hope that the choice of a regent for Greece will soon be settled. Prince Leopold must be stung by a tarantula to wish for this place. To reign over emptiness is a dreary occupation, and yet if Greece offered nothing but emptiness there would be means of coming to an understanding; but this is not so, for she is, on the contrary, full of all kinds of disorder."—ED.

detest still more the Latins, and the United Greeks are as much Catholics as the Latins, and do not hate the Turks. It might be different with Protestant princes, among whom the greater part would make no difficulty about passing into the Eastern Greek Church.

There is no doubt that out of this dilemma a great number of fresh diplomatic intrigues will arise which will all turn in favor of Russia. At the present moment I suppose the Cabinet of St. Petersburg begins to resemble a hall in which the throne of Greece will be put up to auction.

You will doubtless remark that the King of Naples' mind is harassed by the very natural terror that he has had for some time of the possibility of seeing a revolutionary State form itself in Greece, and that he is beset, on the other hand, by certain inclinations of a dynastic ambition. It will not, therefore, be difficult to give an answer to the very friendly proposal of his Sicilian Majesty.

Pray speak with perfect candor to Lord Aberdeen upon the rather strange subject of the present despatch, and invite his Excellency to make us acquainted with the ideas of his Cabinet on a question which cannot fail to present itself immediately to every Cabinet under different forms,

POLIGNAC'S MINISTRY.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Königswart, Aug. 13, 1829, with the Imperial Resolution of Aug. 18, 1829.

948. When the Report of the Count Apponyi of the 9th inst. was sent to me, I considered its contents to be of the greatest importance, and therefore lay them before your Majesty out of the usual course.

The change of Ministry in France is an event of the highest importance. It gives this impression because the late ministry, who were utterly wanting in vigor, were only serviceable for evil. Not less important is the fact of the entirely Royalist composition of the new ministry.

Under the new ministry there are well-known Royalists of every sort. The most distinguished men among them are:

Bourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior.

Montbel, formerly Mayor of Toulouse, and an intimate friend of Villèle.

Courvoisier, Commissioner-General of Lyons; for merely a doctrinaire, latterly an undoubted Royalist.

Rigny, Minister of Naval Affairs, I know but slightly in relation to his political ideas: he agrees with us on the Eastern Question, and his attitude hitherto has been faultless.

Polignac, Minister of Foreign Affairs, holds our opinions thoroughly. This appointment will act very favorably on the English Cabinet and be a thunder-clap for the Russians.

In theory all this is excellent. But how will it turn out in practice, how will the parties in France arrange themselves, and will the King and the Government have sufficient strength to meet the

serious attacks which the new ministry will certainly encounter from the already formed revolutionary party? *

The whole event has almost the value of a counter-revolution.

METTERNICH.

Approved. The results alone will show to what this change will lead. God grant that it may be according to your wishes.

FRANZ.

Persenberg, August 18, 1829.

* Some weeks later, in anticipation of coming events, Metternich writes to the ambassador, Count Apponyi, in Paris: "The light that your last despatches have thrown upon the situation of the French ministry have afforded us great interest. Your calm and reflective manner of judging of the position is in conformity with sound practice. There is nothing, I am convinced, to add to or to object to in what you have said. All is true, for all is vague, and it is above all this vagueness which penetrates public affairs in France. I desire from the bottom of my heart, but hardly dare to believe, that M. de Polignac does not deceive himself about the true position of affairs. If his perfect security speaks in favor of his disposition, it is perhaps hardly so favorable to his judgment. This, however, is certain, that the Liberals, too, do not know where they are going, and that everybody in France is weak. You cannot express too warmly our wishes for the duration and success of the present administration."—ED.

THE PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE.

Metternich to Esterhazy, in London, Linz, Sept. 21, 1829.

949. We have at last reached the epoch to which our wishes carried us long ago ! We touch the final *dénouement* of the Eastern Question ; but this *dénouement* comes before us under an aspect little calculated to calm the uneasiness of statesmen. At the very moment when I begin the present despatch the treaty should be signed at the Russian head-quarters.* This instrument of peace and friendship between the two empires, although it wears the form of a common-place treaty, will none the less cause a total change in their mutual positions and in all their relations with Europe.

This movement, which terminates one of the most deplorable crises that have ever occupied the Cabinets, will not be the signal in Europe for that repose which follows ordinary pacifications. Nothing in this affair has had any precedent in the history of diplomacy ; everything in its consequences may bring about new combinations.

On the eve of these combinations we do not believe ourselves called to criticise the past ; the present and, above all, the future have too much right to command our exclusive attention ; and if I feel the need of expressing myself with regard to things so justly the first objects of our solicitude, my words should naturally first be addressed to the British Cabinet.

I beg you to lay the present despatch before Lord Aberdeen. I flatter myself that he will give it the attention that friends are always disposed to give to the explanations of those with whom in many respects they sympathize.

Above all remember how necessary it is for the heads of Cabinets to divest themselves of all illusion ; let them apply themselves freely

* The treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey is dated September 14.

to the search for truth; and let them not give themselves up to the idea that the present epoch requires only ordinary attention on their part.

The Ottoman Empire is shaken to its foundations. The State condemned to owe its existence to what the mass of the public pleases to call moderation on the part of the conqueror has ceased to be counted amongst the number of independent States. Some great unforeseen revolution, some unexpected war, might suddenly raise it from its decadence; but neither the Powers nor the Sultan can find any calculation on such events.

'The evil is done; the losses are irreparable; the future existence of the Ottoman Empire has become doubtful, and yet there is no Power more interested than Austria in the preservation of what remains of this empire.

Everything, then, authorizes us to raise our voices in presence of the new dangers we expect; we think even by proclaiming mournful but salutary truths to fulfil a duty imposed by sound policy. In the name of all that is most sacred, let not the Powers lose in barren regrets for the past, in idle recriminations over foolish errors and abortive plans, the time that should be devoted to the exigencies of the immediate future. In order that it may not come upon us unawares, let the Powers take a strict account of all that lies before us in that future; let them seek the means of preserving what has escaped the wreck of politics; let them draw themselves up on the ground indicated by their common dangers; let them be under no misunderstanding as to the nature and source of these dangers; above all, let them not be ignorant of the part that political Liberalism, and the errors that accompany it at every step, have had in the great work of the last few years! Let them not be deceived as to the necessity under which the Emperor of Russia feels himself to turn his artillery against the herd of innovators! The war which the same factions, who, under the pretence sometimes of policy, sometimes of philanthropy, have declared with real frenzy for the total destruction of the Ottoman Empire, already declare against the moderation of the Russian monarch, will open, it is to be hoped, the most ill-seeing eyes, and will thus serve the cause of reason and right feeling. But the Courts must not limit their endeavors to negative assistance; they must have a clear understanding on their return to a line of conduct which by its firmness and uniformity may yet guarantee the public peace.

Europe is just now in a situation like that of a person after a

great debauch. The time of disappointment has come, and then it is that new necessities make themselves felt in all their strength. The time past will not return; other incidents quickly disturb the mind, and what was strongly felt in the evening loses its effect on the morrow.

It concerns us, above all, to know the principles and views that will now be followed by British diplomacy; the information that we ask on this subject we believe we have a right to expect from the English Government, for we, for our part, do not leave them in ignorance as to our feelings. If the peace that is being prepared is only to be a political truce, let it be at least a truce as solid and as complete as possible; let it not be troubled by alarming agitation, sinister projects, or by the fancies of this or that Court, so that if the result of the Russo-Turkish Treaty does not turn to the advantage of the Porte, it may at least leave him the chance of surviving his defeats. By excluding his European territory from the general guarantee of the European States one great mistake was committed; another, more important in its consequences, was that of expressly and exclusively subordinating the affairs of Turkey to the good pleasure of a great and powerful neighbor. How far will England push this indifference? Does she—yes or no—consider what remains of the Ottoman Empire as placed under the safeguard of European policy? Does she desire, as we do, the conservation of that Empire? Austria never aims at self-aggrandizement at the expense of her neighbors. The Emperor asks nothing from any one; but he must also desire, as a matter of reciprocal good faith, that others should not take advantage of what he can only call the complaisance of Europe to make gradual encroachments, whether expressly or tacitly in agreement with disastrous projects. The factions—enemies of peace—will not fail to advance the idea of a division of the fallen empire. Will the Cabinets speak out on this project, or will they by their silence favor a course which has no other end but general disorder? Will they continue to favor a system of perfidious calmness? Will they second, or will they tolerate, the cries against the pretended Austrian ambition, and the efforts after an alliance wholly directed against the peace of Europe? In short, will the Cabinets persist in the political proceedings by which those years have been signalized that have prepared the present disaster and made a system popular in Europe of which the effects can only end in the indefinite aggrandizement of a victorious Power of that nature, and the enfeebling of all the other Powers;

or will they take a position clearly based on the principle of conservation ?

These are the questions which ought, more than ever, to occupy us seriously, and on which it is most necessary that there should be no uncertainty. It will not be forgotten that Austria had the courage to go firmly through the tempest without allowing any of her plans to be disturbed, and that, instead of losing time in inaction, she was able to calculate and regulate her resources. To determine on our future course we must, in the first place, be acquainted with the views and intentions of those whom we have already informed of our wishes. I beg you to press the contents of this despatch upon the earnest attention of the English Cabinet. In the past nothing has done us so much mischief as uncertainty. The era now commencing demands certainty.

Metternich to Gentz, Linz, September 21, 1829.

950. As my stay here has been prolonged against my will, and as I do not wish to lose time for important matters, I have prepared the next despatches for England. I send you the rough sketch of my despatch and I beg you to correct it yourself. My aim is, to oblige the English Cabinet to reflect, and to win from them some few results of their zeal. The questions I propose are natural in our position, and indirectly answer a false and foolish notion which appears in the last private note (it cannot be called a letter) of Lord Cowley to his brother. If the Duke of Wellington now believes that the Powers (and more especially Austria) are going to destroy and divide the Turkish Empire in consequence of late events, the English Minister's frame of mind is much to be pitied. He is wrong, and his mistake will weaken him. I feel it my duty to oppose both these evils with all my might.

Materials for an Article in the "Beobachter," by Metternich, September 21, 1829.

951. Peace has been signed between Russia and the Porte; ratifications on both sides followed; the cycle of war has been passed through. The event is, in our eyes, an episode in the history of the time.

In looking back into the past, and singling out some movements

of the present, we have no intention of entangling ourselves in theories. We wish to point out facts, and these are clearly expressed before the eyes of the world. During the long period of thirteen years Europe had enjoyed political peace. The military events of the years 1821-23 did not belong to the sphere of war. The internal peace of some States was disturbed; the disturbance menaced Europe with other revolutions, but events were again calmed down.

The first year of war after the Peace of Paris was 1828. With the end of the present year political peace has returned.

Nevertheless, two parties are ready to confront each other. One desires the maintenance of peace by protecting all rights: the Governments and the majority of citizens of all States belong to its adherents. The other party is formed of adventurers of all sorts, of agitated and excited characters. The first blesses peace. The other is disconcerted at its return. These parties consequently are in strong opposition to each other. If it was formerly difficult to explain the true nature of this opposition to an unbiassed mind, this is now greatly facilitated by the open confession of one party.

Latterly the majority of the French journals, and even some in other States, have, as the organs of this party, spoken out freely. The overthrow of all established order under the ensign of the progressive spirits of the age; schemes of conquest under the pretence of aiming at so-called natural frontiers, an aim which each excluded State can expose with equally rightful claims, so that peaceful agreements are to make way for the rights of might alone; the sanguine hope that in a general struggle of the Governments men of this party could seize the helm of State; these and other more or less openly avowed confessions fill the public papers of the last few months. How clearly these aspirations contrast with the intentions and the will of the opposite party is evident, and it is as easy to understand that the re-establishment of political peace must be in direct opposition to such hopes and such aims.

It is no less clear that Austria's unvarying position, calm and peaceful in the midst of the conflict just concluded, her line of conduct ever furthering the maintenance of peace, her remoteness from all projects of aggrandizement, her toleration of all lawful rights and established liberties, her conscientious respect for treaties and the independence of States—such a position, held by a great central Power, must seem an intolerable obstacle to those who look for happiness and reward only in changes and revolutions.

We here pronounce once more our profession of faith regarding what is real in the efforts and struggles of the time. It will be attacked by all who profess an opposite political creed. But what will be the result of such attacks? Nothing but a confirmation of the historical truths we have professed.

REACTION OF THE PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE UPON AUSTRIA.

Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Vienna, October 9, 1829.

952. The peace between Russia and the Porte forms an important episode in the history of our times, and must exercise the greatest influence on the political situation of Europe, and consequently also on the Austrian monarchy. Your Majesty is too well acquainted with the position of the States to need that I should enter here into a minute consideration with respect to it. I will, therefore, confine myself to the principal points, and especially those in which our own interest is affected by the changes already made, or about to take place.

The European Alliance, founded with the active co-operation of your Majesty in 1813-14, upon the basis of sound ideas regarding public rights and regarding States, and exclusively consecrated to the maintenance of peace, asserted itself as a fact till the death of the Emperor Alexander, although subjected to many disturbing influences, and was first formally disavowed in the year 1823 by England. By the signing of the protocol of April 4, 1826, it was practically broken. The union of two Powers, with an aim clearly in opposition to the fundamental principles of the alliance, denotes the transition to a new system. France, restlessly aspiring after political activity, even joined this union, giving it a regular form by means of the treaty drawn up in Paris, and ratified in London, July 6, 1827. This new confederacy, formed in opposition to the one then existing, became known to the world as the Triple Alliance. Though apparently aiming at the same object, this alliance was from its commencement a wild chaos of incompatible elements—each allied Power being guided by its own peculiar intentions and pursuing its own peculiar line of conduct. England (which must be first mentioned as the first origin of the evil), urged by an exaggerated but not groundless anxiety concerning certain proceedings of the new Emperor of Russia, resolved to avert the dan-

ger by sending the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg. There can be no doubt that the Duke undertook this business from the purest motives. "Assure your Government that its safety will be my chief endeavor," were his words to your Majesty's ambassador when he arrived at St. Petersburg. But praiseworthy as his designs may have been, his errors and blunders were no less than deplorable. The want of judgment and the diplomatic inexperience of this otherwise admirable man were mostly the cause of his unaccountable decisions; but other circumstances contributed to them. The old alliance had outlived itself in England. The nation, excited by vain demagogues and frivolous journalists, looked upon it with aversion, as upon a bond endangering their independence; and the perverse mind of Canning had strengthened this aversion till it became the most violent opposition. From want of political clear-sightedness, the Duke of Wellington overlooked the circumstance that it was quite otherwise with the Continental Powers. With them, too, the alliance had to struggle with many adversaries, but powerful support was not wanting. By the Liberal party alone it was everywhere attacked, both secretly and openly. The monarchs of Russia and of France remained faithful. In Vienna and Berlin it was valued as much as ever. The Duke of Wellington believed it extinguished, and nothing appeared to him more useful and necessary than to keep in check the Power which, by its geographical and military position, was most inclined to aim at independence. He flattered himself that he could restrain the freedom of Russia's movements by the weight of England's influence, and discovered too late that, to the exclusive advantage of Russia, he had prepared galling chains for England.

Out of these first unhappy mistakes all those circumstances originated which during the last two years have brought the Turkish Empire to the brink of ruin. With the Peace of Adrianople the Triple Alliance comes to an end. There is reason to believe that Russia will not be disinclined to delay its formal dissolution, but this delay cannot last long. The creation of a perverted and anti-national policy could never be popular in England; and after an issue of the war so contrary to the true interests of this Empire, and so offensive to the British sense of honor, even the semblance of a union cannot be maintained any longer. In Russia, too, where there never has been a sincere predilection for this alliance, and where it was only regarded as a temporary means to gain certain ends, which the Cabinet seems not to have marked out very clearly,

no essential State interest can speak for it any more. France at last, so long at least as the present ministry maintains its principles, will consider herself happy to abandon an alliance which gave the most dangerous enemies of the monarchy means for the execution of the most ruinous schemes. Your Majesty took no part in this perilous alliance, neither did the King of Prussia. Nevertheless a marked difference existed between the two Governments. We have openly and energetically pronounced against the principle on which the Triple Alliance was based—if that can be called a principle which is contrary to all sound principles. Prussia has, without condemning this principle directly, declared that without the full agreement of the five Powers she would not join in the Treaty of London. Austria alone has been faithful to the old alliance in its full strength. Every Power that is inclined to return to the original principle of this alliance, as well as to the system of which it is the basis, must join with Austria; and that this sooner or later must be done is evident from the nature of things, and from the unmistakable necessities of this age.

The chief principle of the Quintuple Alliance was the maintenance of all legal rights; with this principle alone can general peace be possible; and if in ordinary times no express agreement is needed to secure the sway of this principle, extraordinary means must be resorted to in extraordinary circumstances. The age in which we live is not an ordinary one. Europe is visited by a plague; the maintenance of public health makes it necessary for those charged with the most important of all cares to adopt measures unnecessary in ordinary circumstances.

If such measures are to prove effectual they must be adopted by several States in common; alliances between governments is their first law. The formula for such a union has not been lost for Europe; it has only been hidden from view by violent disturbances. The moment of its regeneration is perhaps not far off. The original elements still exist; the first powerful impulse—it matters little from which side it comes—may vivify them again, and Europe may enjoy their blessings even if in their renovated form they are not proclaimed by all orators.

It is not my purpose in this Report to enter into foreign politics more than was necessary to show their influence upon the home interests of the monarchy, and the connection existing between them and the great European confederacy of States, which in troubled times like ours is felt with double clearness. With regret we

must confess that the Eastern Question would neither have been so seriously discussed, or have had such unfortunate results, if Austria had been in a different position from that in which she finds herself after the reductions of the last thirteen years. Austria—from its geographical position the true centre of gravity in the European system of States—cannot retire from the place appointed to her without exposing the whole edifice to serious shocks, and the belief in the entire exhaustion of our strength, even if founded less on reality than on general prejudice, has certainly not been without the most useful influence on the course of events within the last eight years. But though I consider it my duty to proclaim this truth, I am far from considering this state of things to be the only cause of these great evils. The general agitation of men's minds in a direction far from favorable to external and internal peace has been, and still is, a constant source of the most dangerous disturbances. Besides this, the complication in the East has been brought about by the natural progress of the Russian powers and the enormous blunders of the allied Courts. Russia would never have been so easily engaged in an enterprise so difficult to restrain if she had thought it necessary to pay more regard to Austria.

The Peace of Adrianople is to be regarded as a moment of repose. It destroyed many dangerous and wild schemes of revolutionary politics, and proved the necessity of new political forms. With regard to these we must take our position; the indisputable power of events will point it out to us: but your Majesty must have the means necessary to maintain it for the welfare of our kingdom as well as the general welfare of Europe. Two points which cannot be separated from each other ought first to be considered—the financial and the military condition of the kingdom. Your Majesty's wisdom, and the noiseless but steady progress of reform in these two most important branches of the administration, have happily brought us during the last few years far nearer to the goal than foreigners, who have only an insufficient knowledge of our state and our institutions, might suppose. But, to fulfil the duties of your Majesty towards your own empire, and, I may frankly add, to satisfy the hopes which all well-disposed persons rest upon Austria, a course must be taken which will secure a firm and solid basis for the great work still reserved for your Majesty's glorious reign—the work of maintaining peace.

May your Majesty graciously accept the following remarks on this question:

The financial position of the monarchy has doubtless been raised in consequence of the regular progress of the system adopted in 1817. There remain, nevertheless, some measures which have not been thoroughly carried out, and which ought to be improved, and besides, as is always the case with practical enterprises, new experiences have been made, which must be examined and cleverly applied by the Government. The closer examination of the financial question lies so far beyond the limits of the present Report that I confine myself to the following general propositions:

1. The measures already taken have raised the finances so much that a very advantageous final result may be confidently expected.

2. To gain this definite end, time and peace are necessary.

3. Peace cannot be thought of in the present position of European affairs and the general agitation, if Austria, as the great central Power, is not placed in a condition to command peace.

4. The reduction system followed in the army from the year 1817 to 1828 is therefore not now applicable, even with regard to the financial welfare of the State.

In the course of last year the army underwent important reforms, and as it has been increased on a larger scale than was known to the public, we have, in regard to these matters, less to create than to maintain. Among the real necessities which still require attention I believe I must reckon a practical system of defence. With regard to the moral side of the question, much remains to be desired, and in the perfecting of the moral organization of the army we must recognize the first conditions of that strength which I regard as the fundamental support of all attainable perfection.

The enterprise is not an easy one; it demands resolution and ability as well as material peace and careful execution; a well-planned line of conduct can alone render it possible, and for the careful execution of this regular and unprejudiced discussions are indispensable.

In regard to administrative necessities, I place the condition of Hungary in the first rank.

The matters here shortly alluded to, and which have all one chief purpose, are those to which your Majesty will grant especial attention. Any mistake in respect to these would remove us further from the goal at which we ought to aim. Where the first and most important necessity—self-preservation—is at stake, we cannot be too careful to discover the best weapons invented by human skill.

Counsel only is of service that is given at the right moment; if that moment passes, the wisest counsel has lost its value.

With a deep feeling of my duty I therefore venture to draw your Majesty's attention to the following points.

When a new political epoch begins, the economical relations of the State must be arranged with due regard to the true and well-understood needs of the times, for which the necessary considerations include financial, military, and administrative questions; and these can only be properly examined and arranged from one point of view. From this point all the preparations which will enable your Majesty to decide the most important questions must proceed, and it can only be called into existence by your Majesty's will and direction.

With great respect I therefore propose "that your Majesty will authorize me to communicate this Report to the Minister Count von Kolowrat, charging us both to draw up a Report and exposition of our views on these matters, and to lay the same as quickly as possible before your Majesty."

METTERNICH.

Placet.

FRANCIS.

Vienna, October 11, 1829.

THE END.

